Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations
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Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations (CROSBI ID 289662)

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Kardum, Marko ; Skelac, Ines Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations // Disputatio philosophica : international journal on philosophy and religion, 22 (2020), 1; 63-75. doi: 10.32701/dp.22.1.4

Podaci o odgovornosti

Kardum, Marko ; Skelac, Ines

engleski

Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations

In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could understand” is connected to solipsism, or the impossibility to understand other people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general language, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and de Saussure are close to this interpretation of private language.

Chomsky, general language, private language, de Saussure, solipsism, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein

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Podaci o izdanju

22 (1)

2020.

63-75

objavljeno

1332-1056

1849-0174

10.32701/dp.22.1.4

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

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