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Osijek

Kategorija gotovosti i vremenska vrijednost pasivnoga predikata

Autor raspravlja o vremenskoj vrijednosti pasivnoga predikata, uvodeći u raspravu jednu novu kategoriju - kategoriju gotovosti. Rasprava obuhvaća vrijednost pasivnoga predikata u gotovo svim vremenima i načinima hrvatskoga standardnog jezika, a s namjerom potpunijega semantičkog osvjetljavanja kognitivne domene vremena u hrvatskom pasivu.

Ključne riječi: kategorija gotovosti, adjektivizirani pasiv, prototipni pasiv, refleksivni pasiv, perifrastični pasiv, gramatičko vrijeme, izvan-gramatičko vrijeme

U europskoj se i svjetskoj lingvistici rasprave o pasivu uglavnom kreću oko pitanja tipologije pasivne rečenice, odnosa sintaktičkoga i semantičkoga ustrojstva pasiva, mogućnosti iskazivanja vršitelja radnje te kognitivnoga pristupa semantičkoj vrijednosti pasivne rečenice u odnosu prema aktivnoj (usp. Keenan 1985, Langacker 1982, 1986, Shibatani 1985, Siewierska 1988). O pitanju vremenske vrijednosti pasivnoga predikata raspravlja R. Langacker (1982, 1991), ali samo načelno i općenito, tvrdeći kako uvođenje pomoćnoga glagola *be* (= *biti*) pasivnu rečenicu dopunjuje procesualnošću koju joj neovremenjeni pasivni particip ne može dati. On, naime, pasivni particip, odnosno glagolski pridjev trpni, analizira kao jednu podvrstu postupka semantičke kondenzacije (engl. *summary scanning*) i koji svojstva semantičke disperzivnosti (engl. *sequential scanning*) dobiva tek kada stupi u odnos s pomoćnim glagolom *biti*. Usp. "...it lacks a TEMPORAL PROFILE (i.e. it employs

summary rather than sequential scanning), so that the profiled relationship is not a process but a complex atemporal relation,” pa nastavlja “*Be2* combines with a complex atemporal relation, specifically a passive participle derived by PERF3; its function is to reimpose sequential scanning, thus deriving a processual expression that can serve as a passive clausal head.” (Langacker, 1991: 202, 206).

Problem je vremenske vrijednosti pasivnoga predikata nezaobilazno područje u svakoj ozbiljnijoj raspravi o hrvatskoj pasivnoj rečenici. Te se rasprave prije svega tiču perifrastičnoga pasiva, odnosno pasiva tvorenog pomoćnim glagolom *biti* i glagolskim pridjevom trpnim, jer je iz predikata refleksivnopasivnih konstrukcija, a zbog njegove glagolske naravi, vremenska vrijednost najčešće lako očitljiva, kako u pasivu tako i u aktivnom konceptualnom korelatu. Vremenska vrijednost pasivnoga predikata takvih konstrukcija i morfološki i semantički uvijek odgovara vremenskoj vrijednosti aktivnoga predikata, kao u primjerima (1) - (8):

- (1)a. Mlijeko se proljeva po cestama.
- b. Mlijeko proljevaju po cestama. (prezent)
- (2)a. Mlijeko se proljevalo po cestama.
- b. Mlijeko su proljevali po cestama. (perfekt)
- (3)a. Mlijeko se bilo proljevalo po cestama.
- b. Mlijeko su bili proljevali po cestama. (pluskvamperfekt)
- (4)a. Mlijeko će se proljevati po cestama.
- b. Mlijeko će proljevati po cestama. (futur I.)
- (5)a. Ako se mlijeko bude proljevalo po cestama...
- b. Ako mlijeko budu proljevali po cestama... (futur II.)
- (6)a. Mlijeko se proljevaše po cestama.
- b. Mlijeko proljevahu po cestama. (imperfekt)
- (7)a. Mlijeko bi se proljevalo po cestama...
- b. Mlijeko bi proljevali po cestama... (kondicional I.)
- (8)a. Mlijeko bi se bilo proljevalo po cestama...
- b. Mlijeko bi bili proljevali po cestama. (kondicional II.)

Iz navedenih je primjera jasno da vremenska vrijednost predikata u refleksivnopasivnim konstrukcijama nije sporna. Kod perifrastičnoga je pasiva situacija puno složenija, a osnovno pitanje, na koje bi ovaj rad trebao dati odgovor, jest: u kojem su odnosu vremenskoparadigmatske vrijednosti pomoćnoga glagola *biti* s njima izraženim vremenskim značenjem u predikaciji perifrastičnoga pasiva?

No prije nego što se prijede na samu analizu postavljenoga problema, potrebno je dati tipologiju perifrastičnoga pasiva jer o njoj, kao što će se vidjeti, ovisi vremenska vrijednost njegove predikacije. Konstrukcije ćemo s glagolskim pridjevom trpnim podijeliti u tri vrste i to na:

- a) kopulativno – pridjevne**
- b) adjektivizirano ili popridjevljeno pasivne – periferno pasivne i**
- c) prototipno pasivne**

a podjelu ćemo objasniti na sljedećim rečenicama:

- (9) On je nasmijan čovjek. (kopulativno-pridjevno značenje)
- (10) On je nasmijan od jučer poslije podne. (adjektivizirani pasiv)
- (11) On je jučer nasmijan od klauna. (prototipni pasiv)
- (12) Ta je bolest povezana s jednom nepoznom afričkom bolesti. (kopulativno – pridjevno značenje)
- (13) Ta je bolest već dugo povezana s jednom nepoznom afričkom bolesti. (adjektivizirani pasiv)
- (14) Ta je bolest prije dva mjeseca povezana s jednom nepoznom afričkom bolesti. (prototipni pasiv)

Pridjevno značenje glagolskoga pridjeva označuje trajnu psihičku ili neku drugu osobinu nepoznatoga uzroka i trajni nedostatak semantičke prijelaznosti jer netko može primjerice biti nasmijan po prirodi (optimistički svjetonazor), može cijeli život biti sretan i nasmijan zbog povoljnih životnih okolnosti itd. Jednom riječju, nemoguće je uspostaviti vršitelja radnje kao obaveznog sudionika u pasivnoj dijatezi (bez obzira bio on konkretiziran ili ne), sudionika koji je neraskidivo povezan s pasivu inherentnim obilježjima dinamičnosti i semantičke prijelaznosti. Isto je i s primjerom (12) gdje pridjevno značenje participa označuje trajna svojstva subjekta, ničim izazvana ili prouzročena, tj. *bolest* trajno dijeli neka zajednička obilježja s *nepoznom afričkom bolesti*. Ta povezanost obilježja nije ničim izazvana, već se radi o prirodnom zadanim svojstvima obiju bolesti i potpuno je neovisna o kategoriji vremena. Ona jednostavno stoji u vremenu, ne mijenja se vremenom i otporna je na vrijeme. Upravo po toj neovisnosti o vremenu particip u tom slučaju ima pridjevno značenje jer kad bi ovisio o vremenu, radilo bi se o radnji, odnosno glagolskoj funkciji za koju je karakteristična događajnost ostvariva jedino na stupnjevima temeljne kognitivne domene – domene vremena. Pridjevna funkcija participa, jasno, postoji u vremenu jer u njemu, kao u temeljnoj kognitivnoj domeni, postoji sve, ali vrijeme ne može utjecati na nju, odnosno, bolje rečeno, ne može ju vezati uz sebe. Tako se primjerice može reći i:

- (15) On je bio nasmijan čovjek.

tj. može se pridjevno značenje povezati s nekim konkretnim vremenom u značenju 'On je bio vesele naravi, no zbog životnih okolnosti više nije' ili 'On je bio vesele naravi, ali je umro pa više nije', ali je bitno da ni vrijeme niti bilo što drugo nije kognitivno prepoznatljivo kao uzrok-vršitelj njegove sadašnje nenasmijsnosti i neveselosti.

Kod adjektiviziranoga je pasiva particip iz perspektive sadašnjosti pridjev, no uključi li se u analizu kognitivni kontekst, a mora se uključiti, onda je jasan i vidljiv proces pasivizacije na stupnju iza na vremenskoj ljestvici, tj. u prošlosti, ma kako ona bila bliska ili daleka. Adjektivizirani se pasiv prepoznaje uvođenjem različitih vremenskih konkretizatora kojima se nedvosmisleno signalizira trajanje izvršene radnje i u sadašnjosti, a ako je radnja izvršena, onda se nužno prepoznaje i neki vršitelj. Tako u gore navedenim primjerima, a i u, primjerice, rečenici:

(16) Prozor je već danima otvoren.

konkretizator *već danima* nedvosmisleno signalizira trajanje izvršene radnje, ali isto tako signalizira i to da *prozor* ne bi mogao do sada *biti otvoren* da ga netko ili nešto prije nije otvorilo i time izvršilo radnju otvaranja. Pasivizacija, odnosno njoj inherentna dinamičnost doista nije aktualizirana u trenutku govorenja jer se ne može uspostaviti aktivni konceptualni korelat *?Netko je već danima otvorio prozor*, ali je aktualizirana u svijesti govornika i signalizira pasiv koji korelira s aktivom *Netko je otvorio prozor i on je već danima otvoren* ili *Netko je otvorio prozor i još ga nije zatvorio*.

Prototipnomu je pasivu dinamičnost inherentna zbog kognitivne svjesnosti i govornika i slušatelja o aktualiziranosti, trenutnosti i završenosti radnje predočene pasivom, a jezično ostvarene, kao i kod adjektiviziranoga pasiva, uvođenjem različitih vremenskih pojašnjivača–konkretizatora. Nije bitno kada je ta trenutnost ostvarena (jučer, prije dvije godine, prije sto godina itd.) niti je bitan način na koji je ostvarena:

(17) Prozor je otvoren prije dva dana.

već je bitno to da takav pasiv svojim konstituentima evocira i potiče svijest na prepoznavanje jednoga, završenoga vremenskog odsječka signaliziranoga mogućnošću uspostave aktivnoga konceptualnog korelata *Netko je otvorio prozor prije dva dana*.

1. Cop1¹ (trajni prezent pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *bivam, bivaš, biva... + glagolski pridjev trpni*)

Konstrukcija se trajni prezent + glagolski pridjev trpni u gramatikama redovito navodi kao potvrđena i ovjerena, dok se u znanstvenim radovima, koji su se bavili vremenskom vrijednošću pasivnoga predikata, ona smatra

¹ Ovdje treba napomenuti da se oznake Cop1, Cop2... odnose na različita vremena i načine istoga glagola - glagola *biti*.

neovjerenom. Mišljenje o neovjerenosti predikacije s trajnim prezentom glagola *biti* zauzimaju npr. Žepić (1982) i Milošević (1973) te na osnovi toga zaključuju da se prezentsko značenje ne može ostvariti kod prototipnoga pasiva, jer konstrukcije *sam, si, je* + trpni pridjev rezultiraju značenjem perfekta, već samo kod pasiva stanja i kod čistih kopulativno–pridjevnih značenja gdje se ustrojstvom *sam, si, je* + trpni pridjev ostvaruje prezent. Takve tvrdnje nikako ne stoje jer je sveza trajni prezent glagola *biti* + trpni pridjev i ovjerena i potvrđena u svim funkcionalnim stilovima. Evo i primjera:

- (18) Postaje opasan jer je strahovito ugledan i biva likvidiran.*²
- (19) ... kronologija biva uništena, a svaka vrijednost zanijekana i bačena.*
- (20) Bivam tako nošen svojim mislima...*
- (21) Oni bivaju kažnjavani, a njegovi neprijatelji nagrađivani.*
- (22) ...upalne stanice se smanjuju i bivaju zamijenjene koštanim...tkivom.*

Konstrukcijom se Cop1, dakle, može iskazati prezentsko značenje kod prototipnoga pasiva, značenje koje je ujedno i jedino. Prezent se adjektiviziranoga pasiva ne može ostvariti Cop1 konstrukcijom jer glagol *bivati* razumijeva procesualnost i dinamičnost u aktualnom trenutku govorenja, a što je u suprotnosti s naravi adjektiviziranoga pasiva.

2. Cop2 (prezent pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *sam, si, je...* + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Za konstrukciju se Cop2 najčešće tvrdi da kod prototipnoga pasiva signalizira perfekt, a kod adjektiviziranoga pasiva³ i kopulativno–pridjevnih značenja prezent. Primjerice:

- (23) Odmah sam prebačen u Vodnikovu ulicu...*/Odmah su me prebacili u Vodnikovu ulicu... prototipni pasiv, perfekt
- (24) Grad je razrušen./ → Netko je razrušio grad i još uvijek nije obnovljen. → adjektivizirani pasiv, prezent
- (25) On je nasmijan čovjek. → kopulativno–pridjevno značenje, prezent

² Svi su primjeri, označeni zvjezdicom, preuzeti iz Hrvatskoga nacionalnog korpusa Zavoda za lingvistiku Filozofskoga fakulteta u Zagrebu.

³ Adjektivizirani pasiv autori u raspravama o pasivnoj rečenici ili izbacuju iz opozicije glagolskoga roda, ubrajajući ga u kopulativno–pridjevna značenja (Kučanda 1992, Milošević 1972, 1973, Siewierska 1988, Vukojević 1992), ili ga nazivaju pasivom stanja (Žepić 1982) što je neprihvatljivo jer pasivu, da bi uopće bio pasiv, mora biti svojstvena dinamičnost, samo je pitanje na kojem stupnju vremenske ljestvice.

Takav pogled nije pogrešan, ali ni ne osvjetljava u potpunosti vremensku vrijednost tog ustrojstva jer će se pokazati da se radi o puno složenijem spektru semantike jedne od dviju temeljnih kognitivnih domena - domene vremena. Za potpuno je osvjetljavanje vremenskoga značenja te, a i nekih drugih konstrukcija, po mom sudu, potrebno uvesti jednu kategoriju koja do sada u rasprave o vremenskoj vrijednosti pasivnoga predikata, barem koliko je meni poznato, nije uvedena – KATEGORIJU GOTOVOSTI,⁴ točnije kategorije GOTOVE SADAŠNJOSTI I GOTOVE PROŠLOSTI. Kategorija gotovosti ukazuje na to da morfološki oblik predikata ne mora biti, i često nije, i jedini pokazatelj vremenske vrijednosti, već je to naša percepcija vremena, relativno neovisna o formalnim pokazateljima, percepcija koja ovisi o konkretnoj kognitivno-kontekstualnoj situaciji.

Gotova sadašnjost označava "...izricanje u živoj vezi sa sadašnjosti, izricanje onoga što jest kakvo jest jer je nešto drugo bilo i sad je gotovo te svojom gotovosti obilježuje sadašnjost... Gotova sadašnjost je po tome oznaka za prošlu radnju, a zvati je sadašnjošću ima smisla stoga što se od prošlih radnji... karakteristično razlikuje upravo po svojoj živoj i djelotvornoj vezi s pravom sadašnjosti, tj. s vremenom govorenja ili s vremenom zbivanja." (Katičić 1992: 176f). Pristupi li se vremenskoj vrijednosti pasivnoga predikata s tog gledišta, a čini se da je to najpreciznije gledište, onda se može reći da je adjektivizirani pasiv prototip gotove sadašnjosti jer se ona očituje već iz same rečenične strukture. Primjerice:

- (26) ... ne borave u zajedničkim prostorijama, već su podijeljeni po malim zajednicama...*/ ...podijelili su ih po malim zajednicama i još su uvijek u takvom rasporedu (tako raspoređeni)...
- (27) Zastava je spuštena već tri mjeseca./ Zastavu su spustili prije tri mjeseca i još uvijek je spuštena.
- (28) Prozor je otvoren cijeli dan./ Otvorili su prozor i još ga nisu zatvorili.

Pasivni predikat u našim primjerima signalizira da je radnja izvršena u prošlosti, dok predikat u prezentu glavne rečenice primjera (26) te konkretizatori *već tri mjeseca* i *cijeli dan* u primjerima (27) i (28) signaliziraju nezavršenost, odnosno trajanje te radnje u sadašnjosti, uspostavljajući tako, kako Katičić kaže, živu vezu prošlosti sa sadašnjosti.

⁴ Kategoriju gotovosti u raspravu o vremenskim značenjima glagolskih oblika uvodi R. Katičić 1981. svojim radom *Kategorija gotovosti u vremenskom značenju glagolskih oblika* objavljenom u 29. godištu časopisa *Jezik* te u njegovim *Novim jezikoslovnim ogledima* iz 1984.

Prototipni je pasiv, nasuprot tomu, periferni primjer gotove sadašnjosti jer on može označavati i gotovu sadašnjost i čistu prošlost, a ovisno o širem kontekstu. Tako primjerice u rečenici:

- (29) Pogledaj ove ljude, dovezeni su s bojišta./ Pogledaj ove ljude, dovezli su ih s bojišta.

pasivni predikat Cop2 signalizira gotovu sadašnjost jer rečenica prvenstveno ukazuje na trenutno stanje ljudi, na njihov izgled kao rezultat raznih povreda, a sama je perfektivna radnja dovoženja u drugom planu, no ipak prisutna i u svijesti govornika i u svijesti slušatelja. U rečenici, pak:

- (30) Ranjenici su u bolnicu dovezeni prije tri dana i svi su umrli./ Ranjenike su u bolnicu dovezli prije tri dana i svi su umrli.

Cop2 predikat označava čistu prošlost jer u aktualnom trenutku govorenja ne postoji nikakva veza sa sadašnjosti.

3. Cop3 (perfekt pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *bio sam, bio si, bio je...* + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Za predikatno ustrojstvo Cop3 i Žepić (1982) i Milošević (1973) kažu da ostvaruje značenje pluskvamperfekta ili pretprošlosti:

- (31) ... kad sam bio namješten u institutu...*/ ...kad su me bili namjestili u institutu...
- (32) ... pa je mit o ljetnom filmskom mrtvilu jednom zauvijek bio razbijen.*/ ... pa su mit o ljetnom filmskom mrtvilu jednom zauvijek bili razbili.

No kao što konstrukcija Cop2 ne označava uvijek perfekt, tako ni konstrukcija Cop3 ne označava uvijek pluskvamperfekt. Vidjeli smo da adjektivizirani pasiv, ostvaren predikacijom Cop2, ne signalizira perfekt, već gotovu sadašnjost. Isto tako, adjektivizirani pasiv, ostvaren konstrukcijom Cop3, ne signalizira pluskvamperfekt, nego uvijek *gotovu prošlost*:

- (33) ... nisu boravili u zajedničkim prostorijama, već su bili podijeljeni po malim zajednicama.../ ... bili su ih podijelili po malim zajednicama i neko su vrijeme ostali u tom rasporedu (tako raspoređeni)
- (34) Prozor je bio otvoren cijeli dan./ Prozor su bili otvorili i nisu ga zatvorili cijeli dan.
- (35) Zastava je bila spuštena cijeli mjesec./ Zastavu su bili spustili i cijeli je mjesec nisu podignuli.

Radnja je u tim primjerima izvršena u pretprošlosti, a rečenice u trenutku govorenja prvenstveno obavještavaju o njezinom trajanju u prošlosti.

I prototipni je pasiv Cop3, isto kao i Cop2 predikacije, periferni primjer gotove prošlosti jer ju nekada označuje, a nekada ne. Gotovu prošlost označuje npr. u rečenici:

- (36) Jesi li vidio ranjenike, bili su dovezeni s bojišta./ Jesi li vidio ranjenike, bili su ih dovezli s bojišta.

a čistu pretprošlost ili čisti pluskvamperfekt u rečenicama:

- (37) Ranjenici su u bolnicu bili dovezeni prije tri dana./ Ranjenike su u bolnicu bili dovezli prije tri dana.
- (38) Prozor je bio otvoren prije dva dana./ Prozor su bili otvorili prije dva dana.
- (39) Zastava je bila spuštena prošle godine./ Zastavu su bili spustili prošle godine.

Konstrukcije Cop2 i Cop3, osim opisanih, mogu imati i druga, kontekstualno uvjetovana, vremenska značenja. Tako konstrukcija Cop2 kod prototipnoga pasiva može označavati i pluskvamperfektnu, pretprošlu radnju:

- (40) Kad sam mu konačno pročitao gotov tekst on se iznenadi onim što je u njemu napisano.* > što je u njemu bilo napisano.
- (41) Dok sam mu pokazivao slike, on se oduševljavao onim što je naslikano.* > onim što je bilo naslikano.

a pluskvamperfektno značenje konstrukcije Cop3 istovremenost s perfektivnim značenjem:

- (42) Bili su opljačkani, dok su putovali vlakom u Sloveniju.

ili radnju izvršenu poslije radnje izrečene perfektom:

- (43) Novac im je bio vraćen tek kada je policija uhvatila krivce.

4. Cop4 (imperfekt pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *bijah*, *bijaše*, *bijaše...* + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Konstrukcija imperfekt pom. glagola *biti* + trpni pridjev od svršenoga glagolskog vida u adjektiviziranom pasivu i njemu odgovarajućem aktivnom

korelatu ima vremensko značenje gotove prošlosti, konkretizirane morfološkim oblikom pluskvamperfekta:

- (44) Prozor bijaše otvoren cijeli dan./ Prozor bijahu otvorili i cijeli ga dan nisu zatvorili.

dok u prototipnom pasivu također u aktivu korelira s pluskvamperfektnim morfološkim oblikom, s tim što se tu ne ostvaruje vremensko značenje gotove prošlosti, već čiste pretprošlosti:

- (45) Prozor bijaše otvoren prije dva dana./ Prozor bijahu otvorili prije dva dana.

Sveza imperfekta pomoćnoga glagola *biti* i glagolskoga pridjeva trpnog od svršenoga vida u potpunosti odgovara vremenskomu značenju Cop3 konstrukcije jer se od glagola svršenoga vida u aktivnom konceptualnom korelatu imperfekt ne može morfološki ostvariti. Nasuprot tomu, konstrukcija imperfekt pom. gl. *biti* + gl. pridjev trpni od nesvršenoga vida i u adjektiviziranom i u prototipnom pasivu, te njima paralelnim aktivnim rečenicama, ima i imperfektni morfološki oblik i imperfektno vremensko značenje. Primjerice:

- (46) Prozor bijaše otvaran cijeli dan./ Prozor otvarahu cijeli dan.
(47) Prozor bijaše otvaran prije dva dana./ Prozor otvarahu prije dva dana.⁵

Evo još nekoliko primjera konstrukcije Cop4 :

- (48) ... na "Vratima izlaska sunca" bijah pribrojen živima...* – prototipni pasiv
(49) Time su oni pak prinuđeni prekoračiti granice vlastitog... mišljenja koje... nikad ne bijaše propitano.* – prototipni pasiv
(50) Dok još moj grob bijaše otvoren, uzeše i razdijeliše moj nakit i blago.* – adjektivizirani pasiv

⁵ Ovdje bi trebalo dati jednu napomenu kako ne bi došlo do zabune. Kategoriju gotovosti treba jasno lučiti od glagolskoga vida. Domena je primjene kategorije gotovosti značenje cijele rečenice, odnosno cijela semantička parafraza, dok je domena glagolskoga vida samo predikat. Naime, jasno je npr. da ukoliko se radi o svezi pomoćnoga glagola *biti* i glagolskoga pridjeva trpnog oblikovanoga od svršenoga vida, a pri tome se promatra samo semantika predikata, nema smisla govoriti o kategoriji gotovosti jer svršeni glagolski vid nedvosmisleno ukazuje na značenjsku kondenzaciju i završenost bez ikakve mogućnosti protezanja na vremenskoj ljestvici. No rečenični su cirkumstanti tipa *cijeli dan*, *prije dva dana* itd. ti koji omogućuju uključivanje kategorije gotovosti u analizu kada se oblikuje aktivna semantička parafraza.

5. Cop5 (aorist pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *bih, bi, bi...* + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Konstrukcija je Cop5 potvrđena samo kod prototipnoga pasiva. Tomu je tako zbog aorisnoga značenja kojim se signalizira trenutnost i završenost radnje pa se može reći:

- (51) ...i od onog dana ne bi nitko ujedeno...*/ ...i od onog dana nikoga ništa ne ujede...

ali ne i primjerice:

- (52) [?]Prozor bi otvoren cijeli dan.

U rečenici se (52), adjektivizirano pasivnoj, željeno značenje mora konkretizirati imperfektom:

- (53) Prozor bijaše otvoren cijeli dan.

kojim se ostvaruje trajnost i nezavršenost radnje.

6. Cop6 (futur I. pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *bit ću, bit ćeš, bit će...* + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Konstrukcija Cop6 u objema vrstama pasiva i morfološkim oblikom pasivnoga predikata i njegovim vremenskim, odnosno načinskim značenjem, koje se poklapa s morfološkim oblikom, korelira s aktivnim rečenicama. Npr.:

- (54) ...osiguranici s najnižim primanjima bit će zaštićeni...*/
...osiguranike će s najnižim primanjima zaštititi...

7. Cop7 (svršeni prezent pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *budem, budeš, bude...* + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Pasivnomu predikatu Cop7 (futura II.) u aktivu morfološki odgovara ili *prezent* ili *perfekt* ili *futur I*:

- prezent

- (55) ... što bi kao pripadalo za sklapanje braka da eto osam dana budemo pošteđeni... od svojih dužnosti...*/ ...da nas eto osam dana poštede od svojih dužnosti.

- perfekt

(56) ...izbor je novog ravnatelja izravno utjecao na to da Vi budete odba-
rani kao redatelj?*/ ... izbor je novog ravnatelja izravno utjecao na
to da su Vas odabrali kao redatelja./ ... da Vas odaberu...

- futur I

(57) Moguće je da i ovog tjedna budete obasipani komplimentima...*/
Moguće je da će Vas i ovog tjedna obasipati komplimentima./ ... da
Vas obasipaju...

Navedeni su morfološki oblici prezenta, perfekta i futura I. u aktivu zamjenji-
vi i futurom II., no samo ako se radi o pogodbenim rečenicama. Npr.:

(58) Ako budem izabran.../ Budu li me izabrali...

(59) Ako i ovog tjedna budete obasipani komplimentima.../ Budu li Vas
i ovog tjedna obasipali komplimentima...

Aktivni su predikati u perfektu i futuru I. samo morfološki zamjenjivi prezen-
tom, a ne i značenjski. Njihova zamjenjivost prezentom proizlazi iz vremen-
skoga značenja gotove sadašnjosti svojstvene morfološkom obliku futura II.
Ta se gotova sadašnjost, kao što se i vidjelo, može smjestiti na bilo koji stu-
panj vremenske ljestvice. Smjesti li se u prošlost, konstrukcija će Cop8 mor-
fološki korelirati s aktivnim perfektom, a smjesti li se u budućnost, s aktivnim
futurom I. Pokretljivost gotove sadašnjosti u vremenu, odnosno njezino postoj-
vanje u nekom zamišljenom trenutku u prošlosti ili budućnosti, čini je relativ-
nom, pa se to vremensko značenje naziva još i relativna gotova sadašnjost.
Vremensko se značenje relativne gotove sadašnjosti ostvaruje kako kod pro-
totipnoga, tako i kod adjektiviziranoga pasiva.

8. Cop8 (kondicional I. pomoćnoga glagola *biti*: *bio bih*, *bio bi*, *bio bi*... + glagolski pridjev trpni)

Pasivna predikacija Cop8 morfološki uvijek korelira s kondicionalom II. ak-
tivne rečenice, a ima sljedeća vremenska značenja⁶:

- značenje gotove kondicionalne sadašnjosti
- značenje kondicionalne prošlosti

⁶ Ovdje ostaje otvoreno pitanje može li se u slučajevima gdje je pasivna predikacija
ostvarena kondicionalom govoriti o njegovoj vremenskoj vrijednosti. Vremensku vri-
jednost pasivnoga predikata ostvarenu kondicionalom treba uvjetno shvatiti tako da su
i kondicionalni izričaji, kao i svaki drugi, nužno vezani uz kategoriju vremena, ne to-
liko gramatički koliko semantički.

Adjektivizirani pasiv Cop8 uvijek ima vremensko značenje gotove kondicionalne sadašnjosti:

- (60) Prozor bi stalno bio otvoren da ga vi ne zatvarate.
 (61) Kad bi prozor bio otvoren, ne bi bilo zagušljivo.

Te rečenice znače 'Prozor bismo bili otvorili i on bi uvijek bio u tom stanju, uvijek bi ostao otvoren, pa i sada u trenutku govorenja da ga vi ne zatvarate', i 'Kad bismo bili otvorili prozor, (i kada bi on bio otvoren uvijek kada je zagušljivo, pa i sada jer je i sada zagušljivo), zagušljivosti ne bi bilo'.

Za razliku od adjektiviziranoga, prototipni pasiv može imati i vremensko značenje gotove kondicionalne sadašnjosti u, primjerice, rečenici:

- (62) Zadatak bi bio izvršen da nam vi ne otežavate posao.

ali i značenje čiste kondicionalne prošlosti:

- (63) Prozor bi bio otvoren prije dva dana da je bilo lijepo vrijeme.

Rečenica (62) korelira s aktivnom rečenicom *Bili bismo izvršili zadatak da nam Vi ne otežavate posao*, gdje je signalom gotove kondicionalne sadašnjosti predikat u prezentu zavisne rečenice, a rečenicom se sugerira veća važnost percepcije učinka radnje izvršenja zadatka prisutnoga u kondicionalnoj sadašnjosti, tj. u trenutku govorenja, negoli samoga čina izvršenja u kondicionalnoj prošlosti. Rečenica (63) odgovara aktivu *Bili bismo otvorili prozor prije dva dana da je bilo lijepo vrijeme*, a znači 'Bili bismo otvorili prozor prije dva dana, ali nismo jer je bilo ružno vrijeme'. U toj rečenici na značenje kondicionalne prošlosti ukazuju predikati u perfektu i izgubljena je svaka veza s percipiranjem rezultata radnje u sadašnjosti. Kondicional II. tipa rečenice (63) Katičić ne smatra kondicionalnom prošlošću, već relativnom kondicionalnom sadašnjosti koja se odnosi na prošlost, tvrdeći da ukoliko bi se htjelo ostvariti značenje čiste kondicionalne prošlosti, treba upotrijebiti kondicional I. Ako se to primijeni na našu aktivnu rečenicu, čista bi kondicionalna prošlost bila *Otvorili bismo prozor prije dva dana da je bilo lijepo vrijeme*. Takva se interpretacija, po mom mišljenju, ne može prihvatiti jer kondicional I. rečenicu više približava sadašnjem vremenu, dok je kondicional II. smješta dublje u prošlost. Usporede li se ta dva glagolska načina s glagolskim vremenima perfekta i pluskvamperfekta, može se uspostaviti određeni paralelizam u kojem kondicional I. odgovara perfektu:

- (64) *Otvorio bih prozor prije dva dana./ Otvorio je prozor prije dva dana.*

a kondicional II. pluskvamperfektu:

- (65) *Bio bih otvorio* prozor prije dva dana./ *Bio je otvorio* prozor prije dva dana.

Zbog toga smatram da pasivne rečenice tipa *Prozor bi bio otvoren prije dva dana da je bilo lijepo vrijeme* i njima odgovarajući aktivni korelati imaju vremensko značenje čiste kondicionalne prošlosti, a ne relativne gotove kondicionalne sadašnjosti koja se odnosi na prošlost.

Vremenska se značenja konstrukcije Cop9 ostvaruju i u sljedećim primjerima:


- (66) Jedan od bitnih kriterija koji moramo uzeti u obzir... jest vjerojatnost negativnih učinaka kojima bi bio izložen pojedinac i stanovništvo.* – adjektivizirani pasiv, gotova kondicionalna sadašnjost
(67) ...većina bi čak bila zgranuta činjenicom da Tarantino uživa u takvim...* – prototipni pasiv, gotova kondicionalna sadašnjost
(68) ...unuk Otta von Habsburga...bio bi bez problema primljen u naše društvo.* – prototipni pasiv, kondicionalna prošlost

Za pasivne se predikacije pluskvamperfekt pom. gl. *biti bijah bio, bijaše bio, bijaše bio* + glagolski pridjev trpni, kondicional II. pom. gl. *biti bio bih bio, bio bi bio, bio bi bio* + glagolski pridjev trpni, gl. prilog sadašnji pom. gl. *biti budući* + gl. pridjev trpni te gl. prilog prošli pom. gl. *biti bivši* + gl. pridjev trpni u korpusu nije našao nijedan primjer, pa stoga ni neće biti opisivane. U *Priručnoj se gramatici* ti oblici s trpnim pridjevom navode, ali se ne oprimjeruju, dok se u *Povijesnom pregledu* za njih kaže:

U građi za ovaj rad nije se našla ni jedna potvrda participa pasivnoga povezana s pluskvamperfektom, kondicionalom II. i s participom budući, a nije ni vjerojatno da se takvi oblici upotrebljavaju. (Babić et al 1991: 719)


Sve se rečeno može i grafički prikazati:

- pridjevno značenje



- adjektivizirani pasiv


adjektivizirani pasiv → radnja → stanje → trajnost



gotova sadašnjost, gotova prošlost, imperfekt, futur I.,
gotova kondicionalna sadašnjost

- prototipni pasiv

prototipni pasiv → radnja → stanje → završenost



sadašnjost, gotova sadašnjost, prošlost, gotova prošlost, pretprošlost, imperfekt, aorist, futur I, relativna gotova sadašnjost, gotova kondicionalna sadašnjost, kondicionalna prošlost

Iz svega se rečenog nameće pitanje treba li se vremensku vrijednost pasivnoga predikata spoznavati iz same pasivne rečenice ili iz njezina suodnosa s aktivom. Postavljeni je problem doista ozbiljan i teško razrješiv ukoliko se ne luče dvije kategorije koje svakako treba lučiti – *morfološki oblik pasivnoga predikata* (gramatičko vrijeme) i njime ostvareno *vremensko značenje* (vrijeme kao izvanjezična kategorija). Upravo da bi se razlikovale te dvije kategorije, u raspravu je uvedena kategorija gotovosti kojom se nijansira temeljna kognitivna domena vremena, odnosno kojom se vješto premošćuju granice između vremena kao jezičnoga i vremena kao izvanjezičnoga fenomena. Uzme li se kao polazište izvanjezično vremensko značenje, onda je gore postavljeno pitanje suvišno jer je vremensko značenje pasivnoga i aktivnoga predikata uvijek isto. Tako rečenica:

(75) Prozor je otvoren cijeli dan.

označava gotovu sadašnjost i u pasivu i u aktivu, a rečenica:

(76) Prozor je bio otvoren prije dva dana.

pretprošlost također u obama glagolskim rodovima.

Vremenska se vrijednost pasivnoga i aktivnoga predikata razlikuje jedino po morfološkom obliku kojim je predikat konkretiziran i u tom se smislu pasiv i aktiv moraju opisivati pojedinačno jer se, primjerice, isto značenje gotove sadašnjosti u pasivu iskazuje prezentom, a u aktivu perfektom, pretprošlosti u pasivu perfektom, a u aktivu pluskvamperfektom itd.

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THE CATEGORY OF FINITENESS AND TENSE VALUE OF THE PASSIVE PREDICATE

The author discusses tense value of the passive predicate, introducing a new category into the discussion - the category of finiteness. The discussion includes the value of passive predicate in almost all tenses and moods of Croatian, in order to shed more light on the cognitive domain of time in Croatian passive.

Keywords: finiteness, adjectival passive, prototypical passive, reflexive passive, periphrastic passive, tense, non-linguistic time

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Metaphors are events, not objects

This paper discusses the tension that exists between linguistic and psychological approaches to metaphor. It aims to demonstrate that interdisciplinary efforts are probably not all of equal value when it comes to serving the ends of any individual discipline. In the case of psychological research on metaphor, such interdisciplinarity may in fact be limited to a heuristic relation, in which linguistics offers useful constraints in defining an object of study that should allow psycholinguists to pursue their own general goal of mapping the architecture of the language processor. Thus, it may well be that the existing division of labor, between linguistics and psycholinguistics, that holds for the study of metaphor is a principled, instead of a merely contingent, reality. The paper's argumentation for this starts from the observation that the psycholinguistic study of meaning phenomena in natural language is being increasingly marked by a quasi-exclusive focus on properties of the brain, as the seat of the mental lexicon, and not on the interpreter holding that brain. I concentrate on methodological difficulties conjured up by the "heteronomic" aspect of metaphor understanding, as well as on theoretical problems with defining metaphor as an object of study in diverging disciplines.

Keywords: mental lexicon, metaphor, modularity, pragmatics, semantic processing

This paper discusses the tension that exists between linguistic (semantic) and psychological approaches to metaphor. It aims to demonstrate that interdisciplinary efforts, which have become so popular in the age of the cognitive sciences, are probably not all of equal value when it comes to serving the ends of any individual discipline. In the case of psychological research on metaphor, such interdisciplinarity may in fact be limited to a *heuristic* relation, in which linguistics offers useful constraints in defining an object of study, metaphor, that should allow psycholinguists to pursue their own general goal of mapping

the architecture of the language processor. Thus, it may well be that the existing division of labor, between linguistics and psycholinguistics, that holds for the study of metaphor is a principled, instead of a merely contingent, reality. This observation starts from the assumption, which will be maintained in the remainder of the present paper, that the psycholinguistic study of meaning phenomena in natural language is being increasingly marked by a quasi-exclusive focus on properties of the brain, as the seat of the mental lexicon, and not on the interpreter holding that brain. In what follows, I will concentrate on methodological difficulties conjured up by this “heteronomic” aspect of metaphor understanding (and its effects on studying different types of metaphor), as well as on theoretical problems with defining metaphor as an object of study in diverging disciplines.

The scope of the present survey is expressly limited to those psychological paradigms that make use of experimental, chronometric techniques to assess the processing status of figurative interpretations. I will use the terms “psychology” and “psychological” accordingly. After a brief introduction (section 1), I will first describe, in section 2, how the linguistic and the psychological conception of metaphor are bound to be distinct, and how this difference affects the respective formulations of research questions and the corresponding deployment of analytical techniques in both fields. Section 3 presents a number of problems underlying certain “representationalist” assumptions in the study of metaphor, as it is canonically conceived. In section 4, I look at the relationship between psychology and meaning, as an object of study, and propose that this relation only tends to be a heuristic one, where categories of meaning generally serve as shortcuts for getting to genuine psychological concerns that are ultimately nonsemantic. Section 5 spells out the implications of such a view for the investigation of metaphor processing and its online characteristics. I offer some closing remarks in section 6.

1. Introduction

Psychological research on metaphor comprehension can roughly be divided into two major strands of investigation. One type of analysis starts from the subjective experience of metaphor as a special kind of meaning, involving some “tension” that is thought to derive from the conflict between an utterance’s literal and its figurative reading. This tension is taken to account for a variety of experimental observations. Many contributions in this field stress the influence of generalized structures of metaphorical reasoning (sometimes called conceptual metaphors) on the interpretation of metaphor and characterize this process in terms of the mapping relations, from a source to a target domain, that typify metaphor as a mode of language *and* thought. (No similar mechanisms are posited for the processing of literal utterances.) Others focus on the conflicts that arise between properties (“features”) of the source and

target informing a metaphorical mapping, and aim at defining the relevant features for the resulting metaphor in relation to operations that are performed on the original meaning configurations of the lexical items (or concepts) involved. The second line of research, on the other hand, concentrates on the automatic processing mechanisms that underlie the comprehension of metaphor. This type of experimental work does not only seek to reveal the processes that are active during metaphor comprehension, but also the very architecture of the processor that activates them. As such, research that focuses on what is usually referred to as the time course of metaphor processing acknowledges the special status that metaphor has in terms of its meaning structure. However, it does not take this semantic structure as its proper object of study but uses it as a starting point for the investigation of unconscious processing mechanisms that reveal the general cognitive structures involved in interpretation work. In this tradition, metaphor itself is not the ultimate explanandum, but rather a heuristic tool that allows experimenters to probe the hidden features of our ability to understand instances of natural language use.

I will contend in this paper that it is the second strand of investigation that can arguably be claimed to constitute a genuinely psychological (as opposed to linguistic) research goal. Indeed, from a psycholinguistic perspective, there is very little, if anything at all, that chronometric work on metaphor can say about the substance of metaphorical meaning, i.e., about the actual content or structure of metaphorical “mappings” and the representation types that might be involved in them. Consequently, and specifically in regard to the psychology of metaphor, all instances of modeling and/or representing aspects of comprehension are disavowed here that refer, directly or indirectly, to the representation of meaning in whichever format (either as gestalts or as bundles of semantic features), primarily because these formats are effectively copied from more or less convenient representational conventions that seem to thrive in some of the neighboring disciplines, and notably in (linguistic) semantics. As such, they do not per se reflect the modalities that we can assume to hold for an essentially physical system like the language processor. Due to the many theoretical and methodological difficulties that are conjured up by transposing linguistic-semantic concepts and models to the field of psychological investigation, I therefore propose that a concern with the architecture of the semantic processor (and not with metaphor itself) would instantiate the kind of research question that is best suited for psycholinguistic study. This heuristic perspective on psychological metaphor research thus suggests serious limits to an interdisciplinary approach to these matters. While the relevance of semantic studies of various types of metaphor is certainly acknowledged within the domain of linguistic analysis, it remains to be seen whether any of these semantic observations, besides perhaps the very fact of identifying metaphor as a potentially special type of meaning, can contribute to the general understanding of interpretation as a psychological mechanism.

2. One metaphor, two objects

The meaning of metaphor is one that invariably involves a “tension” of some kind, sometimes also referred to as a “dissonance” or plain “strangeness” and perhaps most adequately described by Black (1993), who introduces the original term in discussing what distinguishes a metaphorical statement from a literal one. One of the prime candidates for the kind of *prima facie* evidence that is needed to recognize a metaphor is indeed this characteristic feeling of tension arising between a metaphorical “focus” and its so-called literal frame. The literal meaning of a word that constitutes the focus of a metaphor, which is assumed to be tacitly known by the speaker and shared with the hearer, typically presents a paradigm case of the application or use of that word. If a meaning is not listed as figuring within this paradigm, it is consequently treated as nonliteral or figurative.

In spite of the relatively unambiguous wording in which this discussion is set, nothing should prevent us in principle from rejecting an apparently commonsensical distinction between literal and figurative meaning (or language use) “as superficial and ultimately indefensible” (Black 1993: 22). Indeed, Black, and certain others with him, can at the same time refer to a unique meaning property of metaphor, setting it apart from the rest of “language”, and still maintain that there is no deep rift separating metaphor from a larger set of meaning phenomena that cannot properly be regarded as metaphorical (and at least some of which would fall under what may be regarded as “literal meaning”). In fact, two levels of analysis should be considered when studying metaphor. We could start by saying that the tension at issue is not necessarily situated at the level of semantic processing (i.e., explicating the details of the mapping relation that is presented by a metaphor), but rather at that of identifying a stretch of language use as metaphorical, possibly after having processed (part of) its meaning (i.e., as a post-hoc reflection that can, in contrast with actual processing routines, be made more or less conscious). It is metaphor *recognition* that is at stake when characterizing the special nature of metaphor, but since this presupposes interpretive work, all statements regarding metaphor as a marked semantic type are necessarily hermeneutic and therefore crucially depend on the availability of existing meanings. Metaphor recognition is thus in no a-priori way linked to the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for calculating the meaning of a metaphor, and which may just as well involve the same principles as are needed for the comprehension of literal language use. The tension which metaphor evokes, an undoubtedly “rational” phenomenon in the sense of being based on an underlying analysis of the “logical” proposition informing the metaphor, cannot but arise as the result of interpretation, and not as its prerequisite. A feeling of tension is the very point of using a metaphor, so that we can relegate this feeling to the province of pragmatic (“perlocutionary”) effects and leave the semantic prop-

erties of metaphor to the usual mechanisms of sentence processing. Such a perspective would be completely at odds with classic philosophical theorizing about the matter, where a metaphor needs to be recognized as literally false before any attempt at interpretation can even be made¹ (see [work based on] Grice 1975 and Searle 1993). Although such models are conceived of as providing standard pragmatic accounts of metaphor, they do emphasize the need to calculate the pragmatic meaning of an utterance next to a semantic one that is simply equated with its literal meaning (“or what is said”). What is more, they give substance to this pragmatic meaning, for example by directly connecting the meaning of metaphor to the speaker’s intentional structures and, ultimately, to a propositional representation that is assumed to be present in the speaker’s mind.

These issues have important consequences for experimental research on metaphor. First of all, they suggest that it may matter at which point in the comprehension process “meaning” effects are found, as well as what such effects have to say about the properties of metaphor as a process or a product of interpretation. As a result, Gibbs (1992) proposes a dynamic picture of metaphor comprehension, stressing the need to differentiate between various, qualitatively distinct, stages of metaphor processing. He also suggests that rival accounts of metaphor might conceivably be reconciled, if only the processing range is determined in which these accounts can be held to apply. It is this question of the range in which empirical observations hold true that is usually treated as an implicit assumption. For instance, conclusions drawn from tracking the first few hundred milliseconds of processing are bound to reveal properties that are relevant to concerns with immediate (incremental) processing, but not necessarily to the discussion of extended, reflexive analysis performed on metaphorical meaning (e.g., the appreciation of metaphor quality, issues of conventionality, etc.). Similarly, it is unlikely that any general statements can be devised that would cover the whole spectrum of processing phenomena associated with metaphors, because the entire time course of metaphor processing involves many different stages whose properties cannot all be scrutinized by means of the same measuring tools and methods of analysis. Together with the realization that there exists at least a limited number of different metaphor types — depending on whether a metaphor is felt to be established or new, of good or poor quality, and contextually motivated or not —, this leads us to conclude that the theoretical pluralism that marks metaphor research in psychology has little to do with the eclectic pluralism

¹ Although this is the classic view informing the Gricean analysis metaphor, it is by no means one that should be taken to reflect inescapable inferences of the paradigm at hand. For one thing, diagrams representing various layers of semantic and pragmatic processing that goes on during the comprehension of metaphor need not be mistaken for processing models. Instead, they may simply indicate “which kinds of information are prerequisites to which kind of assignment of meaning” (Levinson 2000: 187).

typical of more canonically interdisciplinary efforts. The pluralism turns out to be one that holds at different levels of analysis, and therefore an assumption of “monism” can in fact be entertained for each individual level, at least until it is empirically falsified. Thus, it is not self-evident that matters of automatic semantic processing can be brought to bear on qualities of metaphor as an object of conscious (e.g., esthetic) consideration, or vice versa. The interdisciplinary study of metaphor is restricted in its scope, in other words, primarily because the tools with which different disciplines work are not always mutually adaptable (and therefore their results aren’t either), but also because the nature of the object of study itself, metaphor, is changed by adopting different research questions and deploying different means of analysis.

The linguistic conception of metaphor and the psychological are two distinct things, because linguistics looks at metaphor as a meaning phenomenon, whereas psychology is interested in this (meaning) phenomenon as a shortcut to its primary concern, the architecture of the language processor. Linguistics can offer metaphor as a relatively well-defined domain of natural language use, which turns it into a convenient object of study for psychology (in contrast with many other, often considerably vaguer linguistic categories). Linguistics, or more properly semantics, cannot, however, aspire to impose its own substance (in the form of semantic features, domains, or “rules”) on the psychological approach to metaphor, because such substance is just nowhere to be located in the mental lexicon, where metaphor meaning is supposed to reside. Such a stance is inspired by what is known in the philosophy of science as the thesis of “weak supervenience”, stating that the objects recognized by discipline *A* (i.e., metaphors) are, or are wholly constituted out of, objects in the domain of discipline *B*, yet the standards for adequate explanations dictated by *A*, say semantics, are not shared by *B*, psychology (see also Davidson 1980). In particular, the psychological study of metaphor tends to concentrate on physical properties of the processing system confronted with a metaphorical input, which manifest themselves as automatic principles of semantic comprehension, while semantics deals with metaphor as the product of a rational “person”. Insofar as a specific type of semantics presents itself as “cognitive”, metaphor can still be defined linguistically as a mental (psychological) object, but not in the sense of providing direct access to some physical (neural) correlate in the brain. In psycholinguistic research on metaphor, this issue is most outspoken in the distinction between online and offline experimentation. The distinction directly reflects Gibbs’ concern with the processing stages that can be identified in metaphor understanding, in that offline methods of measuring are by their very nature more suited for the study of post-hoc, reflexive aspects of metaphor understanding. Online methods, in contrast, are typically needed to investigate features of automatic, incremental sentence processing, especially if these features are to be situated in early stages of processing.

I will now turn to aspects of processing that exemplify the emphasis on meaning (or representational) properties of metaphor and demonstrate that the methods used to track them typically belong to the “offline” regions of the psycholinguistic spectrum.

3. Metaphor as an object of meaning

As an object of meaning, metaphor primarily presents a problem of representation. In their useful overview of psychological approaches to metaphor processing, Cacciari and Glucksberg (1994) offer three possible modes into which different models of metaphor interpretation can be cast. What these have in common is that they adopt or presuppose a linguistic/semantic perspective (see also Levinson 1983: 147–162), and it is because of this property that they will do good service in our survey of how semantics can and cannot contribute to the psychological study of metaphor. (More strictly conceptual approaches, notably Glucksberg’s own class-inclusion model, are thus kept out of the picture here, even though they probably represent some of the more interesting and fruitful research venues in this respect.) One of these modes is the so-called “incoherence view”, which concentrates on the actual time course of metaphor processing and to which I will return in section 5. The other two are intrinsically linked with positions that are taken up on the nature of metaphorical content.

The first of them, the “comparison” view, starts from the Aristotelian conception of metaphor as the transfer of a name (and of features associated with that name) from one object to another, with Richards (1971) providing the relevant modern terminology for discussing the structure of metaphor, as it emerges from Aristotle’s discussion. This structuring in itself is not theory-neutral. For instance, a conception of the “ground” for a metaphor, one of Richards’ terms, will invariably involve deliberations concerning the specific features, or positions in “semantic space” (Katz and Fodor 1963; Lyons 1968), that are taken to make up a set of shared properties between the metaphorical “topic” and “vehicle”. Yet to assume the possibility of attaining such analytical specificity is to deny the fundamentally negotiable character of linguistic meaning and, a fortiori, of figurative meaning. It boils down to the presupposition, which is still popular in certain segments of the cognitive community, that a finite and more or less fixed set of features can be found or inferred that reveal the “point” of a used metaphor in an unequivocal way. Here, the special nature of metaphorical language use (its tension) is localized in the idea of the ground it evokes, whereby the ground should be seen as the essential component of a special, metaphorical meaning. In terms of measuring the time course of metaphor comprehension, however, this model has little to offer, since it predicts quite straightforwardly that “metaphorical comparisons”

are understood in exactly the same way as literal ones, thus effectively claiming that a metaphor is a shortened literal statement. Under certain experimental conditions, differences in processing times may of course still hold between literal and metaphorical utterance types, but this is not due to a qualitatively different strategy of semantic processing but rather to the additional work needed to transform a metaphorical statement into a fully explicit literal comparison. In this view, metaphor is a semantic, not a processing, oddity, which would be in line with the original nominalist ambitions of this paradigm.

The comparison view of metaphor has yielded a number of linguistic processing models that can be characterized in terms of feature or attribute matching (see Weinreich 1966; Van Dijk 1972; Levin 1977; etc.). In the case of a referential metaphor like *The stone died*, these models typically analyze its meaning by replacing a feature in the specification for the subject with a feature that is transferred from the predicate (or vice versa).² Thus, the meaning of at least one of the constitutive expressions in a metaphor (be it the subject or the predicate) will effectively be “neutralized” with respect to the transferred feature in question. Insofar as the transformation of a metaphor into an explicit comparison is not a hypothesis that is crucial to the basic notion of feature matching, such matching models are in fact quite comparable to the “mapping” accounts that have emerged from the cognitive-linguistic preoccupation with metaphor. Matching the properties of metaphorical topics and vehicles is indeed an analytic process that bears a great resemblance to its (at times quite sophisticated) topological variant in the so-called “contemporary theory of metaphor” (Lakoff 1993), where topics and vehicles are represented in the form of conceptual domains that may overlap (or even “blend”; cf. Turner and Fauconnier 2000) to a greater or lesser extent.³ Still, any theory

² Not just any feature, of course. The main problem with models that employ semantic features to calculate the meanings of metaphors is that they seem to rely on more or less automatic principles of calculation, based on sets of features that have been antecedently and independently assigned to lexical expressions. However, talk about semantic transfer and neutralization cannot hide the fact that even feature models need some (pre-theoretical) understanding of “similarity” in order to decide which features are actually available for transfer in any given context. We must, in other words, still assume that the speaker is attributing to an entity some feature or features with respect to which the entity resembles the metaphorical target.

³ I will refrain from discussing this theory of metaphor at length. Instead, I refer to the complex of counterarguments to this theory adduced by Murphy (1996), who notes that the conceptual metaphors identified as the underlying representations of linguistic metaphors may in fact come out of post-hoc (and thus offline) analysis. Various articles by Glucksberg and some of his associates (most recently, see Keysar et al. 2000) have also repeatedly proposed that people need not rely on the types of conceptual mapping postulated by Lakoff’s theory, at least not to understand conventional figura-

that presumes the availability of semantic features as valid psychological objects and maps these unto structures of the brain is problematic on two counts. First, it must hold, like most semantic models that work with features, that they are in fact real objects with real neural correlates. This is a representational claim, and, regardless of whether it applies to metaphorical meaning as an undifferentiated Gestalt or to components of metaphorical meaning (like features), it must maintain that there exists a clear-cut correlation between the products of semantic investigation (as carried out on the part of the analyst) and the constraints that shape the language user's behavior in processing metaphors. However, the act of situating semantic objects in the brain is a highly questionable one, to which I will return below. Secondly, predictions of matching or mapping models regarding the dynamics of interpretation can vary considerably. A variety of these models have concentrated on metaphor as an implicit comparison (e.g., Tourangeau and Sternberg 1981), producing unclear claims with respect to the possible causes of differential processing behavior in literal vs. metaphorical conditions. Others have objected to this biased treatment of metaphors as shortened comparisons and insist that a metaphor should be seen as a special meaning object in its own right, with typical semantic and processing properties. Thus, Ortony's (1979) salience imbalance hypothesis starts from an important distinguishing feature of such "comparisons", viz., that they are asymmetrical, without however formulating the implications of this position for processing time.

Glucksberg and his colleagues, on the other hand, have repeatedly stressed the lack of attention, within metaphor models based on a notion of comparison or similarity, that is paid to pragmatic standards of well-formedness, contending that the strength of a metaphor lies in its *informativeness*. Therefore, a metaphor that projects highly salient features of a vehicle onto the topic is at least potentially felicitous, but it is not this configuration that can produce a defining hallmark of metaphoricality (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990). The same configuration for literal categorizations or comparisons, as in *Chaises longues are (like) sofas*, is only perceived as informative if we assume that the hearer is not aware of the salient properties of a 'sofa'. So, if it is not the feature matching that separates metaphors from literal statements, the distinction must reside in what people do with the outcome of this "matching". According to Glucksberg (1991), language users do not necessarily abandon or reject the literal implications that a metaphorically construed "categorization" presents, so that metaphorical meaning is more typical in what it suggests (i.e., in the inferences based on it) than in what it is as a putative semantic object. Incidentally, Glucksberg's is one of the few experimental approaches where actual predictions are made concerning the time course of metaphor processing that do not assume the automatic priority of literal over metaphorical mean-

tive expressions (which is exactly the kind of expression on which this theory builds most of its case).

ing. The reason for this is that the literal meanings activated by the mere selection of lexical items to form a metaphor may still play a guiding role in the computation of the actual metaphorical point. Consequently, metaphorical meanings are not necessarily optional either and can in fact be apprehended next to a nondefective literal meaning (Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin 1982). This diverges, of course, from what an explicitly modular account would have to say about this, viz., that metaphorical meanings can only begin to be computed if a literal interpretation fails.

The second approach listed in Cacciari and Glucksberg (1994), following Black's interaction view, also assumes the relevance of features for processing metaphor but defines these features in terms of emerging, not necessarily existing, similarities. Thus, the interaction view avoids the trap of postulating both the givenness of finite sets of features that can be assigned to individual words, and the specificity and cognitive availability of the "union" that is said to result from mapping such sets onto one another. It respects, in other words, the *creative* function of metaphor, assigning an essentially pragmatic meaning to it and thereby acknowledging the quintessential role of speech participants in negotiating meanings, instead of just coding and decoding them. Here, too, the work of Richards (1971) seems crucial, if only in its articulation of the two interacting "subjects" (topic and vehicle) that are involved in the workings of metaphor. What this theory implies for psychology is that meanings can be found to play a part in metaphor comprehension that cannot be ascribed to either the topic or the vehicle, at least not outside the implicative complex created by the metaphor itself. Similarity is, again, a key issue in this type of research, but this time the similarity is new, dynamic, and possibly indeterminate.

Waggoner (1990) offers some reasons why the interaction view has generally failed to arouse much interest within experimental psychology. One of the main factors in this respect, one that was also noted by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982), is its philosophical orientation, which insists on the indeterminate nature of metaphorical meaning and therefore tends to refrain from formulating processing procedures that are too specific. Still, some empirical work has been done in this framework over the past years, which has produced a limited number of complex hypotheses concerning the structure of metaphor, including Indurkha (1992), as well as Tourangeau and Sternberg's (1982) domain interaction theory and Gentner's (1983) structure mapping theory. More recently, various studies have addressed certain online characteristics of metaphor processing from the interaction angle, using a combination of reaction-time tests, judgment tasks, and imagery protocols⁴ (Camac and Glucksberg

⁴ Incidentally, this emphasis on mental imagery corresponds to what Paivio and Walsh (1993) have indicated as the third hypothesis concerning the "essential" communicative functions of metaphor, next to that of "inexpressibility" (à la Davidson

1984; Walsh 1990; Tourangeau and Rips 1991; Gineste and Indurkha 1993; Gibbs and Bogdonovich 1999; Gineste, Indurkha, and Scart 2000).

Insofar as these studies examine the strategic potential of metaphor, focusing on offline matters of appreciation and evaluation, they are probably right in claiming, along the lines of Black's original insights, that metaphor creates new meanings and new similarities and thus does not assume the a-priori exploitation of existing similarities between topic and vehicle. However, when these strategic claims are translated into statements concerning online characteristics of metaphor processing, the predictions become less than clear again. What does the interaction theory have to say, for one, about the relationship between an utterance's literal and metaphorical meanings (and about their processing priorities), especially if we recall Black's observation that the special semantic status of metaphor in no way turns it into a "singular" processing phenomenon? In this respect, interaction theory often refers to Black's analogy of metaphor as a smoked glass, a kind of filter that gives special prominence to certain features of the topic while hiding others. But where is the creativity in this analogy, when compared to the more dramatic descriptions, also available in interaction theory, of metaphor juxtaposing the topic and the vehicle and creating, out of this juxtaposition, a new representation, i.e., a metaphorical representation? This, in fact, must be the ultimate semantic, nonpragmatic perspective on metaphor, where a metaphorical meaning is also a representation and thus an actual object. Too often does the interaction view, as it is implemented in empirical research, conflate the online and offline levels of metaphor interpretation, thereby adding to the confusion surrounding the exact location of the tension that characterizes metaphor. The duality to which such a semantic view generally leads is rendered more explicit in Ricoeur's (1975) explanation of metaphorical meaning (cited in Gineste, Indurkha, and Scart 2000), which sees metaphor as a *semantic event* whose tension derives from, or resides in, both its processing properties (qua event) and its object-like status as a representation (of shared or created similarities). Now, while we may agree that metaphor is an event that bears meaning, it is not necessary that it creates a representation of that meaning and much less that this meaning comes out of language itself, as a semantic "system". Metaphor, we might say, is a symbolic activity, not a symbol. Given that it is language users who infer metaphorical meanings from certain utter-

1978) and the transfer of a vehicle's *salient* features to the metaphorical topic. The imagery hypothesis states that metaphor primarily creates something of an image, a vivid (nonlinguistic) representation that is firmly grounded in perceptual experience. Such a stance would certainly allow researchers of metaphor to avoid the inherent difficulties with semantic representation, which will be discussed below. At the same time, however, any talk about metaphor's communicative function betrays an interest in the interpretive nature of metaphor (what it does to people), rather than in its online characteristics. This emphasis is also apparent from many of the titles that are cited here, which repeatedly refer to aspects of metaphor "evaluation" and "appreciation".

ances (or sometimes consciously imbue them with something of a metaphorical “twist”), a pragmatic stance might be more suited to the issue of metaphor interpretation, as suggested, though perhaps for slightly different reasons, by Davidson (1978). Semantically, in terms of true or false propositions, there is indeed nothing extraordinary to say about metaphor: they are simply false (see also Vicente 1992).

4. Meaning as an object of psychology

Whether the hallmark of metaphorical meaning resides in the feature matching involved, in the emergence of an implicative complex, or in the mapping of conceptual structures associated with the metaphorical terms, in each case there is a presumption that measuring effects allows us to open up the mental lexicon and see how meanings are stored and organized inside. Remarkably, this presumption has been questioned only rarely, probably because a critique of (semantic) representationalism in today’s “cognitive revolution” would mainly come from philosophers, not linguists or cognitive scientists. Yet the philosophical claims at issue here cannot readily be reduced to a caricature — for instance, that of a strictly behaviorist position —, in that the relevance of meaning phenomena in natural language (processing) is not simply negated. Instead, a division of labor might be proposed between a cognitive (non-truth-conditional) semantics, as an essentially interpretive analytic endeavor, and those disciplines in the cognitive sciences that model processing in terms of (quite mechanistic) types of information management. As a result, semantic categories of natural language are viable theoretical constructs for semantics, “obeying” the internal “rules” that define this field, whereas they are first and foremost useful heuristic tools for the psychologist who wants to describe the architecture of the language processor. Thus, nobody is denying the “right” of psychologists to make use of semantic categories in their exploration of the mental regions that make up the “lexicon”. It has been done before, and quite successfully (cf. the literature on ambiguity resolution, e.g., Simpson 1994), and psychologists do need to jump at anything they can lay their hands on, lest they run out of heuristic procedures to feed their extremely indirect measuring techniques. Still, the use of semantic categories in psychological research does not imply that all of the qualities ascribed to them should simply be transferred as well. After all, for a psychologist interested in the mental lexicon, there are really not that many options. Either semantically complex categories (like ambiguous words or figurative utterances) point to extra processing efforts, or they do not. Now, while it would be a shame to reduce the set of possible research questions on metaphor to such binary concerns outside the field of experimental psychology, it would be equally regrettable in turn to expect psychologists to provide *reasons* why metaphor creates this effect, if at all. Language processors do not have reasons.

A few psycholinguists dealing with metaphor have occasionally brought up some of the more daunting problems to which the psychological study of meaning may lead. Katz (1992), for instance, is right to observe that all processing models in psychology, whatever the subject matter they apply to, force the analyst to take a stand on the issue of representation (in long-term memory, or the lexicon): which types of representation can be assumed, how do they relate to the computation of metaphorical meaning, and in which computational processes are they involved? Katz is not inclined, on the other hand, to let this stop him from articulating a seemingly given representational scheme anyway and examining it on its psychological implications. The scheme in question happens to be a variant on the traditional cognitive stance in this matter, the “physical symbol system” (Newell 1980), which holds that “to understand metaphor comprehension (and any other intelligent activity) one has to have a model of the representation of knowledge in permanent memory” (Katz 1992: 609). This knowledge is said to consist of concepts, which may be further subdivided into features. Perhaps, though, the problem is not that theories of representational schemes cannot be falsified, for they can, but rather that there is nothing we could possibly conceive of that should correspond to the theoretical entities posited in such schemes, even if (some of) these were proven “true”. Crucially, there is also a “social” aspect of rule following (or, in the case of metaphor, rule exploiting) that is essential to any meaning-oriented conception of language, yet it is one that is almost completely missing from the field of psycholinguistics proper. At this point, I would suggest that this is not a problem as long as the psycholinguistic enterprise concentrates on the mechanics, so to speak, of the language processor. This implies a strong abstinence from any claims concerning the availability of mental symbolic representations, because concepts and meanings — the stuff that linguistic representations are allegedly made of — are objects related to persons who use language, not to processors that process language, and they do therefore not “fit” the vocabulary of psycholinguistics. Any psychological theory of metaphor, insofar as it wants to model regions of the brain and their interactions, will thus need to provide an explanatory account of metaphor comprehension that does *not* refer to symbolic representations, either at an explicit or at an implicit level of analysis.

As suggested above, semantic categories may still be resorted to by the psycholinguist, but not in order to find their psychological or neural correlates, *qua* mental representations. The picture in such an alternative line of research is a slightly bigger one, namely, the viability of assuming a complete separation between conceptual and linguistic knowledge, which is a variation on the theme of modularity that pervades cognitivist thinking until today. In the case of lexical ambiguity research, for instance, it is important to note that so-called homonymous items react differently to the availability of disambiguating context from other classes of lexical items. While all meanings of a

homonymous word appear to be activated independently of such context, it is also suggested that the activation level subsequently drops dramatically for those meanings that are not relevant to the local processing concerns at hand (in contrast with lexical types instantiating other semantic relations, notably polysemy; see Brisard, Van Rillaer, and Sandra 2001). This pattern of (activation) behavior really defines a separate class of psychological phenomena, and it is the merit of linguistic semantics to have pointed out a category of words that can thus be used by psychologists interested in the influence of context on processing. It does not, however, automatically lead to the acceptance of a storage format (the symbolic representation of individual meanings or senses for a word) that presents meanings as static, given objects in the heads of language users. Even though standard accounts of lexical ambiguity do talk in terms of “activation levels”, presupposing that there is a representation to access and activate in the first place, we need not accept this format at face value just because the original hypotheses into which this type of research was cast did so. In fact, we can abandon all beliefs regarding the availability of symbolic representations in the mental lexicon and still accept the empirical validity of the research findings. While there is a psychologically relevant class of homonymous words that behaves differently with respect to other types in the lexicon, we cannot conclude from this (at least not until further notice) because homonymous words have their meanings “stored” separately and that other (polysemous or vague) words do not. Just so with metaphor, we could now propose. There are some indications, given by semantics, that metaphor is indeed a type of utterance that warrants special treatment. But whatever the specific reasons given for this in semantics, these should not lead psychologists in their investigation of the matter. It could still be, in principle, that metaphor is a special kind of object in semantics and in psychology, but for very different reasons. Thus, it might turn out that metaphor yields typical effects that can be measured in experimental settings, even though there are no independent reasons to assume that the language processor differentiates between such general categories as literal and figurative language use. Alternatively, it could be that metaphor is not a special psychological category at all, and that effects found in the study of metaphor actually point to a different variable, be it conventionality, contextual fit, or any other dimension that cuts across the dichotomy between the literal and the figurative. In both cases, psychologists thank semanticists for providing them with a potentially interesting object of study but research the issue quite independently, that is, without being bothered by the original hypotheses that have led to the identification of this object (or rather, of its correlate) in semantics.

The reasons for critically evaluating the conclusions that have been drawn from the research on lexical ambiguity might differ slightly from those involved in the assessment of the experimental study of metaphor in psychology, although an important region of overlap is bound to remain. Though metaphor is not primarily a matter of word meaning, in that it is created out of

the juxtaposition of at least two referents, it does rely on the availability of word meanings to construe an utterance meaning that can arguably be called metaphorical. In addition, the frequency and familiarity of certain metaphorical expressions may eventually cause the metaphorical use of a term to become so entrenched that it might rightfully be considered an extra meaning (or sense) of that term, so that we may now recognize that, in English, the expression *block of ice* can refer to a cold watery substance *or* to a person. Certainly, current online techniques would allow the exact localization of potential metaphorical effects on individual words, if such need should arise. But that would not solve the problem with symbolic representations noted for ambiguous words, and there is consequently no reason to assume that we should posit metaphorical senses or meanings as real psychological objects, even in cases of extreme conventionalization. From a philosophical angle, again, the emphasis on metaphor as a juxtaposition, and thus as an act or event, makes a lot more sense in the light of the previously noted critique of representationalism. It is not only problematic to assume the availability of symbolic representations within the mechanistic field of psycholinguistics. Ultimately, any object-like view of metaphor in particular is bound to meet with serious conceptual and theoretical difficulties, even in semantics. For what else is a metaphor but a certain type of usage event grounded in a communicative situation? Here, Wittgenstein's (1953) contextualism implies a radical critique of any type of meaning or intentional content as objects of inquiry. Now, to compute the meaning of a metaphor is not necessarily to reconstruct the intentions of the speaker, nor are meaning differences necessarily reflexive of differences in mental contents. Meanings lie in their contexts of use, and this is true a fortiori for metaphor, which calls for a pragmatic, or at least praxis-centered, approach by virtue of the very indeterminacy of metaphorical meaning. In short, no individual action, feeling, thought, or experience can be said to constitute *the* substance of metaphor (since all are part of a metaphor's vast range of "effects"). At a sufficiently abstract level, metaphor can still rightfully be considered a meaning phenomenon, but in this capacity it merely behaves similarly to other, nonmetaphorical instances of meaning. Whether we see this meaning of metaphor linguistically, conceptually, or in terms of imagery, the fact remains that no one object, mental or otherwise, can contain its significance within itself. In general, meaning differences are to be located in language games (or contexts of use), and not in the real objects denoted. This, of course, goes against a standard Fregean account of reference, since (metaphorical) sentences are not thought to denote objects in the requisite philosophical sense at all (that is, no objects can fix their meanings). But if meaning is not determined by an object, this goes for those semantic objects posited by the comparison and interaction views as well (cf. section 3). These models may not have succumbed to the temptations of a purely logical account of metaphor, but they too remain stuck in the belief that properties of metaphor (processing) can be *explained* by referring to representational objects in the mind (i.e., that they are *caused* by them).

5. Metaphor as a meaning event

A significant portion of the extant psycholinguistic research on metaphor processing concentrates on tracking the time course of processes of “retrieval” and comprehension (for a good overview, see Gibbs 1994). This is usually accomplished by assuming a set of variables whose influence on these mechanisms is to be empirically established for a range of metaphor types. These variables include the interpretive quality of metaphors (how easy or hard they are to make sense of), their degrees of conventionality, and the presence/absence of preceding context motivating the ground that is conjured up in a metaphor. In this respect, we may refer to a limited set of processing models that predict specific response patterns for metaphorical expressions set against a baseline of literal matches. Frisson and Pickering (2001) offer a useful list of models that have been proposed to account for the online comprehension of figurative language. Theirs is a somewhat unorthodox classification of models in the psychological literature on metaphor, because they focus on single word ambiguities, i.e., more or less restricted regions of a sentence where its literal or figurative status becomes clear in the course of incremental processing. This is a true online perspective on metaphor research, though, because it asks exactly *when* participants in an experimental setup need to “decide” whether they are dealing with a figurative utterance, and what to do with it. It does not ask what participants think of the metaphor they are confronted with, how they assess its meaning, or whether they can appreciate any of its esthetic or otherwise reflexive qualities.

The resolution of “sense ambiguity” (i.e., the ambiguity displayed by figurative expressions) may resemble that of true lexical ambiguity (homonyms) or, alternatively, it may be more in line with a polysemous organization of parts of the lexicon. A number of different theoretical options are available, then, to discuss the nature of the processing architecture that has to deal with figurative expressions. In its most modular form, the processor may be said to access meanings in order of frequency (regardless of the literal-figurative distinction), as in the case of lexical homonymy. Frisson and Pickering (2001) are quick to argue against this option for the case of figurative language, mainly on the basis of online research on sentence processing (see Frazier and Rayner 1990; Frazier 1999; Frazier, Pacht, and Rayner 1999) and assuming that the semantic link that can be postulated between an expression’s literal and figurative readings points to polysemy more than to homonymy.

Two conceptually related models, differing only in the processing priorities they assign, are “Literal First” and “Figurative First”. The former comes from the well-known linguistic-pragmatic tradition of thinking about metaphor, initiated by Grice and Searle. Literal First, at least theoretically, is a rea-

sonable model, because many experimental results suggest that figurative language is indeed processed more slowly than literal utterances. Crucially, however, context seems to affect this derived status of figurative meaning, in that the availability of enough contextual information preceding the metaphor will typically result in the disappearance of any metaphor effect. In addition, Literal First has difficulties explaining the automatic availability of metaphorical meanings in contexts where they are strictly speaking not called for (i.e., contexts that allow literal readings to make sense; see Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin 1982). Figurative First, on the other hand, posits the primacy of figurative meaning in contexts where that meaning would make sense (or rather, where it would make more sense than its literal counterpart). This is for the most part a purely theoretical option in the range of models that can be hypothesized for metaphor processing, but it has also been presented as a real, that is empirically documented, possibility. In that case, however, it looks as if the workability of Figurative First depends on an expression's high degree of conventionalization (as with idioms; cf. Gibbs 1980), so that it is in fact the collocational status of such constructions that is being described, and not per se their figurative nature. As a general model of metaphor processing, therefore, Figurative First seems highly unlikely. A more acceptable variation on this, also exploiting the theme of figurative readings that are accessed at least as fast as literal ones, is the "Direct Access" model, entertained by Gibbs (1994: 421) to account for the immediate availability of metaphorical readings in "realistic social contexts". Thus, Direct Access can explain both why metaphorical utterances are processed more slowly in environments where they do not benefit from any contextual support for their comprehension, and how the presence of sufficient contextual material may level out this processing difference. This model is, incidentally, several steps removed from the orthodoxy of any modularity hypothesis, which would state that context can only help processing after an initial, literal stage of comprehension.

There are two more models that serve as theoretical options in explaining the psychological mechanisms involved in the comprehension of metaphor. One of them, "Underspecification" (Frisson and Pickering 1999; Pickering and Frisson 2001), does not assume the initial activation of any specific meaning in processing a figurative expression, but posits instead that a schematic meaning is first accessed that is subsequently fleshed out according to contextual specifications and the progressive interpretation of the figurative utterance in which the target expression appears. Thus, it is not competition between various stored senses or meanings that is responsible for the processing difficulties found in a number of metaphorical conditions, but the possible delay caused by a processor that is, at a certain point in time, given insufficient information to settle on an appropriate meaning. Note that Underspecification only holds for established metaphorical senses, as there can be no available schematic meaning for a term that is used metaphorically in a creative, novel way. In that case, it is better to speak of sense creation (Gerrig

1989), which is expected to take more processing time than retrieval anyway. And so the contrast between figurative and literal utterance types may well turn out less useful than that between a number of other processing variables that have nothing to do with the discussion of literal truth and pragmatic inference. Novel metaphors may simply be instances of creative language use, next to many other forms of coining, extending, and exploiting meanings, and take up more processing time because of this, not because they are metaphorical. Conversely, established metaphors may come out as strict cases of polysemy, where the semantic link between a term's literal and metaphorical meanings prompts a type of processing behavior that befits other polysemous (as opposed to homonymous) expressions as well, figurative or not.

As far as processing established metaphors is concerned, then, and assuming that they behave like other polysemous items, it is hard to distinguish between the predictions of Underspecification and those of a "Parallel Activation" model, in which *all* available senses are activated regardless of their entrenchment or semantic status. What Underspecification adds to such a parallel model is the processing relevance of an emerging schema capturing all of the semantic commonalities of the instantiations in which it is immanent. But is it really necessary to conceive of such a schema once more as a separate semantic object, which can be accessed and whose contents can be retrieved? I suggest, in line with the general critique of representationalism, that it is not, in that the psychological relevance of a schema interfering with semantic processing may also be seen in terms of an emergent property of the language processor, without any physical status and therefore not localizable in the brain. Obviously, the same goes for all the other models that have been mentioned here, though I have presented them so far as if the respective formulations of their explanatory accounts, in terms of "accessing representations", were unproblematic. Insofar as these models assume the reality of symbolic mental representations, they run into the same theoretical and philosophical difficulties as identified for the comparison and interaction views on metaphor processing. Still, there is something critically distinctive, and worth entertaining, about models that investigate questions of modularity (or "incoherence"), and that is the fact that each of them addresses true online problems of metaphor processing, in the sense of focusing upon the sequential organization of semantic computation and pragmatic inferencing (i.e., the influence of context). The reason why, in contrast with comparison and interaction views, these various models, as a complex of hypotheses, do manage to produce a psychologically relevant research program in the study of metaphor is that they ask pertinent questions, and not necessarily because they provide the right answers to these questions. Even if we reject the explanatory power of mental representations in any account of metaphor processing, we can still proceed *as if* (one or several of) the models developed by these different theories describe the actual behavior of the language processor, as probed under very precise conditions, in an accurate way (provided, of course, that their

predictions are empirically borne out). Without attributing attested effects to the presence of representations, the very same effects can still give us useful clues as to the relevance or meaninglessness of cutting up the language processor into different modules that do or do not relate to each other in more or less interactive ways. For psychology, the real question is not which kinds of representation are involved in metaphor processing or what their internal structure is like, but how processing units, regardless of the specific formats they may assume, function with respect to each other, and in particular how their sequential organization is managed.

Taken together, the models discussed in the present section can, in principle, provide us with valid research questions for a psychological approach to online metaphor comprehension that does not treat the availability of symbolic representations in the mind as a given. In this sense, their focus on the dynamics of semantic processing outweighs any kind of representational claim that might be made by them at the same time. There is one more caveat, though. It is a methodological one, with serious consequences for the interpretation of experimental results. Such models, whether or not they presume a literal bias in mechanisms of semantic processing, call for a genuine and fine-grained online measuring technique, since they focus on locally activated patterns of comprehension that could remain undetected when only global processing times are considered. Moreover, they cannot rightfully resort to indirect measures of processing, such as asking participants to determine whether a sentence is true or acceptable or to rate sentences offline, and still claim to be asking the same types of question. This requirement contrasts with previously adopted techniques in metaphor research, which often rely on measures that are too crude or tasks that are too far removed from natural interpretive behavior to assess online characteristics of metaphors (see also Frisson and Pickering 1999 and Brisard, Frisson, and Sandra 2001). More specifically, if the dynamic nature of metaphor processing is to be examined, the process of reading (or listening to) metaphors must be tapped online, i.e., during the word-for-word presentation of the metaphorical stimulus sentence. If reaction times are measured for complete metaphorical sentences only, other components of metaphor interpretation, like the actual appreciation of the metaphor in question (Gibbs 1992), will have already had a chance to interfere in the course of processing. Thus, measures for entire sentences or large sentence fragments may well miss early effects of metaphor processing. What is more, even the very presence of an effect in such experimental designs that are too crude would still not allow its exact localization (i.e., where it begins to emerge and how long it persists), while its absence (the null effect) may be due to the fact that the effect has been drowned in the sum of all individual data points. In order to make statements on the processing routine itself, one must therefore track the course of comprehension more meticulously, as has also been argued by Dascal (1989). This is what can be achieved by using a variety of online techniques, such as self-paced reading and moving-window

tracking, as well as a host of neurolinguistic measurement and imaging paradigms. The point of using any one of these techniques would be twofold: (i) to allow participants to deal with metaphors in a more or less natural way, that is, without any interference from some experimental task that is imposed upon them in addition to simply processing the metaphors; and (ii) to track the ensuing interpretive behavior of participants on a word-by-word basis, making sure that the distinction between conventional and novel metaphors, as well as other relevant factors, are systematically controlled for in the design of the stimuli.

6. Conclusion

I suggest that, from a psycholinguistic perspective, architectural concerns are among the few valid research questions that can be tackled with the help of chronometry. As a result, there is very little room for interdisciplinarity in the field of metaphor research in psychology, as the question of metaphor within the structure of the language processor does not necessarily relate to its status in semantic or pragmatic theories of meaning. At best, linguistics can contribute to the psychological study of metaphor in providing descriptions of categories that may or may not address issues of interpretive autonomy and/or interaction by tapping into distinct processing routines (on analogy with ambiguity research in semantics and syntax, which offers a similar way into the study of semantic processing). In this case, psychology makes use of linguistic categories, but only as heuristic devices that motivate the application of an explicitly psychological line of research (modularity) to various domains of language use, instead of defining a separate object of study in its own right. This implies that metaphor is not seen as a semantic object with a real correlate in the mental lexicon, but rather as a type of event that may trigger different processing strategies, depending on the architecture of the brain.

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METAFORE SU DOGAĐAJI, A NE PREDMETI

U članku se raspravlja o sukobu lingvističkog i psihološkog pristupa metafori. Cilj je pokazati da svi interdisciplinarni naponi ne donose jednaku korist gledaju li se ciljevi pojedinih disciplina. U slučaju psihološkog istraživanja metafore interdisciplinarnost se zapravo svodi na heuristički odnos, tj. lingvist ustanovljava parametre korisne pri definiranju predmeta proučavanja te tako omogućuje psiholingvistu da se približi svom općenitom cilju, proučavanju arhitekture jezičnog procesora. Iz toga slijedi da je postojeća podjela rada između lingvistike i psiholingvistike nužna realnost, a ne slučajnost. U prilogu se u argumentaciji polazi od opažanja da proučavanje semantičkih aspekata prirodnih jezika sve više i više karakterizira navodno sužavanje pažnje isključivo na osobine mozga kao sjedišta mentalnog leksikona, te tako isključuje interpretativnu moć jedinke u čijem je sklopu taj mozak. Posebna se pažnja posvećuje metodološkim problemima do koji dovodi heteronomni aspekt razumijevanja metafore, kao i teoretskim problemima pri definiciji metafore kao predmeta proučavanja u divergentnim disciplinama.

Ključne riječi: mentalni leksikon, metafora, modularnost, pragmatika, semantička obrada

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Hypothesis and deduction in the studies of the discourse of advertising

The paper is an attempt to show that a discourse type can in itself be an analytic determinant, i.e. that it can effectively dictate methods of investigating it. This claim is illustrated by a study of the discourse of advertising, or rather, of how the discourse of advertising motivates an analyst to adopt a specific track of analysis. In the paper, the discourse of advertising is shown to possess certain properties which favor a deduction-based approach to analysis, whereby an analyst is likely to postulate about a given text's function *a priori*, that is before an inquiry into particular samples of textual data takes place. This approach may lead to a number of analytic fallacies such as, for instance, underspecification of data supporting the thesis or illustration of thesis with atypical or even irrelevant data.

Keywords: discourse analysis, linguistic pragmatics, advertising, linguistic methodology, deduction, 'top-down' analysis, induction, 'bottom-up' analysis, persuasion, rhetoric.

1. Introduction

The present paper aims at outlining ways in which a sample type of persuasive discourse, namely the discourse of advertising, affects the way(s) in which it is approached analytically from the perspective of formal pragmatics and discourse studies. It is very often assumed (cf. Beaugrande 1991; Wilson

1990, etc.) that discourses which rely on high density of macropropositional cues as well as discourses which involve more condensed or consolidated text samples have a tendency to be approached in analysis in an inductive, “bottom-up” manner. Since discourse of advertising is to a large extent a discourse of highly meaningful word-puns, hard-hitting slogans or other textual devices characteristic of a maximum economy of expression, it might seem logical to expect language-of-advertising analysts to follow largely similar tracks, whereby data collection and componential analysis are both necessary and sufficient tools to generate thesis.

While not detracting from partial accuracy of this assumption, the following discussion brings up a prevailing proportion of argument to the contrary. It attempts to show that, although discourse of advertising is not completely devoid of “bottom-up” prompts, a vast majority of analytic activity in the field is affected by “top-down” determinism, which manifests itself in particular texts being approached with a clear-cut hypothesis regarding their function and indicators of this function represented in both form and content of the analyzed text sample.

2. Literature on advertising and idealized models of advertising rhetoric

Post-war discourse analysis and explorations in propaganda and persuasion in particular get a high mileage out of language-of-advertising research, on both sides of the Atlantic. Studies by Ogilvy (1964), Leech (1966), Turner and Pearson (1966), Goffman (1976), Williamson (1978), Dyer (1982), Schudson (1984), Vestergaard and Schroeder (1985), Chapman (1986), Lutz (1990), Myers (1994), and Goddard (1998) are only among better-known instances of this massive research, but they nonetheless give a fair picture of the analytic attitude to discourse of advertising which has developed over the past fifty years. To put it somewhat simplistically, all these studies demonstrate a tendency to presuppose *a priori* about manipulative character of advertisements, reflected in a clever application of several standard (though definitely heterogeneous) features, such as the use of alliteration/assonance, rhyme, reiteration of weasel words, unfinished comparisons, parity claims, etc. In the quoted literature, practically all research into these features is a research in cue distribution, not interaction. This appears to follow from the relatively uncomplicated character of developing a hypothesis concerning the function of advertising, which is commonly (and by no means truthlessly) seen as a tool to make the addressee pursue an action (i.e. buy a product) or develop some kind of favorable mental state toward an action (i.e. admit possibility of buying a product at a later date). The point is, however, that although this hy-

pothesis is probably true, the readiness of developing it seriously hinders further investigation into the many consistently-structured, homogeneously grammatical elements which underlie such effective advertising.

In fact, little needs to be said about why analysts should be so prone to postulate *a priori* claims concerning language of advertising. Over years, as world markets have come to be dominated by same product brands, so have the marketing and advertising outlets. A Coca-Cola ad is nowadays much more likely to attract (in the same form) worldwide attention than it used to, say, thirty years ago. And since majority of language analysts are exposed to similar advertising experience, with similar products, in similar time, it comes hence as little surprise to see similar analytic layouts pursued worldwide.¹

Post-war analytic attitude to the discourse of advertising is still representatively manifested in Lutz (1990), Myers (1994), and Goddard (1998), though these works, being relatively new in the field, do invite certain shift in approach to analysis of advertisements, which, ironically, might well result from the proliferation of similar attitudes demonstrated in earlier studies. For all these reasons, analyses by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard will be quoted and commented on extensively in this paper.

3. Criteria of manifestation of “top-down” approach to discourse of advertising

In subsections 3.1-3.4 I look at how studies by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard have been affected by “top-down” determinism and which of the tenets and strategies of their analyses have undergone such overdetermination to greatest extent. There are four analytic activity domains postulated, each of which is claimed to have been affected differently in each of the quoted studies. These are:

- *data vs thesis placement*, involving the placement of definition of (a) given discourse function(s), in relation to the whole of the data examined with a view to formulating this definition;
- *degree and frequency of occurrence and placement of componential data support*, involving absence/presence and status of textual exemplification of thesis definitions, as well as placement of particular samples vis a vis the thesis;

¹ This observation has much in common with the description of some political language analysts as being ‘part of the scene of events’ and therefore offering studies of highly deductive nature (cf. Wilson 1990).

- *ratio of data amount to thesis amount*, involving a statistical look at the analyst's balancing of the data/thesis parts in terms of management of the writing space;
- *radicalism of thesis*, involving investigation of language forms and their illocutionary capacity of scientific persuasion.

3.1. *Data vs thesis placement*

One of the most striking manifestations of “top-down” determination in studies by Lutz, Myers and Goddard is placement of thesis statement prior to data analysis. The latter is hardly ever (occasionally in Lutz) followed by any reiteration of the thesis, since the thesis is considered too evident to pose a need for reiteration. The assumption of clarity and straightforwardness of the thesis further affects data presentation, in the sense that data components are shown to occur randomly, rather than interact with one another. In other words, the analysis adheres predominantly to the visuality of the text/image sample, at the expense of an autonomous investigation of the lexis/grammar used.

These tendencies are most radically exemplified in Goddard's study, where thesis statements about advertisements are all voiced in the “Introduction” (and never reiterated later), while the question of the definition of advertisement is first tackled (in, arguably, somewhat trivialized manner) in “Chapter 1”, with a sample analysis (or rather simple description of an ad) following yet later in “Chapter” 2:

Make no mistake: advertising works [...]. It is not difficult to see that and why advertisers should want to make their texts capture our attention. The whole aim of the copywriters is to get us to register their communication either for purposes of immediate action or to make us more favourably disposed in general terms to the advertised product or service. (1998:2, “Introduction”)

Advertising is so familiar to modern readers that it may seem odd to ask what an advertisement is [...]. At the root of the word ‘advertisement’ is the Latin verb ‘advertere’, meaning ‘to turn towards’ [...]. Often, though, classifications [of advertisements] are more a question of degree rather than of absolutes. For example, clothing in its broadest sense can be seen as advertising ideas about the wearer, but manufacturer's labels on clothing are a direct strategy of getting free publicity. Therefore, central to the idea of an advert appears to be the factor of conscious intention behind the text, with the aim of benefiting the originator... . (:7, “Chapter 1”)

[...] One attention-seeking strategy [...] is the startling image, combined with emotionally stirring text. The Benetton clothing company, for example, showed a series of large-scale hoardings which featured real scenes of life and death - a baby being born, covered in blood from the mother's womb, a man on his deathbed, some of them shockingly coupled with a sequence of universally-appealing, emotion words... . (:13, "Chapter 2")

It seems from Goddard's study that an approach so radical, in terms of the formulation of hypothesis about function of the text, might strongly affect what I shall henceforth call 'management of the writing space', that is, the whole complexity of the build-up of analysis, or, in yet other words, any analytic activity involving the quantity and sequencing of data and theory. Before commenting further on Goddard, however, it is worthwhile to point to a couple of issues underlying the study by Lutz (1990), an analysis being eight years older than Goddard's, and apparently indicative of methodological tendencies which have subsequently grown into a problem for analysts of advertising in late 1990s.

Lutz's study offers what might be called a 'deductive catharsis' in advertising analysis. He is in fact the first analyst to have posed an ultra-clear set of hypothesis concerning the language of advertising ("advertisers try to wrap their claims in language that sounds specific and objective, when in fact the language of advertising is anything but", "Unfinished comparisons abound in advertising since they create a possibility of filling the claims differently by different addressees", "The biggest weasel word used in advertising is 'help'; once the advertisement starts with 'help', it can develop to make whatever (insincere) promise or claim, because 'help' qualifies all the follow-up of the sentence" (Lutz 1990 :85-9), and many more), to have limited data's function to a *a posteriori* presentation, and to have gone to the final extreme of almost ignoring data analysis after its presentation. As a result, Lutz's analysis would turn into a series of exemplification chunks, each looking more or less in the following way:

HYPOTHESIS

(e.g.)

One of the most powerful weasel words is "virtually" [...]. "Virtually" is used in advertising claims that appear to make specific, definite promises when there is no promise. (Lutz 1990: 88)

DATA

(ctd. from the same example)

In 1971 a federal court rendered its decision on a case brought by a woman who became pregnant while taking birth control pills. She sued

the manufacturer for breach of warranty. The woman lost her case. Basing its ruling on a statement in the pamphlet accompanying the pills, which stated that, "When taken as directed, the tablets offer virtually 100% protection," the court ruled that there was no warranty, expressed or implied, that the pills were absolutely effective. In its ruling, the court pointed out that, according to *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, "virtually" means "almost entirely" and clearly does not mean "absolute" (*Whittington versus Eli Lilly and Company*, 333 F. Supp. 98). (Lutz 1990: 88)

THESIS

(ctd. from the same example)

[...] So whenever one encounters an ad claim that uses the word "virtually", one should translate that claim into its real meaning, which is "in essence or effect, although not in fact." (:88)

However, in an attempt to keep the addressee constantly preoccupied with his (hypo)thesis claims, Lutz would use a massive number of examples, each needing or in fact just naturally entailing a hypothesis-thesis wrap-up of the kind quoted above. Goddard, in turn, is quite reluctant to use multiple examples, especially if they should concern everyday commercial advertising. Whatever the reason (reluctance of mental plagiarism?; fear of triviality?), this seems to prove that with the 'hypothesis space' almost filled up (here: by authors such as Lutz), the analyst is tempted to take all the established pre-conceptions about the function of the analyzed discourse 'for granted', voice them out concisely, and possibly look for some atypical instances of this discourse, which have not yet been accounted for. And this is what is clearly manifested in Goddard's writing, as she makes up for the limited hypothesis space with an inflated data-analysis space - yet never concerning the principal issue of commercial advertising, but an apparently marginal subject of non-profit advertising (this tendency is especially provoking in the light of Goddard's "Introduction", in which there is no hint whatsoever as to her being interested in this subtype of ad discourse).

3.2. Degree and frequency of occurrence and placement of componential data support

This last observation on Goddard's writing leads us to consideration of language of advertising via the prism of its increasing and ever-changing (also diachronically) determination of data support. A diachronic look at works by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard reveals an increasingly greater role of the status of function-defining hypothesis in data presentation and/or analysis. Seemingly,

the bigger the perception of hypothesis as objective (this awareness will naturally grow in the analyst over time, as homogeneity of the discourse and its source in real-world context increases), the smaller the amount of data related to the principal discourse under investigation. And consequently, the bigger the perception of hypothesis as objective, the bigger the amount of data related to atypical manifestations of the same discourse. These observations are reflected in Goddard's (1998: 9-13) analysis of an anti-tobacco ad, which takes the space of four pages to develop (contrary to mini-analyses of commercial advertising), offers linear approach to the study of wording (a substantial degree of pragmatics-based metalanguage is used - "pragmatically presupposes...", "illocutionary point", etc. - unlike in analyses of commercial ads), and although does not reiterate the hypothesis of the effectiveness of advertising (1998: 9), still goes a long way in data presentation to have the addressee develop such reiteration for him/herself.

In her analysis Goddard is unable, however, to restructure her hypothesis in such a way as to make it stem from anything but 'visuality' of the discourse context. Hence, her study is overdetermined by the perception of the effectiveness of commercial advertising, quite fallaciously applied in her approach to non-profit advertising, a subtype which must be, logically, quite different from the main type.

Myers (1994) encounters the same problem of visual determination, by real-world factors. His study is also somewhat more clearly indicative of the determination of (specifically) the frequency and placement of data. Therefore, in the rest of the present subsection I shall first quote (with minor cuts) a sample analysis by Myers, then point to data determination manifested in it, and finally offer an enriched analytic approach to the quoted case, applying some of the "bottom-up" orientation which has been missing from the original analysis.

(quoted after Myers 1994:2-4, paragraph structure retained, numbering mine)

(1)

Here is a description of an exciting advertisement for a chocolate bar that appeared in the middle of a broadcast of Disney's *The Reluctant Dragon*. [...] The ad begins with the pop song 'Oh oh oh it's magic', and the O on the screen becomes lips. Then it runs through a series of snatches of songs and phrases, each with an 'Oh' in it, each for just a few seconds (a doctor saying 'Say oh,' a reggae song, Mendelsohn's 'Oh for the wings of a dove', Al Jolson, from *The Jazz Singer*) and for each the cartoon O is transformed to illustrate the soundtrack. The slogan 'It's the air in your Aero that makes you go O' comes with a picture of the chocolate bar at the end [...].

(2)

Now you could argue that with so much exciting going on, language was not very important to this ad. It would certainly fall flat if you just read the script for it, or just had the slogan. But it makes extraordinarily deft play with language at a number of levels [...].

(3)

We could start with the slogan *It's the air in your Aero that makes you go O*. This plays on the relationship between *Oh*, the exclamation, the shape of the letter *O*, and the sound /o/ as part of the product name. The pattern of these *Oh-O-/o/s* relies on linked choices. The sounds that go with the letters *air* and the *o* are both repeated. [...] Not only that, the pattern of stresses makes a regular metre - two unstressed syllables followed by a stressed syllable (*It's the AIR in your AERo that MAKES you go O*). You can test the effect by trying to rephrase the ad without the poetic effects - *An Aero is full of holes that make you say Ah* - the point is the same but it's not very catchy or memorable [...].

(4)

The rest of the ad is an elaborate series of plays on the slogan. It starts with a metaphorical relation between the *O* at the end of the product name and the mouth that eats the product. This provides the basis for a series of phrases, all linked by an *Oh* [...].

(5)

The structure of this slogan is also crucial to its effect. It is constructed to put the product name near the end, where it will have maximum weight. But the Aero slogan is a statement. It doesn't tell us or ask us to eat Aero chocolate but states something about the Aero bars we already eat - one important result of stepping back from the ad this way and analysing the language is that we learn to see choices; we realize even with a slogan that has been thoroughly drummed into us, it could have been otherwise [...].

(6)

We can get that far just looking at the linguistic features of the ads in isolation - in some ads there will be very complex formal play with these patterns, and in others not much. but of course the effect does not just arise from a repeated *O*, from the regularity in the occurrence of a letter. Each variation of the *O* has different associations - medical language, a concert recital, rock and roll, reggae, soul. They are not only different kinds of music, they are done with identifiably different social varieties of English. It's an effect like flipping the channels on a TV, or like the snatches juxtaposed in house music, or like leafing through some pop music magazines. And the different voices alternate male and female, high and low, ending with a very deep voice with exaggerated intonation, and a very feminine voice, also with exaggerated intonation [...].

(7)

These associations and meaning are confirmed by the little sketches that flash around the *O* - palm trees or hands or a mirror or wings [...]. The associations are crucial to the effect of the ad - for instance the suggestive mock sexiness of the last two voices. It's not sex it promises; it's a kind of excitement - as if adding holes was adding something. There are also double meanings, so that the *O*s are at the same time holes, letters, and exclamations. Puns like this are particularly common in contemporary British advertising [...]. Part of the effect of these ads is their relation to other cultural artefacts - what is called *intertextuality*. One may not be able to trace all the linguistic and musical allusions in the Aero ad, but one does recognize them as allusions to different periods and subcultures. All ads, even those making no explicit allusions, carry associations from other texts: ads, movies, novels, everyday talk. Language in ads comes to us used.

As can be seen from this study, almost each time a linguistic point is made, it is offset by an extralinguistic observation. It is somewhat as if Myers couldn't stop being monitored by what he (in some probability, subconsciously) perceives to be the genuine reason for the effectiveness of advertising, that is, a well-worked out and consistent build-up of image. In his analysis, Myers typifies an analyst of a homogeneous discourse genre whose function is pre-defined and therefore calls for little data support. There are language data points raised throughout the argument (cf. para. 2, 3, 5, 6), but these are invariably interspersed with real-world-context based clarifications (esp. para. 1, 2, 4, 7). Occasionally, a language data point is made implicitly; for instance, the closing part of para. 3 invites discussion of theme and rheme, or topic/comment, but a further interrelated observation is withheld until para. 5 ("...to put the product name till the end..."), and even as such gets downplayed by the general comment that follows ("...one important result of..."). It is also interesting to look at the placement of the word "exciting" in the analysis. As this word, in Myers's (subconscious?) understanding, provides a bridge with the effect of advertising that can be observed in real-world context (and it is probably a well-entrenched image of consumer behaviour that serves as a basis here), the distribution of "exciting" or "excitement" is always among visual data, not language data (cf. para. 1, 2, 7). In paragraph 1 it occurs with localization of the advertisement, in paragraph 2 it precedes a strong assertion of the action movement underlying the ad ("going on"), and in paragraph 7 it occurs with an image description. Finally, it has to be noted that the bulk of the 'linguistic' commentary on the ad relies on phonetic and phonological accounts, that is, the accounts of sounds and sound patterns which can again be "seen" (or rather sensed in an act of hearing) in real-world context.

As a result of being monitored by extralinguistic considerations, the structure of the argument gives the analyst little space to "pick up speed" to develop the otherwise interesting points which could explain the effectiveness

of the advertisement in linguistic terms, by adhering to such concepts as pragmatic presupposition (para. 5: "...but states something about the Aero bars we already eat...") or cleft sentence structuring (cf. later analysis in the present subsection). The use of these concepts should not entail any unnecessary and abundant formalization; it should be approached as a tool for generalization of the analytic findings characteristic of the given sample, but at the same time clearly representative of the whole of the source discourse. Thus Myers's analysis turns out not so much faulty as simply incomplete, both critically at the sample level and methodologically at the genre level. And it should be stressed again at this point that the incompleteness of Myers's study results from the fragmented occurrence of language data support within an analytic space which is dominated by all kinds of extralinguistic accounts. Ironically, it is a linguist here that tends to admit the inferiority (!) of language description (cf. para. 6: "We can get that far just looking at the linguistic features of the ads in isolation...") or dares to make a strong claim in favor of componential research (cf. para. 2: "But it makes extraordinarily deft play with language at a number of levels..."), with little or no follow-up to come. But this tendency only goes to show the degree of determination in analysis of a discourse which an analyst is part of and thus holds a well-defined, homogeneous attitude to its function. The following discussion attempts to show how the quoted analysis could possibly profit from the shake-off of such attitudes which, as has been claimed, appear to stem largely from over-attachment to cognitive factors.

Predominantly, it is the status and function of the presupposition made in the ad ("your Aero") that needs to be accounted for. It is an existential presupposition (cf. Karttunen et al. 1979; Kempson 1975; Cole 1981; Levinson 1983 and later works), under which it is taken for granted that the addressee is familiar with the object being referred to, which in this case is the advertised chocolate bar. Assuming that the addressee, under normal circumstances, has a variety of chocolate bars to choose from and therefore cannot be reasonably expected to show any particular familiarity with (or priority for) a specific brand, the use of presupposition in the advertisement goes a long way toward establishing addressee's favorable attitude to the very product which is advertised. It is namely quite clear (cf. Festinger 1957; Fishbein and Ajzen 1980; Bandura 1986; Noelle-Neumann 1991; Jowett and O'Donnell 1992, and others²) that an addressee will better accept a novel idea or develop a novel behavior which is in line with his/her predispositions. The presupposition made in the ad defines these predispositions. Furthermore, by imposing relationship

² The quoted works give a fair diachronic outline of one of the most influential theories in post-war studies in social psychology, usually referred to as "consistency theory". This theory provides a methodological basis for all psychologically-oriented claims made in the analysis of the presupposition in the Aero advertisement.

between the brand name and the consumer, it paves the way for perception of familiarity with the product and makes it possible for the product to fall within the addressee's latitude of acceptance, rather than rejection. Far from ruining the addressee's psychological need for *homeostasis*, it actually fosters his/her consistency in belief. In short, the use of the existential presupposition in the Aero ad seems to be a conscious strategy on the part of the slogan's author, a strategy of constructing a linguistic facilitator of acceptance and internalization of a novel behavior desired from the addressee.

As it seems, this last observation could apply to the whole category of advertisements carrying existential (as well as non-existential) presuppositions. Even though neither Lutz, Myers, nor Goddard approach presuppositions analytically (or, in fact, hardly ever use the very term "presupposition" in the first place), the examples used in particular analyses abound with them:

- (1) The wonder drug that works wonders (Lutz 1990: 101)

(Bayer aspirine ad, presupposing familiarity with Bayer aspirine tablets)

- (2) Your oil for life (Lutz 1990: 101)

(Puritan cooking oil ad, presupposing previous use of the oil)

- (3) A cocoa you can enjoy (Myers 1994: 30)

(Van Houten's cocoa ad, presupposing previous negative experience with other cocoa brands)

- (4) Amazingly pays in your glazing (Myers 1994: 35)

(Pilkington glass ad, presupposing existence of context for use of the product)

- (5) It can stop the pain (Goddard 1998: 33)

(Sinutab painkiller ad, presupposing addressee's condition)

The parenthesis explanations of particular presuppositions are missing from the studies by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard, while each of these explanations could signpost a larger functional domain in advertising in general. It is beyond the scope of the present work to develop these considerations further. The point has to be made, however, that it is the absence of metalanguage that hinders the analytic generalizations. And in turn, the use of metalanguage - as

has been argued before - is seriously constrained in a deductive, “top-down” approach to the analysis of advertising.

3.3. *Ratio of data amount to thesis amount*

Although previous subsections have offered several observations on how Lutz, Myers, and Goddard manage exemplifications of claims on the function(s) of advertising, some further comments need to be made on representation of thesis and data in statistical terms. Simultaneously, there are certain diachronically-oriented implications of this representation that deserve a separate comment. Assuming that thesis parts are those in which the analyst makes a point on the function and effectiveness of advertising, either in the case of an individual sample or in general (including hypothetically-put claims), and the data parts are those where particular text samples are presented and analyzed, a breakdown look at studies by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard reveals the following figures and regularities. Within the domain of commercial advertising, there are 35 thesis paragraphs vis a vis 105 data paragraphs in Lutz, 25 thesis paragraphs versus 40 data paragraphs in Myers, and, astonishingly, 5 (!) thesis paragraphs vis a vis 5 data paragraphs in Goddard. This doesn't, however, mean that Myers and Goddard offer pamphlet-like discussions. Quite to the contrary, there are as many as 30 data paragraphs which deal with *non-commercial* (e.g. by non-profit institutions) advertising in Myers (accompanied by no respective thesis paragraphs), and further 50 (!) non-commercial data paragraphs in Goddard (again, with no extra thesis parts). In the light of Lutz, Myers, and Goddard starting out their arguments with introductory claims adhering solely to *commercial* advertising, it seems logical to postulate the following hypothesis: analysis of advertising suffers from increasing overdetermination by ‘self-monitor of descriptive triviality’. Over time, analysts of advertising keep cutting down on self-evident claims and examples, but at the same time, finding themselves with less and less principal data remaining to support introductory thesis parts, they back up the latter with atypical data. In so doing, they invariably pursue analytic manipulation, stemming from proliferation of like studies of the analyzed genre and like attitudes to it.

3.4. *Radicalism of thesis*

This parameter of “top-down” determination has been remaining relatively stable over the past decade of advertising studies (at least in terms of its presence), though, as has been mentioned before, there is a tendency among ana-

lysts to postulate increasingly radical claims regarding nature, function, or effectiveness of advertising. The radicalism of these claims is manifested in the way particular points are made, how categorical they are (for instance, in terms of the economy of argument layout), how global or far-reaching they are, and what degree of illocutionary force they possess. First of all, (hypo)thesis claims are radicalized by virtue of being packaged as directives or strong, occasionally metaphorized, assertions, imposing ‘undeniable’ truths in limited language context within single-sentence space. This is readily seen from Goddard and Lutz:

- (6) Make no mistake: advertising works (Goddard 1998: 2)
- (7) Children eat, drink, and breathe commercials (Lutz 1990: 74)
- (8) Now comes the interesting part. Follow this closely [...] (Lutz 1990: 74)
(description of the mechanism of advertising industry follows)

Secondly, thesis claims are made radical by being presented as containing elements of threat to the addressee of advertising. Since there are also the ‘advice’ parts, attempting to help the addressee neutralize the threat, such structuring of thesis claims tends to produce slightly longer sentences:

- (9) The next time you see an advertisement for... [...], don’t rush out to buy it (Lutz 1990: 86)
- (10) Helpless audiences reconstruct advertisements in diverse ways, filling them in with their own meanings (Myers 1994: 7)

Coupled with the threat elements are, finally, lexical structures which radicalize thesis claims by pointing to the globality or macro-range of advertising industry. These are responsible for constructing the aura of overall advertising experience whereby not a single addressee remains beyond the effect of advertising. Again, the presence of such structures may affect length or complexity of argument undertaken within single-sentence space (cf. forthcoming examples from Myers and Lutz):

- (11) Advertisements offer a world-extensive relationship between the advertiser and all possible audience members, based on the associations of all possible meanings with all possible commodities (Myers 1994: 8)
- (12) Advertising is so familiar to modern readers that it may seem odd to inquire what an advertisement is (Goddard 1998: 5)

- (13) Studies such as... [...] offer a lot of information about the sheer size and influence of advertising, but a person usually maintains that, while others may be and probably are affected by advertising, he/she knows that he/she is not, and this is exactly what advertisers attempt to accomplish (Lutz 1990: 77)

On a somewhat digressive note, it has to be pointed that example (12) from Goddard is also quite indicative of what was called ‘self-monitor of descriptive triviality’ (cf. subsection 3.3).

However, the most important observation is that the overwhelming majority of suchlike claims will be inalienable property of introductory parts of the particular studies. Highly radical (hypo)thesis claims are made prior to actual data presentation and analysis. And the reason why these claims can hardly be called either ‘hypotheses’ or ‘theses’ is that the analysis itself is hardly ever profound enough to allow such distinction.

4. A “bottom-up” element in the analysis of advertising

Under specific circumstances, language of advertising may invite a minor dose of inductivist analysis. It can be seen from Goddard’s case that if hypothesis space is limited and/or if (hypo)thesis claims are, in analyst’s eyes, too evident to be reiterated after presentation of data, the analyst may choose to investigate data in a componential, linear manner, as well as treat the parameters of such investigation as mutually interactive rather than mutually exclusive. Though in Goddard this has meant merely illustrating conventionalized claims with atypical data samples, it seems possible to imagine a different analytic track, where the hypothesis is still clearly definable, but where the data gets to be thoroughly examined for derivation of a subsequent thesis claim. Consider the following slogan.

- (14) Up to 50% off!

There is little that can be postulated prior to the analysis of this ad other than that the author attempts to persuade the addressee into buying the product by making the addressee pick out a single, non-representative meaning of (exactly) *50% off*, out of the whole range of meanings which are less ‘acceptable’. This hypothesis naturally stays in line with the general hypothesis of the effectiveness of advertising as based on manipulative enactment of various linguistic and non-linguistic ploys. But at the same time the analyst might ask him/herself the following question: how come that with the initial conclusion being so readily available to *both* analysts *and* consumers (though a lay-

man-consumer will probably 'skip' the latter part of it), the slogan still seems to work? And the result of posing such question might well be an analysis whereby the apparently clear and evident hypothesis gets to some degree modified before it is reiterated in a thesis format.

The considerations that the analyst might want to undertake involve, namely, an essentially paradigmatic look at the occurrence and status of other *up to* advertisements. There are ads for medicines that work 'up to ten times faster', batteries that last 'up to twice as long', and soaps that get the skin 'up to twice as clean'. They are all based on ideal situations for using those products, which the addressee is hardly likely to experience him/herself. But still, the addressee may and usually will aspire to find him/herself in such privileged position and it is the advertisement as a whole that fosters this aspiration. The point is that the effectiveness of *up to* slogans lies not so much in what the target of addressee's aspirations (exactly) is, as in the very existence of a certain range of lucky options available to the addressee to make his/her aspirations fulfilled. It is at least doubtful the addressee should develop the same perception of quality of the sale products from a shorter, standardized *50% off!* slogan. Rather, he/she would question their quality on the very basis of this standardness. In that sense, the *up to* part is just as crucial to the effectiveness of the advertisement as is the *50% off!* part, or rather, what is really crucial is the swift interaction of both. To recognize this, however, one needs a paradigmatic look which takes into account the maximum manifestation of consumer behavior in a maximum number of situations, a look which builds up a social rule out of a range of individual cases.

5. Conclusion

The discourse of advertising seems to invite a substantial degree of "top-down", deductive determination. Simultaneously, it offers relatively limited scope for "bottom-up", inductive research. There are a vast number of analytic activities which are affected. The major and most typical manifestations of "top-down" determinism are the following:

- redefinition of the status and the role of hypothesis and thesis in construction of analytic argument; treatment of hypothesis and thesis in like terms and the resulting placement of most or even all hypo(thesis) claims prior to data presentation/analysis;
- selection of data adhering mostly to visual/sensory experience; underassessment of intralinguistic, autonomous data chunks;

- little or no concern for data interaction, i.e. derivation of larger functional units (of, for example, speech event format) out of individual data samples;
- occasional reliance on data atypical of the principal manifestations of the analyzed discourse genre, following from perception of the general hypothesis as 'too' objective or evident to yield interesting discussion throughout the development of the argument;
- ever-increasing radicalism of (hypo)thesis claims, manifested in sentence structuring, length, as well as their illocutionary load.

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HIPOTEZA I DEDUKCIJA U PROUČAVANJU DISKURSA REKLAMNIH PORUKA

U prilogu se pokušava pokazati da tip diskursa već sam po sebi može odrediti analitički postupak, tj. može stvarno diktirati kojim će ga se metodama istraživati. Tu se tvrdnju ilustrira na primjeru proučavanja reklamnih poruka, odnosno pokazuje se kako diskurs reklamnih poruka utječe na lingvistu pri izboru specifičnog smjera u analizi. Ističu se osobine diskursa reklamnih poruka koje dovode do deduktivnog postupka u analizi pri čemu analitičar a priori postulira neke funkcije teksta prije nego što je zapravo krenuo ispitivati jezični materijal. Takav postupak može rezultirati nizom analitičkih zabuda poput previđanja određenih podataka ili potkrepljivanja tvrdnji atipičnim ili čak irelevantnim materijalom.

Ključne riječi: analiza diskursa, lingvistička pragmatika, reklamne poruke, lingvistička metodologija, dedukcija, analiza „od-vrha-nadolje”, indukcija, analiza „od-dna-nagore”, persuazivnost, retorika

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Osijek

Prijedložni subjekti kao komplementi pridjevskih predikata

U članku se raspravlja o komplementima pridjevskih predikata uvedenih pomoću prijedloga *for* i *of*. U literaturi je uobičajena praksa da se za prijedložni izraz s *for* kaže kako uvodi subjekt infinitiva sljedećeg glagola, dok se prijedložni izrazi s *of* opisuju kao pragmatičko sredstvo koje omogućava spominjanje osobe o kojoj je riječ. Budući da između prijedložnih izraza s *for* i onih s *to* ne postoje sintaktičke, semantičke ili pragmatičke razlike, autor predlaže da se oba prijedložna izraza opišu jednostavno kao sredstva koja omogućavaju spominjanje agensa infinitivne klauze, ali nemaju svojstva kodiranja ili ponašanja tipičnog subjekta. Spomenuti prijedložni izrazi su komplementi pridjevskih predikata i istovremeno semantički/pragmatički argumenti infinitivne konstrukcije, ali nemaju jasno definiranu sintaktičku funkciju.

Ključne riječi: subjekt, prijedložni izrazi, komplementacija pridjeva, gramatičke konstrukcije, sintaktičke funkcije

1. Uvod

U ovome radu osvrnut ćemo se na sintaktičku i semantičku analizu takozvanih prijedložnih subjekata kao komplemenata predikata u rečenicama kao što su:

- (1) It is easy for John to teach Mary.
- (2) It is nice of John to teach Mary.

U postojećoj literaturi uobičajena je praksa da se *for John* analizira kao subjekt infinitiva uveden pomoću takozvanog *for to device* (Quirk and Green-

baum 1973), dok se sintaktička funkcija prijedložnog izraza *of John* u (2) zanemaruje, odnosno ne analizira na isti način kao u paralelnoj rečenici (1).

Svrha je ovoga rada ukazati na to da ni *for John* u (1) niti *of John* u (2) nisu subjekti infinitiva jer nemaju ni jedno svojstvo kodiranja, ponašanja ili kontrole tipičnih za subjekt, odnosno ukazati na to da infinitivi jednostavno nemaju subjekte.

U lingvističkoj je literaturi uobičajena praksa reći da je u rečenici (3) subjekt, a u rečenici (4) objekt kontrolor implicitnog subjekta infinitiva (vidi Comrie 1984a, 1985) tj., rečenica (3) znači isto što i (3a), a (4) isto što i (4a):

- (3) Jack promised Helga to leave.
- (3a) Jack promised Helga that he would leave.
- (4) Jack persuaded Helga to leave.
- (4a) Jack persuaded Helga that she should leave.

Quirk *et al.* (1985:1186), štoviše, kažu da rečenice (5) i (6) sadrže monotranzitivne komplemente koji se sastoje od nefinitne klauzule sa eksplicitno izrečenim subjektom:

- (5) Jack hates her to miss the train.
- (6) Jack hates her missing the train.

Isti su autori svjesni i činjenice da je ovakva formulacija pomalo nespretna, jer se u površinski identičnim rečenicama isti nominalni izraz javlja u dvostrukoj ulozi. Naime, po svome položaju, padežnom kodiranju i sintaktičkom ponašanju nominalni izraz *her* u (7):

- (7) We expect her to see a doctor.

ima obilježja direktnog objekta glagola glavne rečenice, ali je s druge strane jasno i to da se tu radi o argumentu predikata zavisne infinitivne klauzule (tzv. subjektu infinitiva), i upravo je status toga argumenta predmet diskusije u ovome radu.

2. Diskusija

U anglističkoj se literaturi obično govori o dvije vrste subjekta: o eksplicitno izrečenom subjektu finitnih glagola i o implicitnome subjektu nefinitnih glagolskih oblika (infinitiva i gerunda). U ovome radu poći ćemo od sljedeće metodološke postavke: da bi mogli reći da je gramatička relacija (sintaktička funkcija) X relevantna za opis jezika Y, potrebno je naći nekoliko logički me-

dušobno nezavisnih kriterija koji ukazuju na relevantnost te gramatičke relacije. Ako se ne mogu pronaći takvi nezavisni kriteriji, onda se ne radi o relaciji X (vidi Comrie 1981).

Još od pionirskog Keenanovog (1976) članka svojstva subjekta dijele se na svojstva kodiranja, svojstva ponašanja i svojstva kontrole. U tradicionalnim gramatikama subjekt je bio ili previše općenito definiran kao vršitelj radnje ili kao ono o čemu se u rečenici govori, ili je definicija subjekta bila specifična za određeni jezik. Tako je, na primjer, Katičićeva (1976: 72) definicija subjekta¹ neprimjenjiva na analitičke jezike ili jezike u kojima nema sročnosti između subjekta i predikata. S druge strane, Keenan (1976) navodi popis od tridesetak morfosintaktičkih, semantičkih i pragmatičkih svojstava subjekta od kojih ni jedno nije nužno i dostatno samo po sebi već u kombinaciji s drugim svojstvima karakterizira manje ili više tipični subjekt:

We shall say that an NP in a b-sentence (in any L) is a subject of that sentence to the extent that it has the properties in the properties list below. If one NP in the sentence has a clear preponderance of the subject properties than it will be called the subject of the sentence. On this type of definition then subjects of some b-sentences can be more subject-like than the subjects of others in the sense that they present a fuller complement of the subject properties.. Note further that on this type of definition 'subject' does not represent a single dimension of linguistic reality, it is rather a cluster concept, or as we shall say, a multifactor concept. (Keenan 1976: 312).

2.1. Neke tipične karakteristike subjekta u engleskom i hrvatskom

2.1.1. Svojstva kodiranja

Od svojstava kodiranja za opis subjekta u engleskom i hrvatskom relevantna su kongruencija subjekta i predikata, padežno kodiranje i red riječi. U engleskom je red riječi najvažnije sredstvo kodiranja jer je engleski striktni SVO jezik. Druga sredstva imaju manje značenje jer su zbog gubitka padeža u nominalnoj paradigmi i djelomičnog gubitka padeža u pronominalnoj paradigmi ona gotovo potpuno izgubila svoju diskriminacijsku funkciju i predstavljaju samo rudimente nekada razvijenog padežnog sustava bez gotovo ikakve funkcije u modernom engleskom jeziku:

One can account for these unusual case distributions more simply and consistently eliminating the notion case altogether from consideration in the con-

¹ "Većina predikata otvara u rečeničnom ustrojstvu mjesto za imensku riječ u nominativu. Takva se imenska riječ zove *subjekt*. Subjekt se mora slagati s predikatom u licu i broju."

structions under study. Rather the distribution of pronoun forms in Modern Standard English reflects the nearly total loss of the grammatical case marking in English. The pronouns, and, to a degree, the functions of the pronouns are synchronic reflexes of a case system that can be traced back to Proto Indo-European, but the forms no longer function as case. (Stahlke 1984: 361).

U kolokvijalnom engleskom uporaba takozvanog akuzativnog oblika zamjenice u položaju subjekta veoma je česta (*Me and my dad went fishing yesterday*), a ulogu padeža preuzeo je u skladu s Keenanovim (1978) principom kovarijacije funkcionalnih elemenata red riječi², tako da govornici shvaćaju rečenicu (8):

(8) Me and him hit Bill.

kao rečenicu s redom riječi SVO unatoč posve anomalnome kodiranju subjekta (vidi Schreiber 1981). S druge strane, u hrvatskom je red riječi kao sredstvo kodiranja gramatičkih relacija potpuno irelevantan jer veće značenje ima padežno kodiranje. Sročnost je u oba jezika obvezna tamo gdje je moguća, ali nikada nije jedino sredstvo kodiranja gramatičkih relacija kao što je to slučaj u nekim jezicima (vidi Comrie 1984b). Značaj ova tri sredstva kodiranja subjekta u engleskom i hrvatskom može se prikazati na sljedeći način:

HRVATSKI:

padeži > kongruencija > red riječi

ENGLESKI:

red riječi > kongruencija > padeži

2.1.2. Svojstva ponašanja

Od svojstava ponašanja subjekta spomenut ćemo samo dva, jer ona na jednak način tretiraju subjekte i to samo subjekte, bez obzira na njihovu semantičku ili kategorijalnu pripadnost. To su transformacije podizanja subjekta na razinu objekta glagola glavne rečenice (*Subject to Object Raising - SOR*) i podi-

² "Syntactic (and morphological) processes which have the same 'function' covary in their distribution across languages. By covary we mean that the more a language has one of the processes the less it need have the other. By 'have the same function' we mean something like 'code the same semantic or syntactic information' (a notion which is obviously not too well defined). For example, case-marking and word order restrictions on major constituents of basic sentences have somewhat the same function of coding major grammatical relations, e. g. 'Subject-of, 'direct object-of' etc. The principle predicts that the more we assign a language overt case marking the freer can be its basic word order and conversely." (Keenan 1978: 120).

zanje subjekta uložene rečenice u položaj subjekta glagola glavne rečenice (*Subject to Subject Raising - SSR*).

Transformacijom SOR može se uz određene glagole podići subjekt glagola zavisne rečenice na razinu objekta glagola glavne rečenice bez obzira na njegovu semantičku ulogu. Na primjer, u (9) subjekt zavisne rečenice je agens, u (10) pacijens, u (11) ima temporalno značenje, a u (12) i (13) je bez ikakvog značenja, odnosno predstavlja semantički prazan *slot filler*, odnosno dio je idiomatskog izraza:

- (9) a The police believe that Jack killed Mary.
b The police believe Jack to have killed Mary.
- (10) a The police believe that Mary was killed by her husband.
b The police believe Mary to have been killed by her husband.
- (11) a The weathermen believe that tomorrow will be nice and sunny.
b The weathermen believe tomorrow to be nice and sunny.
- (12) a The rat exterminators believe that there was a mouse in the basement.
b The rat exterminators believe there to be a mouse in the basement.
- (13) a People believe that tabs are kept by the FBI on all habitual criminals.
b People believe tabs to be kept on all habitual criminals by the FBI.

Ova transformacija je neosjetljiva i na kategorijnu pripadnost subjekta. Naime, subjekt je obično nominalni izraz, ali u engleskom ulogu subjekta mogu preuzeti i prijedložni izrazi, kao što pokazuju sljedeći primjeri iz Quirk et al. (1972: 305; 1985: 658):

- (14) Between six and seven will suit me.
- (15) During the vacation is what we decided.
- (16) In the evenings is best for me.

Upravo transformacija *Subject to Object Raising* pokazuje da se u takvim slučajevima prijedložni izrazi, a ne nominalni izrazi iza predikata ponašaju kao subjekti (vidi Borkin 1984, te Jaworska 1986):

- (17) Around 4:00 is the most dismal part of the day for elderly shut-ins.
- (18) Max reports around 4:00 to be the most dismal part of the day for elderly shut-ins.

Transformacija *Subject to Subject Raising* ima slično djelovanje, s tom razlikom što zbog ograničenog broja predikata koji dozvoljavaju tu transformaci-

ju (*seem, appear, turn out*) primjeri nisu tako brojni kao u slučaju transformacija *SOR*:

- (19) John seems to have killed his wife.
- (20) Mary seems to have been killed by her husband.
- (21) Today seems to be nice and shiny.
- (22) There seems to be a mouse in the kitchen.
- (23) Tabs seem to be kept on all habitual criminals.

Od svojstava kontrole subjekta najčešće se spominju kontrola refleksivizacije i imperativne konstrukcije. Budući da ova dva svojstva kontrole zavise od semantičke uloge subjekta (vidi Kučanda 1998) ovdje ih nećemo spominjati jer se sporni subjekti pridjeva o kojima je ovdje riječ ne javljaju sa semantičkom funkcijom agens.

2.1.3. "Implicitni subjekti" pridjevskih predikata

U cijeloj diskusiji poći ćemo od sljedeće opće generalizacije koju navodi Comrie (1981: 101):

The prototype of subject represents the intersection of agent and topic; i.e. the clearest instances of subjects, cross-linguistically, are agents which are also topics. There are two important characteristics of this definition: first, it is multifactor; second, it is stated in terms of prototypes, rather than in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria for the identification of subjects. The second point is particularly important, given that many subjects in many constructions in many languages are not topic, or are not agent, or are neither.

Ova je karakterizacija subjekta utemeljena na semantičko/pragmatičkim svojstvima subjekta i svakako ju je potrebno nadopuniti i određenim morfosintaktičkim svojstvima subjekta. Naime, poznato je iz lingvističke tradicije da je subjekt previše često definiran na temelju svojih semantičkih (npr. subjekt je vršitelj radnje) ili pragmatičkih svojstava (subjekt je ono o čemu se u rečenici govori) iako su se te definicije pokazale jednako nedostatnima kao i isključivo morfološka karakterizacija subjekta (vidi Keenan 1976; Kučanda 1998). Osim što koreliraju s određenim semantičkim i pragmatičkim funkcijama, tipični subjekti bilo unutar jednoga jezika bilo između više jezika dijele i neka opća svojstva kodiranja, ponašanja i kontrole. U slučaju da subjekti u dvije rečenice bilo unutar jednoga jezika bilo između više jezika nemaju baš ništa zajedničkoga, to bi značilo ili da subjekt nije općelingvistička kategorija

ili da je subjekt potrebno različito definirati za svaku pojedinačnu konstrukciju.³

Nameće se, naime, pitanje što *Mary*, *for Mary* i *of Mary* imaju zajedničko što bi opravdavalo da se sva tri izraza smatraju subjektima u sljedećim rečenicama:

- (24) *Mary is nice.*
- (25) *It is easy for Mary to be nice.*
- (26) *Is is nice of Mary to teach Bill.*

Status nominalnog izraza *Mary* u (24) uopće nije upitan jer on ima sva relevantna obilježja subjekta. Što se tiče statusa prijedložnog izraza *for Mary* u (25) Quirk et al. (1985: 1229) kažu:

Unlike the preceding types, Type (v) permits *for* + subject to be inserted at the beginning of the infinitive clause: *Those darts are tricky (for a beginner) to use*. Where the infinitive has no overt subject, its implicit subject is understood to have an indefinite meaning:

Jack is easy to fool = Jack is easy *for anyone* to fool.

Ako *for Mary* u (25) predstavlja umetanje subjekta infinitiva sljedećeg glagola, postavlja se pitanje zašto i *of Mary* nema isti status u (26): "These adjectives can also occur with anticipatory *it* and *of*-phrase as additional complementation." (Quirk et. al. 1985: 1227). Razlog za ovakvo različito tretiranje *for* + NP i *of* + NP mogao bi se potražiti u semantičkim razlikama između te dvije konstrukcije: "With some adjectives in this group, such as *nice* or *unpleasant*, the entailment relation between *be* + adjective to V and *be* + adjective is less easy to avoid, eg: *Jenny is nice to know* implies that *Jenny is nice*." (Quirk et al 1985: 1229). Ta implikacija ne vrijedi uvijek i čini se da zavisi od značenja infinitivne dopune. U dvoznačnoj rečenici *Mary is nice to teach*, koja se može interpretirati kao *It is nice to teach Mary* ili kao *It is nice of Mary to teach* ta implikacija ne vrijedi, jer ni jedna rečenica ne implicira *Mary is nice*, kao što se vidi kad se imenica *Mary* modificira pridjevom potpuno suprotnoga značenja od *nice*: *Mary is an awful person but she is nice to*

³ Stav da subjekt nije općelingvistička kategorija donekle zastupaju Foley and Van Valin (1977), no njihovi nam se argumenti čine zasnovani na pogrešnim premisama. Oni, izgleda, polaze od tvrdnje da subjekti u svim jezicima moraju imati identičan broj semantičkih, pragmatičkih i morfosintaktičkih svojstava, iako je poznato da u sintaktički ergativnim jezicima argument sa semantičkom funkcijom agens nema sva svojstva kodiranja, ponašanja i kontrole koja su inače tipična za jezike s nominativno-akuzativnim padežnim sustavom, a osim toga, sva svojstva subjekta nisu nezavisna od njegove konkomitantne sematičke/pragmatičke funkcije (vidi detalje u Kučanda, 1998).

teach. Pri obje interpretacije, Mary je vršitelj radnje izrečene infinitivom, pa zašto i prijedložni izraz *of* ne bi uvodio subjekte, nego se ta funkcija pripisuje isključivo prijedlogu *for*. Štoviše, unatoč površinskoj sličnosti između rečenica *It was easy for him to tell lies* i *It was wrong of him to tell lies* prijedložnom izrazu *of*-NP poriče se status subjekta: "The adjective in this group is often followed by an *of*-phrase identifying the person(s) being discussed." (Quirk et al. 1985: 1230).

Ako izraz s prijedlogom *of* služi samo zato da omogućiti spominjanje osobe o kojoj se govori, onda bi se moglo reći da i izraz *s for* omogućava spominjanje osobe koja vrši radnju izrečenu infinitivom. To što se izraz *s for* odnosi na agens, ne znači da je taj agens i kodiran kao subjekt. Zapravo, nemogućnost subjektivizacije uzrokom je infinitivizacije glagolskog predikata: "Infinitives arise regularly when the subject of an embedded sentence is removed by a transformation, or else placed into an oblique case, so that in either case agreement between subject and verb cannot take place." (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971: 356-57).

Prijedložni izrazi mogu se smatrati jednom vrstom padežnog kodiranja (vidi Lyons 1968: 289ff), odnosno prijedlozi *of* i *for* služe za padežno kodiranje argumenta predikata koji bi bio subjekt kad bi pridjevi uz koje se javlja ta vrsta dopune dozvoljavali finitnu klauzulu uvedenu pomoću *that* kao dopunu. Argument da prijedložni izraz *s for* uvodi subjekt infinitiva vjerojatno proizlazi iz toga što argument predikata uveden pomoću toga veznika često ima semantičku funkciju agens, a poznato je da se u gramatičkoj tradiciji subjekt često poistovjećivao s agensom bez obzira na način kodiranja subjekta, kao npr. u pasivnim rečenicama u kojima se prijedložni izraz *s by* često naziva pravi ili logički subjekt iako nema svojstva ponašanja i kodiranja subjekta.

3. Zaključak

Kao što je vidljivo iz gornjih citata, Quirk et al. (1985) na različit način opisuju prijedložne izraze u rečenicama (1) i (2). Prijedložni izraz *s for* opisuju kao subjekt sljedećeg infinitiva, dok za prijedložni izraz *s of* samo kažu da omogućava spominjanje osobe o kojoj se govori. Poznato je iz logike i tradicionalne gramatike (vidi Sandmann 1954) da je subjekt često bio definiran kao "ono o čemu se govori", pa bi prema tome i prijedložni izraz *s of* mogao biti subjekt. Štoviše, i jedan i drugi izraz omogućavaju spominjanje argumenta infinitivnog predikata koji bi bio subjekt da rečenica ima finitni oblik, no ni jedan od njih nema svojstva kodiranja i ponašanja subjekta (npr. padežno kodiranje, kongruencija, transformacije podizanja). Ta se dva prijedložna izraza ne razlikuju ni na semantičkoj razini, jer semantička interpretacija imenice koju uvode zavisi od značenja infinitivnog predikata, a ne od značenja prijed-

loga. Ti se prijedložni izrazi mogu, dakako, smatrati dopunama predikatnih pridjeva i istovremeno argumentima infinitivnih predikata, no njihova sintaktička funkcija nije jasna, odnosno, za nju ne posjedujemo odgovarajući meta-jezički naziv. U okviru funkcionalne gramatike, koju je razvio nizozemski lingvist S. Dik (1978, 1989) moglo bi se reći da takav argument predikata ima dvostruku funkciju (jednu na razini glavne predikacije, gdje je argument pridjevskog predikata, a drugu na razini umetnute infinitivne klauzule, u kojoj funkcionira kao argument verbalnog predikata), ali ne postoji pravilo izražavanja koje bi ga preslikalo na transparentnu sintaktičku funkciju. Činjenica da ti prijedložni izrazi imaju semantičku i/ili pragmatičku funkciju ne znači da moraju imati i jasnu sintaktičku funkciju, kao što subjekt ne mora istovremeno kodirati i neku semantičku ili pragmatičku funkciju (npr. egzistencijalno *there* ili meteorološko *it*). Potragu za nevidljivim (implicitnim) subjektima infinitiva i drugim nevidljivim konstrukcijama pod svaku cijenu dobro je još davno okarakterizirao Siebs (1911: 256):

Sie berücksichtigen, wie die Logiker so oft in sprachlichen Dingen zu ihrem Schaden getan haben, mehr das, was ihrer Ansicht nach in der Sprache vorhanden **sein sollte**, als das, was wirklich vorhanden **ist**, und suchen mehr das, was **nicht** gesagt ist, zu erklären, denn das, was gesagt ist.

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PREPOSITIONAL SUBJECTS AS COMPLEMENTS OF ADJECTIVAL PREDICATES

This paper discusses the functions of prepositional phrases with *for* and *of* as complements of adjectival predicates. The *for* phrase is usually described as a device which introduces the subject of the following infinitival verbal predicate, whereas *of* is assigned only a pragmatic function of facilitating the mentioning of the person being discussed. It is shown that there is no syntactic or semantic/pragmatic difference between the two prepositional phrases and that they should therefore be given identical treatment. Neither prepositional phrase exhibits any of the coding or behavioural properties of a typical subject. They introduce the NP which is the semantic argument of the following predicate, but they do not have a clear syntactic function.

Key words: subject, prepositional phrase, adjective complementation, grammatical constructions, syntactic functions

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Explizite und implizite Kodierung von Deontizität und Epistemizität: Über die grammatische Musterbildung vor der Entstehung von Modalverben

Wo verbergen sich Deontizität und Epistemizität vor der Herausgrammatikalisierung einer geschlossenen Gruppe von Modalverben? Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die Relevanz dieser bis jetzt nicht bearbeiteten Fragestellung transparent zu machen. Ausgangshypothese ist, dass sich Modalverbssysteme nur in solchen Sprachen systematisch herausbilden, in denen kein Verbalaspekt bzw. nur Relikte eines solchen Systems vorhanden sind. Auf der Grundlage dieser Arbeitshypothese wird die Wahrnehmung neuer Daten in scheinbar längst bekannten und ausgewerteten Texten des Althochdeutschen möglich. In einer ersten Stichprobe sollen bislang unbekannte Musterbildungen von impliziter Kodierung von Epistemizität und Deontizität am Beispiel des Althochdeutschen aufgezeigt werden. Es handelt sich um erste Ergebnisse, die in einem größeren Maßstab durch einzelsprachspezifische Pilotstudien und durch übereinzelsprachliche Untersuchungen im Rahmen der diachronen Sprachtypologie und Grammatikalisierungsforschung auf ihre sprachtypologische Generalisierbarkeit überprüft werden müssen.

Key words: Epistemizität, Deontizität, epistemische Modalverben, Aspekt und Modalität, Modalität im Gothischen, Modalität im Althochdeutschen

1. Das speziesspezifische und modalverbdefinierende Merkmal der Epistemizität

Die epistemische Modalisierung einer Aussage gehört zu den sprachlichen Höchstleistungen der menschlichen Spezies. Ihre Leistung besteht darin, dass die durch eine Proposition zum Ausdruck gebrachte Aussage vom Sprecher in ihrem Wahrheitsgehalt und Geltungsgrad mehr oder weniger deutlich relativiert wird. Die Epistemialisierung einer Aussage steht uns nicht von Anfang an zur Verfügung: Der Erwerb epistemisch verwendeter Modalverben gehört zu den späten Phasen des Kindspracherwerbs (Stephany 1993: 136). Erst mit durchschnittlich acht Jahren sind Kinder imstande, das Modalverb *können* epistemisch zu verwenden (Doitchinov 2001: 128-129). Der Erwerb von Epistemizität nimmt somit nochmals soviel Zeit in Anspruch wie der Erwerb grammatisch vollständiger Propositionen, der bereits mit vier Jahren abgeschlossen ist.

Die Relativierung einer Aussage durch die Thematisierung ihres Sicherheitsgrades durch den Sprecher stellt einen weit komplexeren Prozess der Relativierung des Wahrheitsgehalts dar als die Negation, die Lüge oder die Täuschung, zu der offenbar auch Tiere in Ansätzen in der Lage sind. Die Epistemialisierung über Modalverben stellt ausserdem einen komplexeren Prozess dar als die Epistemialisierung über Modaladverbiale wie *vielleicht*, die etwa ein Jahr früher erworben werden als die scheinbar synonymen epistemischen Modalverben (Doitchinov 2001: 129). Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass der grammatische Mehrwert von epistemischen Modalverben nicht durch epistemische Modaladverbiale kompensierbar ist. Diese Schlussfolgerung konfrontiert uns unausweichlich mit der Frage, wie in Sprachen ohne epistemische Modalverben die modalverbspezifische Epistemizität zum Ausdruck kommt. Warum eigentlich wurde in der Modalverbforschung diese Frage bislang nicht gestellt? Diese bislang nicht beachtete Fragestellung verbirgt ein nicht zu unterschätzendes Erkenntnispotential: Will man die menschliche Kognition verstehen und den Anteil, den die Sprache am Aufbau der komplexesten kognitiven Prozesse hat, steht uns mit dem Bereich der epistemischen Modalisierung eine der ergiebigsten Erkenntnisquellen zur Verfügung.

Doch die Modalisierung gehört nicht nur beim Spracherwerb zu den späten Phasen, die erst nach Durchschreiten früherer Entwicklungsphasen erfolgreich in Angriff genommen werden kann. Dasselbe gilt für den metasprachlichen Erkenntniserwerb auf diesem Gebiet. Auch die Grammatiktheorie ist auf vertiefte Kenntnisse über die weniger komplexen Kategorien wie Aspekt und Tempus angewiesen, um das Phänomen der Modalität bearbeitbar zu machen. In Bezug auf den Kindspracherwerb weiß man heute, dass zunächst die kategorialen Felder der Aspektualität und Temporalität erworben sein müssen, bevor Modus bzw. Modalität aufgebaut werden kann. Aspekt und Tempus

stellen ganz offensichtlich elementare sprachliche Bausteine beim Aufbau von Modus und Modalität dar. Es ist daher zu erwarten, dass die vertiefte Kenntnis der Kategorien Aspekt und Tempus die Erkenntnis von Modalisierungsphänomenen nur fördern kann.

Für die unterschiedlichen Grade der Relativierung des Sicherheitsgrades einer Proposition stehen differenzierte Ausdrucksmittel zur Verfügung. In den germanischen Sprachen werden zu diesem Zweck sehr ausgiebig die Modalverben genutzt. Nun ist aber bekannt, dass es sich bei diesem Verfahren aus sprachhistorischer Hinsicht um eine Neuerung handelt. In den älteren germanischen Sprachen gibt es entweder keine epistemischen Modalverben oder es gibt sie nur in ersten Ansätzen (im Althochdeutschen des 8. Jahrhunderts beispielsweise vertreten durch ein einziges Modalverb). Doch dann entsteht plötzlich ein ungeheurer Grammatikalisierungsdruck, der bis zum 16. Jahrhundert zur Herausbildung einer Gruppe von Modalverben geführt hat, - ein Prozess, der bis heute nicht abgeschlossen ist. Am deutlichsten hat seine Verblüffung über diese Entwicklung Hammerich (1960: 66) zum Ausdruck gebracht: "Die Gruppe der Modalverba ist eine ausgesprochene Eigentümlichkeit der neugermanischen Sprachen und hat kaum anderswo eine genaue Entsprechung"; und "Im Griechischen, im Indischen (Pāli!), im Hethischen, ja, in allen altindogermanischen Sprachen wird man mehr oder weniger schwache Ansätze zur Bildung von Modalverben finden, nirgends aber ein so geschlossenes Gebilde wie in den germanischen Sprachen" (Hammerich 1960: 68). Bei der Untersuchung von Modalverben im Englischen oder anderer germanischen Sprachen spricht man daher gerne vom "Entstehen von Epistemizität" ("rise of epistemic meanings in English"; vgl. Traugott 1989). Epistemizität muss aber auch in den älteren germanischen Sprachen als grammatische Technik nachweisbar sein. Das gilt auch für alle weiteren Sprachen, die über kein differenziertes Modalverbssystem verfügen: Dazu gehört die Mehrzahl der heute bekannten Sprachen. Als Beispiele seien nur das Russische, das Chinesische und das Türkische genannt. Doch noch fehlt die Antwort auf die Frage nach den alternativen Mustern dieser Kodierung.

Die Beantwortung dieser Frage setzt eine terminologische Klärung voraus: Wann verfügt eine Sprache über ein Modalverbssystem? Welche Voraussetzungen müssen also vorliegen, dass man bei der Beschreibung einer Sprache auf die Idee kommt, eine Gruppe von Modalverben auszusondern? Auch in modalverblosen Sprachen sind zahllose deontische Verwendungen möglich, vergleichbar mit Konstruktionen wie:

- (1) Sie wünscht die Klausur zu bestehen.
- (2) Sie versteht es gut zu lügen.
- (3) Sie ist gezwungen auszuziehen.

Keines dieser finiten Verben oder Verbkomplexe wird im Deutschen als Modalverb oder Modalprädikativ eingeordnet. Dagegen werden die semantisch äquivalenten Verben *wollen*, *können* und *müssen* im Deutschen der Gruppe der Modalverben zugeordnet:

- (1') Sie will die Klausur bestehen.
- (2') Sie kann gut lügen.
- (3') Sie muss ausziehen.

Der Grund für diese unterschiedliche Zuordnung liegt nicht primär an formalen Besonderheiten, die sich ad hoc immer benennen lassen, beispielsweise der Anschluss einmal mit einfachem Infinitiv, zum anderen mit *zu*-Infinitiv. Ein Verb wird dann primär als Modalverb oder Modalprädikativ eingeordnet, wenn es auch epistemisch verwendet werden kann. Das ist beispielsweise bei *wollen* der Fall, nicht jedoch bei *wünschen*:

- (4) Sie will alles verstanden haben.

Dieser Satz beinhaltet eine Stellungnahme des Sprechers und lässt sich folgendermaßen paraphrasieren: 'Sie behauptet, dass Sie alles verstanden hat. Ich stehe nicht hinter dieser Aussage'. Die zweite Komponente der Paraphrase, die Distanzierung des Sprechers, ist dabei unverzichtbarer Teil der epistemischen Bedeutung aller Modalverbtypen. Erst damit ist eine Proposition wirklich epistemialisiert. Epistemialisierung findet somit auf der illokutionären Ebene statt. Diese Ebene ist der propositionalen Ebene übergeordnet. Aus diesem Grund sind Modalisierungen, die auf den Bereich der Proposition beschränkt bleiben, wie zum Beispiel der Konjunktiv bzw. Irrealis, nicht als epistemische Modalisierungen einzuordnen. Weitere Argumente gegen diese Einordnung finden sich, bezogen auf das System des Althochdeutschen, auch in Lühr (1997). Valentin (1973) spricht in Bezug auf den Konjunktiv im Vergleich zu epistemischen Modalverbverwendungen von "zéro-modalisation", da die Modifikation einer Aussage durch den Konjunktiv auf die propositionale Ebene beschränkt bleibt. Ganz gleich, welche Terminologie man wählt, es ist wichtig, im Sinne von Valentin die propositionalen und die illokutionären Formen der Modalisierung streng voneinander zu trennen. Auf diese Weise entgeht man der Versuchung, die grammatische Kategorie Modus mit der Sprechaktkategorie der Epistemizität zu verwechseln. Es ist somit wenig plausibel, dass epistemische Modalverben einen verlorengegangenen oder geschwächten Konjunktiv kompensieren, auch wenn diese Hypothese immer wieder geäußert wurde.

Die Unmöglichkeit der Gleichsetzung von Konjunktiv und epistemischer Modalverbbedeutung lässt sich am Verb *wünschen* im Gegensatz zu *wollen* demonstrieren. Während *wollen* in Satz (4) eine epistemische Bedeutung

entfaltet, ist eine vergleichbare Epistemialisierung beim Verb *wünschen* nicht möglich.

(5) *Sie wünscht alles verstanden zu haben.

Das gilt auch für alle anderen synonymen deontischen Konstruktionen wie:

(6) Sie sucht/versucht alles zu verstehen.

Auch hier ist eine epistemische Lesart ausgeschlossen:

(6') *Sie sucht/versucht alles verstanden zu haben.

Epistemialisierende Kontexte führen hier zu grammatisch nicht akzeptablen Satzkonstruktionen. Die Beispiele machen nebenbei schon klar, was man sich unter einem epistemialisierenden Kontext vorzustellen hat: Der infinite Prädikatsteil muss aspektuell die Merkmale der Homogenität und die dadurch implizierten Merkmale der Additivität und der Teilbarkeit aufweisen. Das ist bei imperfektiven Verben, bei stativen Verben und bei resultativen Konstruktionen mit dem Schwerpunkt auf der unabgeschlossenen Nachzeitigkeitsbedeutung der Fall.

Selbst wenn man vergleichbare Sätze als akzeptabel einordnen würde (im Sinne eines konjunktivischen: *Sie wünschte alles verstanden zu haben*), bleibt die epistemische Lesart ausgeschlossen. Der Konjunktiv transportiert nicht die Bedeutungskomponenten der Behauptung und der Distanzierung des Sprechers von dieser Behauptung. Das Beispiel zeigt deutlich, dass Irrealis bzw. Konjunktiv und Epistemizität keine synonymen Konstruktionen darstellen.

Die Anzahl der Verben oder finiter Prädikative, die mit Infinitiv konstruierbar sind und die lediglich deontische Modalität entfalten können, lässt sich bei keiner Sprache so leicht vollständig ermitteln. Äquivalente für deontisches können sind beispielsweise:

- (7) Er *weiß* sich zu benehmen.
- (8) Er *versteht* es Eindruck zu machen.
- (9) Sie *ist imstande* zu überzeugen.
- (10) Sie *hat das Potential* zu führen.
- (11) Er *ist Mann genug* seine Fehler einzusehen.
- (12) Er *ist fähig* nachzugeben.
- (13) Sie *hat die Fähigkeit* sich durchzusetzen.
- (14) Wir *sind in der Lage* abzuspringen.

Keines dieser deontischen Modalverbäquivalente kann epistemische Bedeutung entfalten. Nach Öhlschläger (1989: 236) gehört das Vorhandensein der

epistemischen Bedeutungskapazität zum definierenden Merkmal eines Modalverbs. Die metasprachliche Praxis der Aussonderung einer Gruppe von Modalverben folgt diesem Kriterium mehr oder weniger bewusst. Selbstverständlich muss bei Berücksichtigung dieses Kriteriums das Auxiliar *werden* der Gruppe der Modalverben im Neuhochdeutschen zugeordnet werden, da es epistemische Verwendungen aufweist. Die Klassifikation von *werden* als Modalverb (Vater 1975, der damit in der Folge eine der wichtigsten grammatiktheoretischen Kontroversen der Germanisten ausgelöst hat) ist schon allein aus diesem Grund zwingend. Beachtet man dieses Kriterium nicht, was häufig dann geschieht, wenn der Modalverbbegriff auf weitgehend modalverblose oder modalverbarme Sprachen wie etwa das Finnische projiziert wird, kommt es zu sehr variablen Aussagen über die Anzahl der vorhandenen Modalverben. In Bezug auf das Finnische schwanken die Aussagen zwischen 2 und 45 Modalverben (Kangasniemi 1992: 291). Dieses Schwanken erklärt sich damit, dass nur zwei epistemisch verwendete Modalverben vorhanden sind (*voida* und *saattaa*); die weiteren Kandidaten entfalten nur deontische Bedeutungen und lassen sich aus diesem Grund nicht sinnvoll eingrenzen, wie die prinzipiell offene Liste von (7) bis (14) am Beispiel des Deutschen gezeigt hat.

Bei der Untersuchung der Entstehung von Epistemizität am Beispiel der Modalverben muss man daher unbedingt vermeiden, dass man die Gruppe der Modalverben des Gegenwartssprachlichen einfach zurückprojiziert auf ältere Sprachstufen, um dann auf dieser Basis die Herausgrammatikalisierung von epistemischen Bedeutungen zu untersuchen; denn im Althochdeutschen ist beispielsweise nur ein epistemisch verwendetes Modalverb vorhanden (*magan* bzw. *mugan*). Das bedeutet strenggenommen, dass tatsächlich nur ein Modalverb vorhanden ist. Ähnliche methodische Vorsichtsmaßnahmen sollten künftig bei der diachronen Untersuchung aller Modalverbssprachen Anwendung finden.

Um den Grammatikalisierungsprozess von Epistemizität zu verstehen, muss man daher zunächst entweder den Untersuchungsgegenstand auf die epistemischen Vorkommen von Modalverben einschränken, oder man muss zusätzlich die deontisch verwendeten "Modalverben", die vor der Grammatikalisierung von Epistemizität vorhanden waren, gleichermaßen in die Untersuchung miteinbeziehen. Der Mittelweg, die Untersuchung eines rückprojizierten Systems, ermöglicht nur eine verzerrte Wahrnehmung der Herausgrammatikalisierung von Epistemizität. Vor allem aber verhindert ein solches Vorgehen die Entdeckung alternativer Muster der Kodierung von Epistemizität.

Es geht im Folgenden um die 'vergessene' Frage nach dem Ort von Epistemizität in modalverblosen und modalverbarmen Sprachen. Es geht also um die Suche nach einer grammatischen Funktion, von der wir aus

axiomatischen Gründen annehmen müssen, dass sie vorhanden und damit entdeckbar ist. Es geht damit primär um die Wahrnehmung konkurrierender Musterbildungen von Epistemizität. Die Einsicht in dieses Musterbildungspotential erhöht die Chancen, dass wir eines Tages verstehen, worin der Vorteil und die Funktion dieser speziesspezifischen Ausstattung des Menschen mit Epistemizität besteht. Auf die universalsprachliche und sprachtypologische Relevanz des Vorhandenseins versus Nichtvorhandenseins eines Modalverbssystems hat Abraham (1995) deutlich aufmerksam gemacht. Daher kann uns die Frage nach dem materiellen Korrelat, das für die Abwesenheit von Modalverbssystemen verantwortlich ist, nicht mehr in Ruhe lassen.

2. Aspekt und die Kodierung von Epistemizität

Epistemizität ist das Ergebnis einer besonders komplexen Form von Modalisierung, die ihrerseits schon in ihren einfacheren propositionalen Ausprägungen unser Verständnis übersteigt. Es liegt daher nahe, zunächst die grundlegenden kategorialen Bausteine, die beim Aufbau dieser hochkomplexen kategorialen Leistung beteiligt sind, zu betrachten. In Betracht kommt bei Modus und Modalität das Mitglied der "ATM-Familie", das beim Spracherwerb zuerst erworben wird: Das ist die Kategorie des Aspekts bzw. das Feld der Aspektualität. Bei der Beschränkung unserer Perspektive zunächst nur auf diese Kategorie entsteht ein stark vereinfachter Versuchsaufbau, der erste Gedankenexperimente erlaubt.

Die Arbeitshypothese lautet: In Sprachen mit gut ausgebautem Aspektsystem sind keine oder kaum Modalverben vorhanden (so bereits formuliert in Leiss 2000a). In Bezug auf die germanischen Sprachen bedeutet das: Mit dem umfassenden Abbau eines ursprünglich intakten Aspektsystems korreliert der Aufbau eines Modalverbssystems. Der Umfang von Aspekt- und Modalverbssystemen verhält sich nach dieser These jeweils umgekehrt proportional zueinander. Die Überprüfung dieser Korrelation verspricht für die germanischen Sprachen besonders ergiebig zu sein: In den verschiedenen germanischen Sprachen hat sich das einstige Aspektsystem (prototypisch vertreten durch die *ga-/gi-/ge-*Verben) in jeweils unterschiedlicher Geschwindigkeit aufgelöst. Die Erosion der aspektuellen Verbpräfixe beginnt in den nordgermanischen Sprachen wie dem Altisländischen im 7. Jahrhundert und findet ihren Abschluss in Süddeutschland erst im 16. Jahrhundert, also fast tausend Jahre später. Dieses Nord-Süd-Gefälle findet sich offenbar auch bei der Herausgrammatikalisierung der Modalverbssysteme der germanischen Sprachen. Abraham (1995 und 1995a) ist die Einsicht in diesen Zusammenhang zu verdanken. Er führt die stärkeren Epistemialisierungsgrade des englischen Modalverbssystems im Vergleich mit dem des Deutschen auf den frühzeitiger erfolgten Verlust des verbalen Aspektsystems zurück. Dass Aspekt als Faktor involviert ist, wird auch bei Untersuchungen bestehender Modalverbssysteme

immer wieder sichtbar. So hat Coates (1983: 244-245) auf die Verbindung zwischen der Aktualisierung epistemischer Modalverbbedeutungen und imperfektiver Aspektualität des Infinitivverbs hingewiesen. Steedman (1977) findet es interessanterweise allein aus sprachlogischen Gründen selbstverständlich, dass imperfektive bzw. homogene Verben (bei ihm 'situations' bzw. 'states') und perfektive bzw. inhomogene Verben ('events') jeweils eindeutige modale Vorlieben haben: Epistemizität habe etwas mit der Entscheidung darüber zu tun, ob etwas der Fall ist, was Steedman (1977: 228-229) zufolge dem Konzept einer Situation doch sehr nahe komme. Wenn also imperfektive Infinitive epistemische Modalverblesarten provozieren, dann sei es a priori naheliegend, dass die perfektiven Infinitive für die deontischen Lesarten in Frage kommen. Er demonstriert dieses Zusammenspiel von Aspektualität und Modalität am Beispiel des englischen Modalverbs *must*:

EPITEMISCH: He must be the plumber.

DEONTISCH: You must leave now.

Solche Hinweise auf Affinitäten zwischen Epistemizität und Imperfektivität finden sich verstreut immer wieder in Arbeiten zu Modalverbssystemem verschiedener Sprachen (eine unvollständige und mosaikartige Auswahl von Hinweisen auf solche Affinitäten findet sich in Leiss 2000a). Sehr deutlich hat Abraham (1995) auf den Zusammenhang zwischen deontischer Modalverblesart (DMV) und perfektivem ("terminativem") Infinitivverb sowie epistemischer Modalverblesart (EMV) und imperfektivem ("durativem") Infinitivverb herausgearbeitet.

Es wäre sinnvoll und notwendig, solchen Affinitäten und Korrelationen in einer umfassenderen sprachtypologischen Untersuchung nachzugehen. Auch müssten systematisch Pilotstudien zu den einzelnen germanischen Sprachen angefertigt werden. Im Folgenden soll in einem ersten Schritt am Beispiel des Gotischen und Althochdeutschen aufgezeigt werden, welche Daten fokussiert werden müssen, um noch unbekannte Musterbildungen von Epistemizität entdecken zu können.

Es geht also darum zu zeigen, dass die in bestehenden Modalverbssystemen erkennbaren aspektuellen Affinitäten eine 'Vergangenheit' haben, in denen das deontische und epistemische Kodierungspotential von Aspekt weit systematischer sichtbar wird. Aspekt ist als systematisch entfaltete grammatische Kategorie im ATM-Bereich sozusagen 'zu allem fähig'. Es kann sowohl deontische als auch epistemische Modalverben weitgehend, potentiell sogar vollständig ersetzen. Die Untersuchung des Umfangs von Modalverbvorkommen in älteren Sprachstufen (sowie in anderen Sprachen) setzt zunächst voraus, dass man weiß, wonach man sucht.

Vorstellungen eines Modalverbs aus. Dabei gibt es auch im Neuhochdeutschen vergleichbare Konstruktionen wie: *Er suchte/versuchte ihn zu sehen*. Will man verstehen, wie und unter welchen Bedingungen sich epistemische Modalverbbedeutungen herausgrammatikalisieren können, müsste man konsequenterweise alle Konstruktionen mit finitem Verb + Infinitiv in deontischer modaler Verwendung ermitteln und berücksichtigen. Eine Durchsicht des Texts zeigt jedenfalls, dass das Verb *sokjan* ganz regulär als deontisches Modalverbäquivalent für *wollen* verwendet wurde. Eine der weiteren vergleichbaren Stellen findet sich unter Luk. 9:9: *jah sokida ina gasaihvan* ‘und er wollte ihn sehen’.

Die Transkription weist einen interessanten Befund auf, den man bei der künftigen Erhebung der Belege beachten sollte: Als Infinitiv wird jeweils der perfektive Aspektpartner des Verbs gewählt, z.B. *ga-saihvan* an Stelle von imperfektivem *saihvan*. Aspektpaare dieser Art sind für das Gotische charakteristisch. Ausschnitte dieses Systems sind auch noch im Althochdeutschen und Mittelhochdeutschen funktional intakt. Das Verbpaar *sehan/gi-sehan* (ahd.) bzw. *sehen/ge-sehen* (mhd.) stellt beispielsweise ein solches, gegen Aspektabbau lange resistentes Verbpaar dar.

Interessanterweise findet sich in Streitbergs Wörterbuch zur gotischen Bibel der Hinweis, dass der abhängige Infinitiv zu *magan* “fast durchweg perfektiv” ist (Streitberg 1910/1971, Teil II: 87). Es ist anzunehmen, dass die häufigeren perfektiven Infinitive die ebenfalls häufigere deontische Modalisierung auslösen. Von hier ist es nur noch ein Schritt zur Arbeitshypothese, dass die imperfektiven Infinitive epistemische Modalisierung bewirken. Noch aber wissen wir nicht, ob es epistemische Modalisierung im Gotischen überhaupt gibt.

4. Das Zusammenspiel von Modus und Aspekt im Gotischen

Überprüft man die abhängigen Infinitive, die bei Verben wie *magan* oder *sokjan* vorkommen, so sieht man sofort, dass die perfektiven Infinitive vorherrschen. Die imperfektiven Infinitive fehlen nicht völlig. Ihre Distribution ist jedoch ebenfalls deutlich regelgeleitet. Sie kommen ganz regulär in negierten Sätzen vor. Hier verhält sich das Gotische wie eine typische Aspektsprache: Im Russischen ist in negierten Sätzen die freie Aspektwahl aufgehoben: Tauscher/Kirschbaum (1983: 252) benennen in ihrer russischen Grammatik die Regel, dass nach Ausdrücken des Wünschens, Wollens, des Müssens und der Notwendigkeit (also nach prototypischen deontischen Modalverbbedeutungen) vorwiegend der perfektive Infinitiv steht, während bei Verneinung gewöhnlich der imperfektive Infinitiv stehe. Mit ‘vorwiegend’ und ‘gewöhnlich’ wird offensichtlich auf die unmarkierte Verwendungsweise

Perfektive Verben sind unter bestimmten, noch zu klärenden Bedingungen offenbar in negierten Sätzen mit *magan* nicht ausgeschlossen; ihre Verwendung ist in diesem Kontext jedoch auf jeden Fall markiert. Durch die unübliche Aspektwahl im negierten Satz hat außerdem eine auf den ersten Blick kaum wahrnehmbare Bedeutungsverschiebung in Richtung Epistemialisierung stattgefunden. Die Bedeutung von *magan* 'sie können' ist hier nicht 'vermögen', sondern: 'es ist nicht möglich', 'es ist ausgeschlossen'. Man könnte den Satz somit nicht paraphrasieren mit: 'Fleisch und Blut haben nicht die Fähigkeit das Reich Gottes zu erben'; die adäquate Paraphrasierung der Bedeutung ist: 'Es ist nicht möglich, dass Fleisch und Blut das Reich Gottes erben'. Die deontische Fähigkeitsbedeutung von *magan* kippt um in die epistemische Möglichkeitsbedeutung. Die unpersönliche Konstruktion der Paraphrase mit 'es ist möglich' macht außerdem deutlich, dass eine Skopusverschiebung stattgefunden hat: Die Negation bezieht sich auf die gesamte Proposition. Skopusweiterungen dieser Art sind typisch für Epistemialisierungen.

In einer Zwischenzusammenfassung lässt sich somit für gotische Konstruktionen mit *magan* + Infinitiv festhalten:

- A. In unmarkierten Aussagesätzen werden perfektive Infinitive selektiert.
- B. In negierten Sätzen sind sowohl imperfektive Infinitive als auch perfektive Infinitive belegt. Die imperfektiven Infinitive sind in negierten Sätzen frequenter und stellen den unmarkierten Verwendungsfall dar. Die perfektiven Infinitive stellen im Gegenzug sowohl formal als auch inhaltlich den markierten Fall dar.
- C. Epistemialisierung wird über markierte Aspektwahl und den dadurch ausgelösten Reinterpretationsprozess realisiert.

Nun ist Negation nicht gleich Epistemialisierung, aber es stellt doch ein Einfallstor für Epistemialisierung dar. Die Frage liegt nahe, ob es im Gotischen auch bereits Modalisierung in nichtnegierten Sätzen gibt. In diesem Fall müsste die Modalisierung durch den imperfektiven Aspekt des abhängigen Infinitivs ausgelöst werden, da in nichtnegierten Sätzen mit *magan* + Infinitiv der perfektive Aspekt die unmarkierte, deontische Lesart bewirkt.

Zunächst darf man sich bei der Betrachtung von Belegen nicht von scheinbaren Ausnahmefällen ablenken lassen. Es gibt nämlich tatsächlich Konstruktionen mit *magan* + imperfektivem Infinitiv, die weder etwas mit Negation noch etwas mit Epistemialisierung zu tun haben. Wenn perfektive Verben in definiter Umgebung, etwa mit einem Demonstrativpronomen vorkommen, entfällt häufig das Perfektivierungspräfix. Der Grund dafür ist, wie

in Leiss (2000) ausführlich besprochen wurde, dass Definitheitskontexte für das Verb Perfektivierungskontexte darstellen. Die Verwendung eines Präfixes wäre somit redundant. Folgende Beispiele zeigen dieses Verhalten deutlich:

- (19) *ga-u-laubjats þatei magjau þata taujan?* [Matth. 9:28]
(19a) Glaubt ihr, dass ich euch helfen kann? [Ü:JB]
(20) *hvas mag þis hausjon?* [Joh. 6:60]
(20a) wer kann das anhören? [Ü:JB]

Ohne das Definitpronomen *þata* in (19) müsste dort *magjau gataujan* verwendet werden. Völlig parallel verhält sich mit *þis* in (20), das ebenfalls die Setzung des perfektivierenden *ga*-Präfixes überflüssig macht. Die perfektivierende Funktion von Definitpronomen im Gotischen wurde in Leiss (2000: 114-155) herausgearbeitet.

Gibt es nun aber auch Konstruktionen von *magan* mit imperfektiven Verben, die nicht durch Satznegation oder durch Definitheitskontexte gefordert werden, und die dennoch epistemische Modalverbbedeutungen aufweisen? Das ist tatsächlich der Fall, wie die beiden nächsten Sätze exemplarisch zeigen:

- (21) *ibai mag blinds blindana tiuhan?* [Luk. 6:39]
(21a) Kann ein Blinder einen Blinden führen? (Ü: JB)
Kann denn ein Blinder einen Blinden führen? (Übersetzung: E.L.)
(21b) *ibai mag blinds*
PARTIKEL können:PRÄS.3.PS.SG. Blinder:NOM.SG.M.
aber/denn kann (ein) Blinder

blindana tiuhan?
Blinder:AKK.SG.M. ziehen:INF.
(einen) Blinden führen?
'Kann denn ein Blinder einen Blinden führen?'

Erwartbar wäre hier der Aspektpartner *ga-tiuhan* an Stelle von *tiuhan*, allerdings nur dann, wenn deontische Modalverbbedeutung vorläge. Doch das ist nicht der Fall. Die Bedeutung von *mag tiuhan* ist ins Epistemische verschoben: Es wird in Zweifel gezogen, dass ein Blinder einen Blinden führen kann, ganz gleich unter welchen Voraussetzungen. Gemeint ist, dass es unmöglich ist, dass ein Blinder einen Blinden führen kann. Es wird also nicht nach den Voraussetzungen gefragt, unter denen ein Blinder einen Blinden führen kann. Im Neuhochdeutschen kann man diese Relativierung einer Aussage durch eine Abtönungspartikel wie *denn* oder *aber* zum Ausdruck

bringen und/oder durch eine unpersönliche Konstruktion und Skopuserweiterung: *Ist es nicht möglich, dass...*

Es handelt sich deutlich um eine epistemische Modalverbkonstruktion. Bewirkt wird sie durch ‘nichtoptimale’ Aspektwahl und die damit verbundene Lesartverschiebung.

Ein weiteres Beispiel für eine epistemische Modalverbkonstruktion mit imperfektivem Verb ist:

(22) frauja, ni witum hvaþ gaggis, jah hvaiwa magum þana wig kunnan?
[Joh. 14:5]

(22a) Herr, wir wissen nicht, wohin du gehst. Wie sollen wir dann den Weg kennen? [Ü: JB]

(22b) frauja,	ni	witum	hvaþ
Herr:VOK.SG.M.	NEG.	wissen:PRÄS.1.PS.PL.	wohin:ADV.
Herr,	nicht	(wir) wissen	wohin
‘Herr, wir wissen nicht, wohin			

gaggis,	jah	hvaiwa
gehen:PRÄS.2.PS.SG.	KONJ.	wie:ADV.
(du) gehst,	und	wie
du gehst, aber wie		

magum	þana
(wir) können:PRÄS.1.PS.PL.	DEF.ART.AKK.SG.N.
können wir	den
können wir denn dann den	

wig	kunnan?
Weg:AKK.SG.M.	kennen:PRÄS.1.PS.PL.
Weg	kennen?
Weg kennen?’	

An Stelle des perfektiven Infinitivs *ga-kunnan* wird das imperfektive *kunnan* verwendet. Wieder liegt epistemische Lesart vor: Gefragt wird mit *magum kunnan* hier nicht nach der Fähigkeit oder den Mitteln, den Weg zu kennen; vielmehr wird die Möglichkeit, dies zu tun, in Frage gestellt: ‘Es ist nicht möglich, dass wir den Weg kennen’ bzw. ‘wie wäre es denn möglich, den Weg zu kennen’.

Der Zusammenhang zwischen Negation, Aspekt und Deontizität/Epistemizität im Gotischen lässt sich mit folgender Tabelle zusammenfassen:

NICHT-NEGIERTE PROPOSITION:

magan + perfektiver Infinitiv: deontische Modalverbbedeutung:
'vermögen', 'können'

magan + imperfektiver Infinitiv: epistemische Modalverbbedeutung:
'es ist möglich, dass'

NEGIERTE PROPOSITION:

ni magan + imperfektiver Infinitiv: deontische Modalverbbedeutung:
'nicht vermögen'

ni magan + perfektiver Infinitiv: epistemische Modalverbbedeutung:
'es ist nicht möglich, dass'

Tabelle 1. Der Zusammenhang zwischen
Negation, Aspekt und Deontizität/Epistemizität im Gotischen

Paradoxerweise erzielen *magan* + imperfektiver Infinitiv und *ni magan* + perfektiver Infinitiv dieselbe Wirkung, nämlich die Epistemialisierung der Konstruktion. Was beide Konstruktionen gemeinsam haben, ist die nicht-optimale, markierte Aspektwahl. Diese löst jeweils die Epistemialisierung der Konstruktion aus. Will man also eine negierte deontische Modalverbkonstruktion erzeugen, so ist sowohl die Negation als auch ein imperfektiver Infinitiv erforderlich. Die maximal unmarkierte, d.h. die deontische und nichtnegierte Modalverbkonstruktion erfordert den perfektiven Aspekt. Unmarkiert ist dieser Aspekt nur auf der modalen Ebene. Auf der Ebene der aspektuellen Bedeutungen verhält es sich wiederum umgekehrt: der imperfektive Aspekt stellt eindeutig den unmarkierten Verbpartner dar. Die Umkehrung von Markiertheitswerten wird ganz offensichtlich sehr systematisch zum Aufbau neuer grammatischer Information genutzt.

5. Modus und Aspekt in den frühesten Belegen des Althochdeutschen

Es liegt nahe, den für das Gotische deutlich erkennbaren Zusammenhang zwischen Aspektselektion, Negation und Epistemialisierung hypothetisch auf das Althochdeutsche zu übertragen. Götz (2001) sieht im Althochdeutschen keine spezifischen aspektuellen Vorlieben, was den angeschlossenen Infinitiv bei Präteritopräsentien betrifft. Ihre Auswertung differenziert allerdings nicht zwischen negierten und nichtnegierten Sätzen und konnte schon deshalb keine

Musterbildung erkennen. Ohne diese Differenzierung erscheint Zufall dort, wo Ordnung herrschen könnte, denn immerhin 23,9% aller Belege des ausgewerteten Korpus sind negiert, wie Götz (2001: 137) in einem Kapitel zur Negation feststellt. Negation und die Aspektualität des Verbs werden von ihr in keinem Zusammenhang gesehen, obwohl dieser bei Aspektsprachen bekannt ist. Dieses Versäumnis wird dadurch nicht besser, dass sie dem Althochdeutschen Aspektpaare abspricht. Ohne die Sichtbarmachung dieses älteren, noch wirksamen Systems wird man in der Grammatik des Althochdeutschen nur wenig Musterbildung erkennen können.

Beginnen wir mit den ältesten Texten des Althochdeutschen. Sie lassen sich auf das 8. Jahrhundert datieren. Folgt man den Datierungen im Chronologischen Wörterbuch des deutschen Wortschatzes (Seebold 2002), so kommt für unsere Untersuchung als einziger längerer und zusammenhängender Text nur der althochdeutsche *Isidor* in Frage.

Es ist unbestritten, dass *magan* von allen heute bekannten Modalverben des Deutschen das Grammatikalisierungsrennen um Epistemizität eröffnet hat (Fritz 1997). Es stellt sich die Frage, ob im *Isidor* bereits epistemische Lesarten von *magan* + Infinitiv vorliegen. Götz (2002: 314) verneint diese Frage. Sie nimmt für alle 8 ermittelten Belege deontische Bedeutung (bei ihr 'eigentlicher Gebrauch') an. Im Folgenden soll gezeigt werden, dass dieses Ergebnis zu hinterfragen ist.

Zunächst fällt auf, dass *magan* sowohl mit perfektiven als auch mit imperfektiven Infinitiven konstruiert werden konnte. Berücksichtigt man die Befunde aus dem Gotischen, wo ja die Setzung des perfektiven Infinitivs den unmarkierten Fall darstellt, lässt sich a priori hypostasieren, dass die Vorkommen mit dem perfektiven Infinitiv die frequenteren sind und damit den unmarkierten Normalfall der Verwendung darstellen. Das ist tatsächlich der Fall, wie folgende Tabelle zeigt:

<i>magan</i> + perfektiver Infinitiv	<i>magan</i> + imperfektiver Infinitiv	<i>magan</i> + imperfektiver Infinitiv im negierten Satz
<i>mac chi-rahhon</i>	<i>mac uuesan</i>	<i>Haldan ni mahtun</i>
<i>mahta ar-rahhon</i>		<i>ni mac uuesan</i>
<i>mahti chi-frumman</i>		
<i>mahti chi-boran uuerdan</i>		
<i>mahti chi-garauuan</i>		

Tabelle 2. Aspekt der mit *magan* konstruierten Infinitive

Als perfektiv müssen auch die Verben eingeordnet werden, die zusätzlich zum perfektiven Aspekt eine Aktionsartbedeutung aufweisen. Sie sind in spezifischen Bedeutungskontexten als perfektive Partner selegierbar. Die Zuordnung eines perfektiven Aspektpartners erfolgte somit nicht starr: So wird *ar-rahhon* neben *chi-rahhon* verwendet. Die lateinischen Entsprechungen sind jeweils *ennarrari* und *narrare*. Von den fünf perfektiven Infinitiven weisen vier im Althochdeutschen noch einen bedeutungsgleichen imperfektiven Verbpartner auf (*chi-* wird im Folgenden mit dem häufigeren *gi-* transkribiert). Dasselbe gilt für den imperfektiven Infinitiv im negierten Satz: Ihm ist ebenfalls ein perfektiver Aspektpartner zugeordnet:

<u>rahhon</u>	gi-rahhon	‘sprechen’, ‘sagen’, ‘erzählen’, ‘erörtern’
<u>rahhon</u>	ar-rahhon	‘sprechen’, ‘sagen’, ‘erzählen’, ‘verkünden’
<u>frumman</u>	gi-frumman	‘handeln’, ‘machen’, bewirken’
<u>garawan</u>	gi-garawan	‘bereiten’, ‘vorbereiten’
haltan	<u>gi-haltan</u>	‘halten’, ‘behalten’, ‘einhalten’, ‘befolgen’ etc.

Tabelle 3: Aspektpartner der belegten Infinitive

Nach den bisherigen Befunden aus dem Gotischen liegt es nahe zu hypothesieren, dass der nichtnegierte Beleg *mac* + imperfektiver Infinitiv epistemische Bedeutung aufweist. Auch wenn Götz (2001: 314) dem Beleg deontische Bedeutung zuweist, erscheint es nach den bisherigen Überlegungen erforderlich, diesen Beleg nochmals zu überprüfen:

- (23) Uuala nu auh huues mac dhesiu stimna uuesan, nibu dhēs nerrendin druhtines?
 [Isidor; Paris, BN, Ms. Lat. 2326: 11,5]
 Lateinischer Text: Age nunc cuius sit hec uox nisi saluatoris?

- (23a) ‘Wohlan nun auch, wem kann diese Stimme gehören [wessen kann diese Stimme sein], wenn nicht dem rettenden Herrn?’
 [Übersetzung: Götz 2001: 315]

- (23b) Uuala nu auh huues mac
 wohl nun KONJ. FRAGEPRON.GEN.SG. können:PRÄS.3.PS.SG.
 Wohlan nun auch wessen kann
 Nun, wem kann denn
- dhesiu stimna uuesan, (nisi saluatoris)
 DEM.PROM.NOM.SG.F. Stimme:NOM.SG.F. sein:INF.
 diese Stimme sein

diese Stimme gehören, (wenn nicht dem Herrn)?

Es ist offenkundig, dass *mac* nicht die Bedeutung von ‘vermögen’, ‘können’ hat. Es geht nicht um eine Fähigkeit oder ein Vermögen, sondern um die Möglichkeit eines Sachverhalts aus der Einschätzung des Sprechers. Die Evaluation durch den Sprecher lässt sich im Neuhochdeutschen durch die Abtönungspartikel *denn* wiedergeben. Die Ablehnung dieser Modalverbkonstruktion als epistemisch durch Götz (2001) ist das Ergebnis einer falschen Paraphrasierung des Satzes. Sie schlägt zwei epistemische Paraphrasierungen vor: a) wem gehört - meiner Vermutung nach - diese Stimme? b) Wem vermute ich, dass diese Stimme gehört? Selbstverständlich muss Götz (2001: 315, Anm. 1068) diese seltsam konstruierten Lesarten dann anschließend als unsinnig ablehnen. Die zutreffende Paraphrasierung ist “Wem denn kann diese Stimme gehören” bzw. “Wem mag/könnte diese Stimme gehören (wenn nicht unserem Herrn)”. Die Lesart ist eindeutig als epistemisch einzuordnen. Es handelt sich um eine Thematisierung und damit Einschätzung der Proposition aus der Sprecherperspektive.

Es würde den Umfang einer Dissertation erfordern, alle Belege im Althochdeutschen auf den Zusammenhang von Aspekt, Negation und Epistemialisierung hin zu überprüfen. Bis jetzt sollte deutlich gemacht werden, dass eine solche Arbeit mit beachtlichen Ergebnissen rechnen kann. Was die epistemialisierten Belege von *magan* + Infinitiv in Otfrids Evangelienbuch betrifft, so findet man bei Krause (1997) eine vollständige Zusammenstellung der Belege. Alle sind ausschließlich mit imperfektiven Verben konstruiert: mit den Infinitiven *sîn* und *wesan*. Es gibt auch Belege mit Satznegationen, die ebenfalls mit imperfektiven Infinitiven konstruiert werden. Wie zu erwarten, entfalten sie keine epistemische Bedeutung. Daneben ermittelt Krause (1997: 96ff) eine Reihe von Belegen, die sich nach ihrer Einschätzung nicht eindeutig als deontisch oder epistemisch einordnen lassen. Sie spricht in Bezug auf diese Belege von einem “dritten Bereich” zwischen Modalität und Modalisierung, d.h. zwischen Deontizität und Epistemizität. Betrachtet man diese Belege näher, so fällt auf, dass ein Teil von ihnen mit perfektiven Infinitiven konstruiert ist, ein anderer Teil mit imperfektiven Infinitiven, ein Teil wiederum ist negiert. Unter der Berücksichtigung der Aspektualität der Infinitive und des Faktors der Negation lässt sich die Lesart jeweils eindeutig festlegen, so die These, die hier vertreten wird. Grammatische Kategorien haben primär die Funktion, in Kontexten, die eine alternative Perspektivierung erlauben, und die nicht in Bezug auf ihre Lesart bereits festgelegt sind, darüber zu informieren, welche Perspektive vorliegt. In unserem Fall bedeutet das den Wechsel zwischen einer deontischen und einer epistemischen Perspektivierung durch Aspektwechsel.

Wichtig ist in diesem Zusammenhang noch, dass gerade *magan*, das die Avantgarde bei der Herausgrammatikalisierung der Modalverben darstellt,

auch die höchsten Vorkommen an perfektiven Infinitiven aufweist. Das macht deutlich, dass die Alternierung zwischen Perfektivität und Imperfektivität systematisch genutzt wurde, um Deontizität und Epistemizität zu kodieren. Das bringt uns zu unserer Ausgangsfrage zurück: Wie wurden diese modalen Perspektivierungen vor dem grammatischen Neustart in ein Modalverbssystem hinein zum Ausdruck gebracht?

6. Implizite Kodierung von Deontizität und Epistemizität

Es ist sichtbar geworden, dass gleich in den Frühphasen der Herausgrammatikalisierung eines Modalverbssystems die Aspektualität der Verben als Baustein genutzt wurde. Eine große Rolle hat dabei die markierte Aspektwahl gespielt. Scheinbar nichtoptimale Aspektselektion wird genutzt, um Modalität zu kodieren. Dabei wurde Deontizität kodiert durch die Wahl des markierten Aspektpols: Das ist im Gotischen und Althochdeutschen der formal markierte perfektive Infinitiv. Zur Steigerung von Modalität hin zur Modalisierung bzw. Epistemialisierung wird das Verfahren der nichtoptimalen Aspektwahl rekursiv genutzt: Die imperfektive Aspektform kommt erneut ins Spiel. Diese Markiertheitsumkehrung tritt zunächst hochfrequent und regulär bei Negationen auf und kodiert schließlich Epistemizität in nichtnegierten Sätzen mit *magan* + Infinitiv. In einem weiteren Schritt werden schließlich auch die negierten Sätze epistemialisierbar, wiederum durch die Wahl des aspektuellen Gegenpols, diesmal des hypermarkierten perfektiven Aspekts. Der Hauptakteur bei dieser gewaltigen Steigerung an grammatischer Information ist die Kategorie des Aspekts. Dieser Mehrwert an Information wird in Kooperation mit einem finiten Verb erzielt. Aus dieser grammatischen Zusammenarbeit entwickelt sich schließlich ein ausdifferenziertes Modalverbssystem.

All diese Beobachtungen zwingen uns dazu, den Blick auf die Kategorie des Aspekts zu richten, wenn wir in Sprachen ohne Modalverbssystematik nach Deontizität und Epistemizität suchen. Tatsächlich verfügen die bekannten modalverbarmen Sprachen alle über ein ausdifferenziertes Aspektsystem. Nach den bisherigen Beobachtungen zeichnet sich auch ab, wie sich in solchen Sprachen ein Aspektsystem nutzen lässt, um deontische und epistemische modale Bedeutungen zu realisieren: Es ist der einfache und hocheffiziente, da rekursiv nutzbare Prozess der nichtoptimalen Aspektwahl. Diese Nichtoptimalität löst Reinterpretationsprozesse aus. Die 'Rettung' einer nichtoptimalen Aspektform mündet in eine neue Lesart. Diese Prozesse sind intersubjektiv stabil und robust genug, um damit grammatische Kategorien aufzubauen.

Mit Blick auf das Gotische und das Althochdeutsche bis hin zum Mittelhochdeutschen ist dabei von zwei koexistenten Kodierungsmustern für

Modalität auszugehen, die komplementär und arbeitsteilig ineinandergreifen. Die ersten Modalverbvorkommen sind die sichtbaren Formen dieses neuen Systems. Es ist, wie wir das von neugrammatikalisierten Formen erwarten, analytisch kodiert, bestehend aus einem infiniten und einem finiten Verbspart. Der infinite Teil transportiert dabei die aspektuelle kategoriale Information; auf den finiten Teil wird die temporale und modale Information gepackt. Das alles entspricht unseren Erwartungen in Bezug auf die Aufbaulogik analytischer Verbformen. Die Basiskategorie ist auf den infiniten Teil der Konstruktion gepackt, während der finite Teil die komplexeren Kategorien transportiert. Das neue System wird notwendig, weil sich das Aspektsystem zunehmend auflöst. Doch noch ist dieses Aspektsystem wirksam. Das alte System der rekursiven Nutzung nichtoptimaler Aspektformen muss also noch vorhanden sein.

Bislang wurde bei der Untersuchung des modalen Systems der älteren Stufen des Deutschen ein solches älteres System nicht vermutet. Es wurde nicht einmal in Ansätzen nach alternativen Mustern der Kodierung von Deontizität und Epistemizität gesucht. Damit wurde etwa die Hälfte des Untersuchungsbereichs weggelassen. Von einer systematischen Untersuchung von Modalität in den älteren Stufen des Deutschen und der germanischen Sprachen sind wir daher noch weit entfernt. Das hatte die paradoxe Folge, dass man in den überlieferten älteren Stufen zuwenig an Epistemizität überliefert fand. Krause (1997: 93) spitzt ihre Unzufriedenheit mit diesem Zuwenig an epistemischen modalen Bedeutungen folgendermaßen zu: "es ist nicht anzunehmen, dass im 9. Jahrhundert, welches schließlich nur etwa 44 Generationen zurückliegt!, weniger spekuliert und relativiert wurde als heute". Es ist kein Ausweg, die überlieferten Textsorten dafür verantwortlich zu machen. Auch der Duktus der Mündlichkeit, der die Texte teilweise noch charakterisiert, kann nicht die Ursache dafür sein, da Epistemizität auch in der gesprochenen Sprache nicht primär suprasegmental über Betonung oder Prosodie zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Es ist auch keine Lösung, die Anzahl der ermittelten epistemischen Modalverbkonstruktionen irgendwie doch ausreichend zu finden, wie Krause (1997: 99-100) das schließlich vorschlägt. Und es wäre ein Desaster nicht nur für die Linguistik, sondern für unser Verständnis der menschlichen Kognition ganz allgemein, wenn wieder rassistische Kräfte Auftrieb bekommen würden, welche die Existenz von Sprachen mit geringerer Komplexität postulieren wollen. Dass diese metalinguistische Perversion nicht aus der Welt ist, zeigt das Themenheft von *Linguistic Typology* (2001). Die Entdeckung implizit kodierter grammatischer Inhalte ist daher von größter Relevanz, da sie falsche Behauptungen über die Komplexität von Einzelsprachen vermeiden helfen.

7. Die Kodierung von Deontizität

Die Suche nach deontischen und epistemischen modalen Bedeutungen in modalverblosen Sprachen kann nach den bisherigen Autopsien nur in einer Richtung erfolgreich sein: Fokussiert werden müssen Prozesse der nicht-optimalen Aspektwahl:

1. die Verwendung imperfektiver Verben, obwohl inhaltlich keine imperfektive Aspektbedeutung vorliegt;
2. die Verwendung perfektiver Verben, obwohl keine perfektive Aspektbedeutung vorliegt.

Es ist bekannt, dass zu den aspektuellen Nebenaufgaben die Realisierung von Zeitbezügen gehört. So weisen perfektive Verben in ihrer Präsensform bevorzugt nichtpräsentischen Zeitbezug auf. In Aspektsprachen wie dem Gotischen oder Russischen ist das der zukünftige Zeitbezug. Es ist somit anzunehmen, dass es auch in Bezug auf die temporalen Nebenfunktionen von Aspektverben zu nichtoptimaler, markierter Aspektwahl kommen kann. Solche wären:

3. die Verwendung imperfektiver Verben, obwohl kein aktueller Gegenwartsbezug vorliegt;
4. die Verwendung perfektiver Verben, obwohl kein Zukunftsbezug vorliegt.

Die deontische Bedeutung von 'können' lässt sich tatsächlich durch die Verwendung von imperfektiven Verben implizit kodieren. Voraussetzung ist, dass sich die Proposition nicht auf ein Andauern einer Verbalsituation in der aktuellen Gegenwart bezieht, sondern vielmehr auf eine allgemeine Fähigkeit oder Eigenschaft. Man könnte von einer Art generischen Verwendung des imperfektiven Aspektverbs sprechen. Diese Regularität ist aus der Russistik bekannt (vgl. Burkhardt 1990: 90). Beispiele dazu sind:

- (24) Stella *govorit* po-russki.
(24a) wörtlich: Stella spricht Russisch.
Bedeutung: 'Stella kann Russisch sprechen'

Das Verb *govorit* ('spricht') ist imperfektiv und löst die Lesart 'kann sprechen' aus. Ein analoges Beispiel ist:

- (25) Rebënok ešče ne *govorit*.
(25a) wörtlich: Das Kind *spricht* noch nicht.
Bedeutung: 'Das Kind *kann* noch nicht *sprechen*'

Ein interessanter Hinweis zu einem vergleichbaren System in älteren Stufen des Deutschen findet sich bei Behaghel (1923/1989: 104). Danach kann ein perfektives Verb zum Ausdruck der Möglichkeit verwendet werden. Das von ihm genannte Beispiel ist:

- (26) er engesah den man
 (26a) ‘er konnte den Menschen nicht sehen’
- (26b) er en-ge-sah
 PERS.PRON.3.PS.SG.M. NEG-PV-sehen:PRÄT.3.PS.SG.
 Er nicht wahrnahm
- den man
 DEF.ART.AKK.SG.M. Mensch:AKK.SG.M.
 den Menschen

Für Behaghel (1923/1989: 104) ist die Verbform *en-ge-sah* synonym mit der analytischen Modalverbkonstruktion: *er enmohte sehen*. Diesem Beispiel lässt sich entnehmen, dass das perfektivierende Verbalpräfix ursprünglich dieselben Funktionen realisieren konnte wie ein Modalverb mit (imperfektivem) Infinitiv. Was bei diesem Beispiel vorliegt, ist deontische Modalverbbedeutung. Zusätzlich handelt es sich um eine negierte Proposition. Die Negation selektiert offenbar nur bei der Modalverbkonstruktion den imperfektiven Infinitiv.

Der folgende Ausschnitt aus Otrids Evangelienbuch zeigt deutlich, dass im Althochdeutschen auch imperfektive Aspektformen zur impliziten Kodierung eines deontischen ‘können’ verwendet wurden. Die Textstelle ist besonders geeignet, weil in unmittelbarer textueller Nachbarschaft, nämlich zwei Verse vorher, eine parallele Konstruktion mit dem perfektiven Verb vorkommt. Dort fehlt die deontische Konnotation. Das beteiligte Aspektpaar ist im Althochdeutschen noch intakt:

- singan* (impf.) *gi-singan* (pf.)
 ‘singen’, ‘preisen’ ‘ein Lied/Dichtung vortragen’, ‘ein Preislied singen’

- (27) thaz wír imo hiar gisúngun in frénkisga zúngun.
 (27a) das, was wir ihm hier in fränkischer Sprache zum Vortrag brachten
 [Übersetzung von E.L.]
 [...]
- (28) Thaz wir Kríste sungun in únsera zungun,
 (28a) dass wir Christus in unserer Sprache preisen konnten
 [Übersetzung von Vollmann-Profe (1987)]
 [Otrid von Weißenburg: Evangelienbuch, I,1, 122 und 125]

Aspekts ist auch aus anderen Aspektsprachen bekannt und wurde von Hedin (2000) als “type-referring function of the imperfective” bezeichnet.

Gewinnt man erst einmal einen Blick für diese Form der Aspektnutzung, geht man vermehrt dazu über, alle verbalen Aspektformen auf ihre inhärenten modalen Kapazitäten hin zu überprüfen. So enthält beispielsweise bereits der nachfolgende Vers von Beispiel (27) wieder ein imperfektives Verb, das “verdächtig” werden könnte, ein modales Bedeutungspotential zu transportieren:

(29) [Thaz wir Kríste sungun in únsere zungun,]
joh wir ouch gilébetun, in frénkisgon inan lóbotun!

(29a) dass auch wir es erleben sollten, dass wir ihn auf Fränkisch loben konnten. [Übersetzung von E.L.]

(29b) joh wir ouch gi-lébetun,
KONJ. PERS.PRON.3.PS.PL.NOM. auch PF.-leben:PRÄT.1.PS.PL.
und wir auch erlebten,
‘und auch wir es erleben durften/konnten/sollten,

in frénkisgon		inan
PRÄP. Fränkisch:AKK.SG.N.	PERS.PRON.3.PS.SG.AKK.M.	
in Fränkisch		ihn

lóbotun
preisen:PRÄT.1.PS.PL.
priesen
ihn auf Fränkisch preisen zu können’.

Wir sehen in diesem Beispiel nicht nur die generische Verwendung des imperfektiven Aspekts (*lóbotun*), sondern auch die generische Verwendung des perfektiven Aspekts (*gi-lébetun*). Die generische Verwendung ist also, anders als Hedin (2000) annimmt, nicht auf den imperfektiven Aspekt beschränkt. Die generische Verwendung sowohl des imperfektiven als auch des perfektiven Aspekts ist aus der Russistik bekannt. In dieser Verwendungsweise sind sie dann entweder durch die generischen imperfektiven Aspektformen substituierbar oder sie weisen eine subtile zusätzliche Bedeutung auf, die durch die ursprüngliche Aspektbedeutung beigesteuert wird. Vergleichbar ist dieses Verhalten mit den generischen Verwendungen des bestimmten und des unbestimmten Artikels. Auch sie sind jeweils beide generisch verwendbar, doch nicht immer in allen Fällen substituierbar. Zur Differenzierung zwischen definiten und indefiniten generischer Verwendung des Artikels gibt es eine umfangreiche Forschungsdiskussion. Zur Differenzierung zwischen generisch verwendetem perfektivem Aspekt und generisch verwendetem

die	pfäwen	sâhen;
DEF.ART.NOM.PL.	Pfau:NOM.PL.	sehen:PRÄT.3.PS.SG.
die	Pfauen	sahen/sehen konnten;

Das Verb *sâhen* wird hier in der imperfektiven Form verwendet, obwohl die perfektive Bedeutung ‘erblicken’, ‘wahrnehmen’ gemeint ist. Erwartbar wäre also die Verbform *gesâhen*. Dieses Verb ist im Mittelhochdeutschen vorhanden und wird auch im vorliegenden Text zwei Zeilen weiter verwendet (*gesâch*:PRÄT.3.PS.SG. in der Bedeutung von ‘erblickte’: *swelhiu ir vederen dâ gesach*/die, welche ihre Federn da erblickte). Ehrismann löst in seiner Übersetzung die syntaktische Struktur auf und unterlegt eine Übersetzung, die im Neuhochdeutschen einigermaßen Sinn gibt. In diese Verlegenheit kommt er, weil er die modale Bedeutung von *sâhen* nicht erkennt. Die Modalisierung entsteht, weil in einem deutlich erkennbaren perfektiven Bedeutungskontext die imperfektive Verbform verwendet wurde. Mit anderen Worten: die nicht-optimale Verwendung einer Aspektform wird systematisch zur Erzielung eines grammatischen Mehrwerts genutzt. Da das Verbpaar *sêhen/gesêhen* im Mittelhochdeutschen noch ein voll funktionstüchtiges Aspektpaar darstellt, funktioniert die Erzielung eines modalen Mehrwerts durch die nichtoptimale Nutzung einer Aspektform noch.

Bis jetzt haben wir Hinweise auf das inhärente Potential deontischer modaler Bedeutungen bei markierten Verwendungen von imperfektiven und perfektiven Aspektverben. Doch wo sind die verborgenen epistemischen modalen Bedeutungen?

8. Die Kodierung von Epistemizität

Rathmayr (1976: 108) hat eine interessante Beobachtung bei ihrer Untersuchung der Übersetzung von deutschen Modalverbkonstruktionen ins Russische gemacht:

Es ist sicher ein Kennzeichen stümperhafter Übersetzungen, wenn jedes deutsche Modalverb im R[ussischen] mit einem Modalprädikativum wiedergegeben wird. Es müsste stärker beachtet werden, dass im R[ussischen] sehr viele modale Bedeutungen durch die PF [perfektive Präsensform] zum Ausdruck kommen.

Rathmayr weist hier auf alternative Muster der Kodierung von Modalität hin, die dem metasprachlichem Bewusstsein nur schwer zugänglich sind. Es ist naheliegend anzunehmen, dass auch die epistemischen Modalisierungen auf alternative, uns heute noch unbekannt Weise kodierbar sind. Auch hier dürften die Aspektverben, die in einer voll ausgebauten Aspektsprache

offenbar kategoriale ‘Alleskönner’ sind, die Kodierungsleistung erbringen. Doch auf welche Art und Weise? Da die epistemischen Kodierungen von Modalität komplexer sind als die deontischen Kodierungen, liegt es nahe, bereits von einem komplexeren aspektuellen Startprogramm auszugehen: Es ist bekannt, dass in Aspektsprachen die Aspektverben auch zusätzliche temporale Nebenfunktionen übernehmen. Epistemische Modalität könnte dann entstehen, wenn es zu Verstößen bei der Aktualisierung der Zeitbezüge, die mit spezifischen Aspektverben verbunden sind, kommt. Das hieße dann, dass perfektive Aspektverben, die im Russischen und im Gotischen bis hin zum Althochdeutschen zur Realisierung zukünftigen Zeitbezugs verwendet werden, nichtzukünftigen, gegenwartsbezogenen Zeitbezug aufweisen müssten, um epistemische Modalisierung auszulösen. Im Gegensatz zur deontischen Modalisierung entsteht dabei keine generische Bedeutung. Die Proposition bleibt weiterhin zeitlich lokalisierbar, allerdings nicht in der Zukunft, sondern in der Gegenwart. Dass Epistemizität durch diese Verschiebung der Zeitbezüge erzeugbar ist, können wir auch an Hand der vertrauten Muster aus dem Neuhochdeutschen nachvollziehen:

(31) Wo ist Anna? - Sie wird auf dem Balkon eine Zigarette rauchen.

Futurkonstruktionen werden im Deutschen und anderen Sprachen durch nicht-kanonischen, präsentischen Zeitbezug epistemisch modalisiert. Dasselbe dürfen wir konsequenterweise für die perfektiven Präsensformen von Aspektverben annehmen. Im Russischen sind sie vollständig als Futur grammatikalisiert. Doch können sie auch mit präsentischem Zeitbezug oder eben generisch verwendet werden. Dieser Verwendungsbereich ist nach Rathmayr (1976) sehr umfangreich: In ihrem Korpus sind es immerhin über 40% der von ihr untersuchten perfektiven Präsensformen, die nichtfuturisch verwendet werden. Es ist naheliegend anzunehmen, dass sich unter diesen nichtgenerisch und gegenwartsbezogen verwendeten Aspektformen das Funktionspotential für epistemische Kodierung entdecken ließe. Dabei ist nicht a priori davon auszugehen, dass sich allein die perfektiven Aspektformen für diese Kodierung besonders eignen. Gerade das Beispiel des Deutschen, in dem *werden* + Infinitiv (ebenso wie die früheren Futurformen mit *sollen* und *wollen* als Auxiliare) ursprünglich nur mit imperfektiven Verben konstruiert werden konnte, macht deutlich, dass imperfektive Futura die Quelle für die Kodierung von Epistemizität darstellen, sobald sie mit nichtoptimalem Zeitbezug verwendet werden. Entdeckt ist diese alternative Kodierung von Epistemizität in Sprachen OHNE epistemische Modalverben bislang noch nicht. Doch wir haben immerhin eine Spur, die wir bei unseren künftigen empirischen Untersuchungen aufnehmen können.

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**EKSPPLICITNO I IMPLICITNO KODIRANJE
DEONTIČKOG I EPISTEMIČKOG ZNAČENJA:
O RAZVOJU GRAMATIČKIH PRAVLINOSTI
PRIJE POJAVE MODALNIH GLAGOLA**

Gdje su deontička i epistemička značenja prije gramatikalizacije zatvorenog skupa modalnih glagola? Cilj je ovog rada ukazati na relevantnost ovog dosada zanemarenog pitanja. Ishodišna je hipoteza da se sistemi modalnih glagola sustavno razvijaju samo u jezicima koji ne poznaju glagolski vid ili u jezicima u kojima je vid prisutan samo u tragovima. Polazeći od te hipoteze dolazi se do svježih podataka u odavno poznatim starovisokonjemačkim tekstovima za koje se mislilo da su iscrpno istraženi. U ovom prvom naletu pokazuju se dosada nezamijećene pravilnosti u implicitnom kodiranju epistemičkih i deontičkih značenja na primjeru starovisokonjemačkoga. Radi se o preliminarnim rezultatima čiju će tipološku valjanost i mogućnost poopćavanja trebati šire provjeriti putem daljnjih pilot-studija posvećenih pojedinim jezicima, te putem sveobuhvatnih istraživanja u okviru jezične tipologije i teorije gramatikalizacije.

Ključne riječi: epistemička modalnost, deontička modalnost, deontički modali, epistemički modali, aspekt i modalnost, modalnost u gotskome, modalnost u starovisokonjemačkome

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Osijek

O poredbenom frazemu u engleskom i hrvatskom jeziku

Istraživanje prezentirano u ovom radu analiza je poredbenih frazema u engleskom i hrvatskom jeziku. Cilj istraživanja je utvrditi odnose između poredbenih frazema, poredbi, metafora i metonimija, karakteristike i strukturu poredbenih frazema, te identificirati specifična svojstva i tipove poredbenih frazema analizom korpusa engleskih i hrvatskih poredbenih frazema. Posebno se razmatraju primjeri varijacije i modifikacije, leksički sastav i leksički odnosi između poredbenih frazema, neizravno izricanje negacije i intenzifikacija značenja, upotreba i stilska obilježja, te mehanizmi koji ravnaju tvorbom poredbenih frazema.

Ključne riječi: poredbeni frazem, poredba, metafora, metonimija, varijacije, modifikacije

1. Uvod

U modernom engleskom i hrvatskom jeziku koristi se velik broj kratkih poredbi kako bi se izričaj učinio jasnijim i slikovitijim. Govoreći o karakteristikama poredbi Sommer i Sommer (1995: vii) kažu da su oni '*as timely as tomorrow, as useful as a Swiss army knife*', jer su efektivniji i snažniji od samo jedne riječi (*timely* ili *useful*), te jedna dobra poredba može vrijediti koliko i fotografija – tisuću riječi.

U sljedećim poglavljima pokušat ću razgraničiti poredbene frazeme od srodnih poredbi i metafora, iznijeti osnovna svojstva poredbenih frazema vezana uz njihovu strukturu, leksičke odnose koji vladaju među njima, mehanizme koji utječu na njihovo oblikovanje te druge specifičnosti uočene pri

kontrastiranju engleskih i hrvatskih poredbenih frazema. U analizi je korišten korpus od ukupno 743 primjera. Primjeri su prikupljeni većim dijelom iz jednojezičnih engleskih frazeoloških rječnika, dok je manji dio prikupljen iz manjih frazeoloških priručnika, dvojezičnih rječnika, knjiga, novina, časopisa, i bilježenjem idiomatskih struktura u govoru izvornih govornika engleskog jezika. Kako se pokazalo da su poredbeni frazemi u književnim djelima rijetki, morali smo se poslužiti i drugim izvorima¹.

2. Poredba vs. poredbeni frazem²

Potrebno je razlikovati između poredbe kao stilske figure³ i poredbenog frazema kao konvencionaliziranog izraza:

POREDBA:

- (1) A small bottle of forty-year old balsamic made by Giuseppe Giusti, one of the oldest producers in the world, is *as thick as mollasses and nearly as sweet*. [The New Yorker, 20. 12. 1999. str. 22]

POREDBENI FRAZEM:

- (2) It's hopeless trying to explain anything to him – he'll never understand it, he's *as thick as two short planks*. [ODCIE, str. 30]

¹ Nužnost okretanja korpusne lingvistike 'lakšoj literaturi' kao zanemarenom izvoru u prikupljanju građe već je zabilježio Piltz: "Gerade für ein Phraseolexikon müßten viel mehr als bisher üblich die weniger bekannten und renommierten (regionalen und lokalen) Zeitungen u Zeitschriften, die Kinder- und Jugendliteratur, humoristische und Trivialliteratur usw. herangezogen werden. Hier fehlen noch viele grundlegende Einzeluntersuchungen (Basisarbeit für Generationen von Phraseologen!)." (Citirano iz Kölbl 1993: 20) Brojni primjeri, odnosno modifikacije poredbenih frazema pronađeni su u tzv. ženskim časopisima: *Cosmopolitan*, *Marie Claire*, *Vogue*, *Good Housekeeping*, znatno veći nego u političkim časopisima *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The Economist* ili *The New Yorker*.

² U engleskom postoji širok raspon pojmova. Dok neki autori koriste *simile* ili *comparison* za ono što je u hrvatskom poredba, neki koriste *similes* (npr. Seidl) za poredbene frazeme. Kao ekvivalenti poredbenom frazemu javljaju se u engleskom još i *idioms of comparison*, *idiomatic similes* (Carter 1992). Gibbs (1994) naziva poredbene frazeme *frozen similes* za razliku od onih koje nisu idiomatične. Ortony (1993) razlikuje *literal comparisons* (*his face was red like a beet*) i *similes* (*his face was like a beet*). Matešić (1978) i Melvinger (1983-84) koriste poredbeni frazem, dok Vučetić i Fink (1992-1993) koriste poredbeni frazeologizam.

³ 'simile n. a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another, dissimilar thing by the use of *like*, *as*, etc. (Ex.: *a heart as big as a whale*, *her tears flowed like wine*): distinguished from metaphor.' -*Webster's New World Dictionary*, Third College Edition, 1994, Prentice Hall.

Dok su poredbe⁴ kao stilske figure svojstvene *on-line* jezičnoj produkciji, poredbeni frazemi su u procesu idiomatizacije konvencionalizirani, djelomice desemantizirani, te se reproduciraju kao cjeline. Postoje čitavi rječnici s na tisuće poetskih poredbi, no samo su manji broj tih poredbi ujedno i poredbeni frazemi (tek nekoliko stotina)⁵.

3. Metafora i metonimija vs. poredba i poredbeni frazem

Poput metafore, poredbe uspoređuju dva različita predmeta, ideje ili pojma⁶. Međutim, one nisu identične stilske figure, niti se mogu zamijeniti jedna drugom. Tako je *she became a tiger in her own cause* metafora, dok je *she fought like a tiger for her position* poredba. Ovdje se dakako radi o pjesničkoj a ne konceptualnoj metafori, i o poredbi kao stilskoj figuri. Jasno je da je uspoređivanje na planu izraza eksplicitnije izraženo u poredbama zbog upotrebe poredbenih kopula⁷. Strukturalno bi se ta razlika dala opisati na sljedeći način:

METAFORA X je Y

(3) *Jeff Goode's script is cotton candy* – delightful to look at but insubstantial. [The New Yorker, 20.12.1999. str. 9]

POREDBA X je kao Y
 Z_x je kao Y
 X : Y je kao nX : nY⁸

(4) I looked around one day and realised *my whole life was like Groundhog Day* - the same routine over and over. [Cosmopolitan, 1/1999. str.112]

X= život je kao Y= film *Groundhog Day*

⁴ Vidi Bredin (1998) o razlici između *simile* i *comparison*. Dok su *comparisons* simetrične (dopuštaju zamjenu mjesta) *similes* to nisu. Dodatan problem kod ove distinkcije je da u hrvatskom postoji jedan termin: poredba. Moguće rješenje bilo bi u razlikovanju poetske (*My love is like a red, red, rose*) od obične poredbe (*Michael is like Ann, Michael is older than Anne*).

⁵ Cf. Sommer (1980), Wright (1994) sa ODCIE, LDEI i NTC's.

⁶ Vidi Ortony (1993) o ulozi sličnosti u poredbama i metaforama.

⁷ Miller (1993) tvrdi da poredbe nisu ništa manje zanimljive od metafora, te da osim lakšeg prepoznavanja, njihovo razumijevanje uključuje sve elemente koji su uključeni u razumijevanje metafora.

⁸ Bredin (1998) govori o čak šest vrsta: "A is like B, A is not like B, A is like B in respect of p, A is unlike B in respect of p, A has as much of p as B has, A has a different quantity of p than B has."


- (5) ...according to Di Palo, *the vinegar gets sweeter and more complex with age just like a good friendship*. [The New Yorker, 20. 12. 1999. str. 22]

U ovoj poredbi sudjeluju tri elementa X= ocat, Y= prijateljstvo, i Z_x = slatkoća i složenost. Samo se aspekt slatkoće i složenosti od X uspoređuje s Y: slatkoća i složenost octa je kao dobro prijateljstvo.

- (6) *A woman without a man is like a fish without a bicycle*.
X= woman, Y=man, nX= fish, nY= bicycle⁹

Jedno od viđenja suodnosa poredbe i metafore smatra metafore skraćenim oblikom poredbe¹⁰. Tako je od poredbe *čovjek je kao vuk*, skraćivanjem nastala metafora *čovjek je vuk*.¹¹

Razlika između metafore i poredbenog frazema, je također u tome što se poredbeni frazemi reproduciraju kao cjeline, dok metafore nastaju u govornom procesu. No postoje i u određenoj mjeri konvencionalizirane metafore poput *on je stari lisac* koje nisu rezultat *on line* jezične uporabe. Jasno je da su se mnogi frazemi razvili iz metafora¹², jer su iz govora pojedinca konvencionalizirani i postali dijelom jezika zajednice, te su se počeli upotrebljavati kao neraščlanjiva veza riječi, no to se ne može tvrditi i za poredbene frazeme. Oni su prvi put upotrijebljeni kao poetske poredbe, a ne metafore, a upotrebom su prerasli u poredbene frazeme. Proces transformacije i međusobni suodnosi mogli bi se prikazati kako slijedi:



⁹ Ovakve poredbe Miller naziva analogijama; poredbe uspoređuju dva slična pojma, a *similes* dva različita. (1993: 372).

¹⁰ Ovakav stav nastavlja se na Aristotelovu tradiciju koja zastupa ekvivalenciju. Slično tvrde i Lakoff i Johnson (1980). Black (1993) s druge strane smatra poredbe samo stilističkim varijacijama metafora, Ortony (1993) zastupa stav da metafore nisu implicitne poredbe, kao i Aisenman (1999).

¹¹ Usp. Gibbs (1994), Miller (1993). Vidi također Kennedy i Chiappe (1999) za analizu ekspresivne snage poredbi i metafora.

¹² Usp. Matešić (1978).

Ono što možemo tvrditi jest da poredbe i poredbeni frazemi jesu zasnovani na METAFORI KAO KOGNITIVNOM MEHANIZMU¹³. Ako kažemo da netko *plače kao kiša*, ta je poredba zasnovana na metafori PLAKANJE JE KIŠA, koja je na planu izraza poprimila eksplicitniji oblik poredbe. Slične veze s metaforama mogu se utvrditi za velik broj poredbenih frazema, npr. *friendship is like china* 'friendship is priceless' zasniva se na metafori FRIENDSHIP IS A HIGHLY VALUABLE COMMODITY; *be tight as a glove* 'be close friends and spend a lot of time together' ili *be as thick as thieves* 'be close friends and do everything together' zasnivaju se na metafori FRIENDSHIP IS CLOSENESS; *be like cousins/sisters/brothers* zasnivaju se na metafori FRIEND IS A FAMILY MEMBER, itd. Na istim metaforama zasnovani su i hrvatski frazemi *biti kao prst i nokat/nokat i meso*, *biti kao braća/brat i sestra*.

Jedan je dio poredbenih frazema zasnovan i na METONIMIJI KAO KOGNITIVNOM PROCESU, npr. *to tremble like a leaf* 'shake involuntarily from fear; be afraid' ili *to quiver like a rabbit* 'be very afraid' zasnivaju se na metonimiji PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR FEAR, dakle fizički aspekt straha predstavlja strah; *be as white as sheet* 'be pale with fear' zasniva se na metonimiji BLOOD LEAVES FACE FOR FEAR ili BLJEDILO ZA STRAH.

4. Svojstva poredbenih frazema

Nedoumica jesu li poredbe *plakati kao kiša* ili *vrijedan kao mrav* u isto vrijeme i poredbeni frazemi proizlazi iz njihove sličnosti s metaforama, ili kako tvrdi Matešić (1978: 212) činjenice da oni zapravo nemaju odlike pravih frazema. No pogledajmo kako se poredbeni frazemi i njihova svojstva uklapaju u svojstva frazema uopće:

- **polileksičnost**

Poredbeni frazemi jesu formalne veze najmanje dvije riječi, npr. *as strong as an ox*, *as beautiful as a dream*, *sleep like a log*, *lijep kao slika*, *jak kao bik*, *plakati kao kiša*, *as sure as (God made) little apples*, itd.

- **suprakomponencijalno značenje**

Ovo svojstvo ne opisuje u potpunosti poredbene frazeme, jer se njihovo značenje uglavnom daje izvesti na osnovi značenja njegovih sastavnica, dakle kod njih nije došlo do potpune desemantizacije. Tako npr. kod *ravan kao daska* ili *as flat as a pancake* nije došlo do značenjske preobrazbe niti jedne od riječi, a značenje oba ova frazema odgovara značenju samog pridjeva *ra-*

¹³ Lakoff i Johnson (1980: 153): "Metaphor is primarily a thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language."

van, flat kojemu se pridružuje usporedba koja služi intenzifikaciji njegova značenja ili pridonosi slikovitosti izraza. Ne može se reći da se radi o prenesenom značenju. Kod poredbi *kao grom iz vedra neba, high as the hair on the cat's back, high as a Georgia pine, as nutty as a fruitcake* međutim, došlo je do modifikacije značenja, te one znače 'neočekivano, iznenada', 'very expensive', 'very drunk' i 'abnormal in behaviour'. No kako smo u raspravi o svojstvima frazema utvrdili kako uz sva svojstva može stajati odrednica 'relativan', ovo odstupanje jednog broja članova skupa poredbenih frazema nije dovoljno da se poredbeni frazemi isključe iz kategorije frazema u širem smislu.

- **nepromjenjivost**

Sličan argument o relativnosti ovog svojstva vrijedi i za poredbene frazeme: jedan broj pokazuje potpunu monolitnost i invarijantnost, dok postoje i oni koji dopuštaju leksičke i morfosintaktičke promjene, dakle jesu, u određenoj mjeri, produktivni. Po svom leksičkom i gramatičkom sastavu može ih se čak smatrati tipičnijim od mnogih jedinica koje smatramo frazemima.

- **konvencionaliziranost**

Poredbeni frazemi jesu ustaljeni, prepoznatljivi i opće prihvaćeni izrazi, npr. *hungry like a wolf, eat like a horse, like a bolt from the blue, težak kao klada, osjećati se kao prebijena mačka*, itd.

- **holistička reprodukcija i uklapanje u kontekst**


Poredbeni frazemi reproduciraju se kao cjeline, i kao takvi se uklapaju u kontekst.

- **sveprisutnost u jezičnoj praksi**

Poredbeni frazemi su frekventni i sveprisutni u jezičnoj praksi, pogotovo u govoru.


5. Struktura poredbenih frazema

Strukturalno su poredbeni frazemi vrlo jednostavno konstruirani. Većina podjela poredbenih frazema u engleskom i hrvatskom zasniva se na prvom elementu frazema, odnosno vrsti riječi kojoj se dodaje poredba. Njihova bi se struktura mogla predočiti na sljedeći način:




sl. 1. Poredbeni frazem

U engleskom je struktura gotovo identična, s tek nešto manjim varijacijama, ovisno o tome radi li se o glagolskim ili pridjevskim frazemima:



sl. 2. Pridjevski poredbeni frazem

Struktura glagolskih poredbenih frazema u engleskom je sljedeća:



sl. 3. Glagolski poredbeni frazem

Seidl (1987: 223) dijeli poredbene frazeme u engleskom jeziku u tri skupine, ovisno o vrsti riječi koja se javlja na lijevoj strani, i složenosti strukture:

1. POREDBENI FRAZEMI S PRIDJEVIMA (*as merry as a cricket*)
as + adjective + as + NP
2. POREDBENI FRAZEMI S GLAGOLIMA (*to drink like a fish*)
verb + like + NP
3. RAZLIČITI POREDBENI FRAZEMI (*to be like a red rag to a bull, as quick as a dog can lick a dish*)

Prve dvije skupine najbrojnije su u engleskom jeziku. Posljednja je skupina strukturalno različita skupina poredbi, s proširenom desnom stranom poredbe, a u nju Seidl svrstava i tzv. nulti tip poredbi, dakle one bez izraženog glagola ili *tertiuma comparationis*, te one koji se u hrvatskim klasifikacijama nazivaju imeničkim poredbenim frazemima (*like a bolt from the blue*, (*to have*) *a memory like a sieve*)¹⁴. Treća bi skupina uključivala i one rijetke primjere u kojima se pridjevi koriste kao neobilježeni prilozi (bez nastavka *-ly*), koje su svojstvene neformalnom engleskom (Quirk et al, 1985: 406): *She buys her clothes as cheap as dirt*.

U hrvatskom je podjela nešto složenija, jer osim glagola i pridjeva, na lijevoj se strani frazema može se nalaziti:

- GLAGOL (*rasti kao iz vode*)
- PRIDJEV (*blijed kao smrt*)¹⁵
- IMENICA (*mjesečina kao dan*)
- PRILOG (*čisto kao u crkvi*)
- tzv. NULTI TIP (komponenta se može izostaviti) (*kao grom iz vedra neba, kao od majke rođen*).

Nultom tipu pripadaju i poredbeni frazemi kod kojih je glagol fakultativan (*(biti) kao živa žeravica*) (Matešić 1978: 214).

Kod Melvinger (1983/84: 129-135) je ta klasifikacija još složenija, jer ona osim elemenata lijeve strane, uključuje i elemente desne. Poredbeni frazemi u hrvatskom najčešće su nominacijski (imaju ulogu rečeničnog člana: priložne oznake, predikata ili atributa), a rijetko su na razini rečenice. Nominacijske poredbene frazeme Melvinger dijeli na sljedeće podvrste, ovisno o strukturi.

Usporedba sadrži priložni veznik *kao/poput* i imenicu (slobodna ili s prijedlogom, neproširena ili s atributom) koja se priključuje elementu na lijevoj strani, dakle:

- GLAGOLU, leksički ili sintaktički proširenom (*psovati kao kočijaš*)
- PRIDJEVU (*zdrav kao bik*)
- IMENICI ILI NJEZINU ATRIBUTU (imenice označavaju atmorsferske ili druge prilike u ljudskoj okolini ili dijelove tijela) (*vručina kao u paklu*)

¹⁴ Usp. Kölbl (1993) koja osim pridjeva i glagola navodi i imenice kao mogući *comparandum*, dok kao *comparatum* navodi i zavisne rečenice (*as sure as God made little apples*).

¹⁵ Vidi Vučetić (1992-1993) koja analizira pridjevske i priloške frazeologizme u talijanskom jeziku.

- PRILOGU (*jasno kao dan*)
- TRPNOM PRIDJEVU (*stisnuti kao sardine*)
- NE PRIKLJUČUJE SE NEKOM ČLANU FRAZEMA NEGO STOJI SAMA (*kao pas na lancu*)

S obzirom na elemente koji se nalaze na desnoj strani, postoje sljedeće podvrste:

- Usporedba sadrži priložni veznik *kao* i IMENIČKI PAR te se ili priključuje glagolu ili se samostalno uvršćuje u rečenicu (*živjeti kao brat i sestra, biti kao prst i nokat*). U engleskom je to npr. *to fight like cat and dog, as different as night and day*.
- Usporedba sadrži veznik *kao* i i JOŠ DVA ČLANA koja pripadaju različitim sintagmama; priključuje se glagolu ili pridjevu, ili stoji samostalno (*sličiti kao jaje jajetu, trčati (kao ždrijebe) pred rudo, to look like two peas in a pod, as different as chalk from/and cheese*).
- Usporedba sadrži veznik *kao* i TRPNI PRIDJEV KOJI MOŽE BITI PROŠIREN IMENICOM; priključuje se glagolu ili pridjevu ili stoji samostalno (*kao rukom odnesen, kao zaklan*). U engleskom jeziku nema usporedbi s trpnim pridjevom.
- Usporedba je ZAVISNI DIO DIJELA NAČINSKE REČENICE sa složenim veznikom *kao da*, priključuje se glagolu, pridjevu ili imenici: *izgleda kao da je pao s Marsa/kao da su mu sve lađe potonule/kao da je iz gladi utekao*. U engleskom se ovakve usporedbe uvode s *as if* ili *as though* i vrlo su produktivne, no samo ih je mali broj idiomatskih: *to look as if/ though one has been dragged through a hedge backwards, to look as if/ though one has slept in that suit for a week, to look as if/ though one has been feeding hens in the rain*.

Matešićeva klasifikacija čini se ipak jednostavnijom i ostavlja dovoljno prostora za uvrštavanje svih poredbenih frazema, dakle možemo je smatrati preglednom a sveobuhvatnom.

6. Poredbeni frazemi sa slabije izraženim stupnjem uspoređivanja – nulti tip poredbenih frazema

U realizaciji poredbe sudjeluju *comparandum*, *comparatum* i *tertium comparationis*¹⁶. U hrvatskom i engleskom jeziku postoji određen broj glagolskih

¹⁶ Usp. Burger (1982), koji govori o dva elementa u *pocrvenjeti kao rak*. *Pocrvenjeti* je *tertium comparationis* a *kao rak* kvalifikator a Kölbel (1993) govori o *comparandumu*, *comparatumu* i operatoru. Matešić govori o *comparandumu* (koji u isto vrijeme može biti *tertium comparationis* – kod pridjevskih poredbenih frazema), i *comparatumu*.

poredbenih frazema, i jedan manji broj imeničkih frazema kod kojih *tertium comparationis* ili *comparandum*, nisu izraženi, te oni nisu poredbe u pravom smislu, npr. kod *Ivan je jurio po dvorištu kao bez glave/kao muha bez glave*, (Matešić 1978: 212) nema uspoređivanja, jer je nestao uvjet za uspoređivanje koji bi u tom kontekstu imao smisla. Poredbe *kao bez glave* i *kao muha bez glave* popirimile su drugo značenje: ‘bez cilja, izbezumljeno’. Slično vrijedi i za englesku poredbu *like a bolt from the blue* koja znači ‘neočekivano, iznenađeno’, *pamet kao rešeto*, *memory like a sieve*, itd. U engleskom se velik broj nultog tipa poredbenih frazema može objasniti velikom produktivnošću glagola *be* i *have*. Oni se pojavljuju u velikom broju frazema, a ne pridonose u velikoj mjeri njihovom značenju, već značenje nose elementi koji se nalaze s desne strane.

7. Promjenjivost poredbenih frazema

Analiza korpusa pokazuje da poredbeni frazemi u engleskom i hrvatskom pokazuju relativnu nestabilnost forme i javljaju se u velikom broju leksičkih i morfosintaktičkih varijacija i modifikacija. Za ilustraciju tih varijacija korišteni su primjeri iz korpusa. Uočene su sljedeće vrste promjena i njihovih kombinacija:

1. ZAMJENA LEKSEMA (*lexical substitution*)
2. DODAVANJE ELEMENATA (*addition*)
3. IZOSTAVLJANJE ELEMENATA – REDUKCIJA (*clipping*)
4. MORFOSINTAKTIČKE TRANSFORMACIJE

Supstitucija leksema odnosi se na zamjene:

- pridjeva (*as drunk/ pissed as a newt, rumen/ crven/zdrav kao jabuka, as full/ tight as a tick*)

(7) But, when all your single girlfriends suddenly seem to have boyfriends and you're the only one who's on your own, it's *as miserable as sin*. [Jane Green (1999) *Mr Maybe*, Penguin, London, str. 76] (*za as ugly as sin*)

(8) They're not the sickly sweet pair on the BBC, who paw each other all morning like a pair of rampant lovebirds, nor are they the married couple on the other side who, granted, are *as slick as they come*. [Jane Green (1987) *Straight Talking*, The Random House Ltd, London, str. 7]

Kako je *as they come* visoko produktivna poredba, ona se pojavljuje u kombinaciji s više pridjeva: *big, nice, good*, itd.

- imenice/imeničke fraze (*as red as a rose/blood/beetroot, crven kao krv/mak/jabuka, glup kao ovca/guska/tele/stup, znati kao vodu/Očenaš, hodati kao lud/luđak*).

Kod nekih slučajeva leksičkih varijacija radi se o regionalno uvjetovanim varijantama, odnosno o britanskoj ili američkoj varijanti. Tako je npr. *as strong as a bull* američki regionalizam¹⁷, dok su *as strong as a horse/ox* navedeni u ODCIE i LDEI. *As sound as a dollar* u smislu 'secure, well-constructed' je američki frazem koji nema ekvivalenta ni u britanskom engleskom, gdje *as sound as a bell* znači 'healthy and fit, without fault', ni u hrvatskom.

- glagola (*opiti se/bititi pijan/napiti se kao majka, tremble/shake like a leaf, to go/strut along like a peacock*)
- priložnog veznika

Osim *like* i *as*, u engleskom postoje i alternativne fraze koje uvode poredbu: *as if, as though, it is a bit like, is comparable to, can be likened to, not unlike, is kind of like, may be compared to, similar to*, no one su nešto rjeđe i narušavaju cjelovitost frazeološke strukture, te su svojstvenije poetskim poredbama ili varijacijama poredbenih frazema. Zanimljivo je da prvi *as* u strukturi (*as*) + *Adj* + *as* + *NP* može izostaviti i često se izostavlja. Ista struktura ponekad je premodificirana s *about*, i to posebice u slučajevima u kojima se naglašava indirektna negacija, npr. *about as handy as a bale of hay in the garage* 'not handy at all'. U slučaju premodifikacije s *about* radi se o dodavanju elemenata. U hrvatskom se osim *kao*, mogu javiti i skraćeni oblik *k'o*, svojstven razgovornom stilu, i *poput*, koji je svojstven književnom stilu i poetskoj usporedbi. Rijetko se javlja i (*tako*) *kao da*: *kriči kao da ga kolju, juri kao da ga vile nose*.

Leksičke promjene mogu rezultirati stvaranjem sinonimskih ili antonimskih nizova, no u nekim se slučajevima leksičke supstitucije ne radi o istoznačnom frazemu, već tekstualnoj modifikaciji koja nije potvrđena u frazeološkim rječnicima¹⁸. U takvim slučajevima teško je utvrditi granice između sinonima, tekstualnih modifikacija frazema i obične, *ad hoc* poredbe. U slje-

¹⁷ Vidi Kölbl (1993), iako NTC's navodi samo *as strong as an ox*, dok Wright (1994) navodi čitav niz: *as strong as a bull/cart horse/Flanders mare/giant/horse/lion/Atlas/God(F. Nietzsche)/Hercules/Pluto's gates (W. Shakespeare)/Samson/Zeus/steel*, i još mnoge druge. Wrightov rječnik je dobar izvor tekstualnih varijacija i modifikacija poredbenih frazema, a između ostalog navodi i izvore.

¹⁸ ODCIE navodi *spread like a rash, spread like wildfire*, a NTC's i LDEI samo *spread like wildfire*, dok Wright navodi brojne tekstualne varijacije: *spread like a fungus/ lie/ cancer/ fire/ floodwater/ gossip/ ivy/ wildfire*, itd.

dećim primjerima možemo ipak reći da se radi o varijacijama frazema, jer su izrazi, unatoč zamjeni leksema, zadržali prepoznatljivost forme i lako ih je povezati s poredbenim frazemima na osnovi kojih su nastali:

- (9) So hot was the Pitt-Floriani on-screen passion that gossip about the real affair *spread* from the set out through the media *like a forrest fire*.
[Cosmopolitan 7/1998, str. 68]
(za *spread like wildfire*)
- (10) ... he *looked a bit like Henry Fonda in distress*.
(za *to look like a damsel in distress*)
[Joseph Heller (1982) *Catch-22* str. 20]
- (11) *As good as they go*.
(za *as good as they come*)
[Joseph Heller (1982) *Catch-22* str. 9]
- (12) ...and they *sold like panini*.
(za *to sell like hot cakes*)
[*Vogue* 1/97 (str. 66)]

Primjeri dodavanja elemenata su sljedeći:

- (13) I have a mistress that is fair
And *sweet as sugar candy*...
(za *as sweet as sugar*)
[Helen Simpson (1990) *Four Bare Legs in a Bed*, HarperCollins, Glasgow str. 17]
- (14) *as busy as a bumblebee in a bucket of tar, as busy as a beaver building a new dam, as busy as a cranberry Merchant, as busy as a fish peddler in Lent, as busy as popcorn on a skillet, as busy as a one-armed paperhanger, as busy as a hibernating bear*¹⁹
(za *as busy as a bee, as busy as a beaver*)
[NTC's *Dictionary of Folksy, Regional and Rural Sayings* (1995) str. 14-15]
- (15) ... *as large as life and twice as ugly*...
(za *as large as life*)
[*Cosmopolitan* 7/1996 str. 25]

¹⁹ *As busy as a hibernating bear* jedini znači 'not busy at all', dok svi ostali znače 'very busy'.

- (16) At John's bachelor party they got him *drunk as Cooter Brown*.
(za *as drunk as a coot*)
[NTC's *Dictionary of Folksy, Regional and Rural Sayings* (1995)
str. 18]
- (17) Tada sam bila mlada, bezbrižna i *slobodna kao ptica na grani*.
(za *slobodan kao ptica*)

Kod gore navedenih primjera dodavanja, dodani elementi služe daljnjoj in-
tenzifikaciji značenja frazema te doprinose slikovitosti samog izraza.

Primjeri redukcije su sljedeći:²⁰

- (18) *bone-dry, coal-black, crystal-clear, ice-cold, ink-black, poker-stiff, razor-sharp, ramrod-straight, ramrod-stiff, poker-stiff, pit black, pitch black, stone cold, velvet-smooth*
(od *as dry as a bone, as black as coal, as clear as crystal, as cold as ice, as black as ink, as stiff as a poker, as sharp as a razor, as straight as a ramrod, as stiff as a ramrod, as stiff as a poker, as black as the Pit, as black as pitch, as cold as stone, as smooth as velvet*)
[ODCIE str. 678-685]
- (19) *kristalno jasno, kristalno čisto, snježno bijel, ledeno hladan, grobna tišina, paklena/paklenska vrućina, munjevitom brzinom, brzinom munje, strelovitom brzinom*
(za *jasno kao kristal, čist kao kristal, bijel kao snijeg, hladan kao led, tiho kao u grobu, vruće kao u paklu, brz kao munja, brz kao strijela*)
- (20) Make like Julia Roberts in *Stepmom* and order a shot of Patron – a *velvety-smooth* high-end tequila – when you're out.
(od *as smooth as velvet*)
[*Cosmopolitan*, 1/1999 str. 137]
- (21) He's tubbyish with *jet-black*, crew cut hair.
(od *as black as jet*)
[Helen Simpson (1990) *Four Bare Legs in a Bed*, HarperCollins, Glasgow str. 44]
- (22) ... a full, glorious, *plump-pillowed* day in bed.
(za *as plump as a pillow*)

²⁰ Pridjevske složenice tipa imenica + pridjev nastale na osnovi i kao varijanta poredbenih frazema mogu se također smatrati primjerima redukcije.

[*Cosmopolitan* 7/1998 str. 99]

Ovdje se radi o tekstualnoj varijaciji frazema *as plump as a partridge* u *as plump as a pillow* (dakle zamjeni leksema) a zatim o redukciji i morfosintaktičkoj promjeni.

- (23) ‘Anyway’, I say, feeling slightly guilty at admitting all this, ‘it’s not just the money. It’s everything. We’re *like chalk and cheese*.’
(od *as different as chalk and/ from cheese*)
[Jane Green (1999) *Mr Maybe*, Penguin, London str. 53]

- (24) *Satchmo*

Ovaj je nadimak nastao na osnovi poredbe *mouth as big as a satchel*, reducirane na složenicu *satchel-mouth*, dalje reduciranu na nadimak *Satchmo*.

Primijećene su sljedeće morfosintaktičke promjene:

- Pridjevi (osim padežnih promjena) u pridjevskim poredbenim frazemima mogu pojaviti i u komparativu: *brži od zeca*, kao varijanta frazema *brz kao zec*, *colder than ice* kao varijanta frazema *as cold as ice*, *more changeable than a weathercock* za *as changeable as a weathercock*, *no/ not any better than the next (one/ man)* za *as good as the next (one/ man)*, *scarcer than hen’s teeth* za *as scarce as hen’s teeth*.
- Imenice u nekim frazemima mogu biti u jednini ili množini:

- (25) When I see the waste that goes on in this house I don’t wonder you’re *as poor as church-mice*.
[Helen Simpson (1990) *Four Bare Legs in a Bed*, HarperCollins, Glasgow str. 23]

Matešić (1978: 216) međutim tvrdi kako *živjet ćemo kao bubrezi u loju* ili *glave su nam bile kao burad* jesu moguće veze, no to više nisu frazemi, s čime se ne možemo složiti, jer, iako promijenjena broja, ostala obilježja frazema zadržana su i u množinskom obliku, te se i ovakve poredbe mogu smatrati prihvatljivim i frazeološki obojenim varijantama frazema.

- Jedna od mogućih varijacija je i zamjena mjesta leksemima: *svađati se kao pas i mačka*, *svađati se kao mačka i pas*, no ova mogućnost odnosi se samo na one frazeme koji u kojima se u poredbi nalazi imenički par.
- Kod glagolskih frazema glagoli dopuštaju promjene glagolskog vremena, lica, roda i broja: *I always sleep like a log*. *We slept like a log*

last night. I think I will sleep like a log tonight. Uvijek spavam kao klada. Sinoć smo spavali kao klade. Mislim da ću noćas spavati kao klada.

Sljedeći primjeri ilustriraju različite vrste morfosintaktičkih promjena i kombinacije promjena:

- (26) *as innocent as a babe unborn*
(za *as innocent as a (new-born) babe*)
[ODCIE str. 678]

Ovaj primjer pokazuje i zamjenu mjesta i leksičku supstituciju, dok se semantički radi o daljnjoj intenzifikaciji *as innocent as a babe/new-born babe/babe unborn*.

- (27) What I said was...something quite different... Utterly different... entirely different... As different as chalk from cheese. Although when you come to think of it, *cheese isn't all that different from chalk!*
(*as different as chalk from cheese*)
[Peter Shaffer (1981) *Black Comedy*. In *Four Plays*. New York: Penguin str. 178]

U ovom se primjeru radi o nekoj vrsti metalingvističkog komentara.

- (28) *The high as a kite feeling* lasts precisely two days.
[Jane Green (1999) *Mr Maybe*, Penguin, London str. 53]

Ovaj primjer ilustrira rijetku pojavu uklopljenosti poredbenog frazema u imenički izraz. Poredbeni frazemi ni u engleskom ni u hrvatskom ne mogu premodificirati imenicu, no u korpusu su primijećena još dva izuzetka:

- (29) How different children's schoolbooks are now from the *dry-as-dust grammars* and manuals of fifty years ago!
[ODCIE str. 20]
- (30) The real crime of the British Communist Party is the number of marvelous people it has either broken, or turned into *dry-as-dust hair-splitting office men*, ...
[Doris Lessing (1989) *The Golden Notebook*, Grafton, London str. 307]
- (31) The guest is Ruby Everest, *larger-than-life stand-up comedienne* who specialises in degrading men.
[Jane Green (1997) *Straight Talking*, The Random House Ltd, London str. 8]

- (32) The picture has *an arrow-like swiftness* and seriousness, and a good part of Greene's bracing candor comes through.
[*The New Yorker*, 20. 12. 1999. str. 26]

Ovaj primjer pokazuje višestruke promjene: od *as straight as an arrow* 'fast and in a straight, direct line', comparandum *straight* zamijenjen je sa *fast*, zatim njegovim sinonimom *swift*, da bi se zatim izvršila redukcija i morfosintaktička transformacija.

- (33) To have his name uttered in that ritual way might cause him to materialize, (...) his head watching her *with a Cheshire grin*, (...) (za *to grin like a Cheshire cat*)
[Atwood, Margaret (1982), *Life Before Man*. Virago, London str. 261]
- (34) I'd be *happier than pigs in a puddle* to get an e-mail from you.
(za *as happy as a pig in clover*)
(e-card na bluemountain.com)

Ovaj primjer ilustrira u isto vrijeme dvije morfološke promjene (komparativ pridjeva, množina imenice) i supstituciju elemenata. U američkom engleskom javlja se varijanta *as happy as a pig/ pigs in mud, as happy as a fly in a pie*, dok je *as happy as ducks in Arizona* antonim.

8. Semantički odnos među elementima poredbenih frazema

Poredbeni frazemi izražavaju semantički odnos usporedbe koja ih određuje kao posebnu semantičko-strukturalnu grupu frazema. Uspoređeni pojmovi slični su u odnosu na određeno značenjsko obilježje koje ih karakterizira. To značenjsko obilježje koje im je zajedničko, osnova uspoređivanja ili *tertium comparationis*, može biti eksplicitno ili implicitno izraženo. Melvinger (1983/84: 132) dijeli poredbene frazeme u dvije skupine, ovisno o tome koja je riječ *tertium comparationis*:

1. *tertium comparationis* je riječ kojoj se poredbeni izraz izravno priključuje: pridjev, prilog, trpni pridjev, glagol ili imenica: *zdrav kao bik* 'sasvim zdrav', *pocrvenjeti kao paprika* 'jako se zacrvenjeti', *vrućina kao u paklu* 'nesnosna vrućina'. Ovi su frazemi su ekspresivno intenzivirani, pojačano je značenje riječi u ulozi *tertiuma comparationis*. Pridjevski frazemi mogu imati samo takvo značenje.

2. *tertium comparationis* je ili atribut ili priložna oznaka koji nisu eksplicitno izraženi, nego se podrazumijevaju: *osjećati se (ugodno/ sigurno) kao riba u vodi* ‘osjećati se sasvim ugodno/sigurno’. Takvo značenje ima velik broj glagolskih i manji broj imeničkih poredbenih frazema.

9. Leksički odnosi među poredbenim frazemima

Budući da je većina poredbenih frazema na razini riječi, među njima vladaju leksički odnosi slični onima koji vladaju među drugim riječima u leksikonu: odnosi sinonimije, antonimije i polisemije.

9.1. Frazeološka sinonimija

Menac (1979: 158) ističe da je frazeološka sinonimija rijetko apsolutna, jer sadrži semantičke, stilističke, konotativne ili kolokacijske razlike. Ona upozorava na postojanje frazeoloških varijanti (fonetske, morfološke, tvorbene, sintaktičke i leksičke) i frazeoloških sinonoma koji imaju različit sastav elemenata ali jednako ili blisko značenje. Frazeološke varijante i frazeološki sinonimi nisu isključive kategorije, naime između frazeoloških varijanti (posebice leksičkih) vrlo često postoji odnos sinonimije, dok sinonimski frazemi nisu nužno i varijante.

Istoj upravnoj riječi mogu se pridružiti različite usporedbe. Ako se radi o pridjevu, dobivamo niz sinonimnih poredbenih frazema različitih na planu izraza a sličnih na planu sadržaja. I u hrvatskom i u engleskom jeziku su takvi pridjevi najčešće oni koji označavaju ljudska fizička i psihička svojstva, imovinsko stanje, boju i sl. Npr. *pijan kao smuk/čep/letva/majka/čuskija bačva/do besvijesti/kao metla/sjekira/panj/svinja/drvo/klen/duga/zemlja/lijevča/duga*. U ovim se frazemima pijan čovjek uspoređuje s nečim neživim, bez svijesti, tupim ili drvenim, te u samo dva sa životinjama svinjom i smukom, dok je *pijan kao majka* skraćeno od *pijan kao majka zemlja*. Etimološki se *pijan kao majka* veže i uz stari običaj opijanja žena pri porodu kako bi olakšale porođajne boli. U engleskom postoji sličan sinonimski niz vezan uz pridjev *drunk*: *as drunk as a lord/fish/newt*, no očigledno ne tako dug kao sinonimski niz u hrvatskom.

U hrvatskom jeziku primijećeni su znatno duži i leksički raznovrsniji sinonimski nizovi nego što je to slučaj u engleskom, što se u konačnici odražava većim ukupnim brojem poredbenih frazema u hrvatskom nego u engleskom.

Takvi sinonimski nizovi frazema najrazvijeniji su uz pridjeve koji opisuju negativne karakteristike i mane: pijanstvo, glupost, ludilo, bljedilo, mršavost, siromaštvo i sl. Frazemi u takvim sinonimskim nizovima istog su značenja, no

ona se ipak razlikuju u nijansama. Tako na primjer razlika između *zdrav kao bik* i *zdrav kao riba*, iako oba znače dobra zdravlja, jest u svojstvima koja pripisujemo tim dvjema životinjama: biku snagu a ribi okretnost, čilost.

Od vrlina se pozitivno vrednuje zdravlje: *zdrav kao bik/dren/jabuka/riba/kremen/drenova srž/trijesak*. Zdrav se čovjek u narodu opisuje s onim što je stvorila priroda: biljkama, životinjama, prirodnim tvarima. Pojam zdravlja tako se dovodi u vezu s nečim snažnim, jedrim, zaobljenim i pokretljivim.

Kod poredbenih frazema s istim upravnim glagolom ne dolazi nužno do stvaranja sinonimskih nizova, već se radi o varijantama frazema koje mogu imati različita značenja. Glagol *šutjeti* pojavljuje u sljedećim sinonimnim frazemima: *šutjeti kao grob* 'čuvati tajnu kao svetinju', *šutjeti kao kamen* 'uporno, postojano šutjeti, ne prozboriti ni riječi', *šutjeti kao mula* 'uporno šutjeti, ne progovoriti ni jedne riječi', *šutjeti kao olovom zaliven* 'ne govoriti ni riječi, ne otvarati usta', *šutjeti kao panj* 'uporno šutjeti, ne progovoriti ni riječi', *šutjeti kao riba* 'ne progovoriti ni riječi', *šutjeti kao zaklan* 'nikome ne pričati ono što je povjereno', *šutjeti kao zaliven* 'uporno, stalno šutjeti', *šutjeti kao zid* 'ne govoriti ništa'. Od ovih frazema u sinonimskom nizu, pejorativni su *šutjeti kao panj* i *šutjeti kao mula*. Isto vrijedi i za npr. *as cold as ice/charity*: oni nisu sinonimi zamjenjivi u svim kontekstima. *As cold as charity* znači 'bezosjećajan', dok *as cold as ice* koristi za opis fizičkog svojstva *comparanduma* (*His feet were as cold as ice*).

Osim leksičkih varijacija imenica i pridjeva, moguće su i varijacije glagola: *go/sell like hot cakes, to shake/tremble like a leaf* i sl. Riječ je najčešće o glagolima koji označavaju različite ljudske djelatnosti i oblike ljudskog ponašanja: *rintati kao pas, raditi kao rob*, itd.

Sinonimijom možemo smatrati i odnose između poredbenih frazema i postojećih srodnih pridjevskih izraza, npr. *as clear as crystal – crystal-clear; as dark as pitch – pitch-dark, as sharp as a razor – razor-sharp, as cold as ice – ice-cold, bijel kao snijeg – snježno bijel, bijel bjelcat²¹, hladan kao led – ledeno hladan, tiho/ tišina kao u grobu – mrtvačka /mrtva/ grobna tišina*.

Određen stupanj sinonimije pokazuju i srodni parovi glagolskih i pridjevskih poredbenih frazema: *crven kao rak i pocrvenjeti kao rak, to run like clockwork i as regular as clockwork, probljedjeti kao krpa i bijel kao krpa, piti kao smuk, pijan kao smuk*, itd.

²¹ Ovdje se radi o tautologiji ili tautološkoj frazeoshemi. Slični primjeri su: *sam kao prst – sam samcat; pun kao šipak/ oko – pun puncat, gol kao od majke rođen/ pištolj/ koljeno – gol golcat; nov (kao) ispod čekića/ nakovnja, kalupa – nov novcat*.

9.2. Frazološka antonimija

Češće međutim niz komparativnih frazema s istim upravnim glagolom nije sinonimski, već ima i primjera antonimije: *živjeti kao braća* 'živjeti složno/u velikoj slozi/ u ljubavi', *živjeti kao pas i mačka* 'živjeti u stalnom neprijateljstvu, neprestano se svađati, ne slagati se međusobno', *živjeti kao bubreg u loju* 'živjeti u izobilju/ u velikom blagostanju/ vrlo dobro živjeti, uživati', *živjeti kao pas* 'bijedno, loše živjeti/ pod teškim materijalnim prilikama'; *jesti kao ala/ mećava* 'neumjereno jesti' i *jesti kao ptica/ vrabac* 'malo jesti'. Antonimija nije nužno vezana uz promjene samo jednog elementa frazema, već se može ustanoviti i za poredbene frazeme koji se potpuno leksički razlikuju, npr. *živjeti kao car, umrijeti kao pas; pričati kao navijen, šutjeti kao grob*, itd. Primjera antonimije ima i među pridjevskim poredbenim frazemima: *as cold as ice, as hot as hell; vrijedan kao mrav, lijen kao buba; as white as lard, as brown as a berry*, no oni su ograničeni na parove poredbenih frazema koji su leksički u potpunosti različiti.

9.3. Polisemija

Višeznačnim se mogu smatrati oni frazemi koji imaju više no jedno značenje. Tako se npr. *(as) smooth as oil* može odnositi na mekoću kremaste tvari no i na mirnoću morske površine, te kao takav u hrvatskom ima dva različita ekvivalenta: *mek kao maslac* i *miran kao ulje*. Sličan je primjer i *as slippery as an eel* koji može opisivati lukave osobe i klizave ceste (*ljigav kao jegulja* i *klizak kao led*). Postoje i frazemi koji su izrazito višeznačni, kao npr. *as flat as a pancake* koji ima pet prijevodnih ekvivalenta u hrvatskom koji jasno pokazuju značenjske mogućnosti ovog frazema: *tanak/ spljošten kao palačinka, prazan, ispušten* (za gume), *monoton* (za glas), *neslan* (za šalu) i *ravan kao dlan* (za krajolik).

10. Neizravno izricanje negacije

Jedan ograničen broj poredbenih frazema u hrvatskom pokazuje svojstvo neizravnog izricanja negacije (Melvinger 1983/84: 132): usporedbom se pomoću ironije negira ono izraženo upravnim djelom frazema. Takvi su frazemi npr: *razumjeti se u što kao magarac u kantar* 'ne razumjeti nešto', *govoriti francuski/engleski... kao krava latinski* 'ne govoriti francuski/engleski', *napredovati kao rak* 'nazadovati', *voljeti što kao oči hrena* 'mlad kao rosa u podne 'star', *biti bistar kao boza, biti pun para kao žaba dlaka, slagati se kao pas i mačka* 'ne slagati se' *biti pun pameti/poštenja kao samar svile* 'ne biti inteligentan/bit nepošten', *brz kao rak* 'spor', *liče jedno drugima kao pas i mačka* 'posve su različiti', *mlad kao rosa u podne* 'star', *jasno k'o pekmez*

‘nejasno’. U engleskom također postoji manja skupina takvih frazema, npr. *as clear as mud* ‘not clear or understandable’, *needed about like a dog needs two tails* ‘not needed at all’, *about as needed as a hole in the head* ‘not needed at all’, *to blush like a dog* ‘not to be ashamed at all’, *as funny as a crutch* ‘not funny at all’, *as happy as ducks in Arizona* ‘very unhappy, discontent’, *as busy as a hibernating bear* ‘not busy at all’, *as much chance as a wax cat sitting in hell* ‘no chance at all’ itd.

Iako se radi o usporedbi, ne može se reći da se radi i o uspoređivanju sličnih, već prije o opoziciji dvaju različitih pojmova ili predmeta kakva je svojstvena ironiji, za razliku od metafore.

Like hell it is! je jedan od primjera za izricanje neizravnu negacije. Njegovi ekvivalenti u hrvatskom: *Ma vraga!* *Je vraga!* ili *Vraga je!* također izriču neizravnu negaciju, no oni nisu poredbe. Oprez se preporuča u upotrebi ovih izraza jer spadaju u neformalni registar, dok ih neki čak smatraju slengom.

11. Usporedbe za negativno i pozitivno vrednovanje pojma i intenzifikaciju značenja

Neki poredbeni frazemi osim osnovnog značenja mogu pružiti dodatne informacije o stavu govornika prema pojavi ili zbivanju. Tako se dobivaju dodatna konotativna značenja poredbenih frazema kao što su negativno ili pozitivno vrednovanje pojma (odobranje ili negodovanje) ili pak mogu intenzivirati značenje, *tertium comparationis* sadržanog svojstva, stanja ili radnje.

Kod većine poredbenih frazema *tertium comparationis* nije metaforičan, on nosi samo denotativno značenje²². Postoji ipak nekoliko izuzetaka: u *as nutty as a fruitcake* npr. *nutty* zadržava metaforičnost. Funkcija *comparatuma* ovisi o *tertiumu comparationis*: on pojačava značenje pridjeva kod pridjevskih poredbenih frazema (*bijel kao snijeg*, *as white as snow*, *as black as coal* – ovdje se radi o semantičkoj tautologiji), pojačava ili pobliže označuje glagol kod glagolskih poredbenih frazema (*to eat like a horse*, *pjevati kao slavuj*). *Comparatum* pridonosi ukupnom značenju poredbenog frazema upravo konotativnim značenjem²³. Npr. za imenice *svinja/ prasac/ krmak/ krmača/ prasica* se osim denotativnog značenja javljaju i brojne negativne konotacije vezane uz debljinu, prljavštinu, neuredne uvjete i način života. Na osnovi tog konota-

²² Denotativno značenje je ono koje denotat opisuje neovisno o odnosu govornika prema njemu i neovisno o uvjetima u kojima se konkretni govorni akt ostvaruje (Melvinger 1989: 23).

²³ Konotativno značenje može se opisati kao sistem uobičajenih asocijacija ili simboličke vezane uz određen semem, koji odslikavaju različite okolnosti što utječu na aktualni komunikacijski proces i odslikavaju odnos govornika prema predmetu ili pojavi.

ativnog značenja nastali su poredbeni frazemi *debeo kao svinja*, *prljav kao svinja*, *pijan kao svinja*, (*neuredno/prljavo*) *kao u svinjcu* ali i brojni drugi: *biti svinja*, *bacati bisere pred svinje/ krmke*. *Prljav kao svinja* češće se javlja kao *prljav kao prasac* koji pokazuje i aliteraciju. *Svinja i krmak/ kрмаča* su metafore koja su pejorativni izrazi za prljavog, neurednog ili karakterno ništavnog čovjeka, dok *prase* i *prasac* nisu nužno pogrdni. Slično vrijedi za *svinjac*, *svinjarija*, *zasvinjiti*, *usvinjiti se*. Kako su konotacije ove vrste univerzalne prirode, na njima se zasnivaju i poredbeni frazemi u engleskom: *as fat as a pig*, *sweat like a pig*, ali i brojni drugi: *make a pig of oneself*, *cast pearls before swine*, *make a pig's ear out of sth*. Zanimljivo odstupanje u kojem se javljaju pozitivne konotacije čine *sretan kao (malo) prase* 'biti vrlo sretan' i *to live like pigs in clover* 'live comfortably, having plenty of money', *as happy as a pig/ pigs in the mud* 'happy and content'.

Jedna te ista usporedba može biti pridružena različitim upravnim riječima kao ekspresivno sredstvo za negativno vrednovanje različitih pojmova. U hrvatskom je takva usporedba npr. *kao pas ili kao pseto* u: *gladan kao pas*, *lagati kao pas/pseto*, *umoran kao pas*, *živjeti/mučiti se kao pas*, *ubiti/ustrijeliti koga kao psa/pseto*, *puzati kao pas*, *umrijeti/crknuti kao pas*, *sam kao pas*, *mršav kao pas*, *puzati kao pas*, *ljubomorani kao pas/pseto*, *dotući koga kao pseto*, *držati se/vući se kao pokislo/prokislo pseto*, *goniti koga kao pseto*, *živjeti/gledati se/slagati se kao pas i mačka*, *landrati/lutati/skitati se kao jalovi pas*, *kao pas na lancu*, *trpjeti kao pas*, i sl. No ista ta usporedba nema negativnu ekspresivnu boju u frazemu *vjeran kao pas/ pseto*.

U engleskom jeziku usporedba *as a dog*, *like a dog* imaju sličnu ekspresivnu funkciju, odnosno negativne konotacije u sljedećim frazemima: *as sick as a dog*, *work like a dog*, *to be dressed up like a dog's dinner*, *to fight like cat and dog*, *die like a dog*, dok jedino *like a dog with two tails* ima pozitivne konotacije i znači 'delighted, proud'.

Indikativna je, međutim, razlika u broju poredbenih frazema s ovim usporedbama u hrvatskom i engleskom. Iako je ekspresivna funkcija ista, *kao pas* je očito produktivnija usporedba u hrvatskom nego što je to slučaj sa *as a dog* i *like a dog* u engleskom. U engleskom postoje frazemi koji nisu poredbeni, no u kojima se *dog* koristi za negativno vrednovanje pojma, npr: *to lead/ live a dog's life*, *dog eat dog*, *the dog it was that died*, *to dog one's steps*, *dog days*, *in the doghouse*, *be dog tired*, *dog in a manger* itd. Očito je da pojam *pas* ili *dog* u oba jezika ima izrazito negativne konotacije.

Negativne konotacije u frazemima vežu se uz lekseme *magarac*, *magare*, *sivonja*, *mula* u sljedećim poredbenim frazemima: *navaliti/nasrnuti kao sivonja*, *razumjeti se u što kao magarac u kantar*, *tvrdoglav/glup kao magare*. U engleskom je leksem *mule* manje produktivan i javlja se samo u *as stubborn/obstinate as a mule*. *Raditi i zapeti* kao *sivonja* nemaju negativne kono-

tacije već se odnosi na težak fizički rad²⁴. Negativne konotacije vežu se i uz lekseme *guska* i *ovca* u *glup kao guska/ovca*, dok se u engleskom glupost izražava poredbenim frazomom *as dumb as a fish*. *Riba* se u hrvatskom javlja i s pozitivnim: *zdrav kao riba*, *plivati kao riba*, *osjećati se kao riba u vodi*, i s negativnim konotacijama: *šutjeti kao riba*, *nijem kao riba* dok se u engleskom javlja u negativnom svojstvu u *as mute as a fish*, *like a fish out of water*.

Sličnu negativnu ekspresivnu funkciju ima u engleskom pojam *hell* koji se pojavljuje u sljedećim poredbenim frazemima: *(as) hot as hell*, *(as) mad as hell*, *like a bat out of hell*, *as hot as the hobs of hell*, *as hot as the seven brass hinges of hell*, *like hell it is* ali i u onima koji nisu poredbeni, npr: *come hell or high water*, *create bloody hell*, etc. *As hell* se može u engleskom kombinirati s velikim brojem pridjeva i u tim slučajevima nema negativnu ekspresivnu boju, već služi kao intenzifikator značenja u smislu *very*: *as sure as hell*, *touchy as hell*, *It's 110 degrees in the shade and Galen... is getting hot and claustrophobic as hell* (LDEI). *Hell* je izraz koji u gore navedenim značenjima ne spada u neutralni registar, već se smatra dijelom neformalnog registra ili slengom.

U hrvatskom pojam *pakao* ili poredba *kao u paklu* nisu toliko produktivni kao u engleskom. Javljaju se jedino u poredbenom frazemu *vruće/vrućina kao u paklu*, te u manjem broju ostalih frazema kao pridjev: *paklenska/paklena vrućina/vika/sila/muka/dreka* itd. U hrvatskom su zato produktivniji *vrag* i *kao vrag*, npr: *crn kao vrag*, *čuvati se koga/čega kao vrag svete vodice/tamjana*, *derati se kao vrag*, *pakostan kao vrag*, *patiti kao vrag na plitku dnu*, *ružan kao vrag*, *zao kao vrag*, *živjeti kao vrag*. Slično poput *as hell* u engleskom, *kao vrag* u hrvatskom može se pridodati velikom broju glagola, i služiti kao intenzifikator značenja u smislu 'jako': *peče kao vrag*, *boli kao vrag*, *svrbi kao vrag*, itd. U engleskom se *devil* javlja u velikom broju frazema, od kojih niti jedan nije poredbeni, no postoje *as proud as Lucifer* i *as proud as Satan*.

U hrvatskom su visoko produktivne i poredbe *k'o budala*, *k'o kreten*, *kao da je poludio* koje također imaju negativne konotacije, a javljaju se s različitim glagolima: *smijati se*, *vrištati*, *derati se*, *stajati*, *izgledati*, *ceriti se*, *ponašati se*, itd. Za razliku od njih, *kao lud* nema negativnih konotacija (osim možda u *derati se*, *vrištati kao lud*) već intenzivira značenje glagola u smislu 'jako, puno, glasno': *juriti kao lud*, *raditi kao lud*, *vikati kao lud*, *smijati se kao lud*). *Kao lud* negativne konotacije ima u *smijati se kao lud na brašno* 'smijati se bez razloga'. Visoku razinu produktivnosti imaju i njihovi engleski

²⁴ Za iscrpnu analizu konotacija vezanih uz leksem *magarac* u frazeologiji ruskoga, hrvatskoga i njemačkoga jezika vidi Hansen-Kokoruš (1996), a o konotacijama vezanim uz zoone općenito vidi Ljubičić (1995).

ekvivalenti *like crazy, like mad* no oni imaju funkciju intenzifikatora značenja u smislu ‘puno, brzo, aktivno’: *It was a hot day so we sold ice cream like crazy*. U primjeru *When she stubbed her toe, she screamed like mad*, *mad* može biti i intenzifikator u smislu ‘glasno, jako je vrištala’ ali i nositi negativne konotacije ‘vrištala je kao da je poludjela’. Oprez je potreban i kod upotrebe ovih poredbi s negativnim konotacijama, jer su izrazito pejorativne.

Nasuprot ovakvim poredbama s negativnim konotacijama, kao čovjek i kao ljudi imaju pozitivne konotacije i znače ‘dobro, pošteno’, a kombiniraju se s velikim brojem glagola: *naspavati se/odmoriti se/najesti se kao čovjek, napričati se/rastati se kao ljudi*. U engleskom poredba *like a man* ima slične pozitivne konotacije.

Postoje i poredbeni frazemi koji izriču odobravanje, npr. *čist kao zlato/suza/sunce, dobar kao dobar dan, čuvati kao oči u glavi, zdrav kao dren, as clear as crystal*, dakle služe pozitivnom vrednovanju pojma ili zbivanja.

Intenzitet svojstva, stanja ili radnje izražen poredbenim frazom očituje se u stupnjevanju značenja izričaja. *Glup kao stup* znači ‘vrlo glup’, *as pretty as a picture* ‘very pretty’, *to smoke like a chimney* ‘puno pušiti’, a kod njih su glagol *smoke*, odnosno pridjevi *glup* i *pretty* intenzivirani u odnosu na značenje glagola ili pridjeva samih: ‘pušiti’, ‘glup’, ‘pretty’. Intenzificiranje značenja ukazuje ili na veliko mnoštvo ili visoki stupanj: *to have a memory like a sieve* ‘to have a very bad memory’, *imati čega kao blata* znači ‘imati puno nečega’, *pijan kao letva* znači ‘jako pijan’, itd.

U jednom broju primjera ne nalazimo svojstvo intenzifikacije značnja, već se poredbom na određen način pobliže određuje ili modificira značenje glagola kojem se dodaje poredba: *smijati se kao lud na brašno* ‘smijati se bez razloga’, *stajati kao drvena Marija* ‘stajati ukočeno’, *to sleep like a log* ‘sleep deeply’, *plakati kao kiša* ‘neutješno plakati’, itd.

12. Upotreba poredbenih frazema i neka stilski obilježja

U prikupljanju korpusa primijećeno je da neki autori gotovo uopće ne koriste konvencionalizirane poredbene frazeme, vjerojatno stoga što poredbene frazeme smatraju klišeiziranim, stereotipnim frazama, indikatorima lošeg stila. Čini se da je tome razlog raširena predrasuda da poredbene frazeme koristi samo obični puk: ‘*A great part of their language is proverbial. If anything rocks at all, they say it rocks like a cradle, and in this way they go on.*’ Samuel Johnson (citirano u Kölbel 1993:8)

Brojni autori, međutim, koriste njihove varijacije i modifikacije, ili tek aluzije na postojeće poredbene frazeme, te na taj način unose inovativno u jezik. Jedan od razloga svojevrsne 'devalvacije' poredbenih frazema je i u oslanjanju na drastičnu intenzifikaciju koja brzo gubi na snazi i živosti.

Poredbeni frazemi se češće koriste u govoru nego u pisanom tekstu²⁵, te smo se stoga pri prikupljanju korpusa morali osloniti na frazeološke rječnike više no na pisanu građu. Dok se poredbeni frazemi u govoru češće koriste u svom konvencionaliziranom obliku²⁶, u tekstu više dolazi do izražaja njihova fleksibilnost i mogućnost igre riječima. Dok su u književnim djelima oni vrlo rijetki, velik broj pronađen je u novinama i časopisima, te tzv. 'lakšoj' literaturi.

Iako je većina poredbenih frazema stilski neutralna (*crven kao krv, vrijedan kao mrav, as free as a bird*), dobar dio ih pripada razgovornom stilu (*pijan kao letva, as full as a tick*). Poredbeni frazemi često su HUMORISTIČNI (*as often as goose goes barefoot, as nervous as a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs, as tough as putting socks on a rooster, as slow as coal tar running uphill backwards*), neki su IRONIČNI (*brz kao rak*):

- (35) The perfect Brit should be... *humble as the royal family, a great cook like the English, relaxed as a guardsman, welcoming as the weather, generous as a Scot, polite as a punk, sober as a judge, intelligible as the Welsh.*
[S razglednice THE PERFECT BRIT SHOULD BE, Whiteway Publications Ltd, London, 1993]

U ovom primjeru sadržani su elementi i humora i specifičnog britanskog osjećaja za ironiju.

- (36) And this morning I *need her whining voice like a hole in my head*,... trying to turn down the earpiece so her nasal tones sound halfway bearable.
[Jane Green (1997) *Straight Talking*, The Random House Ltd, London str. 7]

²⁵ Vidi analizu frekventnosti frazema u različitim vrstama tekstova u Burger et al. (1982). Burger između ostalog tvrdi da se poredbeni frazemi u govoru koriste rjeđe no što se to obično smatra.

²⁶ Primijećena je međutim i specifična individualna upotreba poredbenih frazema, svojstvena samo jednoj osobi. Zanimljivo je bilo uočiti kako se izraz *kao diklič* kojeg je osoba koristila s velikim brojem različitih glagola: *stajati, sjediti, buljiti, blejati, biti*... s vremenom počeo pojavljivati i kod više osoba koje su se kretale u istom društvu.

Neki su poredbeni frazemi čak vulgarni i uvredljivi, što se posebice odnosi na njihove varijacije, npr. *happy as a bastard on Father's Day, about as handsome as a turnip, about as handy as a wooden fish in a bottle, rare as a cat with wings, useless as tits on a boar (hog)/bull, as scarce as hen's teeth, pun čega kao žaba dlaka, glup kao stražnjica*, itd. *Pijan kao majka* npr. pripada VULGARNOM STILU, koji je snižena varijanta razgovornog stila (Menac 1978: 223). Menac (*ibid.*) spominje i GRUBO VULGARAN STIL koji se nalazi "s one strane bontona", pa se obično ne navodi u rječnicima, no sve se više susreće u književnosti, kazalištu i medijima. Nekoliko primjera grubo vulgarnog stila ima i među poredbenim frazemima, posebice kod negativnog vrednovanja nekih pojava ili osobina, primjerice ljudske gluposti ili nekarakternosti, no ti su primjeri u ovoj analizi izostavljeni.

Poredbeni su frazemi uočeni i u šalama i vicevima, često neprevodivima na hrvatski:

- (37) - Mum, am I a bear?
- No, why?
- Because I'm *hungry like a wolf and as sick as a parrot*.

13. Mehanizmi za oblikovanje poredbenih frazema

Osim već spomenutih kognitivnih mehanizama METAFORE i METONIMIJE, te IRONIJE, dakle asocijativnih slika i predodžbi zasnovanih na uspoređivanju, sličnosti i različitosti, i jezična figura HIPERBOLA utjecala je na nastanak nekih poredbenih frazema. Tako je na primjer dobar dio poredbenih frazema u određenoj mjeri preuveličan: *as red as a beetroot* nije doista i jednako intenzivne crvene boje kakvu ima cikla, ili u hrvatskom poredbenom frazemu *crven kao paprika*, već se odnose na osobu koja se zacrvenjela od bijesa ili stida, no ipak se teško može reći da se radi o jednakom intenzitetu boje. *Eyes as big as saucers* nisu doista velike poput tanjurića za kavu, ili u hrvatskom frazemu *oči velike kao crkvena zvona, oči kao krofne*, ne radi se o takvoj veličini očiju, već o hiperboli. Dok je kod frazema općenito jedna od figura i eufemizam, kod poredbenih frazema ona nije primijećena.

Glavni mehanizmi koji služe za oblikovanje poredbenih frazema su ALITERACIJA i ASONANCA. Primjere za aliteraciju nalazimo u sljedećim poredbenim frazemima: *to sleep like a log, as flat as a fluke, as flat as a flounder, as still as statue, as brown as a berry, as weak as water, as bold as brass, as clear as crystal, cool as a cucumber, as right as rain, zdrav kao dren, prljav kao prasac, lukav kao lisica*, itd. Primjeri asonance su sljedeći: *as snug as a bug in a rug, as wet as a drowned rat, as fleet as deer, as black as the ace of spades, lijep kao cvijet, glup kao stup* itd. U nekoliko primjera zamijećena je i aliteracija i asonanca: *as busy as a bee, as busy as a beaver, as fit as*

a fiddle, rumen kao ruža, itd. Ovi mehanizmi omogućuju veću zvučnost ovih frazema, doprinose njihovom lakšem pamćenju, te su vjerojatno jedan od razloga zbog kojih su ovakvi frazemi u procesu idiomatizacije prerasli od obične poetske poredbe u poredbeni frazem.

Jedan od bitnih mehanizama od utjecaja na oblikovanje poredbenih frazema je i znanje o jeziku, princip modela ili analogije, odnosno strukturalne norme koju prate gotovo svi poredbeni frazemi, te se novi tvore lako u skladu s postojećim.

14. Leksički sastav poredbenih frazema

Izvanjezični faktori koji utječu na izbor elemenata poredbenog frazema odnose se na kulturološku, povijesnu, ekonomsku ili političku uvjetovanost, odnosno na znanje o fizičkoj, društvenoj, psihološkoj i metafizičkoj zbilji. Tako u hrvatskom frazem *as busy as Grand Central Station* nema leksičkog ekvivalenta, jer *Grand Central Station* nije dio hrvatske stvarnosti, radi se o glavnom željezničkom kolodvoru u New Yorku, te se taj isti poredbeni frazem može prevesti parafrazom: *pun ljudi/prenapučen/užurban/velika gužva* i sl. Isto vrijedi i za *as sound as a dollar*, *as busy as a beaver*, jer *dollar* i *beaver*²⁷ nisu dio hrvatske stvarnosti. Dok *as busy as a beaver* postoji semantički i frazeostilistički ekvivalent *vrijedan kao mrav*, za *as busy as Grand Central Station* i *as sound as a dollar* ne postoje frazeostilistički ekvivalenti, već samo parafraze samih značenja frazema. Mogli bismo reći da se radi o 'konceptualnim prazninama'²⁸ na frazeostilističkoj razini, koje su nastale na osnovi 'leksičkih praznina' – nepostojanje izraza *Grand Central Station* u hrvatskom jeziku.

Velik se broj poredbenih frazema u oba jezika oslanja na elemente iz neposrednog okruženja: živog i neživog svijeta. Velike podskupine čine oni koji kao jedan od leksema sadrže životinju, boju, voće, povrće, vlastito ime i sl. Zanimljivo je da se poredbeni frazemi vrlo često koriste za slikovite opise fizičkog izgleda i karaktera, posebice negativnih svojstava: ružnoće, neprivlačnosti, gluposti, ludosti, pijanstva; područje emotivnosti: sreće, straha, bijesa, ljubavi, antipatije i sl. Zanimljiv je velik stupanj poredbenih frazema koji su opisi ili reakcije negativnih pojava ili ponašanja, koji je izrazito asimetričan u odnosu na pozitivno obojene.

²⁷ To ne znači da *beaver* i *dollar* ne postoje kao leksemi u hrvatskom jeziku, no kako dabar i dolar nisu dijelom fizičke zbilje, oni nisu leksikalizirani u istoj mjeri kao što su to npr. životinjske vrste koje žive u hrvatskoj ili novac koji se koristi/koristio u Hrvatskoj (mula, magare, tovar, cekin, dukat, lički medo, šarov, guja, som).

²⁸ O konceptualnim i sistemskim prazninama vidi Ivir (1977).

Jedan manji broj poredbenih frazema uključuje i poredbe s vlastitim imenom²⁹, npr: *as dead as Queen Anne, as rich as Croesus, as poor as Lasarus, as old as Methuselah, as patient as Job, as pleased as Punch, to grin like a Cheshire cat, as busy as Grand Central Station, as proud as Lucifer, as wise as Solomon, like Rip Van Vinkle, as tight as Dick's hat-band, bogat kao Krez, (star kao) Metuzalem, kao luda Mara/ Marta, držati se kao drvena Marija, smotati koga kao Vlah pitu, proći kao Janko na Kosovu, koštati/ stajati kao svetog Petra kajgana, jak/ snažan kao Likota, mudar kao Solomon, pušiti kao Turčin, crn kao Ciganin, ležati (bespomoćno) kao Lazar, ima koga kao Rusa/ Kineza* itd. Oni su svi zasnovani na znanju o svijetu, odnosno različitim aspektima znanja o svijetu. Kako jedan dio njih postoji i u engleskom i u hrvatskom, npr. *as rich as Croesus, bogat kao Krez, as wise as Solomon, mudar kao Solomon* ili *as poor as Lasarus, ležati kao Lazar*, jasno je da su oni pripadaju zajedničkoj iskustvenoj podlozi: znanju povijesti, poznavanju Biblije ili mitologije: Krez je ime posljednjeg kralja Lidije koji je bio poznat po svom velikom bogatstvu, Salamon je bio kralj Izraela i sin Davida i Betsabeje, a krasila ga je velika mudrost, Lazar je prosjak koji je ležao na vratima bogataša u Isusovoj priči iz poslanice po Luki.

Dok se niti u jednom engleskom, pa ni u njemačkom, poredbenom frazemu na pojavljuje *Turčin*, zbog uske povijesne povezanosti u hrvatskom se javlja *pušiti kao Turčin, lagati kao Turčin, zadužiti se kao turska carevina, prolaziti kao kraj/ pokraj/ pored turskog groblja, biti gori od Turčina* zasnovane na predrasudama o karakterističnom ponašanju ovog naroda³⁰. *Turčin* i *Švabo* (*natezati se kao Švabo s gaćama*) iz povijesnih razloga nose izrazito negativne konotacije u hrvatskom. Slična analogija, samo na potezu engleski – hrvatski, može se izvesti za *as pleased as Punch* koja je nastala vjerojatno na osnovi veselih crteža lika *Punch* koji se pojavio na naslovnica časa *Punch* u 19. stoljeću³¹, te se ovaj poredbeni frazem na hrvatski može prevesti jedino parafrasom *vrlo zadovoljan*. Zanimljivi su i poredbeni frazemi *as mad as a hatter* i *as mad as a March hare* koji su nastali na osnovi likova *Mad Hatter* i *March hare* iz knjige Lewisa Carolla *Allice in Wonderland*. Zanimljivo je usporediti etimologiju ova dva poredbena frazema u frazeološkim rječnicima. Dok se oba vežu uz Carollove likove u NTC's, LDEI daje sasvim drugačija objašnjenja: za *as mad as a hatter*: 'Perhaps referring to an old belief that HATTERS (people who made hats) were often mad. It is now thought that they may have developed a disease caused by working with MERCURY (a

²⁹ O frazemima s komponentom vlastitog imena u hrvatskom jeziku vidi Matešić (1992-1993). Matešić je utvrdio da su od svih frazema s vlastitim imenom najbrojniji oni poredbeni.

³⁰ Iz istih razloga - povijesne i zemljopisne blizine - i u talijanskom postoje frazemi *bestemmiere/bere/fumare/sedere come un turco* (psovati/piti/pušiti/sjediti kao Turčin).

³¹ NTC's međutim veže *as pleased as Punch/punch* za lik *Punch* u *Punch & Judy Show*.

metal formerly used in hat making).’, za *as mad as a March hare*: ‘These animals can be seen leaping about wildly during March, when they breed.’ (LDEI: 207). ODCIE (24) veže *as mad as a hatter* uz *Alice in Wonderland*, dok se *as mad as a March hare* objašnjava čudnim ponašanjem zečeva u ožujku. Vjerojatno je Carroll dao imena likovima na osnovi ponašanja i svojstava kakva daje LDEI, no nije jasno jesu li ona ušla u jezik prije ili kao rezultat toga.

U engleskom ekvivalente nemaju poredbeni frazemi s vlastitim imenom *proći kao Janko na Kosovu, jak kao Likota, smotati koga kao Vlah pitu* koji su nastali na osnovi narodnog kazivanja, povijesnog događaja ili imena svojstvenih hrvatskom jeziku, te oslikavaju tipično domaće odnose.

Zanimljiva je dominacija muških imena u odnosu na ženska u poredbenim frazemima u oba jezika.

Što se tiče glagolskih poredbenih frazema, primijećen je ograničen broj, i to uglavnom čestih, glagola koji su središnji u svom polju: *biti, imati, izgledati, osjećati se, stajati, piti, jesti*, i sl. U engleskom su primijećeni isti glagoli: *be, have, feel, drink, eat, drink, look like*, itd. I u hrvatskom i u engleskom oni se javljaju u oko 30% svih glagolskih poredbenih frazema.

Iz analize leksičkog sastava poredbenih frazema u engleskom i hrvatskom proizlazi da se svaka pojava ne mora nužno leksikalizirati, ili leksikalizirati na isti način u svakom jeziku.

15. Zaključak

Analiza korpusa poredbenih frazema u engleskom i hrvatskom jeziku pokazala je postojanje velikog broja sličnosti na različitim razinama: leksičkoj, strukturalnoj, tematskoj, stilskoj i semantičkoj.

Dok semantička svojstva poredbenih frazema ne pokazuju jezične ili nacionalne specifičnosti (oni su reakcije na stanja pojave i zbivanja od općeg značaja), leksička svojstva odražavaju specifičnosti kulture i jezične zajednice kojoj pripadaju (jezično i kulturološki specifičan izbor leksema). Leksička preklapanja elemenata poredbenih frazema u oba jezika rezultat su zajedničke svijesti, društvenih procesa, zajedničkog kulturnog i povijesnog naslijeđa (zajedničkog znanja o svijetu), međujezičnih dodira i općih semantičkih mehanizama. Leksičke razlike rezultat su specifičnosti pojedinog jezika i kulture (kulturno-specifičnog znanja o svijetu). Sve pojave nisu nužno leksikalizirane u oba jezika, ili su u različitim jezicima leksikalizirane pomoću različitih leksema.

U oblikovanju poredbenih frazema u oba jezika sudjeluju isti mehanizmi (metafora, metonimija, ironija, aliteracija, asonanca, hiperbola, znanje o jeziku i svijetu). Isti mehanizmi primijećeni su i kod tekstualnih modifikacija poredbenih frazema.

Veća čestotnost poredbenih frazema za negativno vrednovanje pojma i opis nepoželjnih svojstava izrazito je asimetrična u odnosu na pozitivno vrednovanje ili opis pojmova u oba jezika.

Poredbeni frazemi pokazuju ista stilistička obilježja u oba jezika: smješteni su na potezu od stilski neutralnog, preko neformalnog, do slanga, no najveća koncentracija je u neformalnom registru.

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ON IDIOMS OF COMPARISON IN ENGLISH AND CROATIAN

The study reported in this paper examines idioms of comparison in English and Croatian. In particular, it investigates the relationship between idioms of comparison (IOC), similes, metaphors and metonymies, and characteristics and structure of IOCs. Moreover, it discusses specific features and types of IOCs that were observed when contrasting sets of English and Croatian expressions. Special attention is paid to variations and modifications of canonical forms of IOCs. Other issues addressed include lexical relationships between IOCs, expressions for indirect negation, expressions for positive and negative evaluation, and meaning intensification, use and stylistic features of IOCs, mechanisms underlying the formation of IOCs and, finally, their lexical composition.

Key words: idioms of comparison, simile, metonymy, metaphor, variation, modification

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Cognitive operations and and projection spaces¹

In recent years, Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier have popularized the theory of blending (or conceptual integration) as a widespread cognitive mechanism which applies over many areas of conceptualization, including metaphor and metonymy. According to this theory, the understanding of some metaphorical expressions involves the activation of, at least, four different mental spaces: two input spaces (i.e. a source and a target space), a generic space, and a blend. Turner & Fauconnier contend that in this process emergent structure may be created which is not present in any of the input spaces. Emergent structure is the result of a number of potential irregularities in the mapping process, such as the existence of asymmetries and non-correspondences between source and target. The present paper examines Turner & Fauconnier's proposal carefully and argues that there are no irregularities in conceptual projection. In our view, purported irregularities are only apparent and may be explained away in terms of the activation and principled combination of partial source and target inputs which are projected and integrated into single composite source and target spaces. These composite spaces have all the structure necessary for the metaphorical cross-domain mapping to take place in such a way that there are no non-correspondences or asymmetries between source and target. We also

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argue that the default interpretation of expressions involving conceptual projection and integration is a matter of the activity of any of a number of cognitive operations such as correlation, contrast, domain expansion, domain reduction, strengthening, mitigation, saturation, and counterfactual reasoning. Finally, in our alternative account, there is a projection space that is constructed on the basis of the conceptual structure resulting from such operations. This space is available for additional implicative operations that are often needed to derive the ultimate value of expressions in context.

Key words: mental space, blend, emergent structure, input space, conceptual projection, integration, cognitive operations, projection space

0. Introduction

The question of conceptual interaction has been a relatively important area of interest in cognitive linguistics, especially in work carried out by Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier in relation to mental space theory and the notion of blending or conceptual integration (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 1996, 1998, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier, 1995, 2000). However, some relevant aspects of mental space theory have been convincingly challenged in Ruiz de Mendoza (1996, 1998), in particular those connected with the apparent irregularities and asymmetries found in blended mental spaces. In this connection, we propose an alternative account that explains such irregularities and idiosyncrasies in terms of the activation and principled combination of multiple source and target input spaces. These are projected and integrated into single composite source and target spaces that thus become available for metaphoric, metonymic or other related cognitive operations. As complementary to this proposal, we take up previous work on conceptual interaction patterns carried out by Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) and examine their role in projection tasks. Since interaction patterns place constraints on conceptual projection and integration, they need to be taken into account by mental space theory. However, interaction patterns are only one kind of constraint on conceptual projection. They allow us to know about interaction possibilities but they reveal nothing about the kinds of cognitive operation which underlie the projection and integration of conceptual structure from different mental spaces. So we will also address the issue of how such operations govern the flow of information into what we call the projection space and they ultimately determine the final form it takes.

1. Mental spaces and blending

A mental space is a small conceptual packet built up provisionally for the purpose of performing certain cognitive operations (Fauconnier & Turner,

1996: 113). It must be noted that a mental space is a dynamic construct that derives its structure from a non-dynamic conceptual repository. In this respect it differs from the notion of 'idealized cognitive model' -put forward by Lakoff (1987) and widely accepted nowadays in the cognitive linguistics community- which is used to refer to different forms of conventional knowledge such as Fillmore's (1985) *frames* (conceptual structures with processes, roles, and participants), Johnson's (1987) *image-schemas* (such as the notions of 'container' and 'path'), metaphor, and metonymy (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In fact, some mental spaces (like metaphoric inputs) import their structure from frames or image-schemas, while others (like blends) are the result of an integration process, like the one triggered off by a metaphoric or a metonymic mapping.

Blending theory is a theory of conceptual projection and integration of mental spaces. In metaphor processing and production, it is proposed that there are usually four mental spaces involved. Two of them, which would roughly correspond to the traditional source and target domains of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) metaphor theory, are called INPUT SPACES. Input spaces have elements that correlate on the basis of the generic structure that they have in common and which constitutes a GENERIC SPACE. There is a fourth space, the BLENDED SPACE or BLEND, which derives its structure from the correlated inputs. Blends exploit and develop counterpart connections between input spaces and in so doing integrate simple related events into more complex simple related events. Blends are dynamic (during blending conceptual work involving the activation of new spaces and the modification of previously activated ones may be required) and they may have structure which is not provided by the input spaces. In fact, they may even contain emergent structure inconsistent with that of the input spaces. The four-space model is diagrammed in figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Turner & Fauconnier's four-space model.

By way of illustration of how this model works, consider the following example, taken from Fauconnier & Turner (2001). In it, a clipper, *Great America*, which currently sails from San Francisco to Boston, is involved in an imaginary race against the *Northern Light*, which did the same journey in 1953. In order to understand this situation, we need to combine the following mental spaces: one input space for the passage of the Northern Light in 1953; another for the passage of the present run by the Great America; a generic space, which extracts structure common to the two input spaces (i.e. a ship makes a journey of a certain duration from a source to a destination); and the blended space into which the Northern Light and the Great America are projected as taking part in a race. The blended space has emergent structure that does not exist in any of the input spaces, where there is no competition between two ships, but only two separate journeys carried out on different dates.

A different but comparable situation is provided by the analysis of the expression *You could see the smoke coming out of his ears* (Turner & Fauconnier 2000: 136). In terms of Turner & Fauconnier's analysis, if we postulate a cross-domain mapping in which the source consists of a container (typically a pot or a kettle) with boiling water and the target a person's head, there arise some inconsistencies: boiling water gives off steam, not smoke, which is naturally released through an opening which, unlike the ears, is not found on the sides of the container. The natural solution for Turner & Fauconnier is to think of the blend as inheriting part of its structure from the source input and part from the target input, while it also has emergent structure which is produced by the blend itself.

2. The combined input hypothesis

The existence of emergent structure and of non-correspondences is a peculiar feature of blends in Turner & Fauconnier's proposal. However, this hypothesis, which we shall call the *emergent structure hypothesis*, has been questioned by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996, 1998) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002). These authors give alternative accounts of some of Turner & Fauconnier's best-known examples of metaphor in terms of the activation of multiple source inputs which, after being combined and integrated into one single source, correlate with relevant elements of the metaphoric target. We shall refer to Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez's proposal as the *combined input hypothesis*.

In order to show the explanatory power of the combined input hypothesis, we shall consider again the example of the race between the Northern Light and the Great America. Under this hypothesis, the race frame is not created by the blend, but derived from pre-existing, already available knowledge about

racés, i.e. from an extra input space, and, if this is correct, a revision of their explanation is required. In this alternative view, the Northern Light vs. Great America example requires the activation of three input spaces: one containing the journey of the Northern Light; a second one providing a characterization of the journey of the Great America; and the third one supplying information about races. Once the two clippers have been assigned the racers' role in the projection space (the blend in the standard four-domain model), whatever the two clippers do will have to accord with the conceptual structure of the domain of races. This situation may be represented in figure 2 below.




Figure 2. Imaginary race between the Northern Light and the Great America

Let us now go back to the sentence *You could see the smoke coming out of his ears*. We analyze this example in terms of the activation of two combinable source inputs: one selects its structure from the container image-schema; in the other there is a burning object or substance (e.g. firewood) which produces smoke. The target input has a very angry person. External signs of anger (sweat, redness) in the target correlate with external signs of combustion inside the container (smoke, heat) in the composite source. Figure 3 below captures the essentials of this process.

In the combined input hypothesis the presence of more than one combinable source or target input is not always necessary. Thus, it is often the case

that one single source is able to provide all the structure needed to correlate all relevant elements of the metaphoric source and target. Let us consider in this regard Grady, Oakley & Coulson's (1999: 103) discussion of the metaphor *This surgeon is a butcher*, which is a faithful application of what we have labeled the emergent structure hypothesis. According to Grady, Oakley & Coulson (1999), Lakoff's traditional two-domain model of metaphor would give an account of this expression in terms of direct projection from the source domain of butchery to the target domain of surgery. This projection would be guided by a number of counterpart mappings: from 'butcher' onto 'surgeon', from 'animal' onto 'human being', from 'commodity' onto 'patient', from 'cleaver' onto 'scalpel', among others. However, these authors believe that there is a crucial meaning element that is eluded in the traditional analysis: the suggestion that the surgeon is incompetent. In their view, this notion is not projected from the source to the target, since butchers are typically competent at what they do. Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) conclude that the idea that the surgeon is incompetent is emergent structure, peculiar to the blend, which results from contrasts between surgeons and butchers, a factor that goes beyond a cross-domain mapping. Thus, the blend combines the surgeon's goal of healing his patients with the butcher's means of achieving his own goal of cutting flesh. The blend does not import either the butcher's goals or the surgeon's conventional means of performing surgery.




Figure 3. Conceptual interaction in *You could see the smoke coming out of his ears*

The problem with this analysis is that it makes the strong claim that in the blend there is actual integration of conceptual elements from the source and target. However, such integration would involve an interpretation of *This surgeon is a butcher* in which the surgeon, in doing surgery, actually performs the same movements as a butcher cutting up an animal. If there is no actual integration of elements but only correlation and contrast, we can make the weaker but more plausible claim that there is only similarity between the way a butcher and the surgeon work. Thus, we think of the surgeon using his scalpel in a careless or clumsy way; a comparable way of using the cleaver is not careless in a butcher's activity, since much less accuracy is required. In any case, the idea that the surgeon in this metaphor is incompetent is not emergent structure any more than other implications that follow naturally from the correlation and consequent comparison of the metaphorical elements in correspondence. For example, another implication of the metaphor concerns the probable poor state of the patient after the figurative butchery; and still another is the surgeon's lack of concern for or perhaps his unawareness of his own incompetence. These observations lead us to conclude that while it is correct to state that the blend has emergent structure (i.e. new structure arising from correlation and contrast), it is not accurate to maintain that this structure is the result of integrating non-corresponding elements.

It must be observed that integration in the combined input hypothesis is limited to cases of multiple source or target domains. In examples like the surgeon-butcher metaphor there is no integration but only correlation and contrast. We see some of the characteristics of one domain in terms of some of the characteristics of another domain. This allows us to derive meaning implications that are projected into the blend. The blend is thus the repository not only for explicit but also for implicit knowledge. This issue will be addressed in some more detail in section 5 below.

To sum up, the difference between the two conceptual projection hypotheses is evident from the comparison between the standard model as represented in figure 1 above and the diagram in figure 4 below.




Figure 4. Combined input hypothesis

The combined input hypothesis preserves some of the most relevant characteristics of Turner & Fauconnier's account. Thus it retains the notion of 'mental space' as a dynamic construct which derives its structure from an idealized cognitive model or from other mental spaces. It also retains the basic correlational structure between source and target inputs and the notion of generic space as a mental space containing generic structure abstracted away from source and target. Finally, it makes use of the notions of 'projection' and 'integration' as two crucial cognitive operations involved in conceptual interaction. However, there are a number of significant differences between our own account and Turner & Fauconnier's. We make the following claims:

- The label "blend" may not be retained. It is more accurate to use the alternative term "projection space". Unlike a blended space or blend, a projection space is the result of ongoing cognitive activity, not the creator of such an activity.
- Projection spaces (i.e. the counterpart of Turner & Fauconnier's blends) do not contain structure inconsistent with the structure projected from the input spaces. The apparent existence of emergent structure is explained in terms of the activation of multiple conceptual spaces that interact according to a range of possible operations and constraints.
- Projection spaces are not dynamic in the sense that Turner & Fauconnier postulate for blends, i.e. by being able to create their own emergent structure independent of the structure provided by the in-

put spaces. Instead, we consider projection spaces to be the outcome of previous cognitive activity.

- Cognitive operations like integration, correlation, and contrast play a prominent role in regulating the outcome of the projection process. Other operations are also considered (see section 3 below): domain expansion, domain reduction, strengthening, mitigation, completion, counterfactual conditioning, and probably others.
- Conceptual projection is also constrained by conceptual interaction patterns (see section 4 below).
- Projection spaces may become inputs for further conceptual projection operations, as in implicature derivation processes (see section 5 below). These operations abide by all the constraints indicated above.

There are, in our view, three clear advantages of the combined input hypothesis over the emergent structure hypothesis. One is that there is no need in it to postulate the existence of non-correspondences or inconsistencies in the correlational structure of the metaphor. Another is that a projection space is, in consonance with the nature of other mental spaces, the result of cognitive activity and not the producer of such activity. The third one is that the operations of correlation and integration are assigned their proper places: in the combined input hypothesis, correlation takes place before conceptual structure is integrated into the projection space; in the emergent structure hypothesis, correlation is partly a matter of the blend, as the result of an irregular projection system.

From our discussion so far, it will have become evident that the notion of ‘cognitive operation’ plays a central role in the creation of projection spaces. In what follows we shall examine in greater detail the implications of this notion for our account.

3. Cognitive operations

By a cognitive operation we mean a mental mechanism whose purpose is to derive a semantic representation out of a linguistic expression (or of other symbolic device, such as a drawing) in order to make it meaningful in the context in which it is to be interpreted. Here a brief terminological digression may be in order. The terms *COGNITIVE* and *CONCEPTUAL* sometimes seem to be used rather interchangeably in cognitive linguistics. For example, many cognitive linguists would accept to use *CONCEPTUAL MECHANISMS* as synonymous with *COGNITIVE MECHANISMS*. However, it may be wise to reserve the term *COGNITIVE* to refer to mental processes and the term *CONCEPTUAL* to talk about the outcome of such processes. Thus, it should be preferable to

speak of conceptual interaction, if our focus is on the different interaction patterns that emerge out of cognitive activity. By the same token, it would be more appropriate to talk about COGNITIVE MECHANISMS to underscore their dynamic nature. The notion of COGNITIVE MODEL, first proposed by Lakoff (1987), was conceived as having both a processual and a resultative aspect. As an organizing principle (e.g. a metaphoric mapping), it has a dynamic nature. In this case, the term COGNITIVE MODEL would seem to be more felicitous. On the other hand, a cognitive model is often seen as the result of the activity of an organizing principle (e.g. a metaphor). It may be suggested that the term CONCEPTUAL MODEL may be used in the latter case.

Metaphoric and metonymic mappings seem to be clear cases of cognitive operations. However, saying that a mapping is a cognitive operation, although correct, is an oversimplification. Let us see why. A cognitive mapping is defined as a set of correspondences between two (conceptual) domains. In metaphor the mapping is carried out across discrete conceptual domains; in metonymy, the mapping is internal to one domain, i.e. there is a domain-subdomain relationship where a subdomain may map onto the domain it belongs to or, conversely, a domain may be mapped onto one of its subdomains. The fact that metaphoric mappings are domain-external and metonymies are domain-internal has important consequences in terms of the kinds of cognitive operation that support the mapping.

3.1. *Correlation and contrast*

Metaphors may be classified from various perspectives, such as the ontological nature of the domains involved, their degree of genericity, the complexity of the metaphoric operation, the number of correspondences in the mapping, and the nature of the correspondence between source and target. The typological issue has been addressed in some detail in Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal (2002: 43-50). Here we are only concerned with the last of the perspectives mentioned above. In this connection, Grady (1999) has distinguished between CORRELATIONAL and RESEMBLANCE metaphors. The former involve a correlation between different but naturally co-occurring dimensions of experience, as in CONSCIOUS IS UP/UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN (e.g. *Get up, He fell asleep, He sank into a coma*), which correlates the experience of humans (and most mammals) rising up when they awake and lying down when they go to sleep. The latter take place when source and target have comparable attributes, as in *John is a lion*, where we think of John as having the same kind of instinctual courage and fierceness which we observe in lions.

The previous examples have allowed us to see that comparing and correlating are different forms of cognitive operation which underlie metaphoric mappings. In our view, these two operations may combine to yield a complex

range of meaning implications. Consider the metaphor *Journalists dug up some interesting facts*. In it we see the discovery of unknown information by journalists in terms of diggers finding hidden objects (typically treasures or archeological remains) by removing them from the ground. Journalism and treasure-hunting have enough features in common to license the metaphor INVESTIGATING (A PROBLEM) IS EXPLORING (A LANDSCAPE). But in our example, this metaphor works in combination with the correlational metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, which is based on the primary experience of getting information through vision (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 54). The combination of the two metaphors allows us to derive the implication that, just as an object which is taken out of the ground becomes accessible to visual inspection and therefore to intellectual apprehension, whatever the journalists have been able to reveal is now available for other people to know.

3.2. Expansion and reduction

Generally, metaphoric mappings work on the basis of many correspondences, although some metaphors only seem to exploit one correspondence, as in *My tender rose abandoned me*, where only one relevant attribute of roses (i.e. the kind of feelings it evokes by virtue of its beauty, scent, and color) is at work in the mapping from plant to person. Metonymic mappings are also based upon one correspondence. In this case, this is the consequence of the domain-subdomain relationship that is definitional of metonymies. Thus, it would be impossible to map more than one element of a subdomain onto the domain to which it belongs, or conversely to map a whole domain onto more than one of its subdomains. In this view, one of the domains involved in a metonymic mapping acts as a MATRIX DOMAIN for all the subdomains which depend on it. The term “matrix” captures the two crucial ideas of structured dependency and primariness that characterize domain-subdomains relationships. Thus, in *The child broke the window*, ‘window’, the matrix domain, maps onto ‘window pane’ (one of its subdomains). In *He gave me a hand*, ‘hand’ maps onto ‘help (as if with the hand)’, where ‘hand’ is an instrumental notion within the domain of ‘help’; as such, ‘hand’ is a subdomain of the matrix domain ‘help’.

The two kinds of metonymic relationship between a matrix domain and its subdomains have allowed Ruiz de Mendoza (1997, 2000) to make a distinction between SOURCE-IN-TARGET and TARGET-IN-SOURCE metonymies. In the former the source is a subdomain of the target, while in the latter it is the target that is a subdomain of the source. The distinction might at first sight seem inconsequential, but it is easy to see that this is not the case once we examine the different cognitive and communicative roles assigned to each of the two choices.

Consider again the target-in-source mapping from ‘window’ to ‘window pane’. The role of this mapping is to bring into focus that part of the matrix domain that is relevant for interpretation. By highlighting this relevant domain we perform a cognitive operation which results in the reduction of the conceptual domain involved in the metonymy. Conceptual reduction by highlighting is an economical operation for the speaker: it is the addressee’s task to determine the relevant subdomain. The economy of this kind of metonymy is evident from a sentence like *Marlboro has decided to challenge the new anti-smoking campaign*, where it is difficult to pin down the right target with accuracy. Thus, it is completely unnecessary for both speaker and addressee to know who is actually responsible for the policy of Marlboro in relation to the anti-smoking campaign. It is enough to assume that the decision has been made by someone who has the authority or the responsibility to do so. In fact, it would be fairly unnatural, even cumbersome, for the speaker to use a longer description like “the person or persons in charge of dealing with anti-smoking campaigns”. In much the same way, it would be unusual in many contexts to be explicit as to what part of the window has been broken if it is the window pane that we are referring to (cf. *The child broke the window pane*), rather than other parts of a window like the frame (cf. *They even had to break the window frame to make their way into the house*). Note that the pane is the most prominent and breakable part of a window, which makes this element the easiest to access by means of metonymy.

Now think of the mapping from ‘hand’ to ‘help provided as if with the hands’. What we have here is domain expansion, a cognitive mechanism by means of which a subdomain is developed into its corresponding matrix domain. This cognitive operation is the exact reverse of domain reduction. Thus, while domain highlighting reduces the semantic scope of a conceptual representation, domain development gives rise to an expanded conceptual domain. Like reduction operations, domain expansion is economical for the speaker too, but for a different reason. Here the speaker works by providing limited information under the assumption that it will be developed by the hearer into the relevant conceptual representation. It is also economical for the hearer since it is his task to determine the actual scope of the resulting domain in such a way that potentially non-relevant material is left out.

3.3. Completion or saturation

Utterances may have incomplete and expanded versions. The context of situation provides us with the conceptual material that is used to expand an utterance into a fully interpretable form. For example, the utterance *John’s not good enough* demands completion in such a way that it is specified what it is that John is not good for (e.g. *John’s not good enough for an executive position*). Completion operations have been studied in the pragmatics literature

under different labels. Bach (1994) uses the label “completion”, but Sperber & Wilson (1986) deal with this phenomenon as another form of enrichment, while Récanati (1989) favors the label “saturation”. Completion is not to be confused with what we have called domain expansion. The former is a grammatical phenomenon: there are some constructions (e.g. *be good for*, *be enough for*, *be ready for*, *be ready to*, *finish +ing*) which can dispense with the prepositional object. If not present in the expression, the prepositional object has to be supplied from the context for the utterance to be interpreted. Domain expansion, on the other hand, is not a constructional problem but a purely conceptual one where part of a domain stands for the whole matrix domain to which it belongs.

3.4. Mitigation

Let us now think of scalar concepts like height or weight. If taken literally, the sentence *John is as tall as a mountain* describes a factual impossibility. However, in a non-literal interpretation we understand that what is meant is that John is extremely tall, so much so that we feel impressed. *John is as tall as a mountain* is actually a hyperbolic expression, an exaggeration that is intended to be evident to the addressee. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the semantic impact of this hyperbolic statement is the result of a cognitive mapping from mountains to people. We understand the impressiveness of John’s tallness in terms of the impressiveness of the height of a mountain. However, this mapping is different from most parallel metaphoric mappings. Thus, in *John is a lion*, where we see a form of human behavior in terms of corresponding animal behavior, it is possible to think of John’s courage as rivaling or at least equaling a lion’s attributed courage. This is not the case in *John is as tall as a mountain*. A human being and a mountain could not possibly have the same size. There is a clash in the topological structure of the two domains, which needs to be solved. So, after the mapping operation takes place, it is necessary to carry out a mitigation operation that adapts the scalar notion of height to human standards.

In general, hyperbolic statements require *mitigation* operations. Thus the predicate in *This suitcase weighs tons*, as uttered by a person who has to carry the weight, is to be mitigated into ‘a lot’. However, mitigation is not, of itself, enough to understand the meaning implications involved in this sentence. There is a previous mapping from extremely heavy things (i.e. objects which actually weigh tons) to heavy suitcases (i.e. which may weigh a few pounds). In the mapping, we see the physical and psychological effects of the weight of the suitcase on the protagonist (i.e. the person who has to carry its actual weight) in terms of the effects that we believe would be caused by an object which weighs several tons (frustration, anger, impotence, among others).

3.5. *Strengthening*

Scalar concepts are not only amenable to mitigation but also to the converse operation, which may be called *strengthening* or *reinforcement*. Sperber & Wilson (1986) have already identified this cognitive operation under the label of “enrichment” in the context of inferential pragmatics. For them, enrichment is one of the tasks which, together with linguistic decoding operations, allow to derive a form of pragmatic inference called *explicatures* or explicitly communicated assumptions (see Ruiz de Mendoza, 2002, and Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez, 2002, for a detailed discussion of the compatibility of this aspect of relevance theory with cognitive semantics). Sperber & Wilson discuss truistic and vague expressions like *some time* and *some distance* in sentences like *It will take some time to repair your car, sir* or *The park is some distance from here*. In principle, “some time” and “some distance” may refer to any stretch of time or space. But in some contexts the former will mean ‘a (fairly) long time’ and the latter ‘a (fairly) long distance’. For example, if a person takes his car to be repaired and he is warned that it will take “some time” to do his car, he will have to assume that the repair work will be considerably longer than she expected. For Sperber & Wilson this kind of inference is a development of the blueprint provided by the linguistic expression and it is obtained through enrichment. An enriched representation contains the same information and more than the initial representation. Récanati (1989) uses the label “strengthening” to refer to the same phenomenon.

3.6. *Counterfactual operations*

Let us now consider the following expression, discussed by Turner & Fauconnier (2002: 470) in the context of blending theory:

- (1) If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink.

The context for this sentence is the time when President Clinton seemed to be surviving political damage from a number of sexual scandals and the film *Titanic* was popular. For Turner & Fauconnier, there is a partial cross-space mapping between two input spaces: one features President Clinton and his scandals; in the other, the purportedly unsinkable Titanic hits an iceberg and sinks. Clinton is the counterpart of the Titanic and the scandals are the counterpart of the iceberg. Then, there is a blended space where Clinton is the Titanic and the scandals are the iceberg. The blend draws part of its structure from the Titanic input space (the source, where there is a voyage by the Titanic which runs into something enormous in the water) and part from the Clinton input space (the target, which provided the blend with its causal and event shape structure). In the blend, the Titanic is unsinkable after all and it is

possible for ice to sink. These inferences do not come from the source, where the Titanic does sink, or from the target, where Clinton merely seems to be surviving the scandals. In the blend, instead, the scandal-iceberg is the greatest conceivable threat and the Clinton-Titanic survives even this kind of threat. This structure is, according to Turner & Fauconnier, constructed in the blend and projected back to the target input to reframe it and give it new and clearer inferences.

The Clinton-Titanic example is a case of counterfactual statement. Counterfactuals are usually equated with conditional statements that have a false antecedent. However, not all conditionals of this kind are true counterfactuals. Thus, the sentence *If I had been born a woman, I'd hate short skirts* is an impossible conditional since I was born a man. But the false situation described in the antecedent is conceivable: people can be born male or female. Or think of Lewis's (1973) well-known example *If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over*. We know that kangaroos have tails but it would not be impossible to conceive of a situation in which kangaroos have no tails (think of malformations). These conditionals spring from an implication whose reason we can understand, not from imagining an alternative world. Conditionals of this type contrast with what we may call a true counterfactual, like the Clinton-Titanic example, in two ways:

- (i) In a true counterfactual, the antecedent (*protasis*) is not only impossible but also unconceivable (i.e. Clinton could not possibly be the Titanic); in fact it has a metaphoric element in it, i.e. we are required to map the event of the Titanic hitting the iceberg onto the situation in which Clinton is faced with one scandal after another.
- (ii) In a true counterfactual, the consequent (*apodosis*) describes an impossible situation or event (e.g. sinking ice). This is not necessarily the case in an impossible conditional, where the consequent may be true or not. For example, in *If I had been born a woman, I'd hate short skirts*, we do not know if the speaker would actually have hated skirts had he been born a woman.

It may be observed that there are limiting cases of impossible conditional like *If I had been born a cat, I'd hate cat's food*, which partially resemble pure counterfactuals. In this example, it would be a matter of controversy whether it is possible or impossible for a person to be born a cat (this will even depend on cultural beliefs like reincarnation). However, this possibility or impossibility is immaterial to the extent that there is no metaphoric element in the protasis and the apodosis does not describe something impossible.

Since counterfactuals are essentially figurative, it should not be surprising to find that they share a number of relevant properties with hyperbole. Thus, while sometimes hyperbole describes possible-though highly unlikely-states

of affairs, it will usually present the hearer with an impossible state of affairs (except in a fictional world). In effect, it is possible to conceive a suitcase that weighs tons. Think of a giant suitcase specially made with the purpose of breaking a record for the Guinness. However, it is impossible to find a man that is literally as tall as mountain. In both cases, a hyperbole communicates a situation or a state of excess that either bothers or impresses the speaker. Counterfactuals are evident impossibilities intended to create in the hearer basically the same effects. Thus, in the Clinton-Titanic example, the speaker expresses his astonishment at Clinton's ability to survive an extremely difficult situation. Interestingly enough, the difficult situation itself is seen in terms of an impossible situation (it may be possible to survive a series of consecutive scandals but it would have been impossible for the Titanic to sink the iceberg). The hyperbolic effect is derived from this mapping from impossible to hardly likely. It is because of this mapping that it is possible to consider counterfactuals as extreme cases of hyperbole.

There are also differences. Hyperbole is based upon single scalar concepts ('weight', 'size', 'height', etc.) and counterfactuals on situations. In fact, counterfactual statements are constructed on the basis of what Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal (2002: 82) have called situational metonymies, where an especially relevant episode within a situational or eventive frame stands for the whole frame. In the Clinton-Titanic example, two situations are accessed metonymically: one, in which Clinton is beset by sexual scandals; another, in which the Titanic hits an iceberg and sinks, against all predictions, with the result of the horrible loss of much human life.

4. Interaction patterns

Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) distinguish between interaction based upon metaphor-metonymy combinations and interaction based upon combinations of other models (e.g. propositional structures and image-schemas). In this section, we shall give a brief outline of the different combinations of cognitive models and their motivation. In our view, such combinations place preliminary constraints upon conceptual projection tasks.

One crucial observation made by Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez is that, in cases of conceptual interaction between models with different degrees of genericity, the most generic model provides the blueprint for the activation and integration of other less generic models. For example, in such expressions as *She's in trouble*, *We're out of trouble now*, and *He went into trouble*, the concept 'trouble', which is endowed with a negative axiology, is seen in terms of a CONTAINER image-schema, i.e. as a bounded region in space. Once inside this figurative bounded region the protagonist is affected by the conditions prevailing inside it. If able to get out of it, the container will no longer have any

effect on the protagonist (see Peña 1997, for a detailed study of structure and logic of this image schema). In each of these three examples, the protagonist interacts with the CONTAINER schema by becoming part of its structure and logic.

As Peña (1999a, b, 2002) has studied in detail, some image-schemas are more basic than others that are subsidiary to the former. When a subsidiary schema interacts with a basic schema, the former is built into the structure and logic of the latter. For example, take the expression *We have had our ups and downs*, as uttered by two lovers who find themselves at a point where they feel they have made progress in their relationship in spite of difficulties. The most crucial aspects of the meaning of this expression are accounted for in terms of the interaction between the PATH and VERTICALITY image-schemas. The PATH schema is the embedding schema which accounts for the context specified above. It licenses the activation of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor (cf. Lakoff, 1993), in which lovers are seen as travelers, the love relationship as the vehicle, difficulties in the relationship as impediments to travel, and the lovers' common goals as the travelers' common destination. The VERTICALITY schema associates higher positions with vantage points and is thus endowed with a positive axiological load, whereas lower positions are negative (cf. Krzeszowski, 1993). Within the context of the lovers' figurative journey along a path, the ups and downs map respectively onto good and bad moments in the love relationship. In this sense, the VERTICALITY schema becomes part of the structure and logic of the PATH schema: journeys can have good and bad moments just as love relationships.

The principle of interaction we have just presented has an important role to play in the creation of combined spaces. A clear case is our discussion of the sentence *You could see the smoke coming out of his ears* (figure 3 above), where input_y (the burning substance which gives off smoke and heat) becomes part of input_x (the container) and not the other way around. Another clear case is provided by the imaginary race between the Northern Light and the Great America. Here we have two levels of integration: one in which the two journeys are combined into one, thus yielding a combined target input; another in which the source input provides the structure (i.e. a ship race) to see the Northern Light and the Great America as competing in the projection space.

Metaphor and metonymy are, in their turn, a fruitful source of interaction possibilities. These have been exhaustively investigated in Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002). Here we provide just a brief overview with minor refinements oriented toward the explanation of their role in conceptual projection tasks. There are four main patterns each of which may have a number of variants or subsidiary patterns: (i) metonymic expansion of (part of) a metaphoric source

input; (ii) metonymic reduction of (part of) a metaphoric source input; (iii) metonymic expansion of (part of) a metaphoric target input; (iv) metonymic reduction of (part of) a metaphoric target input. These patterns are represented in figures 5 to 8 below.




Figure 5. Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source




Figure 6. Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric source




Figure 7. Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric target




Figure 8. Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric target

In order to illustrate the first possibility, i.e. metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source in terms of the combined input hypothesis, let us discuss the expression *beat one's breast*. Goossens (1990) has aptly studied this and similar body-part expressions (e.g. *speak with one's tongue in one's cheek*, *be closed-lipped*) as cases of metaphor derived from metonymy. In Goossen's view, the metonymic basis of *beat one's breast* ('make an open show of sorrow that may be partly pretence') is the religious practice of beating one's breast when one confesses one's sins publicly. However, rather than a metaphor with a metonymic basis, what we have is an expansion operation of the source domain of a metaphor. What is said (i.e. that someone hit his breast repeatedly) provides a point of access to a broader concept (i.e. the scene in which breast beating is performed with the purpose of showing publicly that one is sorrowful about one's mistakes). The broader concept then maps onto particular situations that have common structure. Consider in this regard the semantic implications of the sentence *He held a press conference to publicly beat his breast about his marital infidelity* in a context in which a politician wants to show repentance for his immorality in order to avert negative electoral consequences. There is no actual breast beating, only public confession, but carried out in such a way that it is not believed to be genuine. For this interpretation to take place, it is necessary to develop the source input metonymically in such a way that we have in it not only the action of a sinner beating his breast, but also the stereotypical knowledge associated with this action, i.e. that it is carried out as a way of showing genuineness and of moving God to mercy. The target in turn integrates the politician's observable actions with knowledge about infidelity and its consequences in connection with the context (the expected public opinion reaction). The elements of the expanded source input correlate with the combined target input in which we have a politician acting out his feelings in public in order to show true repentance and move his voters to forgiveness. From this correlation arises the idea that the politician pretends his sorrow in an attempt to appease his voters and avoid some kind of electoral punishment. This information is received by the projection space (figure 9).




Figure 9. *He beat his breast about his marital infidelity*

The second interaction pattern, metonymic reduction of a metaphoric source, is illustrated by the sentence *She's my heart and my soul*, where the speaker's heart and soul stand metonymically for a subdomain of them, i.e. the deep emotions they figuratively contain. It is these emotions that get metaphorically mapped onto the protagonist who is thus envisaged as the main source of such emotions for the speaker.

By way of illustration of the third interaction pattern, i.e. metonymic expansion of a metaphoric target, consider the expression *The singer was given a big hand after her performance*. At one stage 'give a big hand' is a metaphor whose target domain contains a metonymy: '(big) hand' stands for '(loud) applause' or '(loud/enthusiastic) clapping of the hands' (i.e. the instrument stands for the action) in the metaphor 'give applause' where an action is envisaged as a transfer of possession (see Lakoff, 1993, for an account of this kind of metaphor). At another stage, there is a metonymy in which part

of an event (i.e. clapping hands) stands for the whole event (i.e. the audience clap their hands after the performance to express enjoyment or appreciation)². Note that the fact that the idea of enjoyment is part of the explicated meaning of “give a big hand” is evident from the incongruity of the following adaptation of the utterance under analysis:

(2)??*The singer was given a big hand after the show because nobody really liked her performance.*

Finally, the fourth interaction pattern, metonymic reduction of a metaphorical target, is illustrated by the sentence *He finally won her heart*. In it we have a metaphor from the domain of competition or contest-which involves prize winning after beating the opponents-onto the domain of courtship - which involves taking control of the loved one’s emotions by persuasion and other related strategies, and often defeating other potential lovers. In this metaphor, the target has a built-in metonymy from ‘heart’ (the lover’s “prize”) to ‘love’.

What metonymy has in common in all the above examples is the fact that it is part of the architecture of the metaphor and not the other way around. As Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) have pointed out, this may be related to the very peculiar nature of metonymy as a domain-internal mapping in contrast to metaphor, which is domain external. However, there is at least one additional reason in that metonymy allows us either to expand or reduce the amount of conceptual material that is brought to bear upon processing. Thus, metonymy has a supporting role for metaphor either by allowing the interpreter to develop a domain for all the correspondences of a mapping to take place adequately (through domain expansion) or by directing the interpreter’s attention to the most significant part of a domain (through domain reduction). There is no comparable role for metaphor with respect to metonymy.

Furthermore, the two cognitive functions of metonymy are paralleled by corresponding communicative functions. Contrast the cognitive and communicative processes illustrated in figures 1 and 2. In figure 1 we have two cases of domain expansion through metonymy, while figure 2 is a clear case of domain reduction. From the point of view of cognition, metonymies based on domain expansion are an economical way of providing access to as much

² In fact, there is one further metaphor at work in this expression, i.e. IMPORTANT IS BIG (see Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 50). This metaphor allows us to conceptualize the intensity of the noise made by the audience clapping their hands (in the domain of action) in terms of the physical size of the object given (in the domain of transfer of possession). However, in being subsidiary to ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS in the way specified, BIG IS IMPORTANT plays only a local role within the general derivation process through conceptual mappings and does not call for a third stage in the explication generation task.

conceptual material as is necessary by just invoking a significant part of the domain which contains all that material; on the other hand, metonymies based on reduction work by providing global access to a domain of which the addressee is to choose a relevant part. Note in this connection that in the first kind of metonymy access is not global, i.e. on the basis of part of a domain, the addressee has to single out the number and type of conceptual ingredients which will eventually be activated. From the point of view of the communicative impact of both cognitive mechanisms, domain expansion is a way of providing the hearer with a rich amount of conceptual implications for very little processing effort. The hearer is responsible for the number of implications that will be derived, generally not more than needed for satisfactory interpretation in context. In conceptual interaction, this allows the hearer to develop a domain to the extent that it is ready for all necessary metaphoric correspondences to be made, as in the first stage of interpretation of “give a big hand”, or for the full range of relevant implications worked out, as in the second stage of the same metaphor. Domain reduction, on the other hand, usually bases its communicative import on the relationship between the activation of a conceptual domain as a whole and the highlighting of one of its parts. Thus, in *He finally won her heart*, invoking the heart as the object of the lover’s goals conveys the idea that it is not simply love feelings but also the most central part of a person’s emotions that is at issue.

5. Meaning implications

As has already been noted above, the full meaning impact of a linguistic expression based on conceptual correlation and integration is to be calculated on the basis of the total range of meaning implications which the hearer is led to derive. Consider again the complex metaphor *You could see the smoke coming out of his ears*. Working out the meaning of this expression involves much more than simply seeing a certain angry person in terms of a container with burning contents. For example, smoke serves as a figurative indicator of internal combustion because of extreme heat. Real combustion generates consumption of energy and materials. In a similar fashion, figurative combustion of a person involves the person being eventually deprived of energy and vitality. That is why we can say that a person is being “consumed” with anger. This is just one out of several potential meaning implications of *You could see the smoke coming out of his ears*. There are at least two other such implications:

- The person has lost control of his anger (i.e. the figurative fire has gone unchecked until the moment of the utterance being produced).
- The person is potentially harmful for other people (in the same way that uncontrolled fire is dangerous).

These implications are independent of the context but need to be compatible with it.

There is an important connection between this analysis and the question of *explicature-generation mechanisms*, which has been explored in some detail by Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez (2002). The notion of EXPLICATURE was first put forward by Sperber & Wilson (1986) within Relevance Theory and is to be distinguished from the more traditional notion of IMPLICATURE within inferential pragmatics. For Sperber & Wilson (1986), a proposition is explicated rather than implicated if it is a development of the blueprint provided by the linguistic expression. Implicated propositions, on the other hand, are the result of a premise-conclusion calculation where the set of premises is exclusively derived from the context (including our world knowledge) without the help of any indicators within the linguistic expression. For example, in the utterance *The park is some distance from here*, the expression “some distance” may be developed into ‘quite a long distance’ by means of an explicature-generating mechanism called STRENGTHENING. The same utterance can be used to warn the hearer that it will take him longer than he thought to arrive at the park, or perhaps that it would not be wise to walk to the park. These are just two out of a broad range of potential implicatures that will vary with the context of the utterance.

For Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez (2002), it is possible to derive explicatures on the basis of conceptual mappings. Thus, from an expression like *You don't know where you're going*, we obtain the explicated proposition ‘The addressee has no clear goals’ on the basis of the metaphoric mapping GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. Possible implicatures would be, depending on the context, the idea that the addressee is in trouble, that the addressee is being warned about his way of doing things, that the speaker is complaining about the addressee, etc. In a similar way, a metonymy like *The sax has the flu*, where by “the sax” we refer to ‘the sax player’ (INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER), may be regarded as a way of developing the central explicature of the expression.

We may wonder about the stage of the conceptual projection process at which explicatures and implicatures occur. Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) has suggested that implicatures are a matter of the blend. This suggestion is in keeping with Turner & Fauconnier's view of the blend as a dynamic space where inferential activity takes place and with the notion of implicature as involving the activation of supplementary contextual information. The need to use such information would call for the creation of additional input spaces to be projected into the blend. Consequently, for Ruiz de Mendoza (2002), explicatures, which are simply adaptations of the conceptual material initially provided by the linguistic expression, would fall outside the blend. There are two problems with this proposal. One is that it ignores the fact that explicature

derivation, as conceived by Sperber & Wilson, is a form of inferential activity too. The other is that, as we have argued above, the blend is constructed on the basis of previous mental operations, including conceptual projection. Meaning implications are worked out before projection takes place. Thus, in our own proposal, both explicated and implicated meaning is worked out before being received by the projection space, where it is integrated with other relevant elements in terms of their inherent combinability.

The picture we are trying to draw is more complex than it seems at first sight since the derivation of implicatures requires the previous development of fully specified propositions (i.e. explicatures) which satisfy the requirements of relevance in the context of the utterance. Thus, before we use an utterance containing the expression 'some distance' as a piece of advice or as a warning (an implicature), it is necessary to make "some distance" compatible with the context in which it is produced: it may be just one or two miles, or perhaps much more (an explicature). In a similar way, before one can interpret the metaphor *You could see smoke coming out of his ears* as, say, a warning to beware of the protagonist in certain situations (this is implicated meaning), it is necessary to understand that the speaker is talking about a situation in which the protagonist is extremely angry, to such an extent that he may lose control and be potentially harmful (this is explicated meaning).

6. Conclusion

The analysis of the various cases of metaphor-metonymy interaction carried out in the previous section, although limited, is enough to understand that conceptual interaction tasks are more complex than recognized in the emergent structure hypothesis, but at the same time more clearly regulated by cognitive mechanisms such as domain expansion and domain reduction. Giving an adequate explanation of how such mechanisms work endows conceptual projection theory with a large degree of parsimony. Note that emergent structure theorists need to postulate the existence of a dynamic blend which levels out inconsistencies simply because they believe that the blend only incorporates structure which has been correlated in a careful way. In our own hypothesis, Turner & Fauconnier's blend is replaced by a projection space, which is different from other mental spaces, like input spaces, in that it does not supply information but receives and combines it. It resembles the other spaces, however, in that it is not a dynamic construct. What is dynamic in conceptual interaction is the different cognitive mechanisms and operations at work between the different spaces involved: on the one hand, we have metaphoric and metonymic mappings (i.e. forms of correlation), the latter bringing about expansion or reduction operations; on the other hand, we have a projection operation which exports structure to the projection space.

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KOGNITIVNE OPERACIJE I PROJICIRANI PROSTORI

Konceptualna integracija, vrlo raširen konceptualni mehanizam koji su svojom teorijom posljednjih nekoliko godina učinili popularnim Mark Turner i Gilles Fauconnier, očituje se u više područja konceptualizacije, uključujući tu i metaforu i metonimiju. Prema toj teoriji, razumijevanje nekih metaforičkih izraza uključuje aktiviranje najmanje četiriju različitih mentalnih prostora: dvaja ulaznih (tj. izvorišnoga i ciljnoga prostora), generičkog prostora, te integriranog prostora. Turner i Fauconnier tvrde da tijekom integracije nastaju strukture koje nisu bile prisutne niti u jednom ulaznom prostoru. Te su strukture rezultat određenog broja nepravilnosti u procesu preslikavanja, poput asimetrije i nepodudaranja između izvora i cilja. U ovom se radu kritički razmatra Turnerova i Fauconnierova teza te se tvrdi da nema nepravilnosti u konceptualnoj projekciji. Po našem su viđenju navodne nepravilnosti samo prividne te se mogu objasniti pomoću aktiviranja i sustavnom kombinacijom djelomičnih izvorišnih i ciljnih ulaznih prostora koji se projiciraju i integriraju u jedinstvene složene izvorišne i ciljne prostore. Ti složeni prostori posjeduju sve strukturne preduvjete potrebne za metaforičko preslikavanje između domena bez ikakvih nepodudaranja ili asimetrija između izvora i cilja. Također tvrdimo da je normalna interpretacija izraza koji uključuju konceptualnu projekciju i integraciju rezultat djelovanja određenog broja kognitivnih operacija poput korelacije, kontrasta, proširenja domene, sužavanja domene, pojačavanje, ublažavanje, zasićenja, te zaključivanja o nestvarnim situacijama. Naposljetku, u našem se alternativnom modelu pojavljuje projicirani prostor koji je konstruiran na temelju konceptualnih struktura koje su rezultat navedenih operacija. Taj je prostor dostupan dodatnim

implikativnim operacijama koje su često potrebne kako bi se došlo do konačne vrijednosti izraza u kontekstu.

Ključne riječi: mentalni prostori, fuzija, emergentne structure, izvorišni prostor, konceptualna projekcija, konceptualna integracija, kognitivne operacije, projicirani prostori

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Noun/pronoun asymmetries: Evidence in support of the DP hypothesis in Polish¹

The aim of this paper is to analyse the syntax of Polish nominal expressions in terms of what is known as the *DP hypothesis* (the idea that was discussed in Abney 1987). The fact that articles occupy the D position crosslinguistically is widely accepted. But many linguists have raised the question whether it is reasonable to assume the DP hypothesis for languages that do not have lexical articles. Polish is an articleless language. In this paper, I will argue that even Polish has the DP layer. Furthermore, I will show that it projects at least one more functional phrase between NP and DP. The evidence for the above claims will be based on certain DP-internal word order facts. I will account for them by pos-

¹ This paper was presented at the 10th *Postgraduate Linguistics Conference* held in Manchester in March 2001 and at the 7th *Doctorate Meeting in Linguistics* at the University Paris 7 in May 2002. Its slightly different version was published in the proceedings of the latter conference (Rutkowski 2002). I would like to thank Jan Fellerer, Ljiljana Progovac, the audiences in Manchester and Paris and two anonymous *Jezikoslovlje* referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.

tulating that, in the absence of lexical articles, other elements may move to the functional projections above NP and lexicalise them in overt syntax.

Keywords: the DP hypothesis, nouns, pronouns, functional projections, word order, N-to-D movement

1. Introduction

Following Abney (1987), it has been widely assumed in generative literature that nouns project up higher functional categories – D(eterminer)s, which head their own phrases (DPs – Determiner Phrases). There are restricted classes of items that have been considered to occupy the D node. Articles (such as *the* in English) are the most obvious instantiation of the position in question. Under the assumption that all languages share the same underlying phrase structure (cf., e.g., Kayne 1994), DPs should be projected both in languages that have articles and in those that do not. In this paper, I will consider an example of a language without lexical articles, namely Polish. Some researchers (e.g. Willim 2000) have argued that the lack of articles makes the DP hypothesis inapplicable to Polish. However, I will postulate that what appears to be a bare NP in Polish is actually headed by the D node, which often remains empty (at least in overt syntax) but may also be filled by certain elements from lower positions inside the nominal structure that move to it. The strongest evidence comes from DP-internal word order facts. In particular, my goal is to examine a number of noun/pronoun asymmetries. I will also attempt to show that DP is not the only functional projection in Polish nominal expressions. In order to account for certain phenomena related to case assignment in structures containing numerals and pronouns such as *coś* ‘something’, another functional phrase must be argued for.

2. Noun/pronoun asymmetries with respect to attributive adjectives

In Polish, attributive adjectives generally precede nouns (including proper names). This statement has to be understood as describing the unmarked order. Therefore, the opposite order (a noun followed by an adjective) should be considered ungrammatical unless the noun is emphasised phonologically or topicalised (which would lead to a marked reading).

Polish personal pronouns, unlike nouns, tend not to be modified by adjectives (this could be viewed as a crosslinguistic property of personal pronouns – therefore, Abney 1987 assumes that they usually remain “dangling” – i.e. they do not take any complements or specifiers). However, there are a few adjectives which, under certain reading, might be allowed as modifiers of pronouns. Interestingly enough, this class of adjectives seems to be present in other Slavic languages as well. Progovac (1998) shows the following data from Serbian/Croatian:

- (1) a. i [samu Mariju] to nervira
and alone Mary that irritates
'that irritates even Mary'
- b. i [nju samu] to nervira
and her alone that irritates
'that irritates even her'
- c. *i [samu nju] to nervira
and alone her that irritates

When adjectives such as *sama* above appear with personal pronouns, they are admitted only to the right of the pronominal head. Exactly the same phenomenon might be observed in Polish:


- (2) a. [sam Chomsky] czytał mój artykuł
alone Chomsky read my article
'even Chomsky read my article'
- b. [on sam] czytał mój artykuł
he alone read my article
'even he read my article'
- c. *[sam on] czytał mój artykuł
alone he read my article

The DP hypothesis proposed by Abney (1987) provides an elegant explanation for the above asymmetries. They could be accounted for by assuming that personal pronouns reside in the D node, whereas nouns occupy the N position (this idea stems from Postal 1969). The assumption that nouns and personal pronouns are not competing for the same syntactic slot seems to be supported by examples such as (3a-c):

- (3) a. we linguists like formalisation
b. my lingwiści lubimy formalizację (Polish)

- ‘we linguists like formalisation’
c. mi lingvisti volimo formalizaciju (Croatian)
‘we linguists like formalisation’


If we consider nominal constructions in the above examples to be mono-phrasal, their syntactic representation should be as follows:



However, many linguists (e.g. Willim 2000) note that constructions such as *we linguists* might be considered appositive, i.e. parallel to structures like *Paul Jones, the student of linguistics*. They also point out that constructions such as *I linguist* or *he linguist* are generally ungrammatical, which suggests that the internal structure of expressions such as *we linguists* is more complex than what has been shown in (4) – cf. Panagioditis (1998). This means that the examples (3a-c) cannot be considered as evidence for the suggestion that personal pronouns and nouns are not in competitive distribution.

Researchers such as Cardinaletti (1993) claim that personal pronouns do not occupy the D position underlyingly. Instead, they are generated in N (just like regular nouns) and move to D in overt syntax for referential reasons. Progovic (1998) follows the above line of reasoning in her analysis of struc-

tures shown in (1). She argues that the order in (1b) results from raising the pronoun from an underlying position in N to D, crossing the adjective *sama*, which occupies a fixed syntactic position (adjectives are widely assumed to be some kind of Spec-based modifiers). Drawing on the work by Progovac (1998), we can describe the Polish data in (2) in a similar way. The derivation in question (N-to-D movement of the pronoun) is illustrated below:




Progovac (1998) suggests that the obligatory movement of a personal pronoun (often referred to as the *N-to-D raising*) might be driven by the Principle of Greed (cf. Chomsky 1995), which makes pronoun move in order to check its referential features.

3. Noun/pronoun asymmetries with respect to the quantifier *wszysty* 'all'

The pattern described in the previous section does not seem to be an isolated idiosyncratic phenomenon in Polish. It can be traced in another nominal construction, namely in DPs modified by the quantifier *wszysty* 'all.'

- (6) a. [wszyscy lingwiści] czytali mój artykuł
all linguists read my article
'all linguists read my article'
- b. [wy wszyscy] czytaliście mój artykuł
you all read my article
'all of you read my article'
- c. *[wszyscy wy] czytaliście mój artykuł
all you read my article

As shown above, the quantifier *wszyscy* 'all' always follows personal pronouns. Giusti and Leko (1995) notice the same regularity in other languages. They account for it by assuming that the pronoun rises to the specifier of the phrase headed by the quantifier. The diagram in (7) illustrates Giusti and Leko's (1995) approach: the complement of the quantifier (i.e. the pronoun) can optionally rise in Italian and must rise in French and English:



Giusti and Leko (1995) admit that they cannot give any plausible reason for the movement of the pronominal DP (as opposed to regular DPs, which do not rise). I would like to propose an analysis that describes the data in (6b) and (7) without postulating an extra phrase above DP. I assume that quantifiers such as *wszyscy* 'all' in Polish are base generated in a specifier position inside the DP. This assumption is based on the fact that, from a morphosyn-

tactic point of view, quantifiers such as *wszyscy* ‘all’ behave like regular adjectives in Polish – they always agree in case, gender and number with the following noun (which suggests a spec-head relation). This means that DP is always the highest nominal projection. Thanks to the above assumption we can analyse the structures containing the quantifier *wszyscy* ‘all’ in a way parallel to the analysis of structures with adjectives proposed in the previous section. Once again, the asymmetrical word order (shown in (6)) can be interpreted as following from the independently motivated N-to-D raising of pronouns and no extra movement operation has to be postulated.


4. Noun/pronoun asymmetries with respect to numerals

For independent reasons, it has been argued that Polish numerals are functional elements, occupying a functional head projected above NP (see Rutkowski 2001a). What is notable about the syntax of numeral quantifiers is that they normally precede nouns, but follow pronouns:

- (8) a. [siedmiu policjantów] czytało ten artykuł
 seven policemen:GEN read this article
 ‘seven policemen read this article’
- b. [ich siedmiu] czytało ten artykuł
 they:GEN seven read this article
 ‘seven of them read this article’
- c. *[siedmiu ich] czytało ten artykuł
 seven they:GEN read this article

The above noun/pronoun asymmetry is parallel to the ones shown in (2) and (6), but it differs as far as case assignment is concerned. Polish adjectives and quantifiers such as *wszyscy* ‘all’ always manifest agreement with the head noun with respect to all features (including case). On the other hand, in certain contexts (when the whole DP appears in the subject or the accusative object position), numerals make the noun assume a case form which it would not otherwise take (the so-called Genitive of Quantification GEN(Q) – cf., e.g., Franks 1995). Rutkowski (2001a) assumes that the numeral resides in the head Q (projected in the region between NP and DP) and assigns genitive to its complement (NP). Since the pronoun in (8b) is also assigned genitive, it must be base generated inside NP (and raised to D after GEN(Q) assignment).

(9)



This analysis crucially depends on the presence of the N-to-D movement of pronouns. Without postulating such a movement, the fact that the element that precedes the numeral has a genitive marking would not be explainable. Therefore, I claim that the syntax of numeral constructions provides another argument for a DP analysis of Polish nominal structures. Similarly to the other expressions containing pronouns (discussed in the previous sections), numeral constructions can be analysed in an elegant and coherent way only if we assume that the D node, being the target of the N-to-D raising, is syntactically active in Polish.

5. Noun/pronoun asymmetries in the construction *coś ciekawego* ‘something interesting’

The final argument in support of the claim that the DP hypothesis holds for Polish is indirect. However, it is closely linked to the previous discussion. If we accept that pronouns are base generated inside NP and then rise to functional projections above it, it seems reasonable to assume that also in examples like (10a) the attributive adjective appears at the right periphery of the nominal construction as a result of raising of the pronoun across it.

- (10) a. *lingwista zobaczył [coś ciekawego]*
 linguist saw something interesting:GEN
 ‘a linguist saw something interesting’


- b. lingwista zobaczył [ciekawą nielingwistkę]
 linguist saw interesting:ACC non-linguist
 ‘a linguist saw an interesting non-linguist’
- c. *lingwista zobaczył [ciekawego coś]
 linguist saw interesting:GEN something

The pronoun *coś* ‘something’ assigns genitive in Polish (see a detailed discussion in Rutkowski 2001b). Note that some native speakers of Polish accept the pronoun *coś* at the right periphery of the phrase but only if the case marking of the preceding adjective is nominative:

- (11) % ciekawe coś
 interesting:NOM something

This suggests that the pronoun assigns the genitive only after moving to a slot above the adjective. If the movement does not take place, the genitive cannot be assigned.

Kishimoto (2000) argues that indefinite pronouns in English (such as *something*, *anything*, *everybody*) consist of a determiner (e.g. *some*) and a light noun (*thing*, *body* etc.). The semantically light nouns are susceptible to overt head raising (in a way comparable to overt V-to-T raising of the light verbs *have* and *be*). It is illustrated in (12).



Similarly, Rutkowski (2001b) proposes that the Polish pronoun (“light noun”) *coś* ‘something’ moves from N to a functional phrase above NP. It targets a position comparable to what Rutkowski 2001a refers to as QP and what Ritter 1992 and Kishimoto 2000 label NumP. The word *coś* ‘something’ and numerals must occupy the same syntactic slot because they assign genitive in the same contexts (namely, the subject and accusative object positions – cf. Rutkowski and Szczegot 2001). Whatever the label of that slot, Kishimoto (2000), Rutkowski (2001b) and Rutkowski and Szczegot (2001) assume that the indefinite pronoun must land in a functional projection above NP. This analysis requires that both English and Polish nouns project functional phrases and, indirectly, supports the DP approach to Polish nominals.

6. Concluding remarks

On the basis of the above observations, I suggest that, even in Polish, there are functional categories associated with the noun. Since there are no lexical articles in Polish, the presence of D is manifested otherwise. The D position must be syntactically active since it is targeted by overt N-to-D raising in certain constructions with numerals, quantifiers and attributive adjectives. Moreover, there is evidence for another functional projection – located between DP and NP. The head of this phrase hosts numerals and has to be considered the target for the raising of elements such as the pronoun *coś* ‘something.’

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ASIMETRIJE IZMEĐU IMENICA I ZAMJENICA:

U PRILOG HIPOTEZE O DETERMINATORSKOM IZRAZU (DP) U POLJSKOME

Cilj je rada analizirati sintaksu poljskih imeničkih izraza u svjetlu pojave poznate kao DP hipoteza (ideja o kojoj se raspravlja Abney 1987). Opće je prihvaćena činjenica da u mnoštvu jezika članovi zauzimaju poziciju determinatora (D poziciju), no mnogi su lingvisti postavili pitanje je li razumno takvo što pretpostaviti i za jezike koji nemaju leksičke članove. Poljski je među jezicima koji nemaju članove. U prilogu se tvrdi da je nivo s determinatorskim izrazom prisutan i u poljskome. Štoviše, tvrdi se da se između imenskog i determinatorskog izraza projicira barem još jedan funkcionalni iz-

raz. Potvrda za tu tvrdnju nalazi se u određenim činjenicama glede poretka riječi unutar determinatorskog izraza. Te se činjenice objašnjavaju pretpostavkom da se u nedostatku leksičkih članova drugi elementi mogu pomicati u funkcionalne projekcije iznad imenskog izraza te eksplicitno leksikalizirati u njihovoj sintaksi.

Ključne riječi: hipoteza o determinatorskom izrazu, imenice, zamjenice, funkcionalne projekcije, red riječi, pomicanje imenica prema determinatoru

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Das gehört nicht vom Tisch gewischt... **Überlegungen zu einem modalen Passiv** **und dessen Einordnung ins Passiv-Feld**

Ausgangspunkt des vorliegenden Beitrags ist die feldmäßige Beschreibung des Passivs. Dabei erscheint es notwendig, das Passiv-Makrofeld in die Passiv-Mikrofelder 1 [- Modalfaktor] und 2 [+ Modalfaktor] zu unterteilen. Anschließend wird die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II einer genaueren Analyse unterzogen und in das Passiv-Feld eingegliedert. *Gehören* wird als Passiv-Auxiliar aufgefasst, das auf dem Valenzrahmen eines passivfähigen Vollverbs operierend bei diesem eine Umperspektivierung bewirkt, die mit einem Wechsel der Prädikatsklasse und der Zentrierungsverhältnisse verbunden ist.

Schlüsselwörter: Basisperspektivierung, Passivfunktion, Passiv-Feld, Grammatikalisierung, Auxiliarisierung, Metaphorisierung, *gehören* + Partizip II (*gehören*-Passiv)

1. Passiv als Möglichkeit der Perspektivierung außersprachlicher Sachverhalte

Außersprachliche Sachverhalte werden im Rahmen von Perspektivierungsmöglichkeiten sprachlich präsentiert. Das deutsche Verb ermöglicht folgende Perspektivierungsmöglichkeiten: Handlungs-, Geschehens-/Vor-

gangs-, Zustands-, (Eigenschafts)perspektivierung. Bei der Versprachlichung ist die Struktur der Situation (die Lehmann (1992: 160) als “eine kognitive Repräsentation, die einem außersprachlichen Sachverhalt entsprechen kann oder nicht”, definiert) von Bedeutung. Zentrale Komponenten einer Situation sind Partizipant, Partizipatum und Partizipantenrelation.¹ Prototypische Partizipata sind Ereignisse, worunter ich Handlungen, Vorgänge, Zustände (und Eigenschaften) fasse. Durch die Partizipantenrelationen ergibt sich die semantische Rolle der Partizipanten und zugleich eine Perspektivierung der Situation. Hier wird von einer grundsätzlichen, im Lexikoneintrag konventionalisierten Perspektiviertheit jedes relationalen Zeichens (die ich BASISPERSPEKTIVIERUNG nennen möchte) – somit auch jedes Verbs – ausgegangen:

Jedes relationale Zeichen, jedes Verb ist ein Vorschlag der Sprachgemeinschaft an den Sprecher, ein zu bezeichnendes Geschehen aus einer bestimmten subjektiven (nicht individuellen) Perspektive darzustellen. Man kann geradezu von einem Zwang zur Perspektivierung sprechen. Perspektivierung scheint eine universelle Bedingung der Kognition zu sein (vgl. die Figur-Grund-Opposition in der Gestaltpsychologie). Dieses Universale hat weitreichende Folgen: Es wirkt sich bereits auf den Lexikoneintrag aus. Der Lexikoneintrag gibt eine bestimmte subjektive Perspektivierung vor. Die Funktion von Passiv, Antikausativ, Applikativ ist die Perspektivveränderung. (Welke 1994: 13)

Dabei schließe ich mich der Annahme Welkes (1994) an, dass im Lexikon die aktivische Perspektivierung (als Basisperspektivierung) festgehalten ist. Zur Umperspektivierung dieser unmarkierten Basisperspektivierung stehen dem Sprecher neben lexikalischen u.a. verschiedene grammatische Ausdrucksformen zur Verfügung, darunter solche, die nur eine Perspektivierung, und solche, die mehrere Perspektiven – sogar mit Abstufungen – zulassen. Die meisten Möglichkeiten scheinen die Verben zu bieten, die unterschiedliche semantische Zielgrößen/Partizipanten (wie z.B. Patiens, Rezipient) realisieren, so dass aus deren Perspektive auch außersprachliche Sachverhalte präsentiert werden können, indem eine der Zielgrößen Ausgangspunkt der Perspektivierung wird. Eine der möglichen Veränderungen der Basisperspektive ist die passivische Konzeptualisierung. Im Rahmen der passivischen Perspektivierung von Handlung zu Geschehen oder Zustand (oder Eigenschaft) finden sich vielfältige Umperspektivierungsmöglichkeiten. Bei

¹ Lehmann definiert diese zentralen Begriffe folgendermaßen:

- “Ein Partizipant ist eine beliebige Entität, auf die referiert werden kann, insoweit sie an der Situation beteiligt ist.
- Ein Partizipatum ist ein Situationstyp, verkörpert durch einen relationalen Begriff, der Leerstellen für die Partizipanten eröffnet.
- Eine Partizipantenrelation ist eine funktionelle Beziehung, in welcher ein Partizipant an einer Situation teilhat und welche zwischen ihm und dem Partizipatum vermittelt.” (Lehmann 1992: 160)

3-Partizipanten-Ereignissen sind u.a. folgende Umperspektivierungen möglich, z.B.:

Handlungs- Geschehens/Vorgangs- Zustands- Eigenschaftsperspektivierung

Ein Lektor korrigiert ihr den Text.

Der Text wird ihr (von einem Lektor) korrigiert.

Der Text gehört (von einem Lektor) korrigiert.

Sie bekommt den Text (von einem Lektor) korrigiert.

Der Text ist korrigiert.

Der Text lässt sich korrigieren.

Die sprachlichen Mittel, die bei der Realisierung der Passiv-Funktion systematisch zusammenwirken, erfasse ich in einem funktional-semantischen Feld (vgl. Gulyga/Šendels 1970, Šćur 1977, László 1980, Piehler 1996). Unterschiedlichen sprachlichen Ebenen angehörige Mittel (morphosyntaktische, lexikalisch-grammatische, wortbildende, rein lexikalische Mittel) bilden die Konstituenten des Feldes, das durch die gemeinsame Bedeutung/Funktion zusammengehalten wird. Diese gemeinsame Funktion ist den Feldkonstituenten in unterschiedlichem Maße eigen, was zur Bildung von Mikrofeldern führt. Die Mikrofelder lassen sich im Sinne der Zentrum-Peripherie-Beziehung weiter untergliedern. Das Zentrum des Feldes bildet die Feldkonstituente (= Dominante, Prototyp), die sich am besten und eindeutigsten auf den Ausdruck der Funktion spezialisiert hat sowie regelmäßig verwendet wird (vgl. Šćur 1977: 51). Unterschiede in der Feldstruktur ergeben sich aus der morphologischen, syntaktischen und lexikalischen Zugehörigkeit der Dominante. Die Konstituenten können aufgrund ihrer Mehrdeutigkeit an mehreren Feldern beteiligt sein, wobei sie als dominantes Glied des einen Feldes oder peripheres eines anderen in Erscheinung treten können. Das Passiv-Feld wird folglich als ein Inventar sprachlicher Mittel verschiedener Ebenen verstanden, die durch Systemverhältnisse miteinander verbunden sind. Man kann das Passiv also nur in Relation zur Basisperspektivierung des Verbs als der nicht markierten Form betrachten. Ich gehe von folgender Passivfunktion aus:

Der Sprecher verändert die Perspektive auf den außersprachlichen Sachverhalt, weil er diesen aus der Geschehens(Vorgangs)perspektive oder Zustands(Eigenschafts)perspektive sprachlich realisieren will. Diese Perspektivierung des außersprachlichen Sachverhaltes kann außerdem dahingehend verändert werden, dass der Sachverhalt aus der Sicht der Größe (Entität), auf die das Geschehen/der Vorgang gerichtet ist bzw. die sich in dem versprachlichten Zustand befindet (Patiens) oder die daran – nicht als Agens – beteiligt ist (sei es als Experiencer, Nutznießer oder Benefizient, Geschädigter, Verlierer, Besitzer oder

Korrespondent²), dargestellt wird. Gelegentlich kann das Geschehen durch aktionale bzw. modale Komponenten zusätzlich gekennzeichnet werden.

Damit sind im verbalen und nominalen Bereich folgende morphosyntaktische und semantische Charakteristika verbunden:

1. Im verbalen Bereich (im Partizipatum-Bereich) zeigt sich die Veränderung der Perspektivierung im Anschluss an Askedal (1984: 10) in morphosyntaktischen Merkmalen, die sich als "besondere Passivmorphologie" beschreiben lassen: Das passivfähige Vollverb erscheint als von "einem 'Hilfsverb' regiertes Infinitum". Aufgrund der Passivmorphologie gehe ich deshalb von einem Kernbereich mit der für das Deutsche prototypischen Passivmorphologie – bestehend aus einem Passiv-Auxiliar + Partizip II – aus. Semantisch vollzieht sich ein Wechsel der Prädikatsklassen. Nach von Polenz (²1988) verliert die semantische Prädikatsklasse HANDLUNG des Aktivsatzes zugunsten der Prädikatsklasse VORGANG bzw. ZUSTAND im Passivsatz den Vorrang.
2. Im nominalen Bereich (im Partizipantum-Bereich) vollzieht sich nach Ágel (1997) ein "Wechsel der Zentrierungsverhältnisse", wodurch es möglich wird, den Sachverhalt auf andere Partizipanta/Kasusrollen hin zu perspektivieren. Ágel (1997: 154-155) trennt dabei das konstitutive Passivmerkmal vom nicht-konstitutiven: Prototypisches Merkmal des Passivprädikats ist demzufolge "die Agens-dezentrale Sachverhalts-Präsentation", die damit verbunden sein kann, dass entweder keine Zentrierung vorgenommen oder eine andere thematische Rolle (z.B. Patiens, Rezipient) zentriert wird (nicht-prototypisches Merkmal).

1.1. *Passiv-Mikrofeld 1 [– Modalfaktor]*

Aufgrund der für das Deutsche prototypischen Passivmorphologie sowie des Wechsels der Prädikatsklassen und der Zentrierungsverhältnisse nehme ich zunächst folgende Einteilung des Passiv-Feldes in das Passiv-Mikrofeld 1 [– Modalfaktor] vor:

² Vgl. Wegener (1985: 128).




Abbildung 1: Passiv-Mikrofeld 1 [- Modalfaktor]

Diese sprachlichen Mittel stellen das Zentrum des Passiv-Mikrofeldes 1 [- Modalfaktor], die prototypischen Passivkonstruktionen, dar. Für jede Perspektivierungsmöglichkeit nehme ich somit einen prototypischen Vertreter an, zu dem dann die weiteren Konstituenten in Beziehung gesetzt werden. Eine umfassende Erfassung des Passivfeldes bedarf vielfältiger onomasiologischer und semasiologischer Untersuchungen. Erschwert werden diese durch den Tatbestand, dass zwischen den Konstruktionen u.a. zahlreiche Überlappungen existieren, die das Feld in dieser Form nicht erfasst (allerdings meine ich, dass die feldmäßige Beschreibung sprachlicher Erscheinungen – wegen ihrer Anschaulichkeit – besonders für den DaF-Unterricht geeignet ist). Einige Probleme seien an dieser Stelle kurz angedeutet:

³ In Anlehnung an Helbig (1989) nehme ich ein *haben*-Passiv an, dessen Merkmale und Restriktionen allerdings noch abzuklären sind. Wie das *bekommen*-Passiv ist das *haben*-Passiv eine dativ-konvertierende Konstruktion, die jedoch einen Zustand ausdrückt, z.B. *Er (≠ Agens, P. Sz.) hat die Wunde verbunden.* (Helbig 1989: 219). Das Vorkommen dieser Konstruktion ist stark eingeschränkt. Häufiger scheint sie in Verbindung mit dem Modalverb *wollen* vorzukommen, z.B. *Sie will das laut und deutlich vorgelesen haben.* ('sie will, dass man es ihr laut und deutlich vorliest').

- a. Das *werden*-Passiv drückt nicht nur die Vorgangsperspektive aus, sondern kann auch zum Ausdruck der Zustandsperspektive⁴ genutzt werden:
- (1)a. Alle umliegenden Gebäude werden von dem neuen Hochhaus überragt.
 b. Die Ortschaft wird durch den Bach in zwei Teile geteilt.
- b. Das *sein*-Passiv bezieht sich nicht in jedem Fall auf die Darstellung der Zustandsperspektive, sondern vermag – ähnlich dem *werden*-Passiv – Handlungen, deren Verwirklichung jedoch noch aussteht, auszudrücken (vgl. Vañó-Cerdá 1992):
- (2)a. In diesem Zusammenhang sei noch einmal betont, dass ...
 b. An dieser Stelle sei darauf verwiesen, dass ...

In diesem Gebrauch gehört das *sein*-Passiv zu:

- c. Konstruktionen, in denen der Modalfaktor implizit enthalten ist, während er in anderen nur explizit ausgedrückt werden kann. Implizit enthalten ist der Modalfaktor z.B. auch in folgenden Beispielen:
- (3)a. Da gehört eher etwas im Sparkassen- oder Genossenschaftssektor gemacht. (WirtschaftsBlatt 235/1996: B4) = ‘[...] sollte/müsste [...] gemacht werden’
 b. Dieses Gesetz gehört entsorgt. (WirtschaftsBlatt 235/1996: 2) = ‘[...] soll/sollte/muss/müsste [...] entsorgt werden’

Gerade dieses modale Passiv will nicht in das “allgemeine” Bild vom Passiv passen, so dass man es entweder nur am Rande behandelt oder “weg-postuliert”. Im Weiteren möchte ich nach einer tentativen Darstellung des modalen Passiv-Mikrofeldes die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II in dieses Feld einordnen und zeigen, dass es durchaus berechtigt ist, diese Konstruktion als Passiv zu betrachten.

⁴ Auch der Aktivsatz hat diese Zustandsperspektivierung. Zifonun et al. (1997) weisen auf den Umstand hin, dass Verben wie z.B. *bedecken*, *beleuchten*, *teilen*, *verbinden* usw. “auch in der nicht-agentiven/nicht-kausativen Lesart ein *werden*-Passiv bilden. [...] In solchen Fällen ist das *werden*-Passiv als ZUSTANDSBEZEICHNUNG zu verstehen [...]” (Zifonun et al. 1997: 1798, Hervorhebung im Original).

1.2. *Passivkonstruktionen mit Modalfaktor (modales Passiv) – das Passiv-Mikrofeld 2 [+ Modalfaktor]*

Im Rahmen ihrer semantischen Bestimmung des Passivs (aufgrund der Verteilung der thematischen Rollen) formulieren Hentschel und Weydt (1995) drei Definitions- und Ausschlusskriterien. Demnach muss es sich (1) um eine (synthetische oder analytische) Verbform handeln; (2) die passivischen Verbformen sollten regelmäßig gebildet werden können, wenn die semantische Voraussetzungen gegeben sind (Agens – Patiens), und (3) die Umformung soll nur eine Veränderung des Genus, nicht aber eine gleichzeitige modale Markierung bewirken. Ähnlich argumentieren Zifonun et al. (1997: 1790)⁵, wenn sie als letzte Bedingung für das Passiv festlegen:

[vi] Sätze mit der nach [i] bis [v] aufgebauten periphrastischen Form und entsprechende Aktivsätze, die eine in Tempus und Modus übereinstimmende Form des Verbs enthalten, sind – von skopussensitiven Fällen abgesehen - in ihren Wahrheitsbedingungen gleich.

Dadurch schließen die genannten Autoren Sätze wie:

- (4)a. Es sei noch darauf hingewiesen, dass die Verwendung des Wortes ...
- b. Das gehört einem doch gesagt.

aus der Beschreibung im Rahmen des Passivs aus. Mein Vorschlag ist parallel zum Mikrofeld 1 ein Passiv-Mikrofeld 2 [+ Modalfaktor] anzunehmen. Aufgrund möglicher Modalfaktoren lässt sich dies u.a. in folgende Felder subklassifizieren:

- 2.a Mikrounterfeld der Possibilität,
- 2.b Mikrounterfeld der Notwendigkeit/Erfordernis,
- 2.c Mikrounterfeld “sonstiger Modalität”.

⁵ Nach Zifonun et al. (1997: 1790) besteht das Passiv

- [i] aus dem Partizip II des Verbs
- [ii] aus einem Hilfsverb bzw. dessen periphrastischen Formen
- [iii] aus einer konversen Argumentstruktur des Partizip II (der lexikalische letztzubindende Term (LZT) des Verbs ist blockiert, dadurch ‘promoviert’ das Akkusativkomplement zum operationalen LZT)
- [iv] aus der Degradierung des lexikalischen LZT zum ‘chômeur’ (er kann nur als Präpositivkomplement im “Randbereich der Komplemente” realisiert werden bzw. bei Argumentreduktion entfallen)
- [v] aus der Konservierung der konversen Argumentstruktur durch das Hilfsverb, d.h. es deblockiert den lexikalischen LZT nicht.

Zur Präzisierung dieser Grobunterteilung sind noch vielfältige Untersuchungen erforderlich. Ferner ist eine Unterteilung unter Berücksichtigung des Wechsels der Prädikatsklassen und der Zentrierungsverhältnisse notwendig. Für das Mikrounterfeld (2b) möchte ich dies nach einer Beschreibung und Zuordnung der Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II auch vornehmen.

2. Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II (das *gehören*-Passiv) als Konstituente des Passiv-Feldes

In der Fachliteratur wird das *gehören*-Passiv recht unterschiedlich behandelt. Helbig und Buscha (¹⁶1994) z.B. beschäftigen sich damit gar nicht, Zifonun et al. (1997: 1790) ordnen “*gehören* mit Rektion des Partizip II” der “abgestuften Peripherie von Modalverben im weiteren Sinne” zu und betrachten diese Form als grammatische Konverse des Passivs (als “modale Partizipalkonverse mit *gehören*”), Engel (²1992) nimmt ein *gehören*-Passiv an und nach Ágel (1996) gehört die Konstruktion zu den Nebentypen des Passivs.⁶ Die Akzeptanz bzw. Nicht-Akzeptanz des *gehören*-Passivs ist demnach eng an den implizit enthaltenen Modalfaktor geknüpft. Dabei weist es den prototypischen Passivkonstruktionen vergleichbare Merkmale auf. Die Konstruktion ermöglicht dem Sprecher ebenfalls, eine Umperspektivierung der außersprachlichen Wirklichkeit vorzunehmen. Im verbalen und nominalen Bereich zeigen sich die für das Passiv typischen morphosyntaktischen und semantischen Charakteristika sowohl im Partizipatum- als auch im Partizipantum-Bereich.

2.1. Veränderungen im Partizipatum-Bereich

Die Konstruktion verfügt über die “besondere Passivmorphologie”: Das passivfähige Vollverb erscheint als von einem ‘Hilfsverb’ regiertes Partizip II. Einige Zeitungs- und Hörbelege seien hier zur Veranschaulichung angeführt:

- (5) Dummheit gehört bestraft. (Hörbeleg)
- (6) Da gehört eher etwas im Sparkassen- oder Genossenschaftssektor gemacht [...] So wird bereits seit Monaten über eine mögliche Fusion von Dresdner und Bayern-Hypo gemutmaßt. (Wirtschaftsblatt 235/1996: B4)

⁶ Ágel (1996) bezeichnet das subjektlose *gehören*-Passiv (*Hier gehört gründlich ausgemistet.*) und das *gehören*-Patienspassiv (*Wer über dreißig ist, gehört aufgehängt.* (K. Mann)) als Nebentypen der beiden Haupttypen (des subjektlosen Passivs und des Patienspassivs), weil diese durch eine Modalkomponente angereichert werden, “wenn statt *werden* das Hilfsverb *gehören* gewählt wird” (Ágel 1996: 82).

-
- (7) Die Ungerechtigkeit, daß Bund und Länder derzeit nichts in den Fonds einzahlen, jedoch Begünstigungen erhalten, gehört abgestellt. (Burgenlands Wirtschaft 13/27.3.1997: 9)
 - (8) Diese beiden Unruhestifter gehören getrennt. (Hörbeleg)
 - (9) Keely und ich sind der Meinung, daß Liebe unbedingt legalisiert gehört. (NEWS 20/97: 19)
 - (10) Das ganze System gehört reformiert. (NEWS 26/94: 46)
 - (11) Solange Sie mir nicht den Gegenbeweis liefern, ist Dr. Thoma ein unbescholtener Bürger, der anständig behandelt gehört. (ORF, 22.06.97)
 - (12) Die Theorien von Geerd Ryke Hamer gehören endlich überprüft. (täglich Alles 2077/98: 9)
 - (13) Das gehört abgeschafft, dann wird auch der Zahntourismus deutlich abnehmen. (Die ganze Woche 29/98: 58).
 - (14) Dem Mann gehören die Adler abgenommen und ein Tierhalteverbot verhängt, dann wird für alle Zeit Ruhe sein. (Die ganze Woche 10/96: 3)
 - (15) Für mich ist der Heilige Abend der Geburtstag Christi, und das gehört für mich gebührend gefeiert. (max.&more. 3/98: 9)
 - (16) Das "Spiel im Morgengrauen" gehört nämlich historisch verfilmt. (Kurier 6.6.2001: 32)
 - (17) Dieser Prozess gehört gestoppt. (Krone HitR@dio, 1.10.2001)
 - (18) Hier gehört gründlich ausgemistet. (Ágel 1996: 82)

Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II kommt also sowohl in der geschriebenen als auch in der gesprochenen Sprache vor. *Gehören* fungiert als Hilfsverb und regiert das Partizip II eines Handlungsverbs, d.h. eines Verbs, das Leerstellen für die Kasusrollen Agens und Patiens eröffnet, vgl. die Liste der Verben aus obigen Belegen:

abnehmen, abnehmen (= wegnehmen), abschaffen, abstellen, auftauen, ausmisten, behandeln, bestrafen, entsorgen, feiern, legalisieren, machen, reformieren, stoppen, trennen, überprüfen, verfilmen, verhängen

Tabelle 1. Liste der im Kleinkorpus aufscheinenden Vollverben

Anhand des Beispiels (10) seien die Beziehungen zwischen Aktiv-, *werden*-Passivsatz und der Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II veranschaulicht, vgl.:

- (10) a. Das ganze System gehört reformiert. (NEWS 26/94: 46)
- b. Man muss/müsste/soll/sollte das ganze System reformieren.

- c. Das ganze System muss/müsste/soll/sollte reformiert werden.

Alle drei Formen sind zeitgleich. Bei den Sätzen mit *werden* bzw. *gehören* vollzieht sich semantisch ein Wechsel der Prädikatsklasse. Die semantische Prädikatsklasse 'Handlung' des Aktivsatzes verliert zugunsten der Prädikatsklasse 'Vorgang' im Passivsatz den Vorrang.

Da sowohl im Aktiv- wie auch im *werden*-Passivsatz die Modalität nur mithilfe lexikalischer Mittel (in Abhängigkeit vom Kontext als 'Erfordernis' oder 'Notwendigkeit') ausgedrückt werden kann, ist die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II, die die Modalität implizit enthält, vom sprachlichen Standpunkt aus ökonomischer. Auf diese Konstruktion lässt sich außerdem das Konzept der strukturellen Offenheit von Ágel (2000) anwenden. Das Konzept besagt, dass bestimmte Sätze ambig sind, weil ihre Struktur "offen sein [muss] für zwei oder (mehrere) verschiedene Interpretationen" (Ágel 2000: 34). Für den Sprachteilhaber stellen "Strukturen keine 'semantischen Gefängnisse', sondern eher Interpretationshilfen [dar], die innerhalb von bestimmten grammatisch-semantischen Grenzen bestimmte semantisch-pragmatische Interpretationsmöglichkeiten eröffnen" (Ágel 2000: 39).

Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II ermöglicht durch ihre strukturelle Offenheit mindestens zwei Lesarten ('sollen'/'müssen'), die sogar noch weiter modifiziert werden können ('sollten', 'müssten'). Dem Sprecher/Rezipienten wird somit Raum für Interpretationsmöglichkeiten der außersprachlichen Situation gegeben.

2.2. Veränderungen im Partizipantum-Bereich

Hier findet eine Perspektivierung des Sachverhalts auf andere Partizipanta/Kasusrollen hin statt. Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II weist dem *werden*-Passiv vergleichbare Merkmale auf: Der versprachlichte Sachverhalt (die Situation) wird Agens-dezentriert präsentiert, damit ist die Zentrierung einer anderen thematischen Rolle – des Patiens – verbunden, vgl.:

- (7) Die Ungerechtigkeit, daß Bund und Länder derzeit nichts in den Fonds einzahlen, jedoch Begünstigungen erhalten, gehört abgestellt. (Burgenlands Wirtschaft 13/27.3.1997: 9)
- (12) Die Theorien von Geerd Ryke Hamer gehören endlich überprüft. (täglich Alles 2077/98: 9)
- (13) Das gehört abgeschafft, dann wird auch der Zahntourismus deutlich abnehmen. (Die ganze Woche 29/98: 58)

Die als Patiens vorkommenden Lexeme in obigen Belegen lassen sich aufgrund der semantischen Merkmale [\pm abstrakt] bzw. [\pm human] in zwei Gruppen unterteilen:

[\pm abstrakt]	[\pm human]
das, Dummheit, etwas, dieses Gesetz, Liebe, der Prozess, das "Spiel im ...", diese Speise, das ... System, die Theorien ..., die Ungerechtigkeit,	die Adler, Dr. Thoma ein unbescholtener Bürger, Unruhestifter,

Tabelle 2: Semantische Merkmale der Patiens-Lexeme des Kleinkorpus

Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II scheint sich semantisch in erster Linie mit einem auf Gegenstände/Begriffe referierenden Patiens in Subjektposition zu verbinden. Daraus ergibt sich die Lesart der Konstruktion, wonach zum Ausdruck gebracht wird, wie man in einer bestimmten Situation eine bestimmte Angelegenheit erledigen soll (sollte) bzw. muss (müsste). Eine solche Entscheidung ist "Unbelebtem" gegenüber weitaus einfacher zu treffen als belebten Wesen gegenüber, die selbst über einen "Willen", d.h. über die Fähigkeit zu entscheiden, verfügen.

Der Beleg (18) zeigt weiter, dass diese Konstruktion – wie das *werden*-Passiv – subjektlos gebraucht werden kann. Auch in diesem Beispiel wird *gehören* mit dem Partizip II eines Handlungsverbs (*ausmisten*) kombiniert. Dieses transitive Verb kann auch intransitiv verwendet werden, wodurch es zur Bildung des subjektlosen Passivs kommt, vgl.:

- (18) Hier gehört gründlich ausgemistet. (Ágel 1996: 82)
 (19) a. Man mistet den Stall aus. – Der Stall wird ausgemistet.
 b. Der Stall gehört ausgemistet.
 c. Man mistet hier aus. – Hier wird ausgemistet.
 d. Hier gehört ausgemistet.

Um die Konstruktion als *gehören*-Passiv einordnen zu können, ist es notwendig, sich mit *gehören* als Hilfsverb, Auxiliarverb zu beschäftigen. Wie die Verben *sein*, *werden*, *bekommen/erhalten/kriegen*, *haben* durchläuft das Verb *gehören* einen Grammatikalisierungsprozess, der mit der Dekategorialisierung und Desemantisierung des Verb einhergeht und dem "abgespaltenen" *gehören* grammatische Funktionen zuweist.

3. Zur Grammatikalisierung von *gehören*

Die Begriffe GRAMMATIKALISIERUNG und AUXILIARISIERUNG hängen eng zusammen. Nach Askedal (1997) ist Grammatikalisierung der allgemeinere Begriff, den er in Anlehnung an die Fachliteratur als

eine Entwicklung [auffasst], die zu mehr oder weniger weitgehendem Verlust der lexikalischen Bedeutung eines Lexems und gegebenenfalls zu dessen Eingliederung in eine schon bestehende Systematik funktional ähnlicher Ausdrucksformen führt. Mit der funktional-semantischen Verschiebung können morphosyntaktische und Frequenzveränderungen einhergehen. (Askedal 1997: 12)

Auxiliarisierung ist eine besondere Art der Grammatikalisierung im Bereich der Verben (vgl. Askedal 1997). Amrhein (1995) definiert Auxiliarverben wie folgt:

Auxiliarverben (“Nebenverben”) sind alle Verben, die mit einem weiteren Element das Prädikat des Satzes bilden, wobei das Auxiliar Träger der Verbflexion ist (nach Person, Numerus, Tempus, Modus) und das zweite Element zwar keine Flexionsmorpheme aufweist, aber eine vom Verb abgeleitete Form darstellt (im Deutschen sind das Infinitiv, Partizip und Nominalisierung), die als Träger des verbsemantischen Kerns im komplexen Prädikat fungiert. Die funktionale Leistung des Auxiliars kann auf grammatische Kernfunktionen (wie Passiv und Tempus) beschränkt sein, sie kann aber auch stärker “eigensemantisch” sein, indem sie die Satzaussage modalisiert, aspektualisiert oder sogar situativ und pragmatisch modifiziert. Von Vollverben abgrenzbar sind Auxiliarverben (bzw. auxiliar gebrauchte Verben) dadurch, daß der infinite Prädikatsteil nicht satzwertig ist, d.h. nicht getrennt temporalisierbar und negierbar ist [...]. (Amrhein 1995: 86-87)

Nach Wegener (1998: 37,43) treten bei der Grammatikalisierung folgende Grundprozesse auf:

1. Verlust an phonologischer Substanz (das Element wird weniger betont, wodurch es zu einer Abschwächung der vollen Vokale und Endsilben kommt, mit diesem Prozess können Klitisierung und Affigierung, d.h. der Übergang zum gebundenen Morphem bis zu dessen Schwund, verbunden sein)
2. Verlust an semantischer Substanz (die konkrete/referentielle/denotative Bedeutung geht verloren, sie “bleicht aus” (*semantic bleaching*), damit ist eine Zunahme der abstrakten Bedeutung und u.U. der grammatischen Funktion verbunden)
3. Verlust an syntaktischer Freiheit (die freie Positionierbarkeit des Elementes ist nicht mehr gegeben, es erfolgt eine Reduzierung auf

wenige obligatorische Positionen im Satz und eine Beschränkung auf bestimmte Satzarten (restringiert auf bestimmte Satzmodi))

4. Gewinn an pragmatischer/illokutiver/metakommunikativer Stärke ("bei Grammatikalisierung [ist] nicht nur Verlust zu beobachten, sondern gleichzeitig ein Zunehmen an illokutiver/epistemischer/pragmatischer Stärke (pragmatic strengthening)" vgl. Traugott 1988, zitiert nach Wegener 1998: 43)

Einschränkend möchte ich festhalten, dass die Grammatikalisierungsprozesse nicht bei allen sprachlichen Erscheinungen gleich verlaufen bzw. zu erkennen sind (z.B. der Verlust an phonologischer Substanz). Ein Beispiel für Grammatikalisierungsprozesse im Deutschen ist die Entwicklung von konkreten Vollverben zu Passivauxiliaren. Hier zeigt sich der Verlust an phonologischer Substanz vor allem darin, dass das Auxiliarverb nur bei expressiver Ausdrucksweise den Satzakzent tragen kann. Wesentliche Parameter der Entwicklung zum (Passiv-)Auxiliarverb sind demzufolge der Verlust an syntaktischer und semantischer Substanz sowie der Gewinn an pragmatischer Stärke.

3.1. *Der Verlust an semantischer Substanz*

Das "semantische Ausbleichen"/die Desemantisierung eines ursprünglichen lexikalischen Konzepts ist ein langwieriger Prozess, der sich aus der kognitiven Strategie ergibt, Abstraktes metaphorisch durch Konzepte der menschlichen und konkreten Welt wiederzugeben (vgl. Amrhein 1995: 97). M.a.W. werden bei der Metaphorisierung sprachliche Zeichen mit bisher nur konkreter, kognitiv einfacherer Bedeutung zur Darstellung eines semantisch-kognitiven Bereiches, eines neuen, abstrakteren, kognitiv komplexeren Inhalts genutzt (vgl. Diewald 1997: 44-45). Somit sind metaphorische Prozesse bei der Herausbildung grammatischer Formen und Funktionen von wesentlicher Bedeutung.

In Kluges Etymologischem Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (1999: 307) finden sich zu *gehören* folgende Angaben:

gehören swV. (< 8. Jh.). Das Wort war weit verbreitet als Intensiv-Form zu *hören*. Die heutige Bedeutung entwickelte sich aus 'auf jmd. hören' = 'zu ihm gehören', geht also ursprünglich von Personen aus und ist dann auf Sachen verallgemeinert worden. [...]

Das ursprüngliche lexikalische Konzept von *gehören* erforderte demzufolge eine Besetzung der Subjektposition durch eine Entität mit dem semantischen Merkmal [+ human]. Die Kombination mit Sachsubjekten ist demnach als erste Zwischenstufe bei der Auxiliarisierung anzusehen.

Dieser Stufe folgt die allmähliche Verwendung des Verbs zur Um-
perspektivierung. Dabei handelt es sich um langwierige Prozesse der Meta-
phorisierung. Fónagy (1978) sieht in der Metaphorisierung ein Modell, dass
auf alle sprachlichen Veränderungen anwendbar ist. Auf diesen Überlegungen
basiert sein Drei-Stufen-Modell, dessen Ausgangspunkt das stabile Zeichen
ist, das sich über das dynamische Zeichen zum neuen, veränderten Zeichen
entwickelt. Mithilfe dieses Modells lässt sich auch erklären, warum es keine
“sauberen” Übergänge von einer Ausdrucksweise zur anderen gibt, denn das
dynamische Zeichen kann verschiedene Entwicklungsrichtungen nehmen
(z.B. (a) wieder zum ursprünglichen Gebrauch zurückkehren oder (b)
losgelöst von dem ursprünglichen Gebrauch eine eigenständige Entwicklung
durchlaufen oder (c) beide Entwicklungen eng miteinander verknüpfend sich
zu einem polysemen Ausdruck entwickeln, vgl. Fónagy 1978: 89). Damit ist
verbunden, dass jede Synchronie ein dynamisches Moment in sich birgt (vgl.
Hessky und Juhász 1978, Hessky 1987). Diese Tatsache berücksichtigt
implizit auch Hopper (1990), wenn er beim ersten seiner vier Heuristischen
Grammatikalisierungsprinzipien (*Heuristic Principles of Grammaticization*,
Hopper 1990: 158)⁷ feststellt:

When a new layer of grammaticized morphology emerges, the older layers
are not necessarily discarded, but may form sedimented subsystems (e.g.,
of tense categories, lexical classes, etc.) which coexist with and interact
with the newer layers. (Hopper 1990: 165-166)

All dies führt dazu, dass bei jedem synchronen Schnitt sowohl vergangene,
gegenwärtige als auch potentielle Entwicklungen sichtbar werden. Diese ze-
igen sich innerhalb der Sprache u.a. in zahlreichen Überlappungen und
unterschiedlichen Graden der Grammatikalisierung.

⁷ Danach ist die Grammatikalisierung eines Sprachzeichens damit verbunden, dass (1)
das grammatische Sprachzeichen innerhalb seiner funktionalen Domäne eine
Kontinuität des ursprünglichen lexikalischen Zeichens bedeutet und damit dieses
nicht notwendigerweise ablegt, sondern mit diesem koexistiert und interagiert
(Prinzip der Akkumulation); dass sich (2) eine Auseinanderentwicklung (Prinzip der
Divergenz) vollzieht, was dazu führt, dass neben dem grammatischen Zeichen das
ursprüngliche Zeichen erhalten bleibt und – wie jedes andere lexikalische
Sprachzeichen – autonome Veränderungen durchläuft; dass (3) das Sprachzeichen,
das innerhalb einer funktionalen Domäne in einem bestimmten Stadium mit
verschiedenen Nuancen ausgestattet ist, im Laufe seiner Grammatikalisierung eine
Einengung in seinen formalen Wahlmöglichkeiten erfährt, wobei dann diese geringe
Anzahl an ausgewählten Formen generellere grammatische Bedeutungen annimmt
(Prinzip der Spezialisierung); dass (4) das Sprachzeichen beim Übergang von einem
lexikalischen zu einem funktionalen Zeichen seine ursprüngliche lexikalische
Bedeutung nicht völlig ablegt und sich diese in seiner grammatischen Distribution
zeigt (Prinzip der Persistenz) (vgl. Hopper 1990: 159).

Eine weitere Zwischenstufe setze ich mit dem Auftreten des Reflexivums an, z.B.:

- (20) Das gehört sich nicht.

Nach Welke (1997) handelt es sich bei der Reflexivierung ebenfalls um einen metaphorischen Prozess, dies zeigt sich darin, dass ein metaphorischer Zusammenhang zwischen referentiellem und nicht-referentiellem Gebrauch des Reflexivums besteht. Es findet eine metaphorische Übertragung von Belebtem zu Nicht-Belebtem statt. Ich setze diese Stufe deshalb an dieser Stelle an, weil diachron gesehen im Indoeuropäischen der passivische Gebrauch aus dem medialen entstanden ist (vgl. Dal ³1966, Kemmer 1993, Welke 1997).

Das reflexive *gehören*, das sich wahrscheinlich aufgrund der Bedeutungsvariante 2 (Ausdruck des Erforderlichseins, der Notwendigkeit, der Zuordnung: *der Kranke gehört ins Bett, dazu gehört viel Mut* (vgl. 3.2.)) herausbilden konnte, hat die Bedeutung 'sich geziemen', es drückt also ein vom Umfeld erwartetes Verhalten aus (im Sinne von 'man soll(te) sich in einer bestimmten Form verhalten'), vgl.:

- (21) Bei einem Vorstellungsgespräch zu spät zu kommen gehört sich nicht. (= 'man soll(te) bei einem Vorstellungsgespräch nicht zu spät kommen')

Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II scheint sich aus dem nicht so frequenten reflexiven *gehören* oder parallel dazu entwickelt zu haben. Beide Konstruktionen bilden also abstraktere, kognitiv komplexere Inhalte ab. In der Gegenwartssprache sind beim reflexiven *gehören* allerdings die Besetzungsmöglichkeiten der Subjektposition stark eingeschränkt (*das, es* oder satzförmig), die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II dagegen verfügt über eine größere Vielfalt: Ihre Subjektposition kann mit Entitäten besetzt werden, die das Merkmal [\pm human] oder [\pm abstrakt] besitzen, vgl.:

- (22) a. Er gehört anständig behandelt.
 b. Die Adler gehören dem Mann abgenommen.
 c. Die Fenster gehören geputzt.
 d. Der Prozess gehört gestoppt.
 e. Dummheit gehört bestraft.
 f. Da gehört etwas gemacht

3.2. *Der Verlust an syntaktischer Substanz*

In Anlehnung an Amrhein (1995) gehe ich hier von Prozessen aus, die letztendlich zu einer Veränderung der syntaktischen Struktur führen: Aus der "syntaktischen Quellstruktur [Subjekt – Verb – Ergänzung]" bildet sich "die Zielstruktur [Subjekt – grammatischer Marker – Hauptverb]" heraus. Demzufolge entwickeln sich Auxiliare aus zwei- oder höherwertigen Vollverben.

Das Verb *gehören* (V.i.)⁸ ist (auch in der Gegenwartssprache) ein zwei- oder höherwertiges Verb:

Variante 1: *gehören*_{<Sn, Edat>}

(Ausdruck einer Haben-Relation: Das Buch gehört mir. Dem Kind gehört ihre ganze Liebe.)

Variante 2: *gehören*_{<Sn, Eprp>}

[(a) Ausdruck des Erforderlichseins, der Notwendigkeit, der Zuordnung: der Kranke gehört ins Bett, dazu gehört viel Mut, zu diesem Rock gehört eine elegante Bluse; (b) Ausdruck der Teil-von-Relation: er gehört zu meinen Freunden, Gartenarbeit gehört nicht zu meinen Pflichten]

Variante 3: *gehören*_{<Sn, Edir >}

Wohin gehört dieses Buch?

Variante 4: *gehören*_{<Sn, Edat, Eprp>}

Für deine Frechheit gehören dir ein paar Ohrfeigen!

Variante 5: *sich gehören*_{<Sn>}

(Ausdruck eines Erfordernisses im Sinne von 'sich (ge)ziemen', 'sich schicken': wie es sich gehört)

Als Vollverb forderte *gehören* im Sinne von 'zu ihm gehören' (= Haben-Relation) mindestens zwei Leerstellenbesetzungen: [Subjekt – Verb – Ergänzung]. Aus dieser Quellstruktur entstand die Struktur [Subjekt – grammatischer Marker – Hauptverb (Partizip II)]. Wie bei *werden* verliert die Er-

⁸ 1 jmdm ~ jmds Besitz sein; zukommen; gebühren 2 Das Buch gehört mir; seine freien Stunden ~ seiner **Familie**; dem **Kind** gehört ihre ganze Liebe 3 für deine Frechheit ~ dir ein paar Ohrfeigen!; dies gehört nicht **hierher** *das paßt nicht hierher*; der Kranke gehört **ins** Bett *muß oder müßte unbedingt ins Bett*; zu etwas ~ *darunter sein, dabei sein, Teil sein von; erforderlich sein*; er gehört mit zur Familie; er gehört zu meinen Freunden; der Wald gehört zu unserem Grundstück; dazu gehört viel Mut; die Gartenarbeit gehört nicht zu meinen Pflichten; das gehört nicht zur Sache; zu diesem Kleid ~ weiße Schuhe; dieses Bild gehört zu seinen besten Werken 4 wohin gehört dieses Buch? wo ist dafür der Platz? 5 <refl.> sich ~ *sich (ge)ziemen, sich schicken*; wie es sich gehört [<mhd. *gehæren* „hören, auf etwas hören“, dann „zukommen“ <ahd. *gahorran, gihoran* "hören, gehorchen"] (Wahrig 1991: 533).

gänzung ihre nominale Morphologie (“Denominalisierung“) und übernimmt eine verbale Morphologie (“Verbalisierung“) (vgl. Amrhein 1995: 97). Das Partizip II weist allen im Satz aufscheinenden Ergänzungen semantischen Kasus zu, vgl. die Infinitivprobe in (23).

- (23) a. Die Adler gehören **dem Mann** weggenommen.
 Patiens **Verlierer**
 b. **dem Mann** die Adler wegnehmen
 Verlierer Patiens

Gehören operiert demgemäß auf dem Valenzrahmen des Hauptverbs. Das Hilfsverb *gehören* regiert das Partizip II eines Handlungsverbs, dabei behält es seine volle verbale Morphologie. In Kombination mit einem Handlungsverb übernimmt es die Rolle eines “Intransitivierers“. Dadurch erfolgt einerseits der Wechsel der Prädikatsklasse, andererseits führt dies zur Agens-Dezentrierung, d.h. die Subjektposition wird frei für eine andere thematische Rolle. Das Geschehen/der Vorgang ist auf das Patiens – syntaktisch durch das Satzsubjekt ausgedrückt – gerichtet. Die syntaktische Rektion auf das Subjekt des Passivsatzes geht also vom Hilfsverb aus. Die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II kann – wenn auch stark eingeschränkt – einen grammatikalisierten Agensanschluss mit *von* aufnehmen, vgl. (24):

- (24) Dieser Prozess gehört **von einem Spezialisten** überwacht.

3.3. *Der Gewinn an pragmatischer Stärke*

Auch im Laufe von Grammatikalisierungsprozessen legt das sprachliche Element nicht völlig seine ursprüngliche lexikalische Bedeutung ab, abstrakte Merkmale, die es ja gerade für diese Entwicklung prädestinierten, bleiben erhalten. Im Falle der Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II ist dies der Ausdruck des Erforderlichseins/der Notwendigkeit. Dieses abstrakte Merkmal ist Grundlage für die pragmatische Verstärkung, die darin besteht, dass eine Sprechereinstellung signalisiert wird: Der Sprecher signalisiert den Grad und die Art der Dringlichkeit eines Sachverhaltes. Durch den Wechsel der Prädikatsklasse ermöglicht die Konstruktion eine unmittelbare Verknüpfung von Vorgangsorientiertheit und Modalität – und damit eine Perspektive auf den außersprachlichen Sachverhalt, die die prototypischen Vertreter des Passiv-Mikrofeldes 1 nur “umständlich“ – über lexikalische Mittel – realisieren können.

4. Fazit

Zusammenfassend möchte ich behaupten, dass die Konstruktion *gehören* + Partizip II eine weitgehend grammatikalisierte Form ist, so dass es sicher berechtigt ist, von einem *gehören*-Passiv zu sprechen. Aufgrund seiner modalen Komponente ist es der prototypische Vertreter des Mikrounterfeldes 2b. Dieses Mikrounterfeld lässt sich anhand der Passivmerkmale (Agens-Dezentrierung, Vorgangsorientierung, ohne Zentrierung einer thematischen Rolle bzw. mit Nicht-Agens-(Patiens)-Zentrierung) weiter untergliedern. In dieses Mikrounterfeld kann das *gehören*-Passiv wie folgt eingeordnet werden:




Abbildung 3: Einordnung des *gehören*-Passivs ins
Passiv-Mikrofeld 2 [+ Modalfaktor]

Aufgrund seiner Funktion, die Sprechereinstellung bezüglich eines vorgangsorientierten Geschehens zum Ausdruck zu bringen, füllt das *gehören*-Passiv eine Nische im Rahmen der passivischen Konzeptualisierung.

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**DAS GEHÖRT NICHT VOM TISCH GEWISCHT:
RAZMIŠLJANJA O MODALNOM PASIVU
I NJEGOVOM MJESTU UNUTAR PASIVNOG POLJA**

Polazište je ovog rada opis pasiva kao polja. Pri tome je nužna podjela pasivnog makropolja u mikropolje 1 [- modalnost] te mikropolje 2 [+ modalnost]. Potom se konstrukcije tipa *gehören* + particip II podvrgavaju detaljnoj analizi te određuje njihovo mjesto unutar pasivnog polja. *Gehören* se određuje kao pomoćni glagol za tvorbu pasiva, a koji dovodi do promjene perspektive kod glavnog glagola unutar čijeg valencijskog okvira operira, što je povezano s promjenom predikatnog razreda te odnosa centriranja.

Ključne riječi: temeljno perspektiviranje, pasivna funkcija, pasivno polje, gramatikalizacija, nastanak pomoćnih glagola, metaforizacija, konstrukcija tipa *gehören* + particip II (pasivna konstrukcija s glagolom *gehören*)

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Osijek

Pučka etimologija među nekim njemačkim posuđenicama

Ova studija obrađuje fenomen pučke etimologije na primjeru dvadesetak posuđenica iz njemačkoga jezika. Većina ih ne ide u sastav hrvatskoga standardnog jezika, a poneka od njih je i sa samoga ruba hrvatskoga govornog jezika. Prilog tendira ukazati na različit intenzitet pučke etimologije, pri čemu načelno diferencira različite stupnjeve pučkoetimologijskoga naslanjanja (aficiranja).

Ključne riječi: posuđenica, pučka etimologija, fonoadaptacija, morfoadaptacija, naslonjenost, istozvučnost, analogija

1. Uvod

U postupku integracije svaka posuđenica pretrpi u novome jeziku preinake na više različitih razina. Na fonetsko-fonologijskoj razini jezik-primatelj posuđenicu prilagođava svojim vlastitim fonologijskim zakonitostima i fonemskome inventaru (fonoadaptacija), dok je na morfologijskoj razini svrstava u neku već postojeću gramatičku paradigmu, npr. deklinaciju, konjugaciju itd., ako se radi o nekoj promjenjivoj vrsti riječi (morfoadaptacija). Treba napomenuti da se najčešće posuđuju imenice, rjeđe glagoli i pridjevi, dok se ostale vrste riječi rijetko posuđuju. Ima katkad i primjera posudbe tvorbenih morfema koji u jeziku-primatelju postanu produktivni i kasnije koriste domaće riječi kao baze novim izvedenicama. Ove prve dvije razine integracije posuđenica mogu se okarakterizirati kao mehaničko prilagođavanje za razliku od one treće, semantičke razine, koja pripada području ljudskoga uma, pa je stoga ta razina inte-

gracije podosta složenija od prve dvije, budući da ona u dotičnom semantičkom polju jezika-primatelja može korjenito promijeniti ili čak poremetiti neke do tada postojeće odnose. Ako si rječničko blago nekoga jezika (leksik) predočimo u obliku mozaika ili više mozaika s bezbroj čestica (leksema)¹, zapazit ćemo da neki leksemi, svojom izrazitijom međusobnom srodnošću, čine zasebne cjeline ili takozvana semantička polja. Posuđenica ulazi u jedno njoj srodno semantičko polje jezika-primatelja i vrši kao u nekome stvarnom mozaiku pomicanje unutar dotičnoga semantičkog polja. Pomicanje unutar semantičkoga polja može uzrokovati različite promjene: od sužavanja značenja već postojećih leksema konkurenata do kasnijeg istiskivanja jednoga ili više leksema konkurenata jezika-primatelja. Danas u hrvatskome govornom ali i pisanom jeziku gotovo potpuno prihvaćena posuđenica *šogor*, koja je k nama došla iz mađarskoga (*sógor*), a ovi je u starini posudili iz njemačkoga (*Schwager*), potisnula je neke, a u gradovima sjev. Hrvatske sve hrvatske narodne ekvivalentne nazive (*djever*, *šurjak*, *zet*, *svak* i *pašananac*) koji u odnosu na *šogor* imaju parcijalna ali preciznija značenja. U pravilu većina posuđenica i sama pretrpi manju ili veću semantičku preinaku u obliku sužavanja, proširenja do potpuno novoga značenja spram izvornoga konteksta jezika-davatelja. U sjevernoj Hrvatskoj se na primjer za *otrešenjaka* i *man-gupa* ponekad kaže *gelipter* što dolazi od njemačke riječi *Geliebter* s izvornim t.j. prvotnim značenjem 'ljubavnik'.

Ovih nekoliko *ad hoc* misli upućuje na složenost međujezičnoga posuđivanja što je već više vrsnih jezikoslovaca teorijski i praktično obrađivalo. Spomenuo bih ovdje jedan vrlo važan rad Uriela Weinreicha *Languages in Contact* (1953), koji je obradio sve važnije aspekte međujezičnih dodira, a knjigu popratio bogatom stručnom literaturom ovoga i srodnih tematskih krugova. Neoprostivo bi bilo ne spomenuti i vrstan rad uglednoga, nedavno preminulog, hrvatskog anglista Rudolfa Filipovića *Teorija jezika u kontaktu* (1986) koji, praktično primjenjujući sve tekovine dosadašnjih istraživanja jezika u dodiru, obrađuje hrvatske dodire s engleskim jezikom kao jezikom davateljem. Intenzivniji utjecaj engleskoga jezika na hrvatski započinje tek u 20. stoljeću, osobito poslije Drugoga svjetskog rata, a posljednjih desetljeća dolazi do prave poplave engleskih jezičnih osobina u hrvatskome jeziku, među kojima ipak prevladavaju leksičke posuđenice.

Njemačke posuđenice, koje prodiru u hrvatski jezik od srednjevjekovnih vremena na ovamo različitim putovima, raznorodnije su ali i mnogobrojnije² nego engleske i povijesno pripadaju različitim posudbenim slojevima ili valovima. Dotičnom se problematikom manjega opsega bavilo nekoliko hrvatskih

¹ Usporedba jezičnoga blaga s mozaikom je preuzeta od Josta Trieria iz njegove knjige *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes*, Heidelberg (1931, pret. 1973). Usporedi str. 1-26.

² Samo leksičkih posuđenica ima nekoliko tisuća.

jezikoslovaca, ali osobito treba upozoriti na tri rada, koje su pisali izvorni govornici njemačkoga jezika³. Hildegard Striedter-Temps stavlja težište u svojem radu iz godine 1958. na probleme fonološke i morfološke prilagodbe njem. posuđenica. Edmund Schneeweis, koji se desetljećima bavio ovom problematikom, posebno naglašava kulturno-povijesne momente u svojoj knjizi iz godine 1960. Treći rad Matthiasa Rammelmeyera iz godine 1975. istražuje utjecaj njemačkoga jezika u području leksikologije i posebno izdvaja i nabraja velik broj prevedenica iz njemačkoga jezika. Sva tri rada za jezik-primatelj koriste tada u inozemstvu gotovo jedini raširen naziv *srpskohrvatski* (*Serbokroatisch*), no nije toliko sporno to sada već pomalo zaboravljeno ime jezika, nego tretiranje cjelokupnoga prostora hrvatskoga i srpskoga jezika kao jedne kulturno-povijesne cjeline. Hrvatski jezik naime, a osobito njegov sjevero-zapadni dio, ima više od tisuću godina dug i neprekinut kontinuitet utjecaja njemačkoga jezika, dok je u srpskome jeziku tek u 19. stoljeću zabilježen prvi brojniji sloj posuđenica iz njemačkoga jezika, a ukupan mu je broj mnogostruko manji nego u hrv. jeziku. Osim ove primjedbe navedeni radovi njemačkih kolega mogu još uvijek dobro poslužiti kao relativno pouzdan izvor podataka.

Pored čisto leksičkih posuđenica iz njem. jezika, koje u hrvatskome imaju najveći udio, postoje i ostali tipovi jezične posudbe. Hrvatske riječi *utisak*, *Crvenkapica*, *djelokrug*, *ispad*, *izlet*, *istovremen* su (doslovne) PREVEDENICE prema njemačkom: *Eindruck*, *Rotkäppchen*, *Wirkungskreis*, *Ausfall* (mit Worten), *Ausflug*, *gleichzeitig*. Riječi *kolodvor*, *željeznica* i *štednjak* nisu dakako prevedenice nego PREKOVANICE, jer su nesumljivo nastale prema njemačkim istoznačnicama kao uzorima, dakle prema njem.: *Bahnhof*, *Eisenbahn* i *Sparherd*. Sve tri su nekoč u hrvatskome govornom jeziku bile i izravne leksičke posuđenice: *banovo*, *ajziban* i *šparet* (*šporet*), a posljednja se i danas može čuti na hrvatskome sjeveru. Ima također mnogo hrvatskih riječi, koje su pod utjecajem njemačkih semantičkih ekvivalenata preuzele neko dodatno novo značenje, koje u hrvatskome do tada nije postojalo, pa u tim slučajevima govorimo o POSUĐENOME ZNAČENJU. Riječ *vatra* (njem. *Feuer*) je pod utjecajem njemačkoga preuzela novo dodatno značenje 'djelovanje vatrenoga oružja' u ratnim sukobima. Jednako je tako polazeći od njem. riječi *Lager*⁴ u hrvatskome stručnom jeziku 19. stoljeća preneseno novo značenje na riječ *ležaj* za 'samookrećući dio stroja'. U hrvatskome ima mnoštvo izvedenih neologizama (obično glagola) koji kao baznu riječ koriste neku već ranije po-

³ Striedter-Temps (1958: 255), Schneeweis (1960: 206), Rammelmeyer (1975: 360).

⁴ Riječ *lager* postoji u hrvatskome i kao izravna leksička posuđenica, i to sa sljedećim značenjima: 1. gov.jez. *imati na lageru* 'imati zalihe' 2. gov.jez. među majstorima 'samookrećući dio stroja', 'ležaj'; 3. pol. žarg. *komunistički lager* 'polit. kolektivni naziv za države istočnoga bloka'. Od riječi *lager* treba odvajati u 18. st. iz njemačkoga govornog jezika posuđenu riječ *logor* koja je ušla u hrvatski književni standard (AR. VII. 135) sa značenjem 'izvan naselja ograđen boravišni prostor'.

suđenu njem. imenicu npr.: *farbati*, *flaširati*, (s)*krahirati*, *šlagirati se*, *vagati* itd. Dakle, hrvatski je posudio iz njemačkoga imenice: *farba* (njem. *Farbe*), *flaša* (njem. *Flasche*), *krah* (njem. *Krach*), *šlag* (njem. *Schlag-anfall*), *vaga* (njem. *Waage*) i od njih načinio potrebne mu glagole⁵. Neki su, od na ovaj način izvedenih glagola, uz prvotno konkretno značenje razvili i sekundarno preneseno značenje. Tako su glagoli *prišarafiti* i *ispeglati* uz konkretno značenje ‘pričvrstiti vijak’ i ‘izglačati rublje’ u krugovima represivnoga aparata policije razvili prenesena značenja: ‘radi priznanja kakvoga nedjela izvršiti pritisak na osumnjičenog’ (*prišarafiti nekoga*) i ‘osumnjičenoga teško premlatiti’ (*ispeglati nekoga*)⁶.

Kako je ponekad složen razvojni put neke riječi pokazuje dvosložna odredbena (determinativna) složenica hrvatskoga govornog jezika s imeničkom osnovom *mašina*⁷: *vešmašina*. Njezina je odredbena sastavnica njemačka imenica *Wäsche*, pri čemu se ona (*veš*) kao posuđenica pojavila u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj početkom 18. stoljeća. Riječ *vešmašina* je očito neka vrst PREKOVANICE njemačke složenice *Waschmaschine*, koja je doživjela oblikovne preinake, pri čemu je prva sastavnica *Wasch-* (u njem. glagolska osnova) u hrvatskome jeziku snagom pučke etimologije supstituirana ranije posuđenom imenicom *veš*. Osobito su zanimljivi idiomatski izrazi ili FRAZEOLGIZMI koji katkad ostaju u izvornome jeziku kao *cuker komt zulect* (njem. *Zucker kommt zuletzt*), no ipak su najčešće doslovno prevedeni: *baciti se u trošak*, *davati ton*, *praviti komu scenu*, *iza kulisa*, *praviti račun bez krčmara* (njem. *sich in Unkosten stürzen*, *den Ton angeben*, *jd-m eine Szene machen*, *hinter den Kulissen*, *die Rechnung ohne den Wirt machen*) itd. Ima također i parcijalno prevedenih frazema kao *imati peh*⁸ prema njem. *Pech haben*, *platiti ceh* prema njem. *die Zeche bezahlen*, ali ima i podosta hrvatskih frazema, koji su u nas nastali a kao baznu frazeološku riječ rabe neku njemačku posuđenicu: *knedla* (< njem. *Knödel*) je bazna riječ u frazemu *gutati knedle* (‘biti vrijeđan i ponižavan, bez da se možeš braniti’) ili *vic* (< njem. *Witz*) u frazemu *u tome i jest vic* (‘u tome i jest stvar, to je ono najbitnije’) itd. Znakovit je i jezičnosociološki fenomen JEZIČNOGA ČISTUNSTVA ili purizma, kojem je sklon hrvatski standardni jezik, a koji je poznat i u nekim drugim slavenskim jezicima, osobito u slovenskome i češkome. Jezično čistunstvo u hrvatskome se prvotno okomilo na brojne njemačke i latinske posuđenice, ali i

⁵ Njemački koristi sljedeće verbalne ekvivalente: za *farbati* ‘färben, anstreichen’, *flaširati* ‘Flaschen abfüllen’, (s)*krahirati* ‘Krach (Misserfolg) erleben’, *šlagirati se* ‘Schlaganfall erleiden’, *vagati (se)* ‘wiegen (sich)’.

⁶ *prišarafiti* i *ispeglati* su postnominalne izvedenice od njemačkih posuđenica: *prišarafiti* od imenice *Schrauf* iz južne Austrije (knjiž. *Schraube*), a *ispeglati* je izvedena od posuđenice *pegla* koja je nastala prema prvoj sastavnici njem. složenice *Bügeleisen* koja u nekim južnim narječjima glasi *Bögeleisen*.

⁷ *mašina* kao samostalna riječ (simpleks) ne ide u hrvatski standardni jezik (*stroj*), ali se u govornome jeziku često čuje u različitim značenjima.

⁸ Postoji i doslovno prevedeni oblik *imati smolu*, koji je podosta rjeđi nego prvi.

na mnogobrojne orijentalizme, koji u velikome broju kao superstrat žive u susjednim balkanskim jezicima negdašnjega Turskog carstva.⁹ Takav odnos prema stranom i posuđenom jezičnom blagu je po svemu sudeći kulturno-povijesni utjecaj njemačkoga jezika, u kojem se jezično čistunstvo gotovo neprekidno njeguje od 17. stoljeća. Za to su osobito zaslužne kulturne udruge za njegu i samosvojnost njemačkoga jezika (Sprachgesellschaften) koje su od 17. st. na ovamo ponijemčile tisuće osobito francuskih i latinskih tudica, koristeći pri tome tvorbene i ine jezične mogućnosti njemačkoga jezika.

Ovaj kratki pregled međujezične posudbe hrvatskoga kao jezika-primatelja i njemačkoga kao jezika-davatelja ilustrira široku lepezu posudbenih mogućnosti i oblika, koji mogu biti, kako je prikazano, dublji i dalekosežniji od one obične, no ipak najčešće, čisto leksičke posudbe. Jedan od tih oblika, do sada ne spomenut, po svojoj čestoći možda i pojava sa samoga ruba jezika, jest takozvana PUČKA ETIMOLOGIJA, čiji je jezični učinak ponekad teško omeđiti, no njezino postojanje nitko ozbiljan ne osporava. Pučku etimologiju kao fenomen poznaju svi živi jezici svijeta i može se svrstati u takozvane *univerzalije* ljudskoga jezika. Spomenuti fenomen za koji njemački jezik rabi naziv *Volksetymologie*, engleski *popular etymology*; a francuski *étymologie populaire* bit će obrađen u ovome znanstvenom prilogu, koristeći pri tome njemačke posuđenice u hrvatskome jeziku.

Ferdinand de Saussure upućuje vrlo kratko na najvažnije osobine pučke etimologije u posmrtno objavljenoj zbirci njegovih predavanja *Cours de linguistique générale* u poglavlju *Linguistique Diachronique*¹⁰ gdje pučku etimologiju opisuje kao *sakaćenje* ili *unakaženje* (*déformation*) riječi i njoj vidi neku vrst *jezične patologije*. On pučku etimologiju još uspoređuje s analogijom (*analogie*), koja po njemu ima sličnosti s pučkom etimologijom, no ne uzrokuje *sakaćenje* riječi (*sans déformation*), rezultira racionalno objašnjive oblike za razliku od pučke etimologije koja je po njemu rezultat spleta često smiješnih slučajnosti. U nizu primjera iz francuskoga i njemačkoga jezika de Saussure potkrepljuje svoj stav ali pri tome u pučku etimologiju svrstava i slučajeve kao što su njem. *Abenteuer* 'avantura' (< fr. *aventure*) i *durchbläuen* 'premlatiti' (stvnj. *-bliuwan*), gdje je općim glasovnim promjenama a ne pojedinačnim i spontanim došlo do blagoga semantičkog naslanjanja na *Abend* 'večer' kod *Abenteuer* i jačega naslanjanja na *blau* 'plav, modar' kod glagola *durchbläuen* ('premlatiti koga tako da nastanu vidljive modrice'). Ova Saussureova stroga distinkcija na analogiju kao opći

⁹ U tretmanu orijentalizama su u Hrvata postojale dvije struje, ona starija od konca 16. do konca 19. stoljeća (od Vrančića do Šuleka), koja je osim manjega broja većinu orijentalizama smatrala stranim riječima, i ona mlađa struja na prijelomu 19. i 20. stoljeća hrvatskih Vukovaca (Maretić i drugi), koja je sve u narodnim pjesmama potvrđene orijentalizme tretirala kao integralni dio vlastitoga leksika.

¹⁰ Usp. de Saussure (1978: 238-241); njem. izdanje (1931, ²1967: 207-210)

fenomen (*phénomène générale*) i na 'pravu' pučku etimologiju kao 'sakaćenje' neke riječi¹¹ u analizi mojih primjera se pokazala vrlo nepraktičnom i neproduktivnom pa sam za svoje potrebe oba pojma pokušao tretirati kao jedan, stupnjujući dakako intenzitet pučke etimologije.

Njemački jezikoslovac Elmar Seebold u svojoj knjizi *Etymologie* iz 1981. obrađuje pučku etimologiju u poglavlju 'leksikalizacija i razjašnjenje' (*Lexikalisierung und Verdeutlichung*, str. 219-238) i svrstava ih u grupu *Nachdeutungen* ('tumačenja prema nekom uzoru, reeksplikacije') i još ih naziva 'sekundarna motivacija' (*Sekundärmotivation*). Prema Seeboldu (1981: 227-8) iz pučke etimologije proistječu različiti rezultati ili produkti, pa je stoga ishod u pravilu nepredvidiv. Za složenicu *Friedhof* (doslovno: 'dvoriste mira') 'groblje' kaže da je snagom pučke etimologije dobila zadovoljavajuće odnosno prihvatljivo značenje, jer je riječ prvotno stvnj. i srvnj. glasila *frīthof* i da bi se bez utjecaja pučke etimologije, uvažavajući kasniju glasovnu promjenu diftongizacije (13. i 14. stoljeće), pravilno razvio oblik **Freithof* koji u suvremenom njemačkom jeziku ne postoji. Pučka etimologija je djelovala u prvoj sastavnici složenice *frīt-* time što je došlo do naslanjanja na imenicu *Frieden* 'mir'. Sastavnica *frīt-* je u stvari oblik od glagola *frīten* 'štititi' i nema ništa s imenicom *Frieden*, čiji je oblik srvnj. glasio *vride* i *vrit* s kratkim /i/ koji nije podlijegao diftongizaciji. Prema Kretschmeru (1918, ²1969) *frīthof* je u srvnj. imao značenje 'ograđeno predvorje ispred neke veće zgrade', a za 'groblje' je u srednjem vijeku postojao drugi kasnije izumrli izraz: stvnj. i srvnj. *līhhof* koji bi da nije izumro danas glasio *Leichenhof* dakle 'dvoriste mrtvacu'. Da utjecaj pučke etimologije može imati i posve drugačiji razvoj s još uvijek donekle zadovoljavajućim ishodom, ilustrira drugi Seeboldov primjer imenice *Armbrust* 'samostrijel, arbalet', koja na prvi pogled izgleda kao bilo koja druga njemačka složenica sa sastavnicama *Arm* 'ruka' i *Brust* 'prsa'. Radi se u stvari o starijoj posuđenici iz latinskoga jezika *arcuballista*, koja je snagom pučke etimologije već srvnj. razvila u *armbrust*. Dvosložne njemačke složenice u pravilu je lako tumačiti jer su im sastavnice većinom motivirane ili providne, no to sa složenicom *Armbrust* ipak nije slučaj i suma *Arm + Brust* ne znači 'samostrijel ili arbalet'. Riječ je ipak sematički stabilna i ne zbunjuje govornike zbog svoje parcijalne motiviranosti, jer se u korištenju samostrijela koriste i prsa *Brust* i ruka *Arm*, iako možda preciznije šaka *Hand*. Sličan primjer ali s potpuno drugim ishodom navode lingvisti Boomfield i

¹¹ Nameće se dojam, čitajući Saussurea, da on ova dva pojma pomalo rangira, pa se analogija čini kao poželjna a 'prava' pučka etimologija kao slučajna i smiješna pa time gotovo i nepoželjna pojava. Koliki značaj daje distinkciji tih dvaju pojmova dokazuje i posljednja rečenica u navedenom poglavlju (1978: 241): *Ces deux phénomènes, si ressemblants par certains côtés, s'opposent dans leur essence; ils doivent être soigneusement distingués.* ('To su svakako dva fenomena, koji si možda s jedne strane /s neke strane, u neku ruku, nekako/ i nalikuju, u biti se suprotstavljaju /suprotni su/ jedan drugome i mora ih se strogo razlikovati.')

Onions¹² za engleski jezik s latinskom riječju *asparagus* ‘šparoga’. Latinsku su riječ Englezi posudili u 16. stoljeću u obliku *sparagus*, koja se u govornom jeziku snagom pučke etimologije razvila u složenicu *sparrowgrass*, dakle *sparrow* ‘vrabac’ i *grass* ‘trava’ ili ‘vrapčja trava’ što je očito stvaralo smetnje u komunikaciji i u 18. stoljeću riječ iščezava iz govora.

Pučku etimologiju bi se moglo definirati kao *više ili manje spontanu ili slučajnu oblikovnu preobrazbu neke strane ili zastarjele domaće riječi, ponekad i samo dijela riječi, čije izvorno značenje narod ne razumije, time što je glasovno a na taj način i sadržajno približi nekoj domaćoj ili bolje poznatoj riječi*. Dakako da je pučka etimologija kao fenomen vrlo česta u međujezičnim posuđbama, ali je njezino djelovanje jednako tako moguće i u okviru domaćega jezičnog blaga. Tako su naprimjer njemački ili bolje rečeno germanski dani u tjednu *Dienstag* ‘utorak’ i *Freitag* ‘petak’, koji su po tvorbi složenice, stoljetnim jezičnim razvojem u prvim satavnicama *Dienst-* i *Frei-* razvili oblike, koji su zbog pučkoetimologijskog naslanjanja na *Dienst* ‘služba’ i *frei* ‘slobodan’ uzrokovali potpuno drugačije tumačenje značenja navedenih složenica od onoga prvotnog. Polazeći od toga *Dienstag* se sada može tumačiti kao ‘dan službe’ ili ‘radni dan’, a *Freitag* kao ‘slobodan dan’. Izvorno je *Dienstag* bio posvećen germanskome bogu *Thingsusu* po uzoru na rimskoga boga *Marsa* (lat. *Martis dies*, fr. *mardi*, tal. *martedì*) od čega se razvio *Dienst-*, dok je *Freitag* (stvnj. *fríatag*) bio posvećen božici *Friji* po uzoru na rimsku *Veneru* (lat. *Veneris dies*, fr. *vendredi*, tal. *venerdì*) od čega se razvio *frei*.¹³

Već je na početku rečeno da je djelovanje pučke etimologije poznato u svim jezicima i da se pučka etimologija može svrstati u univerzalije ljudskoga jezika. Produkti pak pučke etimologije su vrlo različiti i tako nastali oblici mogu katkad imati za međuljudsku komunikaciju, kako će se ponuđenim primjerima i prikazati, zbunjujući pa ponekad čak i učinak zablude. Stoga standardni jezici najčešće ignoriraju a ponekad i progone riječi nastale pučkom etimologijom. Zbog svoje počesto humoristične igre riječi koja nastaje spontano, ponekad i nesvjesno, pučka je etimologija je važan i frekventan segment govornoga jezika, dok je u pisanome jeziku mnogo rjeđa pojava, osobito u pisanom jeziku obrazovanih ljudi.

2. Divergentnost pučke etimologije

¹² L. Bloomfield, *Language*, New York 1933; 13. izd., London, 1976. usp. s. 423.; C.T. Onions, *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, Oxford 1966. usp. s. 850.

¹³ Usp. Talanga (2000). *Deutsche Wochentagsnamen. Zagreber germanistische Beiträge* 9: 141-157.

2.1. Pomak u značenju djelovanjem pučke etimologije

Glagol razgovornoga jezika *lump(ov)ati* jest postnominalna tvorenica nastala u nas od posuđenice *Lump* kao bazne riječi koja na hrvatskome sjeveru živi i kao simpleks sa sačuvanim, gotovo identičnim, značenjem kao u njemačkome: 'luralica, odrpanac, klošar'. Značenje pak izvedenoga glagola *lump(ov)ati* nije kako bi se moglo očekivati, polazeći od bazne riječi *lump*, 'živjeti ili ponašati se kao luralica ili odrpanac'¹⁴ nego ima značenje otprilike: 'glasno pjevajući i galameći, osobito u kakvoj krčmi, uživati u alkoholu', 'pijančevati, bančiti'. Izvedeni se glagol očito snagom pučke etimologije naslonio na hrvatski glagol *lupati* i na taj način znatno promijenio značenje u odnosu na baznu riječ *lump*. S tom promjenom značenja u svezi je i pomak značenja posuđene njemačke sufiksne izvedenice *lumperaj* (njem. *Lumperei*) pa danas znači, slično kao i *lumpati*, 'pijančevanje, bančevanje' za razliku od prvotnoga značenja u njemačkome jeziku gdje znači 'prijevera', 'prostačko nedjelo' ili 'huncutarija'. Pučka etimologija nema utjecaja na već spomenuti simpleks *lump* kao niti na također posuđenu složenicu *lumpenproletarijat* prema njem. *Lumpenproletariat* (također *lumpenproleter* prema njem. *Lumpenproletarier*), koju je u 19. stoljeću skovao Karl Marx a čija prva (determinativna) sastavnica *Lumpen-* postoji i kao simpleks (plurale tantum) a ima značenje 'poderana odjeća, dronjci' (njem. *Lumpen*). *Lump(ov)ati* i *lumperaj* su izrazi hrv. razg. jezika a navode ih svi moderni rječnici hrvatskoga jezika.

Klaić (1979: 871) i Skok (1971: II. 408) navode posuđenicu *merkati* 'gledati, motriti' prema njemačkome *merken*. Glagol *merkati* je u hrvatskome jeziku snagom pučke etimologije promijenio glagolski vid (aspekt) i od svršenog (perfektivnog) značenja u njemačkome jeziku (*merken* = 'vidjeti, zapaziti') dobio nesvršeno (durativno) značenje u hrvatskome jeziku 'gledati, motriti'. Naslanjanje se dogodilo u finalnom dijelu osnove *-ka(ti)* i taj je oblik analogijom izravno naslonjen na hrvatski sufiks *-ka(ti)*, koji u hrvatskome služi za tvorbu jednoga tipa durativnih ili preciznije iterativnih glagola.

Njemačka se riječ *Bund* 'savez' pojavljuje u hrvatskome od 16. stoljeća, a bilježe je svi rječnici od Habelića¹⁵ na ovamo u obliku *punta*. Od samoga početka *punta* ima značenje 'pobuna, ustanak' (njem. 'Aufruhr'), a budući se istovremeno pojavljuju izvedeni oblici drugih vrsta riječi s istovjetnim temeljnim značenjem (*puntati/puntariti* 'aufwiegen', *puntarenje* 'das Aufwiegen', *puntarija*¹⁶/*puntarstvo* 'Aufwieglung, Rebellion', *puntar/puntarica* 'Auf-

¹⁴ Otprilike ovo značenje prema Wahrigu (1986: 849) ima njem. glagol razg. jezika *lumpen*. Ovaj neprelazni glagol je postnominalna tvorenica nultoga morfema od već spomenute bazne riječi *Lump*.

¹⁵ Habelić, Juraj: *Dictionar ili Rechi Szlovenske*. Graz 1670.

¹⁶ *puntarija* je na primjer prema AR XII.672-3 prvi put zabilježena godine 1578.

rührerin', *puntarski* 'aufrührerisch') za pretpostaviti je da je *punta* kao bazna po-suđenica i nešto starija od naših prvih izvora. Koncem 18. stoljeća se pojavljuje oblik *bunt*, koji tijekom 19. stoljeća istiskuje sve oblike s inicijalnim p- i svi odreda postaju jezični historizmi.¹⁷ Glasovni razvoj od njem. *Bund* u hrv. *punta* je relativno lako objašnjiv jer većina posuđenica s južnonjemačkoga prostora s inicijalnim b-, koje su posuđene usmenim posredovanjem, imaju u hrvatskome p- (njem. *Bauer* > hrv. *paor*, njem. *Blech* > hrv. *pleh*, njem. *Beiz(e)* > hrv. *pac*). Njemačka glasovna skupina /-nd/ (u izgovoru [nt]) nije u hrvatskome uobičajena, pa se razvije ili medijalna (*Bank* > *banak*, *Gang* > *ganak*) ili finalna samoglasnička epenteza (*Grind* > *grinta*). Ipak se postavlja pitanje kako je došlo do toga da se pored oblika *punta* pojavi koncem 18. stoljeća i oblik s b- kao *bunt*, koji je glasovno bliži izvornome obliku, i da u sljedećih pedesetak godina potpuno istisne preko dva stoljeća star oblik *punta*? Prvo bi objašnjenje moglo biti korektivni utjecaj njemačkoga pisanog jezika, no to je ipak manje vjerojatno jer su značenja u hrvatskome ('pobuna, ustanak, protest') i njemačkome ('savez') različita. Druga je mogućnost ipak vjerojatnija, da je naime pučkom etimologijom došlo do utjecaja hrv. riječi *buna* i *buniti* (*se*), jer se u tome slučaju poklapa i formalna strana preu-zimanjem inicijalnoga b- od *buna* i semantička razina s vrlo bliskim znače-njem. Utjecaju njemačkoga *Bund* bi se eventualno mogao pripisati oblikovni dočetak riječi s -nt *bunt* za razliku od -nta u *punta* jer bismo inače imali oblik **bunta* (< *punta*), ako taj utjecaj isključimo. Za pretpostaviti je da je *punta* od samoga početka stajala pod jakim semantičkim utjecajem hrv. riječi *buna* i da je tek kasnije dovršen onaj formalni utjecaj pučke etimologije¹⁸. Od imenice *bunt* su izvedene sljedeće riječi: *buntovan*, *buntovnik*, *buntovnički*. Kako vidimo nedostaje izvedeni glagol. Hrvatski normativisti vide u obliku *bunt* konkurenta obliku *buna/pobuna/prosvjed* i preporučuju ove druge likove na što se osobito hrvatski razgovorni ne obazire mnogo, budući su *bunt* i od njega izvedene riječi vrlo frekventne zbog svoje ekspresivnosti.¹⁹ Natuknicu *punta* i/ili njezine pojedine izvedenice navode: Habelić (1670), Vitezović, (1708, ostao u rukopisu), Belostenec (1740, nastao oko 1670), Jambrešić (1742), Voltić (1803) itd. Natuknicu *bunt* navode rječnici od sredine 19. stoljeća do danas.

Rječnik stranih riječi Bratoljuba Klaića navodi natuknicu *vozmajstor* (1979: 1432) i tumači je kao 'čistač zahoda, ispražnjivač zahodskih jama' s napomenom da je nastala od njemačke riječi *Wasenmeister* za koju

¹⁷ Bogoslav Šulek u svojem njemačko-hrvatskome rječniku (1866) navodi kao jedan od posljednjih *punta*. Njemačku natuknicu *Aufwieglung* on tumači s: *buna* i *punta*.

¹⁸ Neki istrživači tumače i ženski rod imenice *punta* kao pučkoetimologijski utjecaj od *buna* (f.), što je vrlo prihvatljivo: usp.: Skok (1971: 1.237), Strieder-Temps (1958: 107).

¹⁹ S. Pavešić, *Jezični savjetnik*, Zagreb (1971: 46); V. Anić, *Rječnik hrvatskoga jezika* (RHJ), (1994: 74); Rječnik hrvatskoga jezika. (2000: 112). Svi *bunt* markiraju s 'razgovorni jezik'.

Šamšalović (1971: 1033) navodi značenje ‘strvoder, živoder’. Prvi dio posuđenice *voz-* (njem. *Wasen-*) naslonjen je pučkom etimologijom na hrvatski glagol *voziti*, a sam proces naslanjanja je relativno lako objašnjiv. Većina posuđenica s južnonjemačkoga prostora s naglašenim [a, a:] u sredini riječi, koje su posuđene usmenim posredovanjem, imaju u hrvatskome u pravilu [o, o:] jer je to osobina južnonjemačkih govora. Intervokalni [s] s druge strane izgovara se njem. u ovome slučaju zvučno tj. kao [z] pa tako nastane hrv. *voz-*. Drugi dio *-Meister* je supstituiran u hrvatskome češćim istoznačnim oblikom *majstor*. Po Klaiću (ibidem) je izraz *vozmajstor* razvio i dodatno, od prvoga potpuno različito značenje: ‘vođa puta neke skupine vojnika ili đaka’. Ovo drugo značenje izraza *vozmajstor* više nema semantički nikakve veze s njemačkom riječi *Wasenmeister* jer polazi isključivo od hrvatskoga značenja pojedinih sastavnica ove složenice.

2.2. *Komunikativne smetnje i zablude uzrokovane formalnim naslanjanjem na neku hrvatsku riječ*

Kod natuknice *Zeperl-Polka*, nastale prema vroclovskome skladatelju Bogumilu Zepleru iz 19. st., Klaić (1979: 1445) upućuje na srodni sporedni oblik nastao pučkom etimologijom *cipel-polka*, koji je zbog popularnosti plesa bio frekventan i uobičajen u hrvatskome jeziku u vrijeme Austro-Ugarske na prijelomu stoljeća. Glasovno preoblikovanje disimilacijom glasa r od *Zeperl-* u *cepel-*, koje Klaić također navodi (*cepel-polka*), pospješilo je zbog glasovne blizine s hrvatskom riječju *cipela* pučkoetimologijsko naslanjanje na nju, a time i jače semantičko udaljavanje od izvorne riječi *Zeperl-Polka*, pa u toj novoj polusloženici polku više ne određuje skladatelj *Zepler* nego predmet *cipela*. Budući se pak radi o povijesnome i danas već potpuno nepoznatom pomodnom izrazu govornoga jezika, koji se rabio pored regularnoga izvornog njemačkog izraza *Zeperl-Polka*, izraz *cipel-polka* nije svrstan u grupu riječi s pomakom u značenju (II.1).

Od njem. riječi *Filzlaus* (lat. *Phthirius pubis*, hrv. *stidna uš*) nastao je u nas u govornome jeziku glasovnom prilagodbom oblik *picajzl(a)*. Glasovna prilagodba prvoga dijela ove inače njem. složenice je relativno providna i može se tumačiti na sljedeći način: supstitucija njem. *f* u hrv. *p* je uobičajena budući da hrvatski kao i svi ostali slavenski jezici ne poznaje fonem /f/ u smislu historijske gramatike i u inicijalnome položaju ga najčešće nadomješćuje glasovima /v/ ili /p/. Glasovna grupa *-lc-* je pak hrvatskome jeziku strana i disimilacijom je pojednostavljena u *-c* i tako je nastalo *pic-* umjesto *Filz-*. Glasovna prilagodba druge sastavnice *-laus* u *-ajzl* je nejasna, ali bi se možda mogla tumačiti kao analogija mnogobrojnih njemačkih posuđenica na *-ajzl* ili *-ajzn*: *štemajzl*, *širajzl*, *lohajzl* itd. Prvi dio izraza *picajzl* t.j. *pica-* stvara komunikacijske smetnje jer je istozvučan s hrvatskom riječju *pica* sa značenjem ‘vagina’. Riječ *picajzl* je u govornome jeziku

dotatno razvila i preneseno značenje: ‘dosadan i nametljiv čovjek, gnjavator’. Riječ navode: Klaić (1979: 1041), Anić (1991, ³1998: 661), Anić i Goldstein (1999: 988) i RHJ Leksikografskoga zavoda (2000: 825).

Riječ *sise* u značenju ‘kuhano dizano tijesto servirano s kompotom’ ne navodi kao natuknicu niti jedan hrvatski rječnik. Ova vrst deserta i sam izraz su prema mojim saznanjima rašireni jedino na hrvatskome sjeveroistoku t.j. u istočnoj Slavoniji. Riječ *sise* ima po svemu sudeći svoje ishodište u njemačkoj riječi *Süßes* a posrednici su vjerojatno podunavske Švabe, čije su žene u ovim krajevima na daleko bile poznate po pripremanju vrsnih slastica i kolača, tim više što su oni sami imali ovu vrst deserta i zvali ga *sises* [si:səs]. Dizano tijesto spomenutoga deserta ima oblik ženskih grudi, pa budući se one u hrvatskome govornom jeziku zovu *sise* bila su otvorena vrata pučkoj etimologiji. Poklopile su se slučajno dvije stvari, naime formalno-jezična istozvučnost s hrvatskom riječju *sise* ‘grudi’ s jedne strane i oblik dizanoga tijesta koji podsjeća na ženske grudi s druge strane. Iako je izraz za ovu vrst slastice *sise* raširen na vrlo ograničenom prostoru hrvatskoga jezika, on je vrlo upečatljiv primjer pučke etimologije s vrlo jakim konotativnim nabojem a time i komu-nikativnim smetnjama, jer se izraz *sise* u smislu ‘ženske grudi’ isključivo rabi u govornome jeziku pa kao takav, za razliku od književnoga izraza *grudi*, ima veću ekspresivnost i time još intenzivnije opterećuje regionalizam *sise* u značenju navedene slastice.

Od sintagme *bei Wache* ‘pod stražom’ razvio se, po svemu sudeći među hrvatskim vojnicima Austro-ugarske monarhije, pohrvaćeni oblik *bajbok*, *bajbuk*, a dodavanjem dočetka *-ana* i oblik *bajbokana* sa značenjem ‘zatvor, pritvor’.²⁰ Polazna osnova bi mogla biti spomenuta sintagma *bei Wache* u austrijskom regionalnom izgovoru [ˈbae ˈvɔx], pa budući da se njem. fonem /v/ u hrvatskome jeziku u postupku fonoadaptacije u inicijalnome položaju često pretvara u /b/, finalni njem. /h/ u hrv. /k/,²¹ a sve usmenim putem posuđene njem. riječi s naglašenim njem. (austr.) [a] u hrvatskome pokazuju [o], dobijemo potvrđeni oblik *bajbok* odnosno *bajbuk*. Pojam *buhara* (ponekad među štokavcima i *buvara*) koji ima istovjetnu uporabnu vrijednost kao i *bajbok/bajbuk* i *bajbokana* upućuje na to da je postojao i nepotvrđeni oblik **bajboh/bajbuh* od kojega se pučkoetimologijskim naslanjanjem na hrv. riječ *buha*, izostavljanjem prvoga dijela *baj-* i sufiksalsnom parentezom *-ara*, razvio oblik *buhara*. Izraz *buhara* kao ostali gore navedeni izrazi istovjetna značenja

²⁰ V. Anić u svojem hrvatskom rječniku (1994) markira navedeni oblik *bajbuk/bajbok* po mojem mišljenju krivo kao orijentalizam, jer ne postoji odgovarajući oblik orijentalnoga supstrata/superstrata od kojega bi se *bajbok* mogao izvesti. Hrvatski rječnik Leks. zavoda (2000: 50) navodi njemački kao izvor.

²¹ usporedi: v > b : njem. *Wirtshaus* > hrv. *bircaus*, njem. *Weiher* > hrv. *bajer*, njem. *Zuwaage* > hrv. *cu**b**ok* itd., ili h > k : njem. *Schreibbuch* > hrv. *š**l**ajbok/š**l**ajbuk*, njem. (bav.-aust.) *Fürtuch* > hrv. *fer**t**uk/fer**t**un/fer**t**uš/fer**t**of*.

rabe se isključivo u govornome jeziku s humoristično-ekspresivnom konotacijom.²² Zanimljivu je sudbinu na hrvatskome jugu doživjela talijanska riječ *prigione* ‘zatvor’ jer je naslonivši se na hrvatski glagol *pržiti* u postupku glasovne prilagodbe nastala u govornome jeziku riječ *pržun* slične uporabne vrijednosti i značenja kao i gore navedeni izrazi s njemačkom osnovom. U slučaju *buhara* i *pržun* vidljiv je učinak pučke etimologije koja ovdje funkcionira kao ne baš rado viđen pospješivač integracije posuđenica, pa tako nastali izrazi najčešće ostaju na rubu jezika-primatelja i rijetko postanu sastavnim dijelom standardnoga jezika.

Prema Skoku (1971: I.182) je posuđenica *boginje* kao plurale tantum od njem. *Pocken* potvrđena u hrvatskome jeziku u 17. stoljeću (kod Mikalje²³). U postupku fonoadaptacije došlo je do pučkoetimologijskoga naslanjanja na hrvatsku riječ *boginja*. Budući da austrijsko-bavarska narječja vrlo slabo ili nikako ne aspiriraju bezvučne eksplozive, prijelaz je između bezvučnih [p, t, k] i zvučnih [b, d, g] vrlo fluidan, tako da je usmenim posredovanjem u hrvatskome moguć (nepotvrđeni) oblik **bogen* od njem. *Pocken* od kojega se kasnije razvio oblik *boginje*. Otprilike u isto vrijeme postoje potvrde (kod Belostenca) vrlo zanimljivoga doslovnog prijevoda (kalka) njemačke riječi *Pocken* kao *koze*, *kozice* (kasnije i *kozjače*), koji pretpostavlja njemačku riječ *Bock-* ‘jarac-kozle’, a ne *Pocken*. Riječ *Pocken* inače nema nikakove srodnosti niti semantičke niti etimologijske s riječju *Bock*, pa se prijevod očito u nas ravnao prema pučkoetimologijskom tumačenju polazeći od izgovora s inicijalnim [b] dakle *Bocken*²⁴ umjesto s [p] *Pocken* i došlo je do naslanjanja na *Bock* ‘kozle, jarac’. Iako su nastali pučkoetimologijskim naslanjanjem, izrazi *boginje* i *kozice* su kao pluralia tantum postale sastavnim dijelom hrvatskoga standardnog jezika i navode ih svi rječnici od 17. stoljeća do danas.

Posuđenica *bivol* (lat. *bubalus*) je u svojem drugom dijelu snažno naslonjena na hrvatsku riječ *vol*. Prema AR (I.555-7) i prema Skoku (1971: I.164) postoje u hrvatskome potvrde za *bivol* već iz 15. i 16. stoljeća.²⁵ Prema Klugeu (1975: 109) je ova životinja u Europi (sjeverna Italija) poznata od oko 600. godine poslije Krista i prve potvrde njezina imena se u njem. jeziku pojavljuju nakon 1300. god. u obliku *büffel* (< fr. *buffle*). Po svemu sudeći njemački jezik ipak nije bio posrednik iako bi se njegov oblik zbog glasovne bliskosti lakoćom mogao pretpostaviti kao izvor. Protiv njemačkoga kao izvora za hrvatski *bivol* govore kultuno-povijesni podatci. Njemački je naime

²² Izraz *buhara* navode Klaić (1979: 136) i Hrvatski rječnik Leks. zavoda (2000: 109).

²³ Mikalja, Jakov: *Blago jezika slovinskoga ili slovník*. Loreto-Ankona, 1651.

²⁴ I u njem. se jeziku toga vremena često (osobito na jugu) pisalo *Bocken* umjesto *Pocken*.

²⁵ I prvi hrvatski (petojezični) rječnik Fausta Vrančića iz godine 1595. bilježi u hrvatskome stupcu *bivol* (lat. *bubalus*, njem. *Büffel*, tal. *buffalo*, mađ. *bival*).

oblik *Büffel* posudio tek početkom 14. stoljeća, dok je mađarski svoj oblik *bivaly* posudio iz slavenskih jezika već u 13. stoljeću. Osim toga postoje još stariji rusko-crkvenoslavenski oblici koji reflektiraju već potpuno slavenizirane oblike: *быволъ* (Skok (1971: I.164); Miklosich (1886: 27)). Drugim riječima su stare slavenizirane potvrde, koje su sve do jedne pučkoetimologijski snažno naslonjene na *vol*, starije od njemačkoga oblika posuđena iz francuskoga jezika. Prema Skoku su Slaveni riječ posudili iz balkanorumunjskoga (rum. *bivol*), pri čemu je na primjer u staroruskome, osim naslanjanja na *vol* u drugome dijelu riječi, došlo do pučkoetimologijskoga naslanjanja i u prvome dijelu riječi, pa tako staroruski oblik *bujvol* naslanja prvi dio na *bujъ*²⁶ 'divlji' i time nudi tumačenje 'divlji vol'. Kod riječi *bivol* i danas se osjeća jaka naslonjenost na hrvatski *vol*, pa često dolazi do pučkoetimologijskoga tumačenja i zablude među neupućenima, jer se ne radi o vrsti *vola* nego o vrsti *goveda*.

Posuđenica *kurva* prema njem. *Kurve* (< lat. *curvus*) je od samoga početka bila u tešku položaju u hrvatskome jeziku, jer je istozvučnica s hrvatskom riječju 'kurva'. Riječ je kao simpleks služila kao stručni izraz za potrebe zemljopisnih i topografskih karata ali ju je istisnuo hrvatski neologizam *krivulja*. U suvremenome hrvatskom jeziku nalazimo je još kao sastavnicu dvočlane složenice *kurvimetar* (< njem. *Kurvimeter*) što potvrđuje i Anić-Goldsteinov Rječnik stranih riječi (1999: 752).

2.3. Slabo naslanjanje ili istozvučnost s nekom hrvatskom riječi

Schneeweis (1960: 139) i Striedter-Temps (1958: 149) navode za hrvatski jezik posuđenicu *križbam* prema njem. *Kristbaum* koja je u svojem prvom dijelu slabo naslonjena na hrvatsku riječ *križ*. Glasovnom prilagodbom posuđenice *križbam* došlo je po mojem mišljenju slučajno do naslanjanja na hrvatsku riječ *križ* jer je očito polazni njemački oblik dijalektalna riječ *['krištbaom] s medijalnom palatalizacijom [št] umjesto [st] što nije uobičajeno u njemačkome standardnom jeziku.²⁷ Glasovna prilagodba riječi *križbam* je u hrvatskome jeziku vjerojatno protekla na sljedeći način:

njem. *['krištbaom] hrv. **kriš_baum* disimilacija²⁸ suglasnika t

²⁶ Usp. hrvatski: *bujati*, *bujna* trava.

²⁷ Striedter-Temps (149) navodi potvrdu takovoga dijalektalnog oblika ['krišbam] u Štajerskoj, no mogla bi se uvažiti i druga narječja u kojima je šibilarizacija suglasničkih skupina *st* i *sp* puno izrazitija u medijalnome (i finalnom) položaju nego ona u Štajerskoj, pri čemu treba spomenuti alemansko-švapsko narječje koje zbog geografskih razloga u ovome slučaju ne dolazi u obzir, pa bi se narječje podunavskih Švaba moglo smatrati posrednikom navedenoga oblika.

²⁸ Vrlo često kod njem. posuđenica s tročlanim suglasničkim skupinama; usp.: njem. *Trinkgeld* > hrv. *tringelt* 'napojnica'.

hrv. **križbaum*
hrv. *križbam*regresivna asimilacija²⁹ šb > žb
monoftongizacija³⁰ au > a

Uzmemo li pak njem. standardni izgovor riječi *Kristbaum* ['kristbaom] kao polaznu osnovu, glasovnom bi prilagodbom u hrvatskome nastao drugačiji oblik:

njem. ['kristbaom] hrv. **kris_baum*
hrv. **krizbaum*
hrv. *krizbam*disimilacija suglasnika t
regresivna asimilacija sb > zb
monoftongizacija au > a

Prema Klaiću (ibidem) postoji stvarno takav oblik *krizban*, koji nije naslonjen na hrvatsku riječ *križ*, no u obliku *krizban* je u odnosu na njemačku izvornu riječ *Kristbaum* ['kristbaom] došlo do pojedostavljanja bilabijalnoga nazala /m/ u dentalno-alveolarni nazal /n/³¹, što među njemačkim posuđenicama u finalnome položaju nije rijetko (njem. *Maibaum* > hrv. *majpan*, *majpam*). Od svih navedenih oblika Klaić i Anić-Goldstein (1999: 739) prednost ipak daju glasovno poluprilagođenome obliku *krizbaum*.

Već u Belostenca potvrđena posuđenica *mužar* (i *možar*) slabo je (samo glasovno) naslonjena na hrvatski *muž* 'suprug' ili arhaično i u narječjima 'muškarac'. Riječ je posuđena iz mađarskoga (*mozsár*)³² koju je ovaj prije toga posudio iz njemačkoga jezika *Mörser* (< lat. *mortarium*). Posuđenica *mužar* razlikuje u hrvatskome oba značenja uobičajena u njemačkome i mađarskome jeziku: 1. uporabni predmet u domaćinstvu 'stupa, avan' i 2. vrst manjega topa (i vrst puške). Za ovo drugo značenje (vrst topa) Hrvati su kasnije izravno iz njemačkoga posudili i oblik *merzer* (< njem. *Mörser*) koji danas polako zastarijeva.³³ Pa iako je neupitna istozvučnost prvoga dijela posuđenice *muž-ar* s hrv. riječju *muž*, izvorni govornici hrvatskoga jezika ne osjećaju semantičku naslonjenost riječi *mužar* na hrvatski *muž*.

Njemačka posuđenica *krmenadla* prema bav.-austr. *Karmenadl*³⁴ (< fr. *carbonnade*) pokazuje istozvučnost u svojem prvom dijelu s hrvatskom riječju *krme* od koje je izveden oblik *krmača*. Ovdje ne može biti riječi o

²⁹ U takovim dodirima je regresivna asimilacija u hrvatskome jeziku pravilo.

³⁰ Hrvatski jezik osim u nekim stranim riječima ne posjeduje dvoglas (diftonge) u svojem inventaru samoglasnika.

³¹ Radi se o nekoj vrsti disimilacije, budući da i prethodni b (p) i finalni m imaju zajedničko mjesto artikulacije (bilabijalni, dvousnjeni samoglasnici), dakle b+vok+m > b+vok+n.

³² Usp. Hadrovics (1985: 369-370).

³³ Tomislav Ladan misli da je *mužar* u hrvatskome bolje integriran (pohrvaćen, kroatiziran) nego riječ *merzer*, koju on svrstava među tuđice, iako su obje istoga podrijetla (2000: 482).

³⁴ Usp. Andreas Schmeller (1939, svezak I: 1292).

pučkoetimologijskoj naslonjenosti na *krme*, tim više što prema Anić-Goldsteinu (1999: 655) postoji oblik *karmenadl(a)*, jednake ili slične uporabne vrijednosti i frekventnosti kao i *krmenadla*, a ne pokazuje istozvučnost s hrvatskom riječju *krme* i bliži je njemačkome izvornom obliku.³⁵

Posuđenica *griz* prema njem. *Grieß* ['gri:s] istozvučna je s hrv. Izvedenicom nultoga morfema *griz* (od *gristi* prema prezentu *grizem*, *grizeš*...). Na prvi pogled se može steći dojam da je posuđenica *griz* zbog adaptiranoga zvučnog [z] umjesto njemačkoga bezzvučnog [s] *Grieß* ['gri:s] naslonjena na svoju hrvatsku istozvučnicu *griz*, no o tome nema ni govora, jer na semantičkoj razini nije došlo niti do miješanja niti do bilo kakovoga doticaja dviju istozvučnica. Kod adaptacije od njem. [s] u hrv. [z] se više radi o pravilu glasovne prilagodbe njemačkih posuđenica s finalnim [s] koje u hrvatskome jeziku dobivaju oblike sa zvučnim [z]:³⁶ *bircauz* prema njem. *Wirtshaus*, *firnajz* prema njem.-bav. *Firneis*, *paradajz* prema austr. *Paradeis*, *melšpajz* prema njem. *Mehlspeis(e)* itd.

2.4. Pučka etimologija i pseudogenetska srodnost

AR (XII: 499) i Skok (1971 III: 57) bilježe i tumače vrlo frekventnu riječ *prsluk* a za umanjenicu *prslučić* bilježe da je pučki izraz za 'grudnjak'. *Prsluk* je danas riječ hrvatskoga standardnog jezika pa ga na primjer Anić u svojem rječniku ne markira kao posuđenicu. Skok (ibidem) za riječ *Prsluk* pretpostavlja mađarsko posredovanje (mađ. *pruszlik*) njem.-švap. riječi *Brustfleck*³⁷ i upozorava na zanimljivo 'turbiziranje' posuđenice *-lik* > *-luk*. Turski dočetak *-luk* je na razini osobito govornoga jezika nekih hrvatskih regija postao produktivan pa se u izvedenicama pojavljuju hrvatske i poneke strane riječi neorijentalnoga postanja kao derivacijske baze: *nestašluk*, *bezobrazluk*, *kukavičluk*, *privatluk*, *lopovluk* itd. Schneeweis (ibidem 18) i Striedter-Temps (ibidem 178) ne spominju mađarsko posredovanje za *prsluk*, no upozoravaju na prilagodbu *-luk* u drugome dijelu posuđenice i na prilagodbu njem. riječi *Brust-* u hrv. *prsl(-luk)* u prvome dijelu motiviranu

³⁵ Kao osamnaestgodišnjak sam u Zagrebu o izrazu *karmenadl* čuo zanimljivo pučkoetimologijsko tumačenje koje sadrži puno slučajnosti i intelektualiziranoga humora, kad je našoj, vrlo obrazovanoj susjedi, umro muž i poslije pokopa prilikom ukopnoga objeda ili *karmina* kako ga još zovemo, dotična susjeda servirala pečeni *karmenadl* i to opravdavala time da *karmenadl* ima jezično nekakove veze s *karminama* i da ga za *karmine* treba servirati, pa kad je još i dodala da *karmenadl* i *karmine* imaju nekakove jezične skopčanosti i s latinskom riječju *carmen* ('pjesma') i da na *karminama* ne treba biti žalostan nego se radovati životu, prolomio se grohatan smijeh za kojim je ožalošćena gospoda očito i čeznula.

³⁶ Usp. Striedter-Temps (1958: 61).

³⁷ Usp.: Hermann Fischer (1904-1936: I 1479).

pučkom etimologijom prema hrvatskoj riječi *prsa*³⁸. Ovdje traba napomenuti da se formalno-jezičnom prilagodbom slučajno ispreplela i semantička podudarnost riječi *Brust* i *prs(a)*, no da se radi i o staroj indoeuropskoj genetskoj srodnosti dviju riječi, kako se to na prvi pogled čini, nisam pronašao uporište u dostupnoj stručnoj literaturi. Njemačka odnosno germanska riječ *Brust* se prema Kluge-u (1975: 105) izvodi od indoeuropskoga praoblika **bhreus-* ‘bujati, rasti, nabreknuti’, dok se hrvatski odnosno slavenski oblik *prs(a)* prema Gluhaku (1993: 506) izvodi od indoeuropskoga praoblika **perk* sa značenjem ‘rebro’ odnosno ‘prsa’.

Slične sudbine kao i riječ *prsluk* jest i njemačka posuđenica *pekar* (< njem. *Bäcker*) koja se naslonila na hrvatski glagol *peći* odnosno na njegov prošli particip aktiva *pek-ao* (glagolski prilog radni) ili na prezentski oblik 3. lica množine *peku*, i danas je izraz hrvatskoga standardnog jezika. Riječ *pekar* je prema Skoku (II.628) potvrđena već u 17. i 18. stoljeću, a naslijedila je stariju njemačku posuđenicu srodna postanja *pek* (< njem. *Beck* †) koja je prema Mažuraniću (1975: I. 909) potvrđena 1360. godine u pojašnjavajućim složenicama *hlebopek* i *pekohljeb* sa značenjem ‘pistor panis’³⁹. Glasovnom prilagodbom od njem. *Bäcker* u hrv. *pekar* došlo je do semantičkoga naslanjanja motiviranog pučkom etimologijom na hrvatski glagol *peći*, koji slučajno ima slično značenje kao i njemački glagol *backen*, pa je na taj način iščezao svaki trag posudbe iz njem. jezika.⁴⁰ Izvorni govornici hrvatskoga jezika riječ *pekar* ne osjećaju kao posuđenicu i većina bi bila iznenađena kada bi ih se nešto u svezi s tim upitalo. Da se kod riječi *pekar* radi o besprijeckorno uspjeljoj integraciji u hrvatski jezik, svjedoči i činjenica da nitko od naših leksikografa osim Skoka (II, 628) ne markira imenicu *pekar* kao naslonjenicu ili prekovanicu njemačke riječi *Bäcker*. Čak i najveći hrvatski autoritet za tvorbu riječi Stjepan Babić kod sufiksalne tvorbe na –ār (1986: 355) navodi da je izvedenica *pekar* nastala od prezentske osnove glagola *peći*. Njemački *backen* i hrvatski *peći* pokazuju izvjesnu glasovnu i semantičku bliskost, no nema ni govora o tome da se radi i o staroj indoeuropskoj genetskoj srodnosti. Za *backen* se navodi pragermanski oblik **bakō* koji odgovara ie. obliku **bhǵō* s temeljnim značenjem ‘zagrijati’ s potvrdom npr. u grčkome *phōgō*

³⁸ Kod natuknice *prsluk* Skok ne spominje naslanjanje na *prsa*, no ipak to čini kod obrade dočetka –*luk* (1971: II 328).

³⁹ Mažuranić (1975: 306) navodi lekseme-konkurentne riječi *pekar* potvrđene u Zagrebu u 15. st.: *fištar*, *fišter* prema njem. *Pfister* (lat. *pistor*), a i prvi hrvatski rječnik (petojezični) Fausta Vrančića iz godine 1595. navodi za lat. *pistor* hrv. *pećar* (*pechyar*) što je po tvorbi denominalna sufiksalna izvedenica od osnove *peć*. Za lat *pistor* Vrančić navodi u njem. stupcu *Pfister* i *brotbeckh*.

⁴⁰ Skok (1971: II 628) polazi od toga da je prvo integrirana starija njem. posuđenica *pek* (< njem. *Beck*) pa je kasnije od njezine osnove izvedena radna imenica *pekar* od koje su potom izvedene ostale riječi s istom osnovom: *pekar(n)a*, *pekarski*, *pekarov*, *pekarica* itd. Ova Skokova postavka zvuči vrlo uvjerljivo.

‘pržim’. Za *peći* se navodi praslav. oblik **pekti* koji odgovara ie. obliku **pekw-* s odgovarajućim etimologijskim potvrdama u većini ie. jezika.

2.5. Neologizmi opterećeni pučkom etimologijom

Prema njemačkoj složenici *Auspufftopf* su u hrvatskome govornom jeziku nastala najmanje tri oblika koje se može okarakterizirati kao parcijalne posuđenice ili prekovanice. Prvi oblik *auspuf* (Klaić 1979: 122) je parcijalna posuđenica budući je posuđena samo prva (determinirajuća) sastavnica *Auspuff-*. Drugi oblik ***auspuh*** (Klaić 1979: 122; Anić-Goldstein 1999: 130) je doživio glasovnu adaptaciju u finalnom položaju *f > h* pa je na taj način došlo do pučkoetimologijskoga naslanjanja na hrvatski glagol *puhati*. Treći oblik *ispuh*, koji je naknadni razvoj drugoga oblika (*auspuh*), nastao je tako što je njem. *aus-* jednostavno preveden s hrv. *iz (is-)* pa je stvoren ‘pravi hrvatski’ oblik *ispuh* koji se rabi i u pisanome jeziku. Oblik *ispuh* je nastao kako je prikazano u dvije faze i ima formalno gledajući u hrvatskome jeziku sve osobine izvedenice nultoga morfema prema hrv. glagolu *ispuhati* kao tvorbenoj osnovi. U hrvatskome standardnom jeziku je danas za njemački *Auspufftopf* više uobičajena sintagma *ispušni lonac* čiji je atribut *ispušni* nastao od gore navedene prekovanice *ispuh*.

Sličan razvojni put kao i *ispuh* imala je i riječ *izlog*, čiji je uzor nedvojbeno njemačka riječ *Auslage*, a danas je u potpunosti integrirana u hrvatski standardni jezik. Polazna osnova je po svemu sudeći bio južnonjemački izgovor [‘aoslāk] iz koje se u nas razvio, danas već rijedak, fonoadaptirani oblik *auzlog*⁴¹ sa zvučnim [z] umjesto bezzvučnoga [s] uobičajena u njemačkome jeziku u toj poziciji (na granici morfema). Drugi dio posuđenice *-log* se pučkoetimologijski naslonio na hrvatski glagolski par *izložiti-izlagati*⁴², koji slučajno ima slično značenje a time i sličnu kolokaciju kao i njemački odgovarajući oblici. Njemačke i hrvatske temeljne riječi i njihovi leksikologijski srodnici *lieg(en)*, *leg(en)*, *Lag(e)*, *Lag(er)* odnosno *leći*, *lež(ati)*, *lijeg(ati)*, *leg(lo)*, *lež(aj)*, *(iz)ložiti*, *(iz)lagati* ne pokazuju samo zbunjujuće veliku sličnost na glasovnoj i semantičkoj razini, nego odražavaju i raznolikost stare genetske srodnosti indoeuropskih jezika. Ie. praoblik glasi **legh-* i ima potvrde u svim ie. jezicima na zapadu, a za potvrde je karakteristično, uvažavajući i naše navedene etimone, da imaju više različitih

⁴¹ Klaić (1979: 127) navodi za stari Zagreb oblik *auzlag* s *a* (-lag) koji očito potječe iz njemačkoga standardnog jezika ili je možda pod njegovim utjecajem korigiran stariji i češći oblik *auzlog*. Druga ali manje vjerojatna mogućnost jest da u obliku *auzlag* već imamo posla s pučkoetimologijskim naslanjanjem na hrv. *izlagati* iako drugi glagol *izložiti* svojim o (različit prijevoini stupanj) bliži južno-njem. izgovoru riječi [‘aoslāk].

⁴² Ovi se glagoli u hrvatskome razlikuju samo različitim glagolskim aspektima (glagolski vid), pri čemu je prvi (*izložiti*) perfektivnoga (svršenoga) a drugi (*izlagati*) durativnoga (nesvršenoga) značenja.

prijevojnih stupnjeva (*legh-*, *lēgh-*, *logh-*, *lagh-*).⁴³ Od glasovno prilagođenoga oblika *auzlog* (njem. *Auslage*) razvio se u hrvatskome jeziku danas standardni i vrlo dobro integrirani izraz *izlog*. To se dogodilo ili pukim prevođenjem njem. prijedloga odnosno prefiksa *aus-* u hrv. *iz-* ili možda analogijskom prilagodbom glagolskoga para različitoga glagolskog aspekta *izložiti-izlagati*.

Bogoslav Šulek (1816-1895) je bio jedan od onih predstavnika hrvatske filologije koji su hrvatskoj leksikografiji druge polovice 19. stoljeća poticali snažne purističke ili čistunske tendencije u hrvatskome jeziku. On je primjerice u svojem njemačko-hrvatskom rječniku iz godine 1860. zabilježio neologizam *glasovir* za njemački *Klavier* (hrv. *klavir*). Riječ *glasovir* je vrlo brzo bila prihvaćena u hrvatski književni jezik, no nikada nije potisnula posuđenicu *klavir* i danas zvuči samo malo svečanije i biranije nego riječ *klavir*. Riječ *glasovir* je po svemu sudeći skovana u slovenskome jeziku i u svojem je drugom dijelu pučkoetimologijski neznatno naslonjena na hrvatsku riječ *vir*, a preuzeta je iz drugoga dijela njem. riječi *Klavier*. Budući da tvorbeni model *glasovir* u svojem prvom dijelu sadrži riječ *glas-* a u drugom *vir* možemo mu značenje parafrazirati kao 'izvor glasa. O kovanici *glasovir* je početkom 20. stoljeća među filozozima vođena i šira rasprava, među ostalim da li je *-vir* simpleks ili se radi o izoliranome sufiksu, to jest da li je *glasovir* složenica ili sufiksalna izvedenica.⁴⁴ Zaključno se o riječi *glasovir* može još utvrditi da prosječan izvorni govornik hrvatskoga jezika u drugome dijelu modela *-vir* ne osjeća naslonjenost ili pučku etimologiju riječju *vir*.

Anićev Rječnik hrvatskoga jezika markira natuknicu *dvopek* (1998: 171) s *kalk* (prevedenica/prekovanica) prema njemačkom *Zwieback* što je na prvi pogled i prihvatljivo. Oba se modela *dvopek* i *Zwieback* po tvorbi riječi mogu smatrati složenicama. Prva sastavnica *dvo-* hrv. modela odgovara otprilike prvoj sastavnici njem. modela *zwie-*, no kod druge sastavnice nastaju problemi, jer između hrvatske i njemačke sastavnice ne postoji doslovna podudarnost. Hrvatska sastavnica *-pek* kao simpleks u hrvatskome jednostavno ne postoji niti je po svemu sudeći postojala, dok je njemačka sastavnica *-back* izvedenica nultoga morfema od glagola *backen* 'peći' (proizvode od brašna ili nešto drugo što je panirano). Hrvatska druga sastavnica *-pek* je ipak pučkoetimologijski prekovanica prema njemačkom *Zwieback* od glagola *peći* (gl. prilog radni *pekao* ili prezentski oblik *peku*). Dakle, *dvopek* jest prekovanica prema njem. *Zwieback* ali s pučkoetimologijskim naslanjanjem druge sastavnice na njemački uzor *-back*. Prosječan hrvatski izvorni govornik ne osjeća u riječi *dvopek* učinak pučke etimologije, pa budući je hrvatski standardni jezik

⁴³ psl. *legt'i*, got. *ligan* 'ležati' (germ. **ligjan*), lat. *lectus* 'postelja', gr. *lekhos-lokhos* 'postelja'-'zasjeda', st.-ir. *laigim-lige* 'liježem'-'ležaj', toh. *lake* 'ležaj', het. *lagari* 'leži',

⁴⁴ Usporedi: Jonke (1954: 68), Maretić (1924: 23), Pavešić (1971: 82), Kettenbach (1949), AR ibidem III. 163, Rožić (1903: 276, 389) Rammelmeyer (1979: 182).

izraz *dvopek* dobro integrirao, on je u međuvremenu gotovo u potpunosti potisnuo iz jezika staru posuđenicu *cvibak* (< njem. *Zwieback*)⁴⁵ s potvrđama iz 18. stoljeća.

Schneeweis (21) navodi izraz *kaljače* i vidi u njemu prekovanicu motiviranu pučkom etimologijom prema njem. riječi *Galoschen* (< fr. *galoche*). Po tvorbi riječi je izraz *kaljače* po mojem mišljenju denominalna sufiksalna izvedenica i sastoji se od bazne riječi *kalj* 'blato' i sufiksa *-če* po uzoru na orijentalizam *papuče*. U prilog Schneeweisove teze da se radi o prekovanici opterećenoj pučkom etimologijom govore glasovne i semantičke podudarnosti. Kao polazna osnova bi mogao biti oblik koji navodi Klaić (1979: 650) *kalošne*, koji je u prvome dijelu glasovno blizak s hrvatskim riječima *kalj* ili *kaljav*, pa pučkoetimologijskim naslanjanjem lakoćom nastane nepotvrđeni oblik **kaljošne*, a u sljedećem koraku se oblik **kaljošne* pod utjecajem riječi *papuče* i preuzimanjem njezina dočetka razvije u oblik *kaljače*. Riječ *kaljače* kao i izrazi *galošne* i *kalošne* koji su neopterećeni pučkom etimologijom imaju identično značenje, no sva tri izraza danas pomalo zastarijevaju.

3. Zaključni pregled

Za pučku etimologiju se može reći da kao fenomen postoji u svim živim jezicima i da je jedna od jezičnih univerzalija. Njezino djelovanje je najčešće u posudbenim procesima, ali počesto i među zastarjelim i manje frekventnim riječima istoga jezika. Neintegrirane ili nepotpuno integrirane riječi ili pak dijelovi riječi ne naslanjaju se samo na frekventne domaće leksičke morfeme nego i na tvorbene morfeme koji nemaju individualno nego grupno značenje o čemu nam svjedoče primjeri: mer*kat*i, kalja*če* i prsluk. Budući dakle da pučka etimologija osim među leksičkim može djelovati među tvorbenim i gramatičkim morfemima Bußmann (1983: 579-580) vidi u njoj neku vrst procesa tvorbe riječi pri čemu veliku ulogu imaju analogija i asimilacija. Analogija⁴⁶ je prema njemu ona formalno-jezična pretpostavka koja na semantičkoj razini omogućuje ono poželjno, katkad i nepoželjno ili slučajno novo tumačenje. Prema našem korpusu je moguće razlikovati tri vrste intenziteta glasovnoga naslanjanja, koji se formalno manifestiraju kao homofonije. Prvu vrst bi se moglo nazvati iznuđena homofonija riječi i oblika opterećenih pučkom etimologijom koji doživljavaju vrlo složene i teško objašnjive glasovna preinake kao što to pokazuju neki naši primjeri: *buhara* (< njem. *bei Wache*), *prsluk* (<

⁴⁵ Mažuranić (1975: I.124) navodi i treći oblik *cipov* s potvrdom iz godine 1653 koju su Hrvati posudili iz njemačkoga posredovanjem mađarskoga jezika (mađ. *cipó* < njem. *Zwieback*). Izraz je i danas s pomakom u značenju rasprostranjen u sjeverozapadnoj Hrvatskoj i prema Klaiću (1979: 227) znači 'bijeli kruh'.

⁴⁶ Za analogiju u smislu procesa ovaj rad rabi naziv *naslanjanje* a rezultat takva procesa *nalonjenica*.

njem.-dijal. *Brustfleck*), *kaljače* (< njem.-dijal. *Kaloschen*), *ispuh* (< njem. *Auspuff*-) *cipel-polka* (< njem. *Zeperl-Polka*) itd. Druga vrst glasovnoga naslanjanja obuhvaća one riječi i oblike opterećene pučkom etimologijom, čiji je nastanak lako objašnjiv prema pravilima glasovne prilagodbe a nastali su manje ili više slučajnom glasovnom podudarnošću s nekom hrvatskom riječju: *križbam* (< njem. *Christbaum*), *sise* (< njem. *Süßes*), *mužar* (< mađ. *mozsár* < njem. *Mörser*), *pekar* (< njem. *Bäcker*), *boginje* (< njem. *Pocken*), *griz* (< njem. *Grieß*) itd. Treća vrst glasovnoga naslanjanja obuhvaća one riječi i oblike opterećene pučkom etimologijom koje pokazuju tek neznatne glasovne promjene u odnosu na riječi izvornoga jezika ili su od samoga početka bile istozvučne s nekom hrvatskom riječju ili s dijelom neke riječi: *bunt* (< njem. *Bund*), *glasovir* (< njem. *Klavier*), *kurva* (< njem. *Kurve* < lat. *curvus*) i *lumpati* (< njem. *Lump*). Glasovno naslanjanje posuđenice na neku hrvatsku riječ ili na dio riječi ne uzrokuje samo različite glasovne adaptacije i promjene nego jednako tako uzrokuje promjene različita intenziteta na semantičkoj razini. Formalno-jezična razina se dakle u pučkoj etimologiji ne može gledati izolirano od semantičke razine niti obrnuto jer zajedno čine jednu cjelinu. S druge strane jačina ili intenzitet formalnojezične preobrazbe nekog oblika pogođenog pučkom etimologijom nije pokazatelj pomaka i preinaka na semantičkoj razini. Dakle, iako formalnojezična i semantička razina čine jednu cjelinu, ne postoji nikakav proporcionalni odnos između tih razina u smislu što veća formalna preobrazba, veći pomak na semantičkoj razini. Tako su na primjer *prsluk* i *kaljače* na formalnoj razini temeljito preoblikovani u odnosu na svoje parnjake jezika-davatelja *Brustfleck* i *Galoschen*, a da nije došlo do značajnijega pomaka na semantičkoj razini jer su temeljna značenja parnjaka jezika-primatelja i jezika-davatelja ostala ista. Upravo obrnut odnos pokazuju posuđenice *bunt* i *merkati*, koje su formalno samo u nekim manjim segmentima preoblikovane u odnosu na ekvivalente izvornoga jezika *Bund* i *merken*, ali je zato na semantičkoj razini došlo do velikoga pomaka u značenju.

Jednako kao i na formalnojezičnoj razini, gdje su se, polazeći od ponuđenog korpusa, mogle razlikovati tri vrste intenziteta glasovnoga naslanjanja, moguće je i na semantičkoj razini razlikovati tri vrste ili možda preciznije tri stupnja semantičkog naslanjanja ili aficiranja. One semantički najsnažnije aficirane posuđenice imaju proporcionalno i najveći pomak u značenju u odnosu na svoje izvorne njem. ekvivalente: *lump(ov)ti* (< njem. *Lump* 'odrpnanac, propalica') hrv. 'pijančevati', *lumperaj* (< njem. *Lumperei* 'prostota, prijevara') hrv. 'pijančevanje, bačevanje', *merkati* (< njem. *merken* 'zamijetiti, zapaziti, ugledati') hrv. 'gledati, promatrati' - dakle njem. perfektivno, hrvatski pak durativno značenje - i na koncu *bunt* (< njem. *der Bund* 'savez, udruženje') hrv. '(po)buna, ustanak, protest'. Sljedeći tip je dvosmjerno semantičko naslanjanje, koje je evidentno među mnogim posuđenicama našega korpusa, ima za posljedicu dvojaku semantičku interpretaciju, jednu koja polazi od njemačkoga kao jezika-davatelja i drugu

koja polazi od hrvatskoga kao jezika-primatelja: *buhara* (< njem. *bei Wache* ‘pod stražom’) hrv. ‘zatvor’ ili ‘prostor gdje vrvi od buha’, *sise* (< njem. *Süßes* ‘slatko’) hrv. ‘vrst slastice’ ili ‘(ženske) grudi’, *cipel-polka* (< njem. *Zeperl-Polka* ‘vrst polke’) hrv. ‘vrst polke’ ili ‘polka koju karakterizira nešto s cipelama’, *boginje* (< njem. *Pocken* ‘kozice’) hrv. ‘kozice’ ili ‘božice’ itd. Kod ovog tipa je uvijek naravski dominantno jedno značenje i to ono koje je blisko njem. izvornom značenju, dok je ono drugo značenje, koje se tumači prema nekoj hrvatskoj isto- ili sličnozvučnici ponekad čuje među neupućenima ili u šali. U trećoj grupi semantičkog, može se reći teško primjetnog ili prikrivenog, naslanjanja ili aficiranja pokazuju neki oblici ponuđenog korpusa, čiji se njem. uzori ili ekvivalenti mogu utvrditi samo sofisticiranom jezičnom analizom na glasovnoj razini. U ovome se slučaju može govoriti o prikrivenoj ili opskurnoj pučkoj etimologiji, jer niti je semantičko naslanjenje sasvim vidljivo, niti se glasovno naslanjanje u odnosu na njem. ekvivalente daje jednostavno utvrditi: *pekar* (< njem. *Bäcker*), *prsluk* (< njem. *Brustfleck*), *kaljače* (< njem. *Galoschen*), *izlog* (< njem. *Auslag-e*), *ispuh* (< njem. *Auspuff-*), *dvopek* (< njem. *Zwieback*) i glasovir (< njem. *Klavier*).

Načelno se može reći da je djelovanje pučke etimologije u ponuđenom korpusu uzrokovalo različite učinke, koji su polazeći od fonološke i semantičke razine vrlo različita intenziteta, pa se treba govoriti o eficientnoj skali pučkoetimologijskoga djelovanja. Među ‘finalnim proizvodima’ nastalim djelovanjem pučke etimologije ima prihvatljivih oblika s prihvatljivim značenjima, kao što su: *pekar*, *prsluk*, *bunt*, *izlog* itd., ali ima i onih oblika s neprihvatljivim ili zbunjujućim značenjem, pa ponekad čak i onih oblika s učinkom zablude, kao što pokazuju primjeri: *picajzl*, *buhara*, *kurva*, *sise* itd., koji su više komunikativni balast, jer su se glasovno a time i semantički naslonili na u ovom slučaju tabuizirane hrvatske riječi.

Rüdiger Schmitt kao izdavač zbirnoga toma *Etymologie*⁴⁷ upućuje u predgovoru na jezičnosociološki momenat pučke etimologije kad kaže, da je ona tumačenje nekih riječi ili preciznije njihova reinterpetacija koja nastaje u narodu, t.j. u onome jezikoslovno manje obrazovanom dijelu. Schmittovo se stajalište može sažeti u rečenicu: Što je obrazovaniji govornik, tim je proporcionalno manje pučke etimologije. Pa iako je ovo Schmittovo stajalište prihvatljivo, ono ipak ignorira pozitivne učinke pučke etimologije, koja je na primjer, polazeći od našeg korpusa, pospješila integraciju nekih njemačkih posuđenica u hrvatski jezik: *izlog*, *pekar*, *prsluk*, *bunt*, *buhara*, *kaljače*, *lump(ov)ati* itd. Pučkom etimologijom mnoga riječ dobije onu potrebnu providnost ili leksičku motiviranost koja je često neprihvatljiva i stvara komunikativne smetnje ali je ponekad i prihvatljiva. Zaključno se može reći

⁴⁷ *Etymologie*. Rüdiger Schmitt (Izdavač), Wege der Forschung, svezak 373. Darmstadt 1977: usp. str. 5.

da je pučka etimologija konstantan jezični fenomen koji se nerado tolerira ali i progoni, no ona će i nadalje osobito u međujezičnim posuđbama uporno nuditi svoje usluge. Sjajnu budućnost dakle nema, ali joj ne prijeti opasnost od izumiranje niti među obrazovanima a još manje među neobrazovanima.

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VOLKSETYMOLOGIE IN DEUTSCHEN ENTLEHNUNGEN

Der Beitrag behandelt das Phänomen der Volksetymologie am Beispiel von zweiundzwanzig Entlehnungen aus der deutschen Sprache. Die meisten von ihnen gehören nicht zum Bestandteil der kroatischen Hochsprache und stehen teilweise sogar am Rande der kroatischen Umgangssprache. Der Beitrag hat das Ziel, auf verschiedene Intensitätsgrade der Volksetymologie hinzuweisen, wobei grundsätzlich zwischen verschiedenen Affizierungsgraden der Volksetymologie unterschieden wird.

Schlüsselwörter: Lehnwort, Volksetymologie, Phonoadoptierung, Morphoadoptierung, Anlehnung, Homophonie, Analogie

Bilješke i diskusija
Notes and discussion
Notizen und Diskussion

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Jezikoslovlje:
The tongue in the mind's ear

When the decision was reached in early 2002 that this journal ought to be relaunched and made into an open, international forum, the editor-in-chief suggested that an editorial note is in order in the new issue that would explain the journal's background and its future goals. When an internationally renowned board of consulting editors was successfully called into life, and when first contributions from abroad started getting in, in other words, when it appeared that the journal is on a good course, the editor-in-chief suggested that the pleasure of composing of this editorial note be mine, as I happened to have been engaged in the most visible part of the work in the preparation stage, so to say, acting as the executive hand that carried out most of the suggestions of the whole editorial board. Not surprisingly, I declined this particular offer. Now that the double issue for 2002 is about to go to press (and a couple of papers are being revised that will most likely appear in the first issue for 2003), I feel that a note might be useful, not a prefatory one, but just a post-script mostly focussing on the journal's name, and thus revealing some of the quandaries that the editorial board was in during the past year.

There is hardly any need for the editorial board to comment on the papers published. After all, the papers speak for themselves. However, let me just as well make two points. Firstly, it is clear that most papers in the present volume are true to what the editorial board envisaged: most papers contest or re-evaluate some established conceptual and/or methodological traditions. The second point that must be made clear is that most of the papers in Croatian (both articles and book reviews and notices) had been submitted either long before the decision to relaunch the journal, i.e. while it was in a limbo, or during the time the board was busy reviving the journal. This explains in part the relatively high proportion of the number of papers in Croatian when compared to the number of papers in English and German. This proportion is quite

likely to change in the issue to follow, but hopefully not to the detriment of Croatian. If all goes well, it will shift more and more from the status of the metalanguage, i.e. the medium, to the status of the object language, i.e. the topic of papers composed in the other two languages.

This also explains why the journal continues with Volume 3, and does not start anew. The first volume, with one issue, was published in 1998, and was followed by a double issue of Volume 2 in 1999. This means that there is a gap for 2000 and 2001. For quite some time, the possibility was entertained of starting with a clean slate, i.e. either changing the name of the journal (for the reasons to be discussed below) and naturally starting with volume one, or keeping the name but at least starting afresh with a new series. The expanded editorial board eventually decided that the continuity in both the journal's name and volume sequence, with an acknowledged gap in publication, is the wisest option.

In fulfilling its mission - holding up for discussion theoretical and descriptive issues relevant to the linguistic community at large and thus aiming at reflecting current trends in linguistic research – *Jezikoslovlje* will clearly contribute to the development of linguistic research in Croatia. First of all, by being a forum that reflects current trends it will help the Croatian linguistic community keep pace with colleagues abroad. *Jezikoslovlje* is also intended to promote Croatian linguistics by publishing contributions by Croatian linguists, and last but not least on Croatian (occasionally in Croatian). However, the traffic of ideas is expected to be bidirectional, i.e. the journal is to be a means of not only importing but also of exporting ideas. This latter goal can only be achieved if contributions also take a broader perspective and succeed in linking up to worldwide trends in terms of their methodology, the theoretical framework in which they are couched, and the relevance of their findings. One of the prerequisites is the choice of an international medium that would make such work more widely accessible (e.g. writing on Croatian in English or German).

In the remainder of this note I will be trying to kill two birds with a single stone. On the one hand, I would like to demonstrate that even an apparently petty issue such as the etymology of the journal's name can be discussed in a manner that makes the topic theoretically relevant and interesting for larger audience. On the other hand, I hope to convince the reader that *Jezikoslovlje* is an apt name for a linguistic journal.

So what's in this name? A morphological analysis yielding two immediate constituents linked by an interfix seems very plausible at first sight: *jezik-oslavljje*. If we disregard the interfix, the right-hand IC of this compound-like structure can be further broken down into two morphemes: *slov-lje*. Of course, it is also possible that this is a synthetic compound-like structure where the

final suffix *-lje* is added to a complex base. This question, however, is not our immediate concern here.

The left-hand constituent, *jezik*, is not a trouble-maker here. This is a pattern of metonymic extension of the type SPEECH-ORGAN-FOR-LANGUAGE, attested in language after language, particularly in Indo-European languages, but also in Uralic, Turkic, Semitic, Caucasian, Chadic, and American Indian languages (cf. Radden 2002).

This accounts for the first part of the subtitle of this note. But what about the meaning of the whole word, why should the tongue be in the mind's ear? Checking on the word *jezikoslovlje* in Croatian and Croatian-English dictionaries, one finds that, provided the word is included, two senses are offered, viz. two English equivalents, respectively. Bujas (1983) gives both *philology* and *linguistics* as its English equivalents, while Drvodelić (1989) provides only *philology*. Simeon's encyclopedic dictionary of linguistic terms (1969: 619) indicates that the term was coined by Bogoslav Šulek in 1860 as the equivalent of the German term *Philologie* (the same person is recorded as being responsible for the term *jezikoznanstvo* (cf. Russian *jazykoznanie*), coined in 1874 and corresponding to German *Sprachwissenschaft*). The dictionary of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts provides *filologija* as the first gloss, immediately followed by *lingvistika*. The fact is that *jezikoslovlje* is not a terribly frequent form. A search in the Croatian National Corpus, which at present contains 30 million words, yielded 17 tokens (with 4 different case forms)¹. I must admit here that I myself hardly remember ever having come across the word before joining the editorial board in 2002, apart from the occasion on which I read Katičić (1986).

Studying the tables of contents of the first two volumes of *Jezikoslovlje* (all in all 3 issues), one may get the impression that the journal was more about philology than linguistics.

A brief comparison with some other words ending in *-(slov)lje*, does not seem to lend unequivocal support to this assumption. Babić (1986) cites, among others, forms such as: *mudroslovlje* and *bogoslovlje*. The first constituents are *mudr(o)-* and *bog-*, i.e. 'wise' and 'God', respectively. The former word was a failed attempt to replace the internationalism *filozofija* (i.e. philosophy), an attempt that failed for good long, long before the present author was born, and thus cannot be blamed on the present-day Croatian language policy. The latter word is quite current in the sense of 'theology' (cf. *Bogoslovni fakultet* 'Faculty of Theology'). There is a clear analogy between *jezikoslovlje* and *mudroslovlje* to the effect that in both words the first constituent corresponds to the second constituent in their Greek counterparts (on

¹ The corpus can be searched at www.hnk.hr.

which they may be assumed to have been modelled), while *-slovlje* in both cases corresponds to *philein* 'love'. If *mudroslovlje* is the love of wisdom, then *jezikoslovlje* is the love of language. However, *bogoslovlje* is a different case, as *-slovlje* here corresponds to Greek *-logia*. In other words, the second constituent denotes something that is more study- or science-like.

However, the statement on its scope and goals, agreed on by the new expanded editorial board, is clearly at odds with such purely philological orientation. A change of the journal's name seemed to be well-advised - a possibility that was duly considered.²

Anić (1999: 417), however, defines *jezikoslovlje* as *proučavanje jezika, lingvistika* ('study of language, linguistics'), but does not include any reference to philology. So it appears as if we witnessed here a shift in the meaning of the term from the 'philology' towards the 'linguistics' sense. Is this shift perhaps attributable to what Jahn (1999) describes as the Croatization language policy? Specifically, this might seem like an old word from the Croatian linguistic heritage being revived after having long been in disuse.³ Notice that it is possible that the other competing term coined by Šulek, *jezikoznanstvo*, may have been dispreferred by many speakers on the grounds of being felt to be too close to Russian, which currently does not enjoy a prestigious status in the Croatian society, due to the politics of the past. In sum, the shift of meaning would seem to be essentially arbitrary from a linguistic point of view. In other words, it takes place for extra-linguistic reasons, either due to ignorance, i.e. confusing philology for linguistics, or due to the wish to replace the international term *lingvistika* for basically political reasons. If *jezikoslovlje* was originally used in the sense of philology, such a shift would

² Note that the board in fact did not face much of a choice. Changing the journal's name to something English or Classical could have led to some high-sounding, presumptuous (and in the long run ridiculous) syntagma, or to partial infringement (as most apt and/or eye-catching names are already in use). Opting for either interpretation of its scope and goals (i.e. either choosing to be a philological or a linguistic journal), but sticking to the resources of Croatian morphosyntax, the journal had to manoeuvre in a very narrow space left by two well-established Croatian journals, viz. *Filologija* and *Suvremena lingvistika*. *Jezikoslovlje* may be a tongue-twister, and suspicious, or even offensive to some linguists, but it is at least original, quite unique, and hopefully eye-catching (if this were one of the ingredients that go into making a successful journal, in addition to eye-catching contents).

³ By way of digression, let me just point out that the only linguistic term that Jahn discusses is *syntax* (i.e. *sintaksa* in Croatian), which is claimed by his informant (allegedly a teacher of Croatian) to be systematically replaced by the term *sročnost*. In a matter of fact, *sročnost* is not an innovation but a long-established term covering what is in English called concord or agreement, nothing more and nothing less. Cf. Katičić (1991), where the term *sintaksa* is used in the title of the volume, and *sročnost* is duly used in the sense of concord.

not make much sense for at least two reasons. If the alleged purpose of resurrecting an old Croatian word is to “preserve the purity” of the language, then this purpose is not served if the “original sense” is betrayed. On top of this, it is just like robbing Peter to pay Paul – if *jezikoslovlje* is used as a patch to render *lingvistika* superfluous, another gap emerges because there is no native term replacing *filologija*.

In what follows below, I would like to show, that even if Anić (1999) may be wrong about not supplying the philology⁴ sense for *jezikoslovlje*, he is at least right about glossing it as the study of language, i.e. linguistics in the sense of German *Sprachwissenschaft* (language-science, i.e. getting to know/acquiring knowledge about language).

We might assume that the right-hand constituent, *-slovlje*, is etymologically related to *Slaven* ‘Slav’, *slaviti* (v.) ‘praise’, and *sloviti* (v.) ‘speak, tell, announce’. This is indeed borne out by most etymological dictionaries. One could then jump to the conclusion that *jezikoslovlje* should be taken to mean something like ‘the activity of talking about/discussing language’. Since scholarly discussions are prototypically dialectic exchanges between participants not possessed of identical bodies of knowledge, i.e. one knows more about a given topic than the other participant, the latter then benefits from the discussion because he is given an opportunity to learn something. Of course, the roles may be reversed, and the direction of the transfer of knowledge reversed at the next turn. Last but not least, even the participant that apparently acts as the primary source of knowledge, may her-/himself be learning in the process, as we all have experienced on many occasions. It may almost sound like a joke, but such dialectic exchange may be thought of as a phenomenon resting on a metonymic basis: scholarly discussion goes hand in hand with transfer of knowledge (in whatever form), and thus ultimately leads to the acquisition/possession of body of knowledge (in the sense of *Wissenschaft*).

However, there is harder evidence that *jezikoslovlje* indeed covers the sense of ‘linguistics’, more precisely, that *-slovlje* has to do with cognition. The evidence is to be found if one decides to plunge into much deeper etymological strata. The ultimate etymon of *-slovlje*, and *slovo* ‘letter’, and *Slaven* and *sloviti*, seems to be IE **kleu-* ‘hear’.

To try to argue for a link between *-slovlje* and cognition on the basis of such an etymological affinity may seem surprising, even incoherent. The link is, on the face of it, totally unmotivated. At best, assuming such a link would imply some sort of meaning extension from the domain of perception onto the

⁴ In fact, in the official nomenclature of scientific disciplines approved by the Croatian Ministry of Science and Technology, *jezikoslovlje* is being used as a hyperonym of both philology and linguistics.

domain of cognition, probably based on a metaphor. This type of general extension is in fact widely attested, as discussed in Sweetser (1990). The only trouble with this is that it is actually out of sync with Sweetser's prediction that such metaphoric mappings from perception to cognition are more likely for certain perceptual modalities than for some others. Specifically, verbs of visual perception are claimed by her to be universally more likely to develop into verbs of knowing than verbs related to any other perceptual modality. In other words, verbs of hearing are not very likely to develop a usage meaning 'know'. Rather they will acquire the sense of 'heeding, obeying', i.e. extend into the domain of social interaction. If they are nevertheless also found to develop in the direction of cognition they, at best, exhibit a usage meaning 'understand'.

It has been recently shown by Evans and Wilkins (2000)⁵ that Sweetser's prediction about the universality of the extension of visual perception verbs to cognition readings (like 'see' > 'know') cannot be upheld. Making use of data from a broad range (approximately 60) of Australian languages, they demonstrate that verbs denoting higher intellection, i.e. cognition in the sense of 'think' and 'know' are recruited from verbs for aural perception, rather than from 'see' verbs. Cf. some of their examples:

Pitjantjatjara

- (1) itit-la takata kuli-ntja wiya
long.ago-LOC doctor hear/know-NOMZR NEG
'In the old days we didn't know about doctors'

- (2) yumpa-na puṯu nguwan kulini
face-I in.vain hardly hear/remember
'I can't really remember the face'
(Goddard 1992: 39)

Dalabon

- (3) 'ngale! kvhrdvh-kah kvhrdvh-kah kvhrdvh-kah'
oh.yes this.way-LOC this.way-LOC this.way-LOC

kah-rok-wona-rre-ninj.

3way-hear-REFL-PASTPERF

"'Oh yes, along this way, this way, this way,'" he remembered/ recalled/knew the way along'

⁵ This article provides, of course, not only arguments for the present note, but also the obvious inspiration for its subtitle.

Vestiges of this pattern can also be detected in Indo-European languages, e.g. in English or Croatian. Verbs of aural perception can of course be used in the sense of ‘understand’, as in the questions in (4-5):

(4) A mistake has been made, do you hear me?

Croatian

(5) Jesi li me čuo?
AUX-2SG Q-PARTICLE me-ACC heard
‘Have you heard (and understood) me?’

In both examples the implicature arises – if the addressee has perceived the message, i.e. has heard it, s/he must have understood it.

A verb of hearing may occasionally be also used in the sense of ‘know’:

(6) a. Have you heard the one about...
b. Never heard of him.

(6) a. may be understood as the speaker simply inquiring whether the interlocutor has aurally perceived the joke in question, but it is normally enlarged into an inquiry as to whether the interlocutor knows the joke. Similarly, (6) b. is normally interpreted in the sense that the speaker does not know the person in question. The same patterns are attested in Croatian, and in many other languages, even some non-Indo-European ones, e.g. in Hungarian.

Let us now return to some expressions deriving from the other etymon of interest, **kleu-*, that was discussed above. As pointed out by Sweetser (1990: 35) words coming from this root often mean ‘tale, report, fame, glory, news’. This is the case in Latin *clūor* ‘fame’, and *clueo* ‘be famous’, and while Cl. Greek *klúo* means ‘hear’, its nominalizations and adjectivalizations are *kléos* ‘fame’ and *klutós* ‘famous’, respectively. They can be traced to the same etymon which developed in Croatian into *slava* ‘fame’ and *slavan* ‘famous’. Fame, and being famous or well-known, clearly have to do with knowledge.

This shift from hearing to knowing, though not very systematic, and nowadays as good as obscured, is in fact no less well motivated than the shift from seeing to knowing. In other words, the latter is as unmotivated as the former. The explanation that Sweetser (1990: 39) gives basically presupposes some metaphorical mapping, the common denominator between vision and cognition being distance:

... vision is connected with intellection because it is our primary source of objective data about the world... Vision gives us data from distance. This ability to reach out is a significant parallel between vision and intellection, since the

objective and intellectual domain is understood as being an area of personal *distance*, in contrast to intimacy or closeness of the subjective and emotional domain... Vision is also identical for different people...

But this assumption of a parallel is clearly biased in that it presupposes one particular type of cognition and knowledge (the objective one, probably one arrived at experimentally, assuming emotional distance from what is being observed), and one particular stage in the development of society and technology. Otherwise, distance need not result in cognition. Being emotionally disinterested and detached from what one studies can of course be beneficial, but detrimental as well (e.g. because of lack of motivation). Finally, it is almost a platitude to point out that spatial distance is reversely proportional to successful visual perception, and may thus prevent cognition.

I would like to submit that the shift from both visual and aural meaning to the domain of knowing (both objective and subjective) can perhaps be better motivated if we assume underlying metonymic chains instead of metaphors. What is going on in both perception modalities is a complex scenario or ICM. Successful perception presupposes the readiness/attention of the organism.

Note now that both Croatian *čuti* and English *hear* derive etymologically from the Indo-European root **(s)kēu-* 'watch, look', which is in turn claimed to derive from the nostratic **cuHΛ* 'watch, observe', also reflected in Kartvelian **čew-* 'pay attention'. We could assume that the initial stage of the perceptual process came to be reinterpreted as denoting its result, i.e. the lexemes originally denoting attention came to mean perception itself. In other words, we witness a high-level predication metonymic mapping of the CAUSE-FOR-RESULT type here. Closer to our times, we may illustrate this on the English pair *listen to – hear*. The former activity may lead to the event of hearing, but hearing does not presuppose listening, you can hear things without listening to, i.e. without consciously attending to the task. This sort of conceptual contiguity in the sense of defeasibility/cancellability is just what is predicted for high-level metonymies (cf. Panther and Thornburg 2002). In the next step, what is heard gets processed and incorporated into the knowledge system of the organism in one way or another. If a particular piece of information is relevant and possibly recurrent, it is more firmly incorporated into the knowledge system and can be retrieved independently of the original aural stimulus. In other words, the same high-level metonymy kicks in here again. What has been heard and turned into operationalisable data is now known. This is clearly reflected in the fame/famous cluster of examples above. This now explains how knowledge gets in through ears, and also why the tongue is in the mind's ear.

This sort of motivation, grounded in human bodily and mental endowment, can equally account for both modalities (or perhaps any other modality) as

starting points for the shift towards intellection. So what was it that made language after language (but not Australian ones) choose visual perception over aural one as the starting point, or perhaps, if my arguments above hold water, what was it that may have made many languages shift from one model to the other at some point?

Part of the answer is offered in the concluding section of Evans and Wilkins (2000), when they suggest that “the same semantic domain can have its universal and its relativistic side, a foot in nature and a foot in culture,…” As pointed out above, Sweetser’s concept of cognition seems to be biased by modern Western civilization. At the time the two models may have competed, society was very different. Vision was of course very important, but it was certainly not the only factor relevant to the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. What is more, “objective”, first-hand knowledge arrived at on the basis of direct observation was less privileged in comparison with that acquired through exchange with other humans. In fact, one can safely assume that before the invention of a writing system, and before technological and economical advance could ensure sustainable and high-quality light independent of meteorological conditions, oral transmission of knowledge in concentrated form, was the primary form of dissemination of knowledge that was handed down from generation to generation. It is not incidental that the oldest texts preserved were in the form of verse, to be sung or recited in front of the audience. The regular metre with its rhythmic contours, the use of rhyme and alliteration, recurrent collocations, were all devices that facilitated their oral perception and memorization, so that they could be preserved and handed down further. Once the circumstances started changing, when writing systems were devised, and as the medium for actual recording became more and more accessible, as the lightning techniques became more reliable, the preservation and transfer of knowledge was less and less dependent on aural perception, and the other model could take over. Where such circumstances did not arise, or did not arise so quickly, e.g. in indigenous Australian societies, as demonstrated by Evans and Wilkins (2000), the aural modality went unchallenged.

Let me now return to the issue of the aptness of the journal’s name. Just like the process of cognition starts with the attention, the state of readiness and opening of channels of communication, *Jezikoslovlje* shall be open to all schools and currents of linguistic thought. It shall promote the idea that linguistics, like all science, is a cumulative cooperative enterprise, encouraging an attitude of tolerance and patient listening to, i.e. reading, other people’s ideas/work, and then trying to suggest a solution to the problems or to make clear their relevance to theoretical issues by posing further questions.

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Ocjene knjiga – Book reviews - Buchrezensionen

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Baron, Irène, Michael Herslund, Finn Sørensen, eds. (2001). *Dimensions of Possession*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Typological Studies in Language 47. ISBN 90 272 2951 1. vi + 335 str. € 95.00.

Prikaz gornje knjige počet ćemo jednom metajezičnom napomenom. U hrvatskoj se lingvističkoj literaturi za engleski termin *possession* često rabi izraz posjedovanje i taj ćemo izraz zadržati i u ovome prikazu. Međutim, za termine *possessor* i *possesum* rabit ćemo internacionalizme *posesor* i *posesum* kao predteorijske termine, jer termine posjednik i posjedovano, koje rabi B. Kuna u svom magistarskom radu *Izricanje posvojnosti genitivom u hrvatskom književnom jeziku* (Zagreb 1999.), smatramo previše sugestivnima i neprikladnima za odnose dio – cjelina (*curi mi nos*), rodbinske odnose (*rodio mu se sin*) ili apstraktno 'posjedovanje' (*I have a cold*). Termini *posesor* i *posesum* jednostavno će se odnositi na binarnu relaciju u kojoj *posesor* ne postoji bez *posesuma*, i obratno, *posesuma* nema bez *posesora* bez obzira na to da li se radi o predikacijskom (*Marko ima sina*), atributnom (*Markov sin*) ili ekster-nom odnosu (*Marku se rodio sin*).

Pored vrlo dobrog uvoda (*Introduction: Dimensions of possession*), koji su napisali Michael Herslund i Irène Baron, knjiga sarži šesnaest priloga o različitim aspektima posesivnosti: 1. Hansjakob Seiler: *The operational basis of possession: A dimensional approach revisited* (27-40); 2. Ole Togeby: *The concept of possession in Danish grammar* (41-55); 3. Finn Sørensen: *Possession spaces in Danish* (57-65); 4. William McGregor: *The verb HAVE in Nynulnulan languages* (67-84); 5. Irène Baron i Michael Herslund: *Semantics of the ver HAVE* (85-98); 6. Per-Durst Andersen: *Possesum-oriented and possessor-oriented constructions in Russian* (98-113); 7. Lars Heltoft: *Datives and comitatives as neighbouring spouses: The case of indirect objects and comitatives in Danish* (115-146); 8. Inge Bartning: *Towards a typology of French NP de NP structures or how much possession is there in complex noun phrases with de in French?* (147-167); 9. Henrik Høeg Müller: *Spanish N de N structures from a cognitive perspective* (169-186); 10. Martin Riegel: *The grammatical category 'Possession' and the part-whole relation in French* (187-200); 11. Östen Dahl i Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm: *Kinship in grammar* (201-225); 12. Anne-Marie Spanghoe: *(In)alienability and (in)determination*

in Portugese (227-242); 13. Kari Fraurud: *Possessives with extensive use: A source of definite articles?* (243-267); 14. A. Machtelt Bolkestein: *Possessors and experiences in Classical Latin* (269-283); 15. Marianne Mithun: *The difference a category makes in the expression of possession and inalienability* (285-310); 16. Bernd Heine: *Ways of explaining possession* (311-328).

Prilozi se mogu ugrubo podijeliti na dva tipa članaka: one koji se odnose na posesivnost kao kognitivnu kategoriju i one u kojima se raspravlja o izricanju posesivnosti u pojedinim jezicima. Karakter cijele knjige najbolje ilustriraju prve dvije rečenice uvodne riječi urednika: "Possession is a very elusive notion. It is a complex and vague notion which in order to be expressed has to draw on different linguistic structures" (str. 1).

U ovom prikazu nećemo se posebno zadržavati na pojedinačnim člancima već ćemo samo prokomentirati neke priloge, koji po našem mišljenju zaslužuju posebnu pažnju. Kao što je već spomenuto, jedan se dio priloga u knjizi odnosi na izricanje (kodiranje) posesivnosti u različitim jezicima, i opći je zaključak da ni jedan od analiziranih jezika nema posebnu konstrukciju koja bi služila isključivo za izricanje posesivnosti, a isto tako konstrukcije koje se koriste za izricanje posesivnosti imaju i druge uporabe i značenja. Tako, na primjer, u španjolskome konstrukcija *N de N* ima dvanaest različitih značenja ili uporaba, od kojih se samo neke mogu svrstati u posesivne konstrukcije (npr. one koje označavaju rodbinske odnose *El padre de Juan* 'Juanov otac' ili odnos između cjeline i dijela *Las ramas del árbol* 'grane drveta'), ali ne i one koje označavaju uzrok (*El ruido del coche* 'buka automobila') ili proizvođača (*Los televisores de Philips* 'Philipsovi televizori') (vidi Müllerov prilog, te prilog I. Bartning, koja opisuje sličnu višeznačnost konstrukcije *NP de NP* u francuskome).

U zanimljiviju i relevantniju skupinu članaka mogu se ubrojiti, pored jako dobrog i instruktivnog uvoda, članci u kojima se pojmu posesivnosti prilazi iz teorijskog aspekta uz nužnu ilustraciju primjerima iz indoeuropskih i tzv. egzotičnih jezika.

Posesivnost je, kao i većina drugih metajezčnih pojmova, intuitivno prilično jasan pojam i svaki će ga obrazovani laik lako povezati s glagolima *imati*, *posjedovati*, *pripadati*. No iako između rečenica *Ivan ima/posjeduje kuću* i *Kuća pripada Ivanu* možda nema bitne razlike na planu izvanjezične stvarnosti ili na planu logičke analize istinosne vrijednosti sudova, razlike na planu lingvističkog kodiranja itekako su očite. Uz glagol *imati* i njegove ekvivalente u drugim jezicima (npr. *have*, *haben*) posesor je kodiran kao subjekt/tema, dok je uz *pripadati* (*belong*, *gehören*) posesum subjekt/tema. Razlike su vidljive i na semantičkom planu. Od sedam vrsti posjedovanja koje razlikuje Heine (fizičko posjedovanje, privremeno posjedovanje, trajno posjedovanje,

neotuđivo posjedovanje, apstraktno posjedovanje, neživo neotuđivo posjedovanje, neživo otuđivo posjedovanje) pripadnost ima semantička obilježja TRAJNOST i NEOTUĐIVOST. Osim toga, u jezicima koji koriste članove za obilježavanje određenosti/neodređenosti, posesum je neodređen u rečenicama s glagolom *imati* (*I have a dog*), dok je u konstrukcijama s glagolom *pripadati* određen (*The dog belongs to me*).

Međutim, kada treba dati lingvistički plauzibilnu karakterizaciju posesivnosti, semasiološki i onomasiološki pristup čine se podjednako bezizglednima. Semasiološki je pristup jednostavno nemoguć zato što nije poznat jezik (a procjenjuje se da ih ima između 4000 i 6000) u kome bi postojala morfosintaktička konstrukcija koja bi služila isključivo za kodiranje posesivnosti. Kao što se vidi iz nekoliko priloga, čak se ni genitiv ne može proglasiti posesivnom konstrukcijom, jer osim posesivnosti izriče i niz drugih značenja, a ni predikatne konstrukcije s glagolom *imati*, odnosno njegovim ekvivalentima u drugim jezicima, nemaju isključivo posesivno značenje.

Budući da je posesivnost kognitivna, a ne jezična kategorija, razumljivo je što se problemu posesivnosti najčešće pristupa sa onomasiološkoga staništa, no kao što je već rečeno, jezične strukture koje služe za izricanje posesivnosti istovremeno imaju i druga značenja. Prema Seileru (*Possession as an operational dimension of language*. 1993. Tübingen: Gunter Narr, str.4) posvojnost se može okarakterizirati na sljedeći način:

“Semantically, the domain of POSSESSION can be defined as bio-cultural. It is the relationship between a human being and his kinsmen, his body parts, his material belongings, his cultural and intellectual products. In a more extended view, it is the relationship between parts and wholes of an organism.”

Rezultat ovako shvaćene posesivnosti je sedam gore spomenutih tipova posesivnosti koje razlikuje Heine, od kojih su neki očito bliži prototipičnoj posesivnosti od nekih drugih (npr. neotuđivo posjedovanje bliže je prototipu od otuđivog ili apstraktnog posjedovanja).

Na morfosintaktičkom planu posesivnost se izriče kao predikatna posesivnost, atributna posesivnost i eksterna posesivnost (tzv. posesivni dativ). Tipičan primjer predikatne posesivnosti su rečenice s ekvivalentima glagola *have*, no i unutar te kategorije, kao i unutar druge dvije kategorije, postoji cijela skala ‘posesivnosti’ – od *Mary has a daughter* preko *Mary has a pen* do *Mary has a cold*.

U nastavku ovog prikaza ukratko ćemo se osvrnuti na četiri priloga koji po našem mišljenju zaslužuju posebnu pozornost (uz već spomenuti, izrazito lokalistički orijentirani uvod Michaela Herslunda i Irène Baron).

Od općeg karaktera knjige odstupa Heltoftov prilog o indiretnom objektu i komitivu u danskom. U današnje vrijeme, kad se većina lingvista, bez obzira na teorijsko opredjeljenje, slaže da gramatičke relacije (subjekt, direktni i indirektni objekt) treba nezavisno opisati na planu morfosintakse, semantike i pragmatike vraćanje na Hjelmsjevljevu distinkciju između plana izraza i plana sadržaja u najmanju je ruku čudno i takav se prilog teško uklapa u ostale priloge u knjizi. Prema Heltoftu, semantičke su uloge specifične za svaki pojedini jezik. U rečenici *Ole spiller fodbal met Peter* 'Ole igra nogomet s Peterom', Peter je ko-subjekt, a u pasivnoj rečenici nominalni izraz kodiran kao subjekt predstavlja subjekt na planu izraza, a subjekt na planu sadržaja je tradicionalni logički subjekt koji odgovara semantičkom agensu. Tvrdnja da je subjekt u jeziku s fiksnim redom riječi kao što je danski semantički neproziran nikako ne opravdava pridruživanje sintaktičke funkcije subjekt argumentima predikata sa sintaktičkim funkcijama direktni ili indirektni objekt, odnosno iščitavanje sintaktičke funkcije argumenata predikata iz semantičke valencije glagola. U slučaju posesivnih konstrukcija to znači da "the IO is an object that is at the same time qualified as the content subject of *få 'get'*" (str. 121). To znači da rečenica s uopćenim subjektom *De tildete kongen en ubetydelig rolle* 'Oni su kralju dodijelili beznačajnu ulogu' na planu sadržaja ima isti subjekt kao *Kongen fik en ubetydelig rolle* 'Kralj je imao beznačajnu ulogu', tj., imenica *kongen* je subjekt u obje rečenice, odnosno indirektni objekt kome se tradicionalno pripisuju semantičke uloge recipijent i beneficijar zapravo je semantički subjekt jer se takve rečenice mogu parafrazirati prema obrascu X ima Y, pri čemu je X indirektni objekt na planu izraza, a subjekt na planu sadržaja. Pored ovog u najmanju ruku začuđujućeg opisa gramatičkih relacija, Heltoft (str. 126) uvodi i pojam ko-subjekta (CS) da bi objasnio semantiku rečenica poput *A diskutira s B → A i B diskutiraju* "

As an expression unit, a CS is an adverbial phrase morphologically marked by the preposition *med*. As a content unit, it is an argument, a Comitative, which is never manifested itself by an expression subject, although prototypically, it shows the same content restrictions as the expression subject of the relevant clause.

Kao i u uvodu u knjigu, I. Baron i M. Herslund polaze od lokalističkog tumačenja nastanka konstrukcija s glagolom *imati* (u daljnjem tekstu *have* konstrukcije). Prema tome shvaćanju *have* konstrukcije nastale su iz egzistencijalnih konstrukcija postupnom promjenom kodiranja posesora i posesuma: egzistencijalna konstrukcija (*La maison est/existe*) → lokativna konstrukcija (*La maison est à Charles*) → posesivna konstrukcija (*Charles a une maison*). Prema mišljenju autora temeljno značenje *have* konstrukcija je lokalna relacija. Iako *have* konstrukcije, odnosno njihovi ekvivalenti u drugim jezicima imaju oblik kodiranja tipičan za tranzitivne rečenice, tj., subjekt-glagol-objekt, one su statične, a ne dinamične kao tipične tranzitivne konstrukcije. Prema mišljenju autora jedna od temeljnih karakteristika *have* kon-

strukcija je uključenost objekta u denotaciju subjekta, pri čemu se može raditi o odnosu dio-cjelina, o subjektovom posjedovanju objekta, ili o tome da objekt ima neka semantička obilježja po kojima je uključen u subjekt. Pri tome valja naglasiti da se u *have* konstrukcijama radi o posesivnosti samo kada su imenice relacijskog karaktera. Npr. u rečenici *Julie har et barn på skødet* 'Julie ima dijete u krilu' imenica *dijete* iako je objekt nije posesum i nije uključena u denotaciju subjekta kad *dijete* znači bilo koje dijete, nego je posesum lokativni izraz *u krilu*. Zbog tih razloga Baron i Herslund rečenice kao što je *On ima jedan prijedlog* opisuju kao intranzitivne, a ne kao posesivne jer posesum nije dio denotacije posesora.

Östen Dahl i Maria Kopjevskaja-Tamm uspoređuju termine koji se odnose na rodbinske odnose s ponašanjem vlastitih imenica. Dahl i Kopjevskaja-Tamm pokazuju da unatoč tome što se imenice koje označavaju rodbinske odnose često svrstavaju zajedno s imenicama koje označavaju dijelove tijela u imenice koje označavaju neotuđivu svojinu, te imenice imaju više zajedničkih svojstava s ličnim imenicama. Na primjer, u mnogim jezicima lične imenice i imenice koje označavaju rodbinske odnose imaju sljedeće zajedničke karakteristike: određenost (to jest, uporaba imenica bez determinatora), posebni afiksi koji se dodaju samo ličnim imenicama i imenicama koje označavaju rodbinske odnose, nemogućnost tvorbe plurala pomoću tvorbenih pluralnih sufiksa, tzv. grupni plural (npr. *Majka/Suna i oni s njom pošli su u grad*), odsutnost determinatora ispred imenice (*mon pare* nasuprot *a meva casa*), postojanje takozvanih rodbinskih glagola u nekim australskim i američkim jezicima. Naime, imenice koje označavaju rodbinske odnose po svojoj su prirodi relacijske, jer označavaju odnos između dva bića, a ne posesivnost u užem smislu. Relacije su, s druge strane, tipične za odnos između predikatora (glagola) i njegovih argumenata, te stoga ne čudi da neki jezici taj odnos kodiraju na isti način kao i tipične tranzitivne konstrukcije. S druge strane, u slučajju rodbinskih odnosa ipak se radi o statičnom a ne dinamičnom odnosu, što se jasno odražava u činjenici da se za izricanje tog odnosa češće koriste imenske fraze (s atributom u prepoziciji ili postpoziciji). No, ni među imenicama koje označavaju rodbinske odnose sve se imenice ne ponašaju jednako nego se među njima može izdvojiti takozvani roditeljski prototip, tj. imenice koje označavaju prvu uzlaznu generaciju (otac/tata; majka/mama) imaju više zajedničkih svojstava s ličnim imenicama nego imenice koje se odnose na istu generaciju (brat, sestra) ili na bliske rođake (bratić, sestrična, stric, ujak).

U posljednjem prilogu u knjizi Bernd Heine, čija je knjiga *Possession: Cognitive sources, forces, and grammaticalization* (1997., Cambridge University Press) učinila znatan utjecaj na sve priloge u ovoj knjizi, sažima problem posesivnosti na sljedeći način: (i) posesivnost je prilično stabilan koncept koji se javlja u svim kulturama i svim jezicima; (ii) ne postoji univerzalna jezična struktura koja bi bila zajednička svim posesivnim konstrukcijama; (iii) kon-

strukcije koje služe za izricanje posesivnosti služe i za izricanje drugih koncepta; (iv) koncept posesivnosti izriče se jezičnim jedinicama kojima izricanje posesivnosti nije primarna funkcija; (v) činjenica da između jezičnih jedinica koje služe za izricanje posesivnosti i samog koncepta posesivnosti ne postoji odnos jedan-prema-jedan nije iznenađujuća, ali zahtijeva objašnjenje. Od dva temeljna načina izricanja posesivnosti (predikatnoga i atributnoga) Heine za predikatni način izricanja posesivnosti objašnjenje nalazi u kognitivnim shemama kao što su radnja, lokacija, egzistencijalne konstrukcije, komitativne konstrukcije, itd. Razlog za izvođenje posesivnih konstrukcija iz drugih, temeljnijih kognitivnih shema Heine vidi u apstraktnosti pojma posesivnost (ukradenu jabuku teško je razlikovati od neukradene), jer lakše je lingvistički kodirati što se s nečim dešava, gdje se što nalazi, što se nečemu dešava ili s kime ili čime se što nalazi.

Ova knjiga predstavlja značajan doprinos proučavanju posesivnosti i podjednako će koristiti čitateljima zainteresiranima za teorijske aspekte posesivnosti, kao i onima koji su zainteresirani za kontrastivnu analizu izricanja posesivnosti u različitim jezicima. No iako će nakon čitanja čitatelj više saznati o posesivnosti, sama posesivnost ostat će i nadalje teško uhvatljiv i shvatljiv pojam.

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Faarlund, Jan Terje, ed. (2001). *Grammatical Relations in Change*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Studies in Language Companion Series 56. Str. viii + 326. € 110.00

Grammatical Relations in Change svojevrsni je zbornik radova lingvističke radionice *Grammatical Relations and Grammatical Change* na XIV. Konferenciji o povijesnoj lingvistici u Vancouveru 1999. godine. U okviru *workshopa* u organizaciji urednika prezentirano je šest radova (W. Abraham, J. O. Askedal, J. T. Faarlund, L. Heltoft, L. Schøsler i A. Veerman-Leichsenring), a ostali radovi, s izuzetkom M. Norde, također su prezentirani na Konferenciji, te su zbog tematske sličnosti uvršteni u ovu knjigu. Radovi izdani u ovoj publikaciji mogu se tematski podijeliti na dva dijela: (i) dio koji se bavi gramatikalizacijom gramatičkih relacija (posebice subjekta) u skandinavskim jezicima i (ii) dio u kojem se isti problem razmatra u drugim jezicima (indoeuropskim i neindoeuropskim), iako članci nisu poredani tim redoslijedom. Svi prilozi (izuzevši Abrahama) mogu se svrstati u dvije kategorije. U prvoj su autori koji smatraju da je fiksiranje reda riječi bio dovoljan razlog za tipološku promjenu od sintetičkog k analitičkom jeziku (vidi poznati Keenanov (1978) princip kovarijacije funkcionalnih elemenata. U drugoj su skupini autori koji smatraju da se gore spomenuta tipološka promjena ne može objasniti samo međusobnim utjecajem reda riječi na gubitak padežnog kodiranja, jer su u određenim sinkronijskim periodima oba sustava koegzistirala.

Budući da prilozi u knjizi nisu napisani u okviru bilo koje od međusobno suprotstavljenih teorija za njeno čitanje dovoljno je opće lingvističko obrazovanje, što je svakako dobrodošla vijest za čitatelje koji nisu isključivi poklonici jedne teorije. Naslov knjige pomalo je zbunjujući jer asocira na Perlmutter-Postalovu teoriju relacijske gramatike, no naziv gramatička relacija u knjizi se koristi kao ekvivalent za tradicionalniji pojam sintaktička funkcija (subjekt, direktni i indirektni objekt).

Pored uvoda, koji je napisao urednik, knjiga sadrži 11 priloga: 1. Werner Abraham: *How far does semantic bleaching go: About grammaticalization that does not terminate in functional categories* (15-63); 2. John Ole Askedal: *'Oblique subjects', structural and lexical case marking: Some thoughts on case assignment in North Germanic and German* (65-97); 3. Jan Terje Faarlund: *The notion of oblique subject and its status in the history of Icelandic* (99-135); 4. Elly van Gelderen: *Towards personal subjects in English: Variation in feature interpretability* (137-157); 5. Alice C. Harris: *Focus and uni-*

versal principles governing simplification of cleft structures (159-170); 6. Lars Heltoft: *Recasting Danish subjects: Case system, word order and subject development* (171-204); 7. Alana Johns: *Ergative to accusative: Comparing evidence from Inktitut* (205-221); 8. D. Garry Miller: *Subject and object in Old English and Latin copular deontics* (223-239); 9. Muriel Norde: *The loss of lexical case in Swedish* (241-272); 10. Lene Schøsler: *The coding of the subject-object distinction from Latin to Modern French* (273-302); 11. Annete Veerman-Leichsenring: *Changes in Popolocan word order and clause structure* (303-322).

Članak Wenera Abrahama donekle odstupa od ostalih priloga u ovoj knjizi jer Abraham ne govori o korelaciji između gubitka padežnog kodiranja i fiksiranja reda riječi. Dok ostali autori pod gramatičkim relacijama podrazumijevaju tradicionalne sintaktičke funkcije subjekt, izravni i neizravni objekt, Abraham govori o procesu gramatikalizacije leksičkih elemenata u funkcionalne elemente koje ilustrira primjerima gramatikalizacije modalnih glagola u njemačkom kao ilokucijskih modalnih čestica, gramatikalizacije infinitivnog prijedloga i djelomičnog semantičkog izbljeđivanja modalnih čestica u njemačkom i nizozemskom. Abraham smatra da gramatikalizacija nužno ne dovodi do pretvaranja leksičkih elemenata u funkcionalne morfeme (samostalna riječ → enklitika → afiks) uz popratno semantičko izbljeđivanje do gotovo potpunog gubitka značenja.

John Ole Askedal ukazuje na to da su se kontinentalni skandinavski jezici razvijali u pravcu topološkog kodiranja gramatičkih relacija i postupno gubili padežno kodiranje subjekta, izravnog i neizravnog objekta; s druge strane, 'otočki' skandinavski jezici (islandski i farski) zadržali su padežno kodiranje gramatičkih relacija, tako da u njima postoje ne samo subjekti u kosim padežima već se javljaju i neke kombinacije izravnog i neizravnog objekta koje se ne javljaju u drugim germanskim jezicima. Tako, na primjer, pored najčešćeg subjekta u nominativu subjekt može biti i u dativu, akuzativu ili genitivu, a uz dvovalentne glagole pored uobičajenog redosljedada nominativ-dativ-akuzativ javljaju se još i kombinacije nominativ-dativ-genitiv ili nominativ-dativ-dativ. Ove razlike ukazuju na utjecaj arealne izolacije 'otočkih' skandinavskih jezika u odnosu na kontinentalne skandinavske jezike, ali Askedal ne navodi uvjerljive sintaktičke dokaze da ove razlike u morfološkom kodiranju imaju i jasne sintaktičke posljedice.

Urednik Jan Terje Faarlund raspravlja o statusu takozvanog subjekta u kosom padežu u modernom islandskom i staroislandskom. Pod subjektom u kosom padežu podrazumijeva se imenski izraz u dativu, a rjeđe u akuzativu ili genitivu koji pokazuje neka relevantna svojstva identična s kanoničkim subjektom u nominativu. Za razliku od drugih germanskih jezika u kojima su gubitak padežnog kodiranja i fiksiranje reda riječi doveli do tipološke prom-

jene sintetički jezik → analitički jezik u islandskome je dijakronijski proces tekao suprotnim smjerom. Prema Faarlundu, u staroislandskom postoji samo jedan pouzdan kriterij za razlikovanje subjekta u kosom padežu od subjekta u nominativu ili objekta, dok u modernom islandskom subjekt u kosom padežu zauzima položaj subjekta, služi kao antecedent refleksivne zamjenice bilo u istoj ili u zavisnoj rečenici i može se izostaviti u slučaju koordinacije dvaju rečenica ukoliko je koreferentan sa subjektom ili objektom u glavnoj rečenici.

Lars Heltoft ukazuje na to da dok je u staroskandinavskom subjekt bio neobvezan, kodiran pomoću nominativa i imao poziciju slobodu u rečenici, u modernom danskom subjekt je obvezan i može se pojaviti samo u inicijalnom položaju u rečenici ili kao treća konstituenta, a gramatičke relacije nisu više kodirane pomoću padeža. Heltoft promatra subjekt u danskom u okviru obavijesne strukture rečenice i zaključuje da je subjekt uvijek tema. Padežno kodiranje subjekta zadržalo se još samo u pronominalnoj paradigmi u kojoj je u trećem licu došlo do zanimljive reinterpetacije padežnog kodiranja. Nominativni oblik zamjenice trećeg lica jednine koristi se samo kao anaforički oblik (npr., kao antecedent nerestriktivne relativne rečenice), dok se kao subjekt upotrebljava zamjenica u akuzativu. Na dijakronijskom planu, u skandinavskim su se jezicima dogodile brojne promjene: promjena tipa subjekta (subjekt umjesto tematskih uloga kodira predikacijsku strukturu; gotovo potpuni gubitak padežnog kodiranja osim kod nekolicine zamjenica; fiksiranje reda riječi, s time da je neobilježeni red riječi u zavisnim rečenicama SVO ili SAVO jer adverbijalne oznake ili negacija obvezno zauzimaju položaj ispred glagola. Heltoft pokazuje da danski donekle odstupa od tih glavnih tendencija karakterističnih za razvoj modernih skandinavskih jezika iz staroskandinavskog. U Danskom je, naime, došlo do reinterpetacije reda riječi u skladu s tematskom strukturom rečenice tako da subjekt uvijek zauzima položaj rezerviran za temu.

Prilog Muriel Norde još je jedan doprinos diskusijama o gubitku padežnog kodiranja gramatičkih relacija u švedskom. Norde taj proces promatra u svjetlu načela jezične ekonomije: između govornika, koji želi svoju poruku učiniti što jednostavnijom i slušatelja, koji želi primiti što eksplicitniju poruku javlja se konflikt koji na planu kodiranja rezultira postupnim nestajanjem morfološkoga kodiranja gramatičkih relacija uz popratno fiksiranje reda riječi, odnosno prelazak s leksičkog/inherentnog/tematskog kodiranja gramatičkih relacija na njihovo strukturno kodiranje. S druge strane, neke vrste riječi (npr. zamjenice, pridjevi u službi atributa) zadržavaju svoju fleksiju uz znatnu redukciju morfološki različitih oblika. Defleksija (gubitak padežnog kodiranja) u starošvedskom povezana je s istovremenom pojavom perifrastičnih konstrukcija, no nije sasvim jasno da li je gubitak padeža uzrokovao pojavu adnominalnih konstrukcija, ili je njihova pojava uzrokovala gubitak padeža. No u svakom slučaju to su bila dva konkurentna načina kodiranja gramatičkih

relacija, što je bilo vrlo neekonomično. Konačan rezultat ovakvih dijakronijskih procesa je taj da u modernom švedskom u kompleksnoj nominalnoj frazi nastavke za padež, rod i broj obično ima samo pridjev, dok determinator(i) i imenica nemaju morfološke nastavke, što pokazuje da švedski još nije postigao onaj stupanj analitičnosti koji nalazimo u engleskom.

Van Gelderen istražuje gubitak neosobnih staroengleskih konstrukcija u svjetlu gubitka inherentnog/leksičkog/tematskog pridruživanja padeža i prelaska na strukturno padežno pridruživanje, odnosno dijakronijski razvoj staroengleskog od sintetičkog jezika u moderni engleski kao analitički jezik. Neosobnim konstrukcijama van Gelderen smatra rečenice u kojima nema subjekta u nominativu, nego je subjekt u dativu, iako ne navodi nikakve sintaktičke dokaze o subjektnosti dativa. (vidi priloge Askedala i Faarlunda o staroislandskome). Neosobne konstrukcije, posesivne i pasivne konstrukcije u *Beowulfu* pokazuju postupni sinkretizam dativa i akuzativa najprije kod zamjenica prvog i drugog lica, a zatim i kod zamjenica trećeg lica. Gubitak padežnog kodiranja i postupno fiksiranje reda riječi doveli su i do drukčijeg sustava pridruživanja padeža. Dok se u staroengleskom padež pridruživao na temelju tematskih uloga argumenata kao inherentni/leksički/tematski padež, u modernom engleskom padež se pridružuje strukturno (kategorijalno), tj. prema položaju imenskog izraza u odnosu na glagol. Zbog leksičkog pridruživanja padeža transformacije nisu u staroengleskom mijenjale gramatičke relacije, kao što se vidi iz sljedeće pasivne rečenice s pacijensom u dativu *Him wæs full boren* (doslovce *Him was cup carried* 'Njemu je donijeta šalica').

Gary Miller opisuje dva tipa deontičkih konstrukcija s kopulom u staroengleskom. Prvi je tip po njegovu mišljenju nastao transformacijom nominalnog izraza u položaj subjekta (npr., *Little is to do*) i kasnije se razvio u pasivni tip konstrukcije (*Little is to be done*). Drugi je tip nastao pomicanjem upitne zamjenice (WH Movement) i imao je subjekt u dativu, kao u rečenici *Hwet is us to donne* ('Što nam je činiti?'), a kasnije se razvio u konstrukciju sa strukturno pridruženim subjektom i deontičkim modalom. Miller ne navodi nikakve argumente u korist analize dativa kao subjekta, te se postavlja pitanje ne bi li se takve rečenice prije mogle svrstati u rečenice s obezličnim subjektom o kojima piše van Gelderen.

Alana Jones analizira različitu rasprostranjenost antpasivnih konstrukcija u inuktitskom, jeziku koji se govori od Aljaske do Grenlanda. Na tako velikom području postoji niz dijalekata od kojih su oni na krajnjem zapadu i oni na krajnjem istoku međusobno gotovo posve nerazumljivi, s time što su zapadni dijalekti konzervativniji i čvsto se drže ergativno-apsolutivne tipologije. Što se odmiče dalje prema istoku, dijalekti pokazuju sve više svojstava nominativno-akuzativnih jezika, odnosno na djelu je tipološka promjena od erga-

tivno-apsolutivnoga prema nominativno-akuzativnom kodiranju gramatičkih relacija.

Prema Rene Schøsler, razvoj modernog francuskog iz latinskog jezika preko starofrancuskog i srednjefrancuskog nužno je promatrati na leksičkoj razini kroz valencijsku glagola, pri čemu Schøsler misli na selekcijska ograničenja, na morfološkoj razini (kodiranje nominalnih izraza i glagola), te na razini linearizacije jezičnih struktura. Nestajanje morfološkog kodiranja subjekta i objekta i fiksiranje reda riječi ne mogu po mišljenju Schøsler dostatno objasniti razvoj francuskog u analitički jezik, jer je već u starofrancuskom došlo do potpunog gubitka padežnog kodiranja u nominalnoj paradigmi, ali red riječi je još uvijek bio relativno slobodan. Do defleksije došlo je prvo kod jednine neživih imenica ženskoga roda, a fleksija se zadržala još samo u pronominalnoj paradigmi. Ove promjene nisu odjednom zahvatile cijelo govorno područje francuskog već su se postupno širile od zapada prema sjeveroistoku. U pogledu postupnog razvoja iz izrazito sintetičkog jezika (latinski) u analitički jezik, francuski se kao romanski jezik ne razlikuje od germanskih jezika opisanih u ovoj knjizi.

Harris ispituje dijakronijski razvoj fokusnih konstrukcija u sjevernoistočnim kavkaskim jezicima, koji čine posebnu porodicu jezika s ukupno 30 jezika. Specifičnost je fokusnih konstrukcija u tome što one nastaju od biklauzalnih konstrukcija u kojima svaka klauza zadržava svoje sintaktičke osobine. U prijelaznoj fazi fokusne konstrukcije imaju neke osobine biklauzalnih, a neke monoklauzalnih konstrukcija. U trećoj fazi konstrukcija ima sve osobine monoklauzalnih konstrukcija, tako da je predikat glavne rečenice kontrolor sročnosti i nekih drugih karakteristika u uloženoj rečenici unatoč prisutnosti predikata uložene rečenice. Gornje tri faze dijakronijskog razvoja monoklauzalnih fokusnih konstrukcija iz biklauzalnih konstrukcija ilustrirane su primjerima iz sjevernoistočnih kavkaskih jezika dargi i udi.

Annete Veerman-Leichsenring opisuje sintaktičke promjene u popolokanskoj porodici jezika, koja ima oko 100000 govornika u području južno od Mexico City-a. U popolokanskim jezicima osnovni red riječi bio je VSO s time što je subjekt, a uz mali broj glagola i objekt koji označava živo ljudsko biće bio inkorporiran u glagol. U svrhu fokusa subjekt ili objekt mogli su se javiti i u položaju ispred glagola, ali se u tome slučaju na njihovu mjestu iza glagola javljala koreferentna zamjenica ili imenica kako bi se sačuvao osnovni red riječi. Tijekom dijakronijskog razvoja, a pod utjecajem španjolskoga, jer svi su govornici popolokanskih jezika bilingvalni, došlo je do različitih sintaktičkih promjena, od potpune promjene reda riječi u SVO i gubitka koreferentnih zamjenica, preko reda riječi SVO i djelomičnog zadržavanja koreferentnih zamjenica do potpunog zadržavanja gore opisanog početnog stanja.

Ova knjiga predstavlja značajan doprinos razumijevanju razvoja kodiranja gramatičkih relacija, ali istovremeno ukazuje i na to da se prelazak sa sintetičkog na analitičko kodiranje gramatičkih relacija ne može objasniti samo međusobnim utjecajem fiksiranja reda riječi i difleksijom, jer su u određenim sinkronijskim presjecima koegzistirala oba sustava, odnosno da je tumačenje prema kome je fiksiranje reda riječi uzrokovalo difleksiju, i obrnuto, difleksija je bila uzrokom fiksiranja reda riječi previše pojednostavljeno i da su nužna dodatna istraživanja.

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Main: Peter Lang.

Being now the leading movement in the field of linguistics, cognitive theory has proved able to cover various facets of human life, such as literature, culture studies, language education, lexicography and many others. The present volume offers a further valuable contribution to an attempt to present the current achievements in the application of cognitive theory in practice. It is a collection of papers presented at the first international cognitive linguistics conference in Poland, held at the Faculty of Philology of the University of Łódź on 19-23 April 2001, or rather a selection of papers from general sessions and with the participation of some invited plenary speakers.

As the organizers of the conference and the the editors of these proceedings point out, the overall themes of the conference were interdisciplinarity, applicability and research methodology in Cognitive Linguistics. The volume duly reflects these guidelines, so that it comprises the following major parts: *Theory and Method*, *Figures of Thought*, *Cognition and Pragmatics*, *Case Studies* and *Applied Studies*. This division into rather neutral but informative headings furnishes the reader with a roadmap to navigate his/her way through a considerate body of literature (clocking in at approximately 700 pages and presenting no less than 42 papers, this volume can boast to be a huge body indeed), with diverse theoretical concerns and approaches, and authors with the whole gamut of scholarly backgrounds and affiliations, the latter including scholars from Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Croatia, Hungary, France, Germany, Sweden, Spain and the United States. This, too, gives an idea of how demanding a task was the enterprise of editing such a varied host of authors and their ideas, and this is why Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk and Kamila Turewicz both deserve praise.

Given the limited length of this review, in what follows I will concentrate on the articles which seem to me to identify some overarching themes of this collection or which I find particularly worthy of highlighting.

The first part, *Theory and Method*, which deals with theoretical and methodological questions prompted by the cognitive approach to linguistic issues, is opened by a Ronald W. Langacker's article *Theory, method, and description in cognitive grammar: A case study*. This invaluable contribution by the

founder of Cognitive Grammar presents another insightful overview of the possibilities this theory can offer to a scholar truly interested in this subfield of Cognitive Linguistics, by reintroducing some well known points of reference like PROFILING and TRAJECTOR/LANDMARK ORGANIZATION of a linguistic expression. What Langacker sets as a main focus of this paper is to explain his PRIMARY WORKING STRATEGY in applying CG, i.e. what are the descriptive constructs which make it operative. The underlying evidence for these constructs should have its sources in the necessity for the particular construct to be able to describe, in semantic terms, multiple phenomena in various languages, it must be linked to certain observable cognitive ability, and it must be relevant in explaining various grammatical phenomena. Langacker follows these prerequisites in the sense that he applies several of his descriptive constructs in his case study of English and Mixtec locatives where he opposes the descriptive construct of setting or location vs. participant. Whereas English uses prepositional phrases as typical locative elements, Mixtec, an Otoman-guean language spoken in Mexico, possesses nothing similar to the word class of prepositions and instead makes use of, most frequently nominal, compounds involving body-part terms. The common point of reference in both linguistic tools is the SEARCH DOMAIN, or “the region to which a locative expression confines its trajectory” (p. 25). The search domain would thus be the vicinity of the most salient landmark located in the process of looking for something. Mixtec examples show an amazing interplay of the metaphoric and metonymic forces influencing the choice of the landmark: the metaphoric extension of the element ‘head_tree’ (‘at the top of the tree/over the tree/on the tree’) and its metonymic reference to the adjacent regions in space create a characteristic locative expression, when the location becomes a referent instead of the participant previously construed as body representing a reference object. The author shows later on that English, diachronically speaking, developed some of its prepositional forms from nouns denoting body parts (*ahead of, behind etc.*) and as a further argument stresses the fact that the difference between a preposition and a locational or relational noun becomes relevant only when there obtains a shift of the profile, since, otherwise, locational nouns have all the properties of a preposition: a reference object, a region in space in relation to it and something that occupies that region. With this example Langacker managed to support his initial motivation for developing his working strategy: it is relevant in the sense of the use certain descriptive constructs may have in the typological study; these constructs are based on psychologically and linguistically well motivated evidence; it provides the systematic explanation of the grammaticalisation process of the locatives.

In another interesting paper from this section, *Polysemy: Mechanism and research methodology*, Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk provides an outstanding overview of the treatment polysemy has received in the scope of Cognitive Linguistics as opposed to some, more traditional approaches. This

approach dictates the erasing of the “crisp boundaries between the lexicon and syntax and between semantics and pragmatics”, one of the foundations of the cognitive approach to language. The source for the so called *multisemy cline* formed by homonymy, polysemy and vagueness are various radial categories which cater for different cognitive domains governing the typology of polysemy. The author then accounts for specific subsenses within this typology, distinguishing between regular polysemy or ALLOSEMY when different segments of the concept are profiled (*door* with a reference to the surface of the object, the whole object, or the lock only) and polysemy in a single domain, which, furthermore subsumes metonymy, synecdoche and antonymous polysemy. She then goes on to describe rather rare examples of antonymous polysemy which presents diachronically connected, but lexically divergent senses of a linguistic unit. The examples she uses are taken from English and Polish, showing that various languages make use of the same cognitive system of different linguistic profiling and construal of the outside world. The further subcategories of polysemy are RADIAL POLYSEMY and CROSS-DOMAIN POLYSEMY which involve each other, as well as certain metaphonymic extensions and the processes of cognitive blending. The methodological approach she proposes is an eclectic one, following Newman’s observation that Cognitive Linguistics in general cannot boast to have a unique methodology. It should be our goal to rely on the variety of information ensuing from various scientific fields, e.g. psychology, dialectology, historical linguistics. In sum, this quite informative piece of work whets our appetite for the forthcoming *Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, edited by D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens, where we should hopefully find an even more extensive account by the same author of the polysemy as a very intriguing linguistic structure.

It is the second part of the volume, the part dealing with “figures of thought”, as the editors put it wittily, that I consider probably the most interesting part of the book, since all the papers included are highly relevant and based on real-life evidence. Apart from Wengorek-Dolecka (*The discordant schema: On interpreting irony*), who studies ironic utterances in the light of Fauconnier’s *mental spaces* and claims that irony is far from being just a rhetorical figure but is a full-fledged cognitive category undergoing on-line modifications of the cognitive domains involved in the discourse, all other papers deal with either metaphor or metonymy.

This section on figures of speech gets off to a flying start with Kövecses’s article *Language, emotion, mind*, where he offers an extensive overview of the metaphoric and metonymic basis of the language of emotion, morality and rational thought. The novelty of his approach to these, according to the author ubiquitous subjects, is his introduction of the force-dynamics theory, originally proposed by Lenard Talmy, in the process of describing the metaphoric conceptualization of the three above mentioned linguistic and conceptual do-

mains. Kövecses's constant search for an underlying metaphor for emotion as a target domain has found its answer in *force* being the typical source domain (Kövecses, 2000). He found, however, that the same source domain can be valid for morality and rational thought as well, and the connection can be traced to Lakoff's Event Structure metaphor which states that CAUSES ARE FORCES. If we assume that i. causes lead to emotion, and ii. emotion leads to some response, we can immediately spot the elements of the Event Structure metaphor. In addition, taking into account the notions of the force-dynamics theory, the author introduces the elements of an AGONIST and ANTAGONIST as force entities playing the major role in the conceptualization of the target and source domains and the element of the RESULTANT OF THE FORCE INTERACTION as a final scenario of the metaphor. These elements become evident in all the variants of the emotion metaphor: EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT/A NATURAL FORCE/A PHYSIOLOGICAL FORCE/A PHYSICAL FORCE.

What comes up as an interesting result is that in the other two target domains we find the roles of an agonist and antagonist distributed differently with regard to the resultant action: in the emotion metaphor the rational 'self-agonist' undergoes change, in the morality metaphor the rational 'self-agonist' withstands the change, and in the thought metaphor we shall find the 'self-antagonist' causing the change in thought.

Tomasz P. Krzeszowski considers the theory of metaphor in the light of the issue of the directionality of the metaphoric mapping and the function of the verbal and non-verbal expressions of the source domain in a metaphoric concept. He creates a mirror image of metaphor and studies the realization of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor through verbal and non-verbal means as described in *Pan Tadeusz*, the Polish national epic by Adam Mickiewicz and its film version by Andrzej Wajda. The scope of the properties of this metaphor in this poetic model stretches from the written argument to physical fight, with the corresponding increase in the number of referents to the above metaphor. He concludes his study arguing for the inseparability of the verbal and non-verbal aspects of human communication.

In the article by Rita Brdar-Szabó and Mario Brdar *MANNER-FOR-ACTIVITY metonymy in a cross-linguistic perspective*, the reader will discern the importance of cross-linguistic study of metonymy and metaphor. On the example of the above mentioned metonymy with predicatively used adjectives in the scope of a linguistic action, they show that there is a striking contrast between English and some other Indoeuropean languages (German, Croatian, Russian, Hungarian) concerning the frequency of their usage. A contrastive analysis of an abundance of data makes it possible to extract some interesting conclusions: that the four languages share the feature of paraphrasing the English predicative adjectives with the target verbs of linguistic action, or addition-

ally, cognitive action and behaviour and that, in their case, the active zone subsuming the metonymic extension of predicative adjectives shows a tendency of being specified by an adverbial clause, rather than by prepositional or postpositional phrases, the former being characteristic of English.

This article, with some other in this volume dealing with cross-linguistic issues (Janda's, Pskit's) shows a growing importance of comparing different linguistic systems within the framework of cognitive linguistic. This approach, although seemingly of interest mainly to European cognitivists, would provide the perspective of the cognitive undertow which has been directing the linguistic expression in various directions, as shown by the above article as well.

Antonio Barcelona's article *On the ubiquity and multiple-level operation of metonymy* can be commended for clearly organizing different developmental strands in the field of metonymy, especially in connection to various attempts of many cognitivists to relate it to other cognitive mechanisms, such as metaphor and conceptual blending. Barcelona puts metonymy decidedly in the foreground of all cognitive research, opting to characterize it as the process of: "mapping, within the same overall cognitive domain, of a cognitive (sub)domain, called the source, onto another cognitive (sub)domain, called the target, so that the latter is mentally activated" (p. 208).

He attempts to show how metonymy pervades all fields of linguistic study and how layers of metonymic mappings can be revealed in all traditional levels of linguistic analysis, including lexicology, phonology and grammar. He also promotes its central function in categorization, i.e. in the organization of a category in terms of subcategories, but goes on to relate it to propositional models and some non-linguistic aspects of human communication, such as the iconicity of some conventional symbols and gestures, as well as to its pragmatic role in descriptive discourse where an aspect of an event described evokes metonymically its whole scenario.

Further interesting points are made with reference to the phonological scope of the metonymy investigation, where e.g. certain allophones trigger the recognition and use of another allophone of the same phoneme, and the connection between metonymy and grammar is described on examples of Langacker's *active zone metonymies*, where an element of the clause can be interpreted metonymically as a reference point for an active zone, e.g. relational predicate, so that the verb *begin* in the following example:

Zelda began a novel.

would imply different possibilities of interpretation within the NP active zone *a novel*: 'write/read a novel'. Barcelona finds metonymy especially prominent in the process of noun to verb conversion, and later on, in its use in paragon names as further evidence of grammatical recategorization.

Barcelona's paper is a showcase of insistence on the key-role of metonymy in different cognitive processes and proves an invaluable contribution to supporting Langacker's idea of the continuum between different aspects of language and cognition and language itself.

The papers in the section *Cognition and Pragmatics* is, in my personal opinion, are only tangentially connected to cognitive theory in general. The pragmatists may seem interested in the cognitive processes of the spoken discourse for example, but what they mostly do is to connect the linguistic level to the psychological grounding of an utterance.

Jef Verschueren points out in his paper *Pragmatic aspects of culture and cognition* that he will concentrate on the "profoundly pragmatic" aspect of culturally instigated (in)equality of people at the expense of the *culture-cognition nexus*, as he calls it, and presents four case studies of human interaction influenced by different cultural (pre)conceptions.

After presenting a short historical overview of how social plurality has been treated in different cultural environments, Verschueren concentrates on the race issue in the present U.S.A. Basing his belief on four different stories of people with different racial and national backgrounds, he claims that people are still far away from accepting the theory that an individual has multiple identities. Sooner or later, he or she becomes defined by a particular subset of this multiple identity (race, nationality, sex etc.), which further influences mutual interaction and the conception of others.

Another pragmatic account, offered by Piotr Cap in his article *Cognitive psychology and linguistic politeness: an interactional model of political rhetoric analysis*, concentrates on the novel feature of discourse analysis theory, namely, of linguistic politeness which is exemplified by a detailed study of 'NATO language' as used by some NATO politicians during the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. His introduction is dedicated to different theories of politeness, as presented in Leech's model of discourse maxims and Brown and Levinson's 'face-threatening acts' (or FTA) theory. He then uses both theories in explaining the psychological background of processing extralinguistic findings into linguistic concepts, referring particularly to the concept of psychological consistency as opposed to linguistic ambivalence and optionality.

In Part, 4 which deals with various case studies in particular languages, but also in a crosslinguistic perspective, there are many interesting studies on how cognitive theories may be applied and subsequently revised/refined in a particularized and controlled environment of specific linguistic units.

In the case of Laura Janda's *The case for competing conceptual systems*, the title in fact half hides the topic of her paper, namely, the analysis of the case system of Slavic languages, Czech, Polish and Russian. After providing a semantic basis for the meaning of a particular case, she goes on to provide an exhaustive list of metaphoric extensions of every particular case meaning. This list will serve as a basis of comparison of the above three languages which should prove that there is a fairly systematic motivation for the specific distribution of the case usage. Janda points out that in the case system of Slavic there is no "one-to-one mapping of perceptual input and case use" (p. 360), but that the evident variation in use should be compared to choreography where the same steps (cases) and the same music (case semantics) are organized by different choreographers (linguistic communities) into different dances (case constructions). This beautiful and potentially universal analogy is later on supported by her detailed study of the three languages in their use of particular cases and the cognitive strategies the speakers use while activating a particular case form of a NP. She proposes three important types of variation in case usage: in their range and strength, their usage in construal and syntax, and in particular discrete case contrasts. As a result, it might be concluded that we can talk here about geographical dialectology of the case semantics, since there is a tendency for Czech and Polish to group at one side of the case distribution scale, whereas Russian shows a persistent tendency of offering alternative ways of case semantic expression. An additional point can be made in reference to the distribution of case contrasts: they seem to appear in small sets where these contrasts are realized in multiple instances, so that we have a wide range of overlapping cognitive categories.

Janda also provides a very interesting methodology in contrasting these three languages: in her tables we can find examples of these languages organized in clusters according to the cognitive strategies used as a justification for a particular case appearing in certain contexts. After that she offers these clusters particularized in tables with the English translation and the cases used in the original.

Although the internal organization of the paper is a bit perplexing (the tables with the original examples and the cognitive mechanisms are inserted in between the separate tables with case clusters), it nevertheless provides an excellent introduction to such a demanding area of Slavic linguistics as the Slavic case system (which is further supported by the Tabakowska's paper on the Polish instrumental later in this volume).

Further on in this section, Kamila Turewicz deals with the notion of futurity in the paper titled *What is future in the Future Simple Tense?* This excellent study of the constructs with *will* and *shall* starts off with the claim that these two modal verbs perform the function of ‘future auxiliaries’, as motivated by the Cognitive Grammar definition of modals as epistemic grounding predicates (Langacker 1987). If we put aside the claim that the sense of a tense must be connected to a synthetically modified simple verb form, Turewicz also maintains that the use of *will* and *shall* with the future time reference is motivated by their respective meaning schemas, or in other words, modal concepts, which additionally begs the question of the Future Simple Tense existing as such. The author claims that the modals acquire their modal meanings when used in sentences and not as modal verbs alone, and purports to exemplify that the underlying concept of these verbs is ‘future common prediction’, but this semantic burden of prediction or, in terms of *The Comprehensive Grammar of English* by Quirk et al., prediction and volition exempts them from the concept of tense as such.

After an exhaustive reference to the etymological and lexicological background of the lexemes *will* and *shall*, Turewicz provides the analysis of several examples which are to prove the epistemic grounding of these predications. She wraps it up by relating the nature of polysemy of these verbs to respective schemas defining the modal meanings.

In René Dirven’s paper *Recent cognitive approaches to English phrasal verbs* we are facing a complex and, in many senses, an extremely thorough picture of the latest findings in the cognitive study of English phrasal verbs. He draws on the recent studies by Tyler and Evans, Morgan, Hampe and Gries in order to show the new tendencies in the approach to these specific lexical units. Stressing the metaphorical character of Tyler and Evans’s, Morgan’s, and Hampe’s studies, Dirven then concentrates on the mainly syntactic approach Gries took in his study of transitive particle verbs. Accepting some of their findings and discussing some of the more debatable ones, Dirven stresses the need for “a fully integrated syntactic-semantic approach” (p. 484). It is, however, a pity that we are left without the reference to the theory of independent templates of purely idiomatic particle verbs and globally metaphorised particle verbs. The footnote containing the reference to this research is missing completely from this page.

The final, fifth section of this volume concludes with five applied studies of cognitive linguistic issues, two of them dealing with pedagogical application of the cognitive approach to grammar (Lapaire’s *Imaginative grammar* presents a project of applied cognitive grammar of English for non-native speakers - in this case, French junior high school students -, while Bod-

narkowa's paper deals with *The influence of cognitivism on the development of educational diagnosis*). Two other papers deal with neurocognitive issues in linguistics (Zaliwska-Okrutna), viz. in psychology (Ciepela), and finally the paper by Holmquist and Płuciennik discusses *Appearance markers*.

As for the technical execution of this volume, it can pass as overall quite good, except for the Index of Terms where there are such completely misleading entries as e.g. for *gender*: on none of 15 pages referred to could I trace the concept in question. What I found most curious was that on all the pages (except for the Langacker's paper) there was the word *sex* and/or words morphologically related to it, which leads me to the conclusion that the process of compiling the index was done by a software robot which must have confused the literal use of the word *sex* with the more appropriate grammatical sense of *gender*.

I could also notice a rather biased relationship towards the languages listed in the index: there is no link to e.g. Croatian, Hungarian, German, though these languages are discussed in some of the papers presented, but there is an abundance of pages quoted for e.g. English, which is quite unsurprising, but a bit vacuous, bearing in mind the number of papers dealing with this particular language.

As a conclusion, I might point out that an impressive picture emerges from the volume, although it is clear that organizing this huge number of papers with such a multitude of interests and performances into a meaningful whole was a very demanding task indeed. Apart from a few editorial and/or productional glitches that can be found in some of the present articles, the reader may rest assured that even these do little to detract from the benefits that can be reaped from this book.

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Pintarić, Neda (2002). *Pragmeme u komunikaciji*. Zagreb: Zavod za lingvistiku Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu.

Nakon *Govornih činova* Nade Ivanetić iz 1995. ova knjiga predstavlja drugi cjeloviti rad iz područja pragmalingvistike na hrvatskom jeziku, te prvu kontrastivnu analizu pragmatičnih fenomena, u ovom slučaju u dvije sociokulturne sredine: hrvatskoj i poljskoj. *Pragmeme u komunikaciji* teorijski, metodologijski i obuhvaćenim korpusom zaokružena je cjelina koja će zasigurno ispuniti prostor istraživanja uporabe afektivno obojenih riječi i izraza u sprezi s neverbalnim oblicima, posebice u hrvatskom jeziku, jer u poljskom je jezikoslovlju o opisivanim fenomenima znatno više pisano. U javnosti je uvriježeno pragmalingvistiku smatrati jednim od najmlađih suvremenih lingvističkih izdanaka koji je usmjeren na govor (*parole*), na onaj dio jezične djelatnosti koji se tiče namjere, volje, učinaka i zapreka pri upotrebi jezika. U udžbeničkim odredbama kao predmet pragmalingvistike navodi se odnos upotrebe jezika, na svim razinama, i izvanjezične situacije, odnosno konteksta. Među tematskim područjima izdvajaju se: deiksa, konverzacijske implikature, govorni činovi, presupozicije, ustrojstvo diskursa, itd. No, u ovoj knjizi autorica nastoji tu sliku promijeniti upozoravajući da u totalnoj komunikaciji čovjek ne upotrebljava samo jezične fenomene, stoga "opis, uporaba i djelovanje" svih komunikacijskih sredstava između govornika i recipijenta jest ono što tu znanost čini širom "i od semiologije i od filozofije."

Prvi je dio knjige pod nazivom "Razvoj ljudskoga komuniciranja", pregledno teorijske naravi, predstavlja pragmatiku kao znanost o cjelovitom ljudskom izražavanju i čiji je predmet multikodna narav ljudske komunikacije te se u tom dijelu višekratno upozorava na činjenicu kako ta znanstvena disciplina nastoji obuhvatiti i podvrgnuti temeljitoj analizi i druge čovjekove kodove, kinetički i prozodijski, koji su neopravdano u tradicionalnoj lingvistici (monokodnoj gramatici) bili zapostavljeni ili im nije pridavan veći značaj, a odnose se na neverbalnu komunikaciju koja je gledajući filogenetski i prèthodila verbalnoj. U tom početnom dijelu prikazuju se i osvjetljava put i način izražavanja i sporazumijevanja od prapovijesti koju karakterizira pojava kinetičke (gestovne) komunikacije te njezine postupne zamjene zvukom, pri čemu kao popratni element ostaje gestovni kod sve do danas. Začetke pragmatike Neda Pintarić vidi već u djelovanju retoričara koji su upozoravali i isticali vrijednost glasovnih prilagodbi te pokreta tijela i lica pri govorenju, a u kronološkom prikazu pojedinaca značajnih za razvoj pragmatike, ona izdvaja samo autore koji zapravo istražuju samo gestovni i prozodijski kod te njihovo

ujezičenje (Birdwhistell, Ekman, T.M. Nikolajeva, Knapp i dr.) Sintezu tih pogleda predstavlja INTEGRALNA GRAMATIKA, čiji su prvi model izradili Arndt i Janney 1987. (InterGramatika), i prema kojoj se na verbalne i neverbalne govorne činove ne gleda odvojeno već kao na jedinstveni i cjeloviti sustav ljudskog izražavanja. U tom dijelu se navode i jedinice pragmatike: pragmemi, govorni činovi i dikurz čiji bi hijerarhijski odnos odgovarao tradicionalnim razinama jezičnog opisa: leksem – rečenica – tekst. Glavni predmet ove knjige – PRAGMEMI – određuju se kao najniže jedinice u pragmatičkom opisu čiji je ostvaraj u jeziku leksem, a nastaju preoblikom – ujezičenjenjem ili verbalizacijom - jedinica različitih neverbalnih kodova, pri čemu oni zadržavaju svoja svojstva od onomatopejskog, afektivnog do metaforičkog. Kada je riječ o zadaćama pragmatike u budućnosti, stječe se dojam kako autorica smatra da neverbalni oblici nisu dovoljno vrednovani i da je njihovo značenje daleko veće nego što se to činilo do sada u jezikoslovlju. S tim u vezi može se postaviti i pitanje koji je smisao uvođenja temeljnih jedinica za ostala osjetilna područja, primjerice olfaktorem (za miris), gustatem (za okus) u ljudskoj komunikaciji. Teško je povjerovati da ljudi općenito (a pogotovo jezikoslovci) do sada nisu bili svjesni takvih mogućnosti komunikacije, samo što se nisu nikada dosjetili da to iskoriste. Na takav način i Chomsky dovodi u pitanje (ne)korisnost eksperimenata na životinjama kojima je zadaća prenijeti na njih osobine ljudske komunikacije.

U tom dijelu posljednje poglavlje predstavljao je prikaz razvoja pragmatike u dvije sredine: poljskoj i hrvatskoj. Pionir pragmatične misli u Poljskoj, ali i u svijetu bio je logičar A. Tarski s radom o istinitosti jezika u deduktivnim znanostima, a na to se nadovezuju i istraživanja o utjecaju konteksta na istinitost rečenice, a što se formalnim logičkim sustavom teško ili nikako ne može obuhvatiti (*Kiša je korisna* – tip je rečenice koja je poljodjelcima u danom trenutku istinita, ali vozačima zasigurno ne). Pragmatika je nezaobilazna na poljskim sveučilištima već 30 godina te je duga tradicija ostavila traga u teorijskim i praktičnim radovima autori kojih su poznati znanstvenici: A. Wierzbicka, K. Pisarkowa, A. Dąmbrowska i dr. Osobito su u području leksikografije pragmatični opisi prošireni jer se primjenjuju u natuknicama u općim rječnicima, a izrađeni su i uži, pragmatični rječnici (eufemizama, govornog jezika, psovki i prostota). U Hrvatskoj ta se znanstvena disciplina počela javljati nešto kasnije u prvom radu na katedrama stranih jezika, cjeloviti radovi izostaju (osim spomenuta dva), ali su pragmatične teme zastupljene u mnogim časopisima, posebice govorni žanrovi te leksemi i frazemi u pragmatičnoj funkciji, pri čemu posebno mjesto u popularizaciji i njezinu razvoju u posljednje vrijeme, ističe autorica, pripada skupovima Hrvatskog društva za primijenjenu lingvistiku (HDPL).

Opsežni drugi dio knjige, “Hrvatsko-poljska kontrastivna pragmatična istraživanja”, otkriva sličnosti i razlike na primjeru pragmea u ta dva jezika.

N. Pintarić na početku daje minucioznu raščlambu pragmea koja podrazumijeva 4 etape preobrazbe nejezičnog (gestovnog) koda u jezični, ali zapravo 4 tipa sadržajnih odnosa između dvaju kodova: Na prvoj se razini dobivaju gestemi – artikulirani (uzvici) i neartikulirani (usklici) zvukovi ili ekspresivi koji prate, naglašuju pokret ili su njegova posljedica. Na primjerima uzvika, vidi se relativnost svojstva motiviranosti takvih znakova, čak i u tako srodna dva jezika, primjerice pri oponašanju zvuka sata u hrvatskom se rabi *tik-tak*, a u poljskom *cyk-cyk*. Na drugom stupnju njihovom gramatikalizacijom nastaju leksogestemi, dakle jedinice uklopljene u gramatički i tvorbeni sustav, ali koje čuvaju prvotni ekspresivni (uzvični) korijen, npr. *mrmljanje/mamrot*. Na trećem su stupnju gestoleksemi (denotativi) - leksikalizirane jedinice koje su samo značenjem povezane s gestama, dakle koje simbolički predstavljaju pokret i zvuk i za koje vrijedi de Saussureovo svojstvo arbitrarnosti između pojma i akustične slike. Četvrta su etapa gestometforemi (konotativi) – jedinice nastale upotrebom riječi i fraza za opis gesta, ali koje imaju preneseno značenje, npr. *puzati - hodati na sve četiri /chodzić rączkiem*. Sve jedinice na te četiri razine ujezičenja, autorica razlaže s obzirom na značenje na 8 tipova (emocionalnost, stanje organizma, poticanje, oponašanje, pokazivanje, modalnost, stupnjevanje i ocjenjivanje, poseban izgovor pragmea). Iz tako zamišljene podjele nameće se i zaključak kako je zapravo riječ o svojevrsnom preimenovanju i preraspodjeli već opisanih postojećih jezičnih jedinica i fenomena kao što su uzvici i usklici - EKSPRESIVI, onomatopejske riječi - VERBATIVI, denotativno značenje riječi – DENOTATIV, konotativno značenje riječi - KONOTATIV, metafora – GESTOMETAFOREM. Samo kontrastivno istraživanje provedeno je na autoričinoj tipologiji koja obuhvaća kulturološke, emotivne i automatizirane pragmea.

KULTUROLOŠKI PRAGMEMI jesu oni oblici koji se usvajaju socijalizacijom, odnosno koji se uče živeći u određenoj kulturi i znak su uljudnosti, lijepog ponašanja (jezičnog bontona). S obzirom na dio razgovora u kojem se primjenjuju riječ je zapravo o pozdravima (pragmemskim formulama) na početku i kraju razgovora te o pragmemima za održavanje razgovora. Pozdravi su dijalekse, dijaloški oblici, i sociolekse jer odstupaju od sredine do sredine (vojska, škola, selo, grad...), također u pozdravima od velikog su značenja paralingvistička sredstva (jačina i boja glasa, intonacija...) koja uvijek prati i gestikulacija, zatim proksemična sredstva (udaljenost komunikatora, doba dana), spolne razlike i dr. Analiza je N. Pintarić pokazala da su unatoč jezičnoj srodnosti i religijskoj pripadnosti Poljaka i Hrvata, kulturološke razlike u pozdravima (u invocaciji i eksvokaciji) izrazite. U obraćanju kod Poljaka češća je uporaba hipokorističnih oblika, uz titulu obvezna je upotreba rodnog obilježavatelja: *pan, pani*, kod Hrvata u tim situacijama izostavljanje *gospodin i gospođa* nije znak neuljudnosti. U pozdravnim neverbalnim oblicima uočene su veće razlike: u Poljaka je češći rukoljub, ljubljenje među prijatelji-

cama i klečaj (kniks) što ga izvode djevojke pri upoznavanju. U vezi s pozdravima, autorica se osvrnula i na njihovu politizaciju u hrvatskom društvu.

U središnjem dijelu slobodne razgovorne situacije u uporabi su intervokacijski pragmemi koji su raznovrsniji od prethodnih među kojima autorica izdvaja adresativne ili pragme obraćanja koji imaju funkciju poticanja ili održavanja prijateljskog i srdačnog razgovora, uglavnom su to vokativni izrazi titula ili zvanja, ali i metaforični izrazi kojima se ističu simpatične sugovornikove osobine koje drugima to nisu: *magare jedno, budalice slatka*. Sljedeća su skupina inicijativni ili poticajni pragmemi koji čine čestice i imperativni oblici glagola (*hajde razmisli, kuži ovo, slušaj, budi pametan...*). Najsloženije intervokacijske govorne etikete čine modalni ili ocjenjivajući pragmemi kojima se pokazuje odnos prema iskazu između komunikatora ili trećih osoba, a to može biti ocjenjivanje, (ne)slaganje, vrjednovanje, čuđenje i upitnost.

EMOTIVNI PRAGMEMI – odraz su osjećaja prema komunikatorima, situaciji ili temi o kojoj se govori. Oni mogu biti iskazani semovima sadržanim u nazivima biljki, životinja, antroponima, etnonima, brojeva i prostora. Emotivno značenje kao “dubinsko” sadržano u nazivima biljaka - fitonima uglavnom se prepoznaje unutar metaforičkih sintagmi a mogu biti upotrijebljeni nazivi i samostalno (*bućoglavac, tikvan*), a služe za izricanje raznih osobina osobe kojoj se obraća ili o kojoj se govori. Podneblje u kojem se jezik upotrebljava utjecat će na izbor takvih pragmea jer dok se u hrvatskom jeziku za tamne (crne) oči kaže i *bademaste oči*, u poljskom jeziku upotrijebit će se u toj službi druga biljka pa će biti *oczy kasztanowe* (kestenjaste). U ovom poglavlju kao emotivni pragmemi u obraćanju spominju se imena ili prezimena koja sadržavaju nazive biljaka, domaće ili strane, no smatramo da bi u tom smislu mogao biti svaki vokativ proglašen pragmemom – druga je stvar kada se nekome obraća s fitonimima: *ružice, dunjo* i sl. Vrijedan je doprinos autoričin pragmatični opis zoonimima. Nazivi životinja upotrijebljeni posebice u obraćanju, lišeni su denotativnog značenja, ali i prenesenog značenja, oni su obilježeni isključivo pragmatičnim svojstvima koja su uglavnom društveno prihvaćena. Zbog te društvene prihvaćenosti postoje i brojne razlike u upotrebi zoonimnih pragmea u poljskom i hrvatskom, a što je oprimjereno navođenjem brojnih potvrda iz obaju jezika. Dio o pragmatičnim (uglavnom pejorativnim) značenjima vlastitih imena, jedan je o rijetkih primijenjenih znanstvenih obrada te teme, bar kada je riječ o hrvatskom jeziku, pogotovu što se imena ne navode u općejezičnim rječnicima. Zanimljiva su zapažanja o sličnostima i razlikama u upotrebi takvih pragmea, primjerice osobnih imena (za naivca *Dudek/* u polj. *Zenon; Hans* - umjesto Nijemac, vrijedi u oba jezika kao i *Juda* za izdajicu) etnonima (glumiti naivca - hrv. *praviti se Englez* = polj. *udawać Greka* (Grka) te toponima (uzaludnost – u hrv. *ispravljati krivu Drinu* = polj. *wywracać Wisłę kijem*). U posljednjim poglavljima o emotiv-

nim pragmemima govori se o vjerovanjima, praznovjerjima i drugim dodatnim značenjima brojeva, osim denotacijskog, a što je dopunjeno i s gestikulacijskim pokretima prstiju i ruke, te izrazima za označavanje prostornih odnosa koji su u uporabi afektivno obojeni, tzv. spacijali. Tako u oba jezika strana svijeta *zapad* označuje i društveni i kulturološki krug demokratskih i kapitalističkih europskih zemalja, u tom značenju pisan kao *Zapad/Zachód*, ali u poljskom ima i dodatno značenje “dobivenih zemalja s njemačkog terena”.

AUTOMATIZIRANI PRAGMEMI – ili podštapalice jesu oni verbalni i neverbalni izrazi, nastali na temelju navike (sociokulturna kategorija), koje govornik rabi nesvjesno i kojima je primarna uloga označavanje stanke u govoru. N. Pintarić tu razdvaja simptome, ako su odraz vegetativnog živčanog sustava, te signale ako su naknadno automatizirani, odnosno naučeni. Načini njihova izražavanja mogu biti različiti, od verbalnih navode se pokreti dijelovima tijela, tzv. tikovi (žmirkanje, micanje obrva, cupkanje nogama, trljanje šaka), tikovi na predmetima (namještanje kravate, vrtenje ili grickanje olovke), tikovi-zvukovi kao posljedica tikova-pokreta (cmoktanje, pljuckanje, nakašljavanje). Verbalni oblici podštapalice mogu biti predstavljeni pojedinim fonemima koji se u govoru umnažaju (*iii, aaaa*), desemantiziranim riječima (*čovječe, kužiš, rekoh, Isuse*) te složenim izrazima (*koliko-toliko, u vražju repu*), a autorica ih usustavljuje i s obzirom na nastanak (religijske podštapalice, riječi stranog podrijetla) te na funkcionalno-socijalno jezično raslojavanje (književne, dijalektalne, žargonske, opće podštapalice). U zaključku se ističe kako podštapalice imaju svoje mjesto u izražajnosti te su i dio jezične kulture, a među funkcijama koje imaju u govornim činovima ona navodi i osiguravanje vlastitog autoriteta, relativiziranje izričaja što slijedi, pridobivanje sugovornika, pojačavanje uvjerenosti te posebno ispunjavanje praznog prostora (*horror vacui*) u govoru.

U istraživački prostor i obzor ove knjige kao jedne od rijetkih u nas unijeti su navodi i dometi najnovije svjetske pragmatičke literature, što je vješto i kreativno primijenjeno i usloženo. Maksimalističko određenje pragmatike i ustrajavanje na njezinoj interdisciplinarnosti kao temeljnom metodologijskom počelu autorica je dosljedno provela i to predstavlja glavno svojstva ove knjige na teorijskoj razini. Iscrpnim i usustavljenim opisima kreativnih ali i tipiziranih združenih jezičnih i nejezičnih fenomena u pokretu i djelovanju u konkretnom govornom činu u poljskom i hrvatskom jeziku, knjiga *Pragmemi u komunikaciji* Nede Pintarić pomiče perspektive i potiče na nova istraživanja te je stoga vrijedna pozornosti znanstvene i stručne javnosti.

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Samardžija, Marko (2002). *Nekoć i nedavno. Odabrane teme iz leksikologije i novije povijesti hrvatskoga standardnoga jezika.* Rijeka: Izdavački centar.

Već i naslovom knjige koji čine dva vremenska priloga, od kojih prvi stilogeni i rjeđi oblik *nekoć* priziva davninu, a drugi općeprošireni i svakodnevni *nedavno*, koji tu davninu zapravo niječe i približava autorovu trenutku¹, odražava se narav onoga o čemu je riječ u knjizi, a to je vremenski slijed mijena u hrvatskom standardnom jeziku koji obuhvaća njihove uzroke (unutarjezične i izvanjezične) ali i posljedice, posebice na leksičkoj razini. Samardžijin popis i opis toga dijela jezičnog sustava odnosi se na razdoblje kodificiranja eksplicitne norme u narodnom preporodu pa sve do danas, no u objašnjavanju sustavnih i trajnih pojava ne izostaju refleksije i na starija razdoblja.

Knjigu čini 16 pojedinačnih znanstvenih radova što ih je autor izlagao na kroatističkim i slavističkim skupovima, a koji su razasuti u različitim domaćim i inozemnim časopisima i zbornicima, uglavnom u razdoblju između 1997. i 2000. godine. Tako nastale knjige ponekad prate i ponavljanja određenih teza i bibliografskih podataka, jer riječ je o srodnim tekstovima nastalim u različitim trenucima i povodima, no jasan koncept njihova nizanja te jedinstvena bibliografija na kraju knjige to su neutralizirali. Radovi su svrstani u dva odijeljena tematska sklopa, u prvom su obrađene leksikološke teme: internacionalizmi, znanstveno i stručno nazivlje, purizam te promjene što zahvaćaju leksik u četiri sociopolitički oprečna razdoblja: za vrijeme "prve" Jugoslavije, u doba NDH, razdoblje nakon 1945. te od 1990. do danas.

Kada se govori o leksiku, sveprisutno je autorovo motrište da je on, za razliku od gramatičkog sloja, u neprekidnoj vezi s društvenim zbivanjima te se u njemu uvijek mogu naći podatci koji su odraz naravi ili snage društvenih mijena (12. str.), stoga je, uz prozirnost i otvorenost, trajna značajka leksika njegova DRUŠTVENA DIFERENTNOST. Promjene u leksiku mogu biti uzrokovane iznutra, jezičnim razvojem, no one su u tom slučaju teže primjetne i neznatne, primjerice značenje riječi *luka*, kao naplavne livade uz rijeku, s vremenom je potpuno potisnulo i zamijenilo značenje mjesta za pristajanje brodova, a prvo se značenje može prepoznati još samo u toponimima (*Oštra Luka*). Izvanjezični uzroci, s druge pak strane, ostavljaju znatno dublji trag,

¹ Kontekstualni okvir, naravno, ključan je za značenje vremenskih priloga.

među kojima Samardžija izdvaja tehnološki i znanstveni napredak, leksičko posuđivanje te svjesni utjecaj na leksik u sklopu jezičnoga planiranja “u čijem pokretanju i ostvarivanju društvo igra najaktivniju ulogu.”²

Dva rada u knjizi, koja prikazuju učinke jezičnoga planiranja u sklopu naglašene direktivne jezične politike u dvjema Jugoslavijama obilježene unifikacijskim težnjama za uklanjanjem razlika između hrvatskoga i srpskog leksika, zavrjeđuju posebnu pozornost jer su rezultat objektivnog i analitičnog istraživanja jezične građe u razdoblju o kojem se u novije vrijeme govori često s kvaziznanstvenog ili političkog motrišta, te zbog toga mogu poslužiti kao “pouzdana izvor svima onima koji se... bave hrvatskim jezičnopovijesnim istraživanjima.”³

Prvi tekst, *Utjecaj sociopolitičkih čimbenika na leksik hrvatskog jezika između 1918. i 1945.*, argumentirano pokazuje kako se zapravo nestajanje razlika između dvaju jezika svodilo na nagli prodor srpskih riječi. Ispočetka, najizravnije se to činilo u novinstvu koje je preuzimalo izvorne tekstove državne telegrafске agencije “Avala”: *hartija, podozrenje, spoljnji, zvaničnik...*, a određeni broj postojećih hrvatskih leksema dobiva nova značenja kao što su: *kolovoz, ugao, gas* i sl. Domobransko vojno nazivlje potpuno nestaje i zamjenjuje ga u cijelosti novo: *bataljon, defile, regrut, raport, fišeklije...* a trenutak koji M. Samardžija uzima kao sociolingvističku prekretnicu, kao znak začetka trajne unifikacije hrvatskog jezika u sklopu službene jugoslaven-ske jezične politike jest pojava “Vidovdanskog ustava” iz 1921. godine koji se objavljuje na ćirilici i latinici, ali ne i na hrvatskom standardnom jeziku. Njime ulazi u uporabu srpsko ustavnopravno i teritorijalno-političko nazivlje *prvostepeni, neprikosnovenost, rasturač, oblast, srez...*, a dalekosežne posljedice nastaju njegovim ukorjenjivanjem u školstvu i prosvjeti. Promjena društvenopolitičkog konteksta krajem 30-ih godina koja vrhunac ima u osnutku Banovine Hrvatske odražava se u promjeni svijesti o jeziku te društvena diferentnost kao trajno svojstvo leksika dolazi do izražaja, čemu pridonose Benešićeva *Gramatika* i *Razlike* P. Guberine i K. Krstića. U osvrtu na razdoblje NDH Samardžija⁴ tvrdi da se o njemu često pisalo politički tendenciozno ili plošno te su njegova istraživanja na onodobnim tekstovima pokazala kako je stvarna leksička slika bitno drukčija. Posebice se to odnosi na novotvorenice kojih je u jeziku bilo razmjerno malo, oko četrdeset riječi (35. str.), poput: *krugoval, logornik, munjovoz* i sl., ali sliku su iskrivljivali napisi o njihovoj brojnosti jer su u novotvorenice ili tzv. “ustaške riječi” poslije 1945. pojedini autori uključivali riječi koje su u tom razdoblju uzete iz pasiv-

² B. Kunzmann-Müller (2001) *Tipovi jezičnih promjena u hrvatskom suvremenom jeziku*, U: Zbornik radova Drugog hrvatskog slavističkog kongresa, Zagreb, str. 512.

³ Iz recenzije J. Silića s ovitka knjige.

⁴ O jeziku iz tog vremena autor je objavio 1993. dvije knjige: *Hrvatski jezik u NDH te Jezični purizam u NDH*.

nog leksika, odnosno iz zapostavljene leksičke baštine Stullija, Mažuranića i Užarevića, Šuleka ili Parčića: *brzjav, ozračje, uljudba, mudroslovlje* (...). Tomu su zaboravu u znatnoj mjeri pridonijeli “hrvatski vukovci” koji su spomenute leksikografe i njihovu građu četrdesetak godina prešućivali. Kada je riječ o stvaranju i porabi novih riječi, zaključuje Samardžija, njima su bili skloniji jezikoslovni laici, a u stručnjaka zamjetan je bio znatniji otklon prema novotvorenicama, a to vrijedi i u suvremenosti.

Drugi tekst, *Promjene u hrvatskome leksiku nakon godine 1945.*, potvrđuje uzročno-posljedičnu vezu između društvenih promjena i standardnoga leksika. Nakon završetka Drugoga svjetskog rata uspostavom socijalističkog uređenja na području NR Hrvatske nastupile su nagle jezične promjene koje su se prvotno odnosile na potiranje jezičnog stanja iz doba NDH, odnosno posebnosti hrvatskoga jezika i to naglašenom internacionalizacijom političkog jezika i valom posuđenica iz ruskog jezika (koji je zaustavljen 1948. nakon rezolucije Informbiroa). Internacionalizacija je isprva zahvatila administrativni i politički stil, ali se brzo proširila i na druge funkcionalne stilove, a najvećim je dijelom bila ideološki uvjetovana: *proletarijat, pionir, reakcionar, revolucionar, sekretarijat* i sl., a kasnije je ona bila trajnim sredstvom uklanjanja razlika između hrvatskoga i srpskog jezika. Jezična su novost brojne pokrate za nazive onodobnih ustanova, organizacija i pokreta čija je učestalost u jeziku javne komunikacije bila velika: *AFŽ (Antifašistički savez žena), NOP (narodnooslobodilački pokret), UDBA* (srpski: *Uprava državne bezb(j)ednosti*). Sve to dovodi i do njihove apelativizacije i onimizacije, čime one postaju i tvorbena osnova za nastanak mnogih tvorenica i izvedenica: *nopovac, udbaš, udbaški*... Kasnije je taj obrazac samo još nadograđivan i proširivan, posebice nakon 1974. kada ustanove u gospodarskom i političkom životu dobivaju duge nepraktične nazive: *SIZ, RSIZ, OUR, SOUR*. Govoreći o porabi jezika u tom razdoblju autor se osvrće i na pragmatični aspekt, odnosno ideologiziranost riječi i izraza kojima se mistificira stvarnost ili se njima ublažavaju *trenutne ekonomske poteškoće (=kriza)*, poput *korigiranja (=poskupljenja) cijena, obustave rada (=štrajk)*.

Unatoč proklamiranoj ravnopravnosti jezika unutar jugoslavenske federacije nastoji se provesti unitaristički koncept stvaranja “središnjeg jugoslavenskog jezika” u domaćoj i svjetskoj javnosti poznatog pod nazivom srpskohrvatski jezik. Na leksičkoj razini značilo je to što snažnije smanjivanje razlika između hrvatskoga i srpskoga jezika, a Samardžija izdvaja tri temeljna postupka kojima se ta zamisao ostvarivala: prvi je sinonimizacija leksema dvaju jezika - u leksikografskoj obradbi oni se predstavljaju kao jedinice istog leksičkog sustava (*dušik – azot*); posljedica toga je leksička egalizacija koja je značila novi prodor srbizama, a jedan od takvih načina je i prilagodba srpskih riječi ijekavizacijom, čime se istiskuju hrvatske riječi, npr. *snabdjeti, bezbjednost, ubijediti* umjesto *opskrbiti, sigurnost, uvjeriti*. Treći je postupak davanje

prednosti u javnoj porabi leksemima koji bi bili zajednički za oba jezika: *sedmica*, *teatar* i sl. Promjenom sociolingvističkoga okvira početkom 90-ih godina počele su i nestajati unifikacijske “naplavine”, ali isto tako i vraćati potisnute riječi iz tzv. pasivnog leksika: *prosvjed*, *promidžba*, *gospodarstvo*, *dužnosnik*, *ozračje* i sl., a koje danas govornici doživljavaju uobičajenim i neobilježenim. Zanimljivo je da takve promjene u hrvatskom jeziku srpski lingvisti nazivaju paradržavnim lingvističkim inženjeringom⁵ jer imaju za cilj politički ubrzano udaljšavanje od srpskog jezika koji za razliku od hrvatskog ostaje nepromijenjen i nema potreba za sustavnim promjenama jezičnog razvoja. Te su izjave zapravo najbolji dokaz ispravnosti i utemeljenosti Samardžijinih istraživanja, stoga su takvi i slični radovi nužni za kroatistiku ali za njih treba znati slavistička i ina međunarodna javnost.

Dva su članka posvećena isključivo internacionalizmima (61.-81. str.), iako se njihova raščlamba daje i u drugim dijelovima knjige. Posudjenice se nalaze već u prvim pisanim tragovima hrvatske pismenosti te ih se zbog njihove starine doživljava kao izvorne riječi (*križ* od lat. *crux*), no već od XV. stoljeća zamjetan je purizam, postojana težnja pisaca i leksikografa za stvaranjem prevedenica i novotvorenica umjesto stranih riječi kako bi se ukupno iskustvo moglo posredovati izvornim riječima. Do početka XIX. stoljeća ta je ponuda, čak i “premašivala komunikacijske potrebe hrvatske jezične zajednice” (64. str.). Hrvatski jezik baštini zaista dugu purističku tradiciju, a kao glavni razlog takvu stanju navodi se kao prvo nepovoljan položaj hrvatskoga jezika u odnosu na susjedne jezike: njemački, mađarski, talijanski i u prošlom stoljeću srpski. Drugi je razlog leži u svojevrsnom paradoksu koji proistječe iz činjenice da su izrazite purističke tendencije u njemačkom i mađarskom naši jezikoslovci koristili kako bi ublažili utjecaj tih jezika na hrvatski. No kada je riječ o suvremenom stanju, ističe Samardžija, prema angloamerikanizmima, koji masovno i brzo pritječu preko sredstava javne poruke, purističke su zahvati sve nemoćniji i neučinkovitiji. Kao glavni razlog tomu navodi se to što one nisu pravodobno ponuđene, a kada se nude pojavljuju se dvostrukosti i višestrukosti – najbolje se to zrcali u računalnom nazivlju, o čemu je u nas već pisala Milica Mihaljević.

U drugom su dijelu knjige pod naslovom *Iz novije povijesti hrvatskoga standardnoga jezika* uvršteni radovi koji se tematski odnose na događaje i osobe koji su dijelom okvira “vanjske” povijesti kao što su: “Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika” iz 1967. godine; koncept jezične i opće politike u Bosni i Hercegovini i hrvatsko jezično pitanje u doba bivše socijalističke Jugoslavije ili “mladoekavska epizoda” (102.) dijela istaknutih hrvatskih intelektualaca s početka 20-ih godina prošloga stoljeća koji su zaneseni idejom jugoslavenskog jedinstva pisali ekavštinom – potvrđeno je to

⁵ Među ostalim takve su teze iznijeli na 12. međunarodnom slavističkom kongresu u Krakovu.

filološkom crticom o jeziku pjesnika A. B. Šimića. Posljednja dva teksta predstavljaju prelazak na “unutrašnju”⁶ povijest hrvatskoga standardnog jezika te skiciraju promjene gramatičke, pravopisne i pravogovorne norme u XX. st. Unatoč prevratnim promjenama u leksiku toga razdoblja, opisujući slijed gramatičke normativne literature počev od Maretićeve Gramatike (1899.g.) do danas, zaključuje se kako se može govoriti jedino o koncepcijskim i metodologijskim novostima, ali gramatička (morfosintaktička) norma u svom preskriptivnom dijelu ostala je uglavnom nepromijenjena te je ona najpostojanijim dijelom standardnoga jezika. Pravopisna je norma tijekom tog stoljeća doživljavala stalne “redizajne”, zbog političkih utjecaja, pri čemu se može govoriti o pravoj inflaciji pravopisnih priručnika, no “u osnovi ona je dobro stabilizirana” (148.) na fonološkom konceptu, tvrdi autor. Fonološka (status dvoglasnika, odnosno određenje alternacija “jata”) i posebice pravogovorna norma najlabilniji su dio sustava koji u mnogome odstupa od norme. Odnosi se to na silazni naglaske na nepočetnim slogovima, gubljenje nenačlane dužine, izostajanje preskakanja naglaske na prednaglasnice, odnosno riječ je o sukobu triju koncepcija, kako kaže Samardžija, tradicionalne novoštokavske norme (od Maretića do *Hrvatske gramatike*), naglašavanja u zapadnim novoštokavskim govorima (Vukušić) i naglašavanja u urbanim idiomima, ponajprije prestižnom zagrebačkom (Škarić).

U ovoj knjizi Marko Samardžija progovara odmjereno i objektivno, a ne na temelju dojmova, o prožimanju društva i jezika na primjeru odabranih leksičkih i standardoloških tema i procesa na koje su odraz imale često radikalne državno-političke, pravne, kulturne i gospodarske mijene. Radovi u noj dokaz su unutrašnje prilagodljivosti i snage jezika, ali i kakva je sudbina i trajnost izvanjskih, direktivnih (normativnih) nametanja pojedinih jezičnih obrazaca i oblika, *nekoć i nedavno*. Tu sociolingvističku zbirku radova, u kojoj se u svakom njezinom dijelu odražava i povijesni aspekt proučavanih pojavnosti, a s obzirom i na srodna istraživanja u posljednjih desetak godina, može se shvatiti i kao završnu skicu toliko potrebne temeljite i iscrpne povijesti suvremenoga hrvatskog standardnog jezika. Bilo bi iznenađenje kada bi nas autor demantirao u tom predviđanju.

⁶ Pojmovi *unutrašnja i vanjska* (jezična) *povijest* preuzeti od S. Damjanovića.

Prikazi knjiga – Book notices - Kurzbesprechungen

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Stefania Nuccorini, ed. (2002). *Phrases and Phraseology - Data and Descriptions*. Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt/M., New York, Oxford, Wien; Peter Lang, European Academic Publishers. Linguistic Insights. Studies in Language and Communication: Vol. 5. 187 str. ISBN 3-906770-08-7/US-ISBN 0-8204-5933-X.

Frazeologija kao područje lingvističkih istraživanja tek u posljednjih deset godina bilježi rastući interes. Zanimanje za frazeološke fenomene obilježilo je osnivanje Europskog frazeološkog društva (*European Society of Phraseology*), brojne konferencije, simpoziji, te publikacije kojima je frazeologija središnja tema. Najnoviji doprinos rastućoj frazeološkoj bibliografiji je i knjiga *Phrases and Phraseology, Data and Descriptions* urednice Stefanie Nuccorini.

Knjiga je zbirka deset priloga različitih autora koji sa specifičnih polazišta prilaze fenomenu frazeoloških jedinica i njihovoj upotrebi: s polazišta lingvistike, leksikografije, ili pak nastave stranih jezika. Iako su polazišne točke različite, svi radovi svjedoče o sveprisutnosti frazeologije, kako u različitim registrima, tako i u različitim jezicima. Većina radova naglašava ulogu različitih vrsta korpusa u frazeološkim istraživanjima, na taj način ističući važnost analize jezika u upotrebi, te ulogu korpusne lingvistike kao nezaobilaznog metodološkog postupka u frazeologiji. Radovi su svrstani od općih razmatranja frazeološke problematike prema istraživanjima specifičnih pojava, bilo da se radi o pojedinom jeziku ili određenoj vrsti frazeoloških jedinica, a bave se intuicijom izvornih govornika, kulturološki uvjetovanim čimbenicima, kontekstualno uvjetovanim izborima, te žanrovskim specifičnostima.

U prilogu Johna Sinclaira *Phraseogonomy* (17-26. str.) intuicija izvornog govornika provjerava se na primjerima iz korpusa, pri čemu se korpus pokazuje kao nezamjenjivo sredstvo analize jezika, a posebno jezičnih promjena. Sinclair zaključuje da podaci dobiveni iz velikog korpusa u većini slučajeva potvrđuju intuiciju izvornih govornika, te je korpus kao takav pouzdan izvor i za govornike kojima engleski nije materinski jezik. Međutim, korpus bilježi i jezične promjene koje su neizbježan rezultat globalizacije engleskog jezika, a koje pokazuju nove trendove u upotrebi engleskog jezika.

Rema Rossini Favretti u članku *Corpus Linguistics in Italian Studies* (27-43. str.) prezentira korpus pisanog talijanskog jezika *CORIS* te njegovu ulogu u analizi talijanskog jezika, ilustrirajući njegovu primjenu na kolokacijskim uzorcima višeznačnih riječi i sinonima. Autorica također naglašava važnost i pouzdanost analize podataka dobivenih iz korpusa, posebice pri identifikaciji pravilnosti koje mogu rezultirati novih hipotezama i preciznijim jezičnim opisom. Autorica također pokazuje da su rezultati analize korpusa primjenjivi i u proučavanju talijanske kulture.

Tamburini, De Santis i Zamuner u prilogu *Identifying Phrasal Connectives in Italian Using Quantitative Methods* (45-64. str) predstavili su svoj rad na označavanju korpusa pisanog talijanskog jezika *CORIS*, s naglaskom na probleme s kojima su se susretali pri njegovu morfosintaktičkom kodiranju. To se posebice odnosi na pripadnost određenoj vrsti riječi, odnosno mogućnost pripadanja pojedine jedinice dvjema vrstama riječi. Autori su koristili kvantitativne metode kako bi razvili sistem kodiranja korpusa uz upotrebu tzv. *dendograma* koji omogućuje empirijsku analizu na osnovi distribucijskih podataka i frekvencija. Proces kodiranja ilustriraju na primjeru veznika, pokazujući kako je *veznik* kao vrsta riječi neadekvatna kategorija za opis pojma *veza* (*connective*), koji se odnosi na tekstualne, semantičke, pragmatičke ili diskursne poveznice.

Elena Tognini-Bonelli u članku *Between Phraseology and Terminology in the Language of Economics* (65-83. str.) pozabavila se frazeologijom u ekonomskom registru, koristeći primjere iz korpusa za ilustraciju distinkcije *termin – riječ*, odnosno terminološke nasuprot frazeološke tendencije. Autorica raspravlja o statusu pojma *termin*, odnosno njegova povlaštenog položaja u odnosu na leksičke jedinice. Zaključak je da termini u komunikacijskoj situaciji dobivaju posebnu pragmatičku dimenziju, što je proces koji se odvija u frazeološkom kontekstu, te se njihov status stoga ne može smatrati povlaštenim u odnosu na druge leksičke jedinice.

U prilogu David Oakeya, *Lexical Phrases for Teaching Academic Writing in English: Corpus Evidence* (85-105. str.), također se koristi korpus za identifikaciju leksičkih fraza koje se koriste u nastavi akademskog pisanja. On analizira specifičnu frazeološku jedinicu i njene varijacije u društvenim, medicinskim i tehničkim tekstovima s ciljem utvrđivanja registarskih specifičnosti relevantnih za nastavu, prvenstveno različitih pragmatičkih, sintagmatskih, diskursnih i metadiskursnih funkcija pojedine frazeološke jedinice u specifičnim registrima. Oakey upozorava da pronađene specifičnosti imaju implikacije za nastavu akademskog pisanja, te za izradu nastavnih materijala, naglašavajući da prevelik naglasak na funkciju u diskursu može dovesti do zane-marivanja odgovarajuće forme.

U članku Susan Kermas, *The Translation of Katherine Mansfield's Botanical Terms: Some Phraseological Insights* (107-125. str.), razmatra se prijevodni aspekt botaničkih fraza u maorskom, talijanskom i engleskom na primjerima iz manjih specifičnih korpusa literarnih tekstova i knjiga o biljkama koji obiluju botaničkim izrazima, s naglaskom na važnost kolokacijskih uzoraka i frekvenciju uporabe pojedine kolokacije. Autorica na primjeru novele *At the Bay*, čija je autorica Katherine Mansfield, ilustrira neadekvatnost kako postojećih prijevoda, tako i dvojezičnih rječnika koji su na raspolaganju prevoditeljima.

U prilogu *The Conventional Language of Press Conferences: Scripted and Spontaneous English Speech* (128-144. str.) Peter Howarth bavi se jezikom konferencija za tisak, posebice razlikama između spontanog govornog jezika, te govornog jezika zasnovanog na pripremljenom pisanom predlošku, koristeći transkripte nekoliko konferencija za tisak koje su organizirale međunarodne organizacije na postoru bivše Jugoslavije. Howarth identificira karakteristike svojevrsnog 'međunarodnog engleskog jezika' u usko specifičnom kontekstu konferencija za tisak i od strane govornika kojima je engleski materinski, odnosno strani jezik. Kao rezultat analize manjeg korpusa govornog engleskog zabilježenog na konferencijama za tisak zapaženo je postojanje 'interne' konvencije koja je prihvaćena od kruga koji obično sudjeluje na konferencijama, a koja nije nužno općeprihvaćena konvencija.

Judith Munat u radu *In Search of the Nominal Compound* (145-161. str.) proučava lingvističke i kulturološke kriterije koje se mogu primijeniti pri razlikovanju između morfoloških i frazeoloških kategorija, tj. složenica i imeničkih fraza tipa imenica + imenica, koristeći podatke dobivene od američkih informanata i analizom korpusa. Zaključak je da se imenički sljedovi koji se često pojavljuju u korpusu i koji su kulturološki obilježeni, ili su pak doživjeli semantičku specijalizaciju, mogu identificirati kao složenice.

Tita Kyriacopoulou i Vasso Sfetsiou u članku pod naslovom *Les constructions nominales à verbe support en grec moderne* (163-181. str.) razmatraju mogućnosti strojnog prevođenja na primjerima kolokacija između imenica i glagola, te načina na koji imenica u funkciji objekta određuje izbor glagola, nudeći brojna rješenja za prevladavanje sintaktičkih i leksičkih problema pri automatskoj analizi tekstova.

Ovaj zbornik u cjelini daje pregled najnovijih trendova i istraživanja u frazeologiji, te daje korisne smjernice za buduća frazeološka istraživanja. Širok raspon analiziranih tema odražava činjenicu da je frazeologija još uvijek relativno mlada lingvistička disciplina koja tek treba odgovoriti na brojna otvorena pitanja. Zbornik međutim svjedoči da su frazeološka istraživanja dobila, kako na širini razmatrane problematike, tako i na dubini i preciznosti, te je kao takav dobar poticaj za daljnji razvoj frazeologije kao discipline.

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Nuyts, Jan (2001). *Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Perspective*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Pp. xiv, 428.

The aims of Nuyts' monograph are twofold: (i) to give an in-depth functional analysis of the major linguistic expression types of epistemic modality in Dutch, German and to some extent English and (ii) to further investigate the nature of the conceptual systems and processes, i.e. the cognitive infrastructure dealing with world knowledge, and its use.

It contains six chapters: Ch. 1 discusses the basic perspective of the approach, delineates the semantic category of epistemic modality, introduces the four functional factors featuring in the analysis and describes the Dutch and German corpora used. The four major expression types, modal adverbs and adjectives, mental state predicates and modal auxiliaries, are analyzed in Ch. 2-4. Ch. 5 offers the description and the results of an experiment, conducted by Wietske Vonk and Jan Nuyts, focusing on the correlation of information structure and epistemic expression types, the findings of which are contrasted with the conclusions of the corpus analysis. The last and longest chapter opens up the cognitive-conceptual perspective, discussing the nature of conceptual representation, the relation of conceptual and linguistic structure and the conclusions to be drawn for a cognitive-pragmatic model of language production.

In Ch. 1 epistemic modality is defined as concerning "an estimation of the likelihood that (some aspect of) a certain state of affairs is/has been/will be true (or false) in the context of the possible world under consideration" (21-22), while it is stressed that epistemic modality is not a linguistic but a conceptual category involving high-level meta-representational operation over knowledge. It is at the same time different and to be kept apart from the independent category of evidentiality, even though the two do co-occur in certain cases.

The data are based on Dutch and German spoken and written corpora, one lexical item of the classes of expression types chosen as representative: *waarschijnlijk/wahrscheinlich* (*probable/probably*) as adverb and adjective, *denken/glauben* (*think*) as mental state predicate and *kunnen/können* (*can/may/might*) as modal auxiliary.

The four major expression types are investigated, following the description of the lexical-semantic and grammatical properties of each class, in terms of the functional factors evidentiality (more precisely (inter)subjectivity, i.e. whether the responsibility for the epistemic qualification is the speaker's or is shared), performativity vs. descriptivity (the speaker's own current evaluation or one reported by him/her), information structure (the focal or non-focal status of the epistemic evaluation in the discourse context) and discourse strategy (the mitigating use of the expression type).

The corpus analysis has yielded the following results: The opposition between modal adverbs and adjectives is maximal: adverbs are neutral in terms of intersubjectivity, adjectives involve an additional evidential meaning (yet not inherently but due to the syntax of the only construction in which they can occur); adverbs cannot be used descriptively, adjectives structurally can; and, most importantly, adverbs are never used when the epistemic qualification is focal, whereas adjectives are preferred in focal uses, especially if focus results from contrastivity. Discourse strategy does not play a role in this relation.

In view of the non-qualificational meaning of mental state predicates acquiring a qualificational reading it should not be surprising that the latter always inherently involves the combination of an epistemic and an evidential (an inferential or, in case of *denken/glauben*, a subjective) component (as opposed to modal adjectives). Descriptive uses are quite frequent. In the majority of the Dutch and in half of the German cases the speaker is then also suggesting that s/he is skeptical about the evaluation reported by him/her. Concerning information structure one must differentiate between parenthetical mental state predicates, always non-focal, and the complementing pattern, allowing for (only contrastive) focus much more rarely than modal adjectives. Here, in performative uses, discourse strategy does play an important role by weakening the force of the claim or the reaction and seems also to account for the high frequency of this expression type in spoken language.

Modal auxiliaries seem to be the semantically most complex expression type. Nuyts claims that the epistemic reading of *kunnen/können* is less prominent, not well established and that the majority of the uses express dynamic modality, pure epistemic qualifications being restricted not to the *Hij kan gedanst hebben/Er kann getanzt haben* (He may have danced) but to the complementing structure *Het kan/zou kunnen zijn dat.../Es kann/könnte sein, dass...* (It may/might be that ...). Nuyts concludes that the dynamic reading is the default, on which the epistemic is dependent as a productive inference, except for the complementing pattern, possibly specializing for the epistemic use. This structure again points towards an intersubjective meaning but, interestingly, does not allow for focalization at all. There are no corpus cases for the descriptive use of these modals. The discourse function of modals is not

face-saving (as with mental state predicates) but rather they serve as an argument managing means. In sum, they seem to be neutral regarding all four factors.

A short survey of the diachronic development of Dutch modals based on two dictionaries confirms Nuyts's hypothesis that the epistemic meaning does not develop out of the dynamic via the deontic but that the deontic and the epistemic readings both emerge from the dynamic one.

The results of the controlled data elicitation yield further evidence for the findings of the corpus analysis in terms of the role of information structure: predicative adjectives are used when the (scalar dimension of the) qualification is focal, mental state predicates, though rarely in focus, are chosen when focus is on the polar expression and the scalar dimension is expressed separately in the embedded clause.

Finally, Nuyts considers the formation of the paradigm of epistemic modal expressions as influenced by the interaction of an information-structural and an iconic force. Among the theoretical issues addressed he discusses the nature of conceptual and linguistic representation and processing; the conceptual and linguistic structure of qualifications; the relative scope of conceptual categories, their layering and how they relate to the state of affairs expressed. In view of the empirical findings and the conclusions concerning their cognitive background Nuyts also critically overviews the respective representations in Role and Reference Grammar and Functional Grammar and gives an account of them in the framework of Functional Procedural Grammar.

The monograph is an important contribution in terms of both aims. For the research of (the linguistic expressions of) modality it offers further valuable insight into questions that have often been investigated (e.g. the use of modals), establishing, at the same time, a function-to-form perspective and thus the paradigm of the means of expressing epistemic modality in the given languages. Concerning the cognitive-conceptual infrastructure, the results and conclusions of the analysis are called upon as the basis for Nuyts's argumentation in several questions reaching beyond the level of linguistic expression. Therefore this is a most valuable reading for those interested in either of the two aspects, in (epistemic) modality and its linguistic expression, or in a better understanding of the cognitive framework underlying, among others, the use of language.

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Ernest Eperjessy (1998). *Šalje pismo Sibinjanin Janko....* Biblioteka Prozor. Pečuh: Hrvatski znanstveni zavod.

Knjigu *Šalje pismo Sibinjanin Janko...* zajedno su objavili Hrvatski znanstveni zavod iz Pečuha, Glavnogradska hrvatska samouprava u Budimpešti na čelu s prof. Stipanom Vujićem i Mađarsko etnografsko društvo u Budimpešti. Knjiga je temeljena na prikupljenim narodnim pripovijetkama prema kazivanju mađarskoga Hrvata Andrije Hidega. Prije trideset i pet godina mađarski je istraživač, po majci Hrvat, dr. Ernest Eperjessy slušao čuvenog, tada devedesetogodišnjeg "hrvatskoga Homera" Andriju Hidega, zvanog Palitka, u selu Martincima u mađarskome dijelu Podravine, na krajnjem jugozapadu baranjske županije. Riječ je o nepismenome ribaru s Drave koji, premda je čitav život proveo unutar mađarskih državnih granica, mađarskoga jezika nije znao, ali je zato njegovo izražavanje na vlastitom mjesnom govoru bilo na zavidnoj razini. Brojne narodne pripovijetke koje je slušao i zapamtio u djetinjstvu, u tijeku je vremena sâm stilski dotjerivao pa je posljednjih desetljeća svoga života postao najpoznatiji i najomiljeniji pučki pripovjedač u svome kraju. E. Eperjessy je 1964. g. snimao Hidegovo pripovijedanje i tako je na magnetofonskoj vrpici ostalo sačuvano 26 pripovijesti. Te je snimke poslije za tisak priredio rođeni Martinčanin prof. Ernest Barić.

Sama se knjiga sastoji od četiri temeljna dijela kojima prethode Uvodne napomene dr. Eperjessyja, a na kraju im je pridodan Pogovor urednika i recenzenta knjige prof. Đure Frankovića, zatim tumač manje poznatih riječi i prilog od dvadeset i dvije fotografije s prizorima iz Martinaca. Inače prvi dio knjige sadržava 14 usmenih pučkih pripovijedaka prema kazivanju A. Hidega. Tu je obično riječ o poznatim temama koje je A. Hideg pripovijedaao na svoj osebujan način pa tako npr. u pripovijesti *Dekla-soldat i kraljeva čer* prepoznajemo poznatu priču o Dugonji, Trbonji i Vidonji. Drugi se dio sastoji od devet priča o Kraljeviću Marku, a to su zapravo prepričane junačke pjesme. Naime, A. Hideg je bio posebno darovit u prilagodabama tekstova. Tekstove epskih narodnih pjesama i različitih pripovijesti prilagođavao je potrebama svoga slušateljstva i to ne samo jezično nego ponekad i ambijentalno, smještajući ih u domaći podravski prostor i prilagođujući ih mentalitetu svoga kraja. Premda je u svojim pripovijestima zadržao neke gotove izražajne figure, kao što je npr. slavenska antiteza, pa čak i deseteračku metriku epskih narodnih pjesama, Hideg i takve ustaljene izražajne sklopove ponekad uspijeva jezično prilagoditi svome slušateljstvu. Naime, jezik epskih narodnih pjesama u pravilu je temeljen na novoštokavskim dijalektima koji su često, upravo preko

epskoga deseterca i narodne pjesme, agresivno prodirali u druge dijalekte ne povijajući se pred njima. A. Hideg taj jezik epskoga deseterca i narodne pjesme pokušava prilagoditi svomu martinačkom mjesnomu govoru. Pritom valja znati da martinački govor pripada slavonskomu (prema tome najarhaičnijem staroštokavskom) dijalektu štokavskoga narječja, i to govorima s ekavskim refleksom jata, ali s nekoliko ustaljenih ikavizama. Na leksičkoj razini taj tip govora karakteriziraju brojni turcizmi. Isti se tip govora rabi i u Hrvatskoj, i to u slavonskom dijelu Podravine. Međutim, specifičnost štokavskih govora u mađarskom dijelu Podravine ogleđa se u utjecaju podravskoga dijalekta kajkavskoga narječja na te govore, i to na svim jezičnim razinama. Svi su ti utjecaji jasno uočljivi i u jeziku A. Hidega. Tako npr. u svojoj slavenskoj antitezi "*Mili Bože, ili grmi, il se zemlja tresе?! Ili more u bregove tuče?! Niti grmi nit se zemlja tresе, nit udara more u bregove*" zadržava izvorni jezik epske pjesme, ali već se u nastavku te figure "*već udarajo sedamdest i sedam topova, udarajo Sibirjanin Janku, gde se krste dva Jankina sina*" (str. 130) prelazi na domaći idiom. Naime, u prvomu dijelu antiteze Hideg zadržava štokavizam *more*, premda se u martinačkom govoru, pod utjecajem podravske kajkavštine rabi inačica *morje*. Protivno tome, u drugom dijelu antiteze već se pojavljuje martinački kajkavizam *udarajo* s glagolskim prezentskim nastavkom *-jo* u trećem licu množine. Inače, ovaj dio knjige karakterizira vrlo velik broj epskih deseteraca. I sâm naslov knjige također je jedan od takvih deseteraca, a poslije ih slijedi još čitav niz, npr. *Okrene se Kraljeviću Marku* (str. 149) ili *Ufate se u kosti junačke* (str.153). Ponekad se rečenica sastoji od dva ili od čak tri uzastopna deseterca. Složivši takve rečenice jednu za drugom, Hideg je ponekad izricao čitav niz uza-stopnih deseteraca, npr. *A joj meni, moja mila majko, di si danas, pobratime Marko? Kad valjade tebe ne imade da mi dojde tica lastavica pa joj kažem da otide k tebi!* (str. 151). Ostvaraji *dojde* i *otide* rezultat su utjecaja martinačkoga govora na novoštokavski deseterački izričaj. Istovjetan se utjecaj ogleđa i u desetercu *Pobratime, Kraljeviću Marko, dojdi venčat cara i caricu* (str. 129). Inače, unutar Hidegovih deseteraca susreću se i drugi kajkavizmi, naročito u oblicima trećeg lica množine prezenta, npr. *Kad so bili trećem na konaku ili kako ido strahote za nama* (str. 117). U tim je primjerima Hideg prilagodio jezik deseterca svome mjesnom govoru. Zanimljive su i rečenice preuzete iz narodne pjesme u kojima je nominativ zamijenjen vokativom da bi se dobio još jedan slog i tako sačuvao desetarac, npr. *Ženio se Zmaj Ognjeni Vuče* (str. 117), *Al govori Zmaj Ognjeni Vuče* (str. 118), *U snu sanja Kraljeviću Marko* (str. 151).

Treći se dio knjige sastoji od triju priča iz martinačke pučke predaje, dok četvrti dio sačinjava poema *Jozo i Jela*. Ta je poema zapravo u četvrcima spjevana već otprije postojeća istoimena pučka pripovijetka. Spomenuta preobrazba iz proze u stihove djelo je podravskoga pjesnika Đuse Šimare Pužarova.

Na kraju bi svakako valjalo nešto više pozornosti posvetiti Hidegovu jeziku u kojemu se ogleda martinački govor. Na leksičkoj razini tu možemo izdvojiti turcizme *komšinica*, *begeniti*, *menđuše*, *mejdan*, *mehana* i sl. Takvi su turcizmi osobito uočljivi u kombinaciji s tipičnim kajkavskim elementima u martinačkome govoru, kao npr. u sintagmatskom sklopu *bum se divanil z ljudima*. Pritom valja naglasiti da je utjecaj mađarskoga jezika neznatan jer su hungarizmi vrlo rijetki, npr. *orsag* u značenju 'država'. Inače, kao tipične štokavske elemente slavonskoga dijalekta u martinačkome govoru možemo izdvojiti oblike glagolskoga pridjeva radnog *išo*, *kazo*, *došo*, *mogo*, *kupovo*, *piso* i sl. Uz uobičajene ekavizme u tom govoru *obesit*, *venčat*, *čovjek* i sl., Hideg rabi i ustaljene martinačke ikavizme *divojka*, *dvi* i *di* (u značenju 'gdje'). Utjecaj podravske kajkavštine osjetan je na svim razinama. Na fonološkoj se razini taj utjecaj očituje npr. u refleksu *e* na mjestu nekadanjeg poluglasa, npr. *ja sem*, *jesem*, *nisem*, *melin* te rjeđe *u*, npr. *vun*; u realizaciji leksema *morje* sa slijedom *rj* na mjestu nekadašnjeg palatalnog *r*; u ostvaraju protetskoga *v* ispred samoglasnika *u* u riječi *vuzda* i *vunja* (u značenju 'ujna') s metatezom *jn>nj*; u čuvanju skupova *jd* i *št* u primjerima *dojde* i *šteli*; u izostanku zamjene *r>ž* u prezentu glagola *moći*, npr. *ne mrem*; u čuvanju fonema *l* na kraju riječi u oblicima pridjeva radnog nekih glagola kao npr. *prosil*; u refleksu vokala *o* na mjestu nekadašnjeg nazalnog samoglasnika *on*, npr. u trećem licu množine prezenta *ido*, *pijo*, *jedo*, *poznajo*, *seli so*, *pogledajo*; u realizaciji samoglasnika *o* u riječi *dečok* u značenju 'dječak'. Na morfološkoj je razini taj utjecaj najočitiji u uporabi futurnih oblika *bum*, *buš*, npr. *bu to moj zet* te u izostanku vokativa (osim u uvezenim desteračkim sklopovima), npr.: *Ja, otac, voljim džipit u jezero, pa se utopit, nego Arapina ljubit!*. Na rječotvorbenoj razini najčešća je uporaba sufiksa *-ička* za tvorbu deminutiva ženskoga roda, npr. *deklička*, *curička*, a na sintaktičkoj uporaba skraćenih oblika pomoćnih glagola na početku rečenice, npr. *So ga Arapovi sluge opazili*. Na leksičkoj su pak razini česti kajkavizmi *coprinja*, *coprnjak*, *pajdaš*, *mam* u značenju 'odmah' i sl. Zanimljiv je i leksem *uranje* u značenju 'ujutro', odnosno priložni sklop *do ranja* u značenju 'do jutra'. U podravskoj kajkavštini uobičajen je leksem *ranje* u značenju 'jutro', odnosno *naranje* u značenju 'ujutro'. Martinački prilog *uranje* jest kombinacija podravskoga leksema *ranje* i štokavskoga prijedloga *u*. Inače, srodan se leksem susreće u češkom i slovačkom jeziku u kojima se riječ *rano* rabi u značenju 'jutro'.

Takav autentičan Hidegov jezik čini Eperjessyjevu knjigu dobrom građom za dijalektološka istraživanja, a u istoj mjeri ta knjiga može biti zanimljiva i etnologima te inim istraživačima i poznavateljima hrvatske dijaspore.

Upute za autore

Prilozi trebaju biti pripremljeni u standardnom formatu A4 (jednostruki pririjed, Times New Roman, veličina slova 12). Valja izbjegavati neuobičajene tipove slova. Bilješke smjestiti na dnu stranice, a ne na kraju teksta.

Rukopis organizirati i numerirati na sljedeći način:

0. stranica: naslov i podnaslov, ime(na) autora, ustanova, adresa (uključujući i e-mail)

1. stranica: naslov i podnaslov, nacrtak na jeziku teksta (u slučaju rasprava i diskusija)

2. stranica i dalje: glavni dio teksta

Popis literature treba početi na novoj stranici.

Na kraju dodati sve posebne dijelove (crteže, tablice, slike) koje se nije moglo integrirati u tekst.

Sve odjeljke i pododjeljke numerirati arapskim brojkama ((1. / 1.1. / 1.1.1.)), izbjegavajući pri tome više od tri nivoa, tj. porabu više od triju brojki. Za različite nivoe upotrebljavati različite tipove slova:

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1.1. Broj masnim slovima, a naslov masnim kosim slovima (Times New Roman)

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Prije novog odjeljka s naslovom ostaviti dva prazna retka, a između naslova i odjeljka po jedan prazan redak. Koristiti kurziv za sav jezični material (primjere) koji su uvršteni u tekst (ali ne za numerirane primjere koji su izdvojeni iz glavnog teksta). Izbjegavati porabu kurziva za naglašavanje ili označivanje stručnih pojmova. Za naglašavanje i označivanje stručnih pojmova rabiti verzal.

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Primjere valja brojčano označiti koristeći arapske brojke u zagradama te odvojiti od glavnog teksta praznim retcima. Grupirati primjere korištenjem malih slova, a u tekstu pozivati se na primjere kao (2), (2a), (2a,b), (2 a-b), ili (2) b.

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Na kraju rukopisa, na posebnoj stranici s naslovom **Literatura** (veličina slova 10), treba dati potpunu bibliografiju korištene literature. Bibliografske jedinice trebaju biti poredane abecedom prema prezimenima autora, a svaka jedinica u zasebnom odjeljku, drugi si svaki daljni redak jedinice uvučen, bez praznih redaka između jedinica. Radove istog autora složiti kronološkim redom, od ranijih prema novijima, a radove jednog autora objavljene u istoj godini obilježiti malim slovima (napr. 1998a, 1998b). Ako se navodi više od jednog članka iz iste

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Potpun naslov i podnaslov rada. U naslovima članaka velikim slovom pisati samo prvu riječ (ili riječi koje se prema pravopisu jezika na kojem su objavljeni pišu velikim slovima).

Uz članke u časopisima navesti ime časopisa i godište (rimskim brojevima) te nakon dvotočke brojeve stranica početka i kraja članka (napr. 93-117.).

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Naslove knjiga i časopisa pisati kosim slovima.

Nekoliko primjera:

Dorian, Nancy C., ur. (1989). *Investigating Obsolescence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hale, Kenneth, Josie White Eagle (1980). A preliminary metrical account of Winnebago accent. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 46: 117-32.

Labov, William (1972a). *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black Vernacular*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, William (1972b). *Sociolinguistic Patterns*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Perlmutter, David M. (1978). Impersonal passives and the unaccusative hypothesis. *Berkeley Linguistics Society* 4:157-89.

Poser, William (1984). *The phonetics and phonology of tone and intonation in Japanese*. Cambridge, MA: MIT dissertation.

Rice, Keren (1989). *A Grammar of Slave*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Tiersma, Peter M. (1993). Linguistic issues in the law. *Language* 69:113-37.

Yip, Moira (1991). Coronals, consonant clusters, and the coda condition. *The Special Status of Coronals: Internal and External Evidence*, Carole Paradis and Jean-Francois Prunet, ur., 61-78. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

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Contributions should be prepared using standard A4 format (single spacing, Times New Roman 12). Avoid unusual fonts. Use footnotes rather than endnotes.

Use the following order and numbering of pages:

Page 0: title and subtitle; authors' names and affiliations; complete address (including e-mail address).

Page 1: title and subtitle; abstract (for full-length articles and notes).

Page 2etc.: body of the work.

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Any special matter (i.e. drawings, tables, figures) that could not be integrated into the text.

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Use *italics* for all cited linguistic forms and examples in the text. Do not use italics for emphasis, or to mark common loanwords or technical terms. Use SMALL CAPITALS to mark a technical term at its first use or definition (if necessary), or to give emphasis to a word or phrase in the text.

Within the text, give only a brief citation in parentheses consisting of the author's surname, the year of publication, and page number(s) where relevant: (Langacker 1987) or (Dirven 1993: 10). If a cited publication has more than two authors, use the surname of the first author, followed by et al. If the author's name is part of the text, then use this form: Labov (1973: 340) comments ...

Do not use notes for citations only. Quotations should be given between double quotation marks; longer quotes (more than about 40 words) should be indented and set apart from the main body of the text by leaving one blank line before and after; printed in a smaller font size (point 10), without quotation marks. Indicate ellipsis by three periods, with a blank space before and after, like ... this.

Words or phrases in languages other than the language of the article should be in italics and accompanied by a translation between single quotes. E.g., *este* 'evening.' Transliterate or transcribe all forms in any language not normally written with the Latin alphabet unless there is a compelling reason for using the original orthography.

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Full title and subtitle of the work. Titles of articles should only have the first word capitalized (and words for which the spelling rules of the language in question require capitalization), all other words in lower case.

For a journal article: Full name of the journal and volume number (roman type), inclusive page numbers for the entire article.

For an article in a book: title of the book, ed. by full name(s) of editor(s), inclusive page numbers.

For books and monographs, the edition, volume or part number (if applicable) and series title (if any). Place of publication: Publisher.

Titles of books and journals should be preferably italicized.

Some examples:

Dorian, Nancy C., ed. (1989). *Investigating Obsolescence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hale, Kenneth, Josie White Eagle (1980). A preliminary metrical account of Winnebago accent. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 46: 117-32.

Labov, William (1972a). *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black Vernacular*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, William (1972b). *Sociolinguistic Patterns*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Perlmutter, David M. (1978). Impersonal passives and the unaccusative hypothesis. *Berkeley Linguistics Society* 4:157-89.

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Hinweise für Autoren

Beiträge werden im Standardformat DIN-A4 (1,5-zeilig, Times New Roman, Schrift-größe 12 pt) geschrieben. Ungewöhnliche Schrifttypen sind zu vermeiden. Fußnoten erscheinen am Seitenende, nicht am Textende.

Gestaltung des Manuskripts und Numerierung:

Seite 0: Titel und Untertitel, Autorenname(n), Institution, Anschrift (einschließlich e-mail)

Seite 1: Titel und Untertitel, Abstract in der Sprache des Textes (bei Besprechungen und Diskussionen)

Seite 2 und weiter: Haupttext

Auf den Haupttext folgt auf der neuen Seite das Literaturverzeichnis.

Im Anhang sind alle nichttextuellen Teile (Zeichnungen, Tabellen, Abbildungen, u.ä.) beizufügen, die in den Haupttext nicht integriert werden konnten.

Verwenden Sie eine Dezimalgliederung (1. / 1.1. / 1.1.1.) in Kapitel, Abschnitte und Unterabschnitte, wobei mehr als drei Stellen, d.h. Untergliederungen in mehr als drei Ebenen, zu vermeiden sind. Für verschiedene Ebenen der Untergliederung ist unterschiedliche Schreibweise zu verwenden:

1. fett (Times New Roman)

1.1. die Ziffer fett, die Überschrift fett und kursiv (Times New Roman)

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Vor dem nächsten betitelten Abschnitt stehen zwei Leerzeilen, zwischen dem Titel und dem folgenden Text eine Leerzeile. Alle objektsprachlichen Belege (Beispiele) im fortlaufenden Text sind kursiv zu schreiben (das gilt nicht für numerierte Beispiele außerhalb des Haupttextes, s. dazu unten). Die Kursivschreibung zur Hervorhebung oder Kennzeichnung der Fachtermini ist zu vermeiden – zu diesen Zwecken sind Großbuchstaben zu verwenden.

Beim Zitieren im Text sind Autorenzunamen(n) und das Erscheinungsjahr, ggf. auch die Seitennummer nach einem Doppelpunkt anzugeben (alles in Klammern), z.B. (Langacker 1987), oder (Dirven 1993: 10). Ist der Autorenname Bestandteil des Satzes, steht er außerhalb der Klammern: Labov (1973: 340) behauptet, ...

Die Fußnoten sind nicht ausschließlich zum Zitieren zu verwenden. Kürzere Zitate sind mit Anführungszeichen („“) zu eröffnen und zu beschließen, alle längeren Zitate (mit mehr als 40 Wörtern) sind als besonderer Absatz zu schreiben, jeweils mit einer Leerzeile vom Rest des Textes getrennt, eingerückt, Schriftgröße 10 pt, ohne Anführungszeichen. Ausgelassene Teile im Zitat sind mit drei Punkten und je einem Leerzeichen vor und nach der Auslassung zu kennzeichnen.

Fremdsprachige Ausdrücke sind kursiv zu schreiben und in die Sprache des Haupttextes zu übersetzen; die Übersetzung ist mit einfachen Anführungszeichen zu kennzeichnen, z.B. *what* 'was'. Für Beispiele aus den Sprachen mit nichtlateinischen Buchstaben ist eine Transliteration vorzunehmen, es sei denn, es gibt bestimmte Gründe für Beibehaltung der Originalschrift.

Beispiele sind mit arabischen Ziffern in Klammern zu numerieren, ggf. durch Kleinbuchstaben neben den Ziffern zu gruppieren, und vom übrigen Text jeweils durch eine Leerzeile zu trennen. Im Text erfolgt der Bezug auf einzelne Beispiele als (2), (2a), (2a,b), (2 a-b), oder (2) b.

Fremdsprachige Beispiele sind mit Glossen in der Sprache des Haupttextes anzuführen, in denen, je nach Bedarf, Wort-für-Wort- oder Morphem-für-Morphem-Äquivalente der fremdsprachigen Beispiele angegeben sind, und mit Übersetzungen in einfachen Anführungszeichen zu versehen. Der Anfang des Wortes oder Morphems in der Glosse ist nach dem Anfang des Wortes bzw. Morphems im Beispiel auszurichten, nach Möglichkeit durch Verwendung von Tabellen, deren Zellen je ein Morphem oder ein Wort enthalten.

Auf den Haupttext folgt auf der neuen Seite mit der Überschrift **Literatur** (Schriftgröße 10 pt) das vollständige Verzeichnis der im Haupttext zitierten Literatur. Die bibliographischen Einheiten sind alphabetisch nach Zunamen der Autoren zu ordnen, jede Einheit im eigenen Absatz, zweite und alle weiteren Zeilen des Absatzes eingerückt, ohne Leerzeile zwischen Absätzen. Mehrere Schriften desselben Autors sind chronologisch von den älteren zu den neueren zu ordnen, bei gleichem Erscheinungsjahr mit Kleinbuchstaben gekennzeichnet (z.B. 1998a, 1998b). Wenn mehr als ein Artikel aus einem Buch zitiert werden, sind sowohl die Artikel unter Autorennamen und mit Verweis auf das Buch als auch dieses Buch unter dem Namen des Herausgebers als gesonderte bibliographische Einheiten zu verzeichnen.

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Erscheinungsjahr in den Klammern, mit einem Punkt hinter der Klammer, z.B.: Radden, Günter, Zoltán Kövecses (1999).;

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Buch- und Zeitschriftentitel sind kursiv zu schreiben.

Einige Beispiele:

Some examples:

Dorian, Nancy C., ed. (1989). *Investigating Obsolescence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hale, Kenneth, Josie White Eagle (1980). A preliminary metrical account of Winnebago accent. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 46: 117-32.

Labov, William (1972a). *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black Vernacular*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, William (1972b). *Sociolinguistic Patterns*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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