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Joseph Beuys
„DANK AN WILHELM LEHMBRUCK“

Ich möchte meinem Lehrer Wilhelm Lehmbruck danken. Warum konnte ein Mensch, der, nachdem ich ein ganz kleines Bruchstück seines Werkes und das sogar als Photographie einmal in die Hände bekam, in mir den endgültigen Entschluß erzeugen, mich mit der Plastik auseinanderzusetzen? Wieso konnte also ein Toter mich so etwas lehren, etwas Entscheidendes für mein Leben festzulegen, denn ich selbst hatte es aus meinem Suchen heraus eigentlich bereits anders festgelegt, denn ich befand mich schon inmitten eines naturwissenschaftlichen Studiums? Ich bekam also dieses Büchlein ganz zufällig, das auf irgendeinem Tisch lag zwischen anderen, ziemlich zerrupften kleinen Heftchen, in die Hand, schlug die Seite auf und sah eine Skulptur von Wilhelm Lehmbruck, und unmittelbar ging mir die Idee auf, eine Intuition also: Skulptur - mit der Skulptur ist etwas zu machen. Alles ist Skulptur - rief mir quasi dieses Bild zu. Und in dem Bild sah ich eine Fackel, sah ich eine Flamme, und ich hörte: „Schütze die Flamme!“ Dieses Erlebnis, das mich durch den Krieg hindurch begleitet hat, hat nach dem Krieg dazu geführt, daß ich mich mit der Bildhauerei, mit der Plastik auseinandergesetzt habe. Ich habe also, ich wußte gar nicht, was das war, ein Kunststudium angetreten. Ich habe mich erst einmal umgehört, wie man so etwas überhaupt macht. Man muß wissen, das gehört auch zur Vorgeschichte dieses Grunderlebnisses hinzu, ich bin ja am Niederrhein geboren, und das in der Zeit des Dritten Reiches, in dem man zwar täglich von einem Wald von Skulpturen umgeben war, der Art, wie sie zu dieser Zeit gemacht wurden, aber sie haben in mir keinerlei Erlebnis ausgelöst. Als ich dann mich entschlossen hatte, später, mich mit den Dingen intensiver auseinanderzusetzen, während des Studiums, habe ich mich gefragt: Wäre denn irgendein anderer Bildhauer, Hans Arp oder Picasso oder Giacometti oder irgendein Rodin, wäre eine Photographie von Rodin, wenn sie mir seinerzeit in die Hände gefallen wäre, fähig gewesen, diese Entscheidung in mir herbeizuführen? Ich muß noch heute sagen: Nein, - denn das außergewöhnliche Werk Wilhelm Lehmbrucks rührt eine Schwellensituation des plastischen Begriffes an.

Er treibt die Tradition, die in dem Erleben des Räumlichen am menschlichen Körper, am menschlichen Leibe besteht, bis zu einem Punkt hin auf einen Höhepunkt, der einen Rodin noch übertrifft. Das heißt, in ihm wird die Plastik nicht mehr nur das rein Räumliche, das Raumausgreifende, der Organismus des „Maß gegen Maß“, wie Lehmbruck immer sagte, dem der Satz, daß Plastik alles ist, daß Plastik schlechthin das Gesetz der Welt ist, ja nicht fremd war, daß also er sich ausdrücken konnte im „Maß gegen Maß“ als einer Tradition der Bildhauerei von Rodin bis zu seinem Tag auf einem Höhepunkt, der etwas Innerliches meint; das heißt, seine Skulpturen sind eigentlich gar nicht visuell zu erfassen. Man kann sie nur erfassen

mit einer Intuition, wobei einem ganz andere Sinnesorgane ihr intuitives Tor offen machen, und das ist vor allen Dingen das Hörende - das Hörende, das Sinnende, das Wollende, d. h. es sind Kategorien in seiner Skulptur vorhanden, die niemals vorher vorhanden waren.

Nun haben wir es mit diesem Erlebnis zu tun. Ich habe mich also nur aufgrund von Wilhelm Lehmbruck entscheiden können, mich mit der Plastik zu befassen. Nun aber habe ich schon angedeutet, daß Wilhelm Lehmbruck an einer tragischen Wende gelebt hat, an einer tragischen Wende, an der er einen Kulminationspunkt gesetzt hat, der scheinbar über diese Höhe, nach dieser Art von „Maß gegen Maß“ im Raum, nicht mehr entwicklungsfähig war. Vielleicht. Ich stelle diesen Gedanken in den Raum. Ich habe in ihm auch, als ich dieses kleine Heftchen gesehen habe, seine Lebenszeit bemerkt. Ich merkte den zweimaligen Jüngling, denn er hat einmal 19 Jahre gelebt im vergangenen Jahrhundert und die zweiten 19 Jahre in diesem Jahrhundert. Ich habe dies alles geballt erlebt, wie ein Doppelbild von einem Jüngling oder von einer Jungfrau oder von einer Jungfrau und von einem Jüngling.

Während meines Studiums, als ich mich also bereits auf den Weg gemacht hatte, als ich mich mit weitergehenden Fragen, die an das Hören in Wilhelm Lehmbrucks Plastiken anschließen und an das Denkende, an den Denksinn, der in ihnen liegt, befassen mußte, um zu einer ganz neuen Theorie des zukünftigen plastischen Gestaltens zu gelangen. Als ich an ein plastisches Gestalten dachte, das nicht nur physisches Material ergreift, sondern auch seelisches Material ergreifen kann, wurde ich zu der Idee der sozialen Plastik regelrecht getrieben. Ich halte dies auch für eine Botschaft von Wilhelm Lehmbruck, denn ich fand eines Tages in einem verstaubten Bücherschrank den sehr oft unterdrückten Aufruf von Rudolf Steiner von 1919 an das deutsche Volk und die Kulturvölker. Dort wurde ein Versuch gemacht, den sozialen Organismus auf einem völlig neuen Fundament aufzubauen. Nach den Erfahrungen des Krieges, an dem Lehmbruck so gelitten hatte, steht also ein Mann auf und sieht die Gründe für diesen Krieg in der Ohnmacht des Geisteslebens. Ich sah in diesem Heftchen diesen Aufruf, der eine Organisation entstehen lassen sollte, die wirksam einen neuen sozialen Organismus begründen sollte, und ich sah unter den ersten Komiteemitgliedern den Namen Wilhelm Lehmbruck. Es war die erste Ausgabe eines solchen Aufrufes, es sind später Nachdrucke gemacht worden, doch fehlen darin die Namen des Gründungskomitees. Nun liegt das Tragische in dieser Sache, daß ich in diesem Aufruf, unter den wenigen Personen, die sich dort angegliedert hatten, um das Komitee zu bilden, die verschiedenen Komitees zu bilden, in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, sah: In dem deutschen Komitee ist ein Kreuz hinter Wilhelm Lehmbruck, d. h. er muß diesen Willen, diese Flamme, die er weiterreichen wollte, im letzten Augenblick seines Lebens, als er durch das Tor des Todes

seiner eigenen Skulpturen hindurchgegangen ist, gemacht haben. Denn Sie wissen, wie es ist bei solchen Aufrufen: man sammelt die Namen der Komiteemitglieder und versucht möglichst schnell, so etwas in Zirkulation zu bringen. Es muß also nur eine ganz kurze Zeitstrecke, eben eine solche, die zwischen dem Sammeln von Unterschriften und dem Druck vorhanden war, dagewesen sein, in der er sein Leben beendet hat. Dieses ist also das zweite Symbol. Und ich fand, dort, es war etwas Deckungsgleiches, dort fand ich, nicht wahr, das Weiterreichen der Flamme in eine Bewegung hinein, die auch heute noch notwendig ist und die auch heute viele Menschen wahrnehmen sollten als eine Grundidee zur Erneuerung des sozialen Ganzen, die zur sozialen Skulptur führt.

Ich will die Zusammenhänge so schließen. Ich will sagen, es kommt nach den Prinzipien, die Wilhelm Lehmbruck auf den allerhöchsten Gipfel der Entwicklung der Plastik in der Moderne getrieben hat, eine Zeit, in der der Zeit - und der Wärmebegriff den Raumbegriff erweitert. In diesem Weitergeben des plastischen Prinzips an einen Impuls, der den Wärme - und Zeitcharakter als plastisches Prinzip für alles Weitere zur Umgestaltung des sozialen Ganzen nimmt, womit wir alle gemeint sind, da hat Lehmbruck die Flamme an uns weitergegeben. Ich Habe sie gesehen.

Ich habe aber auch gesehen: Er ist zurückgegangen zu allen Menschen, denn in dieser Liste der Menschen, die dort unterschrieben haben, findet man Bergleute, Tischlermeister, Krankenschwestern, auch Universitätsprofessoren, gelegentlich einen Künstler, aber man empfindet eben einfach diese Liste als einen Ausdruck der Menschheit schlechthin, an die diese Flamme weitergereicht wurde.

Das ist eigentlich das, was ich zu sagen habe über die eine Seite und über die andere Seite. Ich meine mit der einen wie mit der anderen Seite die weitere Entwicklung des plastischen Prinzips als Zeitprinzip schlechthin. Das heißt, Plastik ist ein Begriff der Zukunft schlechthin, und wehe denjenigen Konzeptionen, denen dieser Begriff nicht zu eigen ist.

Ich habe gestern einen Bericht eines Symposiums von einer wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft gelesen, in der Soziologen sehr leichtfertig die großen Entwürfe von Soziologen oder von Wissenschaftstheoretikern in einen Topf werfen, und diese heißen Rudolf Steiner, Klages, Jürgen Habermas und so weiter und Viele andere Namen. Da wird alles sozusagen in einen Topf geworfen und der Begriff des Verheerenden als Verdikt über solche, sagen wir einmal, plastischen Konzeptionen, verhängt.

Ich möchte also mich auf die Seite stellen, auf der Wilhelm Lehmbruck gelebt hat und gestorben ist und wo er jeden einzelnen Menschen versehen hat mit dieser inneren Botschaft: „Schütze die Flamme. Denn schützt man die Flamme nicht,/ ach eh man's

erachtet,/ löscht leicht der Wind das Licht,/ das er entfachte./ Brich‘
dann Du/ ganz erbärmlich Herz,/ stumm vor Schmerz“. Ich möchte
dem Werk von Wilhelm Lehmbruck seine Tragik nicht nehmen.

(Rede gehalten anlässlich des Festaktes zur Verleihung des Wilhelm Lehmbruck-Preises im Wilhelm Lehmbruck-Museum der Stadt Duisburg am 12. Januar 1986.)

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Joseph Beuys
“ZAHVALA WILHELMU LEHMBRUCKU”

Želim se zahvaliti svom učitelju Wilhelmu Lehmbrucku. Kako je jednom čovjeku - a sve nakon što sam potpuno slučajno naišao na jedan sasvim mali komadić njegova djela, i to tek u obliku fotografije - pošlo za rukom u meni pobuditi konačnu odluku da se bavim skulpturom? Kako me je, dakle, u tako nečemu kao što je određivanje životnih odluka mogao podučiti jedan mrtvac, iako sam iz vlastite potrage zapravo već bio odlučio drugačije, studirajući već dobrim dijelom prirodne znanosti? Dakle, posve slučajno došao sam do te knjižice što je ležala na nekom stolu između ostalih, prilično odrpanih malih bilježnica. Otvorio sam stranicu, ugledao jednu Lehmbruckovu skulpturu i u taj mi se čas stvorila zamisao, intuitivno: skulptura - sa skulpturom se nešto može stvoriti. “Sve je skulptura!”, gotovo da mi je doviknula ta slika. A u slici sam vidio baklju, vidio sam plamen; i čuo sam: “Zaštiti vatru!”

Taj doživljaj pratio me kroz čitav rat, a poslije rata me doveo do bavljenja kiparstvom, plastikom. Započeo sam dakle, bez da sam zapravo i znao što je to, studij umjetnosti. Prvo sam se raspitao kako se to uopće radi. U uvodni dio priče o tom temeljnom doživljaju spada i saznanje da sam rođen na Donjoj Rajni i to u doba Trećeg Reicha kad su čovjeka dnevno okruživale šume kipova, te vrste kako se tada stvaralo, ali oni na mene nisu ostavljali nikakav dojam. Kad sam se onda kasnije, tijekom studija, odlučio za intenzivnije bavljenje stvarima, upitao sam se: Bi li me ikoji drugi kipar, Hans Arp ili Picasso ili Giacometti ili nekakav Rodin, bi li me neka Rodinova fotografija, da mi je onomad dospjela u ruke, uspjela dovesti do takve odluke? Još i danas moram reći ne. Naime, neobično Lehmbruckovo djelo dodiruje jednu graničnu situaciju pojma plastičnog.

On tradiciju što postoji u doživljavanju prostornog na ljudskome tijelu, na truplu, tjera do jedne točke prema vrhuncu koji bi nadmašio i Rodina. To znači da u njemu plastika više ne postaje samo jedino prostornost, ono što širi prostor, organizam “mjere protiv mjere”, kako bi Lehmbruck običavao govoriti. Dakako, njemu postavka da je plastičnost sve, da je skulptura doslovno zakon svijeta, nije bila nepoznata pa se mogao izraziti u “mjeri protiv mjere” kao tradiciji kiparstva od Rodina do svojih dana, na vrhuncu koji znači nešto iz nutrine, tj. njegove se skulpture zapravo uopće ne može shvatiti vizualno. Može ih se shvatiti samo preko intuicije, pri čemu se intuitivno otvaraju potpuno druga osjetila, a to je prije svega ono što sluša – ono što sluša, ono što razmišlja, ono što želi, tj. u njegovoj se skulpturi nalaze kategorije kojih nikada prije nije bilo.

A sad se dotaknimo tog doživljaja. Za bavljenje skulpturom mogao sam se, dakle, odlučiti samo zbog Wilhelma Lehmbrucka. No, već sam natuknuo da je Wilhelm Lehmbruck živio na tragičnoj prekretnici, na tragičnoj prekretnici na kojoj je postavio točku kulminacije što se, po takvom načinu “mjere protiv mjere” u prostoru, vjerojatno nije mogla razvijati dalje od tog vrhunca. Možda. Tu misao stavljam na razmatranje. U njoj sam, kad

sam vidio tu sitnu bilježnicu, primijetio i njegov životni vijek. Vidio sam dvostrukog mladića – prvo je 19 godina živio u prošlom stoljeću, a onda 19 godina u ovom. Doživio sam to intenzivno, kao dvostruku sliku nekog mladića ili nevine djevojke ili jedne nevine djevojke i jednog mladića.

Tijekom studija, kad sam već krenuo, kad sam se morao baviti pitanjima što vode dalje, što se nadovezuju na slušanje u skulpturama Wilhelma Lehmbrucka i na razmišljajuće, na čulo razmišljanja prisutno u njima, a sve da bih razradio jednu posve novu teoriju budućeg plastičnog oblikovanja... Kad sam razmišljao o kiparskom oblikovanju koje ne bi obuhvaćalo samo fizički već bi moglo obuhvatiti i duševni materijal, doslovno sam silom bio navođen do ideje o društvenoj skulpturi. To smatram i porukom od strane Wilhelma Lehmbrucka jer sam jednog dana u nekom prašnjavom ormaru s knjigama pronašao onaj tako često zataškavani proglas Rudolfa Steinera, upućen 1919. njemačkom i kulturnim narodima. U njemu se društveni organizam pokušava stvoriti na sasvim novim temeljima. Naime, poslije ratnih iskustava, zbog kojih je Lehmbruck toliko patio, jedan je čovjek ustao i kao razloge tog rata naveo iznemoglost duhovnog života. U toj sam knjižici vidio poziv na stvaranje organizacije što bi uspješno trebala utemeljiti novi društveni organizam, a među prvim članovima odbora pročitao sam ime Wilhelma Lehmbrucka. Bilo je to prvo izdanje nekog takvog poziva, kasnije su rađeni pretisci, no u njima su nedostajala imena osnivačkog odbora. Međutim, tragično je da sam u tom proglasu među rijetkim ljudima koji su kao članovi željeli uspostaviti odbor, zapravo uspostaviti odbore, u Njemačkoj, Austriji i Švicarskoj, vidio sljedeće: U njemačkom odboru stajao je iza Lehmbruckova imena križ. To znači da je tu volju, taj plamen koji je htio proslijediti, očito bio stvorio u posljednjim trenucima života, kad je bio prošao kroz vrata smrti svojih vlastitih skulptura. Znači sigurno kako je to kod takvih apela - sakupe se imena članova odbora pa se, što je brže moguće, sve to pokuša pustiti u optjecaj. Očigledno se radilo o jednom sasvim kratkom vremenskom razdoblju, dugom kao između skupljanja potpisa i tiskanja, u kojem je Lehmbruck okončao život. To je, dakle, drugi simbol. A u tom sam našao, bilo je to kao sukladno tome, u tom sam vidio, zar ne, predavanje vatre u ruke jednog pokreta koji je potreban i današnjici te kojeg bi i danas mnogi ljudi trebali gledati kao temeljnu zamisao o obnovi društvene cjeline, koja vodi do društvene skulpture.

Povezane misli tako želim zaokružiti. Želim reći da nam dolazi doba u kojem će pojam vremena i pojam topline proširiti pojam prostora, a što se temelji na principima koje je Wilhelm Lehmbruck dotjerao do najviših vrhova razvoja skulpture u moderni. Tim predavanjem plastičnog principa impulsu što značajku topline i značajku vremena uzima kao plastičan princip za sve ostalo u preinačenju društvene cjeline, a čime se misli na sve nas, Lehmbruck je vatru predao nama. Ja sam je vidio.

No, isto tako sam vidio da se vratio svim ljudima. U navedenom popisu potpisnika naći ćemo, naime, rudare, stolare, medicinske sestre, također i sveučilišne profesore, pokojeg umjetnika. Ta lista upravo je izraz

čovječanstva kojem je proslijeđena spomenuta vatra.

To je zapravo sve što moram reći o jednoj i drugoj strani. I s jednom i s drugom mislim na dalji razvoj plastičnog principa kao principa vremena kao takvog. To znači da je plastika pojam budućnosti kao takve, te jao koncepcijama što taj pojam ne prihvataju.

Jučer sam pročitao neki izvještaj sa simpozija nekog znanstvenog društva. Tom su prilikom sociolozi jako lakoumno u isti koš trpali velike zamisli sociologa i teoretičara znanosti, spominjala su se imena Rudolfa Steinera, Klagesa, Jürgena Habermasa i tako dalje, pa još podosta drugih. Sve se takoreći trpa u isti koš i pojam katastrofalnog se izriče kao moralna osuda takvih, recimo, plastičnih koncepcija. Želim, dakle, sebe staviti na stranu kojoj je za života i u smrti pripadao Wilhelm Lehmbruck i na kojoj je svakom čovjeku poklonio sljedeću duhovnu poruku: "Štiti vatru. Ne štiti li se vatra, znaj, / prije nego tebi pravo/ lako će vjetar svjetlu dati kraj,/ što on je rasplamsav'o./ Tad slomi ti/ od boli srce jadno,/ nijemo, hladno." (u orig. "Schütze die Flamme. Denn schützt man die Flamme nicht,/ ach eh man's erachtet,/ löscht leicht der Wind das Licht,/ das er entfachte./ Brich' dann Du/ ganz erbärmlich Herz,/ stumm vor Schmerz.", op. prev.) Djelu Wilhelma Lehmbrucka ne želim oduzeti njegovu tragičnost.

(Govor održan povodom svečanog čina dodjele Nagrade Wilhelma Lehmbrucka u Muzeju Wilhelma Lehmbrucka u Duisburgu, 12. siječnja 1986.)

(Izvorno objavljeno u: „Zum Tode von Joseph Beuys: Nachrufe, Aufsätze, Reden“, Inter Nationes Bonn 1986.)

Mieke Bal
FOOD, FORM, AND VISIBILITY: *Glub*
and the Aesthetics of Everyday Life

Introduction: mood swings and adaptations

In James Purdy's 1984 novel *On Glory's Course*, the mother whose son has just left their small-town life to try his luck in Chicago as a singer, remains inconsolable after his departure. The description of her state after this fateful event begins as follows:

Ever so gradually a remarkable change came over Alec and Ned's mother: a peculiar calm, a resignation, an acceptance of everything. She spent many of her evenings poring over a religious magazine, which had a cover illustration of so many flowers and birds that Ned had first mistaken it for a seed catalogue, to his mother's grudging amusement.¹

Purdy's novel is one of those fabulous literary artworks whose readability stems from an always-incongruous mix of recognisable banalities and haphazardly profound truths, a mix that exploits the power of simple words to swing us around, from mood to mood. I offer the previous sentence as a provisional definition of what I call the *aesthetics of everyday life*. In this case, the mood swings from melancholy to laughter, while the theme swings from religion to seed. The transition, as it happens, is not as bizarre as the novel makes it appear.

In the extract, for example, mother Elaine's apparent calm, which is never longlived, is asserted in the first sentence and undermined in the second. At first her composure seems based on an unsettling over-zealous religiosity. But the woman, who owns a busy but understaffed restaurant, is rather unlikely to spend her evenings leafing through magazines. Hence, in spite of its casual, barely noticeable style, the plot of this novel does not hinge on the kind of traditional realism that is grounded in plausibility (*vraisemblance*). The incongruous shift from a religious tract to a seed catalogue clearly is the point of passage. This shift entails a mood shift from worried to amused, a shift reinforced by Elaine's own participation in it.

For my purposes in this paper, I wish to foreground the shift in the passage that completes a dialectical move. That is, this shift from religion to seeds is not at all incongruous if we consider religious-cultural traditions and their symbols. Seeds, the birds that eat and transport them, and the flowers and trees that grow from them, can also be seen as strengthening religiosity, rather than undermining it. On a very simple level, seeds and trees, fruits and flowers, populate the world's records of religious symbolisms, from the Biblical creation story to the Song of Songs, from Islamic food laws to narratives of celebration. Thus, from the exaggerated and mildly ridiculed religious fanaticism of a frustrated housewife to the adolescent atheist's mundane reaction of the remaining son, the mother's realistic return to reality through laughter is the resolution that stands for adaptation. This motive of adaptation, necessary as

well as perhaps deplorable, but also amusing and sometimes joyful, is what caught my attention in this short passage. The motives of seeds and adaptation indicate a departure from religiosity, without entirely cutting itself off from it.

Instead of a fiction set in a timeless American mid-West, I wish to place the reflection on this dialectic in the context of everyday life, specifically, in the aesthetic, or the “look” and “feel” of a place, in this case of the contemporary Western European city. We all know that cities have profoundly changed under the impact of mass migration, an epi-phenomenon of post-coloniality and the neocolonialism at its heart. In terms of neo-colonial cultural expression, what we learn about this change in the media mainly concerns poverty and drugs, as well as religious fanaticism and inter-group hostility. This one-sided image building has a way of insinuating itself in the minds of even the most open and progressive people. This happens because within the semantic field thus established, every new incident resonates with earlier news items, and becomes recognisable within a “constellation of images.” Recognition, then, is a tool that can be used and abused to instill concepts of cultural difference.

When, in contrast, there is talk about adaptation, we tend to think of migrants’ obligation to adapt. In the Netherlands, a country with a particularly bland culinary tradition, eating Dutch food was mentioned not so long ago as an example of the requisite adaptation.² Meanwhile, the Dutch, wishing to enjoy an evening out, don’t think twice about what it means that they prefer “exotic” cuisine to their own; it is the “other,” the immigrant, who needs to show evidence of adaptation. Under the label of integration, there is now even talk of “vignettes” which would make the degree of adaptation of a migrant immediately assessable.³

For the host culture, there is little or no requirement of adaptation. Yet, there is some degree of adaptation, which I see primarily not in the famous enlightenment “tolerance” of alterity, but in the happy endorsement of contributions from migrants. Food, as a visible token of foreignness, is the most easily perceived as enrichment, and is often incorporated if not naturalised as a welcome element of otherness. This gain is primarily conceived of in terms of ethnic restaurants. In the genre of “tourism at home,” they provide the local culture with an easy way to travel through the senses. In this form of neo-colonialism, the local majority of the host culture creates “ethnicity.”

Retaining the sense-based nature of such adaptation, I wish to foreground in this paper a particularly felicitous instance of adaptation “through the mouth” that synaesthetically speaks to many of the senses and is thus apt to become an emblem of intercultural relations at their best. The name of this instance is seeds – *glub* (hearts).

On (in)visibility

Food is a domain that addresses several senses at once, while it tolerates any acceptable mix of recognition and the unfamiliar. Food thus has

something in common with media coverage, even if it moves (us) in the opposite direction. Considering this situation, I have been exploring ways of conducting an analysis that makes use of the tool of recognition. For this, I began searching for indications of cultural phenomena that could stand for what our urban centers actually gain from the situation, if only we could *see* it, that is, connect it to something we could recognise. Now, when we talk about recognition and novelty together, of “look” and its pleasurable aspects, we step into the neighboring domains of the *semiotic* or the production and use of meaning, and the *aesthetic* that involves the senses and reflection. Any reflection on the aesthetic, in turn, calls forth the age-old tension between innovation and (recognisable) emulation or imitation. I propose to briefly reflect on this inherent tension, and see if we can make it work for something as difficult to grasp as the everyday – that domain whose spaces “. . . compose a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alternations of spaces. . .”⁴

Only in a precise conception of the aesthetic can this domain be helpful for an understanding of the postcolonial everyday. In the current political climate, a responsible view of what the aesthetic can mean and can (make us) do seems therefore in order. Several contemporary scholars, all working on the intersections of philosophy and aesthetic analysis, offer helpful ideas for such a reflection. For example, in agreement with Alan Singer’s plea for the aesthetic as an attitude or “ethos” that can be politically productive, indeed, decisive, I became interested in exercising a look that works with both recognition and difference, but in the mode of what Kaja Silverman would call a “productive look.” Singer and Silverman . . . perhaps “bien e’tonne’s de se trouver ensemble.” A surprising combination, because Singer, in his book *Aesthetic Reason: Artworks and the Deliberative Ethos* (2003), takes his starting point from cognition and rationality, while Silverman, in her seminal 1996 study *The Threshold of the Visible World*, sets out from the unconscious. I wish to make a claim for the necessity to invoke both together, if we are to come up with an aesthetic that, to put it succinctly, “works.”⁵

In conjunction with these two starting points, the presence of recently arrived populations raises an issue of *visibility*. The more they are visible as such, the easier the host culture perceives them in terms of difference, a view that always threatens to tip over into racism or its mitigated forms of exoticism and condescendence. A third partner in this discussion becomes, therefore, the question of visibility, broached in Singer’s book. His argument addresses the paradoxical mutuality between form as the tool of visibility, and the formlessness of what he calls sublimity, a formlessness that makes the sublimity invisible, and therefore needs to be articulated through the *techné* that produces form. This mutuality of form and formlessness – but not the direction in which this mutuality moves from matter to spirit – resonates with Bois and Krauss’s reconceptualisation of the surrealist aesthetics proposed by philosopher Georges Bataille.⁶

The connections among these three sources of aesthetic theory can now perhaps be mapped out. In his attempt to answer anti-aesthetic arguments that indict art for its lack of political agency and its alleged elitism, Singer, as the subtitle of his book intimates, builds an argument for an ethical impulse to deliberate and make choices based on intersubjective recognition. His argument addresses a post-Kantian repulsion against the rationality of Kantian aesthetics, along with a rejection of a purely sense-based, facile attraction/distraction mechanism. He respectively discusses, to use his own summary, the concepts of “translatability, deliberation, choice, and training in reciprocal recognition” as pertaining to the aesthetic, seen as a *practice* rather than a collection of objects.⁷

These concepts lend themselves, it seems to me, to the analysis of “high art” as much as to that of the contemporary cityscape. As for art, Singer’s terse analysis of Caravaggio’s *Conversion of Saint Paul*, from 1600–01, demonstrates in a mere four pages what this means in practice.⁸ He offers an intricate play on the multiple senses of conversion – the ostensible subject of the painting – as a mutual articulation of the seemingly exclusive pair of *techne* and sublimity, form and spirit. As it happens, Caravaggio was the primary artist through whose work I developed my own version of an ethics of vision as part of a “pre-posterous” history, in my book *Quoting Caravaggio*.⁹

There, I focused more on the body – the body depicted but also that of the viewer, who participates in the aesthetic process. This interest in the body will shortly bring food, smell, and sound into the equation. In terms of the body, I am particularly interested in Singer’s attention to foreshortening in the painting, a visual speech act (my term) that “exhorts” the viewer to act out the need for, and the impossibility of making a choice between technique and, for Singer, spirituality. I would insist that the element so weirdly foreshortened as to be both hyper-visible and near-invisible in the Caravaggio, is the carnal body. By extension, the body remains for me the site of articulation of *techne* and spirituality, sensuality and thought. Elsewhere, this insight has led me to develop a political interpretation of a temporal version of foreshortening, activated in Doris Salcedo’s powerfully mournful sculptures.¹⁰ While Singer’s insistence on the need for rational choice-making is well-taken, I think there is a risk of relapse in dichotomising the spirit from the body, a timeworn distinction that is neither called for in the historical baroque of his Caravaggio, nor helpful to address the postcolonial situation where the body – its marking, suffering and stereotyping – is so central. For this reason, food, edibility, and what Dolphijn calls the urban foodscape are extremely important, even if one wishes, as I do, to avoid overrating the place of (ethnic) restaurants.¹¹

Silverman also foregrounds the role of the body in making choices. She grounds her plea for an aesthetic ethos, based on a profound understanding of psychoanalysis, in an acknowledgement of the difficulty of imposing choicemaking in a seemingly frivolous domain such as art. She

begins one section of her argument with an account of her own visual encounters with the homeless people on Telegraph Avenue in Berkeley, encounters in which one day she acknowledged in herself a “specular panic.” At regular intervals she returns to this self-scrutiny to further her argument for an ethics of vision.¹²

The alternative to specular panic is what she will later call “the productive look.” This act of looking is grounded in a vision of vision that I consider key to an aesthetics of the contemporary everyday:

The unconscious “time” of any given perception can last as long as a life span, and bring about a much more radical transmutation of values than can its conscious reversal. To look is to embed an image *within a constant shifting matrix of unconscious memories*, which can render a culturally insignificant object libidinally resonant, or a culturally significant object worthless. When a new perception is brought into the vicinity of those memories which matter most to us at an unconscious level, it too is “lit up” or irradiated, regardless of its status within normative representation.¹³

I would like to add that memories of smell and taste, as well as tactile memories, are integral to visual memories, and play their part in any connection to images or, more vaguely, to visual “takes” that may occur in the present. For anyone who doubts this, Marcel Proust’s *Remembrance of Things Past* with its famous Madeleine episode amply demonstrates this inevitably synaesthetic nature of memory.¹⁴

To make the integration between Singer’s and Silverman’s ethics of vision more concrete, I suggest that Singer’s “reciprocal recognition” is dependent on such a matrix of visual memories. In other words, it is either facilitated or hampered by the proximity of the visible thing to unconsciously resonating memories. Therefore, the “training” he calls for, and which a constructive social environment might provide, might work out even better if the “translatability” he mentions as well is foregrounded by means other than reason alone.

In a later book, where she makes her argument in entirely philosophical terms, Silverman offers a theory of the image as the counterpoint of this view, which makes her position even more clearly complementary to, but also congenial with Singer’s.¹⁵ Her theory of the image, which is also a theory of photography, of dreams, of memory, and of subjectivity, is, not surprisingly, Freudian. The key term of this theory is “visual habitus.”¹⁶

In her discussion of this concept, Silverman uses strikingly anthropomorphic language. To explain this, she writes the following:

If, in trying to make sense of this strange account of unconscious memories, I am unable to avoid attributing to them the status of a subject, that is because subjectivity itself is in its most profound sense nothing other than *a constellation of visual memories* which is struggling to achieve a perceptual form.¹⁷

The beautiful metaphor of memories struggling to accede to form, hence, visibility, recalls psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas’ similar metaphor – except that, as if to enhance the connection I am making between Singer’s post-Kantian rationalism and Silverman’s seemingly incompat-

ible psychoanalytic take, Bollas applies the metaphor to thought, to ideas, not memories:

I often find that although I am working on an idea without knowing exactly what it is I think, I am engaged in thinking an idea struggling to have me think it.¹⁸

I think most of us have memories of such moments, especially when writing a paper. But in order to make the connection really *work* for an aesthetic of the kind I am looking to articulate, the last words of Silverman's invocation of visual habitus must be taken up: perceptual form. Ideas, too, must achieve form, not quite perceptual perhaps, but communicable nevertheless. This is where the writing we, as academics, attempt to *do* to articulate ideas, and the "constellation of visual memories" that we *are*, as subjects, come together; and –to anticipate on the second half of this paper–this struggle to achieve perceptible form and articulated thought can also be considered an adequate definition of art.

In order to avoid any risk of binary structure – the more pernicious where the senses are struggling with thought struggling to take shape – let me insist that form invokes two "others," not one. First, form invokes visibility, its consequence, as well as, second, formlessness, its opposite. At the heart of an aesthetic that "works" is a break between these two pairs of opposites. Formlessness does not entail invisibility. The choice is not to either see fully shaped forms or to see nothing, but to "train" (Singer's term) a "visual habitus" (Silverman's term) that enables us to learn to see what, by lack of recognisable form, seems invisible. That is the novelty of the contemporary that feeds the aesthetic of the everyday. Let me describe where this "struggle" of an idea desiring to be thought, and of a constellation of memories desiring to be perceived, has led me so far.

Making visibility: filmmaking as analysis

It has led me, in the first place, to that site where migration and its aesthetic, in other words, "migratory aesthetics," is most conspicuously present, albeit in *de facto* invisible form: in the inner cities, those places where William Labov discovered story-telling as a "natural" activity.¹⁹ The question I began to ask was, how the "look" of the cities has become more aesthetically pleasing – livelier, more "colorful" if you like – in recent years. This aesthetic can also be phrased as "interesting," provided this word means genuine interest, or phrased as "engaging," as in making us interested, in opposition to dis-interestedness. The absence of scholarship on this aspect is a bit unnerving. However, when you think of it, it makes sense: a city's "look" is hard to pin down, let alone document and analyse. This recognition brought me to consider a different form of analysis, a mode that would, to speak with anthropologist Johannes Fabian, "perform" the analysis "not *about* but *with*" the people concerned.²⁰ The closest I was able to come was through the medium of film. Film is a tool for making visible that which is there for everyone to see but which remains unseen because it does not have a form that stands out. It lends

itself to an attempt to grasp without smothering the emergent phenomena whereby the city absorbs the vitality of novelty.²¹

This is why I have recently embarked on filmmaking as a way of exploring the way things look – as distinct from, say, explaining why they look that way. I got together with a filmmaker, Shahram Entekhabi, who is, according to current parlance, also a migrant, originating from Iran and living in Berlin. As a tool for research, the film we made, *GLUB (Hearts)*, is not an *object* of analysis but an *instantiation* of that activity. It became the central element of a video installation that I would like to briefly describe.²² The idea was Entekhabi's. During a vacation to Turkey, he realised that there might be a connection between two seemingly unconnected phenomena. The first pertaining to the present, is that the art world in Berlin – always a slightly stiff, bourgeois city – has become much more lively during the last decade, while most people inhabiting and animating the Berlin art world are foreigners. The second, emerging from his “constellation of memories,” is that the streets in some neighborhoods in the city are more “dirty,” which makes them more likeable, even aesthetically pleasing.

While having seen it in Berlin and long before that, in Iran, but without having really noticed it, it was in Turkey that Entekhabi recognised the middle-eastern habit of eating seeds – sunflower, pumpkin, and other kinds of seeds, on the street. Seeds – the eating of them, the shells, the shops and stalls, the people cracking the shells and spitting them out: you see it and you don't, hidden as it is in ordinariness. It is a phenomenon that embodies the invisibility that comes with both the hyper-visibility of pervasive presence, and the formlessness of what is situated between countability and mass. Utterly material, seeds are countable items but their countability does not matter. Instead, what characterises seeds or *glub* is their massive presence. This cultural habit determines the way the street looks, not only because the shells are dropped, but also because eating is a communal activity, which makes the interaction between people look different – less in-different. Entekhabi speculated that it is this aspect, a “symptom” of migration that only becomes visible once you notice it, that has made Berlin so much more lively, both as an urban place and indirectly as an art world. In terms of my attempt to articulate an aesthetics of the everyday, the Berlin art world and *glub* on the streets become each other's metaphor. As soon as he mentioned this to me, we had a project. Both of us began to associate around the idea of seeds, and to collect visual memories.

Glub, the Arabic word for hearts, is used for these edible roasted and salted seeds, a low-cost appetiser or snack. Beginning with the many meanings of the seeds – traditionally eaten in many non-European societies but mostly associated with the Arabic world – we took this hyper-visible phenomenon of the nearinvisible because formless transformation of parts of the inner cities, due to seedeating, as a point of departure for a stroll through the urban center. From there, the film explores the

many meanings and connotations of seeds, and the implementation of a “migratory aesthetics” in the Berlin urban landscape and attendant art scene. Inhabiting the world of seeds, enveloped by the smell of seeds being roasted, the inhabitant of the contemporary city is imperceptibly encouraged to be more communicative, to shed haste, and to mitigate the hitherto strict separation of home and the outside world.

Immigrant neighborhoods have more seed shells on the streets than the more self-enclosed, bourgeois neighborhoods. As a result, they attract more birds, particularly pigeons. Feeding the pigeons is a widespread tourist activity. Along these lines, seeds connect long-term displacement through migration with shortterm outings of tourism. *Birds* transport seeds, and now *people* do, transporting a cultural habit from elsewhere to Western Europe. While the art world partly shifted from the Western neighborhoods to the former East-Berlin *Bezirke*, Kreuzberg is the most noticeable area enlivened by immigrants and their restaurants, and it has, indeed, become fashionable, or “hot.”²³

Both galleries and seed shops have established themselves in Kreuzberg. Like parts of Berlin after the *Wende*, seeds contain the potential to grow, to flourish, to evolve, change and reproduce. Both in the bodily postures that come with the eating of seeds, and in the connotations attached to seeds, there is a slight gender aspect to this habit as well. The concept of seed has perhaps different connotations for men than for women, although that difference comes from a mis-conception of seed in human reproduction. But that seeds remind people of their own potential to grow and multiply is obvious.²⁴

Seeds are also food. Eaten between meals, almost permanently, they are a form of non-food. This function of seeds as unofficial food connects seeds to invisibility and formlessness, but its constant consumption, which produces cracking sounds, smells of roasting, and waste that changes the feel of the street and the sound of walking, makes it at the same time hyper-visible. Seeds are less related to religion as an inevitably fixed connotation of the idea of migration, than to the unemployment in the homelands. This condition, granting little money and much time, both explains and justifies migration. As one immigrant from Tunisia, Tarek Mehdi, explains in the film:

you know our people
have little work, so they have lots of spare time
so they buy *glub*, eat it, to pass
the time . . . it becomes like a tradition
people eat it with the family spend the evening
with the whole family sometimes
it's very nice²⁵

Together with the acknowledgment that this eating is something like an “invented tradition,” this statement derives positive enjoyment from a situation of unemployment and boredom. There is no need to idealise the situation this man describes, or to deny that this situation is rooted in the colonialism behind postcoloniality, in order to still see the cultural resil-

ience expressed in these few words. In addition to clearly enjoying eating *glub*, the speaker also draws social value from the bonding that results.²⁶

The shift, in Purdy's novel, from the mother's religious fervor to the son's association with seeds, might similarly be liable to the boredom of adolescence, rather than his declared refusal to believe in God. But his mother's "grudging amusement" might also indicate that she sees an opportunity to keep her boy's mind tangentially on the lesson, so to speak, for a bored adolescent – or an unemployed youngster – might just as well remain interested in religion, by lack of other useful things to do. This thought establishes a complex association from seeds to economic, social, cultural, and, indeed, religious behavior, on the one hand, and creativity, aesthetics, and the sociology of what can be called – in a departure from the history of art – *artnow*, on the other.

But the link between seeds and religion is not entirely absent either – which is important in view of the cultural status of religion, its function in group-life, particularly in Arabic culture. While not subject to food laws, *glub* is related to the intricacies of pleasure, wealth, and the obligations of charity. In a section significantly titled "Ibn Sudun's Sweet Nothings" of his study of food in classical Arabic literature, Geert Jan van Gelder quotes a mock doxology from medieval literature, where God is praised for the creation of the particular economy of *glub*:

He made sellers subservient to swallowers, those who sit in their shops and those who are ambulant. He made the kernels of pistachio nuts, having been cracked, whole.²⁷

Here, as in other cases, van Gelder mentions that the relationship between *glub* and its users is both *metaphorical* – the sellers as well as the swallowers thrive and grow like seeds – and *metonymical* – the economy is sustained.²⁸ And, to make the analogy between this classical tradition and the Berlin art world even more specific, let me add that van Gelder illustrates how in Arabic literature, eating and writing–eating and describing, or in other words, eating and cultural production– are each other's metaphor.²⁹

With these and many other associations in mind, then, we took the video camera and started to explore Berlin, especially Kreuzberg and especially the art world. The crossing of seed eating and art, two hitherto unconnected domains, yielded a great number of unexpected connections. The formlessness of the large quantities of seeds, for example, yielded sometimes to quite beautiful forms, sometimes to the need to focus on the faces, and the mouths of the people eating them – or, for that matter, talking about that eating habit. As the film progressed, we also became aware of the close connection between the invisibility as well as hyper-visibility of seeds, and what Bataille theorised – but refused to define! – as formlessness, with its critical thrust.³⁰

In Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss's rendering, Bataille's interest in formlessness stems neither from "form" nor from "content" but from "the *operation* that displaces both of these terms." According to their interpretation, Bataille means by operation, "neither a theme, nor a sub-

stance, nor a concept,” three possibilities we will therefore resist attributing to the aspect of the city’s “look.”³¹ Bataille nevertheless launches the word *informe* with an instructive qualification:

It is not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves to bring things down (*de’classer*) in the world.³²

And Bois and Krauss continue:

It is not so much a stable motif, to which we can refer, a symbolizable theme, a given quality, as it is a term allowing one to operate a declassification, in the double sense of lowering and of taxonomic disorder. Nothing in and of itself, the formless has only an operational existence; it is a performative [. . .].³³

This rendering of *informe*, might as well be a description of *glub*: as neither food nor image but as image-making performance.³⁴

If we now bring together the three elements of the aesthetic of seed eating – reciprocal recognition, a constellation of visual memories underlying our visual habitus, and this militant performative use of formlessness – we can begin to see what kind of aesthetic we are looking at, or, more suitably, *performing*. All this time, mind you, we are talking about an eating habit, about a tiny snack that is as addictive as any, that produces thirst, communication, and waste. Nothing special, nothing spectacular, and, most importantly, nothing that gives rise to ethnic restaurants as a form of tourism.³⁵

Instead, this migrant eating habit comes to envelop many different cultural elements, or memories, according to where the person grew up. For example, Maryam Mameghanian-Prenzlow from Iran associated *glub* eating with polite manners, when she stated:

we don’t have for instance autobiographies
many autobiographies because . . .
it’s not polite to speak, to tell
who I am, what I do
it’s very communicative also because
you can’t talk while eating the seeds.

Here, the shift, without transition, from a rule of polite behavior to a function the seeds fulfil in a culture of restraint, is perhaps more telling than elaborate analyses of food laws, however insightful they may be. From this short but twofold statement, we not only learn something essential about Iranian literature, but we are also offered an explanation of *glub* that complements the earlier one. For here, there is no question of unemployment and poverty to explain the habit. Nor is there, again, any mention of religion. What matters most, perhaps, in this statement is the tight bond it establishes between cultural values, eating, and literature.³⁶

An aesthetic of the everyday?

Whereas the two immigrants we have heard so far both associated seed eating with memories of their homeland, some others we interviewed brought up the appeal of this habit on the urban westerner. Dawoud Changizi, an Iranian merchant who manages a fancy seeds

and nuts shop in Kreuzberg, spoke about his customers in the following way, which resonates with both Mehdi's and Mameghanian- Prenzlów's explanations:

what are they? [his customers]
Muslims as well as Germans
they are . . . how to say this . . .
between two cultures
they discovered how we get on, enjoying
sitting together, chatting, and eating seeds
they got the hang of it, that feeling . . .
and so they buy 200–300 grams and
sit all night long in front of the TV eating seeds.

Here, we can see the two aesthetic theories intertwined: Singer's post/neo-Kantian one and the psychoanalytic one proposed by Silverman. On the level of the intellectual analysis of the phenomenon of *glub* in Berlin, this statement provides a lucid explanation of a behavior that emulates the social habits of the newcomers. A keen observer of the people who flock to his store on a daily basis, he understands fully what brings Germans to his store to buy *glub*, at a price the Tunisian unemployed can only dream of.

But in terms of Silverman's theory of the agency of dreams and memories, Changizi's statement can also be seen as an attempt to articulate his customers' "lateral memories". As Silverman theorises it, *a propos* of Chris Marker's film *Sans Soleil*, this practice is a form of participating in "other people's memories," which amounts, she continues, "to inhabit[ing] time."³⁷ In other words, when Changizi says that Germans get a feel for what binds immigrant social units together, and that they subsequently seek to imitate that behavior, he is saying that they are engaging in a form of looking "which can render a culturally insignificant object libidinally resonant," whether or not memories collaborate to shape this libidinal investment.³⁸

Thus, *glub*, the tiny hearts of seeds that are at the heart of cultural habits, in all their diversity, stand for – to quote a figure in Marker's masterful film – those "things that quicken the heart."³⁹ Changizi, interpreting his customers, also interprets a culture of "post-colonial food." This culture is not based on the quick fix of the urban tourist enjoying the foodscape enriched by ethnic restaurants. Instead, it is a mixed culture in a more profound sense, simply but effectively expressed in the shop-keeper's statement. This sense may take on different specifics for each participant, but this malleability is precisely the contribution of *glub* to an aesthetic of the host city.

The connections facilitated by *glub* eating can be based, for example, on a desire to get a taste of the Tunisian excess time, and used by the western urbanite to unhasten her life. Or such a connection can be based on the recognition of restraint as a form of politeness, rekindling manners that contemporary life has made less relevant but no less desirable. Or it can evoke specific memories, like the one told by yet another participant

in the film whose narrative impulse was triggered by the handful of *glub* we proffered:

I was a very young boy
walking the street of Dar Es-Salaam . . .
I had a handful of these seeds
and on the way to this tree there was
an enclosed space
I remember there was a plank missing
in the fence
and I peeped through this fence
and I saw a swimming pool with
a couple of white women
that was my first proper encounter with
a white person
but I was so scared because I'd
never seen a white person
that I tripped over backwards
spilling all those seeds . . . (Shaheen Merali)

The narrative impulse we witness here, sprung up with amazing frequency whenever we mentioned, showed, or offered *glub* during the project. The multiple stories compose the “manifold story” De Certeau evoked, and perform something between a personal and a cultural voice – importantly, these two cannot be distinguished. As Dolphijn phrases it, this story is an instance of “[v]oices that should not be reduced to the people that produced them, but that create an altogether different space.”⁴⁰ The memory Merali evokes is simultaneously utterly personal and significantly cultural, belonging to this single boy who was part of a group of Indian immigrant’s in West-Africa.

To substantiate my claim that film can provide an instance of cultural analysis – to solicit debate and replace, say, a lecture – a “scholarly” or academic attitude of looking is required. In a pedagogical setting, for instance when presenting *GLUB* to students, the film can only work performatively when its viewers co-perform it. To this effect, I tend to propose students to look at it, actively, in two ways. First, I ask them to consider the associations I have mentioned, and think about other possible motives that they think contribute to the look of any city they are interested in. Hence, the question: “Have you seen this seed-eating habit in Paris, Rome, or Sydney,” can be supplemented with the question: “What else have you noticed that makes this city different from, say, the classical capital you knew, or thought you knew?”

Second, by way of connecting this aesthetic question to a more political one, I request that students consider the shift the film is trying to perform, from an obsession with mosques and violence, to a careful consideration and enjoyment of the specific aesthetic aspects of migration, such as the “look” and “feel” of Western European cities. For our film, this is the connection between seed eating and art – from one domain of fertility to another, each being a metaphor of the other to the benefit of both. For example, the film, as the few quotations from it already intimate, is full of what we ended up calling “wisdom slogans,” uttered by the characters

in relation to their situation of not-being-at-home. One example from the end of the film suffices to demonstrate the genre:

my idea in life is to stand in the street
to be ready for what comes along
instead of preparing for what I think might come along (Jimmie Durham)

Students may pick up on these stories, or the cityscapes in which practically everyone appears to be eating seeds, and which suggest new ideas to them. Moreover, students come up with different associations themselves, ideas that also contribute to a shift in thinking about what we might call the “cultural politics” of migration. Offering audiences some *glub* – enticing them to produce, hear, and be sensitised to the sound that predominates in the film – encourages students to come up with their own stories, which are shared by the members of the group during the subsequent discussion period.

As I already suggested, an integral part of the phenomenon analysed – and another tool for analysis that supplements scholarship – is the exuberant storytelling that occurred during filming. The non-theme, non-substance, and nonconcept of seeds clearly compelled everyone we spoke to – from people in the street, shoppers and shopkeepers, to artists, curators, or computer programmers – to practically burst out in storytelling as soon as they gathered that seed eating was the subject of the film. This linguistic generosity suggested that an extended video installation made sense.

This installation, then, became the second part of the project. We assembled those stories that were too long or otherwise not suitable for the (30 minutes only) film, and we put these on one of two sound tracks. The other track registers the sound of cracking and eating the seeds and spitting out the shells. On seven monitors facing the screen on which the film is projected, we show the busts of a great number of individuals eating seeds, looking into the camera, against an even white background. The sound of that eating, produced by these individuals making eye contact with the visitor of the installation, reinforces, echoes, and responds to the sound of seed eating in the film and in the gallery where visitors are offered unlimited supplies of seeds to eat during their visit. This sound installation creates an eerie uncertainty about levels of reality.⁴¹

The busts are meant to invoke, however fleetingly, Roman emperors in art museums. They, like these high-placed individuals, are honored with a portrait. This incipient individualism is qualified when these portraits blend into one another. In the flash of a single frame, the eyes of one person inhabit the face of the next one. Figure 12 shows one person deep in thought while performing for the camera. Figure 14 shows a number of the happy seed eaters in the studio.

Through a performative exploration of the sense-based aesthetic of the everyday in the urban environment, this project engages the relationship between (non) food and the social process of seed eating in the public sphere. As the academic of the two of us, I proposed to explore

what can be realised with the help of aesthetic theory provided by Singer, Silverman, and Bataille. I was interested to see whether readers, viewers and students, instead of staying inconsolable after the demise of an ethnic purity that never existed, are able to be “grudgingly amused” by the current look of the world’s capital cities. In this they could follow young Ned’s mother, because the permeable limits between religion and seeds are quite funny indeed. For Shahram Entekhabi, there were artistic goals to be met. As we talked the project through, however, the difference between academic and artistic ambitions didn’t amount to much. Both practices are analytical inquiries. Both articulate what is not yet articulated. And in the process of doing so, both struggle to give form to the ideas, phenomena, and images struggling to receive perceptual or intellectual form. That, too, we grudgingly acknowledged, amused us.⁴²

(Mieke Bal, *Food, Form, and Visibility: Glub and the Aesthetics of Everyday Life Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 8, no 1, 51-77, 2005, published by Routledge)

Notes

- 1 James Purdy, *On Glory’s Course*, London: Peter Owen, 1984, p. 334.
- 2 Barbas (2003) concludes her historical analysis of the Chop Suey in the US with the conjecture that cultural minorities may seem “far less threatening to dominant social groups when placed in the context of food and dining.” Samantha Barbas, “I’ll Take Chop Suey”: Restaurants as Agents of Culinary and Cultural Change’, *Journal of Popular Culture*, 36(4), 2003, pp. 669–86, p. 684.
- 3 Rachida Azough, ‘Zoeken naar definities van geïntegreerde allochtonen’, *De Volkskrant* (Amsterdam), 28 February 2004, p. 1.
- 4 The everyday is, paradoxically, the site of minute detail and banality-inducing generalization at the same time. Studies of the everyday embark either on detail, mostly through historical analysis, or on philosophical reflection that does not shun away from leaps between single phenomena and broad-sweeping thoughts. No study of this subject can do without Michel de Certeau’s seminal work from which this quotation was taken by a detour through Dolphijn’s study on food that shares some starting points with my essay. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 93, quoted in Rick Dolphijn, *Foodscapes: Towards a Deleuzian Ethics of Consumption*, Delft: Eburon, 2004, p. 7.
- 5 Alan Singer, *Aesthetic Reason: Artworks and the Deliberative Ethos*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003; Kaja Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, New York: Routledge, 1996.
- 6 Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind E. Krauss, *Formless: A User’s Guide*, New York: Zone Books, 1997.
- 7 Singer, *Aesthetic Reason*, p. 221.
- 8 Singer, *Aesthetic Reason*, pp. 133–137.
- 9 Mieke Bal, *Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- 10 Mieke Bal, *Political Art Now*, (forthcoming).
- 11 Rick Dolphijn, *Foodscapes*, 2004.
- 12 Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, p. 26.
- 13 Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, pp. 3–4, emphasis added.

- 14 Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past*, Jean-Yves Tadie' (ed), trans. C.K. Scott-Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, London: Penguin Books, 1981. See Julia Kristeva, *Time & Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature*, trans. Ross Guberman, New York: Columbia University Press 1997; also, Mieke Bal, *The Mottled Screen: Reading Proust Visually*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- 15 Kaja Silverman, *World Spectators*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, pp. 75–100.
- 16 Kaja Silverman, *World Spectators*, p. 89.
- 17 Kaja Silverman, *World Spectators*, p. 89, emphasis added.
- 18 Christopher Bollas, *The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 10.
- 19 See William Labov, *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972. For a thoroughly theorized extension, see Monica Fludernik, *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*, New York: Routledge, 1996.
- 20 Johannes Fabian, *Power and Performance: Ethnographic Explorations through Proverbial Wisdom and Theater in Shaba, Zaire*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990.
- 21 This is more or less the conception of vision according to Deleuze's "Bergsonianism." See Paola Marrati, *Gilles Deleuze: Cinéma et Philosophie*, Paris: PUF, 2003.
- 22 *GLUB (Hearts)*, by Mieke Bal and Shahram Entekhabi (with the assistance of Noa Roei); Berlin: PLAY_gallery for still and motion pictures, 2004.
- 23 Kreuzberg has its own peculiar social history. Once centrally located, the building of the Wall in 1961 repositioned the borough as a rather isolated periphery of West-Berlin, with its eastern parts almost surrounded by the Wall. To combat the housing shortages after World War 2, it had emerged as an area for low quality but rent-controlled housing projects, which deterred real estate investments. The isolation, in combination with the availability of cheap housing, turned Kreuzberg into a site where immigrants moved into post-war apartment buildings, while squatters occupied the crumbling prewar buildings. Since *Die Wende*, Kreuzberg is once again situated in the centre of Berlin. See <http://www.kreuzberg.de>.
- 24 For a critical analysis of the term "seed" in relation to human procreation, see Carol Delaney, *The Seed and the Soil: Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991. For a study of the relation between food and gender, see Elspeth Probyn, *Carnal Appetites: Foodsexidentities*, London: Routledge, 2000.
- 25 Since this and the following statements are drawn from oral interviews, the line length is maintained to reflect the tone of speech, including hesitations and breaks. Mehdi spoke in French, a recently acquired foreign language for him; Mameghanian-Prenzlow also spoke in a foreign language, a German she had been speaking for twenty years; Changizi spoke in his own Farsi and Merali spoke in English. All translations are as literal as possible.
- 26 For the term "invention of tradition," see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Initially derogatory, this concept has recently been rehabilitated for its forceful explanation of social bonding, especially in minority groups. For a reconsideration of tradition, see Mark Philips and Gordon Schochet (eds), *Questions of Tradition*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.
- 27 *Nuzha*, Litograph Edition, Cairo, AH 1280, p. 2, quoted in Geert Jan van Gelder, *Of Dishes and Discourse: Classical Arabic Literary Representations of Food*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000, p. 91.
- 28 Van Gelder, *Of Dishes and Discourse*, p. 61.
- 29 For example in Van Gelder, *Of Dishes and Discourse*, p. 52.
- 30 Georges Bataille, *Manet*, New York: Rizzoli, 1983.
- 31 Bois and Krauss, *Formless*, p. 15.
- 32 Georges Bataille 'A Critical Dictionary: The Informe', *Documents*, 1(7), 1929, p.382, quoted in Bois and Krauss, *Formless*, p.18.
- 33 Bois and Krauss, *Formless*, p. 18.
- 34 Significantly for our project, the performativity of food has become a fashionable element in contemporary art. For an excellent study of the performativity of food in artistic practices, see Barbara Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, 'Playing to the Senses: Food as Performance Medium', *Performance Research*, 4(1), 1999, pp. 1–30.
- 35 The continuity between this form of tourism-at-home, and the neo-colonial economy that structures western societies, is forcefully argued by Laurier Turgeon and Madeleine Pastinelli, "'Eat the World': Postcolonial Encounters in Quebec City's Ethnic Restaurants', *Journal of American Folklore*, 115(456), 2002, pp. 247–68. On the impact of American food in the world, Eric Schlosser, *Fast Food Nation: What the All-American Meal is Doing to the World*, London: Penguin, 2002. The impact of ethnic food on American cultural identity is analyzed by Donna R. Gabaccia, *We Are What we Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- 36 In fact, Mameghanian-Prenzlow, who is very knowledgeable about literature, comes from an upper-middle class family. The link between eating and literature that underlies Gelder's study is explored in the negative mode in Ellmann's study of starvation; Maud Ellmann, *The Hunger Artists: Starving, Writing and Imprisonment*, London: Blackwell, 1993. A useful overview of food laws in Jewish and Islamic culture is provided in Joe M. Regenstein, Muhammad M. Chaudry and Carrie E. Regenstein, 'The Kosher and Halal Food Laws', *Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety*, 2(3), 2003, pp. 111–127.
- 37 Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, p. 189.
- 38 Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, pp. 3–4.
- 39 Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, p. 191.
- 40 Rick Dolphijn, *Foodscapes*, 2004, p. 7.
- 41 In pedagogical contexts, students are also offered seeds to eat during the class.
- 42 As I am writing this paper, *GLUB (Hearts)* is on display in Cirrus Gallery, Los Angeles, July 17–August 14, 2004; the complete video installation will be on show during October 2004 in the Mather Gallery of Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland (Ohio).

Nada Beroš
KORPORACIJE I UMJETNOST
Dvostruki život korporacije Generali

Razgovor sa Sabinom Breitwieser, direktoricom Generali Foundation, Beč

U svijetu sponzoriranja umjetnosti pušu novi vjetrovi! Tako bi se u najkraćim crtama mogao opisati izmijenjen odnos multinacionalnih korporacija spram ulaganja novca u suvremenu umjetnost, čiji su odličan primjer mlada umjetnička zaklada Generali Foundation iz Beča i njezin osnivač Generali Gruppe Österreich. Specijaliziravši se za istraživanja i promociju inovativnih umjetničkih praksi, u svega desetak godina od svojeg osnivanja, Generali Foundation postala je jednom od najcjenjenijih austrijskih umjetničkih ustanova u svijetu. Ta neprofitna Zaklada, nastala u krilu poznate osiguravajuće tvrtke Generali, od samih početaka njeguje neprikriveno "lijevo orijentaciju", i začudo, podjednako uspješno promovira image progresivne korporacije, kao i radikalnu umjetnost od šezdesetih godina do danas. Generali Foundation osnovana je 1988. godine, a svojim preseljenjem, 1995. godine, u novoizgrađenu zgradu u središtu Beča, Wiedner Hauptstrasse 15, odličnim programima u golemim, sirovobetonskim izložbenim prostorima, nametnula se kao obavezna točka dobro informiranoj likovnoj publici, ali i poslovnom svijetu spremnom učiti na izazovnom primjeru povezivanja umjetnosti i businessa.

Generali godišnje organizira samo tri izložbe, koje obavezno prate opsežne publikacije, seminari, predavanja, radionice, a te su publikacije potom vrlo tražene u knjižarama najpoznatijih svjetskih muzeja.

Dr. Sabine Breitwieser, direktorica Zaklade od samog početka, svojom je osobnošću dala biljeg ustanovi. Zanimalo nas je kako joj je pošlo za rukom uvjeriti Upravu Generali Gruppe Österreich da svoj kulturni image izgradi na podupiranju radikalne suvremene umjetnosti i održi svoju beskompromisnu poziciju do danas...

Kada je i s kojim ciljem osnovana umjetnička zaklada Generali Foundation?

Generali Foundation osnovana je 1988.g. u vrijeme otvaranja novog sjedišta Generali Gruppe Österreich u Beču, a njezino osnivanje valja zahvaliti činjenici što su se mediji s pravom okomili na lošu arhitekturu novog sjedišta. Uprava je odlučila kako mora krenuti drukčijim smjerom i pridobiti kulturnu javnost za sebe. Shvatili su da se moraju uključiti u kulturna zbivanja na kvalitetniji način nego što je to puko sponzoriranje. Odlučili su kako nije dovoljno samo kupovati umjetnička djela s kojima će ukasiti zgradu, na prijedlog ljudi iz Odjela za odnose s javnošću, već treba stvoriti profesionalnu organizaciju, umjetničku zakladu u kojoj će uposliti stručnjake koji će donositi meritorne odluke.

Vi ste od samog početka bili pozvani da osmislite program Zaklade.

Prije moga dolaska Generali je kupovao samo djela austrijskih umjetnika. Konceptija je bila znatno konzervativnija, kupovali su se radovi na papiru, slike, skulpture... Bile su to skulpture u tradicionalnom smislu te riječi. Uspjela sam uvjeriti upravu da je suvremena umjetnost internacionalna stvar po sebi, te ukoliko zaista žele biti moderni, odnosno suvremeni, potrebno je u cijelosti mijenjati politiku. Dakako, žarište našeg zanimanja i dalje je bila austrijska avangardna umjetnost koju smo htjeli povezati s međunarodnom avangardom, kontekstualizirati je. Mi i dalje radimo sa skulpturom, ali to nije tradicionalna skulptura, nego ona koja propituje vrijeme, prostor, tijelo, socijalni prostor... jer se pojam skulpture znatno izmijenio u proteklih dvadesetak godina...

Morate li ponekad činiti kompromise? Jeste li još uvijek uključeni u ukrašavanje sjedišta Generalia?

Da. Činimo to još uvijek, s djelima koja dopuštaju da budu izložena na dnevnom svjetlu i s kojima je lako rukovati. Ali ne mislim da radimo kompromise. Morate znati da je Generali Austria ogranak starog osiguravajućeg društva koje je nastalo u vrijeme Austrougarske i imalo je ogranke posvuda po svijetu, pa i u Hrvatskoj. To je talijanska korporacija, jedna od najvećih, ali novac za našu Zakladu dolazi samo iz njezina austrijskog sjedišta. Generali Austria posluje i u zemljama tzv. bivšeg Istočnog bloka, Sloveniji, Češkoj, Slovačkoj, Mađarskoj, a uskoro će se otvoriti i u Hrvatskoj.

Zbog čega se korporacija Generali odlučila investirati novac u suvremenu umjetnost, a ne primjerice u Formulu 1?

U upravi doista vjeruju kako je to korisno za obje strane. Sebe manje vide kao podupiratelje, sponzore umjetnosti, a više kao producente, one koji omogućavaju da nastanu nova djela, a ja imam zadaću to ispuniti. Radi se o obostranoj razmjeni. Umjetnost treba novac, ali treba i publiku. I svijet businessa također je umjetnička publika. Novac za umjetnost ne može dolaziti samo iz državnog proračuna. Potrebno je uspostaviti odnos između poslovnog svijeta i umjetnosti. Na meni je da uspostavim taj odnos. Ne želim skrivati image, profil korporacije. Dakako, posao je umjetnika da budu kritični spram svega, pa tako i sponzora. Ali mislim da nema bitne razlike između rada s političarima, odnosno kad novac daje država, ili s drugim sponzorima. Što se mene tiče, više volim raditi s korporacijom, jer su oni mnogo transparentniji od političara. U Americi umjetnici su odavno naučili raditi s korporacijama. Za mene je najveći izazov bio suočiti zaposlenike s avangardnom umjetnošću, a ne tek s "business umjetnošću", kakvu surećemo u poslovnim zgradama svugdje po svijetu. Umjetnici su u mnogo čemu ispred svog vremena, stoga poslovni svijet, osobito svijet marketinga, može mnogo naučiti od umjetnika.

Ono što mene posebno impresionira u vašem radu jest činjenica da su vaši programi i izložbe vrlo jasno profilirani, moglo bi se reći da su namijenjeni uskom krugu znalaca. Međutim, vi paralelno radite na edukativnim programima - predavanjima, simpozijima, seminarima - kako biste obrazovali i proširili krug publike, poput velikih muzeja u svijetu, potvrđujući kako su temeljne funkcije tih ustanova danas komunikacija i interpretacija, a ne čuvanje i konzerviranje umjetničkih djela. Kako ste uspjeli taj edukativni dio nametnuti Upravi? Je li bilo prigovora da su vaši programi odveć ambiciozni?

Edukativni programi bili su istinska potreba koja je proizašla iz činjenice da je bilo potrebno posredovati značenje Zaklade zaposlenicima, koji su htjeli znati na što to Generali troši novac. Većina nije razumjela o čemu se radi, a njihove plaće nisu bile onoliko velike koliko su oni željeli da budu. Rano smo shvatili da je prvo potrebno educirati zaposlenike, jer “što više znaš, više i vidiš!”. Izradili smo posebne programe za njih, a u isto vrijeme, kad smo otvorili ovaj novi prostor u Wiedner Hauptsrasse 12, prije četiri godine, započeli smo s edukativnim programima za široku publiku, za škole... Za učenike i studente cijena je ulaznica simbolična, a o njima brinu posebno izučeni edukatori, povjesničari umjetnosti, obrazovani tako da su u stanju svoja znanja prenijeti najširoj publici, koja nije primarno upućena na umjetnost. Radimo programe i za druge korporacije. One nas dolaze kontaktirati, traže savjete, žele učiti što je to suvremena umjetnost i kakvo je njezino značenje danas.

Budući da je Zaklada privatna ustanova, znači li to da vi ne možete zatražiti dodatna sredstva od države ili pak drugih sponzora ukoliko se to pokaže neophodno kako biste realizirali neke od svojih zahtjevnih programa?

Budući da smo mi sami sponzori umjetnosti, bilo bi nepristojno tražiti novac od države koji je namijenjen neprofitnim ustanovama. Za neke od svojih programa namjeravamo u budućnosti tražiti novac od Europske zajednice, na primjer, za naš arhiv koji je dostupan svim istraživačima, piscima doktorata i sl. Imamo tzv. referencijalnu sobu koja je besplatna za sve korisnike, a to stoji mnogo novaca - održavanje, digitalizacija podataka, naime vrlo je zahtjevan i skup proces i za to namjeravamo tražiti pomoć od EZ, jer zapravo ispunjavamo funkciju sveučilišta. Međutim, nećemo tražiti novac od države. Surađujemo i s nekim sponzorima, primjerice Hotelom Triest u kojem su smješteni naši gosti. Ali nije lako raditi s više sponzora jer svaki od njih želi sačuvati svoj image u tome, a teško je pomiriti dvije strane.

Ne samo da su vaši programi vrlo kompleksni i sve više fokusirani na internacionalnu umjetnost, nego se usuđujete otkrivati “zanemarene” i do jučer malo poznate umjetničke sredine, poput Istočne Europe. Je li riječ o ispravljanju povijesnih pogreški ili naprosto nalazite istinsku i duboku povezanost Austrije s tim zemljama?

Radi se o stvarnoj potrebi. Politika je naše Zaklade da pomažemo umjetnike i pojave koje su nedovoljno zastupljene na svjetskoj likovnoj sceni, ali čiji rad smatramo vrlo važnim za razumijevanje suvremene umjetnosti. Danas su mnogi od tih umjetnika vrlo poznati u svijetu, poput austrijske konceptualne umjetnice Valie Export ili američkog umjetnika Dan Grahama. Oni su stvorili određeni umjetnički diskurs, važni su mnogim umjetnicima, premda nisu zastupljeni u velikim muzejima. Posve je prirodno što želimo promijeniti takvu situaciju, otkriti nove teme i područja. Stoga smo nedavno imali veliku izložbu latino-američke umjetnosti gdje se događaju iznimno važne stvari. Istraživanje je među našim najvažnijim ciljevima, jer doista ne želimo samo gledati što se događa u New Yorku, Parizu i drugim svjetskim središtima. Također, Austrija je dio "istoka", to je naš kontekst, od Austrougarske do danas. Mi poznajemo jedni druge, surađujemo međusobno. Pokušavamo promišljati i pokazati situaciju koja je postojala primjerice 70-ih godina u vrijeme izložaba Trigona u Grazu, kad su umjetnici s područja bivše Jugoslavije igrali važnu ulogu u regiji.

Vaše tematske i monografske izložbe uvijek su praćene vrlo opsežnim katalogima. Je su li oni najskuplji dio vaših projekata?

Točno. Velik dio budžeta naših izložaba trošimo na kataloge, publikacije. Cilj je da naše knjige ne završe u podrumu nego u knjižarama, da budu distribuirane posvuda. Odlučila sam da ne poklanjamo knjige, već ćemo učiniti sve kako bi ljudi poželjeli kupiti naše knjige. I uspijevamo u tome. Ne radi se toliko o novcu, koliko nam je važno da knjige imaju smisla. Stoga pažljivo radimo s izdavačima na tim publikacijama.

Producirate li radove umjetnika za vaše izložbe?

Ponekad plaćamo produkcijske troškove, ali to ne radimo redovito, rijetko naručujemo nova djela umjetnika, kao što smo to učinili u slučaju Dan Grahama. To ponekad može biti problematično, zato radije kupujemo već stvorena djela umjetnika.

Koliko djela prosječno kupujete godišnje?

Nema pravila. To ovisi o cijeni. Ponekad to je svega nekoliko djela, ponekad stotinjak, ako se radi primjerice o videoradovima. U posljednje vrijeme uključeni smo sve više u kupnju video radova. Kupili smo rane radove pionira videoarta u Hrvatskoj, Sanje Iveković, Gorana Trbuljaka i Dalibora Martinisa. Sad je naša koncepcija vrlo specifična. Djelujemo poput umjetničkog muzeja koji se specijalizirao za avangardnu umjetnost 60-ih i 70-ih godina, povezujući je s umjetnošću devedesetih. Koncentrirali smo se na određene pojave i umjetnike koje temeljito obrađujemo, poput medijske umjetnosti, ženske, odnosno feminističke umjetnosti, umjetnosti performansa, ali također nas zanima i veza s

arhitekturom i dizajnom, svojevrsno križanje s tim područjima. Zanimaju nas i umjetnici koji su vrlo kritični spram društva, predstavnici tzv. “političke umjetnosti”, poput Hansa Haackea čiju izložbu pripremamo za jesen.

Kako to sve postižete? Vaš tim je vrlo malen!

Da, to je malen tim, svega četrnaest ljudi, ali zapravo velik u odnosu na početke kad sam bila posve sama. Moji su suradnici prilično mladi ljudi, vrlo profesionalni, ali nisu svi stalno zaposleni. Budući da radimo poput muzeja, velik dio našeg posla predstavljaju posudbe djela iz naše kolekcije za izložbe u svijetu, a to je jako zahtjevan posao, koji oduzima mnogo vremena.

Kolika je zapravo vaša Zbirka?

Broj nije velik, oko tisuću djela, ali radi se doista o mnogim vrhunskim djelima. Također, imamo mnogo videoradova iz 60-ih i 70-ih godina, neki od njih su vrlo rijetki u drugim muzejima. Mi smo jedina ustanova u Austriji, a možda i u cijeloj regiji, koja svim zainteresiranima omogućuje pristup videoumjetnosti. Restaurirali smo mnoge rane videovrpce, kao što su radovi Gordon Matta Clarka, Pichlera, Valie Export. To je vrlo složen posao, podjednako fizički kao i mentalno. Ukoliko želimo danas predstaviti neke videoinstalacije, najčešće je potrebno rekonstruirati komplicirane radove, a mi posjedujemo samo video vrpce i uz nju upute umjetnika!

Za izložbu Double Life (11.5.-12.8.2001) rekonstruirali ste rad Eleanor Antin, te izdali reprint umjetničkih publikacija Sanje Iveković. Recite nam nešto o toj izložbi?

Napravili smo rekonstrukciju kina iz dvadesetih za instalaciju Eleanor Antin “Ljubavi jedne balerine”, ali također smo producirali i rad Elke Krystufek, kao i reprint izdanja dviju umjetničkih knjiga Sanje Iveković iz sedamdesetih godina “Dvostruki život” i “Tragedija jedne Venere”. Jako volim rad Sanje Iveković. Kad se pokazalo da nećemo moći imati te radove na izložbi jer su istobno posuđeni za njezinu veliku retrospektivu u Innsbrucku, odlučili smo, u suradnji s Muzejom suvremene umjetnosti iz Zagreba i umjetnicom, načiniti reprint tih publikacija. Izložba Double Life (Dvostruki život) je tematska izložba o problemu igranja uloga, maskerade, preuzimanju fiktivnih karaktera, nešto što zapravo često nalazimo u svakodnevnom životu, u kazalištu, u filmu, književnosti... To je također važan problem i u umjetnosti, osobito 60-ih godina, kad su se gluma i vizualna umjetnost u znatnoj mjeri preklapale, naročito u žanru performansa. Umjetnost performasa u velikoj mjeri izmislile su žene jer to područje još nisu bili zaposjeli muškarci, koji su svugdje bili dominantni. Performans srećom još nije bio dio kanona, tako da je ta vrsta razigrane, vedre forme, upotreba maske i šminke, omogućavala refleksiju vlastite uloge u društvu, vlastite rodne i spolne pozicije. Bilo je

moгуće zastati i kritički promatrati društvene zadatosti. To je razlog što je na izložbi mnogo radova žena-umjetnica. Istodobno, na izložbi je i rani rad Andy Warhola "Outer and Inner Space" iz 1965., koji je ponovno otkriven devedestih godina. To je crno-bijeli film u kojem glumi Edie Sedgwick, rano preminula omiljena Warholova glumica, koja glumi četiri različite "sebe". Na cijeloj izložbu crvenu nit predstavlja "hollywoodska crta", tako je pored Warhola Sanjin rad o Marilyn Monroe... Stvoriti sinteznu, tematsku izložbu o tom pitanju uistinu bi bilo vrlo teško, zato smo se odlučili naglasiti pojedine momente, koncentrirati se na umjetnike koji predstavljaju određene modele, kako bismo propitali neke povijesne primjere u usporedbi s recentnim radovima, primjerice, Elke Krystufek, Philippea Parrenoa ili Pierrea Huyghea, koji rade s likovima iz japanskog stripa Manga. I uz rane radove Sanje Iveković iz sredine sedamdesetih pokazujemo njezine recentne radove iz serije "Narodne heroine", u kojoj je umjetnica vrlo kritičan spram društva i kolektivne amnezije, uloge žene u medijima i u društvu općenito.

Na izložbi je predstavljeno dvadesetak umjetnika različitih generacija. Zanimljivo je kako su neki autori koristili nove, preuzete uloge kako bi kritizirali društvo, poput rumunjskog umjetnika Iona Grigorescu, koji u videu iz sedamdesetih - "Razgovor s Causescuom" - igra istodobno obje uloge, preuzimajući egzistencijalni rizik u vrijeme diktature Causescua.

Jednako kao što je sedamdesetih godina video bio revolucionaran medij, slično vrijedi i za digitalnu umjetnost danas. Na izložbi "Dvostruki život" važnu cjelinu predstavljaju internet projekti. Kako je došlo do uključivanja tog segmenta?

Uz Hemmu Shmutz, na izložbi je surađivala i Yvonne Volkart, koja je birala on-line radove, posebno koncipirane za Internet. Yvonne se oduševila radom mlade hrvatske umjetnice Andreje Kulunčić, koju sam upoznala prilikom svojeg nedavnog posjeta Zagrebu i predložila Yvonne da je pozove na izložbu. Andreja će imati posebnu večer posvećenu prezentaciji njezinog projekta o genetičkom inženjeringu, 26. srpnja. To je izvrstan rad, koji pruža veliku mogućnost sudjelovanja publike i tematizira vrlo važnu društvenu temu. Sviđa mi se to što Internet radovi omogućuju pristup svim korisnicima, i onima koji su svjesni da se radi o umjetnosti, kao i onima koji su posve slučajno zakoračili na to područje. Također, volim i ideju dislokacije izložbe, koja omogućuje da se izložba događa svugdje i da je dostupna svima.

(Interview sa Sabine Breitwieser, direktoricom Generali Foundation, Beč, Banka, Zagreb, srpanj 2001.)

Zoran Erić ID TROUBLES

In global perspective, the very institution of citizenship, tying particular persons to particular states by virtue of the morally arbitrary accidents of birth, serves as a powerful instrument of social closure and a profoundly illiberal determinant of life chances. True, states are open at the margins to citizens of other states – but only at the margins. Seen from the outside, the prosperous and peaceful states of the world remain powerfully exclusionary.

Roger Brubaker

Identity, identification and identity politics

The problem of identity has been an enduring topic since the age of modernism, but as the twentieth century drew to a close, it was revisited as one of the key issues in socio-political and cultural debates. The main thrust of these discussions focused on the social context in which individual identity is built, which led to the exploration of many particular identities and a flourishing discourse of identity politics. However, in these debates, the development of techniques of identification and documentation of individual identity – instrumentalised by the nation states – and the resulting consequences were largely neglected.

Looking at both the sociological and psychological aspects of identity in theory, it is noticeable that both Marx and Freud asserted that *identity* – our sense of ourselves as individuals and as social beings – rather than being predetermined, is constructed through structural processes. The implication for both was that there are not necessarily any universal or unchanging attributes of human identity, but that differentiation and movement between identities is characteristic of modern societies.¹ The conclusion that has been drawn from this assertion is that social (political) identities are subject to construction. To understand this process of construction, we should take into account the psychoanalytic notion of *identification* with its explicit assertion that there is a lack at the root of any identity. Because of the original lack of identity, one needs to identify with something or someone and assume an identity.²

In a similar manner, Ernesto Laclau argues that identity cannot be understood as something fixed, and proposes its radical contextualisation. Identity should therefore always be a process, never an artefact. Laclau develops his argument further, stressing the necessary incompleteness of identity formation. As he puts it, “the field of social identities is not one of full identities but of their ultimate failure to be constituted”³

From the standpoint of feminist discussion on gender and sexuality, Judith Butler concluded that all identities operate through exclusion, “through the discursive construction of a constitutive outside and the production of abjected and marginalized subjects”.⁴ This was just one among many voices in the broader field of *identity politics* on the issues of ‘race’, gender, sexuality, disability, social justice, etc.

Bearing in mind the unavoidable relation between individual and

collective identity, and the briefly sketched tripartite facets of this concept, namely the intersection of the signifying circuits related to the notions of *identity*, *identification* and *identity politics* as in Lefebvre's conceptual triads, I will try to focus specifically on the instrumentalisation of identification processes by nation states, together with the consequences of the elaborate systems of documenting individual identity and the related control of movement. For what is *individuality*, as Valentin Groebner asked, but the system of checking the definitions that others apply to us?

History and techniques

From a historical perspective, universal systems of individual identification came about with the advent of mass literacy and an official culture of written records. There are many accounts of different ID cards, passports, and similar documents used during the Renaissance period in Europe. Official certificates of identity such as *letters of introduction*, *passes*, *badges*, or some kind of *passport* were only sporadically used, and those documents were rendered genuine by the seals with which the authorities authenticated them.⁵ The first important document that had a physical description of the holder was called a *signalment*, and its intention was to prevent the use of the document by anyone other than the individual to whom it was issued.⁶

In contemporary societies, the ID document owes much to the reforms of the judiciary system for establishing identity conceived by Alphonse Bertillon. He created a method known as anthropometrics that incorporated a series of refined bodily measurements (head, arms and legs), physical description and, what was most important in terms of the future of ID documents, photographs. This method, later known as bertillonage, comprised two stages: description and classification. In police procedures it aimed at the elimination of suspects (proving non-identity), but a series of supplementary descriptive techniques together with photographs, which personalised the anthropometrical measurements, could allow the establishment of positive identity. Photographic identification was gradually extended from the sphere of criminology to cover the entire population.⁷

Another important technique of identification, namely fingerprinting, was discovered as a spin-off from Francis Galton's eugenic research in England during the 1880s. Galton was looking for a relationship between fingerprints and heredity, and failed to recognise the potential use of fingerprints as an alternative identification system.⁸ Fingerprinting as a fully developed method of police investigation for use in court as evidence of felony was actually implemented by Juan Vucetich in Argentina at the end of the nineteenth century. Vucetich developed his own complex classification system, and eventually persuaded the La Plata police department to adopt dactyloscopy over anthropometrics, which made them the first in the world to use only fingerprinting for

establishing identification.⁹

The next step in proving the uniqueness of an individual was the invention of DNA-typing by the English geneticist, Alec Jeffreys. His work on blood anomalies and creation of new research techniques in genetics led him to this discovery, and it soon became accepted as a mechanism for positive personal identification. The scientific development of genetics and eugenics has continued with the efforts to map the entire human genome in the Human Genome Project (HGP) with the goal of eliminating “inferior” genes.¹⁰

With the advent of the information era, databases of criminal photos, fingerprints and even DNA records such as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) in the US were digitalised, opening the way for new and even more sophisticated digital and biometric techniques for documenting individual identity. The new technologies and instruments of measurement facilitated the development of a variety of biometric identification methods such as: retinal and iris scans, hand geometry, facial feature recognition, ear shape, body odour, brain fingerprinting, signature dynamics, voice verification, and computer keystroke dynamics; all of which allowed the creation of respective digital records.

Strategies of exclusion

The process of documenting individual identity could be regarded as a social construct driven by the motive of distinction, exclusion and segregation of certain social, ethnic, and other (minority) groups. As Valentin Groebner has noted, even in Medieval Europe there was tension if identity documents were held by persons whose individual description contained the words: “dark-skinned, foreign or non-white”.¹¹ He has detected that the earliest systematic references to invalid documents not surprisingly concern the “passports” of gypsies in Europe. For example, the German imperial order (*Reichspolizeiordnung*) of 1551 instructed the authorities to confiscate and destroy any identity papers tendered by gypsies, as it was assumed that they must be forgeries. It seemed obvious to the German authorities that people of illegitimate status, such as gypsies, could not by definition be in possession of legitimate documents.¹²

The French Revolution could be seen as a turning point in the political development of the nation states and the creation of a specifically national citizenship. This levelling down of all individuals to citizens necessitated the introduction of elaborate systems and uniform procedures of documenting, tracking and verifying individual identities for the entire population. The other side of this development was its relation to the emergence of modern concepts of individuality and subjectivity. It is worth noting that the adoption of a passport regime in international travel is closely tied to the development of citizenship rules, and one of the crucial additions to the criteria for granting passports in post-revolutionary France was that they should be issued to *individuals*.¹³

Building on this legacy, nation states continued to establish criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of citizens and to create homogeneous ethno-cultural units, and therefore the new identificatory logic was crucial for the construction of national identity. As governments became interested in distinguishing their own subjects from undesirable outsiders, the importance of documents that could testify one's specific individuality and belongings grew rapidly. As Gerard Noiriel pointed out, a powerful factor in the creation of socially integrated "national" societies was the control of names; one side-effect was that from the nineteenth century onwards "the stigmatization of personal names became a central theme in xenophobic and anti-Semitic discourse".¹⁴

The modern concept of the "foreigner" for Noiriel was conceived during the French Revolution, which abolished feudal privileges in 1789 and created a national community of French citizens. The biggest problem with this law was the discrepancy and insoluble tension with the other major legal act, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which asserts the equality of all individuals including foreigners.¹⁵

An illustrative example of the strategy of exclusion of foreigners is the regulation passed by the French government that forced Algerian heads of households to adopt patronymic surnames in 1882 or imposed names on them if they refused to do so, which went along with the introduction of the regime of identity cards for the first time in French law. Thus the colonised Algerians were granted an official identity, but did not obtain the status and the rights of citizenship.¹⁶ The notion of *nomads* became almost a synonym for *foreigners*, and a special law in France in 1912 aimed to control the *nomads* regardless of their nationality. They were obliged to carry the "*carnet des nomades*", an "anthropometric identity document" that included fingerprints and photographs, and thus imposed an immutable identity upon them.¹⁷

In the United States the first attempt to exclude members of particular (ethnic) groups on the basis of documents that showed their related distinctiveness was The Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.¹⁸ The later policy of restrictive movement control by the US government came about mainly because the prevalent eugenics and race-conscious methods of codifying the population encompassed such a wide variety of groups whose determinant factor ranged from impureness, uncleanness, idiocy, non-whiteness, to inability to understand the doctrine of republicanism. The later categories of exclusion were based on a simple literacy test introduced in 1917; a geographical focus on a barred zone in the Pacific;¹⁹ and finally an ideological ground with the Internal Security Act of 1950, which denied passports to members of the Communist party.²⁰

State control and surveillance

While being purveyors of identity, identification documents are at same time documents of constraint, control, and state regulations imposed upon subjects. A hallmark of modern statehood has become the

creation of *legible people*, in James Scott's phrase – a people open to the scrutiny of officialdom.²¹ In this respect, Michel Foucault argued that the identity of a person is socially constructed through the instrumentalised methods of state control.

The late analyses of Foucault focused on two divergent research directions. The first was the study of the political techniques the state uses to embrace its subjects and concerns of an individual's natural life. The second was research on the technologies of the self, the process of subjectification whereby the individual determines his own identity and consciousness while relating to the external power. At that point he shifted to the inventive and non-traditional analysis of the direct ways in which the bodies of subjects and their natural life are inundated by the external power.

Taking up the problem of bio-politics that Foucault introduced, Giorgio Agamben suggests that after hospital and prison the most important political space in which the concept of the state of emergency – a metaphor for the new global societal processes – is exemplified in is the camp, which alongside state, territory and nation is the fourth element of the new political order. The camp is the space where the bio-political aspect of power and control over human life can be most clearly seen, because political and legal status in such a space is denied and thus existence is levelled down to its purely physical dimension.²² The camps in many European countries are exact spatialisations of Agamben's state of emergency, the model of power whereby asylum seekers from all over the world are being detained and deprived of almost any legal and political means to obtain a status other than eventual deportation.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the complex and wide-ranging systems of mass surveillance dependent especially on biometric techniques of documenting individual identity and digital databases of this kind were developed in neo-liberal capitalist societies. Now it has become obvious that in the information era surveillance is a major feature of global life, and that control and monitoring of many facets of daily life has reached a high level.²³ Thus Foucault's concept of the *disciplinary society* is actually being replaced by the *society of control*.

One of the many biometric techniques that are rapidly growing into industries in themselves, is facial feature recognition, or Facefinder, as it is called in the trade. With advances in multimedia technology, the development of video technologies such as surveillance cameras in security systems has received strong support and stimulation. One example of the use of this method for public monitoring and identification was its implementation in this year's Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida where the audience was randomly scanned by cameras, and their facial features compared to images in databases of wanted criminals. The public reaction to this action was one of outrage. The technology was soon compared to the "virtual line-up", and the competition dubbed *Snooper Bowl*.

Mobility

If the document in question is a passport, it inevitably raises the problem of borders, of mobility or immobility. In the Medieval period documents for travelling were the prerogative and privilege of the rich, and they were mostly used for safe-conducts of diplomats, couriers and merchants. Yet they were also a requirement and protection against harassment and arrest for nomadic people.

In spite of efforts by Renaissance countries to establish some kind of control of movement, it was only with the final triumph of capitalism and the rise of nation states in Europe in the nineteenth century that this policy shifted from a mostly “internal” matter to a more widespread global phenomenon.

The first modern passport regulation compulsory for all travellers was introduced in France after the Revolution in 1792. The monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement by documentary controls marked an important moment in a state’s development as the system required the establishment of complex bureaucratic apparatuses and technological measures. This process of development of “cards” and “codes” that documented individuals for administrative purposes gradually grew, towards the end of the nineteenth century, into the *revolution identifiatoire* as Gerard Noiriel put it.

In its first phase the French Revolution established the freedom “to move about, to remain, (and) to leave” as one of the crucial natural and civil rights granted by the Constitution of September 1791. At the Assembly meeting, the Marquis de Lafayette proposed the abolition of all controls of movement for French citizens, and especially passport controls which were seen as a vital mechanism of domination under the former regime. With this decision the French Assembly members strongly believed that they were making a great contribution to the cause of human freedom.²⁴ In the aftermath of the Revolution, events like the flight of the King, the threat of war, and the aggression of neighbouring countries towards Revolutionary France forced the Assembly to reconsider its decisions regarding free movement. The new arguments coming from Jacobin Jean-Francois Delacroix suggested that the passport was a certificate of probity ensuring the security of those travelling in France.²⁵ Finally the voice that introduced the attitude that would prevail in the further turmoil of historical development, leading to the current status quo, was that of Le Coz, who christened passports the *Argus of the homeland*.²⁶ Interestingly, this phrase from Le Coz came about almost simultaneously with Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the *Panopticon* prison in 1790.

The final period of the *laissez faire* era in international migration was during the nineteenth century, when governments appreciated foreigners travelling on their soil, and did not expose them to harassment at their borders. This era came to an end with the outbreak of the First World War. Passport controls were reintroduced across the continent,

aiming to control the movement of members of the respective nations as well as that of foreigners. The accomplishment of that goal during the First World War led to firmed-up scrutiny on foreigners and the rise of methods for restricting their movements that has become an ongoing policy in contemporary societies. What seemed to be a temporary restrictive regulation caused by the War has eventually proved to be a nucleus of the state of emergency that Agamben has elaborated.

The United States

One of the most drastic measures in the efforts to control movement in recent history was proposed by the United States government in 1996, namely the development of an automated system for tracking the entry and exit of all non-citizens, thus providing a way of identifying immigrants who stay longer than their visas allow. This law has never seen daylight, but on 5 January 2004 in the post-September 11 era and as part of the proclaimed *War on Terrorism*, the United States government officially introduced the US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) programme involving the obligatory fingerprinting and photographing of all foreign travellers entering international airports and seaports of the country on visas. The new US policy resulted in reciprocal measures being taken by other countries such as Brazil, but even before it was implemented, the announcement of the forthcoming use of different and especially biometric identification techniques triggered sociological and political analysis and comment on a global scale.

The European Union

With the Schengen Accord of 1985 that established travel without passports for European Community nationals of the counties that signed it²⁷ the goal of unrestricted, free travel within Europe was set. The process of further enlargement of the European Community, with the recent addition of ten new countries on 1 May 2004, enables the borders between different European nation states to become almost transparent, but only to citizens belonging to the Union. While the internal borders between member countries have loosened up, the emphasis has shifted to the vulnerability of the outer borders. As a consequence the control and visa regulations for travellers to and from those countries that do not meet EU standards are becoming ever stricter and more discriminatory, which affects the mobility of the citizens of these countries. Finally, it can be noted that national identity is still perceived as valid because the EU states never approved the creation of a European passport (which was one of the main objectives of the advocates of liberalised movement in Europe),²⁸ and still maintained the practice of excluding non-nationals of the member states. In the latest stage of capitalism in the neo-liberal societies of the information age, where the flow of capital, commodities, media, information and ideas is facilitated and fostered, only the movement of people is becoming more restricted to members

of privileged nations. The Fortress of Europe, and its “great nations” is still reluctant to embrace more than three million of its illegal residents, refugees, asylum seekers,²⁹ clandestines, sans-papiers...³⁰

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Footnotes

- 1 Liz Bondi, Locating Identity Politics, in: Michael Keith and Steve Pile Eds. *Place and the Politics of Identity*. Routledge, London, New York, 1996 (pp. 85, 86).
- 2 Ernesto Laclau Ed. *The Making of Political Identities*. Verso, London, New York, 1994 (p. 3).
- 3 As quoted in Michael Keith and Steve Pile Eds. *Place and the Politics of Identity*. Routledge, London, New York, 1996. (p. 29). Laclau argues that all objects of scrutiny in the social sciences are incompletely constituted because of their location within a field of difference from one another. What marks them is a particular historicity that produces the forces of dislocation, which always block the formation of complete objects. Consequently, any articulation of identity or object formation is just temporarily complete; it is always in part constituted by the forces that oppose it (the constitutive outside), and always contingent upon surviving the contradictions that it subsumes (forces of dislocation). Identity therefore emerges through difference; likewise, all object formation is always partial because it is always relational.
- 4 As quoted from Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (Eds.) *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Sage Publications, London 1996. (p. 15)
- 5 Valentin Groebner, “Describing the Person, Reading the Signs in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe: Identity Papers, Vested Figures, and the Limits of Identification 1400-1600”, in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.): *Documenting Individual Identity. The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*. Princeton University Press, 2001 (p. 21).
- 6 Andreas Fahrmeir, “Governments and Forgers: Passports in Nineteenth-Century Europe”, in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.): (p. 222).
- 7 See *Identity and Alterity*, La Biennale di Venezia, 46. Esposizione Internazionale d’Arte. Venice: Marsilio Editori, 1995.
- 8 Pamela Sankar, “DNA-Typing: Galton’s Eugenic Dream Realized?” in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (p. 275).
- 9 Kristin Ruggiero, “Fingerprinting and the Argentine Plan for Universal Identification in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (p. 191).
- 10 Pamela Sankar, “DNA-Typing: Galton’s Eugenic Dream Realized?” in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (pp. 280-283).
- 11 Valentin Groebner, “Describing the Person, Reading the Signs in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe: Identity Papers, Vested Figures, and the Limits of Identification 1400-1600”, in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (p. 19).
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 On the development of the individuality and the Self, see: Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991; Thomas Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, Eds. *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986; Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- 14 Gerard Noiriel, “The Identification of the Citizen: The Birth of Republican Civil Status in France”, in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (pp. 47,48).
- 15 John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (p. 28).
- 16 Jane Caplan “This or That Particular Person’: Protocols of Identification in Nineteenth-Century Europe”, in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (pp. 58,59).
- 17 John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (p. 108).
- 18 Ibid. (pp. 96, 97). The pre-history of this measure was a Burlingame Treaty between the United States and the Chinese imperial government in 1868, which allowed the Chinese to immigrate freely into the country without the privilege of becoming naturalised American citizens. The Treaty was followed by another correction in 1880 in which the United States asserted a prerogative to limit the entry of Chinese whose immigration “affects or threatens to affect” American interests. Just two years later the Chinese Exclusion Act was adopted, limiting the contract labour of Chinese to ten years.

- 19 Ibid. (p. 117). While Chinese, Japanese, and Korean immigration was largely forbidden, the main targets of this legislation were Asian Indians who were technically "Aryans" or "Caucasians", and who were thus excluded on geographical rather than ethno-racial grounds.
- 20 Ibid. (p. 162).
- 21 James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990; James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- 22 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1998.
- 23 David Lyon, "Under My Skin: From Identification Papers to Body Surveillance", in: Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Eds.) (pp 294, 295). See also David Lyon, *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society*. Cambridge: Polity/Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
- 24 John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (p. 29).
- 25 Ibid. (p 35).
- 26 In classical mythology, Argus was a monster with many eyes, who was therefore regarded as a good watchman.
- 27 France, Germany, and the Benelux countries were the first to sign the Accord de Schengen.
- 28 John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (p. 145). See also Claudine Dardy, *Identités de papiers*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998.
- 29 Over 90 % of asylum seekers in the EU are rejected and confined in the deportation camps, or simply deported.
- 30 The autonomous Sans-Papiers' movement, began in March 1996 when 300 illegal African people occupied the St. Ambroise Church in Paris to obtain regular documents from the French authorities.

Marina Gržinić
ON THE REPOLITICISATION OF ART THROUGH
CONTAMINATION

In this essay I intend first to examine the post-socialist (transitional) condition of Eastern Europe in relation to issues of creativity and resistance. Next, I will offer some reflections on the (new) European identity in order to reformulate an idea of (Eastern) European art. Finally, I will suggest a certain oppositional conclusion. In doing this, I will take account of those practices and theoretical approaches that offer the only way forward for the contemporary situation, namely, that of changing our perspective on the relationship between art and theory through politics.

It will soon be obvious that I am insisting here on certain cartography. Its logic is conceptually akin to both Fredric Jameson's mapping processes and Brian Holmes's diagrams. I would also argue, via Holmes, that these diagrams display hierarchical relationships rather than simple networking. Although, according to Holmes, his complex *visualisations* of power and influence are almost enough to wake up the global public today, I am insisting here, on the contrary, on their constant re-politicisation.

In fact, I am insisting on the re-politicisation of art — that art should attempt to reconnect creativity and resistance. The capitalist art system and the art market are constantly trying to sever the dangerous liaison between creativity and resistance. This liaison frightens the capitalist cultural and educational machine; consequently, the global capitalist machine is constantly trying to *dissociate* creativity from resistance. The same is true today of universities and academies. The university is seen by contemporary state educational policy as a managerial enterprise. The ideal embodied in the educational policies of the post-industrial states is to transform educational institutions into efficient managerial organisations that are easy to control and that will produce, instead of thinking citizens, new generations of consumers (today, delicately renamed 'users') and effective bureaucrats. We cannot talk about any open democratic project in art and culture until we rethink the possibility of a radical artistic experience that would function as an open source and would be capable of switching to a radical political experience shared by the wider community.

1.

In her essay 'The Twilight of the Victim: Creation Quits Its Pimp, to Rejoin Resistance' psychoanalyst Suely Rolnik, professor at the Catholic University of São Paulo, where she directs the Centre for Research on Subjectivity, makes the following observations:

At present, certain artistic practices seem to be particularly effective in dealing with these problems [relating to the dissociation of creativity from resistance]. Their strategy consists of precise and subtle insertions at certain points where the social structure is separating, where tension is pulsating due to the pressure of a new composition of

forces seeking passage. It is a mode of insertion mobilised by the desire to expose oneself to the other and to run the risk of such an exposure, instead of opting for the guarantee of a politically correct position that confines the other to a representation and protects subjectivity from any affective contagion. The 'work' consists in bringing the forces and the tension they provoke into existence, which entails the connection of the power of creation to a piece of the world grasped as energy-matter by the resonant body of the artist; and it consists at the same time in activating the power of resistance.

According to Rolnik, in order to understand these processes it is necessary to reconnect the power of creation with the power of resistance, and to free both from the pimp, the capitalist system:

We need to place ourselves in an area where politics and art are intertwined, where the resistant force of politics and the creative forces of art mutually affect each other, blurring the frontiers between them.

She proposes that we attempt to place ourselves in a thoroughly contaminated zone of activity:

first on the side of politics contaminated by its proximity to art, then on the side of art contaminated by its proximity to politics — in order to try to discern strategies of this kind.¹

The failed encounter between, on the one hand, theory, criticism and the institutional framework and, on the other, contemporary art occurred in Slovenia precisely in the field of resistance. I would even say that if there has been a missed encounter between contemporary art and theory, it is because theory failed to rearticulate creativity with resistance. To put it another way, what contemporary theory, criticism and official institutions all happily share is creativity, but it is creativity without resistance. This has also resulted in other important repercussions. It is inherently necessary for the capitalist machine to have new products and expressions of creativity, which means that new forms of art, as well as new forms of life, have to be constantly produced, according to Rolnik, in order to give all these structures (theory, criticism and official institutions) subjective consistency, while other artistic and cultural productions are swept off the stage along with entire deactivated sectors of the economy. This wellspring of 'free' inventive power has been discovered by contemporary capitalism as a virgin resource, an untapped vein of value to be exploited. To describe this process of giving fresh blood to the capitalist system while deactivating entire sectors of troubled artistic, cultural and social strategies, Rolnik introduces the formulation 'kidnapped inventions'; these are innovations that have been kidnapped by various kinds of systems, theories, criticism, institutions and practices.² Here we are speaking not only about the need to reconnect art and life, as was the case in the modern period, for, as Rolnik puts it,

If art and life are still divided, it's no longer because of the deactivation of creation in the broad sweep of social life and its confinement to the artistic ghetto. That situation has already been resolved by capitalism, much more effectively than it ever was by art.

³

To simply remain in the ghetto of art, as a separate sphere to which the power of creation was confined in the earlier regime, means to keep

art dissociated from the power of resistance, and to limit it to being merely a source of value, from which its pimp, capitalism, can make an easy living. I would emphasise that we have to think in a much broader sense about the pimp, capitalism, and take into account its links with the art market, art institutions, theory, criticism, tourism and educational institutions, from art academies to universities. What is, in fact, happening today in contemporary art is the formation of a specific set of technologies for de- and/or re-territorialising capitalism, which puts into process the re-articulation of hierarchical structures that include people as a component and which integrates and exteriorises people and their practices in accordance with institutional models.

The new vocabulary proposed by Rolnik — which in addition to ‘kidnapped invention’ includes such terms as ‘contamination of art and politics’, ‘contagious art practices’, ‘radicalised theory’ — has rarely been used before in the field of art and culture. But if we consider certain events in the art, culture and social-political arenas of Slovenia, on the local level, and more broadly in relation to Documenta and the various biennials, Manifestas and big Balkan shows, we can see the importance of using such paradigms to name in precise terms the processes of expropriation and exhaustion, abstraction and evacuation that are taking place in contemporary art and culture.

What Rolnik calls ‘kidnapped invention’ is exactly what happened to the ‘underground’ or ‘alternative movement’ that developed in the 1980s in Slovenia. This movement was literally kidnapped, taken hostage, and released when it was already symbolically dead, abstracted from interpretations and segregated by academic writings and theoretical non-writings beginning in the 1990s and continuing today. Throughout the 1980s the whole underground, or alternative culture in Ljubljana was kept under harsh political and economic censorship, a hostage of the communist political sphere, which was cut off from any kind of social space. This same underground was of crucial importance in the formation of the civil society of the 1980s, which supported the emergence of numerous heavily marginalised sexual, political and cultural minorities. A good indication of the present state of affairs may be seen in the fact that a recent book about the period, *Punk je bil prej* (Punk was before), published in 2003,⁴ has not yet received a single serious theoretical or critical review in Slovenia.

What is more, these alternative practices were not merely evacuated and abstracted, they were literally ‘kidnapped’ — excluded or marginalised — at least twice and in very blatant ways. The first time was in 1997 when the city of Ljubljana was declared the ‘Cultural Capital of Europe’ — precisely because of its reputation in the 1980s and early 1990s for non-institutional strategies that were, for the most part, conceptualised, produced and organised within the alternative and, later, independent spaces. The event proved to be a disaster for the independent scene, which was left without any infrastructural investments or a

substantial programme. The second ‘kidnapping’ took place in 2000, when Manifesta 3 was held in Ljubljana. Although proclaimed as a pure act of transnational and global artistic vision, Manifesta 3 was, in fact, commissioned by the Slovene state, government and Ministry of Culture, along with the main managerial artistic and cultural institutions in Ljubljana, and not the other way around. Manifesta, with its external reinforcements, legitimised on an international level the power of the major national institutions of art and culture in Ljubljana (led by Cankarjev dom). Once more, the leading independent(!) institutions, such as the ŠKUC Gallery, Metelkova and the Kapelica Gallery, which had been crucial to the establishment of contemporary political art and new media production in Slovenia, were not included in the Manifesta project. Manifesta offered a perfect guise for the codification and acceptance of fake and abstract internationalism in the so-called national realm.

As Rolnik argues:

At issue here is an operation of great complexity that can intervene at different stages in the process of creation, and not only at the end. Its effect at that point is just more obvious, because it coincides with the moment when the *dissociation* makes itself felt on art’s products, reifying them in two ways: either transforming them into ‘art objects’ separated from the vital process whereby the creation was carried out, or treating them as sources of a surplus glamour-value, attached to the logos of businesses and even of cities, like Bilbao, for instance.⁵

Rolnik cites the example of Bilbao with its Guggenheim museum building to illustrate the operation of evacuating resistance from creativity, which transforms the object of art into a pure trademark. For Slovenes, this is precisely what occurred in 1997 and 2000 in Ljubljana.

The case of Metelkova represents an intermediary point in this genealogy of the dissociation of creativity from resistance. The situation may be summarised as follows. Metelkova is the name of a street in Ljubljana on which the barracks of the Yugoslav People’s Army were located. After Slovenia’s ten-day war for independence, in June–July 1991, the Yugoslav army withdrew from Slovenia. In that same year the new generation of underground hard-core punk activists and independent artists and activist groups asked the City Council of Ljubljana to give this former military complex of empty buildings to independent artistic and cultural organisations. After promising to do so, Ljubljana City Council secretly reneged and began demolition of the Metelkova buildings with the aim of constructing a commercial centre on the site. Since 1993, activists, intellectuals and artists have occupied the area as a squat and to this day it remains a site of conflict between the independent art and cultural scene and Ljubljana City Council. In 1993, the municipal authorities cut off the water and electricity supplies to Metelkova in an attempt to put a stop to the cultural activities and to force the activists, intellectuals and artists to leave the squat. By depriving the activists and artists of basic services, the city essentially took Metelkova hostage. The city of Ljubljana then ‘kidnapped’ the Metelkova proposal for organising the area as a central cultural and artistic space in Ljubljana

for the new millennium. In fact, the city is now financially supporting the development of the Metelkova site by constructing a complex of museums there.

It is necessary to rethink Metelkova within the context of a biopolitics through which the state produces and administers the life of its citizens. Giorgio Agamben argues that global states today play with and against two entities of life: modal life and bare (non-modal, naked) life. Modal life exists in Western democratic states in the form of freedom of choice, quality of life, and consumer life. Bare life, on the other hand, is life that serves only as the foundation of sovereignty. According to Agamben, the foundation of sovereignty is, then, based on a concept of bare life; the sovereign body fulfils its role of being sovereign based on its right to take or give/permit life (rights or quality of life) to citizens.⁶ This is what happened with Metelkova when, in the 1990s, the city of Ljubljana cut the electricity and water supplies. The kidnapped Metelkova citizens were transformed through this clear bio-political action into *denizens*, or 'denied citizens', to borrow a term from Tomas Hammar.⁷

Šefik Šeki Tatlić, a theoretician and media activist from Sarajevo, helps us to develop this even further:

Besides the illegal practice of Guantanamo existence ... what displays sovereignty is a model where bare-life is not destroyed, but converted, exposed as a cultural practice of life-with-modality in cases where Western pop and heavy metal music allegedly have been used to torture prisoners and may serve as a banal example or a display of the power of sovereignty where cultural practice is displayed as a weapon by exposing differentiation.⁸

If we consider the recent construction, in 2003 in Metelkova, of the youth hostel Celica ('cell') — whereby the former Yugoslav army barracks prison was renovated, with financial support from the city of Ljubljana, into a shiny youth-hostel theme park, painted in shades of red, yellow and orange — we see just such a turnaround. This can be understood as the city re-establishing subtle control over partially autonomous spaces without the open use of force and in a way that is directly related to the systematic gentrification politics of the contemporary city and state.⁹ As a result of these processes of evacuation, the alternative scene was literally swallowed up and exhausted by over-institutionalised (official) culture in Slovenia, while theory was usurped and commercialised by the capitalist system (a pimp indeed, as Rolnik puts it), becoming part of the theory industry.

Rolnik theorises such processes in precise terms:

In order to extract maximum profitability from this inventive power, capitalism pushes it even further than it would go by means of its own internal logic, but only to make an ever more perverse use of it: like a pimp, it exploits the force of invention at the service of an accumulation of surplus value, taking advantage of it and thus reiterating its alienation with respect to the life process that engendered it — an alienation that separates it from the force of resistance. On the one hand, you have a turbo-charged inventive power freed of its relation to resistance, and on the other, a tension. Easy-to-assimilate 'ready-to-wear identities' are accompanied by a powerful marketing

operation concocted and distributed by the media, so as to make us believe that identifying with these idiotic images and consuming them is the only way to succeed in reconfiguring a territory, and even more, that this is the only channel by which one can belong to the sought-after territory of a 'luxury subjectivity'. And this is no trivial matter, for outside such a territory one runs the risk of social death, by exclusion, humiliation, destitution, or even the risk of literally dying — the risk of falling into the sewer of 'trash subjectivities', with their horror scenarios made up of war, slums, drug trafficking, kidnapping, hospital queues, undernourished children, the homeless, the landless, the shirtless, the paperless, those people who can only be less, an ever-expanding territory. If trash subjectivity continuously experiences the distressing humiliation of an existence without value, luxury subjectivity for its part continuously experiences the threat of falling outside, into sewer-territory, a fall which may be irreversible. The prospect terrifies it and leaves it agitated and anxious, desperately seeking recognition.¹⁰

Are not the stories we receive daily through the mass media evidence enough of the deepening gap between these two subjectivities? In Slovenia, for example, we witness the horrors of the life and sheer chaos endured by the Roma people, as well as by others such as the 'erased'. Abroad, in the world at large, we see the horrors of wars supposedly intended to preserve civilisation, as well as such atrocities as decapitations, and many other kinds of misery.

The most appalling situation in Slovenia is that of the *izbrisani*, the 'erased'. On 26 February 1992, eight months after declaring independence from Yugoslavia, the new Republic of Slovenia deleted some 28,000 residents from its civil registries. This happened long after hostilities between Slovenia and Yugoslavia had ended, so war cannot be used as an excuse for the mass cancellation of these residents' legal status. These people, eventually known as the 'erased', are not ethnic Slovenians, but rather Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanian Kosovars, Roma, and others originally from other parts of the former Yugoslavia who had lived and worked in Slovenia for many years (some of them for decades). Now suddenly, they were deprived of all official status in Slovenia. Their citizenship papers were confiscated, destroyed, removed or invalidated, which meant that other official documents were now also invalid; as a result, they found themselves deprived of the right to work, the right to have social insurance, and, to put it simply, the right to live a normal life (to go to the doctor, receive a pension, etc.).

There are many ways to name this massive violation of human rights, this murderous act of social policy by the Slovenian state: soft genocide, administrative genocide, administrative ethnic cleansing, civil death, mass denationalisation, and so on. These are all examples of social and political subtraction, elimination, of the de- and re-territorialisation of bodies and lives, the eradication of rights and the removal of basic necessities. What we are dealing with here is almost a textbook case of contemporary bio-politics.

As a result of this policy, some 12,000 members of the targeted groups (out of approximately 30,000) left Slovenia. The 18,000 'erased' who remain in Slovenia exist, as it were, between two deaths: a physical one, since without papers they cannot function, and a symbolic one,

resulting from the horrific psychological pressure of being expelled from the social context, cut off from their own families and from all manifestations of public life.

Such expressions of dominance over bare (naked) lives allows the political oligarchy in transitional societies to constitute itself as sovereign, to demonstrate the practice of sovereignty to the nation. As Tatlić explains:

Post-socialist and former Eastern European societies perceive global capitalism not through future inequalities, class divisions, but with a willingness to prepare their states/economies to adopt global capitalism. European Union demands from transitional societies are seen as an implementation of several extremes, such as, for example, the implementation of an information society, but with the false predisposition that it is a mere technological structure, followed by extreme economic imbalances, extreme class divisions, fascistic nationalistic regimes decoded as mere figures in endless political games, with the following unequal distribution of knowledge to certain local social structures which conduct the whole process.¹¹

The bio-political in Slovenia decodes itself in a way that, as Tatlić says,

firstly patches its own linear progress toward modal civilizations by accepting a 'non-repressive' democracy, but only as a countermeasure to the former, 'repressive', communism. Functioning as a fictional platform which, if read through post-modernist practices, works as collective phantasm: the West should accept us, because we were oppressed by communism.¹²

The process is completed, first, by taking advantage of the deepening gap and, then, by strengthening different political positions and developing fake solutions, which are ultimately processed through the mass media.

2.

Let me propose a further theoretical and political positioning. The idea of this positioning, of taking a (conceptually) specific ground, is to philosophically denote and articulate a proper Eastern European position. This idea is not grounded in the simple game of identity politics, whereby specific monsters/entities search for their rights in cyberspace; rather, it is a militant response to the constant process of fragmentation and particularisation. What is more, I insist on the re-politicisation of the cyberworld by taking a ground that is not a physical space or a location on the geographical map of the New Europe but, as Edward Said would say, a ground that is a concept, a paradigm of such a space. My rethinking of the position of contemporary (post)feminism and gender theories is also a direct answer to the frequent populist remark that today is not the time to distinguish between East and West (Europe), since thanks to the ideology of globalisation it is only one's home that matters: 'No East, no West, home is the best!' Despite the ideological blindness of such a statement, which fails to take into account the claustrophobic tendency and totalitarian flavour intrinsic to every ideology of intimacy, we must again ask, where is this home? If we have a home, in which spiritual or conceptual context is it located?

Instead of representing myself as an academically gender-positioned female writer, and therefore as a (cyber) feminist from Eastern Europe, I propose a radical reversal in the possible interpretation of this Eastern European position or paradigm. I would like to articulate my proper Eastern European position (or if you prefer Lyotard's term, my Eastern European condition) as a (post-)feminist — a cyberfeminist.¹³ Eastern Europe is to be seen as a woman, or as the female side in the process of sexual differentiation and in the grounding of ourselves in the real world or the cyberworld. At the start of the third millennium, this can be perceived as the militant theorisation of a particular position in the crucial debate over ways, modes and, last but not least, protocols for entering the (cyber)space of hopes, uselessness, theory and terror.

'Eastern Europe' has always been subjected to different readings.¹⁴ It was often viewed as a land of romantic mythological events. Seen through a Marxist-Leninist filter, the region's technological backwardness offered the myth of a grand brotherly community and total sexual freedom (which was, due to its materialist nature, devoid of ethics and morals and thus capable of the worst sins) or an exclusively totalitarian project and the realisation of an Eastern despotism in which poverty and misery reign amid endless rivers of mucus and blood. It is this last myth that over the past fifteen years has assumed its most horrific form as it has moved from the realm of the symbolic to that of the real, even as we all still hoped it would remain nothing but a Western fantasy. The events in the former Yugoslavia are examples of this materialisation, the entry of the real into the place of the symbolic. We should also consider in this regard of the influx of refugees and illegal immigrants, especially if we think of the European Union integration processes that have forced former Eastern European states to become police watchdogs, as well as disintegration procedures (the need to have the right kind of passport) and, last but not least, the wars in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. It is this situation, and the changes in the East that have brought about a new view of Europe. A reading of the East on the part of the West is exemplified by an absence of communication and with an attitude of 'looking but not seeing, listening but not hearing'. This attitude continued throughout most of the recent events as people in the former Yugoslavia died by the thousands and sought refuge by the millions. Although all this was happening in the heart of Europe, this same Europe could repudiate its heartland, for it renamed it 'the Balkans'. Due to the recent atrocities, some people have given up the pleasure of contemplative and philosophical reading. With reference to history, philosophy (Kant) and the arts, we can elaborate the idea of Eastern Europe as the indivisible remainder of all European atrocities. Eastern Europe is a piece of shit and the bloody symptom of the political, cultural and epistemological failures of the twentieth century.

For the East, only one subject is topical: History — the re-appropriation of history. The whole socialist machine was aimed at

neutralising the side effects of a relevant interpretation of its reality and of art production, at covering up history, effacing and renaming it. At the discursive level, this was a struggle for the formation and interpretation of the history of Eastern Europe, for a re-appropriation of the history of socialism by the East as well as by the West.

What we are dealing with now is a deconstruction and a renewed construction of the same history, but a history which is now augmented by thoughts, images and facts that have so far been inexpressible. What we are interested in is the 'internal re-articulation' that is being engendered beyond the neo-colonial positions of the West, the one that lives 'here', without being recognised as such. What we are witnessing is a process of mirroring and the reflection of one's own self and one's own 'Eastern' position, in which the recycling of different histories does not refer to Western but to Eastern positions and conditions.

An alternative history of the East of Europe signifies a demand for the redefinition of relations within the contemporary constructions and relations of power.

3.

At present, I can state that there is an anthropological machine operating at the base of globalisation and it is developing a secret connection between man and animal. The idea is to make them both more human; humanisation is the basis of this connection. This idea of humanity is the idea of *Being* and its inclusion in civilisation. But who decides what is human and at what point non-humans should take part in the process of humanisation? It's the capitalist machine, of course!

In his 2002 book *The Open: Man and Animal*, Giorgio Agamben in fact warns us that it may be time to insist on the dissolution, or better yet, the separation, of the connection between man and animal.¹⁵ This animal can also be seen as the body of the modern slave. Rather than imagining the slave in the Roman Empire, one can, in the present context, think about the body of the immigrant or the refugee, paperless and poor, as well as the rest of the proletarian population. Agamben proposes a break with this constant hybridisation. To be left out of the anthropological machine, not to be saved — this is our only possible salvation. Not to be part of the process of capitalist humanisation, to be left out of Being, is perhaps the only possible way to have a decent existence.

'Outside of Being' is, in fact, the title of the last chapter of Agamben's book. Let me now briefly, but at a deep level, try to establish a possible genealogy behind the 'Outside of Being' that Agamben proposes. I will put forward the following thesis. In the history of modern philosophy, three books, or positions of thought, have marked the way we understand Being (*Sein*), which Derrida defines as 'we and our life'. These books are Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (1943) and Alain Badiou's *Being and the Event* (1988).¹⁶ To this list, I would add Agamben's 'Outside of Being' chapter from *The Open* (2002).

Heidegger's *Being and Time* is about the (Western) temporisation of History. Sartre's Being is about nothingness in relation to the Holocaust, although I would agree with Derrida that Sartre's 'nothingness' is only a modality of being — something as nothing.

Alain Badiou made a break in the line of Being by means of 'the event'. In 1998, Françoise Proust defined Badiou's event as a break with the house of Western philosophy, which resembles the capitalist anthropological machine in theory and philosophy.¹⁷ Badiou is well aware that the house of Western philosophy resembles the anthropological machine that is today compelled to engage in what is merely empty panic-stricken rotation, producing the total evacuation of histories and practices that are outside of the first capitalist world. Proust describes this house of philosophy as Western metaphysics, which has been transformed into an airless house that stifles our breathing. Badiou's event is, according to Proust, the gesture of opening a window, or more precisely, windows, so as to breathe again. But isn't this merely an attempt to bring fresh air into what remains the same, unchanged, old house of Western metaphysics?

In this trajectory we can identify other paths, or modifications, through history in relation to Being. We might consider the Deleuzian never-ending of Being, as *Being in the process of Becoming*. Derrida introduced the notion of *différance*. It claims difference by means of a single character (*a* instead of *e*). Within this context, Badiou made a far more radical gesture. He at least tried to start to think about Being from the beginning. Badiou's event should be perceived as something similar to the gesture of a professor who, after listening to us and making corrections, tells us, 'Once more from the beginning, please.' But the text, the house, and the single (solely Western) history remain the same!

I would argue that such moves lead to a modification in the Western institution of metaphysics, or in the great philosophical and civilisational edifice, but in the final instance, the edifice remains unchanged. Agamben is the one, then, who provides us with the most radical gesture. Agamben's 'Outside of Being' is not the simple gesture of opening windows within the old anthropological house. What he tells us is that in order to be saved we have to leave the house entirely! To get Outside of Being! To go Outside of Being may itself be perceived as Badiou's radical event, one that was, indeed, invoked by the philosopher himself.

It is important to understand that this *Outside of Being* is not a gesture of foreclosure, of being suddenly dragged into a queer space without time, or outside of time. It does not mean finding ourselves in some weird suspension of time. To go *Outside of Being* means to open ourselves to another temporality. Or to be even more precise, to begin the projection of a completely different film, and not to spend time, as Badiou's suggests, on redefining a single sequence, even if it is the opening sequence.

To go *Outside of Being* is to be open not towards the space of

Otherness, but toward the Other, the Second, the Third Space.

A good example of this is Irwin's project *East Art Map* (2002). Here, a history of avant-garde art from the former Eastern Europe is re-constructed through hundreds of images and references. Taking its cue from Alfred H. Barr's seminal diagram illustrating the development of Western abstract art, Irwin's *East Art Map* is a retrospective (re)construction and mapping of Eastern European Art (1920–2001). It also implies placing a radical hold on the process of historicisation that is taking place too quickly (equal to the process of forgetting) of different spaces, places and territories in the world. The *East Art Map* makes visible what was for decades beyond the gaze of Western (first capitalist world) history. The *East Art Map* is important, as it offers a way of perceiving the (new) avant-garde movement not simply as the space of (disturbing) Otherness, but as the Other space. With this project we can perhaps think about Aesthetics in a new productive form, namely, *Easthetics*.

To offer a kind of a coded order, then, we can read the story of Being and of the mad anthropological machine of humanisation run by capitalism in the following way:

- Badiou: beginning (with his event, he wants to re-question once again the beginning of the edifice of Being and asks us to start from the beginning),
- Deleuze: becoming (he insists on the never-ending becoming of Being),
- Derrida: *différance* (he establishes *A* difference of Being), and
- Agamben: outside of Being.

Agamben is aware that the anthropological machine of Being rotates today uniquely and solely as a mad machine that nobody can correct or improve (despite efforts at rethinking it from the beginning or in its never-ending becoming and/or difference), which is why he suggests an end to it — *outside of being*.

(Original of publication - Marina Gržinić, "On the Repoliticisation of Art through Contamination," in: IRWIN (ed.) *East Art Map: Contemporary Art and Eastern Europe*, Afterall Book, London (forthcoming in 2006))

Footnotes

- 1 Suely Rolnik, 'The Twilight of the Victim: Creation Quits Its Pimp, to Rejoin Resistance', in *Zehar*, no. 51.2003, p. 36. The journal *Zehar* is online at www.arteleku.net.
- 2 Ibid, p.35.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 *Punk je bil prej: 25 let punka pod Slovenci* (Punk was before: 25 years of punk among the Slovenes) eds. Peter Lovšin Peter Mlakar and Igor Vidmar, Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana. 2003.
- 5 Rolnik, 'The Twilight of the Victim', p. 36.

- 6 See Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2004, originally published in Italian as *Aperto. L'uomo e l'animale*, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin 2002, cited in Šefik Šeki Tatlić, 'Post-Modal Reproduction of Power,' *Art-e-Fact: Strategies of Resistance*, no. 3., ed. Marina Gržinić, 2004, published online at <http://artefact.mi2.hr>.
- 7 See Tomas Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*, Research and Ethnic Relations Series Dartmouth, Aldershot, UK 1990.
- 8 Tatlić, 'Post-Modal Reproduction of Power'.
- 9 See R. Mayer, K. Lampert and M. Hille, 'Example Celica, YOUTH HOSTEL, Metelkova, Ljubljana' in *The Future of Computers Arts*, ed. Marina Gržinić, Maska and Maribor: MKC, Ljubljana 2004.
- 10 Rolnik, 'The Twilight of the Victim', p.35.
- 11 Tatlić, 'Post-Modal Reproduction of Power'.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 See Marina Gržinić, 'A theoretical-political positioning of philosophy, media and cyberfeminism', in *Technics of cyber<>feminism <mode=message>*, eds. Claudia Reiche and Andrea Sick, Thealit Frauen.Kultur.Labor, Bremen 2002, pp.141–154.
- 14 See Marina Gržinić, 'Encountering the Balkan. The radicalisation of positioning', in *Art in Europe: 1990–2000*, ed. Gianfranco Maraniello, Skira, Milan 2002, pp.115–126.
- 15 See earlier footnote no. 6.
- 16 Alain Badiou, *L'être et l'événement*, Seuil, Paris 1988.
- 17 Françoise Proust, 'Kaj je dogodek' (What is the event?), *Filozofski vestnik / Acta Philosophica* vol. 19, no. 1. Ljubljana 1998, pp. 9–19.

Bojana Kunst
MICROUTOPIAS OF DISOBEDIENT CONNECTIONS

I.

In K. W. Jeter's science fiction novel *Noir* (1999), people like to curse at each other with expressions like 'connect you mother connector', or 'get the connect outta here'. In other words, you have fucked up entirely if you are connected. In the world of *Noir*, where businessmen walk with "*swarms of e-mails buzzing around their heads [...] tiny holo d'images yatering around them for attention*"¹, it is of course not hard to imagine why the word connection is a very handy swearing. Imagine, for example, a world full of the so-called 'blurbflyers' (as in Jeff Noon's novel *Nymphomation*²) - artificial insects whose buzzing songs transmit advertising messages. When those insect messengers come calling, it is impossible for you not to respond. You may of course swat or chase away one fly, but more of them will always show up. In Jeter's world of the future the technological and communicational connection is at one side our second nature and on the other the only social bound, which is defining the existing morality and laws of the corporative society. There is no wonder that the most difficult penalties are reserved for copyright violators who are sentenced to the hellish life in death - tortured in a way that only the brain of the offender remains. Finally, the offender is transformed into a trophy: the mass of his neurons and synapses - all that remains of him, is encased within a speaker wire, a vacuum cleaner, a toaster or some other common household appliance. The trophy is handed over to the artist whose copyright the offender has violated. Electronic torture is similar to Foucault's description of torture at the beginning of *Discipline and Punishment*, but there is one important difference: the violator's body is disciplinised with the efficient combination of the body and flexible virtual control. In this condition, the violator faces a virtual eternity of pain: the essential brain tissue and the consciousness and personality locked inside the soft wiring can last for decades. And the artist is gratifyingly reminded of the violator's agony every time he or she listens to the stereo or makes a slice of toast.³

This science fiction image of the future corporative world is interesting precisely because it is dislocating the new morality of the connected world. On the one hand, today we can frequently hear that connecting has become one of our basic needs: every invisibility, every break or absence of connection is associated with deep fear. Being disconnected therefore seems to pose one of the biggest dystopian threats in today's world, be it in the economic, social, intimate or private sphere. On the other hand, in the novel *Noir* (1999) the notion of connection acquires an entirely opposite meaning.¹ Connection is here used as a swearword, people are totally overwhelmed with connections and there are many new problems at work, from possibility of total surveillance to dark corporative morality of the world of advertisement with persistent

blurbflies flying all the time around our heads. Connection then seems to be the ground for many dystopian images of the world. But nevertheless - on the other side - connection can also be the impetus for many microutopian uses of the connection. They are offering different social, emotional and personal potentialities, which can maybe also escape the connected totality of the world of Noir.

At this point it is then challenging to observe the different ways in which connection is entering our contemporary life and how it is still represented as a threat to our daily political, social and economic reality. On the one hand there is a constant threat at work of being disconnected, on the other there is a conviction that being connected is the biggest threat. In any case the political consequences of both sides are radical and overwhelming: they evoke not only a global economical catastrophe, but also a disaster in the intimate and private spheres of life. I would like to examine this two understandings more closely and show what kind of procedure connection is becoming in our contemporary life and what are the paradoxes at work when we are talking about politics of connections.

II.

When in the history of modernity connection entered public life, this mostly resulted in the uncanny meeting, which could very clearly be observed for example by the meeting of man and machine. What is interesting here is that some of the traces of this historical uncanny meeting can be found precisely in the contemporary fear of being disconnected. If we go back into history, we see that disconnection has always been an effect of the uncanny meeting with connection; it has been the first terrifying sign of the ambivalent in-betweeness that reveals itself in this meeting. People suddenly become frozen upon meeting the machine, their reason disappears, they are physically immobile, there are suddenly located and facing their own disappearance in the mirror of the artificial creature, they are silenced and behave as if they were dead. The belief that being disconnected represents one of our main economic, political and even intimate fears, veils some old threats. The fear of being disconnected is then not a new fear; it is a transformed version of our old fears of the fluidity and disappearing of borders between the natural and the artificial, life and non-life, me and the other. In this fear the wish for location and control, for division and regulated differentiation, for non-stop regulation of the enormous productivity and intellectual potentiality of today is even stronger. The productive hypertrophy is namely one of the results of the omnipresence of contemporary connections and is with its hypertrophic materiality endangering the manageable transparency of the connecting procedure itself. What we have here is a clear paranoid situation, persistently reinterpreting and hiding its own cause by giving the cause the disguise of the effect. The contemporary connection must - even if it is omnipresent - stay invisible in public life, where new models for participation and collaboration are suddenly being possible.

The main imperative logic of this threat - 'when the connection gets broken, there should be chaos' - does not take into consideration that connection is not a hierarchical procedure but the very core of the aforementioned ambivalence. It is the arrangement of the intermediary, the very arrangement of in-betweeness.

What really produces the threat is therefore not the connection *per se* but the so-called territorialisation of it: the chaos is exactly the effect of precarious control and care of the powerful centre. The threat of being disconnected is the result of excessive familiarity and territorialisation (which can be found in corporations, monopolies, power structures, producers of information, imagination and entertainment etc.). What is really endangered here is thus exactly the hardcore centre, which however always presents itself as fluid and light and disconnection as overwhelmingly chaotic. If the constant internal threat of connection lies in its collapse, that means that connection is in advance understood as centred and hierarchical procedure. What is really threatening here is then not the omnipresence of connections, but the power of the invisible hand, which constantly has to produce ambivalence and chaos to carry on with the state of exception. This is also the only way in which it can suddenly descend to bring order to its dispersed and chaotic individual atoms. The threat of disconnection could be then described as a very dangerous and reactionary reaction to the mediation and connection entering the public and political life. Dangerous also because it does not allow for any other counter-strategy such as good old Freudian resistance, which, as resistance, always already presupposes its own target. When the territories of life were still divided and the political field was mainly about division between different territories of life and the representation of this division, such resistance was still somehow productive. Today - when this division is so hidden in the omnipresence of global connecting - the resistance has no other way as to disclose its own target in a completely irrational (disconnected) way. The only possible resistance today is dead resistance, which - with many casualties and indiscriminate killings - is becoming the main characteristic of contemporary terrorism. The threat of disconnection is thus a disguise of a much more serious problem, which the invisible hand has nowadays with the arrangement of the intermediary, that is with the uncontrollable productivity, which calls for new political issues and new political ways of being active.

This perspective is dealt with by the French philosopher Bruno Latour and can be found in other positions, which are deeply aware that there is a big change happening in the public sphere today.⁴ Latour observes how mediation entered the public and political life in the previous century, how connection became more and more visible in the political and public life. What Latour shows is a specific decay of the old regime of modernity, which shifted mediation and connection from

the public life to the scientific and technological territories.⁵ There was always a great divide, Latour says, in the history of modernity: political territory was a place of purification and division, but in the scientific laboratories, the invisible proliferation of monsters continued.⁶ Although welcomed and allowed in the black box of the scientific laboratory, or in artistic imagination, connections are avoided in the realm of the social, political, representative, constitutional. With the omnipresence of the contemporary connections the main question today however is how, with all these connections penetrating our contemporary life, the non-human object should be legitimised and given representation. As Latour says, the problem is how to slow down, reorient *“and regulate the proliferation of monsters by representing their existence officially. Will a different democracy become necessary? A democracy extended to things?”*⁷ With the politics turning into biopolitics in every aspect of life, this perspective is becoming more and more interesting and generates big questions.

III.

Let us now consider the other side of contemporary connections, where connections are understood as the biggest threat. What are the characteristics of the moment when connection becomes a dirty word, when being connected is the same as being fucked, as K. W. Jeter reveals very well in *Noir*? The world of *Noir* is not only a completely connected world, but also discloses a new morality of the time. It is a dirty morality of merciless world, where every connection has to have a monetary value and the role of profit making.

This threat of excessive connection, the fact that you are fucked if connected, is becoming increasingly topical with contemporary economic demands, which are more and more immersed in our desire to be connected. *“So this is what it means to live in a network society. We have moved out of time and into space. Anything you want is yours for the asking. You can get it right here and right now. All you have to do is pay the price. First of all you must pay a monetary price, since money is the universal equivalent for all commodities. But you also have to pay the informational price, since information is also a universal equivalent. Information is the common measure and the medium of exchange for all knowledge, all perception, all passion, and all desire. The universal equivalent for experience, in short. In the network society, experience will be digital or not at all. But this also means that what you get is never quite what you paid for. It is always a tiny bit less.”*⁷ But if we know that our main desire is to always have a tiny bit more, that we will always come back for more, then what we get is a perfect relationship where economy and our desires go hand in hand, with the production being precisely about the surplus value of the ‘mysterious nothing’, as Steven Shaviro said. Corporations know more and more of our dirty little secrets, for which we are getting more and more certain that they (because of our individual and monadic independence) could never be

revealed. The reality of connection is therefore precisely this ‘mysterious nothing’, which is very similar to Leibniz’s description of the world as a very particular orchestra already in the 17th century: *“The orderliness of things, as I understand it, quite resembles that of various orchestras and choirs; while playing their parts, they are located thus that they can not see or hear each other, and yet, each following its scores, they can play together in a perfect fashion. Thus, anyone present in any of the two choirs, could gather from it what the other choir is playing at that time, and could train oneself (especially if we presuppose that he can hear his choir without seeing it, and see the other choir without hearing it) so that his fantasy would further the unheard more and more, and that he would no longer think of the choir he himself stands in, but of the other. He would actually perceive his own choir as a sole echo of the other, prescribing himself but some particular intermezzos in which certain laws of harmony which could be deduced from the other choir, would not be visible; or he could ascribe melodic movements to his choir, such that, judging from his side, could follow a certain rule, and then – because of the internal connection in the art of music – think that the other choir takes over this same rule, although he does not know that the musicians from the other side play something suitable precisely because they follow their own scores.”*⁸

What we have here is the buzzing and also intolerably noisy world abounding in connections, which, at the same time, is also a harmonic and completely silent world of endless mirroring. The entire magnificence of playing has changed into the sheer connecting procedure, which is passionately dedicated to endless transfers from one choir to another, to ceaseless listening and observation, with nobody hearing or seeing anyone; and only with this connecting and mirroring inflation, we could reach our global happiness. The absurdity of this situation, when the connection is becoming one of the main characteristics of economic profit and therefore turned into a superficial inflation, forgetting the intermediary which is the basis of connection, could also be described with a short part from the novel of Villiers de L’Isle Adam, a French 19th century writer. His novel *L’Eve Future* offers one of the first descriptions of the changes in the meeting between man and machine, which is increasingly becoming a meeting between desire and commodity (this issue was taken over later by surrealists). The meeting between man and machine is revealed in the dialogue between Edison (inventor of the artificial woman) and Lord Ewald. After Edison’s disclosure of the mechanism of the artificial Eve (Ms. Alicia Hadaly), Lord Ewald is curious how one will be able to speak (connect) with her. *“With the Alicia of the future, the true Alicia, the Alicia of your soul, you will no longer have to put up with these sterile discomforts [...] She will definitely answer with the expected word, the beauty of which will depend on your own suggestion! Her “consciousness” will no longer be a negation of your own, but will become the kindred of a soul more*

appealing to your melancholy. In her, you will be able to evoke the joyous presence of your only love, this time without the fear that she might take in your dreams! Her words will never be a disappointment to your hopes. They will always be so sublime [...] that you will be able to awake them with your spirit. Here, you will never have to fear not being understood, as would be the case with the live one: you will only have to learn to pay attention to the time pressed between her words." In a dialogue with a real live woman, there is namely always some dissonance at work: one never achieves perfect harmony but "*some other word dictated by her nature, one that will make your heart sink.*" A link with the artificial woman, however, produces no discontinuity, no misunderstanding, and even more: "*You won't even have to articulate any words yourself! Hers will be a response to your thoughts, your silence!*"⁹ We could say that the relationship between commodity and desire is always that the Other loves us a little bit more than we could bear, and we cannot behave differently than always demanding a little bit more love.

In this relationship, every move and every action seems doomed to recurring emptiness, triteness and simulation. The new morality which is at work in Jeter's novel is a kind of permanent political anxiety: with desire increasingly becoming the core of our connection, it is namely impossible to resist. The only resistance possible is again dead resistance, which is also becoming more and more characteristic of our contemporary globalised orchestra. It is attacking the flows and movements of the city, the urban freedom and its complicated networks, the main big machines of Western desire, which are becoming producers of our global happiness. But the problem is because dead resistance at the same time attacks exactly the very important visibility of the connection in the contemporary public life. We can say that it freezes all the possibilities and potentialities which can nevertheless turn around the anxious morality of the contemporary connected world. It works against disobedience, which is an important part of every connection and opens the ways for different modes of participation and connecting together.

IV.

Dystopian ambivalence of the connection is in the centre of the ways how our being in the world is continuously partitioned and shared, and yet we all constantly have to fight for the right of this sharing and for the right to be partitioned. It seems that both threats – the overwhelming disconnection and the excessive connection – still want to regulate connections in the traditional way: the connection has no part in public and political life. It is regulated by very subtle and transparent protocols, which are becoming the main organizations of power today (and it is no wonder that political, technological and scientific protocols are becoming more and less the same thing). If, as late as in the nineties, the connection and networks were still recognized as universal signifiers of political resistance (Levy's virtual agora, for example), this hope today seems

to be buried. The network space is becoming privatised and controlled, or as Alexander Galloway writes: “*Internet is the most controlled mass media ever.*”¹⁰ The network space becomes today more and more similar to Leibniz’s image of the busy and loud orchestra which, at the same time, is doomed to silence.

There is another point of view, however, which has become much more important and which we must consider when dealing with the connections of today. “*In the middle, where nothing is supposed to be happening, there is almost everything.*”¹¹ What do I mean by that? The most important result of connections entering public life is precisely this arrangement of the intermediary: the way how this ‘nothing’, which, on the one hand, is the basis for the terrible uncanny stillness, and on the other hand, for the dynamic surplus value, is increasingly turning out to be about something. In the middle, we can find an enormous hypertrophy of productivity, with connection always already a possible relation. The field in the middle is precisely where today’s artistic work is entering the scene and displaying its wireless relationships, relationships as counter-strategies to the omnipresence and perfection procedure of connections. Or, as the Italian philosopher and activist Paolo Virno said: an immediate relation between production and ethicality, structure and superstructure, technologies and emotional tonalities, material development and culture, a revolutionizing of the work progress and sentiments.¹²

This visibility of the immediate relation is at work in many artistic works, which are dealing with the different uses of connections: developing anti-protocolar practices, stressing the authorship and copyrights, rearticulating the time and space of the connections. This is not utopian resistance, but network and protocolar microutopias, visible uses of connections and disconnections, visible deterritorialisations of the contemporary protocols. Such connections are disobedient, as by example in the work of Slovenian internet artist Igor Štromajer. His project *wPack* (2004, www.intima.org/wPack) is a project specially made and designed for mobile wireless protocols – WAP and WLAN. It can be described as a wireless packages distribution centre where “*packages are compressed, packed, ready to use units, emotional files, exploring frustrations, traumas and emotion. This is where the basic communication starts.*”¹³ There is a continuous frustration at work in this wireless distribution centre: yes, it is wireless but always under a threat of disconnection. It is accurate that protocols used in the project are still slightly unreliable (especially in the economic frame of the art exhibition), but all these protocols are also predecessors of the more smooth protocols yet to come in the commercialised battle for the perfect connecting procedure. So this continuous frustration is not the consequence of unreliability of the protocols used in the project, or of the non-effectivity of technology. *wPack* is namely applying the disconnection and failure to its wireless structure, disconnection is the

main characteristic of the connecting structure of the very project. The packages of this wireless distribution centre are namely also delivered with difficulties, fragmentarily, with many procedures and sometimes also undeliberately. Some packages with utopian names like history, revolution, north, no mercy, are full of various impossible links, which could also be read as impossible political futures yet to come in our world of overwhelming connections. In addition to these, there are also packages, which are irrational, hard to encode, ludistic, they are delivering us back the files, which we already have in our computer (different operating system files) or are 'exe-files' which of course we rarely dare to install. When delivered, the packages reveal problematic economic, social, intimate and political contexts: who would trust the artist and run 'exe-file' on his computer, the file for which you don't even need to pay, which has no commercial value? Stolen files, impossible fragments, useless data, superfluous files, irrational links, small emotional links, this is the structural organisation of the *wPack*. This is exactly the intermediary, the real 'mysterious nothing'. It is revealed to us through procedures, consequent but not efficient, virtuous but non-servile. Immediate links between emotionality and technology, production and ethicality are those, which are here revealed. Power is namely based in the efficiency and transparency, in the performing and management of the connections, which are mostly about the efficiency of procedure where disconnection is always a threat. But this project is revealing the irrational and real side of the connection as the perfect procedure: impossible links, superfluous packages, intermediaries, which all have to be hidden if the connection wants to operate successfully. The Wireless distribution centre is the centre where we have to play and listen at the same time, and so discover many different layers, which are defining what and how we are connecting, delivering and relating.

So *wPack* could also be recognized as one of the ways to perform the non-servile virtuosity when fully connected, and thus demand the privileges of productivity and imagination. The protocols are consequent in the project, but not efficient. Even if the protocol is formal, there always remains something, which can be described as emotional, imaginary or intimate quality of the connection. The ways in which the *wPack* is using the connections is similar to the strategies of contemporary civilian disobedience, only that, in this case, this can be defined as the protocolary disobedience in the form of connected resistance. *"Civil disobedience represents, perhaps, the fundamental form of political action of the multitude, provided that the multitude is emancipated from the liberal tradition within which is encapsulated. It is not a matter of ignoring a specific law because it appears incoherent or contradictory to other fundamental norms, for example to the constitutional charter. In such case, in fact reluctance would signal only deeper loyalty to state control. Conversely, the radical disobedience which concerns us here casts doubts on the State's actual ability to*

control.”¹⁴ What this disobedience attacks is not the incoherence of the law, but the preliminary form (protocol) of obedience without context, which is always presupposing the law: this unconditional presupposition of controlling power. If I transfer this to the problem of contemporary connection: what we should attack is the preliminary form of connection as protocol, the connection without intermediary. With the entrance of the connection in the public life it is necessary to keep exactly this visibility of in-betweens and intermediary. It is necessary to avoid that the public political life would be also reduced to the battle of transparent interests incessantly systematized and organized (structured) within the contemporary political life, which however, no longer allows space for misunderstanding, uncivil gesture and exterior. The artistic works which are researching the microutopias of different use are opening the potentialities of the political, intimate, emotive and imaginative side of contemporary connections. It is important then to venture (and here I’m borrowing the words of Brian Holmes¹⁵) into this intermediary by means of unstable, difficult and at times uncultured mimicry. This kind of connected *jouissance* is always demanding something more: constant productivity, demanding and non-conforming, constant resistance to divisions of work and activities, permanent resistance to be connected and transparent.

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Footnotes

- 1 Jeter, K. W: *Noir*, New York 1998, p. 18
- 2 Noon, Jeff: *Nymphomation*, Corgi Books, London 1997.
- 3 From K. W. Jeter: *Noir*, New York 1998, pp. 261 – 262.
- 4 Cf. *Empire* by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Cambridge, MA, 2000) or *A Grammar of the Multitude*, by Paolo Virno (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
- 5 Science and technology were through the history always strongly separated from politics – take, for example, the initial debate between Hobbes and Boyle about the air pump, which marks the beginning of the dividing politics of early modernity. See also: Stephen Shapin & Simon Schaffer: *Leviathan and Air Pump, Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life*, Princeton University Press, 1985.
- 6 Cf. Latour, Bruno: *We Have Never Been Modern*, Massachusetts, 1993, p. 12. This modern attitude reaches its ironical and contra-productive end in the postmodernist phrase of differences, which has had to build an enormous bureaucratic differentiating apparatus to purify and include all the differences in their particularity. It is no wonder that postmodernist theories on politics have come up with the end of politics, or with the resigned attitude, the politics of simulacrum.
- 7 Shaviro, Steven: *Connected or What It Means to Live in the Network Society*, Minneapolis 2003, p. 249.
- 8 Translated from german: Holz, Hans Heinz: *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, eine Monographie*, Leipzig, 1983, p. 56.
- 9 Villiers de L’Isle Adam, Auguste de: *L’Eve Future*, Paris 1997, p.240.
- 10 Alexander Galloway: *Protocol, How Control Exists After Decentralisation*, The MIT Press, 2004.
- 11 Latour, Bruno : *We Have Never Been Modern*, Massachusetts, 1993, 123.
- 12 Virno, Paolo: *A Grammar of the Multitude*, New York, 2004, p. 84.
- 13 www.intima.org/wpack (20.06.2004)
- 14 Virno, Paolo: *The Grammar of the Multitude*, New York, 2004, p. 69.
- 15 Cf. Holmes, Brian: *Hieroglyphs of the Future*, Zagreb 2003.

Endnotes

- i Jeter, K. W.: *Noir* (New York: 1998). I’m grateful for this reference on the novel *Noir* to Steven Shaviro and his book: *Connected or What It Means to Live in the Network Society* (Minneapolis: 2003).

Petar Milat, Tomislav Medak
O KORISTI I ŠTETI INTELIGENCIJE ZA ŽIVOT

U kratkim natuknicama koje slijede stalo nam je da pokažemo određene, partikularne načine *kako* nastaje inteligencija. Da razmatramo *što* inteligencija jest već zbog obima teksta ne može nam biti cilj, no to nam ionako nije niti bila prvotna namjera. Kako inteligencija nastaje, to je pitanje inteligencije kao *potestas*, dok se pitanje njene definicije drži onoga što bi inteligencija bila kao *facultas*. Ovdje se dakle radi o kratkim intervencijama, dislokacijama pitanja inteligencije iz uže shvaćene epistemološke domene u područje politike (indirektno i umjetnosti). Uz pretpostavku da je inteligencija pitanje moći i da nema inteligencije koja nije svoja vlastita inscenacija.

1. Scene inteligencije

A što je vrijeme? Tko bi to mogao lako i ukratko razjasniti? Tko bi to mogao i samo misliti shvatiti pa da to onda riječju izrazi? A je li nam išta običnije i poznatije od spominjanja vremena u govoru? I razumijemo sasvim dobro kad o njemu govorimo, razumijemo i kad čujemo gdje drugi o njemu govori. Što je dakle vrijeme? Ako me nitko ne pita, znam, ali ako bih htio nekome na pitanje to razjasniti, ne znam. (Augustin, Ispovijesti, XI, 14)

1.1 Trebalo bi možda preokrenuti stvari: nije vrijeme ono koje se odvija na pozadini znanja, već je znanje ono koje se odvija pretpostavljajući vrijeme.

U prvom slučaju je razlikovanje na implicitno i eksplicitno znanje ono koje garantira konzistentnost vremena. Čini se da vrijeme cijepa znanje i tako ga sa svoje strane pravi inkonzistentnim (implicitno: puno, eksplicitno: prazno), da nema prijelaza iz jednog u drugi režim znanja koji ne bio bez gubitka. Kod Augustina vrijeme je dakle takav objekt koji istodobno dijeli znanje na separatne domene, no stvara i nešto što je vezano uz znanje iako to samo nije znanje (to je gubitak/*ostatak* znanja koji preostaje u prijelazu iz implicitnog u eksplicitno znanje, i obratno). Taj gubitak/*ostatak* znanja (ili u Augustinovom primjeru, *razjašnjavanje*) jest zapravo artikulacija znanja, tj. ono što *više* ili *još* nije znanje, a s njime je ipak nekako povezano. Drukčije rečeno, artikulacija jest zapravo deficitarnost znanje, istovremeno nešto što je manje od znanja, ali i ono što od znanja preostaje u momentu kad ono prelazi iz svojeg konzistentnog/punog u inkonzistentni/prazni oblik. Pitanje koje se postavlja jest je li takva (strukturna) deficitarnost rezultat vremena kao temporalne dimenzije ili vremena kao retoričke jedinice, *najobičnije i najpoznatije u govoru* kako kaže Augustin. U potonjem slučaju vrijeme stoji kao paradigmatički primjer za slične općenite (jezične) pojmove, a možda čak i za jezik u cjelosti. Opcija o kojoj je riječ značila bi, ukratko, da je upravo jezik sam onaj koji zapravo onemogućava svoju vlastitu artikulaciju - tako da artikulacija uvijek ostaje preostatak koji stoji između punine značenja i beznačajnosti znanja. Ako artikulacija znanja funkcionira po navedenom modelu, što znači da je artikulacija ujedno manjkava i nužna, ostaje pitanje dade li ju se kao takvu uopće i više

supsumirati pod neki stabilni i generalni režim znanja. U Augustinovoju konstrukciji to je pitanje, iako važno i dostojno pažnje, ipak samo od marginalne važnosti kako je u odlomku kojeg smo naveli u krajnjoj liniji *vječnost* ona koja nadodređuje znanje o vremenu, a Bog je ona instanca koja garantira konzistentnost znanja. Argumentativna sekvenca koju smo mi naveli pak ne pretpostavlja ni jedno ni drugo, te je stoga pitanje sveobuhvatnijeg okvira u kojem bi se znanje moglo stabilizirati ovdje radikalizirano do ekstrema. Artikulacija (kao ostatak znanja) tu je shvaćena negativno, doista kao neka vrsta *loše beskonačnosti* i neprestanog cirkuliranja između dvaju mogućih režima znanja. Artikulacija (znanja) je tu, da ponovimo, deficijentna, diferencijalna i difuzna, i tako u beskonačnost.

Obrat. Što bi značilo preokretanje perspektive gdje se znanje događa na foliji vremena? Kada je znanje ono koje razdvaja ili otvara različite dimenzije vremena? Kada znanje koje poimamo (a to je *artikulirano znanje*) više nije gubitak/ostatak znanja koji rezultira beskonačnim kruženjem u prazno, već je artikulacija onog što znamo, moment koji omogućava nove sekvence, nove prostore u vremenu? Umjesto artikulacije kao uprizorene vječne ukletosti znanja, artikulacija koja - upravo u svojoj heterogenosti - obogaćuje i pomiruje znanje? Nije li tako pojmljena artikulacija znanja upravo svijest i moć historijskog materijalista, o kojoj govori Benjamin u svojim tezama o pojmu povijesti? Moć da se prekine kontinuitet porobljavanja u povijesti? Moć emancipacije?

Sve sretne obitelji nalik su jedna na drugu, svaka nesretna obitelj nesretna je na svoj način. (Tolstoj, Ana Karenjina)

1.2 Analiza prosvijećene Modernosti na kraju uvijek zapinje oko pitanja društvene moći. Za autore *Dijalektike prosvjetiteljstva* moderno se doba, uz sav napredak u tehnici, ekonomiji, okrenulo samo protiv sebe, ugrožavajući tako same temelje vlastitog moderniteta. Srž takvog imanentno-kritičkog razumijevanja sastoji se u osnovnoj spoznaji da se (politička i socijalna) moć pervertirala, tj. da je odustala od sebe same. No, to odustajanje ne može se tumačiti kao otpadanje moći od njoj inherentne racionalnosti (u smislu da bi odmetnuta moć bila posve iracionalna), već se radi o procesu komprimiranja moći. Drugim riječima, dok je moći nekad bilo stalo do vladanja, u određenom trenutku je moć počela skrbiti isključivo oko održavanja vladavine. Ni u ovom slučaju opcije se međusobno ne isključuju, no početna kvantitativna razlika (*razlika u težištu*) postaje kvalitativnom. Vlast se istovremeno radikalizira, depotencira i racionalizira u pitanju *kako* održati vlast. Moć (bilo politička, bilo socijalna) postaje posljedično omeđena, distinktna oblast ljudskog djelovanja, uz paradoksalni efekt svojeg vlastitog delimitiranja i depotenciranja. S jedne strane nikad autonomnija, a s druge pak nikad ovisnija o potpori sa strane.

Do sličnih je uvida došao i Foucault kada govori o guvernmentalnosti. Moderna, prosvijećena zajednica po njemu više nije zajednica u kojoj

se investiraju suštine, već je to zajednica relacionalnosti (zajednica odnosa “zajednice” i onog “mi”), istovremeno ozbiljena i dokrajčena, pa stoga i apsolutna. Drukčije, moderna zajednica jest kao apsolutna zajednica uvijek puno više i mnogo manje od zajednice. Na poseban je način ta zajednica stoga slijedom neizbježna, neumitna, neprevazilazna i nemoguća. Neizbježna, nužna katastrofa. Katastrofa političkih relacija, a ne suština ili tijela. U svojim predavanjima s kraja sedamdesetih, Foucault je nešto minucioznije opisao što znači življenje u jednoj takvoj zajednici na kraju svih zajednica. Foucault je time, čak više no što je za njegova života bilo jasno, doveo do obrata u suvremenoj političkoj filozofiji. Manje nekom nepojmljivom inovativnošću, više svojevrstnim komprimiranjem mnoštva teorijskih motiva iz fundusa modernističkog mišljenja o politici. Pritom je naslov njegova poznog mišljenja, a to je “biopolitika”, kod samog Foucaulta ostao poprilično ambivalentan, provocirajući raznolika tumačenja, bez definitivnog konsenzusa oko toga što bi to doista bila “biopolitika”.

Ukratko, život koji je postao svoj vlastiti zakon, svoja vlastita mjera i cilj, subjekt je politike takve “zajednice”, a logika guvernmentaliteta postaje logikom ne više političkog vladanja i odlučivanja o granicama zajedničkog. Politika ovdje nije ništa drugo no policija (tj. održanje vlasti), u najstrožem značenju tog termina.

Zaborav, nestanak ili smrt (politike ili socijalne) vlasti stoga nije samo, ili je to ponajmanje destruktivan kraj svih stvari, utoliko što je jedan određeni modus odlučivanja zamijenjen drugim, još efikasnijim i demokratskijim modusom, onim policije.

Život koji je bezostatno postao zakon, to ujedno znači i život koji je svoja vlastita apsolutna legitimacija. Životu koji živi svoju vlastitu utopiju nije problem manjak legitimacije, već njen višak.

Ali ono što je za nas ovdje zaista interesantno jest Foucaultovo razlikovanje teritorija i populacije, a koje je u osnovi središnjeg razlikovanja (klasične) suverenosti i (modernog) guvernmentaliteta. Kod Foucaulta to je razlikovanje samo prošarano daljnjim diferenciranjima, pa stoga nije moguće jednoznačno kazati u kakvom točno odnosu stoje logike suverenosti i guvernmentaliteta: je li guvernmentalitet nastavak i ekstenzija polja suverenosti ili se to dvoje međusobno isključuju?

Da rezimiramo: dok suverenost upravlja teritorijem, guvernmentalitet vlada populacijom, što se ne poklapa s razlikovanjem fizičkog i psihičkog prostora kao što bi se to na prvi pogled dalo zaključiti. Suverenost vlada i tijelima i dušama kao i podjelama na tijela i duše, dok je vladavina guvernmentaliteta puno prekarnija i nestabilnija jer guvernmentalitet upravlja s onu stranu svih tijela i duša, i s onu stranu njihovih podjela. Ako sintagma *nominalistički materijalizam* koja se tako često koristi da se opiše Foucaultovo mišljenje, uopće ima smisla, nužno je slijedom utvrditi da guvernmentalitet upravlja onim što Marx naziva *general intellect*.

To je intelekt ili fundamentalna proizvodna snaga života, s onu stranu

svih zamislivih relacija tijela i duše, teritorija i populacije. Intelekt tako shvaćen, dakle, nadmašuje (istobno realizirajući i ostavljajući za sobom) fizičke/teritorijalne prostore suverenosti kao i psihičke/populacijske prostore guvermentaliteta. Ili, kao što smo prije rekli - to je vlast koja je postala policija, tj. vlast bez prostora za vladanje. Zanimljivo je stoga promatrati kako je Foucault u svojoj maniri *novog pozitivizma* nastojao opisati dinamiku takve jedne strukture zajednice koja je određena intelektom kao primarnim motorom društvene produkcije. Ako je *nacionalizam* koncept koji opisuje strukturu uključivanja/isključivanja narodne suverenosti, za guvermentalitet to je *rasizam*, drži Foucault. No, posve čudni rasizam, naime rasizam bez rase/rasa koje bi se s obzirom na neku psihofizičku karakteristiku, uključilo ili isključilo iz "zajednice". Ili *intelektualni rasizam*.

Intelektualni rasizam kao pokretač guvermentaliteta sveobuhvatan je i ne dopušta si ništa izvanjsko. To je *nunc stans* zajednice koja više ne poznaje priziva i koja ne ostavlja mogućnost bijega.

No, kao što smo prije ustvrdili: s jedne strane nikad autonomnija vlast, a s druge pak nikad veća ovisnost vladanja o potpori sa strane, tj. o životu koji podupire vlast. Riječ je o udvojenom naličju modernog rasizma bez kojeg ovaj ne bi niti mogao egzistirati: o privoli života da se njime vlada i o krađi znanja. Na ovom nas mjestu više zanima drugi aspekt jer otvara pitanja koja se direktno dotiču teme (zlo)upotrebe informacija.

Jedan od resursa kapitalističkog poduzetništva je oduvijek bila takozvana "krađa radničkih umijeća". To bi značilo: kada bi radnici pronalazili načine da izvrše posao s manje napora, s jednom pauzom više, itd., hijerarhija poduzeća bi iskorištavala i tu najmanju pobjedu, čak i spoznajnu, kako bi promijenila organizaciju rada. Smatram da se može raditi o relevantnoj promjeni kada se zadaća radnika ili službenika u određenoj mjeri upravo sastoji u iznalaženju izlaza, "trikova" i rješenja koja bi poboljšala organizaciju rada. U ovom posljednjem slučaju radnička informacija nije potajice upotrijebljena već je eksplicitno zatražena, što hoće reći da je postala jedan od radnih zadataka. (Paolo Virno, Gramatika mnoštva)

Proces kojeg Virno opisuje i koji je u 20. stoljeću ostao poznatiji pod naslovom *taylorizam*, bio je i jest pokušaj da se *skriveno* radničko znanje i kooperativnost, za koje se pretpostavlja da su u takvom implicitnom obliku prepreke eficientnijem tehnoekonomsom razvoju, dovede do razine eksplicitnog, *znanstvenog upravljanja* (=vladanja) procesom produkcije. Za razliku od vremena kada je F.W. Taylor objavio svoje knjige, privola ili iznuda da se radna inteligencija napravi eksplicitnom, postala je važećom normom (npr. u obliku *non-disclosure agreements*). Pretpostavljena iracionalnost (*trikovi*, na primjer) radničkih rješenja, njihova tajnovitost (*skrivenost pred poslodavcem*) i implicitnost koju se teži prevesti u racionalne, eksplicitne forme upravljanja, taj konglomerat pretpostavki koji je služio iznudi znanja danas je radikaliziran već na pristupnom koraku. To je zasigurno učinak imaterijalizacije rada u kasnom 20. stoljeću, no obrat o kojem ovdje govorimo je još zanimljiviji utoliko što se od uposlenika (=najamnih radnika) traži obvezivanje i

početna odluka o istovremenoj *indiskretnosti* (spram vlastita poslodavca) i *konspirativnosti* (spram cjelokupne okoline). Odluku, dakle, o kojoj ovisi odnos upravljanja/vladanja uposlenik je primoran donijeti na razini artikulacije *naprosto*. Unatoč svim razlikama, čini se da na ovom mjestu imamo posla s artikulacijom istoznačnom onoj kakvom je poima i Augustin, ona je beskonačno loše cirkuliranje između implicitnog i eksplicitnog, otvorenog i zatvorenog.

Vlast kojoj je krajnji cilj postalo puko održanje vlasti, što formulom iskazano želi reći - vlast kojoj je stalo da vlada isključivo sama sobom, bez obzira ima li to učinaka na okolinu ili ne - ovisi o odluci koja se donosi na razini puke artikulacije. Artikulacije koja je lišena ikakva specifična sadržaja, svedena na svoje *tko* i *kako*. Ako su prije trikovi i *zabušavanje* radnika bili ono što je plašilo ali i intrigiralo poslodavce, danas je situacija izokrenuta. Ono što pobuđuje našu znatiželju jest mađioničarstvo kojim se naše vlastite odluke, artikulacije, odluke o artikulaciji uvijek iznova upisuju u beskonačnu sekvenciju loših ili samo nešto malo manje loših činova.

Ma koliko god se iz sadašnje pozicije to činilo naivnim, trebalo bi iznova podsjetiti na nadu sadržanu u opisu jedne zadaće: *Podruštvljeni rad može postići svoj vlastiti identitet samo ako radnici ponovo prisvoje umne funkcije koje je kapitalističko upravljanje otuđilo od njih. To se može postići samo tako da radnici u procesima nacionalne proizvodnje djeluju kao revolucionarna klasa na svjesnoj realizaciji implikacija svog statusa kao područstvljenog rada. Međutim, efektivna radnička apsorpcija direktorske vladavine i odgovarajuća promjena njihova statusa u stvari je isto što i formiranje socijalističkog čovjeka. (Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Imperijalizam - era dvojne ekonomike, Praxis 1/2 - 1969)*

2. Neke pametne i manje pametne odluke

Razlog da iskustvo tragedije vrijedi (dalje) i za nas same, leži u tome da i kako prosuđujemo - u normativnosti naše prakse. Zato što sudi o sebi, da - zato što upravo presuđuje samome sebi, Edip utire put vlastitoj sudbini. Jer Edip svoj usud/presudu više ne može pretvoriti u svoj vlastiti čin, o kojem bi još mogao odlučivati; vlastiti sud je onaj koji odlučuje o njemu. Tako kao što on sudi, sudimo i mi. Tako dugo dok sudimo/prosuđujemo/presuđujemo, živimo u suvremenosti tragedije. (Christoph Menke, Suvremenost tragedije)

U svojoj nedavnoj knjizi *On Popular Reason* Ernesto Laclau zadao si je težak zadatak da rehabilitira koncept koji, barem dosad, političkoj teoriji nije zvučao primamljivo. Štoviše, termin *populizam* korišten je i korisiti se gotovo beziznimno u negativnom, pejorativnom značenju, te označava nešto takvo kao deficijentnu i malicioznu socijalnu inteligenciju. No, da je Laclauov zadatak bilo tek puko rehabilitiranje koncepta populizma, autorova analiza bi završila odbacivanjem (prije svega) *etičkog* omalovažavanja fenomena populizma i onih za koje se pretpostavlja da su uključeni u populistička gibanja. Etički se aspekt (intelektualnog) omalovažavanja populizma dakako oslanja na pretpostavku epistemičke manjkavosti populizma, te naglašava

manipulativne i iracionalne momente u populizmu. Zadaća pak koju je Laclau preuzeo jest puno ambicioznija i ne može se jednostavno svesti na rehabilitaciju jednog ostarjelog koncepta: dok drugi govore o manipulaciji i iracionalnosti, Laclau pomišlja na konstitutivnost i afektivnost populizma. Ni manje ni više, radi se o teoretskoj avanturi kako bi se populizam (za)mislio kao os ili temelj nastanka kolektivnih identiteta. Populizam, dakle, naprosto kao srž političkog.

Sekvenca nastajanja populizma je po Laclauu sljedeća: *Populizam iziskuje dihotomijsku podjelu društva u dva tabora - od kojih se jedan predstavlja kao dio koji je sam cjelina. Dihotomija uključuje antagonističku podjelu socijalnog polja. A popularni tabor, kao uvjet vlastite konstitucije, pretpostavlja konstrukciju globalnog identiteta slijedom ekvivalencije mnoštva socijalnih zahtjeva* (*On Popular Reason*, str. 83). Dio (*plebs*) koji za sebe tvrdi da je cjelina (*populus*) nastaje tako što već svojim pukim postankom antagonizira, udvaja društvo, jer je otprije čitav jedan niz i skup različitih društvenih zahtjeva ostao nepriznat i neispunjen, pa se iz situacije koju dijele mnogi, posve heterogenic, socijalni aktori logikom ekvivalencije i afektom solidarnosti došlo do tabora koji (već svojom pukom pojavom) provocira vlast. Nastavljajući se na vlastita razmatranja kao i na ona Chantal Mouffe, koja sežu još od prekretničke studije *Hegemonija i socijalističke strategije* iz osamdesetih, Laclau emergenciju populizma upisuje u koordinate hegemonijske logike. To prije svega želi reći da je moment nastanka kolektivnog, univerzalnog identiteta, tj. trenutak u kojem se prvo percipira, a zatim i artikulira jednakovrijednost heterogenih zahtjeva - moment subjektivnog ili partikularnog. Artikulacija univerzalnog ili kolektivnog, dakle, ne može bez partikularnog ili subjektivnog u dvostrukom značenje tih termina - kao onog što je istodobno kontingentno i individualno. No, uvjet da dio može artikulirati cjelinu (čime je on sam *cjelina naprosto, ovdje-i-sada*) jest taj da takav partikularitet mora biti ispražnjen od svakog prijašnjeg partikularnog sadržaja kako bi mogao kristalizirati, reprezentirati, te posljedično i intenzivirati moment ekvivalencije posve heterogenih elemenata spram onog drugog tabora, vlasti. Partikularno koje u artikulaciji čini kolektivno stoga je po Laclauovoj nomenklaturi *prazni označitelj*. Označitelj koji je - ma koliko god partikularan, subjektivan, pa čak dobrim dijelom i arbitran - *nužan* u uspostavljanju (hegemonijske) logike koja vodi do pojave kolektivnog identiteta. A snaga praznog označitelja u njegovom je (potpunom) antagoniziranju društvenih odnosa.

No, što u slučaju kada određeni element hegemonijske jednačine (određeni zahtjev, na primjer) može biti ili jest preuzet od suparničkog tabora i kada više nije moguće potpuno i zaokruženo antagoniziranje, udvajanje društvenog polja? Kada mi i suparnici više nismo samo *crno-bijeli* već se unutar naših tekstura razabiru sitne pukotine i provale nečeg stranog i drukčijeg, koje prijeti razaranjem naše isuviše manihejske predstave? Na tom će mjestu autor uvesti pojam *klizećeg označitelja*,

kao onog artikulacijskog mehanizma koji odgovara opisanoj situaciji, tj. trenutku u kojem određeni partikularni zahtjev može biti upisan u različite, međusobno sukobljene socijalne sekvence.

Ono što je prije bila insuficijentnost populizma, ili njegova glupost - ako hoćete, sadržana u neodređenosti te afektivno nabijenoj ispraznoj retoričnosti, kod Laclaua postaje upravo njegovom snagom i validnošću. Jer daleko od toga da bude prototip kolektivne uniformnosti populizam upravo u bitno heterogenom elementu artikulacije od partikularnog čini kolektivno, od arbitrarnog nužno.

Uz svu uvjerljivost autorove ekspozicije, ipak ćemo se na ovom mjestu zapitati kako stoji stvar s razlikovanjem *praznog* i *klizećeg* označitelja? Jasno, kod Laclaua se radi ponajprije o gradualnom, kvantitativnom razlikovanju koje omogućuje i različite gradacije i oblike populizma. No, je li takvo stupnjevanje, tj. odluka da se upravo tako razlikuje efekte socijalne artikulacije, opravdana s obzirom na onog kojim nam stoji s druge strane - našeg suparnika ili neprijatelja?

Ako pak suprotstavljenost neprijateljstva ukazuje na granicu najradikalnije radikalizacije, na granicu prema kojoj sve radikalizacije implicitno tendiraju, onda se onaj koji radikalizira prema mogućem neprijatelju odnosi ravnodušno, bez obzira do čega mu je u radikalizaciji stalo. (Alexander Garcia-Düttmann, Prijatelji i neprijatelji)

Na kraju. U svojoj *Teoriji partizana* Schmitt zaključno reflektira o različitim tipovima neprijatelja (*zbijski* ili realni : *apsolutni* ili totalni). I kao da Laclauovo razlikovanje *praznog* : *klizećeg* označitelja u analogiji repetira Schmittovu diferencijaciju. Konstelacije i ulozu su, naravno, posve različiti, ali nam Laclauovo upravo retoričko stupnjevanje omogućava da se pitamo nije li i samo takvo razlikovanje uistinu (*samo*) retoričko? Retoričko, ovdje u smislu izlišnog. Nije li populizam koji je ono puko i naprosto političko, upravo stoga što politiku postavlja u njenom navlastitom elementu, kao artikulaciju/inscenaciju, u razlikovanju praznog i klizećeg zarobljen da bez kraja i konca odlučuje o prirodi neprijatelja kao svom jedinom i preostalom retoričkom kriteriju, birajući tako uvijek samo između zala? Birajući označitelja, ostajući u ratu.

(Dio teksta "O koristi i šteti inteligencije za život" izvorno objavljen u katalogu Touch Me Festival - sjecišta umjetnosti, tehnologije i znanosti: Zloupotreba inteligencije, KONTEJNER - biro suvremene umjetničke prakse & Multimedijalni institut, 2005.)

Žarko Paić
NEOMODERNA ? – Teorija
u slijepoj ulici

U jednoj od Lyotardovih ključnih rasprava naslovljenoj *Uzvišeno i avangarda* nastoji filozofski utemeljitelj postmoderne razumjeti bit novoga. Novost novoga nije puka «stvar» trenutka koji nadolazi. Novo u smislu novosti umjetničkoga djela jest «događaj». Lyotard događajnost novoga razumije u hajdegerijanskome značenju kao ono «što» ulazi u prostor-vrijeme iskršavanja svijeta kao (umjetničkoga) djela. Uzvišeno stoga nije, čak ni kad se vraćamo Kantovoj estetici, posve suprotno nakani avangarde.¹ Ona, naime, upravo ustrajava na vremenitosti trenutka. Njezina je strast za «novim» pokretačka moć nečeg što još uvijek neuhvatljivo nazivljemo modernim. Filozofija umjetnosti, teorija i estetika koje u međusobnome dijalogu s vizualnom umjetnošću kraja XX. stoljeća žele pobjeći od pojma moderne unaprijed znaju da je to nemoguće. Kako bi se inače moglo govoriti o post-moderni, post-historiji i, što se odnedavno nereflektirano rabi, nakon što se postmoderna pokazala iscrpljenom teorijskom «igrom» - neomoderni ? Svi ti prefiksi u nazivu «pokreta» s kojim teoretičari umjetnosti kao i kustosi megasmotri svjetske umjetnosti (Biennale u Veneciji, Documenta u Kasselu) olako preokreću pojmove, tragajući za vlastitim pojmom razlike moderne i suvremene umjetnosti više ne predstavljaju problem samoj teoriji, nego upućuju na temeljnu problematičnost predmeta vizualne umjetnosti. A zbog višeslojnosti i posvemašnjih mogućnosti svijeta kao umjetničkoga događaja, posve je bjelodano da odnos između umjetnika-teoretičara-svijeta u kojem se umjetnost događa kao spektakl slike više nije samorazumljiv. To vrijedi čak i u trenutku kad s jedne strane filozofi određuju koncepciju Documente u Kasselu, i kad s druge strane umjetnici nastoje vlastitu praksu pojmiti zbrkanim govorom teorije (filozofije, društvenih i prirodnih znanosti). Najlakše bi bilo reći da smo, eto, upravo sada postali *neomoderni*. Ako takve prosudbe posjeduju neku teorijsku relevantnost, a nagovijestimo da već niz godina ima mnoštvo respektabilnih autora koji se kreću unutar tog misaonog obzorja, onda je to ponajprije znak regresije teorije, a tek onda i same umjetničke prakse koja pristaje da slijedi čisti pasijans iluzornih pojmova.

Što je to uopće «novo» u pojmu historijske epohe kao što je to moderna ? Ponajprije, moderna nema nikakvu filozofijsku težinu. Za razliku od pojma novoga vijeka u kojem novo određuje način znanstveno-tehnologijskoga nabačaja svijeta kao «slike» (Heidegger), moderna u smislu modernosti pretpostavlja vrijeme vladavine racionalnosti unutar društva. Društvo jest moderno ako se bitno oslobodilo mitske svijesti. Modernost društva znak je njegova raskorjenjivanja od prirode. Sama priroda u modernome društvu više nema mogućnosti opstanka kao takva. Priroda postaje društveni ili kulturalni fenomen. Ona je proizvedena. Biotehnologija, kloniranje i proizvodnja «novih», genetski promijenjenih organizama pokazuje

razmjere tog obrata. «Moderniziranje moderne», kako sociolog Ulrich Beck i njemu srodni društveni istraživači nazivlju sve fenomene društveno-prirodno-kulturalne preinake na kraju XX. stoljeća, označava dovođenje samog pojma do potpune prozirnosti. Sve je predmet moderniziranja. Stoga nije posrijedi «projekt» kako ga je zamišljao Habermas u smislu ne-ozbiljenih mogućnosti prosvjetiteljstva da bi, usuprot iracionalnosti i mistici postmodernista, u koje je ubrajao francuske poststrukturaliste (Derrida, Baudrillard, Foucault, Lyotard), spasio čast racionalnosti jednog društvenoga projekta oslobođanja čovječanstva, nego način funkcioniranja zapadnih društava.²

Razlikovanje moderne kao znanstveno-tehničko-društvene «epohe» i modernizma kao estetskoga konglomerata ideja u svim oblicima umjetnosti legitimno je tek kad se preuzetno ne ustvrđuje da potonji pojam ima višu metafizičku razinu od prethodnog. Modernizam u umjetnosti nije moguć bez epohalno određene društvene moderne. Modernizam je izričito moderni fenomen. Apsurdnost ili tautologija tog stava otklanja čak i one «heretičke» stavove u suvremenoj sociologiji znanosti koji kažu da mi «nikad nismo bili moderni».³ Postavka o moderniziranju moderne (Beck) usuprot Latourovu naizgled kritičko-regresivnome stavu nije uopće logički suprotstavljena. Ako se iza pozitivnosti sadržaja teorije «refleksivne modernizacije» koju zagovara Beck i negativnosti forme teorije «simetrične antropologije» skriva tek ideja neke druge vrste napretka osim linearnoga rasta («razvojni ciklusi, ekološki održivi razvitak, briga za svjetski etos primjeren novim tehnologijama»), to još uopće ne potkopava pojam moderne. Ona je sociologijski neprekoračiva. Zbog toga se u posljednje vrijeme svi tzv. postmodernisti vraćaju obuhvatnome kritičkome vrednovanju procesa modernizacije. Što vrijedi za društvene znanosti kao što je to paradigmatski slučaj sa suvremenom sociologijom, na isti način vrijedi i za teorije moderne/suvremene umjetnosti. Razlika je ipak samo u jednome. Dok se društveni analitičari bave izričito modernim društvima, pri čemu je pojam suvremenosti za sociologiju neoperabilan jer se ne zna na što on sve upućuje, suvremena je umjetnost, čak i u smislu objektne razlike pohrane «predmeta» umjetničkoga stvaralaštva (muzeji – galerije), naizgled radikalno suprotstavljena modernoj umjetnosti. Dok, naime, prva nastoji teorijski razumjeti «estetiku umjetničkoga događaja», potonju je nemoguće zamisliti bez analize «estetike umjetničkoga djela».⁴

Kako onda uopće još suvislo govoriti o kraju post-moderne, kraju avangarde i nadolasku neke spasonosne neo-moderne u umjetnosti ako već najutjecajniji teoretičar avangarde u samom naslovu svoje najnovije knjige izabranih eseja o estetici, slikarstvu i fenomenima suvremene umjetnosti upućuje na «zastarjelost moderne»?⁵ Bürger, naime, s pravom konstatira da se nalazimo u ispražnjenome prostoru inflacije pojmovlja za objašnjenje vlastite nelagode u vremenu «globalizacije». Što su filozofi i sociolozi još donedavno samorazumljivo zvali postindustrijskim/

postmodernim društvom nije iščezlo u nepovrat. Želja da se imenuje stadij visokoga kapitalizma (potrošnje, užitka i ekspanzije znanosti) pojmovima tranzitivnoga karaktera posve je razumljiva. Rad je izgubio fizičko svojstvo neposredne predmetnosti. Nadomještanje radnoga društva sa svim proturječjima odnosa kapitala i rada znanstveno-tehnologijskim nabačajem društva visokoga rizika potrošnje uistinu je bila «spektakularna» promjena. Po prvi se put u modernoj povijesti znanost pojavila zajedno s umjetnošću u smislu estetizacije svijeta života kao samopokretački mehanizam «novoga društva». Stoga nije bilo začudno da je i sam pojam postmoderne u području umjetnosti, da se o filozofiji ne govori, dijelio iste boljke kao i u društvenim znanostima. Zašto je on uopće izgubio vjerodostojnost? Zašto se srozao do uobičajene predodžbe o patchworku, citatnosti, neinventivnosti, dosadi, estetici lagodnoga kiča? Za vizualne umjetnosti taj pojam nikad zapravo nije imao točno određeni cilj. Postmodernoga slikarstva u suvremenoj umjetnosti nije bilo. Opis tendencija i tzv. stilskih preinaka nije značio baš ništa. Čak i u teoriji književnosti za prethodnika se postmodernizma mogao uzeti bilo tko: Beckett, Pessoa, Proust, Pound... Jedina smislenost pojma bila je u teoriji i praksi arhitekture, zahvaljujući tekstovima i jasnim arhitektonskim projektima Jencksa, Venturija, Eisenmanna. Pravi dijalog filozofa i arhitektonskih ljudi obilježavao je duh postmoderne. Stoga sadašnje melankolično i ravnodušno razočaranje pojmom, kao i teorijskim oproštajem od još jedne ne-utopijske zablude mnoštva tzv. zvijezda «postmoderne teorije, uopće ne držim nečim posebno značajnim. To je još manje razlog da namjesto post-moderne bez refleksije prigrlimo još jednu iluziju nastavka moderne drugim sredstvima – neomodernu/neomodernizam. Bürgerova je samokritička prosudba o «zastarjelosti moderne» poticajna samo onda kad se vidi da nije posrijedi rehabilitacija pojma avangardne umjetnosti u novome globalnome kontekstu.

Zastarjelost je primarna karakteristika pojma moderne zato što je njezina pokretačka moć – kult novoga. U tom smislu moderna i avangardna umjetnost nisu dvije različite stvari. Avangardna umjetnost na isti način kao i modernizam nezamislivi su bez modernoga društva. To ne znači da je ruska avangarda kao jedina zbiljska historijska formacija preinake staroga društva i umjetnosti imala kao svoje tlo – moderno društvo. Ona ga je morala pretpostaviti zato što je ideologija komunizma, kao njezin društveno-politički kontekst, bila navjestitelj modernosti u čistome obliku. Namjesto kapitala kao subjekta-supstancije povijesti, komunizam je postulirao rad znanstveno objavljenoga «kraja povijesti». Novo kao «inovacija» u avangardi i suvremenoj umjetnosti ne samo što pretpostavlja neprestanu (radikalnu) promjenu, nego je oslobođeno puke emfaze utopijskoga nacrtu budućnosti.⁶ Zato novo ne treba zamišljati samo kao žudnju za prijelazom u «novu epohu», ili kao rezultat tek utopijskih i totalitarnih ideologija. Novo je istodobno kult modernizma u umjetnosti i pronalazak «nove tradicije». Jedno je nezamislivo bez

drugoga. Tek se u posljednjih desetak godina u filozofijskim estetikama izvan odanosti Adornu, a to je za pojam modernosti prva dogma i kanon, rasvijetlilo «novo» tlo razumijevanja odnosa modernosti, avangarde i tradicije. Ti pojmovi nisu međusobno isključujući. Naprotiv, modernost nije moguća bez odriješenja od tradicije. Avangardna umjetnost je nesvodiva na modernu umjetnost zbog ikonoklazma i «estetike umjetničkoga događaja». Ali ona ima u samome pojmu već uvijek baš kao i moderna upisanu zastarjelost. Avangardna je umjetnost «konzervativna» zato što potrebuje drukčiju verziju tradicije od zapadne u smislu drukčijeg razumijevanja vremena. Uništenje tradicije jest uništenje koncepta linearnoga vremena. Pronalazak «nove tradicije» izvan Zapada jest istodobno pronalazak cikličke koncepcije vremena.⁷ Krug je zatvoren. Nakon Maljevičeva misticizma, Duchampove ezoterije i Kleinove teozofije, svi «neoavangardni» umjetnici traže neku vrstu drukčijeg duhovnoga utemeljenja u zen-buddhizmu ili New Age praktikama. Suvremena konceptualna i performativna umjetnost bliža je iskustvu zen-buddhizma negoli bilo kojoj filozofijskoj estetici Zapada.

U Bürgerovu novome određenju moderne prisutan je isti misaoni motiv kao i u Klotzovu nastojanju da shvati umjetničke fenomene devedesetih godina XX. stoljeća. Ako su za Klotza nova apstrakcija i dekonstrukcija tek estetski izrazi na «početku jedne druge moderne», onda je bjelodano da bi post-moderna trebala zauzeti mjesto nekovrsnoga hirovita prekida s početnim impulsom inovacije i eksperimentalnosti moderne umjetnosti.⁸ Druga moderna ili neomoderna bila bi, prema tomu, neiscrpivi potencijal vizualnih umjetnosti nakon post-modernoga zamora i dosade. S različitih motrišta takvo promišljanje zagovaraju mnogi teoretičari i kustosi suvremene umjetnosti (Celant, Szeemann, Bonito Oliva). Naizgled bi se takva pozicija mogla braniti bez poteškoća. Ali ključni je problem ipak izvan ikonoklazma apstrakcije i umjetnosti dekonstrukcije, što sam pojam neomoderne dovodi u pitanje. Prije negoli pokažemo u čemu je nemogućnost istinskog neomodernizma u umjetnosti, valja razložiti razloge zbog čega teoretičar avangarde Peter Bürger uopće dolazi do potrebe za novim određenjem moderne. Njegovo je objašnjenje gotovo trideset godina poslije objavljivanja *Teorije avangarde* znakovito za sam smjer aktualnih rasprava zašto vizualne umjetnosti na početku III. tisućljeća još uvijek prizivlju sablast jednog iscrpljenoga pojma. Bürger otklanja bilo kakvu mogućnost tumačenja vlastite teorije kao vjernosti duhu Adornove estetike. On je sam kritizirao njezinu jednostranost za razumijevanje fenomena konceptualno-performativne umjetnosti.

Problem samotumačenja i samokritičkog otklona od Adorna ne pronalazi se, poput Hansa Beltinga, u radikalnosti postavke o kraju (povijesti) umjetnosti nakon suočenja s «predmetom» suvremene umjetnosti nakon Beuysa, kad je postalo samorazumljivo da ni slikarstvo ni geste nijekanja kapitalističkoga društva kao druge prirode suvremene umjetnosti (tzv. subverzivnost performativnoga djelovanja) više ne

pronalaze smisao vlastita opstanka, jer su nove tehnologije preuzele predmetnost slikarstva a nove društvene prakse učinile subverzivnost performativnoga čina banalnim činom umjetnika-komunikatora. Bürgeru je bjelodano da se budućnost više ne pokazuje kao obzorje očekivanja spasa ili radikalne promjene čemu je smjerale sva avangardna umjetnost. Neoavangarda je već bio pojam dvojbene u samome sebi. To je na eksplicitan način pokazao njemački umjetnik Anselm Kiefer kad je početkom devedesetih godina uronio u saturnovsku melankoliju umjetnika-genija, zaogrnuvši se plaštem gnostika i hermetičkih «svetaca» europskoga slikarstva od Dürera do Leonarda. Budućnost više nije «zona novoga», već projekcija sada u beskonačnost. Isto vrijedi i za prošlost. Zastarjelost moderne stoga je nešto već u samome činu tvorbe tog estetskoga pojma zamjetljivo. U hipostaziranju umjetničkoga djela kao parareligiozne instancije svetoga i iščeznuća subjekta, čega su dobri primjeri Valéry, nadrealističko automatsko pismo, anarhističke geste dadaista, događa se onaj prijelom spram obzorja očekivanja budućnosti kao spasa koje više nema nikakve «subverzivne» potencijale. Moderna je sama ambivalentna. Ona nije neprekinuti niz zgoda u smislu linearnoga razvitka, nego niz nesvodivih umjetničkih praksi. Oproštaj od takve, jednostrane i dogmatske estetike moderne Bürgeru je put u drukčije, tolerantnije razumijevanje fenomena moderne i suvremene umjetnosti uopće. Zato novo razumijevanje moderne, neomoderna ili Klotzova «druga moderna» nemaju nikakvo post-značenje. Nije posrijedi niti teorijski koncept koji bi tako jednoznačno mogao obuhvatiti sve što se događa u globalnoj (suvremenoj) umjetnosti. Neomoderna je prazan koncept prevladavanja raspršenosti postmoderne kao lagodnoga pluralizma stilova, kulturalnoga relativizma i svih postkolonijalnih teorija samo s jednom nakanom. Da se ideologijski zastarjelom i neučinkovitom pojmu avangardne umjetnosti vrati neka vrst dostojanstva u trenutku dok je postala izlišna samim činom globalnoga spektakla svijeta. Površno gledajući, moglo bi se zaključiti da je Bürger postao «konzervativac», kao što su Klotz i svjetski poznati kuratori Biennala i Documente postali otvoreni nesvodivoj praznini svijeta suvremene umjetnosti. Ali ipak nije stvar u tomu. Kao što nema postmodernih umjetnika tako još manje ima neomodernih umjetnika kao «takvih». Govori li tko ozbiljan danas o nekom prevladavajućem «stilu» u suvremenoj vizualnoj umjetnosti? Priča o individulanim «stilovima» nema nikakve strogo teoretske vrijednosti.

Zašto je, dakle, neomodernizam u suvremenoj umjetnosti flatus vocis? Zacijelo ne stoga što većina utjecajnih teoretičara nije u stanju artikulirati prijelomnu «novost» i «zastarjelost» ideje avangarde. Teorija o suvremenoj umjetnosti dijeli sudbinu svih društvenih teorija. Ako je društvo transparentno i u svojoj globalnosti nesvodivo na određenje postmodernosti i postindustrialnosti, ako ga vodi izričito demon znanstveno-tehnološke volje za podjarmljivanjem svega što jest kao pukog predmeta obradbe i replikacije opstojećeg, onda ni refleksija

o umjetnosti ne može izmaknuti tom fatalnome začaranome krugu. Sociolog Ulrich Beck nastojao je pojmiti mreže značenja suvremenoga društva pričom o «drugoj, refleksivnoj moderni». Isto su učinili u teoriji umjetnosti krajem devedesetih Heinrich Klotz i Peter Bürger. Problem je s obje teorije ne njihova imaginativno-inovativna preuzetnost ili nedostatak vizija, već sam neprekoračivi pojam bitne zastarjelosti moderne kao sveopće «mante» primjenjive na sve fenomene društva i umjetnosti našega vremena. Sve dok se ide utabanim stazama (teorijske) jednostranosti, pa makar se tvrdilo da je oproštaj s Adornom bio izveden već u začetku, ne može se razumjeti da Beuys, primjerice, nije svediv na Duchampa, kao što ni bilo koji «subverzivni» i «radikalni» performans nekog avangardnoga umjetnika (Kulika ili Gotovca) nema uporišta u bilo kakvoj estetici modernizma. U svijetu bez slike, u svijetu realiziranoga ikonoklazma avangarde, nastavak moderne drugim sredstvima u umjetnosti ima smisla koliko i uskrснуće ideje utopijskoga socijalizma u doba globalizacije. Ako je za Bürgera sam Joseph Beuys bio avangardist u doba kraja avangarde, zašto bi onda imalo ikakvoga smisla produživati život jednom zastarjelome pojmu kao što je moderna dodavajući mu nakon sablasnog mrtvoga post jedan toliko vremenski vulgarni neo? Nakon postmoderne nije moguća «druga moderna» samo zato što je već sam pojam «modernizacije moderne» (Beck) postao transparentna logika suvremenoga svijeta. Suvremena umjetnost ni u jednom svojem prijelomnome trenutku u posljednjih dvadeset godina nije «konzervativno» govorila da prekoračuje svoje vrijeme, nego upravo da ga zrcali ili na sve moguće načine kritički prerađuje. Zašto bi onda samo ona morala biti izuzeta od tog strahotnoga susprezanja u granice vlastita razumijevanja vremena? Estetika neomoderne mrtva je estetika jednog zastarjeloga pojma već samim time što ne može zamisliti umjetnost koja ne bi služila «inovaciji», «novome» i «eksperimentu» a da ne zapadne u grozomorni pasatizam. Lijek protiv toga pružio je Ortega y Gasset u eseju o Velásquezu *Oživljavanje slike*: «Vrijeme koje stvaraju satovi postoji samo ako ga netko mjeri ili broji. Nasuprot tomu, istinsko vrijeme je ono koje se do kraja troši i ima svoj kraj, koje se sastoji od otkucanih sati; jednom riječju, to je živo vrijeme, koje još zovemo «povijest». Zovemo ga tako jer svaki čovjek koji živi u svome vremenu, nalazi u njemu tragove drugih vremena koja nisu njegova, vremena u kojima su živjeli drugi ljudi, vremena koja su već potrošena i koja stoga nazivamo «prošlost». To daje ljudskom postojanju neobično obilježje, gdje početak nije početak, jer sve «postoji od ranije». Kako ovu činjenicu nikada ne bi zaboravio i nikada u nju posumnjao, čovjeku je stalno pred očima upozoravajuća sablast prošlosti.»⁹

Ne, mi nikad nismo bili u životu ni u umjetnosti, niti ćemo ikad biti – neomoderni.

(Žarko Paić, SLIKA BEZ SVIJETA: Ikonoklazam suvremene umjetnosti, *Litteris*, Zagreb, 2006.)

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- 9 José Ortega y Gasset, *Oživljavanje slike*, Europski glasnik, 7/2002., str. 382. (Sa španjolskoga prevela Tanja Tarbuk)

Ulrich Beck i Anthony Giddens: politika refleksivne modernizacije i "treći put"

Politika refleksivne modernizacije kao teoretski pristup fenomenu globalizacije može se izvesti iz sociologijskih radova Ulricha Becka i Anthony Giddensa. Globalizacija se tako ne svodi na monokauzalni ili monodeterministički odnos (samo)određenja društvenih i kulturnih promjena, nego se pokazuje da sam pojam i fenomen globalizacije nužno iziskuje interdisciplinarni društveno-humanistički pristup zbog višestrukih dimenzija društvene zbilje koja se razotkriva u doba globalizacije. Politika refleksivne modernizacije ponajprije je Beckov doprinos analizi globalizacije s pomoću razmatranja druge moderne, dok se Giddens u svojim radovima okreće «konzekvencijama modernosti» i pronalaženja «trećeg puta» za konkretnu socijaldemokratsku politiku koja će biti alternativa neoliberalizmu kao globalizmu i propalome projektu europske države blagostanja. Obojica sociologa nastoje razumjeti pojam i fenomen globalizacije iz odnosa spram procesa modernizacije (Beck, 1986; Beck, 1998; Beck, 2001a; Beck/Bonss, 2001b; Beck, 2002; Giddens, 1990; Giddens, 1999a; Giddens, 1999b). Ulrich Beck refleksivnu modernizaciju naziva vrstom nove znanosti ili sociologijske interdisciplinarne teorije. Ona mora primjereno analizirati i razumjeti globalizaciju kao epohalan raskid s prvom modernom. Stoga je refleksivna modernizacija program moderniziranja moderne, koja nikad u svojem emancipacijskome projektu nije bila zbiljski dovršena, kako je to pokazao Habermas u sporu s filozofima francuskog poststrukturalizma i postmoderne. Kao analitičko-empirijska sociologija druge moderne Beckova teorija globalizacije pretpostavlja jaz društvenih svjetova između industrijskog i postindustrijskog društva.

Nasuprot radikalnih promjena ekonomije, društva i kulture u prvoj moderni, druga je refleksivna i počiva na meta-promjeni moderne. Namjesto klasnih dihotomija, druga moderna ističe pluraliziranje i individualiziranje stilova života. Ona je istodobno i normativno-politička strategija kritičke teorije globalizacije. Politika refleksivne modernizacije polaže nadu u emancipacijske potencijale ekologijskih i uoče antisustavnih novih društvenih pokreta. Njezina je maksima kozmopolitska realna politika koja napušta koncept nacije-države, nacionalnog građanstva i nacionalnog civilnog društva. Globalizacijom je sve postalo univerzalno i kozmopolitsko. No, druga je moderna ili neomoderna ponajprije imanentna kritika političkih konstrukcija europocentrizma. Budući da je Europa proizvod nerefleksivne modernizacije Zapada ona se mora načelno kritizirati i reformirati. Beck otuda prihvaća rezultate postkolonijalne društvene kritike Zapada i modernizacije kao mjerodavne za «novi početak». Ali to ujedno znači da se u samome pojmu moderne mora pronaći izlaz iz singularnosti

ili monizma jedinog puta Zapada za sve druge kulture i društva. Alternativne moderne za Aziju, Afriku, Bliski Istok, Indiju ili Istočnu Europu nisu naknadno iskupljenje Zapada i Europe za kolonizaciju tih teritorijalno-nacionalnih i kulturnih područja svijeta, nego otvorenost novog puta koji nužno potrebuje refleksivnost kao imanentnu samokritiku i kao put samoprevladavanja granica iscrpljenog projekta moderne (Beck/Bonss/Lau, 2001b: 12-13).

Hipoteza o epohalnome jazu dviju paradigmi moderne nije bitno u izvodima različita od Castellsove ekonomsko-tehnologijske paradigme društvenog razvitka. Obje pretpostavljaju dijakronijski aspekt razvitka povijesnih struktura. Naposljetku, Beck pokazuje da se nasuprot linearnom napretku povijesti sagledane iz hegelovsko-marksističkog kruga mišljenja mora izgraditi alternativni put razumijevanja povijesti izvan moderne kategorije napretka. Stoga se uvodi epistemologijsko-metodologijska postavka: moderna se razvija nelinearno. Koliko je time sociologijska teorija i politika refleksivne modernizacije s onu stranu epohalnog zapadnog shvaćanja povijesti i vremena u kojem se razvija globalni kapitalizam, ostaje otvoreno pitanje. Mislim da se uvođenjem hipoteze o drugoj moderni (pluralističkoj, alternativnoj, refleksivnoj) kao načinu artikulacije svijeta sustava i svijeta života izvan dominantnoga predloška zapadnog moderniziranja ne zbiva ništa drugo negoli otvara mogućnost za politizaciju teorije globalizacije kao kritičke utopije kozmopolitizma. U tomu je Beckova, ali i Giddensova, paradigma unutarnjeg reformiranja globalnog kapitalizma iz promišljanja drukčije strategije politike «globalizacije s ljudskim licem» ogledni primjer postmoderne postpolitike s lijevim predznakom. Ona je nova ideologija kulture refleksivne moderne koja vjeruje u nerepresivnu moć meta-promjene sustava.

Ulrich Beck globalizaciju razumije kao složeni fenomen epohalnog prijeloma u duhu kasnog kapitalizma. U njemu se ogledaju ekonomske, ekologijske, političke, kulturne i društvene dimenzije zbilje. Nasuprot tomu, globalnost je povijesni trenutak nastanka svjetskog društva u kojem se skupine i nacije-države međusobno povezuju iz nužde zajedničke komunikacije oko zajedničkih pitanja opstanka. Globalnost, dakle, ima izričito pozitivnu funkciju stvaranja pretpostavki za buduće svjetsko društvo. Globalizacija, pak, nije jednoznačno ni pozitivna ni negativna. Njezini se učinci pokazuju negativnim samo ako u ideologiji neoliberalizma svjetskog tržišta priječe razvitak malih nacija-država i novih identiteta izbacujući ih iz ekonomsko-političke igre svjetske moći. Globalizacija se stoga artikulira kao transnacionalno povezivanje subjekata/aktera društvene prakse u mrežu zajedničkih interesa. Pritom je temeljno obilježje moći globalizacije – nadilaženje suverenosti i teritorijalnog područja modernog poretka nacija-država (Beck, 1998: 26-28). Kao dokaz za vjerodostojnost teorije/politike refleksivne modernizacije Beck gotovo mesijanskim tonom društvenog znanstvenika i kritičara modernog nacionalizma ustvrđuje da «globalizacija a ne

‘država’ definira i mijenja arenu kolektivnog djelovanja» (Beck, 2002: 23). Paradoksalno je da angažirani kritičar ideologija i društveni znanstvenik istodobno polaže nade u proces globalizma i globalizacije zbog izgradnje svjetskog društva i dokidanja modernog poretka nacija-država kao temeljnih subjekata međunarodne moći, te istodobno podvrgava koncept globalizacije radikalnoj kritici iz perspektive refleksivne modernizacije kao uvažavanja alternativnih moderni izvan europocentričnog kruga razumijevanja povijesti.

Nasuprot Castellsovu, weberovskome objektivizmu u pristupu fenomenu globalizacije, koji apsolutizira realno egzistirajući sustav globalnog kapitalizma kao moć mreže ili tehnologizirane kulture nad društvom uopće, Beck je uvjeren u mogućnost alternative putem političke strategije djelovanja subjekata/aktera na globalnoj razini. Njegov kantovski prosvjetiteljski kozmopolitizam, premda se ograđuje od idealizma i utopizma takve pozicije objašnjenja globalizacije i naziva ga realizmom, pokazuje se kao načelo kritike zbiljskog svijeta u prijelazu s nacionalnog na transnacionalno i metanacionalno područje djelovanja. Razlikovanje prve i druge moderne jest bitno razlikovanje između nacionalizma i kozmopolitizma. Transformacija oblika i fenomena onog političkog na svim razinama – norme i sustavi pravila, akteri i strategije, legitimacija, kultura, vojska – pokazuju se u radikalnim suprotnostima. Dualistička shema koju Beck podastire, primjerice, kad je riječ o razumijevanja pojma kulture naglašava da se kultura u okviru nacionalnog uvida tretira kao ideal nacionalne homogenosti i pozitivne integracije, a u okviru kozmopolitskog uvida kao kulturna raznolikost i kao «kritička integracija» različitih tradicija (Beck, 2002: 180–181). Prva je moderna monistična. Druga je pluralistična.

Anthony Giddens kao teoretičar modernizacije s Beckom dijeli shvaćanje globalizacije u smislu uspostave prostorno-vremenskog udaljavanja spram nacionalno i teritorijalno homogenog područja djelovanja subjekata/aktera. Giddens poistovjećuje različite aspekte i područja globalizacije kao dijelove jedinstvenog procesa društvene transformacije modernog svijeta (Giddens, 1990: 70 bilješka). Ekonomski aspekt globalizacije određen je kao način proizvodnje kapitalističke svjetske ekonomije. Tvrtke su lokalno utemeljene unutar nacionalnih državnih okvira, ali djeluju unutar globalne ekonomije svijeta. Političko područje globalizacije odvija se kroz sustav nacija-država koje imaju monopol sile. Subjekti/akteri globalnog političkog poretka stoga su nacije-države, a ekonomskog poduzetničke elite. One djeluju transnacionalno. Treća dimenzija globalizacije za Giddensa predstavlja vojni novi svjetski poredak. U njemu ključnu ulogu imaju vojni savezi (NATO kao model djelovanja u uvjetima posthladnoratovskog svijeta) među nacijama-državama liberalno-demokratskog Zapada. Četvrto područje globalizacije jest međunarodna dioba rada. Politika refleksivne modernizacije Becka i Giddensa nije u svim konzekvencijama teoretske artikulacije istoznačna za oba

autora. Dok se obojica izričito kritički odnose spram neoliberalizma u reganovsko-tačeroovskome ideologijskom obliku ekonomske i političke strategije, različite su alternative koje podastiru. Beck prokazuje neoliberalizam kao zabludu i iluziju globalizma. Ona je ideologija. Spram njezine moći valja utemeljiti kozmopolitsku realnu politiku osporavanja svijeta sustava globalnog kapitalizma. To je antiglobalizam s ciljem redefinicije uloge novih društvenih pokreta u globalnome civilnom društvu. Giddens je kao ideolog britanskih laburista koncipirao političku strategiju «trećeg puta» kao socijaldemokratsku verziju postpolitike za doba globalizacije (Giddens, 1999a). To nije ni socijaldemokracija starog stila s nekovrsnim prosvijećenim etatizmom, a niti tvrdi neoliberalizam, nego potvrđivanje pozitivnih tekovina globalizacije na razini kapitalizma bez neljudskih oblika eksploatacije i nejednakosti. Proturječnost i hibridnost takvog kapitalizma kao socijalno usmjerenog neoliberalizma pokazala se u praksi gubitka vjerodostojnosti Blairovih laburista. Radikalne kritike tog pristupa kao oportunističko-reformističkog puta opravdanja uključenja tradicionalne ljevice u ideologiju globalnog kapitalizma bile su usmjerene više protiv neuspjele političke strategije Giddensova «trećeg puta» negoli protiv njegove sociologijske teorije o konzekvencijama modernosti uopće (Žižek, 2001: 229–256).

Beckova i Giddensova kritika globalnog kapitalizma ne dovodi u pitanje smisao kapitalizma u cjelini. Kad bi bilo suprotno, onda bi se globalizacija jednostavno proglasila neoliberalnom ideologijom američke hegemonije u težnji ovladavanja svijetom, kako je to nazočno u teoretsko-političkim, angažiranim tekstovima Pierrea Bourdieua ili Noama Chomskog (Bourdieu, 2000a; Bourdieu, 2000b; Chomsky, 2004). Razlikovanje između globalizacije, globalizma i globalnosti pokazuje da samo globalizam zadovoljava kriterije ideologije neoliberalizma. Stoga je politika refleksivne modernizacije kritička teorija društvene nejednakosti, oživljavanja civilnih inicijativa protiv politike nacije-države da umrtvi svako nastojanje prevladavanja državnog nacionalizma i alternativa za kulturnu promjenu društva putem individualne odgovornosti građanina. Sam je Giddens u artikulaciji politike «trećeg puta» otklonio mogućnost bilo kakve globalne alternative kapitalizmu. To je istodobno značilo da se svaki oblik staro ili novoljevičarske retorike klasne borbe, imperijalizma i eksploatacije smatra povijesno zastarjelom i neprimjerenom politikom. Je li onda opravdano govoriti da je usporedna politička strategija Ulricha Becka – utopijska? Kozmopolitsko civilno društvo kao protuteža moći nacije-države zacijelo je pozicija koja nastoji društvo i kulturu unutar globalnog kapitalizma promijeniti stavljanjem naglaskom na autonomiji pojedinca. No, u situaciji realno egzistirajućeg globalnog kapitalizma postavlja se pitanje kako globalizam kao ideologija neoliberalizma i hegemonije Amerike u novom svjetskom poretku utječe na nemogućnost da se «iznutra» promijene institucije društvene integracije. Kozmopolitska realna politika samo je rekonstrukcija demokratske politike u liberalno-demokratskim poretcima Zapada drugim sredstvima

refleksivne moderne i ništa više.

Najznačajniji prilog sociologijskome razumijevanju globalizacije i suvremenih društava u transformaciji u Beckovu i Giddensovu teoretskome razmatranju jest analiza svjetskog rizičnog društva. Moderna se ovdje označava društvenom epohom prijetnje i rizika, koji neizbježno proizlaze iz njezine biti kao znanstveno-tehničkog porobljavanja prirode, društva i kulture. Rizici su prijetnje prirodnih katastrofa, opasnosti nuklearnog rata, nezaposlenost, gubitak psiho-socijalne normalnosti. Globalni rizici i mogućnosti katastrofa predstavljaju opasnost za cijeli svijet a ne tek za ograničeno teritorijalno-nacionalno područje neke uže svjetske regije. Kad Beck u teoriji rizičnog svjetskog društva postavlja apokaliptički kraj Drugoga, onda je tu ponajprije riječ o partikularizmu i kulturnim razlikama kao nesvodivu identitetu drugih nacija, etničkih identiteta i kultura. Kraj Drugoga jest pozitivno samoutemeljenje Drugoga na kozmopolitskoj razini kao globalnog čovječanstva. Time razlike nisu poništene niti je individualizacija životnih stilova proglašena iluzijom opstanka u suvremenim društvima, nego se upućuje na mogućnost stvaranja svjetskog društva kao nove «globalne sudbinske zajednice» (Beck, 1998: 155).

Druga refleksivna moderna pretpostavlja, dakle, unutarnju mogućnost globalnog rizika svijeta kao svoj, hölderlinovski govoreći, izgled za ono spasonosno u svijesti o opasnostima znanstveno-tehničke civilizacije. Spasonosno su novi društveni pokreti. Ponajprije se ističe ekologijski u mobiliziranju društvene javnosti s onu stranu medijske ograničenosti poretka nacija-država. Utopijska je kozmopolitska realna politika Ulricha Becka i reformistička politika «trećeg puta» Anthony Giddensa upravo u tomu što se iz postuliranja svjetskog rizičnog društva zaključuje o konačnom dokidanju klasno-društvenih suprotnosti.

Kako je moguće zagovarati kozmopolitsko civilno društvo i samosvjesnu odgovornost pojedinca u doba globalizacije kao temeljnu pretpostavku za ozbiljenje ideje o «kraju klasnoga društva» ako se uopće ne dovodi u pitanje ono što upravo proizvodi iluziju postpolitike i izgradnje društva bez subjekta klasnog antagonizma – globalni kapitalizam? Teorija svjetskog rizičnog društva kao aktivna utopijska politika refleksivne modernizacije stoga se pokazuje nerealnom alternativom otpora moći globalizacije. Ona iz ispravno uočenih pretpostavki, proturječja i složenosti pojma i fenomena globalizacije izvodi pogrešan zaključak. Politizacija globalizacije u ovom se slučaju zbiva kao utopijska politika rekonstrukcije civilnog društva na kozmopolitskoj razini djelovanja subjekata/aktera. Tamo gdje je ekonomsko-tehnologijska paradigma globalizacije kao moći mreže, što je Castellsov slučaj, deterministički otklonila svaku mogućnost promjene svijeta sustava iz svijeta života (kultura identiteta protiv sustava globalnoga kapitalizma), politika refleksivne modernizacije naizgled je optimistička verzija moći političkog subjekta kao samosvrhe kolektivnog djelovanja. Problem nije u tomu što polaganje nade u

moć subjekta kao tvorca novih društvenih pokreta iziskuje sada cijeli svijet namjesto ograničenog prostora nacije-države, nego u iluziji da se iz straha od katastrofičnih scenarija moderne može izgraditi svjetsko društvo bez društvenih nejednakosti i eksploatacije Drugoga. Politički indeterminizam slobode subjekta/aktera u kozmopolitskom civilnom društvu samo je druga aktivistička strana nelagode s globalizacijom. Nije slučajno Manuel Castells nakon završne knjige trilogije o informacijskome dobu skeptički ukazao na činjenicu da novi društveni pokreti unutar antiglobalizma ne mogu biti zbiljska alternativa informacionalizmu globalne kapitalističke ekonomije. Razlog je jednostavno u tomu što su u bitnom produžetak logike djelovanja samoga svijeta sustava i to kao etički korektiv socijalno-političko-kulturnih perverzija globalizacije. Politika kao etika kozmopolitskog civilnoga društva nije, naposljetku, ništa više od strategije «civiliziranja» i «humaniziranja» neoimperijalnog poretka globalizacije (Keane, 2003).

Ana Peraica
CITATION – FALSIFICATION - EXPROPRIATION
(EAST AND WEST)

Citation and Falsification

In the pages of “A Corruption of the Grand Narrative of Arts” I spoke about the difference between the use of quotations in society with and without the consequent introduction of copyright law, and in this essay I would like to explore that idea further.¹ But to begin with, let’s summarise the hypotheses in that article.

Postmodern art, according to Jameson’s definition, is characterised by three close relationships in the domain of citation: homage, *pastiche* and parody, and postmodernism itself is defined more broadly as a state in a capitalist society in its later stages.² The latter definition, to some extent, suggests the impossibility of the existence of the phenomenon of postmodernism in a society with an economic and political organisation other than contemporary, latter-stage capitalism, such as, for instance, socialist societies. In addition and as an analogy, since society itself is differently organised economically, politically and socially speaking, it is plausible to assert that artistic production is also completely different in its organisation in these two societies.

Socialist realism as a pseudo-style, truly was, and still is a product all of its own; directly influenced by political conditions. In addition, the systems of prescriptive censorship which held sway at that time caused the economic exclusion of the existence of other types of art, by means of orders to the artist that came directly from government bodies. Although direct intervention by politics into the content of art hardly exists in late capitalism, the systems of prescription (direct political investment) can be detected, albeit not on such a vulgar level of propaganda. Socialist realism has no parallel in comparable (capitalist) systems, but, are the artistic currents after the phase of political control of art Postmodern or, in fact, partially still (post) socialist in nature? By asking this question I do not, of course, mean to affirm the existence of a structural and general, even specific and qualitative difference between artistic productions which come into being as a result of the qualitative relationships between political, economic and social organisations, but to find a consistent way to describe them. And so, the question arises: what would the difference be between Post-socialist realism and Postmodernism?

In the first place, after a period of socio-economic reorganisation we can assert the existence of a difference between “the artist as a manufacturer” as Benjamin calls workers in the art world after the fall of the traditional system of aesthetics, and “the artist as a bidder”. The problem of citation lies exactly in that difference, since in one instance the manufacturer has no protection, and in the other he or she is protected by the existence of “the market for originals”. In fact, the difference

between the two systems of production exist primarily because of the insufficient liberalisation (or freedom) of the market, which brings about the non-existence of copyright, a restrictive law which regulates priorities in the market for fine art. A socialist society, which is familiar with the law but introduces neither laws nor obligations to obey them, is characterised (both politically and economically speaking) by freedom of access, and the rights of authors are not protected by a prohibitive law.

I am not speaking about political freedom here, but about freedom in the distribution of art in the media regardless of the knowledge of the artist, since the practice of censorship of this very same freedom is limited solely by mechanical reproduction. Copyright is in essence a censorial law, albeit of a commercial nature: it prohibits the exploitation of original works without the artist's knowledge, as well as the practice of falsification for commercial purposes. Exploitation is in itself defined in a utilitarian manner, which is also consequent: from this we derive a definition of falsification that tells us that a copy means to cheat us exclusively for the purpose of direct or indirect material gain.³

Since we are talking about a restrictive, even prohibitive, but certainly not positive law, it is worth reminding ourselves of which kind of freedom it regulates, or, in extreme cases, incarcerates. Walter Benjamin was the first to write about the freedom to copy, asserting that art had lost its "aura", even though with the possibilities of mechanical reproduction in which the number of copies is *de facto* limitless, art had been given both freedom and access to a huge audience. We can contrast this positive stance with the negative one of art historian Clement Greenberg, who claimed that art in mass-produced form is not art exactly because of the loss of that "aura". From these two texts it follows that both systems are necessarily distinct from one another on the very issue of the freedom to copy.⁴

BENJAMIN AND GREENBERG IN THE COLD WAR

In the most influential essay on the theory of media, Walter Benjamin brought to attention the new system of production which causes the artist to become isolated, and suppresses the meaning of the original (the "sacred copy" or *copia intacta*, traditional aesthetics inherited from the classical era, particularly Plato's metaphysics of the degradation of the copy in relation to the idea).⁵ Accessibility to the mass market destroys the original, but, according to Benjamin, opens up the right of access to art which until then had been reserved for the economic and political elite.

At almost exactly the same time, Greenberg put forward a negative interpretation of the implications of Benjamin's theory on the subject of the mass market, which on the same level delivers a pre-evaluation of art as the expression of the elite, something which does not exist on the mass

market (popular culture and Socialism).⁶ He attacked the banalization of art.

Benjamin's theory is still current in media theory today, mainly due to the development of the technology of reproduction, and most frequently under the heading of the disappearance of the original rather than the aura of the object.⁷ Greenberg's position has been abandoned as elitist, and even chauvinist, consequent to the critique of the traditionalism of the aesthetic which is "genetically" inscribed into the discipline of the history of art.⁸

Cultural analyses, which do not register particularly in the society which favours the aesthetics of the original above the mass of copies, make possible an analysis of political effects in both domains, and particularly in their relationships towards the very discussion spaces of the organisation of power through socio-political formations. Only from that wider perspective is it possible to differentiate between "freedom to copy" as practised in socialist societies through *samizdat* (Russian: *sam* = self-, *izdat* = distributed) and *tamizdat* ("distributed there"), and the "free market of the copy" in capitalist societies, as the denominator in both cases is "mass".

The difference is in the existence, or rather, non-existence, of a law which regulates ownership, and in the reaction to such laws. In a capitalist society this is formed by the juxtaposition of *copyright laws* and *copyleft initiatives* (open source etc.) Due to the non-existence of these laws under socialism, no alternative initiative exists, and society could perhaps be named "copyleftless" – and so has no problems with copies, and nor, of course, with originals. The difference in the expropriation of pictures is in the consciousness of the act of taking away.

That the concept of copyleft and copyleftless are different is evident after an analysis of two works which definitively best exemplarise their differing relationships with copies: the works of Sherrie Levine and "Kazimir Malevich", which also appeared simultaneously. The latter is almost impossible in a capitalist system of art.

Sherrie Levine and "Kazimir Malevich"

Sherrie Levine's work "Fountain after Duchamp" (1991) is a copy of Duchamp's "Fountain" (the original dating back to 1917, while the majority of copies were made in the 1960s) but made in a different material – bronze. The difference is evident not only in the name of the work (which includes the artist's name) but also in the material, so that even if the inspiration were not mentioned in the title, it would be obvious. Duchamp's fountain, one of the cardinal works of art of the 20th century, apart from breaking a taboo which survived throughout the entire 20th century, was remembered for its real effect exactly because of

the material from which it was made: a manufactured product which was released as a series.⁹ The copies were made according to the original.

The work of “Kazimir Malevich” is a copy of a complete work by Kazimir Malevich: 0.10 “The Last Futurist Show” (Petrograd, 1915/16), which is reconstructed in a different time and space (Belgrade 1885/6, and, partly, Ljubljana 1986), and according to the installation set-up of the exhibition, includes original photography from the Petrograd exhibition.¹⁰ The pictures are made on the basis of photographs, and that transfer is not concealed. Media transfer is exactly what Groys suggests as a specific characteristic of Socialist Realist painting – intervention on the basis of photography.¹¹ They are “copies by another hand” or, as Flusser would call them, technical pictures of the second order.

The difference between the two works is in the status of pictures, and also in the status of citation. Levine acknowledges Duchamp in the name of her work (content), while “Malevich” acknowledges Malevich’s work in person (formally) in the very signature of the artist. By means of acknowledgement of the content of another artist, we create a homage, a post-mortem remembrance; while a formal acknowledgement in name, or, in the traditional sense, a fraud, becomes a falsification. This is, in an analogy with literary falsifications, pseudo-speak or “pseudocryphal”.¹² But, alongside the problem of naming the original, there exists a specific relationship with the original, where the first is some kind of interpretation, while the second is a facsimile (according to existing sources). And while the content of Levine’s work recognises its place, Belgrade’s Malevich does not add anything thematically new to the work of Kazimir Malevich, but is rather a reworking born of copying *via via* (from a critical perspective – the limitations of media). In summary, the omission of quotation marks and the identity of the person who is quoting is the difference between the two works.

The History of Art as the History of References

Nevertheless, in the system of references in the visual arts literal citation is not always necessary. There exists a kaleidoscope of citations of the works of the great masters, for example: Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa who is given a moustache in Duchamp’s LOOQ (1919); Picabia’s version in *Art of Making Art in the Age of...* (1924); a later version with Dali and his famous moustache (1954), and Lillian Schwarz’s photo-morphs from the 1980s. The difference between artists’ works on the theme of the Mona Lisa and the large number of actual falsifications are in the artists’ signatures and their interventions.

The difference between the citations of the Mona Lisa and the two examples given of *pastiche* post-production of the Modern or Socialist Realism is in the fact that one quotes the motif, while the other quotes the author. Citation of the motif as an artistic unit does not make use of formal means of quotation (“”), but instead uses a familiar visual fact,

almost a cliché. And the history of art itself, as a discipline, is built upon copying with a difference in “time”. But often that copying of artistic units with a specific difference, as in the case of Duchamp’s Mona Lisa and those of Dali, masks the boundary with falsification itself.

This case shows in an even more radical way the relationship between Malevich’s “Suprematism” cycle and the American Minimalists of the 1950s, compared with the work of the Retro-Avantgardeists (Weibel), amongst whom can also be found one “Kazimir Malevich”. The Minimalists did not in any way betray their formal connections with Russian Suprematism in the replication of the square (1913 and after), while Malevich’s square is still today named Malevich’s in Belgrade exhibitions, and Malevich’s cross in the works of the Slovenian Irwin collective is still called Malevich’s cross. However, does American Minimalism have any obligation at all to name its previous sources in the way suggested by the academic concept of citation? Of course it doesn’t... since otherwise Dali’s work should be named “Leonardo *via* Duchamp *via* Picabia”, as well as listing the chronology of themes and artistic ideas which were explored through time.

An Image Library or the Commercialisation of Pictures

Malevich’s work was created before the introduction of copyright law. American Minimalism came into being after the introduction of the law, and “Kazimir Malevich” worked in a space where this legislation did not exist. However, today, Malevich’s works have been copyrighted.¹³ They have been assumed by institutions who are not able, at the same time, to demonstrate that their inheritance of these objects (pictures and graphics) is legitimate. Their legislation, to some extent, stands in contradiction to the history of art itself as a discipline of chronic recycling.

In conclusion, in the context of copyright as a legislative basis for the relationship between the copy, the *pastiche* and the parody (as Jameson defines Postmodernism), Post-Socialism can be defined via a different system of relationships, primarily that of consciousness. These systems are created by the differentiation of copyright from intellectual property. While copyright is protected by positive legislation, property is protected by a negative law.

In the case of “Kazimir Malevich”, his consciousness of copyright is evident, while that of property is not. On the other hand we have unwitting copying on the part of artists, for example, the American Minimalists, who were conscious of property (implicit in the status of their own works), but not of copyright in the sense of acknowledgement.

And this is where the difference lies in the theme of citation for socialist, post-socialist, Postmodern or postcapitalist societies. Two kinds of unconsciousness – one of the political aims above oneself,

and the other of aims other than that of the marketplace, or rather, the terminology of rights and ownership. Both are the effects of society at large – one political, the other consumerist.

Post-questions

But, the question can be asked, if art is protected by legislation which, in a way, is negative and restricts its freedom in some areas, must art then be politically correct? Or rather, is art obliged to obey the law? In this instance, we are talking about alienation.

From the perspective of the alienation and the ransacking of the population, there is no difference between East and West, since they are both founded on a system of morals (derived from Protestantism or socialism). In practice, left-leaning theorists criticised the ransacking which the capitalists carry out of the oppressed layer of society, yet those very same critics advocated nationalisation and confiscation, which are interpreted by capitalist societies as “theft” of personal property by those who simultaneously maintain a society by means of suppression of the poorer masses with a variety of instruments.

Nevertheless, there exists a section of society for whom expropriation is a vital medium, and which passes on radical anarchy from the historical subculture of piracy. Bakunin alluded to a note of illegality, in the spirit of a modern day Robin Hood, when he said “Let us join hands with the bold world of bandits – the only genuine revolutionaries in Russia”.¹⁴ This theory itself was passed on in the declarations of the Situationists, in particular Vanegheim’s theory.¹⁵ However, for the bandits to be able to succeed and survive in a new society, they must be unconscious of their theft, the negative aspects of which hide from view their aims.¹⁶ And apart from anything, is the aesthetic aim above ingrained commercial versions of traditional aesthetics in which the *copia intacta* is protected by copyright law?

Footnotes

- 1 Peraica, A. (2005). *A Corruption of the Grand Narrative of Arts*. East Art Map. Irwin. London / Los Angeles, Afterall Publishing. 1: 500
- 2 See:
Jameson, F. (1999). *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham, Duke University Press.
Peraica, A. (2005). *A Corruption of the Grand Narrative of Arts*. East Art Map. Irwin. London / Los Angeles, Afterall Publishing. 1: 500.
- 3 This definition is given exactly by one of the falsifiers, the biography of Elmyr de Hory and Howard Hughes from the film “*F for Fake*” by Orson Welles.
Irving, C. M. and E. de Hory (1970). *Fake! The Story of Elmyr de Hory, the Greatest Art Forger of our Time*. London: Heinemann.
- 4 See:
Groys, B. and M. Holein, Eds. (2004). *Dream Factory Communism: The Visual Culture of the Stalin Era*
Traumfabrik Kommunismus: Die Visuelle Kultur der Stalinzeit. Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt Hatje Cantz.

- 5 Benjamin, W. (1935). *Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*.
- 6 Greenberg, C. (1986). *Avant-Garde and Kitsch. Collected Essays and Criticism. C.* Greenberg. Chicago
- 7 Baudrillard, J. (1994). *Simulacra and Simulation*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press,
- Virilio, P. (2000). *Art and Fear*. London, Continuum Books.
- 8 This criticism was on the part of; Groys (ibid),
- Buck-Morss, S. (2000). *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: the Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West*. Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT.
- 9 "Readymade" in the formal sense is understood today to be a finished object which is decontextualised by bringing it into a museum space. Duchamp's readymades were manufactured items with alterations or interventions by the artist, even though the name originally introduced by the artist is used in a different way.
- 10 I use quotation marks for the artist known as the Belgrade Malevich in order to differentiate him from the original artist, Kazimir Malevich, but also consequently used the artist's name as in the signature used in the exhibition, in the same way that Derrida cited himself as "Derrida". In the letter "Why? Why now?" in *Art in America* (1986), "Kazimir Malevich" wrote: "When I was hanging my little Suprematist paintings on the wall, at random, I could not have imagined, even in my dreams, that a photograph of this installation would become so famous, and that it would be published in thousands of books and newspapers. I don't remember exactly who took the picture, but there is only one black-and-white photograph. No colors. I have a feeling that this photograph is becoming even more important than my Suprematist paintings."
- 11 Groys, B. and M. Holein, Eds. (2004). *Dream Factory Communism: The Visual Culture of the Stalin Era Traumfabrik Kommunismus: Die Visuelle Kultur der Stalinzeit*, Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt Hatje Cantz.
- 12 See: Eco, U. (1990). *Limits of Interpretation*. Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press.
- 13 i.e. "All images and text on this Kasimir Malevich page are copyright 1999-2005 by John Malyon/Artycyclopedia"
- 14 Bakunin (Revolutionary Catechism) in Nomad, M. (1950). *Aspects of Revolt*. New York, Bookman Associates.
- 15 See later in Ludlow, P. (2001). *Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias*. Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT,
- Hakim, B. (2003). *T.A.Z.: the Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism*. Brooklyn, NY; [Great Britain], Autonomedia
- Debord, G. (1967). *The Society of the Spectacle*. New York, Zone Books,
- Debord, G. (1990). *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle*. London, Verso,
- Ludlow, P. (2001). *Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias*. Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT,
- Hakim, B. (2003). *T.A.Z.: the Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism*. Brooklyn, NY; [Great Britain], Autonomedia.
- 16 Sisely Xaffe demonstrated that this goal can also be an aesthetic one ("theft as art") when she engaged in pickpocketing of gallery visitors with the justification that it was for art's sake.

Nataša Petrešin
**WHAT TO DO WITH THE ALTERNATIVE/ARTISTIC
KNOWLEDGE?**

The question of artistic research regarding to the scientific research that produces facts and discoveries and the whole bureaucratic and public relations' manipulative system of mediating those facts to the public has become a field, necessary to revisit within the discourse of contemporary art. Specially after the notorious and ongoing frustrating case of Steve Kurtz' trial that is due to happen this year (Steve Kurtz is artist, activist and founding member of Critical Art Ensemble, facing charges of mail and wire fraud at acquiring a harmless bacteria for the collective's artistic projects), the right wing vertigo sweeping over the new EU members and The States, and the neoconservative views to the fields of creativity, one cannot deny the once more challenged or changed position that art is proposing.

If we touch upon an eternal question, the one of the role of the artist within the field of art, we should bear in mind its utopian historical avant-gardistic intentions of extending aesthetics into the outer world with a wish of a feedback and interaction (let's only recall Futurist seratas and their manifestos which tried very hard to engage the audience, sometimes even very aggressively). The echo of visionary Beuys is very important in dealing with creativity as a right to expression of everyone, not only the privileged artists: "Creativity isn't the monopoly of artists... When I say everybody is an artist, I mean everybody can determine the content of life in his particular sphere, whether in painting, music, engineering, caring for the sick, the economy or whatever. All around us the fundamentals of life are crying out to be shaped or created. But our idea of culture is severely restricted because we've always applied it to art."¹ Hence from Beuys' time on, a notion of the artist as a mediator, nomad, moving between different competencies has emerged, and introduced the possibility for participatory aspects from the side of the audience to evolve, the ones which Brian Holmes links to "alternative information exchange, both semiotic and material..." or a "democratic debate about the exchange of ideas"². Alternative forms of journalism (known also as citizen journalism), scientific and scholarly knowledge, or free software movement and its sharing of files, codes, ideas and commons are all examples of human creativity reaching the level of artistic value in its strive for expression, ethics and contribution to tolerant communication.

The different competencies of the artist bring us further to the notion of the artist as a public amateur, as Claire Pentecost and Critical Art Ensemble call his/her current position, and thus the interest in the tension between potentiality and actuality of an act, gesture, but mostly in what potentiality carries within itself and why are we thinking of artists and art practices as potential agents of a change. Giorgio Agamben refers to Aristotle and his understanding of all potential to be or to do something being always potential to be or not to do, without which

potentiality would always already have passed into actuality and would be indistinguishable from it. This potential not-to is the cardinal secret of Aristotelian doctrine of potentiality, which transforms every potentiality in itself into an impotentiality. The greatness and also the abyss of human potentiality is that it is first of all potential not to act, potential for darkness. To be potential means to be one's own lack, to be in relation to one's own incapacity. Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own impotentiality. In potentiality, sensation is in relation to anesthesia, knowledge to ignorance and vision to darkness. In the abyss of potentiality it is possible to find the root of freedom: to be free is not simply to have the power to do this or that thing, nor is it simply to have the power to refuse to do this or that thing. To be free is to be capable of one's own impotentiality.³ We can thus see artists as ethical figures who experience one's own potentiality, of being one's own possibility, and further challenge "evil that consists in the decision to remain in a deficit of existence, to appropriate the power to not-be as a substance and a foundation beyond existence; or to regard potentiality itself, which is the most proper mode of human existence, as a fault that must always be repressed"⁴.

Consciously playing with the potentiality and functionality of an artistic (physical) work, German artist Leopold Kessler is repairing or reconfiguring public property. His interventions occur in the hyper-regulated public space which lacks a concrete renewal of obsolete or damaged objects, and Kessler repairs or transforms those. Subway signs, warning slogans on the banks of the river, or sign boards get visible, changed and repaired. Public lights get connected to a remote control by night and can be switched on and off according to the artist's will which is then subsequently transferred to the possibility of the audience to play with them. With these gestures, Kessler is preparing "the conditions for a discreet revolution against public authorities. In this way, he questions what he considers to be enforced limitations masquerading as protective measures for the citizenry."⁵ Whenever he performs an action, Kessler wears a blue coat of the repairing workers, and with some technical and mechanical knowledge solemnly operates in a field of appropriated and amateur knowledge.

Jakup Ferri, an artist of the youngest generation from Kosova, uses himself as a main protagonist of the videos in which he establishes ironic distance towards the issues of identity, (cultural and family) history, and the role of the peripherally located artist as he perceives himself. He is very aware about how the visibility and invisibility of certain artistic practices and positions are produced and how the "breakthrough" to international scene is economically and politically defined and linked to the centres of power. What he tries to resist, along with the other artists from Eastern Europe or Third World, is the notion that was labeled to them by the Western gaze, and that is its being late in all the art trends that Western world established. In Ferri's video "Three Virgins" the artist

tries to surmount the impossibility of having been at the crucial moment at the place of happening due to the time lapse, but also due to the contextual and geopolitical limits. He screams his own name repeatedly over the sound recording of a performance by John Lennon and Yoko Ono, where they screamed each other's names continuously. His other video "An Artist Who Cannot Speak English Is No Artist" is a homage to a cult work by the key Croatian conceptualist Mladen Stilinović done in 1992 with the same title. Ferri, in real life not being able to speak English, speaks a broken English without pause for 7 minutes, thus creating a hilarious situation that at a certain moment turns into a self-introspected criticism when one realizes, burdened with Balkanism discourse, what a problem one is laughing at.

The alternative knowledge produced by the artists in the role of public amateurs comes to us also through the collaborative and participatory nature of the works themselves or via the distribution oriented to the new community nodes such as Internet, chat rooms, public domains and mailing lists. Pierre Lévy, in his essays on collective intelligence, has described the potent ability of reciprocal engagement of the global audience with the artists: "Rather than distribute a message to recipients who are outside the process of creation and invited to give meaning to a work of art belatedly, the artist now attempts to construct an environment, a system of communication and production, a collective event that implies its recipients, transforms interpreters into actors, enables interpretation to enter the loop with collective action."⁶

Founded in 1998 the Paris based Bureau d'études is an artist duo that consists of Leonore Bonaccini and Xavier Fourt who promote yet another level of artistic amateurship, the one of a researcher of the world governance relations. Bureau d'études concentrates on mapping various issues of world governance such as networks of data-gathering systems, bio war or global resistance movements, and addresses the notion of autonomous knowledge: "An autonomous form of knowledge acts by resonance, intensifying the potentials of being and deconstructing the complex machines, the unipolar totalities that constitute our environment: technological and economic power, bureaucratic, cultural and sexual power. The being who brings autonomous knowledge and power into play is a potential being. S/he is not just there, frozen in a role or trained to seek or desire a particular, normalized possibility, or to choose among such possibilities. Her/his possibilities are not commodity-possibilities, controlled or rationalized by the capitalist system, but real chances, possible destinies brought into play by the activity of being."⁷ Bureau d'études develops pictographic installations and they visualize the distribution of power in its various forms on a global basis and show the interrelations between the different actors involved.

A different kind of mapping offers an ongoing research project "East Art Map" by Slovenian artist group Irwin. Since 1983, first within the collective Neue Slowenische Kunst and afterwards as the five-member-

group, Irwin has been working with various media, from painting to public art, from sculptural works and installations to publishing. Following their “retro principle”, they utilize and combine different motifs, symbols and signs from the fields of politics and art, which results in the transformation of their historical meaning and content, and in the re-contextualisation and deconstruction of their related ideologies. “East Art Map” is their most recent project that aims to critically (re)construct the history of art in Eastern Europe between 1945 and the present in an effort to transgress against the closed systems of interpretation and evaluation. By leading interested individuals through the last fifty years of the visual arts in the region, EAM hopes to serve as an orientation tool, an art-history GPS to a vast, but uncharted territory. 250 artists/events/projects considered of major importance by 24 invited art critics, curators, and artists from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern countries have been preliminarily identified. Most interestingly, the project evolved in the last months into an open contribution forum, where, through its new website, EAM invites the public to provide it with data that might well change the topography of the map it is formulating. In this way, EAM hopes to accelerate the collection of data and democratize its organization, to make it possible for anyone to collaborate in the creation of a history that will unfold before their eyes, and to establish a space and create conditions that facilitate communication among theoreticians, critics, and others from around Eastern Europe.⁸

Yet another ongoing project that deals with democracy and governmentality has just been happening in Helsinki, conceived and organised by the Finnish new media artist Juha Huuskonen. “Plan*B for Arkadianmäki”⁹ is exploring how we can influence the world around us. Our opinions - the Public Opinion - as an essential factor is based on rational reasoning and collective analysis. It is based on open and active discussion, generating various choices which all have their own supporters. In order for one to have an opinion about the subject, one needs participate at the discussion in order to learn about the options. The project presents itself as an alternative Parliament house that offers opportunities for the citizens to voice their opinion and govern. Several referendums (on sovereign microstates, relationship between man and computer, forms of government, non-objective media) and lectures tried to anticipate more opinion sharing on-line as well as off-line Finnish and international audience.

Susan Sontag in her arresting thinking about the photographs, documents or other bodies of evidence about atrocities, either in everyday news-filled lives or within the art field, analyzes the intention of viewing these images: “Compassion is an unstable emotion. It needs to be translated into action, or it withers. The question is what to do with the feelings that have been aroused, the knowledge that has been communicated. If one feels that there is nothing ‘we’ can do – but who is that ‘we’? – and nothing ‘they’ can do either – and who are ‘they’? – then

one starts to get bored, cynical, apathetic.”¹⁰ Arguably though I will borrow her lines to highlight

what politically and socially aware artists today seem to urge, and I would argue that their intentions are visibility, affect, mobilization, raising of responsibility in an economically and socially interdependent world. Globalized phenomena like privacy/surveillance, intellectual property/copyleft, access/non-connectedness, freedom of information/manipulation are becoming a medium with which new media and contemporary artists engage with, and with it they are obviously becoming of an interest to the policy makers, politicians and the lay citizens. Referring to the Kurtz’ case, Beatriz da Costa, the collective’s long-term collaborator, gives us a clear answer: “Could CAE’s work be perceived as a serious threat to an authoritarian capitalist system, which relies on public ignorance and knowledge distribution through controlled channels like the one reigning the US at this point in time? It could indeed.”¹¹

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Footnotes

- 1 Joseph Beuys: Diverging Critiques. Liverpool: Tate Gallery Liverpool and Liverpool University Press, 1995.
- 2 Brian Holmes, Three Proposals for a Real Democracy. Information Sharing to a Different Tune, 2004, http://multitudes.samizdat.net/article.php3?id_article=1558
- 3 Giorgio Agamben, Daniel Heller-Roazen (ed. and translation), Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- 4 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota, 2001.
- 5 Leopold Kessler, in: Manifesta 5 (cat.), San Sebastian, 2004.
- 6 Pierre Lévy, Collective Intelligence, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1997, <http://www.collectiveintelligence.info>
- 7 Bureau d’études, Autonomous Knowledge and Power, <http://utangente.free.fr>
- 8 EAM (<http://www.eastartmap.org>) invites anyone to propose additions or modification to any project or artwork included within EAM. Submitted proposals will be evaluated by a committee of six experts every two or three months.
- 9 See <http://www.publicopinion.fi> for more information and documentation.
- 10 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of the Others, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
- 11 Beatriz da Costa, Amateur Science, A Threat After All?, in: Divanik, Conversations and Interviews about Media Art, Culture and Society, Novi Sad: Kuda.org, 2004.

Zoran Roško
ZERZAN VON TARZAN UND TAXIS
- Fascism of Desire or Fascism of Objects

Being a human being is not such a big deal and it seems that in their depth, humans do not in fact want to be humans. "We literally want to become an inanimate object, that is, we wish to become a thing like all other things," states Crispin Sartwell. Even though we reluctantly admit to this, the wish in one way or another to become objects is our main utopia and evil, mysticism, naturalism, eroticism, seduction (as a "call to oblivion"), fascism and the most advanced technology converge around this point. People in fact do not wish to have will, to be subjects. Only our social, civilizational pressure forces us to be willing subjects, rational participants, rulers of the world, partakers in difficult and non-conclusive negotiations, but what we actually long for is to be objects so that we can disappear among other objects. Death, oblivion, nature, that-what-is seduce us, claims Sartwell, because they are contrary to our will (creation of values, of a world how it should be and not how it is). This is also evil - surrendering our values, wants, and will itself to oblivion. But this is also the ultimate utopia - a state in which we simply are.

As an escape from that seduction, the entire civilizational utopian project was based on the assumption that humans with their own, inherent forces would realize rule over nature which appeared like an object which provoked resistance, friction, as something obstructing the overall flow of (the best) people's qualities through which the best in nature and the cosmos is simultaneously crystallized. Many analyses and even more experiences show that this kind of utopian project cannot be realized. And while the majority of today's theoreticians are confused, bitter, without hope or even paralysed, because they no longer know where to look for utopian potential, American anarcho-primitivist John Zerzan is interesting in this respect above all for his radical switch. According to him, the only - and therefore, desperate - utopian solution which humans can even conceive today is anticivilizational, and this implies, on principle, the ultimate surrender in the belief of human qualities, into them as the subject, and consequently, to the turning towards the utopian potential of the object. Is the surrendering to the fascism of things the ultimate confession of fascism/mysticism of our own desires or only a temporary withdrawal from civilizational "humanity" as a consequence to the disappointing effects which it caused?

Zerzan (b. 1943) is a man-forest who goes against the grain not only of postmodernist dogma but of all ideological justifications of culture, art, technology and civilization. The anarcho-primitivist standpoint which he represents, is marked by, to put it simply, the radical critique of contemporary civilization and the simultaneous revalorisation, or rather, praise of so-called primitive life. On the one hand, anarcho-

primitivists emphasize the dark side of the contemporary life led by capitalist-technological logic, pointing to the desperation, depression, dispiritedness, emptiness of the contemporary, and especially urban life - they diagnose a pathology of the present-day, but also of civilization as such; on the other hand, they give emphasis to facts, particularly made possible by newer archaeological and anthropological insights which reportedly confirm the possibility that people in the precivilizational era (which in fact covers 99% of the history of humankind) lived healthy, in harmony, non-violently, with egalitarianism, non-alienated, in harmony with nature and other humans and beings.

“The fascination with civilization is fading,” claims Zerzan. Tying in to the idea of the situationist and anarchy movement from ’68, and to the radical understandings of deep ecology, Zerzan therefore is not only an adversary against the state, capitalism and the flawed sides of modern life, but also opposed to civilization as such because he sees the root of our problems in the erroneous veering off course which we made by accepting working on the land and taming animals.

How then to carry out a future, counter-civilizational revolution? As the situationists used to say, “slowly at first, and then suddenly, all at once,” states Zerzan - the conditions need to be prepared in order to suddenly cross over to the pre-civilizational way of life, to suddenly leave civilization and screw everything that we need to tear down. We need to, says Zerzan, renew the idea of the power of the negative; we need to be ready to demolish, to destroy that which destroys us. There is no place for tolerance and coexistence of the most varied of options here. And as far as violence goes, it will be unavoidable to some degree. Zerzan is no longer “convinced that civilization has a particularly sturdy footing, so that even its collapse should not be particularly violent”.

What is most interesting here with regards to Zerzan is that the principle impossibility of (civilized) human characteristics to realize “humane” effects is acknowledged here. That which is most humane in a human cannot be reached by that which is most humane in it. Left to their own devices, to the development of their own strength, humans in principle do not succeed in achieving that which they would like to/need to achieve. Humans as media - in which they “come into their own”, with their multiple identities - are in essence corrupted, of bad quality, bad: “human” as a specific desired experience simply cannot be realized in humans as a media. That kind of goal can only be achieved by a detour, through something else, through something inhuman - humans themselves cannot be the carrier media for becoming a human. The catastrophe of postmodernism is comprised in the non-comprehension that it is precisely the symbolic order (which is supposedly the scope of the human world) not only does not encompass humans in their entirety, but that this seemingly most humane (its only “real” one) “substratum” is always doomed to failure, cataclysm or catatonia, to a life which is

“simply impossible”. Because it is our pure humanity which makes us inhuman.

Therefore, according to Zerzan, utopian potentials are no longer carried by the subject, but by the object. Humans can still only hope that the object itself (outside and within) can bring harmony, peace and happiness. Indeed, there are many indicators that say humans no longer believe with their own traits (even techno-utopians cannot conceive future humans without their fusion with robots or artificial intelligence, that is, with inhuman partners), they no longer have faith in their own freedom, individuality, in their desire, pleasure and dreams, because their “freedom” only changes the repertoire of horrors but does not abolish them. While many other, hypercynical authors do not believe humans nor anything else, Zerzan believes in the inherent characteristics of the object, or more precisely in the “natural” (pre-symbolic) life. Only the characteristics of an object can organize our life in such a way that we do not spatter them, and only life in natural “totalitarianism”, in subordination to the power of the object can truly create a humane life. Only the fascism of objects can bring a subjective freedom - a psychotic disappearance into the Object is our last utopia. Simply said, the subject is an ingenious invention but it causes short circuits, and the collapse of the whole system in which it appears. Here, according to Zerzan, there is no help. We will either disappear or will cross over to the “enemy” side and live happily in natural “fascism”.

Life in the Symbolic Matrix inevitably leads to the awareness that all understandings of human dignity (freedom, humanity, uniqueness) are deceptive, that there is no spontaneous existing humanity, that there is no direct link between humans and that what they are, that they come to themselves like some TV-transmission, from the outside and from afar, mediated by the symbolic structure. Here humans are necessarily exposed as by their nature as virtual beings, just like their knowledge virtualises all phenomena. The only form of life which in that kind of world allows for (egotistically) a “desired” experience is hedonistic cynicism: it is not important how my experience came about, where it is headed and whether it serves anything, as long as it is pleasant. In this Matrix the human-zombie consents to the “fascism” of pleasure (however much they are, as Crispin Sartwell states, banal) and to the fiction of existence which is not their concern as long as it is pleasant.

If the notion of Catch-22 always holds true for humans - that they exist only up to where nothing is required of them - then the basic question for humans is: are not all (natural, symbolic, spiritual) Matrices in which they live actually artificial, foreign constructions in which existence has been taken away and the only thing remaining is the “choice” of specific experiences which will be validated at the expense of others, not because they are closer to their “essence”, “nature”, or “vision”, but simply because they are less inferior than others. Humans

cannot believe with their own desires nor their own ideals for they can never know to where their realizations will take them - because desire is not something that is transparent and theirs, rather, it is an image which persecutes them and obsesses them and that they do not know why. In this regard, it is not even important what or who the human is, but with what experiences they are willing to drug themselves and which “fascism” they will choose. If they wish to find the “middle road” humans should then give up on utopias (which are in fact firstly an expression of the “fascism” of their desires) and begin to negotiate with the “evil” within themselves about the possibility of motiveless, haphazard, everyday, unpretentious goodness. In this kind of goodness there is nothing seductive, and that is why it is a true u-topos and not a utopia.

(Zoran Roško, “Zerzan von Tarzan und Taxis - Fascism of Desire or Fascism of Objects”, Art-e-Fact: Strategies of Resistance, no. 2; published online at <http://artefact.mi2.hr>)

SELECTIVE BREEDING: Towards Critical Curatorial Practices in the Post-Socialist Eastern European Condition

Abstract

This paper deals with the cultural implications of EU enlargement. It focuses on methodologies in terms of organizing exhibitions in the context of globalization, and stresses awareness of the imperative for particular artistic space to become integrated into regional and broader European contexts. Particular emphasis is to be placed on the term “European” because there is an increasingly strong tendency in many parts of Europe to strive for a unified European artistic space within the overall present and future global society. As proposed by Belgrade-based art historian and art critic Ješa Denegri in his recent overview of the contemporary Serbian art scene in an international context¹ “no closed borders, especially not narrow local and national ones, can continue to exist, and the borders that have until recently been, or still continue to be referred to as intra-Balkan and Eastern European, will also disappear. In place of these limiting categories we should advocate and implement the idea of an entirely unified European cultural and artistic space in which every region, including ours, will have an adequate and appropriate place.”

According to Slovenian philosopher, artist and curator Marina Gržinić, current exhibition making practices are parallel to the phenomenon of global culture and art.² The most important aspect of these exhibitions is that they have brought into focus and *made visible* the art and cultural productions of other worlds, most notably the Third World (Africa, Central and South Asia, Muslim-Asian Countries, Latin America) and the Second World (the former Eastern European countries). All these worlds are currently, with some future projects scheduled, becoming (through a specific selection) visible in (Western) Europe and the North American continent, where for decades they were / and still are / out of focus. It is also the question of *re-contextualisation* that is at stake here, i.e., making accessible and reachable within the Empire of the capitalist First World what was until now perhaps just imagined, or occasionally, although very rarely, written about. This approach therefore aims at exploring the current reality of contemporary art curatorship from the standpoint of selective principles imposed by power systems and their respective institutions. The question to be raised, in respect to the way that global culture imperialism functions, is: *what has the contemporary political re-designing of the European map contributed to the establishment of new interpellation of the particular marginalized cultures into the subjects of the defined cultural micro-systems?* This gets close to the issues of genetics in the way of questioning relationships between those selective principles and the phenomenon of cloning and selective breeding as understood in terms of the desire to produce

better human beings by manipulating heredity and reproduction, but also in terms of inclusion/exclusion as results of art power mechanisms functioning in accordance with contemporary geopolitical changes.

“In Eastern Europe (also known as the former communist countries, East & Central Europe, or New Europe) there are as a rule no transparent structures in which those events, artifacts and artists that are significant to the history of art have been organized into a referential system accepted and respected outside the borders of a particular country. Instead, we encounter systems that are closed within national borders, most often based on argumentation adapted to local needs, and sometimes even doubled so that besides the official art histories there are a whole series of stories and legends about art and artists who are opposed to this official art world. But written records about the latter are few and fragmented. Comparisons with contemporary Western art and artists are extremely rare. A system fragmented to such an extent, first of all, prevents any serious possibility of comprehending the art created during socialist times as a whole. Secondly, it represents a huge problem for artists who, apart from lacking any solid support in their activities, are compelled for the same reason to steer between the local and international art systems. And thirdly, this blocks communication among artists, critics and theoreticians from these countries. The aim of the East Art Map is to show the art of the whole space of Eastern Europe, to take artists out of their national frameworks and present them in a unified scheme.” IRWIN

The following response has been given to the question “What does it mean to be a Slovene artist at the end of the millennium?”, once posed to an artist whose art seems to correspond to challenges brought about by globalization: “... *To be a Slovene artist in this situation can of course mean nothing good. It means to be dependent, on one hand, on a completely unstructured capital market, which has not yet reached a level where it might be able to support art in any of its forms. It has a strictly market-oriented approach in terms of trade. On the other hand, it means to be directly dependent on the power structures, which may be, to a lesser or greater extent, in favor of art. And finally, in the international sense it means to be completely left to one’s own resources and survival systems without any serious institutional support at home.*”⁴

It should be noted that this question was posed six years before Slovenia had achieved the long-ago identified goal of national politics to join the European Union, i.e. while the country was still in the trap of post-communist transition. Similar answers could be obtained, were they posed to any contemporary South-East European artist today, in 2005 (provided that s/he is highly conscious of the overall conditions their art is emerging from and is being influenced by). What is left, regarding the art context, is the same kind of hope expressed in the Slovenian case six years ago, that the integration processes are “not only expected to affect the infrastructure and the economy of the local contemporary art scene thoroughly, (but also) a more smooth mobility of artists and professionals, a wider and financially more convenient range of possibilities for further education abroad, and a competitive market for profit-oriented art institutions and their consumer society’s demands.”⁵

One of the possible ways to write and talk about Eastern Europe and

Eastern European Post-socialism is in posing proper questions about the subject concerned. The whole range of different, yet complementary, social, political and economic aspects of Eastern European issues has been fostering contemporary theoreticians and researchers to investigate them from various angles in an attempt to define possible approaches towards the Eastern European discourse as such. Why is it necessary to establish such a particular discourse? Is it only in order to oppose and make a counterpoint to another particular discourse, which is being demonized as the dominant, canonic discourse? The question we might pose in this direction is the following: what has the contemporary political re-designing of the European map contributed to the establishment of a new ideological interpellation of particular “peripheral” cultures into the subjects of defined cultural micro-systems?

The necessity to resolve this problem lies in the fact that each canonized discourse helps the establishment of an official, unified scheme of the Master-Discourse – and its respectively constructed opponent. In the field of arts and culture, this Master-Discourse has been regulated and canonized on a long-term basis by the discursive practices proposed and legitimized by powerful elements coming from theoretical circles of the most (economically and financially) stable territories in the world. The Western discourse has thus emerged into a ruling paradigm of the contemporary world with all the consequences of its centralist dominion, one of them being recognized as the principle of exclusion.⁶ Paradoxically enough, exclusive practices of a dominant system have been neglected until the recent necessity to include innumerable particularities within a centralized and unified power system.

This dialectics of exclusion and inclusion has been reflected in contemporary art as the relationship between two constructed maps of twentieth century art, whose opposition could be broadly described (in optical terms) as the opposition between the visible and the invisible. This situation has shown, even further, that the official art histories are condemned to critical reconsideration by proposing different standpoints to perceive and comprehend the world of art and the art(ificiality) of the world as a globalized system of meaning. To make a long story short, what had been dominant as a historically constructed image of the visual world, is now being subjected to a previously invisible “alternative tradition” which has emerged from history through an archaeological process of critical reconsideration, i.e. the re-designing of Reality. In Lev Manovich’s words, for example, a complex network of convergence of new and old media (and cultural forms alike) resulted in simulative practices of appropriation and emergence of the so-called postmedia / metamedia; this has been provoked by new medias’ exploitation of the old ones, in a way that the latter have been used as the source information ready for converging processes: accumulation and processing of existent media traces have finally transgressed the previous dominant practices

of registering the world through its representation, and consequently changed the modes of representation by those of simulation.⁷ Regarding this, one of the proper questions might be as following: can Eastern European art be said to possess a distinctive character? As Boris Groys put it in his speech “The Complicity of Oblivion” (on the occasion of the symposium *East of Art: Transformations in Eastern Europe*, Museum of Modern Art, New York, 2003), Eastern European art is first and foremost an art that is subjugated to the external point of view, and being subjected to this external judgment on it, this art becomes Eastern European; becomes informative about what Eastern Europe is.⁸ This international reception of art is being inescapably confined by its geopolitical framework, but what really distinguishes it from the currently employed “balkanizing” or “South-East European” discourses is actually its historically rooted origin in specific avant-garde practices on the one hand, and its overall ideological umbrella of communism and, now, post-socialism, on the other hand.

In the case of Eastern European art, the simulation (as defined by Manovich, in countering the dominant modes of representation) was explicitly proposed by the Slovenian group IRWIN in their project “East Art Map”.⁹ Provoked by the official art historical discourse, which has always been the consequence of the power relations on a global scale of intersections among political, social and especially economic factors, IRWIN encountered the phenomenon of a specific, previously “invisible” practice and protagonists of so-called Eastern European art, tracing back the roots of this invisibility to the period of the historical avant-garde, exactly as Groys maintained in the aforementioned paragraph. According to IRWIN, what the art system of this particular part of the world lacked in order to oppose the dominant historical discourse (apart from being “innocently” subjected to its manipulative and all-encompassing power-discourse) was the very “lack of a referential system accepted and respected outside the borders of a particular country.” The impossibility of getting beyond the strict national borders kept Eastern European art in the chains of a fragmented system, being thus disabled to propose a radical turn against the official, dominant paradigm which parasited on this strictly established relationship between inclusion and exclusion. The mode to correct the current state of affairs was not in setting up another “more official” paradigm as opposed to the previous one, but to show how both of these paradigms originated from the very same historical conditions and are actually false: they are both versions constructed by forces of corporate power relations and by the rules of hegemonic power systems. The aim to take artists out of their national frameworks and present them in a unified scheme, opening up the possibility of comprehending the art created during socialist times as a whole, was IRWIN’s attempt to emancipate the common artistic heritage (rooted in Central and Eastern European historical avant-gardes) from the models of Communist / Socialist cultural dogma present in the region in the last

century. It was also a cynical response toward what has been accepted as a single historical truth by a corporate Capitalist machine. With this project, IRWIN exposed the double-face of the overall XX century (art) history, that (after breaking up with pre-capitalist modes of production) put all its power in motion, and (supported by financial, cultural and symbolic capital) benefited from the stereotypes that were (and still are) attributed to this history in the field of cultural representation.

Here, however, it is also important to introduce the form of capital which relates to the question of the capitalist art system and its connection both to the art market and to the “cannibalization” of new territories. Capitalism – as perceived by some contemporary theoreticians – is a cannibal par excellence, to which every identity is commodified. This practically means that the question of, for example, Eastern European identity (as methodologically investigated through the wave of exhibitions of contemporary Eastern European art in the last decade) relies more on the comprehension of this territory through operations of exclusion/inclusion in relation to the notion of hegemony (i.e., its absorption within the art market of the first capitalist world), than on the real comprehension of the identity as such. Therefore, the most important paradigm of this absorbing structure is cloning, which connects the art system with new technology and changes the museums and galleries into laboratories, while the artwork is seen solely as a new brand or mark.¹⁰ Here I primarily refer to Slovenian philosopher, artist and curator Marina Gržinić and her text “Global Capitalism and The Genetic Paradigm of Culture”. What is especially significant about this approach is an attempt to discern the inner necessity of the art/cultural system (as many of these exhibitions present themselves as just a moment of discovery – the exhibitions are entitled “searching for this or that” – or even as an act of pure generosity and sharing between different worlds in this era of globalization). The analysis, evolving around the question: through what operations of exclusion/inclusion in relation to the notion of hegemony does this new world itself emerge?, fosters the thesis that the model of the way that global art cultural imperialism functions must be looked for elsewhere, outside of the pure cultural context. The elements of the exclusion/inclusion machine are to be found in the scientific discourse on cloning, biotechnology and in the notion of the viability of none other than the (recently deceased) sheep Dolly.¹¹

According to a book that stands for a paradigmatic theoretical reference in embracing the general framework of the subject of post-socialism (*Empire* by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri), the political constitution of the contemporary world is designated by a simple fact that the contemporary existence is determined by the World Order.¹² The contemporary world order is the global order, resulting from at least three corresponding processes: (a) the fall of the colonial regimes, (b) the failure of the Soviet model of communist government, and (c) the breach

of the capitalist world market into the previously “forbidden” zones of the world. Consequently, each of these three instances has experienced its own further counter-effects: (1) the fall of the colonial regimes has witnessed the failure of the Nation-States’ concept of sovereignty and the final decay of the modern European model of colonialism and economic expansion; (2) the failure of the Soviet model of communist government was – as the most profound alternative to capitalism – symbolically marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989: after being capable of resisting the counterforce of the First Capitalist World, a territory of the former Eastern Bloc (protected or isolated from the Western influence of capitalist market rules) finally opened up and facilitated the increasing penetration of capitalism Eastward; and eventually, (3) this breach of the capitalist world market further into the East (including the former Eastern Bloc and ex-Yugoslavia, the region recognized today as Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe) resulted in an inevitable economic and cultural globalization, bringing into the light a new logic and structure of governing, alongside the global capitalist market and the global mechanisms of production.

The international order as proposed by European modernity has, therefore, fallen into a crisis that today shows the cracks within the notion of legally regulated international relations. The legal structure of an organized humankind, leading towards the international legal order as envisioned by the United Nations (UN Charter, for example), functions as a legislative mediator in the transfer from the International toward the Global, and used to be a pinnacle in the genealogy of this process. Furthermore, in the post-Second World War period (1945-1989) it represented *the* centre of the so-called ‘supranational’ legal power performing the supreme role of a legislative body competent in the global scope. This trajectory (from the *Nation-State* via the *International Organisation* to the *Supranational Project*) leads us to the fundamental change that occurred in terms of the constitution of “Empire”, as differentiated from what the “imperialism(s)” used to stand for.

A new political subject is regulating the aforementioned trajectory. Starting from the fact that the former distinction between the centre and the periphery is no longer sustainable in the new world order, this political subject is being identified through a comparison between the former notion of sovereignty, i.e. *imperialism*, and the re-established notion of sovereignty, i.e. the *Empire* – the new political order of globalization. A project of territorially defined sovereignty under the centralized patronage of a European nation-state colonial power has been substituted by another model of sovereignty: a decentralized and de-territorialized apparatus of government, whose sovereignty is provided by a gradual inclusion of the entire global territory within its open and all the more expanding borders. The Empire is therefore an entity that surpasses previous obstacles of the imperialist (euro-centric,

nation-based, border-defined) project; it rather avoids centralized forms of power, and governs over the hybrid identities, elastic hierarchies, and multi-fold exchanges through easily adapting imperative networks.¹³

The *concept* of the Empire is essentially constituted through the following principles: firstly, as a *regime* that effectively encompasses the spatial entirety of the whole ‘civilized’ world, the Empire is fundamentally defined by the lack of territorial borders – it knows no space, because the entire space is subjected to it; secondly, as a non-historical and non-temporal regime, the Empire is also defined by the lack of time-limits – it knows no time, it stands beyond history, and it projects the present situation into eternity; thirdly, besides conducting territories and citizens without literally conquering them (in terms of traditional occupation), the Empire manages all the levels of the social order (including social life and social relations) and thus represents a paradigmatic form of the bio-power; finally, the Empire is always devoted to the ethics of a constant and general peace (although the historical entity is always recognised as showing the bloody side of this principle).¹⁴

The legal framework of the world order is a factor of crucial importance that explains the problematic of the Empire.¹⁵ In their analysis of the constitutive processes determining the central legal categories concerning the transfer from the Nation-States’ sovereign right to the post-modern global features of imperial law, Hardt and Negri make a clear terminological distinction in order to describe the transformation of modern imperialist geography. Conceived within the capitalist modes of production, this transformation was realized (and is still being realized) alongside the accomplishment of the idea of the world market. A conclusion that the former division of the world in spatial terms (the First, Second, and Third Worlds) is no longer sustainable comes out of the fact that the constant overlapping between the First and the Third Worlds have been facilitated by the simple *erasure* of the Second World. The global world today is determined by new and complex regimes of differentiation, de-territorialization and re-territorialization, which means that capital is easily finding its way to the new territories: its uprising follows the transformation of the dominant production processes while simultaneously new global currencies are constructing their paths and borders.

Central to this analysis is the fact that in the last decade – with a radical shift that occurred with the globalization policy – the processes of liberation and democratization of Eastern Europe from Socialism and Communism in the 1990s were effectively supported and influenced by the newly introduced capitalist system, its respective economy, social values and political demands, but first and foremost – defined by the multicultural ideology and new forms of hegemonies. Or simply put: any critical discourse about the issue of multiculturalism as the cultural

logic of global capitalism revolves around the fact that national states lose control where intensifying globalization makes the hyper-mobile and hyper-flexible global capital float all over the world – it operates for the benefit of trans-national companies, that start running and controlling the world while imposing new criteria on the global market. By introducing the concept of Empire, Negri and Hardt have problematized this specific national issue with respect to contemporary globalization from the standpoint opposed to a simple continuation of “imperialism” in the way it has been understood before. What they accentuate in this direction is the necessity to propose a radically different political strategy, provided that we accept the fact that there is no economy without politics and that political solutions alternative to the proliferation of global capitalism are still possible with the creation of new organizations based on *collective (international) resistance*:

“One of the fundamental characteristics of the imperialisms of the 19th century was their competition. Today, competition between the dominant nation states is less important than the co-operation among them. This is one way in which the traditional model of imperialism no longer defines our contemporary era. Two of the fundamental differences between imperialism and Empire are that the latter has no centre and no outside. But to say that there is no centre does not mean that there are no hierarchies within the global system. (...) One must relativise the differences in order to understand complex hierarchies rather than locate the United States as pinnacle of the system. (...) In any case, this is what we are proposing with the concept of Empire. Rather than a centre of global power, we propose a distributive network of powers that is no less oppressive, in fact in many ways more oppressive. This requires a different kind of political strategy.”¹⁶

This urge for a new model of collectivism takes me to the first strategic point with respect to the phenomenon of what I intend to name “critical curatorial practices”, or (more precisely) “re-contextualized curatorial practices from (the East of) Europe”. Consequently, my starting-point is a theoretical approach as defined through criticism of new multicultural and transnational global ordering of what was previously conceived as a nation-state hierarchy.¹⁷ As a matter of fact, even in this aiming at locating theoretical references on globalizing issues (with regard to specific cultural micro-systems in relation to dominant macro-cultures), we are encountering and being subjected to the same mechanisms of the global inversions of historical truth: what once used to be a single, dominant paradigm of a proper critical and theoretical reading of the First World and its hegemonic position towards the rest of the globe (the one as postulated by Fredric Jameson, for example¹⁸) now encounters its logical and complementary counterpart in the Third World’s self-centered and critical examination of the remainder of the previous theoretical doctrine.

What is at stake, then, in this endeavor to “look awry” at theoretical motifs? With a “dislocated” perspective of the new world order and an “awry” looking at all its redesigned aspects, the way this “distorted” view operates somehow equals the way ideology is being looked at as a distortion of reality, whose purpose is to camouflage and legitimate

unequal power relations. I am indicating here the opposing sides of the *visible* and *invisible* (theoretical) discourses as products of power relations that dominated through the political clashes between East and West, or more precisely, the First and the Third Worlds as projected through the perspective of the Cold War division between Western and non-Western worlds.

The space that used to be reserved for former Yugoslavia is exactly the space where we are supposed to situate the conclusion regarding a theoretically conceptualized division of the world (and what is left of it), and particularly – a division of the “two Europes” (Western and Eastern Europe). This proposition is further elaborated in a contemporary critical discourse coming from the so-called ‘Eastern Europe’. Behind this initiative there is a clear commitment to demystify the imposed continuity between the two worlds (Western European and Eastern European) in the very period of the European integration processes after 1989.

These interpretations must always be observed from a very clear point of view regarding the most actual and most acute political processes taking part in contemporary Europe: (1) integration of European countries into a common EU-unit and (2) expansion of the European Union (most notably – Eastward). Why are these processes playing such a crucial part in our understanding of art and cultural changes going on in the former European East? Because we are dealing with the most evident process of *transfer/translation/transition* (from one condition to another, just as if it was a matter of an aggregate change of ice into water, if I may use this outmoded comparative reference).

It is not to be forgotten that the economic and political integration of Europe has evolved into a European Union from its modest beginnings at the proposed integration of six Western European countries’ coal and steel industries in 1950, while the monetary union has also been added to the EU list of accomplishments with the approval of the EURO as a common currency (with the exception of several countries that have rejected such an approval, most notably the United Kingdom). Although the historical roots of the European Union lie in the Second World War¹⁹ (the idea of European integration was conceived to prevent such killing and destruction from ever happening again, and was first proposed by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in a speech on 9 May 1950; this date, the “birthday” of what is now the EU, is celebrated annually as Europe Day), the overlapping of *economic* (steel and coal industries) and *monetary* (EURO) interests are the fundamental background of a collaborative political platform. According to such a logic of strategic and market-driven enlargement, the European Union grew during five expansion waves that last culminated in 2004 – with the accession of ten Southern and Eastern European states on 1 May 2004 (including eight post-communist countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,

Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; Bulgaria and Romania, both being part of the post-communist territory, are expected to join in 2007).

Also, an attempt to define the phenomenon of the European Union could help us approach the *institution-based* strategy of capitalist expansion. According to the official presentation,²⁰ the *European Union (EU)* is a “family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity. It is not a State intended to replace existing states, but it is more than any other international *organization* (cited by the author). The EU is, in fact, unique. Its Member States have set up common *institutions* to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at the European level. This pooling of sovereignty is also called “European integration”.²¹ Departing from such an “institutional” and “organizational” structuring of the subject as concerned here, we can assume that it is the institutional and organizational (or, generally put, *managerial*) character of European art and culture that could be comparatively defined through the political and economic process of EU-expansion and integration taking place in the last fifty-five years. A contemporary protagonist of art and culture, living and working in the period of such paradigmatic processes, must be aware of a shift influencing the very *status* of his or her own profession, just as much as the *position* of his or her field of professional action. What comes up as a fundamental political question for each and every protagonist of art and culture, and especially the one belonging to the common European civilization but not belonging to the common EU-territory (just as it is the case with South-Eastern Europe today) is related to the very concept of “Europe”.

A possibly useful tool to develop specific concepts of reading the former Eastern European territory has been proposed by a model for re-thinking Asian space and the so-called Third World (through the concept of the “inappropriate/d Other”, as Marina Gržinić has suggested according to Trinh T. Minh-ha, the Vietnamese-American filmmaker and feminist theorist, living in Berkeley, California, USA).²² Gržinić insists on a difference between Eastern and Western Europe and aims at defining a break (rather than continuity, in her own words) between what is often referred to as two stages in the Western-Eastern European Community.²³ In this respect, she is addressing the notion of history, or (more precisely): the way that history is reconstructed. The difference she insists on emerges, therefore, from the necessity to oppose the procedures of erasure (with the EU membership of many Eastern European countries), and to protect history from being constructed once again in the manner of its artificial appearance, when the fundamental differences are still so evident:

“After the construction of the new Europe a phenomenon emerges that tends to erase the memory of former Eastern Europe. Whereas it was previously said that there can

never be enough Europe and that the fall of the Berlin Wall had finally brought back this lost part of Europe and made it a part of the European family again, today things are the other way around and this loss is no longer reflected upon, we are merely integrated. In this respect the East is always out of joint”.²⁴

In her essay ‘The Spectralization of Europe’ Marina Gržinić relies on a statement by Peter Lamborn Wilson, alias Hakim Bey, who (in his lecture at the Nettime meeting in Ljubljana in 1997, entitled “Beauty and The East”) also argued for the disappearance of the Second World: the Second World has been deleted/made obsolete, and what is left are the First and Third Worlds; instead of the Second World, there is a big hole from which one jumps into the Third. Starting from this, Gržinić developed the concept to identify two matrices of active players with regard to Eastern and Western Europe and the new media reality: i.e., the Western European “Scum of Society Matrix” and the Eastern European “Monsters Matrix.”²⁵ In her attempt to encompass these two tendencies within a discourse critical toward the modern myth of a global world (i.e., a world without cultural, social or political specificity, a world without centers and peripheries), Gržinić takes into account the respective historical, philosophical, and psychoanalytical approaches. Thus, from a historical perspective, for example, she accentuates the existence of the fundamental, extant difference between the ‘two Europes’, but keeping always in mind that the break between the two (and the consequent beginning of the new order) is dated differently. Depending on a particular perspective (a Western European and/or an American, on the one hand, and an ex-Yugoslav, on the other), the changes that affected Eastern Europe were symbolically marked by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the death of Tito in 1980, respectively.²⁶ This is a statement that already emphasizes a very specific political and cultural position of the former Yugoslavia within the geopolitical region of Eastern Europe.

It is the story of neighborhood (common life/history, the one that has always existed, but was suddenly given a new significance and, accordingly, a new theoretical and political perspective) that stands for an ultimate challenge both to the societies of the East and those from the West. This challenge has been exposed towards both sides once the implications of EU enlargement were taken into account. The idea of grounding these implications in the specific cultural, theoretical and political conditions related to the area once known as Yugoslavia (or, more precisely, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – SFRJ) does not emerge from any nostalgic, self-referential necessity to set up an appeal towards the Titoist years of the “golden past”. On the contrary, it is still imbued with the collective traumatic experience of the last decade after this same country ceased to exist in 1991 and dismembered through a series of wars that were waged all over the 1990s. This idea is rather a response to the very actual global process of particularization and multicultural identity politics of fragmentation, leading towards

a promised unified world of mutually respective societies and their shared values. Here I particularly refer to the specific re-designing of the contemporary European political *landscape* projected through quite a specific declaration of the “unity” towards all the respective members and potential participatory figures taking part in the game of this re-union. Once we are forced to take distance from the previously valuable terminology and step aside from the former “Yugoslav” towards the present “South-East European” cultural space as a point of reference in discussing contemporary art, we are exposed to discursive geopolitical manipulations as legalized instruments of the contemporary power relations, leading towards expected and prescribed effects. Despite the prevalent tendencies to erase the territorial and fictional borders among the European countries in order to prepare for a future life in a joint borderless territory, it is evident (and we, who still live this reality of misbalance and isolation from the European Union, can be so sure in what we mean by that) that no simple solution is possible without challenging the traces behind. This tension between Masters and Servants, dialectically conceived as the most appropriate relation between “them” and “us” in the very process of European integration, can do nothing but prove that any direction towards the future is still traumatically conditioned by the spectres haunting those who cannot escape the collective guilt of the past. The first half of the 2000s has witnessed that, even after the overthrowing of the last totalitarian regime in Eastern Europe, no consistent change (for Serbia at least) has been directed towards the elimination of the border-conditioned isolation. Paradoxically, it seems that citizens are even getting further from Europe, since more countries have pronounced a strict border-policy and declared visa-regime equivalent to the existent one, so the virtual Schengen border is not to be dismissed soon, as things are seen from this perspective. On the other hand, the very same first half of the 2000s has also witnessed the uprising and proliferation of international art activism directed against this frustration provoked by re-establishing borders in many different ways, and thus reflected the state of current artistic affairs in a radically different way from what used to be a standard only a decade before. We must also realize that the re-politicization process in contemporary art has come to the edge of being institutionalized by the art system while dealing with the very issues of non-institutionalized forms of organization, action and resistance. This is significant for the specific positioning of former Yugoslavia in the context of globalization because it reveals the conflict between the systems of particularity and (fake) universality not from a particular direction of the problematic area, but from an internationally recognized and universally directed movement. This border-oriented movement found the way to approach the institutions of power by self-imposed criteria channeled through the art system as a constituent part of the global political system.

What is really important in the field of contemporary art curatorship, and especially in the region such as Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, is bringing together young curators and art critics from the entire European cultural sphere in order to discuss and further develop the aforementioned issues. The exchange of ideas among international fellow curators is, therefore, of an utmost importance for the proper questioning of how the global cultural climate is being formed and put into life. Their joint conclusions must insist on the continuous and progressive exchange of relevant curators, art critics and artists among different European regions, in order to mobilize the creative potentials of all sides in transferring knowledge and experience in the field of contemporary art, art criticism and contemporary art curatorship. A common framework of their production is, now more than ever, related to the metaphor of selective breeding and cloning as a genetic paradigm of contemporary art production in the globalized art world. This explicitly problematizes the specificity of European cultural micro-systems (“micro-cultures”) that have lost their status of invisibility after the political changes in contemporary Europe, and set up relationships both within the mechanisms of a contemporary art system and art market, and within the larger network of institutional art production in the European Union. These questions examine critical art practices and strategies dealing with (non)institutional constraints of a contemporary art system and its respective representative models (curators, gallery and museum structures, art administration, financial and bureaucratic processes, ideological mechanisms of power, etc.) all taking part in selective approaches towards branding specific cultural micro-territories through contemporary art exhibitions. In this respect, they all refer to the micro-political fields of action (seen as individual strategies developed in order to transcend obstacles set by the demands of a contemporary art power edifice) through posing questions such as: how the cloning technologies refer to contemporary exhibition making in an enlarged Europe, and how they influence the functional principles of a contemporary art system in previously anonymous cultural territories? What are the advantages and disadvantages of curatorial breeding techniques, operating in the field of the contemporary art world, and how do they influence the production of meaning, perception and reception of global movements in the contemporary European art world? Finally, is it possible to talk about specifically European art from today’s perspective of a politically re-designed continent, floating in-between a highly capitalist art market in the western sense, and the lack of an established market in the non-EU territories?

Footnotes

- 1 Ješa Denegri. "Savremena srpska umetnička scena u međunarodnom kontekstu" (Contemporary Serbian Art Scene in the International Context), *Kontinentalni doručak – Beograd (Continental Breakfast – Belgrade)*, 45th October Salon (cat.ex.), Belgrade 2004, pp. 56-66.
- 2 Marina Gržinić, "Global Capitalism and the Genetic Paradigm of Culture", in M. Gržinić (ed.), *The Future of Computer Arts & The History of the International Festival of Computer Arts*, Maribor 1995-2004, Ljubljana – Maribor, 2004, pp. 69-80.
- 3 IRWIN, East Art Map. In: BLUT & HONIG / ZUKUNFT IST AM BALKAN (Blood & Honey / Future's in the Balkans), ex. cat., Sammlung Essl Privatstiftung: Klosterneuburg 2003, p. 273.
- 4 See: Eda Čufer, An interview with Marko Peljhan, in *Geopolitics and Art. The World of Art Anthology – Curatorial Course for Contemporary Art* 1999, Saša Glavan (ed.), SCCA: Ljubljana 1999, pp. 67-70. See also: Nataša Petrešin, "Some Notions on Contemporary Art in Slovenia", in *In den Schluchten des Balkan. Eine reportage*, ex. cat., Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel 2003, pp. 35-37.
- 5 Nataša Petrešin, "Project for Slovenia, 2004". <http://www.fridericianum-kassel.de/ausst/balkan03/laender/slovenia.html>
- 6 Charles Taylor, "Democratic exclusion (and its remedies?)", EUROZINE. <http://www.eurozine.com/article/2002-02-21-taylor-en.html>
- 7 Lev Manovich, "Avangarda kao softver. Od 'nove vizije' do novih medija" (Avant-garde as Software. From "New Vision" to New Media) in: L. Manović, *Metamediji – izbor tekstova (Metamedia – selected texts)*, CSUB: Belgrade, 2001.
- 8 Boris Groys, "The Complicity of Oblivion", ARTMargins, 2003. <http://www.artmargins.com/content/moma/groys.html>
- 9 IRWIN, East Art Map. In: BLUT & HONIG / ZUKUNFT IST AM BALKAN (Blood & Honey / Future's in the Balkans), ex. cat., Sammlung Essl Privatstiftung: Klosterneuburg 2003, p. 273.
- 10 Marina Gržinić, from a survey "A Window to the Balkans", in Sorbello, Marina. 2004. "A Window to the Balkans." *Tema Celeste*, 102: pp. 58-69. Related to this metaphor of cloning, see also Gržinić's text "Global Capitalism and the Genetic Paradigm of Culture", in M. Gržinić (ed.), *The Future of Computer Arts & The History of the International Festival of Computer Arts*, Maribor 1995-2004, Ljubljana – Maribor, 2004, pp. 69-80.
- 11 Here Gržinić refers to two basic texts that are to be considered: Sarah Franklin's essay entitled "Dolly's Viability and the Genetic Capital" (2001) and Donna Haraway's book *Modest Witness @ Second Millennium: Female Man© meets OncoMouse™* (1997). See: Marina Gržinić. "Global Capitalism and the Genetic Paradigm of Culture", in M. Gržinić (ed.), *The Future of Computer Arts & The History of the International Festival of Computer Arts*, Maribor 1995-2004, Ljubljana – Maribor, 2004, pp. 69-80.
- 12 Michael Hardt / Antonio Negri, *Imperij*, Zagreb: Arkzin & Multimedijalni institut, 2003. Also, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press 2000.
- 13 Michael Hardt / Antonio Negri, *Imperij*, Ibid, p. 8.
- 14 Hardt / Negri, *Imperij*, Ibid, p. 10.
- 15 Hardt / Negri, *Imperij*, Ibid, p. 17.
- 16 "How Capitalism Went Senile", C. A. Lundberg and M. Wennerhag in conversation with Samir Amin and Michael Hardt, *Reč magazine* no. 68/14, Belgrade, December 2002, pp. 275-276.
- 17 *Situated Contemporary Art Practices. Art, Theory and Activism from (the East) of Europe*, ZRC Publishing, Revolver – Archiv für aktuelle Kunst, Ljubljana – Frankfurt am Main 2004.
- 18 Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London and New York: Verso, 1991.
- 19 See the official presentation of the European Union at www.europa.eu.int
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Marina Gržinić, *Fiction Reconstructed. Eastern Europe, Post-Socialism & The Retro-Avant-Garde*, Vienna: Edition Selene 2000, p. 9. Also: "Shifting the Borders of the Other", An Interview with Trinh T. Minh-ha (August 1998), Heise Zeitschriften Verlag GmbH & Co.KG. www.heise.de/bin/tp/issue/download.cgi?artikelnr=3265&rub_order=inhalt
- 23 Marina Gržinić, *Fiction Reconstructed*, Ibid, p. 13.
- 24 Cf. 'East/West Art, or the Possibility of a Better World', Birgit Langenberger and Manuela Hötzl in conversation with the Slovenian philosopher Marina Gržinić, in: *Report. Magazine for Arts and Civil Society in Central Europe* [Report. Magazin für Kunst und Zivilgesellschaft in Zentraleuropa], Print issue 2004, Vienna: Kontakt. The Arts and Civil Society Program of Erste Bank Group in Central Europe 2004, pp. 20-21. <http://kontakt.erstebankgroup.net/magazines/issue2/stories/Interview+Marina+Grzinic/>
- 25 Gržinić, *Fiction Reconstructed*, Ibid, pp. 13-36. See also: Marina Gržinić, 'Spectralization of Europe', in *The Spectralization of Technology: From Elsewhere to Cyberfeminism and Back. Institutional Modes of the Cyberworld*, Marina Gržinić and Adele Eisenstein (eds.), Maribor: MKC 1999, pp. 17-32.
- 26 Gržinić, *Fiction Reconstructed*, Ibid, p. 37.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT DECONSTRUCTION
or About de-centring of relation between philosophy and music

A problem and performing a problem

An entirely traditional and therefore stabile relationship between philosophy and music has been established in the European cultural tradition, from Hanslik, then Schenker and Adler, Busoni, Janklevich or Focht, almost to our days. This relationship is based on aesthetical and musicological centring of a musical piece as a determining sensual source in the midst of an autonomous and self-comprehensible, yet always anticipating, context of the Western music art. A canonic relation of a quadrangle: music, aesthetics, musicology and philosophy, is certainly founded in, one could say, phenomenological emphasizing of objectivism¹ of a musical piece – e.g. as in the famous statement of Eduard Hanslick:

Music consists of scalar and other figures and shapes composed of notes, and these have no other content but themselves, again recalling architecture and dance, both of which similarly present us with pleasing relationships that have no definite content. Everyone is free to experience and describe the effect of composition in his own individual way; but the actual content of the work is nothing but musical shapes, since music does not simply speak by means of notes; it also consists of nothing else but notes.²

Or, as in a poetically projected performing of a modernistic vision of music as music, of Ferruccio Busoni:

... that music is music, in and for itself, and nothing else, and that it is not split into classes...³

Or, as in a philosophically self-annulling relation of knowledge in the name of uncontrolled fascination with music, of Vladimir Jankelevich:

Let's conclude: music is not beyond law, nor is it spared from limitations and dependence which are inseparable from a human position in the world, and if ethical nature of music is a verbal illusion, a metaphysical nature of music is very close to being but a rhetoric figure.⁴

Entirely dissimilar endeavours of problematizing a canonic positioning of music, musicology, aesthetics and philosophy through self-comprehensiveness of a piece-as-a-source *hoc et tunc*, have led to criticism or deconstruction of 'self-comprehensiveness' and 'objective autonomy' of music as an art, and of a music piece as a carrier or a centred source of music as an art. Those scarce approaches can be specified from Adorno's contextualization in critical theory⁵, Jacques Attali's developing the theory of exchange⁶, to the new-musicology critiques oriented towards studies of culture, such as those of Richard Leppert, Susan McClary⁷ or Rose Rosengard Subotnik⁸, which emphasize autonomy of music, or can be recognized in the psychoanalytical theorization of materialistic functions/effects of music and opera, such as of Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek⁹. From the teachings on

deconstruction¹⁰ of the philosopher Jacques Derrida, directly or indirectly entirely different approaches and applications are drawn, concerning hybrid and plural acts of interpretation of the canonic positioning of music, musicology, aesthetics and philosophy.

In the further text I shall dwell on identifying and interpreting of a problem-oriented approach to the canonic relation of music, musicology, aesthetics and philosophy.

An inherited fashion/procedure

We always depart from the found - the inherited. I am / we are already caught in the world/language which existed before me or us. In this found-ness a fatale and promising always is performed, which is non-existent outside the individual intervening act of différance on the found fragments of the actuality: to be caught among traces whose edges aren't sharp, whose surface is not quite transparent, and whose presence is disturbingly uncertain. If a deconstruction exists everywhere, wrote Derrida, it exists as well, wherever there is something¹¹; so, there's nothing left for us to do but to think what is happening in our world today, in our contemporaneity, when deconstruction is becoming a motive with its meanings, its privileged themes, its mobile strategy etc.!? Derrida couldn't give a simple answer to this question, an answer that would formalize it all. All his attempts may be explicated by this extraordinary question and the uncertainty which initiates this question of an époque of a being-in-deconstruction.

There was, though, one privileged moment for the deconstruction, when it was in fashion, which means that it produced uncertainty, it was open to interpolations and prone to transfiguration of atmospheres of intervenient performing in different hybrid contexts of society, primarily of culture, in fact of art. Deconstruction was a kind of a flourishing fashion or a set of fashions between theoretical post-historicism and political globalism. Therefore there are greatly different interpretations of deconstruction. Jacques Derrida operated with this term in various situations, or simultaneously in different ways disturbing its defining with potentialities of interpretations: "One of the main roles of what is in my texts called 'deconstruction' is exactly limiting of ontology, and in the first place of this present indicative of the third person S is P"¹². Avoiding a precise definition of deconstruction is performed from two reasons: (1) deconstruction can be interpreted as a form of translation (transferring, decentring, exchange, substitute) of language and textual representations of the concepts of Western metaphysical ontology, in which way it (ontology) also transforms in a conceptual way, or gets différanced or disassembled through representation and offer of different textual advocacies of thinking and writing, and (2) deconstruction is not explicitly an explanatory model of a philosophical discourse, but it is also an accelerated productive (quasi-epistemological) model of practices which constitute worlds of philosophy, theory of literature

and art history, partly taking over the functions of productive social work, whose outputs are not only explanatory-epistemological, but also aesthetical, literary, behavioural, i.e. culturally intervenient. Deconstruction is argued as practices of intervention within the Western philosophical rhetoric, and as productive offers of new or different rhetorics. Derrida has explicitly set the interventionism of deconstruction: “Deconstruction, I have insisted on it, is not neutral. It intervenes”¹³. Characterization of deconstruction is establishing relations of rhetoric and aesthetic outputs of performing of the writing and the text, within the complex contexts of representing and différance of the traces of other writings/texts. Derrida wrote that deconstructing presents a simultaneous structuralistic and anti-structuralistic act (behaviour, performing, practice, action, intervention). It displays hybridity and ambivalence of every cultural order in its arbitrariness and the motivations for arbitrariness. When an order in its self fragmentises, decomposes, relocates in a trans-figural way, divides into layers, decentres, marginalizes, hegemonizes, centres, homogenizes, in other words when it disassembles, differentiates and deposits – then an order displays laws (presuppositions, hypothesis, regularities) and an atmosphere of an order as a complex archaeology of alluvia and strata of cultural synchronic and diachronic meaning. In that sense, deconstruction is the philosophy of alluvia or strata of meaning, but as well a philosophy which concerns layers of traces resisting to meaning:

But the paradox, as far as the effects of the deconstructive jetty are concerned, is that it has simultaneously provoked in the last twentieth years several absolutely heterogeneous types of ‘resistance to theory’. In trying to classify their ‘ideal types’ I will try to conceptualize both what ‘theory’ means in that context and what is here the strange and disconcerting logic of resistance.

There is to begin with, I would say, the destabilizing and devastating jetty itself, a ‘resistance to theory’. It is a resistance which produces theory and theories. It resists theorization first because it functions in a place which the jetty questions, and destabilizes the conditions of the possibility of objectivity, relationship to the object, everything that constitutes and institutes the assurance of subjectivity in the indubitable presence of the cogito, the certainty of self-consciousness, the original project, the relation to the other determined as ecological inter-subjectivity, the principle of reason and the system of representation associated with it, and hence everything that supports a modern concept of theory as objectivity. Deconstruction resists theory then because it demonstrates the impossibility of closure, of the closure of an ensemble or totality on an organized network of theorems, laws, rules and methods.¹⁴

Texts which can be classified under the term ‘deconstruction’ do not only have a task to bring a new understanding of order and its decomposition or reconstruction on the base of traces of decomposition or relocating, but also to performatively and interveniently, demonstrate the manner of disintegration and integration of writing of the Western metaphysics, by which texts enter a problem of the basic form of writing, more basic than the philosophic writing: writing in literature or writing as art. Deconstruction obtains characteristics of a post-philosophical activity, though it does not renounce philosophy as an open field of certain rights. Derrida very decisively speaks of the right to philosophy¹⁵ though he disproves the seemingly natural permeating of philosophy and science,

problematizing the non-self-understood naturalness of an episteme by releasing textual potentials of literary and any other artistic writing.

Let's focus on a transition from a verbal writing (*écriture*) to an auditory (acoustic and, then, musical) system of writing (a sound and then a music image as writing). In the premises of deconstruction, potential analogies of the writing and the musical can be noticed. Presupposing an auditory and, later, a music-image as a field of confrontation of texts of different character, a deconstructivist debate: (1) locates a network of different discourses, and which appear in an audible record, and (2) interrupts normalized signifying (linguistic) economies, displaying how meanings get constituted and transformed, producing *différences* (structural and temporal relations). In deconstruction the illusion is problematized, of a self-comprehensible, metaphysical or nominalistic determination of hybrid relations of the signifier and the signified of an acoustic and, then, a musical image and of music as practice. As a matter of fact, through a deconstruction of a compatible team of philosophy, aesthetics, musicology and music, we cease to protect music from the world. We violate its specificity, i.e. we deconstruct the epistemology of music itself, in the name of external epistemologies of music, being concerned at the same time not to lose the 'power' of understanding music through its real or potential structural order. This position of obvious transgression and concern, with all potential contradictions, was provoked by Rose Rosengard Subotnik, who brought us back to confrontation of 'external' and 'internal' discussing of music:

All of us who study music are caught in the Western dialectic. To an extent, all of us in the West who study anything are caught in that dialectic. Against the values we can protect by insulating abstract modes of thinking from the contingencies of concrete experience, we have to measure the risk, well symbolized by Schoenberg paradoxical career, of coarsening through over-refinement our sensitivity to other responsibilities of knowledge. But music offers a special opportunity to learn, for it confronts us always with the actuality of a medium that remains stubbornly to strategies of abstract reduction. In this respect, it provides an ideal laboratory for testing the formalistic claims of any knowledge against the limits of history and experience. To ignore such opportunity is to handicap musical study needlessly, and to consign music itself to a status of social irrelevancy that it does not deserve.¹⁶

Which stands quite close to the Derrida's constantly developed belief that renouncement of metaphysics is impossible, that it is only deconstruction which is possible, of the relation between the centre and the margin in regard to the prevailing and hegemonic metaphysics which enables us to systematize knowledge, values, even the anticipated expressions through tactics of *différance*. In philosophy, aesthetics of music and musicology, deconstructivistic quest for differences of textual (and with them analogous visual, acoustic, spatial, temporal) aspects and characterizations of an auditory and then music image, becomes a discursive production of meanings, i.e. a production of 'differences' and 'différences' which are consequences of confrontation of complex and arbitrary, culturally lead discourses of Western music (metaphysics of a musical piece as a constituent of music art). Let's inspect a characteristic

case: John Zorn's composition *Spillane* (for a mixed orchestra, after a text of Arto Lindsay, 1987, duration 25:12). Zorn is 'inspired' by a film-performed character of a private detective Mickey Spillane. But his inspiration is based not on his inner impression of the one who precedes music, but on an analytic archive of the traces of culture which enable anticipation of a concept of the detective's character as a source of inspiration for music. E.g. Zorn writes:

Because I write in moments, in disparate sound blocks, I sometimes find it convenient to store these 'events' on filing cards so they can be sorted and ordered with minimum effort. After choosing a subject, in this case the work of Mickey Spillane, I research it in detail: I read books and articles, look at films, TV shows, and photo files, listen to related recordings, etc. Then, drawing upon all of these sources, I write down individual ideas and images on filing cards.

For this piece, each card relates to some aspect of Spillane's work, his world, his characters, his ideology. (...) Sorting the filing cards, putting them in the perfect order, is one of the toughest jobs and it usually takes months. Picking the right band is essential because often just one person can make or break a piece.¹⁷

What are filing cards of Zorn's and what is their relation to the sound blocks? According to the early works¹⁸ of Jacques Derrida, it is possible to distinguish a relation of a trace or an erased trace or a preceding trace in the locus of a subjective experience of a composer. As if a composer sees himself on the scene of writing which precedes an experience itself, being a set of selected and moved traces which promise a drama of writing, performing and listening to music which appears after the film, i.e. from the film as an erased and thus of a *différance*:

The trace is the erasure of selfhood, of one's own presence, and is constituted by the treat or anguish of its irremediable disappearance, of the disappearance of its disappearance. An unerasable trace is not a trace, it is full presence, an immobile and uncorruptible substance, a son of God, a sign of parousia and not a seed, that is, a mortal germ.¹⁹

A film, photographic, verbally-narrative, journal character of detective *Spillane* disappears in Zorn's music. This disappearance is not total disappearance, but erasing by moving, where crossing from one medium into another causes a listener to become a kind of archaeologist rather than a phenomenologist. To reconstruct traces, connect them into a momentary and apparent whole. To walk through a character who is transferred from verbal descriptions or visual presentations of a figure into a music course of hybrid sounds.

Asymmetry of the right to philosophy and the right to music

Definitely, here will be discussed what is missing, what is already lost, and what seems entirely impossible, or, unnecessary. Music misses philosophy - it is sung and played without words that seek justification in thoughts about presence and existence (being). The 'playable' or 'singable' music creates an illusion that it doesn't need philosophy, that it exists as a joyful or sad event (of performing) of the music itself in space and time of a human body. As an 'essential' activity within the philosophical, music was lost for philosophy even before Socrates

and Plato, in that horrific, aliening and traumatic post-Pythagorean partition of myth, man and universe, from which the culture of the West originated. Music lacks a 'voice' which becomes 'theoretical speech'. Music lacks a 'voice' which would state its rights to what stays outside music (emotions, nature, humanity, sexuality, politics, religion, everyday life), and philosophy lacks what a voice of utilitarian speech (linguistically centred presentation of thoughts by speaking and writing) fails to provide to an ornamental (decorative) singing voice that still needs to become music²⁰. Fatal discrepancy of philosophy and music, or, fatal attraction of music and philosophy, is clearly demonstrated by the pianist Glenn Gould in his numerous versions of striving to confront a hypothetical and ever synthetic 'will' of a composer (Bach, Mozart)²¹ with an intervenient and ever analytical 'intention' of a performer (pianist). Those two incompatible texts have become a problem for him: a border line of confrontation with a border line of textual hypothesis which promise abundance of a human experience, and, what is even more important, of transferability of human experience through music performance which becomes an act of constructing on the voids of the absence of a composer and the ephemeral presence of a pianist.

Why to create problems *hic et nunc*, and wonder about a hypothetic deficient right of music to philosophy, and an absolutely possible, yet remote, alienated right of philosophy to music? The response is simple, almost infantile: a man is not a bee²². Relations of music (art) and philosophy (theory) are not just there, without me or us who are in a certain local time and space of knowledge or ignorance within or outside music and philosophy. Relations between music and philosophy are set and displayed 'via' an iterative activating of local knowledge which need to:

- (i) Be carried out from music into the field of social theories (as well as of philosophy) in order for the music technique to display itself in relation to concept, ideology or just to intuitions which are its unavoidable surrounding; and
- (ii) Provoke from philosophy - focused on a certain 'broad' field of generality (of entirely obvious speculative systemic hierarchies of interpretation and debate) – some uncertainties of particular localizations of music which are incomparable to other arts, formations or effects of culture, that is - philosophy activates from its generality, systemic nature and universality, potential of local knowledge from the field of music which appears vis-à-vis its promised hierarchical edifice of sense, meaning and values.

And as in the tradition of modernism (ideal of autonomy of disciplines) asymmetry of the right of music to philosophy and the right of philosophy to music appeared as a determining argument for understanding how unnecessary a discussion on the relation of music and philosophy was, today the heterogeneous views on local potentials

or non-potentials of that relation identify the problem of asymmetry as a departing point for a discussion. The core reason is activating of local knowledge which builds a heterogeneous field of differences and which produces an effect of asymmetry of the right of music to philosophy and the right of philosophy to music.

Let's consider those questions of the right and asymmetry once again.

A 'rough' and 'coarse' question of interrelating of music and philosophy is posed, considering approaches which lead or resist leading from music towards philosophy and from philosophy towards music. It is an asymmetric relation through which two entirely different rights are being realized and thus two entirely different authorities being established:

- (a) The right of philosophy to - by its interpretative and speculative capacities- present and represent music for philosophic knowledge and every other possible knowledge of sciences;
- (b) The right of music to - by its particular musical means - stand in relation to the texts of culture which externally provide its musical and extra-musical sense, meanings and values as a particular 'social event'.

To speak of asymmetric rights of philosophy to music and of music to philosophy, doesn't mean to project a unique 'joint' (contact, stitch, seam) between philosophy and music, but to take interest and engage in:

- (i) Philosophy of music when music itself is immediately absent from its discursive presence, and
- (ii) Music 'of' philosophy when philosophy is immediately absent from, for example, its exclusively instrumental (absolute music) presence as an event of tones.

We mean to say by this that a philosophical discourse about music doesn't require presence of music, not even a memory of concrete music (of any particular piece of music). Philosophy can speak about music constituted from philosophical hypothesis (conceptual model, abstract experiment, speculative constructions of a music piece, world of music and a system /style/ of music). Philosophy is in some critical way about music, the musical or the art, though it has no concrete references to such-and-such music. It creates a concept of music (it wonders about it "What is music?" or "What is music for?"). Philosophy is established exactly through such questions as "What is music?" or "What is music for?": (i) philosophy wonders about music by means of philosophical constructs of an intensional concept of music, (ii) philosophy wonders about music by means of specific sciences or theories of music, and (iii) philosophy wonders about music in order to indirectly, in a 'relation of interchange' pose questions "What is philosophy?" or "What is philosophy for?". On the other hand, music doesn't need to manifest in its auditory phenomenon and presence during the performing (or

in a note writing of a sound order) that 'it' is of certain relations with philosophical suppositions (metaphorically speaking – with discursive substances) in order to claim uncertain right to philosophy. Music does not pose such questions as "What is philosophy?" or "What is philosophy for?". It does not inquire by musical or philosophical means within music (musical piece) "What is music?" or "What is music for?". Music creates an illusion that it is just music and that therefore it makes all possible questions about music, philosophy or the world (nature and culture) redundant. But that is, actually, a stand which has its historical and local geographical reason. That is not an answer applicable to all historical and geographical music, on contrary! Music is the only art that, if we consider the history of European civilization, in the very beginning was philosophy (birth of music and philosophy from the Pythagorean cosmogonies, i.e. from myth and ritual). In the Middle Ages music was constituted as a science - the term 'music' signified the science of harmony. The 'birth' of modernity has simultaneously separated music as a skill of singing and playing from a scientific knowledge about music or universe. Afterwards, music was established as an art, constituted as a relation of institutions of creation (music as an art of invention /composing/ and performing) and of institutions of displaying (systematizing, formalizing and interpreting).

This story from the side of philosophy looks somewhat different. Philosophy poses a question of its right to music in order to speak, in the first place, about the right to philosophy itself (philosophy is a single object of any philosophy – which means of advocating any individual knowledge for the thought about the general). It is only afterwards, indirectly from the discourse about philosophy and philosophy of music, that the philosophy approaches music in its hypothetical or historical sense. Philosophy speaks about what is outside philosophy in order to question and constitute what is inside it, but then, paradoxically, what it speaks about, however, is of philosophy, because prior to any question about philosophy being posed from philosophy, for the subject of philosophical disciplines it already exists as philosophy. This last statement is made in the sense in which Jacques Lacan claims that the language exists before the subject crosses its threshold²³. Music doesn't pose a question of its right to philosophy; it even apparently seems as if it conceals this right. For the sense of listening and for the body, music displays what is exclusively musical. For the possibility (motivation) of a discourse external to music to be constituted by music itself, it is necessary that the musical alone confronts the texts of philosophy, and then subsequently, through itself, to confront other texts of culture (to be in the field of inter-textual potentials). For, texts of culture are something existent prior to music and prior to philosophy in constructing one 'intimate' atmosphere where, in an utterly artificial way, both philosophy and music appear as separate worlds which have certain utterly different (asymmetric) rights. Therefore, resistance manifested by music towards

philosophy, which demonstrates, beyond classical style, its particularity (autonomy, unspeakable-ness, absoluteness, objectivity), is not rejecting the right of music to philosophy. In the modern times music itself by its inner formally-technical structure rejects and prevents music as an art to be a function (or, more precisely, an auditory or sound illustration) of philosophy in a way it used to be a function or an illustration (from utilitarian to advocating, and from advocating to allegorical) of nature and the mythic in antic civilization, or of theology in Christian epoch. Therefore, a critical right of philosophy (it is critical because it takes place on the very edge of the blade of a potentiality of différance) and the uncertain right of music (it is uncertain because it displays itself as a multiplicity of fragmentary and local potentialities in constituting one and the same piece as a religious, political, entertaining or autonomous artistic music) are not set and given rights once for all, conquered by philosophy or by music, they are changeable (in motion, mobile) rights which depend from moving along the historical (stylistic, contextual) and geographical (contextual, functional) axes of potentialities.

(Miško Šuvaković, "Critical Questiones about Deconstruction or About De-Centring of the Relation Between Philosophy and Music", from: Leon Stefanija (ed.), *Glasba in Dekonstrukcija / Music and Deconstruction, Muzikološki Zbornik / Musicological Annual XLI / 2, Ljubljana, 2005, str. 71-80.*)

Footnotes

- 1 Edward Lippman, "Conceptions of Objectivity", from *A History of Western Musical Aesthetics*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1992, pp. 393-436.
- 2 Eduard Hanslick, "Chapter VII: The Concepts of 'content' and 'form' in music", in "On the musically beautiful", from Bojan Buić (ed.), *Music in European thought 1851-1912*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988., p. 34.
- 3 Ferruccio Busoni, *The Essence of Music and Other Papers*, Dover Publications, New York, 1965, p. 21.
- 4 Vladimir Jankelevič, "Muzika i ontologija", from *Muzika i neizrecivo*, KZ Novoga Sada, Novi Sad, 1987, p. 40. After the translation: Vladimir Jankélévitch, *La musique et l'ineffable*, Seuil, Paris, 1983.
- 5 Theodor W. Adorno, *Filozofija nove muzike*, Nolit, Beograd, 1968. Translated from the original: Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophie der Neuen Musik*, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main, 1958.
- 6 Jacques Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1985.
- 7 Richard Leppert, Susan McClary, *Music and Society – The politics of composition, performance and reception*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
- 8 Rose Rosengard Subotnik u *Developing Variations – Style and Ideology in Western Music*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991.
- 9 Mladen Dolar, Slavoj Žižek, *Opera's Second Death*, Routledge, New York, 2002.

- 10 Rose Rosengard Subotnik, *Deconstructive Variations – Music and Reason in Western Society*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996.; Mirjana Veselinović Hofman, "Muzika i dekonstrukcija (zapis na marginama Deridine teorije)", from Miško Šuvaković (ed.), *Izuzetnost i sapostojanje (zbornik)*, Fakultet muzičke umetnosti, Beograd, 1997, str. 11-17; Vesna Mikić, "Muzika i dekonstrukcija – mogući pristupi", from Petar Bojanić (ed.), *Glas i pismo – Žak Derrida u odjecima*, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd, 2005., pp. 113-117.; Marcel Cobussen, *Deconstruction in Music*, <http://www.cobussen.com/navbar/index.html>
- 11 It is not limited to only a thought or a text, in a casual or a literary sense of the last word.
- 12 Jacques Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", from David Wood, Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Derrida and Différance*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1988, pp. 1-5.
- 13 "Pismo Jacquesa Derridaa Jean-Louisu Houdebineu (odlomak)", from Žak Derida, *Razgovori*, KZ Novog Sada, Novi Sad, 1993., p. 87.
Jean-Louis Houdebine, Guy Scarpetta, "Positions", from *Positions*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.
- 14 Jacques Derrida, "Some Statements and Truisms About Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small Seismisms", from David Carroll (ed.), *The States of Theory – History, Art, and Critical Discourse*, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, , 1994, pp. 85-86.
- 15 Jacques Derrida, "O pravu na filozofiju" (with the introduction of Borislav Mikulić), *Treći program hrvatskog radija* no. 40, Zagreb, 1993, 62-65.
- 16 Rose Rosengard Subotnik, "Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening", from *Deconstructive Variations – Music and Reason in Western Society*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, pp. 175-76.
- 17 John Zorn, "On Spillane", program booklet from a CD, N – Elektra Nonesuch, 1987.
- 18 Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (1967), Routledge, London, 2002.
- 19 Jacques Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing", from Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (1967), Routledge, London, 2002, p. 289.
- 20 To become an instrumental sound, i.e. *music of music* in its autonomous sense: *absolute music*.
- 21 Glenn Gould, "The *Goldberg* Variation" and "Of Mozart and Related Matters. Glenn Gould in Conversation with Bruno Monsiegeon", from Tim Page (ed.), *The Glenn Gould Reader*, Vintage Books, New York, 1990., pp. 22-28 i 32-43.
- 22 Jacques Derrida, "O pravu na filozofiju", p. 87.
- 23 Žak Lakan, "1. Smisao pisma", in "Instanca pisma u nesvesnom ili razum od Frojda naovamo", from *Spisi (izbor)*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1983, p. 151.

Šefik Šeki Tatlić
LOGIKA FLEKSIBILNE MOĆI
ili posljedica refleksije utopijskog u kapitalu

Pitanje ostvarivosti utopije u kontekstu suvremene umjetnosti/društva prije svega je pitanje ostvarivosti društva u kontekstu matrice proizvodnje umjetnosti i društva kao estetiziranog oblika robe.

Kako su uloge društva i umjetnosti u svojevrsnoj simbiotičkoj, međusobno nadopunjujućoj dijadi, tako su i kao diferencijalna polja suplementi kontingentnog terminus tehnikusa konteksta kojeg sintetizirani čine. Taj kontekst, pak, nije nijedan drugi do onaj svakodnevni, depolitizirani i do krajnjih granica estetizirani kontekst vladajućeg režima kapital-parlamentarizma, kako ga Badiou zove.

Etimološki, utopija kao kombinacija dvije grčke riječi, “ne” (oi) i “mjesto” (topos) značeći “nigdje” zapravo navodi na razliku između dva grčka neologizma outopia (ne-mjesto) i eutopia (dobro mjesto). Iako bi u ovom slučaju, nakon navođenja porijekla riječi, lagodno mogli navesti tekst u smjeru analize razlike, bilo one najpovršnije u smislu dualiteta utopije i distopije, upravo bi to bila i najveća greška. Nije problem u razlici, nego upravo u navođenju.

Recimo, referirajući se na već pomenuti svakodnevni kontekst, nedavno smo imali priliku svjedočiti neredima u predgrađima francuskih gradova koji, nebitno što su praktički rezultirali s nekoliko hiljada zapaljenih automobila, uspjeli pružiti neke od recentnijih primjera koji su reaktualizirali pojam utopije, a najtočnije, smještanja, ne samo značenja utopije u “nigdje”, nego reaktualizaciju cijelog spektra socijalnih odnosa konstruiranih oko ove vrste apstrahirane lokacije.

Cijela javna polemika u ovom slučaju eksponirala je standardni reprezentacijski aparat koji je, kada se radi o desnici, otišao u smjeru ili tlapnji o islamskom terorizmu, crnim neradnicima, imigrantskoj prijetnji, kraju bijele Europe i sličnim fašističkim izjavama, ali i (kao rezultat) pozivima na policijsko suzbijanje nereda (što se i dešavalo cijelo vrijeme) ili čak tvrdnji da je poligamija u siromašnim susjedstvima jedan od razloga što pomenuta populacija ne nalazi posao je zato *“jer poslodavci ne žele uposliti nekoga kome u životu fali figura oca”* [!?!(francuski ministar za uposlenje Gérard Larcher, November 16th, FT.com)].

Ovaj dio reakcije samo je jedan dio cjelokupne slike koja ipak treba i drugi pol zarad očuvanja demokratskog kredibiliteta kapital-parlamentarizma tako tipičnog za Europsku Uniju, tj. treba reakciju neoliberalne ljevice i njene patetične pozive vladi da se “obratiti” prosvjednicima, “sasluša” njihove probleme, inicira “raspravu” i slično, gdje su zapravo oba pola odigrala istu ulogu jer su oba rješenja zapravo i primjenjena. Policijska država na ulici i demokratski spektakl u masmedijima. Ipak, ono što je najzabrinjavajuće, ali i najbitnije kada

se radi o diskusiji o (ne)ostvarivosti utopije zapravo je pozicioniranje protagonista nereda samih.

Auto – implementacija depolitizirane kulture

Kada su se prosvjednici fokusirali na osudu institucionalnog rasizma (koji je naravno prisutan jer 10% od cjelokupne populacije Francuske jeste ne-europskog porijekla, a recimo nema nijednog predstavnika u parlamentu), traženje jednakosti u dobijanju prilike za zaposlenje (koja za nebičele građane u praksi naravno ne postoji) i osudu policije (čija brutalnost, arogancija i rasizam nije upitan), oni se zapravo nisu ni fokusirali na postavljanje pitanja institucionalnom diskursu, nego su eksponirali autentičnost svoje ugroženosti težeći se bolje pozicionirati u liberalnom kapitalu. Znači, svi zahtjevi su od starta bili kontekstualizirani sistemom vrijednosti aparatusa čija je jedna od osnovnih funkcija upravo redukcija bilo kakve referencijalne “autentičnosti” u opscenoj, krajnje isfragmentiranoj i disperziranoj topologiji artificijelnih socijalnih stvarnosti u kapitalu.

Ovo eksponiranje autentičnosti možemo promatrati i kao pitanje eksponiranosti “identiteta,” (u ovom slučaju na makro nivou, mada se također odnosi na tzv. umjetnički identitet na mikro nivou), borbe za njegovo “priznavanje” ili nešto slično, ali najviše kao, kako Marina Gržinić tvrdi u kontekstu gdje je *“identitet neraskidivo povezan sa inherentnim procesima kapitala, gdje suvremeni globalni kapitalizam sa inherentnim i de-teritorijalizacijskim procesim stvara uvjete za procvat novih identiteta. Ta proizvodnja fluidnih hibridnih identiteta ima za posljedicu inherentnu unutrašnju odliku koja je poraz identiteta, identiteta shvaćenog u njegovoj potpunoj nepotpunosti.”* (Gržinić, 2005: 94)

Generalno, ono što je bitno za daljnje promatranje jeste depolitiziranost ovog revolta i njegovo oslanjanje na formulacije nekakvih politika identiteta, postavljenjih u poziciju očekivanja konfirmacije od liberalne države, koja je u samom startu odredila buduću tijek događaja, ali i referentni okvir daljnje analize te pogubnost apolitične pozicije kulture involvirane u događaj. Apolitičnost kulture, u ovom slučaju “disidentskog” pariškog predgrađa, možda je za početak najbolje ilustrirati nekim od tipičnih primjera kulture s disidentskim prefiksom. Kada je recimo nekolicinu autora rap muzike francuski (“lijevi”) ministar De Villepin obranio od optužbi nekih konzervativnih krugova da je rap muzika kriva za nered (BBC News, 25. Novembar), nije propustio i priliku podsjetiti da rasizam neće biti toleriran u kulturnoj produkciji. Braneci kulturnu produkciju predgrađa branio je, u standardnom licemjernom maniru euro administratora, zapravo uzuse za koje je, od strane iste kulture optužena njegova vlada, a to je rasizam. Odbrana institucionalnog rasizma, istodobno optužujući rasizam nije nikakva koincidencija, kontroverza ili slično, nego samo uvod u kontekst

u koji je kako smo vidjeli vrlo lako bila uvučena i sama pobunjena populacija.

Kao dokaz toj tvrdnji, jedan od autora pomenutih rap tekstova promptno se potrudio pojaviti na televiziji i opravdati da njegovi tekstovi zapravo nisu protiv francuske države, nego da su ti tekstovi jednostavno stilski “grubi,” te da su kao takvi Trade Mark rap muzike...

Ova vrsta nježne komunikacije prosvjednika i establishmenta u zadnjoj fazi događaja i kronološki je prikazala “tvrdoću” ivica cijelog procesa, ali i profil dinamike odnosa navodno suprotstavljenih socijalnih entiteta ili kako se prikazuje, sukobljenih etnički determiniranih kultura.

Znači, od vladinih optužbi za terorizam došli smo do izjava u kojima establishment zapravo brani egzotični identitet pripadnika svoje zajednice koji će logikom profita iskoristiti za popunjavanje prljavih radnih mjesta, ali se neće “dodirivati” s njim.

Cijela situacija, cijela dijada sistema apstraktne suradnje neoliberalnog lijevog i desnog te kroz njenu komunikaciju s “odmetnutim” socijalnim fluksom, vidljiva je i u figurama ministra unutarnjih poslova Sarkozyja, “lošeg policajca” koji provodi teror po ulicama i “dobrog policajca” DeVillepina koji suptilno komunicira sa egzotičnom, crnom komponentom francuskog društva neeuropskog porijekla koje će možda i dobiti što traži, ali vjerovatno samo ako ostane u svojim predgrađima.

Ako to kažemo na drugi način, nije problem samo izjaviti da je impliciranje islamskog terorizma nešto za čim je francuski bijeli establishment tijekom nereda žudio da skrene pažnju sa socijalnog revolta (ili bar revolta koji je viđen na taj način), nego je problem upravo to što je “utopijsko” u ovom slučaju nešto što se (od prosvjednika) traži od establishmenta, ali i bez problema dobija, jer je u kapitalu već posjedovano, bez obzira na liberalnu državu koja kapital posreduje i čiji je, po Marxu, izvršni biro.

Kronologija cijelog događanja i/ili medijske re/prezentacije događanja, zapravo je kronologija navođenja zajednice ka samoimplementiranju u relativističku dramu, koja svojim prizivanjem liberalne države nije prizvala ništa drugo do fokalnu točku isisavanja političkog iz kulture te iz, kako se nažalost i ispostavilo, prilično nebitnog revolta. Isisavanje političkog iz kulture revolta predgrađa i jeste, kako hibridizacija socijalnog polja, njegova fragmentacija u mašini proizvodnje linearnih diferencijala, tako i navođenje, navigacija revolta ka lokaciji “nigdje.”

A upravo je lokacija “nigdje”, točka presijeka i početak suodnosa polariteta nadnacionalne kapitalo-parlamentarističke liberalne države i biopolitičkog socijalnog polja u komponente matrice disperzirane supremacije kapitala.

Ono što je ultimativno bitno shvatiti jeste da u kontekstu širenja

kontigentnih granica kapitala na somatsko, točka susreta biopolitičkog kao društveno proizvedenog i institucionalizirane relativističke hegemonije neoliberalne države i jest dinamička točka generiranja utopijskog SAMO kao redukcije političkog. Recimo, u bilo kojem događaju koji izgleda kao da prijeti subverzivnim potencijalom. Ili, kako bi rekao Ranciere, *“Jednakost svih tema je negacija svih nužnih odnosa između forme i zadanog sadržaja.”*

Subverzivna kultura predgrađa, koja to zapravo nije, ne samo da se transformirala u biopolitičku diferencijalu nego je reflektirala bizarni potencijal utopije, ne kao ostvarivog potencijala, nego kao estetike konverzije moguće kritike u potvrdu supremacije neoliberalnog kapitalističkog aparatusa.

Kada Baudrillard pravi paralelu između univerzalizma i mondijalizacije gdje mondijalizacija *“Prvo zahvaća tržište, obilje svih vrsta razmjena i svih proizvoda te se u kulturi javlja kao promiskuitet svih znakova i svih vrijednosti i gdje razlike između univerzalnosti i mondijalizacije zapravo nema, jer je sama univerzalnost mondijalizirana..., ”* (Baudrillard, 2003:74), onda on zapravo odlično objašnjava ovaj slučaj. “Univerzalnost” je ovdje socijalno tkivo radničke klase, masa, koja je u svojoj težnji da se izbori za “demokratske principe” u polju “ljudskih prava” i slično, zapravo “mondijalizirana” estetizirajući samu sebe, te koja je kroz destilirani revolt smanjila distancu između sebe i institucije posrednika u liberalnom kapitalu.

Ovo smanjenje distance funkcionira na dva nivoa. Na jednom nivou, kroz figuru Sarkozyja, država se samolegitimizira nasiljem, tj. prakticiranjem prava na sankcioniranje prosvjednika. Na drugom nivou, kao u slučaju figure “dobrog policajca” DeVillepina, kapital funkcionira kao kopulativni posrednički element koji komunicira konverziju samolegitimacije mase kao singularnosti. Ono što je interesantno u ovom procesu izložene deteritorijalizacije je upravo i uloga informacijske paradigme, posredničke uloge cyberprostora tj. uloge mrežno iskomunicirane proizvodnje singularnosti tj. integracije disperziranog socijalnog polja u kapital.

Rekomodifikacija populacije

Živi sadržaj preko weba, downloadiranje pjesama sa specijaliziranih servisa, umrežavanje proizvodnih linija, blogovi ili takozvano “građansko” novinarstvo, audio/video sadržaj on-demand, industrije bazirane na online multiplayer igrama te umjetnički projekti koji glorificirajući digitalne alate za proizvodnju sadržaja, *“Neprestano pregovarajući o novim projektima,”* (Marina Gržinić) samo su jedan od aspekata ove deteritorijalizacijske mreže virtualnog. A ona je interesantna u raspravi o utopiji, kao prvo što je sama po sebi utopijski prostor evakuacije prvog svijeta kapitala, što je najflagrantniji primjer proizvodnje subjektiviziranih hibrida, a što opet funkcionira kao intersubjektivni autoreferencijalni prostor u kojem je samo pregovaranje

o najnovijim verzijama/upgrade-ima i plug-inima softwara zapravo gore pomenuto “navođenje,” konvertiranje potencijalnog prostora otpora (što cyberspace sigurno jeste, ali to je već druga priča) upravo u ništa drugo do aksiomatski “utopijski” prostor evakuacije.

Kada Manuel Castells piše o tehnološkoj paradigmi, on i pominje *samorazvijajuću sposobnost obrade, sposobnost rekombiniranja i decentraliziranu fleksibilnost* kao tri osnovne značajke informacijske paradigme. (Castells, 2002: 118). Informacijska paradigma ne samo da se dosad pokazala kao svojevrsna refleksija totaliteta socijalnih dinamika, nego je čak omogućila sjajan paralelogram odnosa na liniji kultura/umjetnost/društvo u kapitalu.

Recimo, kada Castells opisuje samorazvijajuću sposobnost obrade on izvodi hipotezu koja kaže da *“Postoji određeni kvalitativni faktor koji omogućava tim tehnologijama da svoju sposobnost obrade same povećaju zbog povratnog utjecaja znanja razvijena na temelju te tehnologije...”* (Castells, 2002:119)

Ova samosvojna mogućnost povećanja sposobnosti obrade i jeste medijski posredovana mreža kanibaliziranja značenja, ne u smislu povećane entropičnosti, nego, kako sama tehnologija implicira, u smislu masovne redundantnosti. Cijeli informacijski fluks, koji se svakodnevne posreduje u ovakvoj mreži, tipa; tragedija u rudniku u West Virginiji; više od 50 mrtvih u iraku; Ariel Sharon u bolnici; guru koristi ljudske kosti kao drogu; Rusija i Ukrajina postigle sporazum o plinu ili zapaljeno 1900 automobila u Parizu, mobilizira ne artikulaciju bilo koje od tih informacija, nego artikulaciju redundantnosti same, boljih metoda distribucije informacija, bolje RSS readere, veću kompresiju digitalnog signala bez gubitka puno kvaliteta, brži prijem većeg broja skraćenih informacija i slično. Na isti način, smisao revolta samog, kao u francuskom slučaju, nije postizanje autentičnog cilja, nego revolt sam, u startu definiran utopijski ispražnjen od samog svog značenja. A kao svojevrsni ekspozice ili banalnije rečeno, medij, koji sam od sebe povećava svoju mogućnost obrade samog sebe kao puke diferencije unutar seta pravila definiranih od onih protiv kojih se, kao, bune.

Drugo, sposobnost rekombiniranja koju Castells analizira pozivajući se na Berners-Leeove funkcije World Wide Web-a *“Kao preglednika i editora umjesto njegovih dosadašnjih ograničenih funkcija preglednika/providera informacija.”* (Castells, 2002: 119) idući je stupanj onoga što bi Foucault nazvao otvaranjem “ekspertne kulture ka biomoći.” Ovdje se radi o rekombinaciji svih postojećih informacija i komunikacija prema *određenim* ciljevima koje u stvarnom vremenu (real time) odredi svaki korisnik korisnik/proizvođač hiperteksta. Ti određeni ciljevi nisu nikakvi univerzalistički ciljevi, ali nisu ni, kako bi teorija zavjere sugerirala, u rukama nekog fantomskog konglomerata ili tako nešto, nego su jednostavno ciljevi koji su “nigdje,” agenda koja je takva, zato što vodi nigdje.

Rekombiniranje informacije o značenju, recimo, “utopije” (koja etimološki i ultimativno implicira nešto pozitivno) zapravo rekombinira načine reprezentacije utopijskog, ne reduciranog, nego konvertiranog u totalitet drugih krajnje hibridiziranih fluksova potpuno ispražnjenih od bilo kakvog značenja. Ali, rekombiniranje informacije označava i sposobnost “zajednice” da se reprogramira, izloži, eksponira onome što ima monopol, ne nad objektom žudnje, nego nad načinom navigacije, navođenja ili komuniciranjem samog sebe....sebi, tj, ničemu.

Ako se poslužimo manje-više banalnim primjerom koji govori da su pripadnici konzumentske populacije zapravo beta tester i cijelog niza softwara kojim, se masovno koriste i na kojima se testira kvaliteta prvobitne verzije, gdje kompanije onda u nedogled izdaju patcheve (zакrpe), plug-ine i razne nadogradnje, onda u analogiji s komuniciranjem populacije same sa sobom te svojim manifestiranjem kroz informacijsku mrežu ne možemo izvesti zaključak koji bi upućivao na to da je populacija žrtva neke vrste obmane ili slično, nego upravo na to da je ona provodnik verzioniranja sebe same. A načinom na koji je imanentna mreži proizvodnih odnosa u Imperiju, populacija je verzija.

Treće Castellsovo obilježje, decentralizirana fleksibilnost, inaugurira i treći dinamički pol personalizirane “komunikacije” unutar hibridnog polja. Ovdje svjedočimo *“Fleksibilnoj raspodjeli sposobnosti obrade u raznim kontekstima i primjenama.”* (Castells, 2002: 120) Fleksibilna raspodjela sposobnosti obrade, gledajući s banalnog aspekta, zapravo je ekspertiza, oznaka za sindrom “ekspertnog tima,” tako omiljenog u javnom vokabularu opskurnih ex-Jugoslovenskih tranzicijskih društava. Gledano s čisto tehničke strane, ovakve najave prisutne su još odavno, a dolazeći od strane direktora MiT Media Laba Nicholasa Negropontea gdje je on još davno (Negroponte, 1998: 52) opisivao mogućnost personalizirane distribucije (audio/video) sadržaja za svakog korisnika ponaosob gdje bi standardni masovni broadcast izgubio primat u većini slučajeva. Negroponte je ovdje entuzijastično najavljivao još jednu stvar koju će donijeti napredak tehnologije, a to je recimo kontrola ne samo vrste sadržaja koji se prima putem medija, nego i vremena u kojem se isti sadržaj prima. To znači da bi se mogli kontrolirati nivoi frekvencije i intenziteta reprodukcije recimo nivoa seksa, nasilja i političkih stavova, ali i birati vrijeme u kojima se isti sadržaji primaju. Ova diseminacija odnosa prostor-vrijeme, toliko inherentna funkcioniranju kybersvijeta predstavlja se ne samo kao jedna od početnih pozicija ispražnjenja smisla iz “informacije,” ne samo kao ultimativna redukcija kritičke artikulacije iste informacije, nego kao radikalni potencijal personalizirane obrade informacije o dinamici socijalnih manifestacija...

Decentralizirana fleksibilnost je upravo to. Fleksibilnost ispražnjenog produkta ničega, subjekta proizvodnje hibridne populacijske biomoci i objekta posredovanja moći relativističke hegemonije liberalnih režima Europske Unije tj. na globalnoj ravni kapitala samog.

Decentralizacija ovog diferenciranog subjekta u kapitalu u smjeru određene ekspertize, bilo da se radi o komunalnom radniku, strojnom tehničaru, arhitektu, copywriteru, pravniku, policajcu ili umjetniku koja, pored toga što dekonstruira iluziju o recimo zagaraniranom radnom mjestu (za onoga koji posjeduje sredstva za proizvodnju iliti kapitalistu), omogućava samo-ostvarenje subjekta u mreži odnosa koja proizvodeći krajnje *personalizirane* pripadnike, proizvodi populaciju samu. Što je više subjekt u mreži “personaliziran” to ima više potencijala za inertnost populacija koju proizvodi. Kada Baudrillard, s pravom, tvrdi da država živi od odgođenog društva, zar ne bi u ovom slučaju mogli ustvrditi da populacija živi od odgođene de-personaliziranosti?

I Castells u jednom momentu, kada opisuje decentraliziranost mreže, naglašava da “*Glavni čvorovi nisu središta nego sklopke i komunikacijski protokoli, koji ne djeluju prema logici zapovijedi, nego prema logici mreže.*” (Castells, 2002: 123) Kada se u slučaju revolta mase, neka Vlada reflektira u mreži kao instanca moći, ili kada se u slučaju umjetničkog rada neki sistem vrijednosti percipira kao instanca pozitivne ili negativne akumulacije moći, nije samo logika profita ta koja će ih iskomunicirati, nego posredovanje, metodologije logike mreže same.

Decentraliziranost radi fleksibilnosti, ali fleksibilnosti koja se manifestira samo kao komunikacijski protokol rekonfirmacije depersonaliziranosti drugih subjekata u mreži.

Biopolitičko, to si ti!

Kako Baudrillard napominje, “*diskriminacija i isključenje nisu slučajne posljedice, nego su u samoj logici mondijalizacije*” (Baudrillard, 2003: 1975) što stoji, ali ovoj tvrdnji zapravo nedostaje i druga, bitnija, ali i daleko prefirganija, suptilnija, bizarnija i totalitarnija strategija čija logika nije temeljena na isključenju, nego upravo uključenju iliti integraciji diskriminiranih socijalnih struktura, tj. svih neintegriranih socijalnih fluksova.

Dominantna paradigma biopolitičke teorije jeste paradigma isključenje/uključenje, ali često se propusti analizirati “konstruktivni” potencijal *uključenja* za relativizacijsku hegemoniju kapitala. Ako sam Baudrillard tvrdi da je recimo napad 9/11 objava rata Zapada samom sebi, šta onda sprječava globalni kapital i/ili kapital prvog svijeta/prvi kapital da uništava (ali ne i uništi!) i “isključenu” socijalnu strukturu trećeg svijeta koja se, što kao posljedica kolonijalnih politika, što putem “decentralizirane fleksibilnosti” i sama uključuje u kulturnu estetiku prvog kapitala?

Smanjenje distance između biopolitičkog subjekta i institucija hiperkapitala, ali i između subjekta i populacije, same prezentira najvidljivije rezultate upravo u mass kulturnom polju.

Zar nije signifikantno da se u zadnje vrijeme smanjenje distance

između mase i institucije kapitala čak i reklamira, kao u slučaju recimo novoosnovane vulgarne televizijske atrakcije koja se pod imenom MTV Adria sloganima “Moj MTV” ili “MTV, to si ti!” pozicionira ne kao nedodirljiva instanca utjecaja, moćni medij ili nešto slično, nego kao kao prijateljski nastrojen susjed, moćni prijatelj svog malog konzumenta kojem je dozvoljeno ne samo da se približi objektu svog indirektnog identificiranja, nego da to bude, što on/ona i jest. Kao što i kažu, “MTV, to si ti!”

Nije upitno da MTV Adria ili recimo zagrebačka TV Nova (sa sloganom “Moja Nova...”) *jest* populacija koja je konzumira, niti je upitno da ista populacija dijeli iste “kvalitativne” attribute kao i MTV Adria. Ipak, ono što je preduvjet ovako *incestuozne* kopulacije, upravo je ranije pomenuti odnos integracije biopolitičkog subjekta u proizvodnju samog sebe da bi se multiplicirao na

transverzali incestuoznog odnosa depolitiziranog socijalnog polja i relativizacijske kapitalističke matrice proizvodnje ničega.

Ali, najinteresantniji su slučajevi kad se zapravo ovakve manifestacije približavanja moći subjektu počnu objašnjavati zbog neke vrste disfunkcije, glitcha u mreži ili nečeg tomu sličnog.

Kao recimo u slučaju njemačke kampanje (osmišljene od 25 ekspertnih medijskih agencija i sa budžetom od 30 miliona eura) za svjetsko prvenstvo u nogometu 2006., a oličene u sloganu “Du Bist Deutschland” (Ti si Njemačka!) za koju je kasnije otkriveno da je bila nacistički slogan 1935. godine, što je iniciralo svojevrsni skandal.

Naravno da slogan nije namjerno izabran u nekom revizionističkom maniru, niti je odabran da namjerno prouzroči skandal, a niti je kao skandal uopće interesantan. Ono što je interesantno je način na koji je slučaj elaboriran od instance koja je ga je producirala, riječima da je “*Du bist Deutschland poruka svima u Njemačkoj da svako od nas ima odgovornost prema dobrobiti i budućnosti Njemačke.*” (Lars Christian Cords, šef kampanje, DeutscheWelle, 24.11.05.). Ono što se želi reći nije jednostavno tvrdnja koja bi aktualizirala nekakav patriotski naboj, nego sa jedne strane, kako smo već vidjeli perfidna igra u kojoj se sa jedne strane podsjeća na kolektiv, na društveno, ali se sa druge strane potencira osobnost, personaliziranost ali i bliskost specifičnog subjekta sa instancom moći kao što je država, ali najviše sa mrežom decentralizirane estetike vladavine mreže same.

Jer, ako je instanca vlasti, kao što smo vidjeli, samo komponenta manifestacije autoriteta u kapitalu, onda se zapravo govori da svatko ima odgovornost ne prema državi nego prema odnosima u mreži samoj. Onoj mreži koja i čini državu instancom moći koja se legitimira polažući pravo kako nad kažnjavanjem svojih subjekata, tako i nad navođenjem svojih subjekata da sad kad su personalizirani, kad napokon imaju priliku biti sami svojima, (“*Tvoja muzika, tvoja multimedija, tvoj život,*” kao što kaže reklama proizvođača kompjuterske opreme Logitech) onda imaju

priliku i sami odlagati društveno, odlagati svoju depersonalizaciju. Ili, u što je većoj mjeri društveno odloženo, to je “personalizirani” subjekt koji ga odlaže!

“Gdje god jedan dio društva ima monopol nad sredstvima za proizvodnju, radnik, bio slobodan ili ne, mora radnom vremenu potrebnom za vlastito održanje dodati suvišno radno vrijeme da bi proizveo sredstva za život za vlasnika sredstava za proizvodnju, pa bio taj vlasnik ...civis romanus, normanski baron, američki vlasnik robova, moderni landlord ili kapitalist (Engels, 1964: 189)” ili, kako stvari stoje u zadnje vrijeme, dodao bih, radnik sam!

Kada Engels nastavlja “Višak rada, rad preko vremena potrebnog za radnikovo izdržavanje i prisvajanje proizvoda tog viška rada od drugih lica, eksploatacija rada je zajedničko svim oblicima društva ukoliko se kreću u klasnim suprotnostima. Ali, tek onda kad proizvod tog viška rada dobije oblik viška vrijednosti, kad vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju kao predmet eksploatacije nađe pred sobom radnika slobodnog od socijalnih okova i slobodnog od vlastite svojine i kad ga eksploatira radi proizvodnje robe, tek tada, sredstvo za proizvodnju dobija specifičan karakter kapitala.” (Engels, 1964: 253) Zar nije preko robe koju slobodan radnik proizvodi, i on sam, kao separat od klasne svijesti, kao personaliziran i mobilan, postao sredstvo za proizvodnju? Zar nije signifikantno, ali i krajnje ironično da, dok se recimo u mnogim zemljama EU primjetno diže prag za odlazak u mirovinu, ti radnici kroz reklamu saznaju da su ONI zapravo ta država čija vladajuća klasa troši 30 miliona eura za reklamiranje nogometnog cirkusa?

Ova tvrdnja ne konstatuje ništa u totalitetu, nego se osvrćući na Marxovu tvrdnju da “Budući kapitalist ne kupuje ono što mu treba, nego ono što kasnije može prodati, i to skuplje, da bi opet dobio novčanu vrijednost koju je uložio u početku, povećanu izvjesnim prirastom u novcu, gdje je taj prirast višak vrijednosti,” pravi paralelu sa diferencijalnim subjektom/potrošačem u liberalnom kapitalu. Onim subjektom ili tačnije objektom koji također preko svoje samorazvijajuće sposobnosti obrade svoje depolitizirane pozicije u liberalnom kapitalu dolazi do sposobnosti rekombiniranja svoje osobne ekspertize ne samo zarad prilagodbe tržištu rada, nego prilagodbe vrijednosti svog rada u ovisnosti od stupnja uključenosti u Imperij. Te, na ovaj način postajući decentralizirana fleksibilnost čija viabilnost ne zavisi više ni samo od logike ostvarenog profita, nego isključivo od stupnja svoje refleksije u matrici hiperkapitala.

Ako ćemo već pomenuti referencu na umjetnost, a u kontekstu “institucije umjetnosti kao ideološke suučesnice neprestane kapitalističke reprodukcije robnog oblika,” (Gržinić, 2005: 62) referirajmo se i dalje na Marininu tvrdnju gdje ona primjećujući da novi izložbeni projekti umjetnika iz drugog i trećeg svijeta, “Raskidajući sa s

tradicionalnom genealoškom šablonom aktiviraju novu vrstu asemblaža koja je djelotvorno aktivirana u prostoru i vremenu.” Te, “Da se pri organiziranju izložbi koje donose dobit drugom ili trećem svijetu koristi takozvana tehnika prijenosa. Tehnika, koja uključenje u teritorij imperija kao jedinu vrijednost umjetnine ispostavlja njezinu moć da svjedoči o uspješnom modelu primjene.” (Gržinić, 2005: 130)

Treba naravno i dodati da se ne radi o procesu terminirajuće potencije, nego o procesu koji jednostavno traje, ali koji naravno nikad ne uspijeva, ne-uspijevajući proces, institucionalizirana metodologija raspada, propadanja u partikularitetne totalitete biopolitičke socijalne refleksije u kapital.

Ako smo do sada govorili o refleksu koji *fiksne* institucije moći (kao država) odašilju biopolitički uvjetovanoj populaciji, možemo se i legitimno zapitati koji je to kompatibilni refleks kojim *mobilna* institucija moći odgovara na njega?

Recimo, na isti načina na koji je patetična srbijanska, antimiloševićevska “revolucija” u oktobru 2000., godine bila svojevrsna kazna pomenute populacije nad institucijom moći (Miloševićeve države) koja nije uspjela do kraja provesti ono što je ista masa željela (vojna agresija, fizičko osvajanje teritorija, etničko čišćenje nesrpskog stanovništva, koncentracijski logori za iste i slično...), na isti je taj način, biopolitičkom produkcijom i pomenutom “revolucijom”, ta masa zapravo tek uspostavila, institucionalizirala, izbalansiran posrednički fluks između sebe i države, koji danas rezultira evo, i u narastajućem antisemitizmu u Srbiji. Ali, tek nakon što je populacija kaznila državu, a ne obratno!

Ova tvrdnja zapravo inaugurira pojam nevidljivog, mobilnog autoriteta koji kažnjava navođen, ne od strane fiksne instance vlasti kao što je država, nego od biopolitičkog tkiva kao alata u suodnosu sa mrežom proizvedenih hibrida u kapitalu kao determinirajuće instance profila te kazne.

Pa, o kakvoj se onda kritičnoj masi uopće može govoriti kad vidimo da kazna ne postoji samo u smislu spektra akcija koje poduzima fiksna manifestacija moći Države (u smislu policijske represije, zabrane kretanja, prisluškivanja, privođenja na informativne razgovore ili slično), nego da ultimativna instanca koja provodi kaznu jeste zapravo populacija sama, točnije simbioza obje de-teritorijalizirane estetike moći u kapitalu.

Kako je još Nietzsche tvrdio, kazna “*Nema više samo jedan smisao, već predstavlja cijelu sintezu “smislova,” gdje se cijela dosadašnja istorija kazne uopće, istorija njenog iskorištavanja u najrazličitije svrhe najzad kristalizira u neku vrstu jedinstva koje je teško rastvoriti, teško analizirati i koje je, to se mora istaći, sasvim nedefinirajuće.*” (Nietzsche, 1990: 77), a upravo je prostorna lokacija ovog nedefinirajućeg u gore

pomenutom “nigdje,” u točki de-determinacije biopolitičkog tkiva populacije same i njene integracije u prethodno fiksirane matrice moći. Ova je instanca ona koja uspostavlja monopol nad definicijom utopijskog što svaku raspravu o mogućnosti utopije zapravo pretvara u glorifikaciju dominacija mirijade heterotopija, “drugih mjesta,” personaliziranih, zamišljenih potencijala realiziranja ili, u biopolitičkom kontekstu, reflektiranja malih, opstruktnih, života u kapitalu. Drugim riječima, utopijski potencijal nije ništa drugo do generator distopijske socijalne stvarnosti.

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Ana Vujanović
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U SVETU IZVOĐAČKIH UMETNOSTI

Startna pozicija. Kako teorije u savremenom svetu izvođačkih umetnosti prelaze prag 'pisma' i prekoračuju svoje hipotetičke sisteme logički povezanih neprotivrečnih teza o predmetu? Kako te hipoteze postaju elementi generalnog performans stratum, performativni blokovi (*performance-blocks*)? Zašto je za savremenu post-naučnu teoriju, za razliku od tradicionalnih drugostepenih diskursa umetnosti, to iskoračivanje u performans ključno? Ako je performans danas onto-istorijska formacija, šta je onda izazov tog teorijskog diskursa? Da li on uopšte izaziva ili samo reprodukuje (preraspoređuje) tu paradigmatiku formaciju? Kako odgovoriti na taj zahtev a imajući u vidu lokalni kontekst gde se još-uvek-samo-priželjkuje njegovo zahtevanje? Kritičkim teorijskim performansom?

Sistematizacija Strukture Leta. Problematika – Izvođenje teorije u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti u potezu od tradicionalnih diskursa stručnih disciplina do savremene teorijske prakse. *Problem* – Izmičem središnjem interesu bloka, a pojmove izvođenja i performansa koristim metaforično? Naprotiv, koristim ih u rigoroznom smislu aktuelne imperativne paradigme *performance*! koja prožima različite razine društva, pa i razine sveta izvođačkih umetnosti: umetnička (performans art, teatar, ples, opera...), teorijska (studije performansa, teatra, muzike...) i organizaciona (menadžment, pravno-finansijska infrastruktura institucijā, inter-institucionalna pozicioniranja...) praksa. Tako je pomeranje očekivanog fokusa samo naizgled i(u)zmicanje. *Metodologija* – Kako nisam sigurna u pozitivne sudove, izvođenje postavljam pre kao metodološki funkcionalni instrumentarij rasprave nego karakteristiku teorija. *Želja za izvođenjem* – Ovaj tekst je teorijski performans, produženo izvođenje jedne nezavršene trajektorije razlika, bez pozitivnih predaha.¹

**-n..., -3, -2, -1 Predizvođački stadijumi drugostepenih diskursa
umetnosti**

Nauka, filozofija i kritika umetnosti nastaju u modernoj Zapadnoj kulturi od 18. veka, kada dolazi do disciplinarnog razdvajanja nauke i umetnosti.² *Kao specifični sistemi izučavanja umetnosti*, institucionalizuju se krajem 19. i početkom 20. veka (što ne znači da na izvestan način nisu postojale i ranije)...³ Kritika umetnosti se javlja u drugoj polovini 18. veka i prvom poznatom i priznatom kritikom se smatraju Diderotovi *Saloni*, pisani od 1759. do 1781. godine⁴. U oblasti teatra, prvim kritikama se smatraju Lessingovi prikazi predstava Hamburškog nacionalnog teatra, objavljivani u pozorišnom listu od 1767-1769. godine⁵. Nauke o izvođačkim umetnostima se konstituišu kasnije. Teatrolologija se sistemski uspostavlja na prelazu 19. u 20. i početkom 20. veka,⁶ muzikologija u poslednjim decenijama 20. veka (tačnije, uvodi je Guido Adler 1885. kao opštu nauku o muzici);⁷ filmologija nešto kasnije, na početku 20.

veka (po Stojanoviću, Ricciotto Canudo je napisao prve filmske kritike i začetke teorije posle 1907. godine);⁸ a specifičnije naučne discipline u okviru njih, kao i filozofija izvođačkih umetnosti, dalje tokom 20. veka. Međutim, iako se prema početnim propozicijama ovi diskursi jasno uspostavljaju kao disciplinarni 'govori o umetnosti', razvoj umetnosti i nauka tokom 20. veka je uticao i na njihove odnose prema umetnosti kao objektu izučavanja, i na samu strukturu ovih diskursa. Te promene se mogu pratiti sve do savremenih teorijskih praksi, koje se, prekoračujući drugostepenu distancu, uspostavljaju kao *post-logijsko (tekstualno) izvođenje* u svetu umetnosti.⁹

Koncepcije drugostepeno-diskurzivne disciplinarne sigurnosti.

Iako se određuju zajedničkim nazivom 'drugostepeni diskursi umetnosti', nauka, filozofija i kritika umetnosti su veoma različiti diskurzivni sistemi.¹⁰

Nauka o izvođačkim umetnostima je formalizovano, klasifikovano i verifikovano znanje o (relativno) konkretnom objektu izučavanja – izvođačkom umetničkom delu, umetniku/ci i opusu, instituciji izvođačkih umetnosti, društveno-istorijskim promenama izvođačkih umetnosti, umetničkim paradigmama, recepciji izvođačkih umetnosti/dela u određenim uslovima i okolnostima itd. Pritom, kako se u naučnom radu ovi se objekti uglavnom uzimaju kao konkretni dati objekti ili činjenice, nauka se određuje po definiciji pozitivnim karakterom i u realizaciji realističkim pristupom predmetu izučavanja. U strogom smislu, tradicionalna nauka o izvođačkim umetnostima i jeste formalizovano *pozitivno* znanje o fenomenima izvođačkih umetnosti. Tako su opšte naučne metode: empirijsko istraživanje izvođačkih umetnosti (prikupljanje i obrada faktografskih materijala itd); analitičko izučavanje (indukcija /izvedena iz hipoteza drugih nauka/ i/ili prethodno artikulacija specifičnih hipotetičkih modela); i sintetički presek empirijskog i analitičkog postupka.

Filozofija izvođačkih umetnosti je izvedena iz sistema filozofije i uvedena/primenjena u svet izvođačkih umetnosti. Ona je sistematizovana refleksija opštih pojmova i objekata saznanja i doživljaja sveta izvođačkih umetnosti. Što se tiče njenog predmeta, filozofija izvođačkih umetnosti se određuje bavljenjem *idealnim* pojmovima/objektima, npr: lepo, čulno, značenje, umetničko saznanje, fenomen umetničkog dela, doživljaj umetničkog fenomena itd; ali, i načelne propozicije drugostepenih diskursa izvođačkih umetnosti. Određujući se tako, filozofija se diferencira od nauke i definiše kao refleksija i/ili spekulacija čiji su objekti posredni, filozofski objekti; čak i kad je ta refleksija u odnosu na konkretan predmet ta konkretnost već posredovana. Karakterističan postupak/ci filozofije izvođačkih umetnosti je/su analitičko izučavanje i refleksija, koje/a se realizuje kao artikulacija hipotetičkih sistema refleksije i, zatim, iz njih indukovanih pojedinačnih stavova o određenom pojmu.

Kritika izvođačkih umetnosti je teorijsko-praktična diskurzivna

disciplina koja je najdirektnije povezana sa umetničkom praksom. Ona se određuje među-statusom/funkcijom: u odnosu na izvođačku produkciju, kritika je drugostepeni diskurs jer govori i piše o njoj, ali u odnosu na nauku i filozofiju, ona je prvostepeni diskurs jer kroz saradnju sa delatnicima izvođačkih umetnosti učestvuje u konstituisanju aktuelnog sveta izvođačkih umetnosti o kojem govore/pišu nauka i filozofija. Kritikom se – uobičajeno i tradicionalno – smatra realističko, relativno neutralno i znalačko (pro-naučno) pisanje/govor o aktuelnoj umetničkoj produkciji. Njen osnovni cilj je tumačenje dela i posredovanje između umetničkog dela i vanumetničkog sveta (publike). Iako je ovakva kritika dominantna i sada, u 20. veku su uspostavljane i drugačije kritičke prakse. One su uglavnom vezane za specifične umetničko-teorijske kontekste ili se razvijaju bliže akademskom okviru koji nije direktno vezan za tipično-kritička mesta delovanja (masmediji).¹¹ Npr: Barthesova¹² teza o projektivnosti kritičkog diskursa¹³ i koncept rekonstruktivističke strukturalističke kritike; američka nova kritika koja je načelno suprotstavljena ‘naivnom realizmu’ tradicionalne kritike i u osnovi antinaturalistička; u procesualnoj umetnosti, koncept akritičke kritike Germana Celanta¹⁴ koja konstruiše informaciono-dokumentacioni arhiv kao trag dela; u konceptualnoj umetnosti, sama umetnost (naročito Kosuthov koncept umetnosti nakon filozofije¹⁵) preuzima kompetencije kritike i uključuje teorijsko-kritičke propozicije; kritika na delu (Bonito Oliva), koja nastaje sinhrono umetničkosti kroz javnu kustosko-promotersko-kritičku delatnost čiji je cilj da određeni umetnički koncept promoviše i artikuliše (Olivin rad od uvođenja transavangarde početkom 80ih do selekcioniranja venecijanskog Bijenala 1993. godine, ali i paralelno razvijanje metaforične meta-kritike.¹⁶). Većina savremenih kritičkih diskursa je samorefleksivna i koristi ‘jače teorijske instrumente’ (Menna), pa se tako razvijaju razne pro-teorijske kritike: kreativna kritika; kritika kao tekstualna simulacija dela; kritika kao specifična kontekstualizacija dela; meta-kritike/kritike kritike itd. U svetu izvođačkih umetnosti, sa razvojem savremenog ‘projektnog tržišta’, razvija se i kritika vezana za globalnije kulturne politike, koja se realizuje kroz inicijatorski i zastupnički programatorski rad (analogno kritičko-kustoskom radu u vizuelnim umetnostima). Itd.

0 Nulti izvođački stadijum: sumnja u logos i pro-sistemska uspostavljanje teorijske prakse

Dok su nauka, filozofija i kritika tradicionalni diskursi sveta izvođačkih umetnosti, savremena teorija je specifična delatnost aktuelnog umetničkog izvođačkog konteksta. I to delatnost koja se spolja (iz društva i kulture) uvodi u svet izvođačkih umetnosti kako bi ga postavila u okviru te njegove ‘spoljašnjosti’.. Osim toga, dok su nauka, filozofija i kritika na institucionalno jasnoj drugostepenoj poziciji, pozicija teorije nije jednoznačno fiksirana budući da se ona realizuje kao uvek-već-praksa a jeste visoko-formalizovani diskurs. Ovi problemi teorije/i su

ključni za razumevanje njenog statusa-funkcije. Kako se tek kroz njih konstituiše, ona se može odrediti kao u osnovi problematična (opiruća/ osporavana) diskurzivna praksa sveta izvođačkih umetnosti.¹⁷

Teorija u savremenom svetu umetnosti se realizuje kao pro-sistemska post-naučna praksa intertekstualnih povezivanja, koja se institucionalizuje od sedamdesetih godina 20. veka, dobijajući sve veći prostor i zamah. Ona se konceptualizuje i institucionalno uspostavlja kroz gotovo istovremen, mada međusobno različit, rad *Tel Quela*¹⁸ u književnosti i *Art&Language*¹⁹ u likovnim umetnostima, od kraja šezdesetih i eksplicitno tokom sedamdesetih godina. Pritom, u razmatranju njenog institucionalnog pro-sistemskog konstituisanja, ne treba prevideti da su obe pojave vezane za 'velike kulture', francusku i englesku. Kasnije, od sedamdesetih godina, ovakva koncepcija teorije je uvedena i u druge kontekste (pre svega američki, nakon čega i kreće njena ekspanzija) i druge umetničke svetove, a među njima i svet izvođačkih umetnosti.

Presek 1. Teorija u savremenom svetu izvođačkih umetnosti nije koherentan koncept. Tako se, prema načinu zasnivanja, identifikuju: teorije zasnovane u spoljašnjim teorijama (umetnosti, kulture i društva), koje se uvode i reinterpretiraju u ovom specifičnom kontekstu; i teorije koje se razvijaju kao 'unutrašnje', i zasnivaju na raspravama specifičnoizvođačkih problema: mimezis, reprezentacija, telo, izvođenje, mizanscen itd. koji su suočeni i preiščitani kroz okružujuće diskurse (politika, ideologija, ekonomija itd). Prema teorijskom uokvirenju problematike, takođe se izdvajaju različite teorije: poststrukturalizam; semiotika; studije kulture (sa specifičnim podsistemima), studije umetnosti u doba kulture (studije performansa, vizuelnih reprezentacija); teorijska psihoanaliza; neomarksizam; nova fenomenologija; postsocijalističke studije; teorije performativa; biopolitičke teorije; tehno teorije itd. Prema specifičnoj institucionalnoj funkciji, razlikuju se: teorija izvođačkih umetnosti, teorija iz i teorija u izvođačkim umetnostima.

Presek 2. Ako se traže sličnosti među različitim savremenim teorijama oko kojih se koncipira pojam 'savremena teorijska praksa u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti', onda su osnovne sličnosti sasvim sigurno na planu generalne teorijske taktike i, s njom povezane, institucionalne status-funkcije. *Karakteristična taktika:* praktična intervencija visoko-formalizovanog diskursa. Dakle, ne praksa zasnovana na visokoformalizovanom diskursu, već praksa samog tog diskursa. Ona se, u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti, realizuje kao niz pojedinačnih makro- i mikro- poteza konstituisanja i transformisanja strukture tog sveta. *Karakterističan status:* insitucionalno ustanovljena, čak akademizovana, pozicija novog oblika formalizovanog diskurzivnog rada. On dakle dobija sav legitimitet sistemskog drugostepenog diskursa, ali se konstitutivno uspostavlja tek u prekoračivanju praga svojih hipotetičkih realizacija i uključivanju u svet izvođačkih umetnosti. *Karakteristične*

opšte funkcije: suočenje izvođačkih umetnosti sa okružujućom kulturom, tj. stalne regulacije i deregulacije strukture sveta izvođačkih umetnosti u njegovom inter- tekstualnom, diskurzivnom i institucionalnom okruženju.

Koncepcije drugostepeno-diskurzivne izvođačke nesigurnosti.

Savremenu teoriju u svetu izvođačkim umetnostima ne zatičemo u idealnom vidu, već se realizuju i diferenciraju kao pojedinačne *tehničke teorijske prakse*: teorija izvođačkih umetnosti, teorija iz izvođačkih umetnosti, i teorija u izvođačkim umetnostima; između kojih su moguće različite intersekcije.

Teorije izvođačkih umetnosti su visoko-formalizovani epistemički diskursi koji nastaju uglavnom u akademskom okviru, a danas se mogu smatrati i dominantnim drugostepenim diskursom sveta izvođačkih umetnosti. U skladu sa opštim konceptom teorijske prakse, oni nisu izolovani, autonomni diskursi koji ne deluju u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti ili čije se delovanje svodi na naknadnu teoretizaciju. Naprotiv, oni i izvide i osujećuju opisnu funkciju drugostepenog diskursa i – kroz proces teoretizacije – regulišu i deregulišu strukturu sveta izvođačkih umetnosti. Primeri su savremene poststrukturalističke, dekonstruktivističke, kulturalne, rodne, novo-istoricističke, performativne, tehno, biopolitičke, mediološke, institucionalne itd. teoretizacije izvođačkih umetnosti, kakve su izvodili ili izvide autori i izvan i unutar institucije izvođačkih umetnosti: Derrida, Kristeva, Barthes, Althusser, Irigaray, Helene Cixous, Žižek, Butler, Peggy Phelan, Sue-Elen Case, Blau, Elin Diamond, Elionor Fusch, Schechner, Phillip Auslander, Bojana Kunst, Marvin Carlson, Josette Feral, Patrice Pavis, Aldo Milohnić, grupa teoretičara/ki oko TkHa itd.

Teorija iz izvođačkih umetnosti je diskurs koji nastaje unutar konteksta, interesovanja i interesa umetničke produkcije koja se kroz njega jasno artikuliše i/ili se artikulisano usmerava njen razvoj. Pritom, kao teorijska praksa, i ovaj diskurs suočava umetničku produkciju sa okružujućim društvenim tekstovima. Međutim, za razliku od teorija izvođačkih umetnosti, to suočenje ne mora biti izvedeno iz okvira jednog teorijskog sistema iz kojeg se ‘teorijski objekti’²⁰ razmatra sa jednoznačne tačke gledišta. Ipak, artikulacije i iniciranja izvođačke prakse ovom teorijom su u intencionalnoj interakciji sa tim diskursima, pa se ovaj koncept ne odnosi na sve umetničke ‘zapisne’ već na one za koje je suočenje sa okružujućim diskursima konstitutivno i intencionalno. Ovu teorijsku praksu izvide sami delatnici sveta izvođačkih umetnosti, a često autori direktno uključeni u produkciju. Njen cilj je konceptualizovana proizvodnja, a zatim i praktična upotreba, pojmova, procedura i tehnika u procesu umetničkog, izvođačkog rada. Primere savremenih teorija iz izvođačkih umetnosti izvide: Schechner, Orlan, Helen Varley Jameson, Sandy Stone, Phillipp Zarrili, Michael Nyman, Peter Brook, Eugenio Barba, Laurie Anderson, Sergej Pristaš, Emil

Hrvatin, Thomas Richards, Martin Spangberg itd.

Teorija u izvođačkim umetnostima je specifična teorijska praksa direktnog upliva okružujućih diskursa u umetnički rad. U ovom slučaju se posmatra način na koji se umetnički rad zasniva na i u sebe uključuje teorijske propozicije, ali (kao i u slučaju teorije iz izvođačkih umetnosti) to ne podrazumeva i precizno ograničavanje umetničkog rada na jedan teorijski sistem. To znači da sa teorijom u izvođačkim umetnostima nije stvar u tome da je umetnički rad demonstracija određenog teorijskog sistema, već da se on strukturira u artikulisanom suočenju sa tim okružujućim teorijskim diskursima.²¹ Teoriju u izvođačkim umetnostima izvide najčešće sami umetnici, specifično umetničkim diskursom (radom): Helene Cixous i Ariana Mnuskina, Jerome Bel, Xavier Le Roy, Societas Rafaelo Sancio, Orlan, ABC experiment, Richard Foreman, Emil Hrvatin, Bad.Co, Igor Štromajer, Katarzyna Kozyra itd.

+1.0, +1.1, +1.n Teoretizacija kao relativni okvir kao konstituent izvođačkih umetnosti

Zadržaću se na savremenoj teoriji izvođačkih umetnosti, tj. njenom izvođenju – *teoretizaciji*, pošto mi se to čini centralnim problemom izvođenja savremenih teorijskih praksi izvođačkih umetnosti. Ova teorijska praksa se izvodi procesom konceptualizacije i kontekstualizacije (deskripcije, analize, objašnjenja, interpretacije i rasprave) umetnosti, a njene osnovne funkcije su da umetnost određuje i artikulise u terminima visoko-formalizovanog teorijskog diskursa i da je (de/)kontekstualizuje u odnosu na okružujuće tekstove kulture, društva²².

+1.0 Logika transparentnosti teorijskog izvođenja i pokušaj dezintegracije te logike

Zbog svoje visoko-formalizovane strukture i čvrstog institucionalnog utemeljenja (akademska pozicija), savremena teorija umetnosti je najbliža (u poređenju sa teorijama iz i u umetnostima) tradicionalnim drugostepenim diskursima umetnosti. Ona se, međutim, konstituise rezom otcepljenja od njih, pa je ova blizina poseban problem za njeno razumevanje, ali i izvođenje.

Demonstracija Logike. Sa aspekta te blizine, izgleda kao da je odnos teorije i predmeta teoretizacije jasan, jednosmeran i jednoznačan, tj. da se u odnosu na nauku, kritiku ili filozofiju umetnosti ništa bitno u njegovom izvođenju nije promenilo. Uzima se, dakle, da postoji predmet i zatim dolazi teoretizacija koja ga objašnjava i tumači i tako čini pojmljivim i instrumentalnim.²³ U tradiciji nauke postoji ključni zahtev da teoretizacija bude 'ispravna' (= istinita i objektivna). Ona bi se, prema tome, načelno zasnivala na 'stručnom' (zasnovanom u /formalizovanom/ znanju) izvlačenju i, zatim, predočavanju predmetne imanencije (*njegovih* značenja, unutrašnje organizacije, njegovog smisla, namere, suštine itd). Tome se pristupa različitim metodama: biografističkim, intencionalističkim, kontekstualističkim ili varijantama 'bliskih čitanja'²⁴

koja se zasnivaju na pristupanju samom umetničkom delu. U tom smislu, teoretizacija ostaje *par excellence* pozitivan diskurs o nekom predmetu. Ako govorim o izvođačkim umetnostima, to ukratko znači sledeće. Umetničko delo ili drugi umetnički fenomen se posmatra kao objekt sa *imanentnim svojstvima*²⁵ koja se teoretizacijom prevode na artikulisani verbalni jezik, čime se taj objekt čini pojmljivijim i dostupnijim (publici, javnosti, umetnicima, stručnjacima itd). Pritom, teoretizacija ne treba (tj. ne sme, kako bi bila naučno-teorijski ispravna) da 'iskrivi' taj predmet (da iskrivi istinu o tom predmetu) tako što će previđati neka (naročito ključna) njemu-imanentna svojstva, odnosno pripisivati mu neka druga, ne-imanentna. Svakako, teoretizacija dela podrazumeva i njegovu kontekstualizaciju a ne samo imanentnu analizu. Zapravo, predmetna imenencija se ne izvlači u vakuumu, već je teoretizacija 'vrednija' ('obuhvatnija', 'temeljnija') što je više u stanju da ta predmetu imanentna svojstva postavi u brojnim relacijama sa drugim predmetima, fenomenima, konceptima, pojavama, činjenicama.

Demonstracija Pokušaja Dezintegracije. Međutim, da li je danas odnos 'umetničko (izvođačko) delo-teoretizacija' tako jasan, a posebno tako jednoznačan?²⁶ Jer, gde je ta *granica*²⁷ koja pouzdano razdvaja umetničko delo i njegove teoretizacije? Kako, na osnovu kojih kriterijuma i pokazatelja, mi znamo da je ovo što 'sad' vidimo na sceni samo/sâmo to umetničko delo, a nije 'već' delo-u-sadejstvu-sa-teoretizacijom? Ili, da li mi uopšte možemo govoriti o umetničkom fenomenu pre i/ili mimo njegove teoretizacije? Ako ovu distancu tako smanjimo, neizbežno slede pitanja same teoretizacije: Kako ona uopšte može pretendovati na bilo kakvu neutralnost, kada se ne izvodi iz prebrisanog trans-društvenog diskurzivnog prostora? Bilo kakva da je njena determinacija, ona je za nju konstitutivna, pa time i za njen odnos prema predmetu. Šta je onda ono što ona 'teoretizuje': njen objekt ili proizvod ili *ulog* (altiserovski i žižekovski) koji u tenziji suočava zahvaćeni objekt i konstruisani proizvod?

+1.1 TENZIJA: izvođačke tenzije savremene teoretizacije izvođačkih umetnosti

Ovih nekoliko pitanja nisu svakako (samo) moje nedoumice/spekulacije, već su i temeljne propozicije savremenih teoretizacija (izvođačkih) umetnosti.²⁸ U tom smislu, može se reći da je za savremene teorije umetnosti karakteristično i bazično bavljenje svojim određenjem (kao 'teorije umetnosti') i svojim odnosom prema umetnosti (svom 'predmetu'). To je jedna od osnovnih tačaka njihovog odvajanja od tradicionalne nauke, filozofije i kritike umetnosti. Pored toga, a u vezi sa tim, savremene teorije izvođačkih umetnosti su konceptualizovane kao visoko-formalizovani epistemički diskursi koji nastaju uglavnom u akademskom okviru, ali ne kao statični i autonomni drugostepeni diskursi koji ne deluju ili deluju samo posredno, kroz *naknadne* teoretizacije, u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti. Ne, one su – kao teorijske

prakse – odmah praktično uložene u kontekstu svoje realizacije. Tu je mesto reza gde počinju tenzije. Čim je izmaknuto stabilno statično tlo, teorija postaje performans sa svim specifičnim otporima materije. To što savremena teorija u izvođenju i formira i osujećuje ‘opisnu’ interpretativnu funkciju diskursa, znači ona, teoretizacijom umetničke produkcije, reguliše i dereguliše ‘uloženu’ strukturu sveta izvođačkih umetnosti a čega ni sama nije pošteđena. (Teorija kao *sujet en procès* /Kristeva/?)

Ako krenemo sad odavde, možemo dalje govoriti o *teoretizaciji kao relativnom kontekstu* i o *teoretizaciji kao konstitutivnom elementu* umetnosti. Ove dve koncepcije teoretizacije ne moraju biti ‘slepljene’, mada su veoma bliske. Analiziraću i pokazaću sada taj proces postupno.

+1.2 PROIZVODNJA: konstitutivno uokviravanje umetnosti kroz teoretizaciju

Kroz specifične teoretizacije umetničke produkcije se konstruišu *novi* – a ne već postojeći, otkriveni – teorijski problemi izvođačke produkcije. Izvešću nekoliko onih koje smatram ključnim u kontekstu savremenih (teorija) izvođačkih umetnosti: ekonomija performans-označitelja (u poststrukturalizmu); performativnost izvođačkog govora, gesta/tela ili izvođenja (u teorijama performativa); ekonomimezis i političnost izvođačkog postupka (u poznom poststrukturalističkom i kulturnom materijalizmu...); kulturni identiteti performer/ki (u studijama kulture, postkolonijalnim, feminističkim teorijama...); disciplinarna određenja umetničkog dela u umetničkoj instituciji, kulturi i društvu (u institucionalnim i novo-istoricističkim teorijama...); telo i odnos tela naspram jezika/politike/istorije (u teorijama tela, biopolitičkim i post-socijalističkim teorijama...); umetničko delo kao ne-ekskluzivni kulturni artefakt (u teorijama spektakla i gledateljstva, studijama kulture i studijama performansa); itd.

Hoću da naglasim da ovi problemi – ni za teoriju izvođačkih umetnosti niti za izvođačku produkciju – nisu postojali *pre* ili *mimo* svoje teorijske platforme i uokvirenja i u tom smislu teoretizacija je već u prvom koraku (*teorija kao relativni kontekst umetnosti*) proizvodna, tj. izvedbeno-interventna. (Ta interventnost je semiotička.²⁹) To se konkretnije da argumentovati činjenicom da ovi problemi ‘zaista’ nisu postojali u Zapadnoj umetnosti i teoriji pre npr. pedeset godina ili više vekova, kao ni mimo savremene (Zapadne/Globalne) umetnosti i teorije, npr. u tradicionalnoj afričkoj umetnosti ili umetnosti Maja. Oni su karakteristični, a sada i nezaobilazni, problemi ne samo savremenih teorija izvođačkih umetnosti, već – u *kontekstu njih* – i savremene umetničke produkcije. To znači da se kroz njih, u procesu teoretizacije, izvodi preiščitavanje i preoznačavanje prethodne i aktuelne umetničke produkcije u novom diskurzivno-društvenom kontekstu (sihronom kontekstu koji je takođe strukturiran ovim problematikama). Ona sada, realizujući se u kontekstu koji za nju

proizvode teorije izvođačkih umetnosti, operiše sa tim novo-stvorenim i teorijski-stvorenim problemima kao svojim konstituentima, koji čak i ne moraju biti tako eksplicitno ugrađeni u strukturu umetničkog rada kao u teorijama u izvođačkim umetnostima. Ovom procedurom, teorija izvođačkih umetnosti izvodi i drugi korak (*teorija kao konstitutivni element umetnosti*) svoje izvođačke interventnosti. Ono na šta hoću da ukažem jeste da, kroz ove izvođačke procedure, relativni okvir umetničke produkcije koji uspostavlja savremene teoretizacije jeste praktično i direktno uložen, proizvođen i semiotički interventan u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti. Dakle, umetnost je upletena u mrežu teoretizacija u kojoj za nju ta – okružujuća, ali ne spoljašnja – problematika postaje konstituišuća.

+1.3 KONTRATRANSFERI I TRANSFERI: opiranje teorijskom/g izvođenju/a

Proces teoretizacije se ovde/sada ne zaustavlja, jer on nije tako ‘čisto’ jednosmeran kako sam ga postavila do sada. Predaha nema i izvođenje se dalje nastavlja kroz nove teoretizacije te inicirane i proizvedene umetničke produkcije iz uspostavljenog teorijskog okvira. A zatim, slede novi izazovi (sada iz umetnosti) teoretizaciji, na koje teorije izvođačkih umetnosti moraju da odgovore kako bi za tu novu umetničku praksu proizvele nove okvire i instrumente za artikulaciju i inter-tekstualna umetnička, kulturna i društvena pozicioniranja.³⁰ Primeri za to su prelazak sa *gay* i lezbejskih na *queer* teorije umetnosti ili, recimo, sa teorijske psihoanalize umetnosti na *culture studies* psihoanalizu. Upravo je dinamika ovih tenzija teorijskih izazova-umetničkih odgovora i, obratno, umetničkih izazova-teorijskih odgovora, po mom mišljenju, ono što je bazična problematika izvođenja savremene teorije izvođačkih umetnosti.

Sa aspekta te tenzije i dinamike, mogu se formulisati dva modela (teorijska intervencija: kontratransfer; reakcija na teoriju: transfer) u osnovi-nesigurnih izvođenja savremene teorije izvođačkih umetnosti. Poslužiću se primerima iz savremenog sveta izvođačkih umetnosti.

Kontratransferi. Za primer u razmatranju uzeću feminističke, pro-feminističke i ženske performanse tokom i od osamdesetih i devedesetih godina. Tu mislim na radove kao što su performansi Orlan³¹, video/foto i plesno/perfomans radovi i instalacije Katarzyne Kozyre³², internet-performansi Avatar Body Collision sa Helen Varley Jamieson (ili njen samostalan rad)³³, kao i nešto raniji radovi Rachel Rosenthal³⁴, Ane Mendieta³⁵ itd. U tom slučaju, možemo sa (priličnom) sigurnošću reći da oni jesu nastali u kontekstu uspostavljenih feminističkih i rodničkih teorija društva, kulture i, zatim, izvođačkih umetnosti³⁶. Ta (prilična) sigurnost se zasniva na referencama i konceptima sa kojima ovi radovi operišu, a koji su inicijalno i odredljivi i određeni u terminima i kontekstima tih, feminističkih i rodničkih teorija. Ali, to njihovo ‘operisanje’ ne govori samo o nastajanju tih radova u tom teorijskom kontekstu – kao da je

taj kontekst nešto što je njima spoljašnje – već govori i o tome da su te reference i koncepti za njih konstitutivni. Drugim rečima, oni jesu njihovi umetnički problemi a ne samo problemi njihovih naknadnih teoretizacija. Ta(kva) umetnička problematika nam dozvoljava da u ovim slučajevima, sa (priličnom) sigurnošću, govorimo o konstitutivnom uokviravanju umetničke produkcije kroz teoretizaciju.

Slično se može uočiti u procesima realizacije postmodernih ‘kulturnih’, često ‘autobiografskih’³⁷, performansa u SAD i Zapadnoj Evropi, koji prvenstveno rade sa pitanjima i konstrukcijama kulturnih (rodnih, rasnih, seksualnih, etničkih, posebnih itd) identiteta savremenog subjekta.³⁸ Oni se jasno zasnivaju u kontekstima studija kulture i američke (uglavnom akademske) proto-postmoderne (šeknerovske) i postmoderne (*TDRove*, *PAJove*, *Carlsonove*...) teorije performansa. Ne samo da im taj teorijski okvir obezbeđuje interpretativnu i kontekstualizujuću platformu za artikulacije i društveno-kulturna pozicioniranja, već im on daje i korpus *umetničkih* koncepata, problema i procedura koji postaju bitni i konstitutivni za same te umetničke paradigme.

Ovaj proces je prepoznatljiv i u mnogim drugim ili specifičnijim savremenim izvođačkim matricama kao što su: multi-, inter- i trans-kulturalno pozorište i ples (ODIN teatret, Piter Brook, Joe Chaikin, Akhram Khan Company); *gay* (Tim Miller, Bob Flanagan, Ron Athey, Franko B) i lezbejski (Annie Sprinkle, Ursula Martinez) performans; tehno- performans i ples (Stelarc, Orlan, Athey, Kathleen Rogers, James Turrel, Yann Marussich); internet- teatar, ples i opera (Desktop theater, Avatar Body Collision, ABC experiment, Hamnet players, Igor Štromajer); itd.

Transferi. Međutim, iako se ovaj model teoretizacije može smatrati paradigmatskim za izvođenje savremene teorije izvođačkih umetnosti, postoje i drugačiji slučajevi. Radi se o umetničkim reakcijama, otporima i prodorima u teoriju, u kojima umetničku praksu ne možemo (ne-nasilno, u kategorijama te prakse i ne-teoricistički) jednoznačno odrediti konstitutivnim uokviravanjem iz savremenih teorija izvođačkih umetnosti kroz proces teoretizacije. Uz to, dodatnu tenziju u izvođenje teoretizacije može uneti i proizvodnja opiruće teorije iz izvođačkih umetnosti.

Na taj način možemo razmatrati npr. savremeni konceptualni ples, tzv. *think-dance*, koji izvode koreografi i izvođači Jérôme Bel, Xavier Le Roy, Tino Sehgal, Boris Charmatz, Thomas Plischke, Mårten Spångberg, Thomas Lehmen itd.³⁹ Ako govorimo o konceptualnom plesu, mi ne možemo tako jednoznačno (kao u gore navedenim slučajevima) da odredimo njegov teorijski okvir niti konstituišuću ulogu određene aktuelne teorije izvođačkih umetnosti. Ova izvođačka praksa svakako jeste odredljiva u kategorijama određenih teorija kulture i društva (radi se pre svega o kasnom poststrukturalizmu, dekonstrukciji,

neomaterijalizmu, različitim institucionalnim teorijama, teorijama tela i biopolitici) koje čine njen relativni okvir/kontekst. Međutim, u okviru same ove umetničke prakse postoji zahtev da njena konceptualizacija i kontekstualizacija iz tih teorijskih okvira – onako kako su oni uspostavljeni u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti – nije dovoljna (ili: nije dovoljno precizna i instrumentalna) da je artikuliše u njenim sopstvenim bazičnim terminima. Drugim rečima, sada je potrebno koncipirati i izvesti jednu novu teoriju izvođačkih umetnosti, koja će se suočiti sa praksom konceptualnog plesa, ali i sa njegovom veoma razvijenom teorijom iz umetnosti koja se ne uklapa u izgrađene sisteme izvođačkih teorija.⁴⁰

Slična tenzija se može uočiti/zaključiti i npr. u procesu teoretizacije umetničkog rada Workcenter of Jerzy Grotowski and Thomas Richards i njegovih projekata *Actions*..⁴¹ Ova izvođačka praksa takođe nije striktno uokvirena i konstituisana postojećim teorijama izvođačkih umetnosti, kao što su političko-istorijski teatrološki pristupi koji bi da je postave kao kasni izdanak neoavangarde na poznatoj ‘liniji Grotowskog’, ali i savremene multi- i inter-kulturalne teorije izvođačkih umetnosti koje bi da je jednostavno smeste u isti paket sa pozorišnom antropologijom za koju već postoji razvijen teorijski okvir u svetu izvođačkih umetnosti. Ne samo da ona u tom smislu nije striktno uokvirena i konstituisana, već se autori koji je realizuju (Thomas Richards, Mario Biagini) i eksplicitno i artikulirano opiru tim teorijskim ‘ponudama’..⁴² Itd, itd.

+1.4 PRIVREMENO ZAKOČENI ZUPČANICI: još o otporu i trenju u procesu teoretizacije

Ono na šta sam, pre svega, htela ukažem ovim razmatranjima procesa izvođenja teoretizacije jeste da se to izvođenje ne ostvaruje: ni odnosom umetnost→teorija u kojem su umetnost i teorija umetnosti nezavisni, autonomni entiteti, pa autentična umetnost nastaje u ‘slobodnoj zoni’ pred-teorijskog, a teorija je njen naknadni i usko-zavisni ‘dodatak’; niti odnosom teorija→umetnost u kojem umetnička produkcija učestvuje kao pasivni objekt, podatan sigurnoj, stabilnoj i statičnoj teoretizaciji. Namera tih problematizacija je bila da, putem njih, ekspliciram da je dinamična tenzija transfera-kontratransfera ključno ‘*stanje*’ izvođenja teoretizacije umetnosti koje ne ide glatko, bez otpora i trenja. Naprotiv, umesto ‘glatkog’ jednosmernog i jednoznačnog odnosa teorije i umetnosti u procesu teoretizacije, u pitanju su *odnosi*; a ti su odnosi promenljivi i višeznačni i postoje samo kao pojedinačni slučajevi izvođenja.

Ovo je naročito važno kada govorimo o teorijama izvođačkih umetnosti, jer kod njih ta hrapava materijalna procesualnost izvođenja nije tako eksplicitna kao u slučaju teorija iz i teorija u izvođačkim umetnostima, i posebno jer se one izvode u najvećoj blizini tradicionalnih drugostepenih diskursa umetnosti ali se od njih veoma razlikuju. (Taj mali razmak je razlučujući.)

+1.n KRITIČKA STANICA LETA LECTURE MACHINE: izvođenje-i-moć

Pitanje koje ovde ostaje otvoreno jeste: da li je ova rasprava zapravo dekonstrukcija ili apologija nestabilnom teorijskom izvođenju i njegovom performativno-aformativnom fragilnom subjektu? Odnosno: koliko ona reprodukuje jednu aktuelnu društvenu paradigmu (*performance*) a koliko joj se opire (neproizvedeći a obećavajući proizvod/ni rezultat/ i iscrpljujući se sva u /pro/izvođenju)? Ako ova rasprava, kao jedan let *lecture machine*, jeste reprodukcija te paradigme, da li nešto igra to što ona nije i ne može biti mašina *Challenger* nego jedino *Sputnik*-u-tranziciji? A, ako je ona otpor (proizvodnji produkta za razmenu /komunikaciju/ i potrošnju /uživanje/), da li je ili nije taj otpor samo željeni luksuz beskorisnog utroška sredstava za proizvodnju i rada/energije?⁴³ (Pomislite samo na 'barokni' potez od 1759-2003. koji sam htela da izvedem rigorozno ili na onih 50ak utrošenih bibliografskih referenci.) ...Ili je baš to (sâmo izvođenje) novi konzumacijski proizvod – postpostinformatički? *Perform or Else*: iritirajući ultimativni imperativ *Izvedi!* – ili – šta je to *U protivnom* na ovom prebrisanom postsocijalističkom terenu?

Bilješke

- 1 Ovakvim izborom predmeta i metode eksplicitno referiram na studiju Jon McKenzie, *Perform or Else: from discipline to performance*, Routledge, London, New York, 2001. Dalje se na nju neću pozivati sem kad je neophodno jer, mada ovaj tekst jeste njeno svojevrsno 'proigravanje', on se može pratiti i samostalno, tj. bez tih referenci.
- 2 Vid. u kontekstu toga o kriterijumu 'slobode', koja od XVIII veka (p)ostaje privilegija umetnosti, dok se nauke zasnivaju kao čvršći i formalniji sistemi saznanja u Michael Root, *Philosophy of Social Science*, Blackwell, Oxford, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1993, 1 The liberal idea, str. 10-12. Vid. i Burginovu 'ideološku genezu' moderne umetnosti i njenih drugostepenih diskursa u Victor Burgin, »The End of Art Theory«, u *The End of Art Theory – Criticism and Postmodernism*, Humanities Press International INC, Atlantic Highlands NJ, 1987, str. 140-204
- 3 Ovo određenje znači njihovo sistemsko uspostavljanje kao specifičnih disciplina a ne osporava i 'raniji život' ovih diskursa, koji se u različitim vidovima odvija još od antičkog doba: npr. izučavanje teatra i muzike od Platonove *Države*, teorijska dramaturgija od Aristotelove *Poetike*, muzikologija kroz razvoj muzike kao nauke od Plotina itd.
- 4 Tačnije, prvu poznatu kritiku je napisao La Font de Saint-Yenne 1747, ali je trivijalna pa se Diderot najčešće uzima kao prvi kritičar: po Lionelo Venturi, »Kritika u Francuskoj. Saloni...«, u *Istorija umetničke kritike*, Kultura, Beograd, 1963, str. 139-143
- 5 Prema Dragan Klaić, Pozorište – 4000 godina, Nezavisna izdanja Slobodana Mašića, Beograd, 1989, str. 055
- 6 Prema Nikola Batušić, *Uvod u teatrologiju*, Grafički zavod hrvatske, Zagreb, 1991, Što je teatrologija?, Obrisi povjesti struke, str. 22-31
- 7 Prema Guido Adler, »The scope, method and aim of musicology« (1885), u *Music in European thought 1851-1912*, Bojan Buijić (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, str. 348-345
- 8 Prema Dušan Stojanović, »Misao stara sedam decenija: film«, u *Teorija filma*, Nolit, Beograd, 1978, str. 15-24.
- 9 Up. koncept »predavačke mašine« (eng. *lecture machine*) u *Perform or Else*, Introduction, 0. Challenges, str. 1-27
- 10 Vid. i Miško Šuvaković, *Diskurzivne analize; Uvod u estetiku, filozofiju umetnosti, nauku o umetnosti i teoriju umetnosti*, Beograd, 2001, rukopis, Deo I: Teorijske discipline u i o umetnosti, 1. Estetika, i 4. Nauke o umetnosti
- 11 Temeljne analize i rasprave tradicionalne i različitih savremenih kritika vid. u Filiberto Menna, »Kritika kritike«, *Dometi*, br. 7-8-9, 1981, str. 51-81, i »Kritika kritike«, *Dometi*, br. 9-10, 1984, str. 47-63; i »The End of Art Theory«
- 12 Vid. *Kritičke eseje*, 1966; »Kritika i istina«, u Rolan Bart, *Književnost, mitologija, semiologija*, str. 191-215
- 13 Vid. »Istorija ili književnost«, u *Književnost, mitologija, semiologija*, str. 127
- 14 Vid. Germano Celant, »Per una critica acritica«, *NAC*, br. 1, Milan, oktobar 1970; i Ješa

- Denegri, »Germano Celant i problem akritičke kritike«, *Izraz*, br. 4-5, Sarajevo, 1972, str. 380-385
- 15 Vid. Joseph Kosuth: *Art After Philosophy and After – Collected Writings*, 1966-1990, Gabriele Guercio (ed), The MIT Press, Cambridge Mass, 1991.
 - 16 Vid. Akile Bonito Oliva, *Priručnik za letenje*, Svetovi, Novi Sad, 1994.
 - 17 Up. Paul de Man, »The Resistance of Theory«, u *The Continental Aesthetics Reader*, Clive Cazeaux (ed), Routledge, London and New York, 2000, str. 429-444
 - 18 Vid. Partick Ffrench, *The Time of Theory; A History of Tel Quel (1960-1983)*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995.
 - 19 Vid. Charles Harrison & Fred Orton, *A Provisional History of Art&Language*, Editions E. Fabre, Paris, 1982; Charles Harrison, *Essays on Art&Language*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991; i Miško Šuvaković, »Art&Language«, u *Konceptualna umetnost*, SKC, Beograd, (u pripremi) 2003
 - 20 O »teorijskom objektu« vid. Yve-Alain Bois, Denis Hollier & Rosalind Krauss, »A Conversation with Hubert Damisch«, *October*, no. 85, Cambridge Ma, Summer 1998, str. 3-19
 - 21 Ovo ne znači da, kao Burgin, savremenu umetničku praksu posmatram kao teorijsku, već da se u specifičnim slučajevima savremene umetnosti realizuje ovakva teorijska praksa.
 - 22 Kontekstualizacija i intertekstualizam nisu isto, tj. kontekstualizacija ne znači uvek intertekstualnu kontekstualizaciju, ali u savremenim teorijama kontekstualizacija dela je upravo njegovo intertekstualno umrežavanje – a ne određenje jednog dela/teksta okružujućim ne-tekstualnim kontekstom, pa su ovde to sinonimi.
 - 23 Vid. početak teksta Robert Stecker, »Interpretation«, u *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, Berys Gaut & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds), Routledge, London and New York, 2002, Part 2 Aesthetic theory, str. 239
 - 24 Pojam 'bliskog čitanja' je preuzet iz teorije američke nove kritike i primenjen na modernistički centrirane teoretizacije umetničkog dela u različitim teorijama umetnosti. Vid. Vladimir Biti, *Pojmovnik suvremene književne i kulturne teorije*, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb, 2000, Čitanje, Nova kritika, i Znanost o književnosti, str. 49, 339, i 581
 - 25 Ovakav pristup je problem koji ne mogu uvek da prevaziđu ni teorijske rasprave pisane sa poststrukturalističkih stanovišta, npr. sa stanovišta dekonstrukcije. Vid. o tome Elionor Fuchs, »Presence and the Revenge of Writing – Re-thinking Theatre After Derrida«, *PAJ* no. 26-27, New York, 1985, str. 163-173
 - 26 Vid. o tome i još o izloženoj koncepciji teorijske interpretacije, Robert Stecker, »Interpretation«, u *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, str. 239-252. Napominjem da se njegova rasprava odnosi na estetičku teoriju, s tim što u tom kontekstu savremena estetika uglavnom znači savremenu teoriju umetnosti u smislu u kojem je ovde postavljam.
 - 27 Vid. i David Carroll, *Paraesthetics, Foucault – Lyotard – Derrida*, Methuen, New York, 1987.
 - 28 Vid. »Interpretation«; a zatim i npr. »The End of Art Theory«; Filiberto Menna, »Kritika kritike«, *Dometi*, br. 7-8-9, i »Kritika kritike«, *Dometi*, br. 9-10; i *Diskurzivne analize...*, 3. Teorija umetnosti
 - 29 Up. Julia Kristeva, »Modern Theatre Does Not Take (a) Place«, u *Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime*; Timothy Murray (ed), The University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2000, str. 277-282
 - 30 Ovo ne osporava Dantoovu koncepciju sveta umetnosti (vid. Arthur Danto, »Artworld«, u *Philosophy Looks At the Arts*, Joseph Margolis (ed), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1987, str. 155-167) već njeno redukovano tumačenje o prvenstvu određenog teorijskog umetničkog okvira nad umetničkom praksom. Ukazujem da je umetnost (naročito savremena) nekad brža i spremnija da prepozna, artikuliše i upotrebi okružujuće (kulturne, društvene i šire teorijske) diskurse od same teorije izvođačkih umetnosti.
 - 31 Vid. www.orlan.net; i Kate Ince, *Orlan – Millennial Female*, Berg, Oxford, 2000.
 - 32 Vid. www.kozyra.org, i *Katarzyna Kozyra*, katalog za izložbu u Umjetničkom paviljonu, Zagreb, 29. 03-22. 04. 2001, Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, Zagreb, 2001.
 - 33 Vid. www.abcxperiment.org; www.avatarbodycollision.org; i www.creative-catalyst.com
 - 34 Vid. *Rachel Rosenthal*, Moira Roth (ed), The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London, 1997; i www.rachelrosenthal.org
 - 35 Vid. »Ana Mendieta«, u *Women Artists in the 20th and 21st Century*, Uta Grosenick (ed), Taschen, Köln, 2001, str. 342-347; www.artcyclopedia.com/artists/mendieta_ana.html; i www.hungryflower.com/leorem/mendieta.html
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 - 37 Vid. npr. Louise Steinman, »The Storyteller«, u *The Knowing Body – The Artist as Storyteller in Contemporary Performance*, North Atlantic Books, Berkeley Cal, 1995, str. 103-144
 - 38 Primere tih radova vid. u npr. Marvin Carlson, *Performance; A Critical Introduction*, Routledge, London and New York, 1999; i Mark Fortier, *Theatre/Theory; An Introduction*, Routledge, London, New York, 2001.
 - 39 Vid. npr. »Novi ples/nove teorije« (temat), *TkH*, br. 4, Beograd, 2002, naročito »Dosije – Jérôme Bel, Xavier Le Roy«, Bojana Cvejić i Ana Vujanović (prir), str. 94-122
 - 40 Vid. npr. Xavier Le Roy, »Self-Interview, 27. 11. 2000«, *TkH*, br. 4, str. 106-114
 - 41 »About Workcenter Jerzy Grotowski and Thomas Richards«, programski tekst Centra, rukopis
 - 42 Vid. naročito jasno u Chantal Boiron, »Grotowski was the passage which enabled me to find something which was within me« – interview to Thomas Richards, *UBU, Scènes d'Europe/European Stages*, no. 19, November 2000.
 - 43 (Jer: otkud inače tom teorijskom izvođenju dominacija nad celokupnim aktuelnim Zapadnim/Globalnim znanjem?)

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2001-2002, with Marko Peljhan; Slovene pavilion at 49th Venice Biennial, 2001, curated by Aurora Fonda). In 2002 she has participated at the Curatorial Training Programme at De Appel Foundation in Amsterdam, where she co-curated the final project of the programme, 'Haunted by Detail'. In 2002, she co-founded the label for experimental electronic music, 'rx:tx' (within the frame of the art organisation Projekt Atol). In 2004 she organized together with Gregor Podnar the conference about cultural policies and art market in Central and South Eastern Europe (Museum of Modern Art and Škuc Gallery, Ljubljana). Since 2002 she is a member of the jury for intermedia arts at the Ministry of Culture of Republic of Slovenia, since 2004 the jury's president. Since 2000 she is a member of the Slovene Society of Aesthetics and since 2004 a member of the Slovenian section of AICA. In 2005 she was nominated for the 3rd Lorenzo Bonaldi Art Prize (at Museum Gamec, Bergamo) for young international curators. She currently works within the curatorial assistance for the 4th Berlin Biennial with an Ifa-Rave scholarship, and is pursuing her Master studies at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris.

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