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Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe

Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
Publication of this book is financed by the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and the East East: Partnership Beyond Borders Program (Open Society Foundations).

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Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe

Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-) Transitional Societies

Edited by
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Institute for International Relations
Zagreb, 2011
# Contents

**Foreword** .................................................................................................................................................................................. 3

**PART ONE**
**HISTORIES, MEMORIES AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES**

*Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective*  
Andrea Komlosy and Hannes Hofbauer .......................................................... 11

*Cultural policies, identities and monument building in Southeastern Europe*  
Milena Dragičević Šešić .......................................................................................... 31

*Performing identities - national theatres and the re-construction of identities in Slovenia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*  
Aldo Milohnić ........................................................................................................ 47

*Culture of trauma and identity politics - critical frames and emancipatory lenses of cultural and knowledge production*  
Jasmina Husanović .................................................................................................. 61

**PART TWO**
**COMMUNICATION, MEDIA AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES**

*Erased languages, aroused alliances - language policy and post-Yugoslav political and cultural configurations in Slovenia*  
Brankica Petković .................................................................................................... 71

*How social media enforce glocalization – the processes of identity change in selected Central and Southeast European countries*  
Paško Bilić ............................................................................................................... 85

*How modern technology shape-shifts our identity*  
Vladimir Davčev ...................................................................................................... 101

*Cultural identities in Southeastern Europe - a post-transitional perspective*  
Nada Švob-Đokić .................................................................................................... 113
PART THREE
PRODUCTIVITY, CREATIVITY AND UNSTABLE IDENTITIES

Cultural identities from the bottom up
– labour relations perspective
Maja Breznik ................................................................. 127

From productivity to creativity – the role of art collectives in solving
the contradictions of the transitional period
Sezgin Boynik ................................................................. 141

Culture of hits vs. culture of niches – cultural industries and processes
of cultural identification in Croatia
Jaka Primorac ................................................................. 149

Repetition of difference – search for unstable identity
Svetlana Racanović .......................................................... 163

Report on the conference “Questioning Transitional Dynamics
in Re-defining Cultural Identities in Southeastern Europe”,
15-16 January 2011, Ljubljana, Slovenia (Jaka Primorac) ..................... 167

Notes on the authors .......................................................... 175
FOREWORD
The redefinition of cultural identities has been an important constituent of the transition processes in all countries of Southeastern Europe (SEE). The interest in cultural and national identities in SEE was particularly strong and very openly pronounced during the 1990s. The search for cultural and national identities and their very dynamic changes in the last decade of the 20th century have become crucial for the establishment of the new states, as well as for the systemic transformation and transition from socialism to capitalism.

However, like the transition itself, the identity changes have not been rationalized or explained through some theoretical context. Especially in the case of the former Yugoslavia they were influenced by the political (ideological) and legal interpretations of citizenship, political and economic transitions, cultural changes that particularly promoted nationalistic approaches, political clashes, ethnic conflicts and wars, state building procedures and the establishment of nation states.

In such a context the notions of national and cultural identities have been intertwined, mixed and marginalized or directly misused in political discourse and cultural life. It was forgotten that they may encompass different values, that they may have different meanings, that they may have been developed from different anthropological and political/social backgrounds, and, last but not least, that different nations may share some common histories and memories.
In this region, new states have been established and social and economic systems are being radically changed. Now, in the post-transitional perspective, an unstable terminology and a search for “flexible” approaches still characterize the cultural identification processes that may be gaining ground over the previous stress on national identification. It seems that the understanding of cultures and their social roles has been slowly moving from orientation to political and ideological issues to a multilayer cultural identification closer to the understanding of culture as a general human “know-how” that involves historical contexts, similar values, collective memories and other aspects that need not be limited to ethnic origins and social or geographical belonging. Cultural identity resides in the interpretation of culture as a system of values that is in principle open to communication and exchange. It is therefore flexible and changeable itself. Cultural identities function as general backgrounds and thus provide a set of values that an individual or a group may establish, develop and reinterpret as their own. This presupposed move towards more flexible and open interpretation of cultural identification may be a valuable subject for further research in the context of the transitional social changes in the Southeast European region.

The transitional interplay of cultural and national identities intervenes in the character of both and designs their relationships. After the dominant shock of nationalism and national identification in the last decade of the 20th century, it seems that national identities have gradually been overshadowed by new cultural values and more open cultural communication. It could be said that, in the context of post-transitional developments, individual and collective identification may proceed towards standpoints that are trans- and intercultural, more tolerant and based on the acceptance of cultural diversities, cultural democratization and the professionalization of cultural production. In this respect the key positions of artists and authors necessitates “a more propulsive social role of intelligentsia” (Maja Breznik) and radical reforms of cultural systems. In the regional frameworks this is reflected as an increased cultural tolerance and the overall democratization of cultural relationships, but also as a proportionally decreased cultural communication that has become almost exclusively oriented to European cultural settings and is strongly supported by efforts invested in the Europeanization of the Southeast European countries.

Any attempt to “Europeanize” societies in this region should include the knowledge and discussion of cultural identities. The information about existing approaches and attitudes coming from different sources may be illustrative in this respect.

For instance, in a recent research conducted on representative samples in several SEE countries, approximately 40% of respondents in Serbia and Macedonia stated that “their own culture and tradition are endangered by influences of values coming from European countries”.\(^1\) Regional and cultural identities are relatively dynamic social phenomena,

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as demonstrated in the same research. While two thirds of respondents in Macedonia expressed their belonging to the Balkan region, only one third of respondents in Serbia opted for that kind of regional identification. Even in Istria, which is known as a multiculturally and ethnically mixed peninsula, similar research showed that only a quarter of respondents (from Slovenian Istria) think that a “common culture of Slovenian Istria” exists.\(^2\) Thus, both Europeanization and regionalization processes in SEE raise an important research question: do these processes (significantly) influence the possible redefinition and reconstruction of cultural identities in the direction of ethnically and nationally non-exclusivist cultures?

In the field of cultural production, heterogeneity of cultural identities in SEE is not generated only in relation to “national cultures” but also in relation to specific segments of these cultures. An illustrative example might be ex-Yugoslav neo avant-garde art practices from the late 1960s and early 1970s and alternative culture from the 1980s. These predominantly amateur art and cultural practices have developed their identities in opposition to the presupposed professionalism of the then cultural elite. Their amateurism was not a bad copy of professional art practices; it was not about mimicking elite culture in the sense of the dilettante actor, musician or painter. It was rather about radical intervention in the cultural, social and political spheres of Yugoslav society. Possible examples of this kind of alternative culture in cultural production in the former Yugoslavia between the 1960s and 1980s are, for instance, punk music and experimental 16mm film production in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as alternative video production in the 1980s, neo avant-garde theatre and radical performances, alternative theoretical production and similar. Nowadays the picture is quite different: previous “radical amateurism” has been significantly professionalized through the process of so-called “NGOization” of voluntary work. This process of professionalization, typically represented by the non-governmental organization (NGO) cultural sphere, has created a relatively new context not only in terms of cultural production, but also in terms of cultural preferences and identification of its audiences. Not only do these processes in the cultural NGO sphere require an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, but also contemporary socio-economic trends in general. Identity politics are interconnected with labour relations within various productive units (such as factories, newspapers, universities or theatres) which determine workers’ life strategies and identity orientations, but it holds true also vice versa.

Social and cultural aspects of the investment policies in the context of Europeanization of the former socialist countries have provoked some interest among researchers of social and economic histories\(^3\) but only a sporadic response from researchers in the

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\(^2\) “National and Cultural Identity in the Area of Slovene-Italian Cultural Contact in European Integration Processes”, in: *Kulturna identiteta Istre (Cultural Identity of Istria)*, Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 2008.

\(^3\) E.g., Hannes Hofbauer, *Osterweiterung: Vom Drang nach Osten zur peripheren EU-Integration*, 2003; Detlef Pollack et al., *Values Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions –*
domains of cultural sociology, cultural policy analysis or cultural studies. Statistical data, on the other hand, indicate significant correlations between economic expansion and traditional cultural ties among the countries involved. For instance, Austria is the largest foreign investor in Slovenia and one of the most important investors in SEE. The largest part of Slovenian foreign investment goes to Serbia and a significant part (one sixth) of Slovenian exports goes to SEE. As stressed in a book on cultural identities of the Western Balkans/SEE recently published by the Peace Institute Ljubljana, “the contemporary political reality of Europe is characterized by incessant attempts to link the political and economic integration of Europe with the cultural aspect of Europeanism”.

Cultural changes in the SEE cultures – as part of rather complex social, economic and political changes in transitional countries of the SEE region – encompass reformulation of cultural values, modernization of cultural practices and cultural identities, and growth of cultural productions, as well as increased cultural communication and exchange, particularly in the regional and European contexts. It might be that such changes are reflected in the supposed redefinition and reconstruction of cultural identities and in a new social role for cultures that increasingly stand for cultural creativity and interaction, rather than for the representation of national values. The nature and outcomes of these transitions are maybe felt in everyday life and practices, but they still remain only partly visible in research and analysis of cultural identification. A reliable theoretical account of transitional changes and of cultural transition practices is indeed needed in all SEE cultures, both at the national and regional levels. The time span of about fifteen to twenty-five years of different cultural practices makes the concentration on cultural identity issues possible and theoretically justifiable. The (re)modelled contexts of cultural identities oscillate among Europeanization, globalization, regionalization and nationalism, but also include balancing between regional cultural heritage and innovative modernity, supported, in particular, by new technologies and increasingly dynamic cultural communication.

The texts published in this book discuss the three main contextual formats that position the processes of identity redefinition: I – Histories, memories and national identities, II – Communication, media and cultural identities, and III – Productivity, creativity and unstable identities. They have all been developed following the fruitful discussions at the Conference on Questioning Transitional Dynamics in Redefining Cultural Identities in Southeastern Europe, held in Ljubljana, on the 15 and 16 January 2011 and presented here in a short report by Jaka Primorac.

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This project is supported by the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana (on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research) and the Open Society Foundations East East Partnership Beyond Borders Program. It is implemented through the partnership between the Peace Institute, Ljubljana, the Institute for International Relations, Zagreb, the University of Arts, Belgrade, and the Department of Social and Economic History at the University of Vienna, Vienna. We hope that it shows how the regional frameworks are influencing the processes of cultural reidentification in SEE and demonstrates the trends that have emerged out of the systemic transitional processes.

Nada Švob-Đokić and Aldo Milohnić

Zagreb, April 2011
PART ONE

Histories, memories and national identities
Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective

Andrea Komlosy and Hannes Hofbauer

Abstract
After the dissolution and destruction of Yugoslavia with its historical cut-off point of 1991 and the successive wars throughout the 1990s, new identities are being sought in the region. Like every cultural and social process this identity construction is exposed to economic and (geo) political rationalities and pressures. They come from inside as well as from outside. In a historical perspective this can be seen clearer than from a contemporary view.

Already the naming of the region reflects the interaction of internal and external factors in a (post) transitional situation. Therefore at the beginning we discuss the terms “Balkan” and “Southeastern Europe”.

The Austrian advance in the region went hand in hand with the step-by-step withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire. The late 19th century with the Berlin Congress (1878) and the end of the administrative particularity of the Vojna Krajina (1881) mark a new period. We study the history of Austrian interests in the Balkans since then. The Vidovdan of 1914 and its geopolitical outcome put an end to Vienna’s advances, at least for a while. In 1941 the Austrians came again, this time in German uniforms helping to divide the region into sections according to the needs of the “Grossraum”. Fifty years later (1991), after the remnants of post-Tito Yugoslavia fell apart, it was Austrian politics and economic interests which heavily intervened in the region, thereby accelerating the disintegration. We discuss the background, personalities and importance of this development.

Keywords: Balkan region, Austria, identity construction, historical representations
The historical cut-off point of 1991 is the starting point of our discourse. The dissolution of Yugoslavia provoked new geopolitical, social and national orientations among the different communities and regions within the European order and questions were also asked from a cultural point of view. New identities were looked for and discovered. This “identity building” followed internal and external logics and pressures, all of them underlined by historical reasoning trying to prove the validity of a single ethnic, national identity.

The process of dissolution and destruction of Yugoslavia was driven by local elites looking for a means to escape the consequences of an economic breakdown. These internal forces were present in virtually all six Yugoslav republics. Some of them were supported by external interests and this accelerated the crisis towards a catastrophe. The more and stronger a united Germany (backed by Austria) supported the Catholic and, later, the Muslim secessionist movements in the respective republics, the more the economic and geopolitical logic of this external force entered into the inner processes of “identity building” within Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. The term “nation building”, as it was (re)invented at the beginning of the 1990s following historical patterns from the second half of the 19th century, already explains the direction in which the planned cultural foundation of the respective societies was heading: national identity based on ethnic definitions was required instead of social and political identity. In this respect the nationalist movements in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia (including the Kosovo Albanian population), Bosnia and Herzegovina (including its Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian populations) and Macedonia became influential in all ethnic groups, while later even Montenegro followed once again the model of “identity building” as has been prescribed by the bourgeois societies since the French and the German revolutions and copied by national liberation movements in the Balkans in the second half of the 19th century.

Space and naming of the region

The geography of the region we are dealing with is defined by the circumstances mentioned above. Historically this space can be roughly described in an ethnic and language sense as south-Slavic, at least as far as the majority of the people were concerned. Besides this south-Slavic majority the region is (or was) populated by Albanians, Germans, Italians, Magyars and Turks, as well as some smaller minorities.

The naming of the region we deal with resembles in itself a political confession. “Yugoslavia” no longer exists as a state and therefore the use of the term would be politically nostalgic and is no longer practical. “Southeastern Europe” is a frequently used term nowadays for the region, and this was invented in the 19th century to replace the term “European Turkey” (Geier, 2006). Today it is again being implemented by Western political scientists and predominantly used by the West European political class and its allies in the region. This term should serve to make people forget the ethnic, national and religious wars on distribution and deployment of economic means in the 1990s.
“Southeastern Europe” tries to use an external perception of a construction of the post-war region within an internal reality. In a historical perspective this is pernicious. We must not forget that it was German and Austrian politics in the 1990s arguing, with the concept of “national self-determination”, in support of the north-western, richer republics in their fight for secession and independence. The shift from the term “national self-determination” towards “Southeastern Europe” says quite a lot about foreign interests in the region. To destroy the multi-ethnic, south-Slavic construction of “Yugoslavia”, self-determination was defined as “national” by the local elites and their German and Austrian supporters. After the new “nation building” was completed, the term “national” acquired a negative image. To now name the region using a geographic construction – “Southeastern Europe” – is to use a (re)invented term, which nowadays connects the peripheral states in the south-east to the project of the “European Union”. Its enlargement in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 2004 (Slovenia, Poland, Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, the three Baltic states, (Greek) Cyprus and Malta) and 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) led to a monopolization of the term “Europe”, defining Europe as a part or a future part of the “European Union”. With this in mind we find many reasons to reject this heavily ideologized term.

“Balkan” is a fuzzy word with a strong historical burden. Geographically it designates a chain of mountains, but it has always meant more than that. The roots of the term are Turkish and include the words “blood” (kan) and “honey” (bal) and thereby mystify the name of the region in a way that the term is not understood by native speakers. An exhibition curated by Harald Szeemann in an art museum near Vienna in 2003 played with this ambiguity. “Balkan” had a negative connotation representing “backwardness” and at the same time legitimizing those powers who intervened in the name of modernization and civilization (Todorova, 1997). The term reminds one of Ottoman interests in the region which may have some weak potential to be revived nowadays. There are two factors that make us opposed to the use of this term in our context: firstly, the fact that the “Bulgarian question”, which is at the centre of any definition of the Balkans, is excluded from our debate and, secondly, the fact that Slovenia and Croatia were neither geographically nor historically part of the “Balkan region” except in the 20th century when both regions took part in the Yugoslav state project. This alone shows the importance of what cultural scientists call “mental mapping”, showing that identity is always related to the historic, social, economic and geopolitical context.

What convinces us nevertheless to use the term “Balkan” to describe the space we are dealing with is the historic continuity of external influence and interference throughout the centuries. The Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Empire (not to speak of Russian and British interests in the region) both fought for centuries for influence in the Balkans, by incorporating the region into their empires. “Balkan” qualifies as an appropriate term precisely because of its fuzziness in a period of time where territorialities and identities are not settled and new identities and territorialities are being sought. Therefore we decided to use “Balkan” as a flexible term with its advantage of being a historical expression and an actual counter-position towards the legitimization of new involvements in the region.
Key elements to approaching the question

Looking at foreign, namely Austrian, interests and involvement in the Balkans in a historical perspective in connection with the question of identity construction, it is clear that cultural identity is never constructed once and for all, but always reflects concrete historical spheres of interest, alliances and requirements. Identity changes along with changing power relationships. New geopolitical orders and alliances, and new states with new roles and functions inevitably lead to the search for new identities and orientations.

As socio-economic processes form the basis and interact with political and cultural relations, they have to be included in our analysis of identity construction.

Manifestations of cultural identities can be seen in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. They can reflect a dynastic understanding based on a multi-ethnic or multicultural diversity (the case of the Austrian and the Ottoman empires) or aim at ethnic and cultural homogenization (as in Hungary and the national liberation movements in Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire). Conversely, they can reflect social or national definitions of identity, to be realized through reform or revolutionary change. Feeling European requires a special geopolitical environment, such as feeling socialist or feeling Muslim. Some cultural feelings of identity are compatible, others contradict each other, but all of them are in constant movement, eventually changing eruptively.

In order to grasp identities, both inhabitants of the region and (foreign) rulers have to be taken into consideration, distinguishing between self-identification from below as well as identity constructions from above.

We are also looking at perceptions and constructions from outside, namely from the Austrian side. Direct foreign involvement necessarily creates a dependent administrative body and class with its own attitude to the respective foreign interest. But more than that, it may lead to a shift in cultural identity within the (colonial) administration and/or large parts of the society. In this case the consequence is a split society, as we have seen for centuries in the Balkans.

Social and national expressions of identity sometimes overlap; in other cases they stand against each other. In the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, we saw the ethnicization of social and economic problems. This ethnicization took place within the region and was used by foreign interests to accelerate the process of disintegration. Social tensions resulting from the economic crisis and uneven distribution were translated into ethnic conflicts, propagating inclusion and exclusion on ethnic terms as a solution for social problems.

Today, after the Yugoslav federation has definitely collapsed and the new states, or entities in the case of Bosnia, have been established based on ethnic separation, they face a new challenge, that is, “EU-Europeanization”, aimed at overcoming national identities by defining their place and future role on the periphery but within the framework of the enlarging European Union. New divisions will arise between those parts of the population who remain true to the principle of national self-determination and others who aim at overcoming nationalism in the name of European commitment.
New imperial setting after the Austro-Hungarian “Compromise”: 1878/1881

The years 1878 and 1881 demonstrate a cultural shift in the Austro-Hungarian advance in the Balkans. The Berlin Congress of 1878 was convened by the European great powers to correct the Treaty of San Stefano, where the Russian sphere of influence after the Russian-Turkish war had become unacceptably strong for Vienna and London. The Berlin Congress functioned as a European readjustment after the defeat and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from big parts of Southeastern Europe. It acknowledged the independence of those states which had seceded from the Ottoman Empire (Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria). Conversely, other regions and nations were exempted from state-building, and Ottoman domination was replaced by a Western European form in order to prevent the new nation states from becoming too strong and to prevent Russia, which was confirmed as a protective power for Orthodox believers, from becoming too influential. In this situation the Habsburg Empire was guaranteed occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas Great Britain took Cyprus and Tsarist Bessarabia also made territorial gains. Incidentally, 130 years after the congress, there is again no stability in all these three regions.

The year 1881 marks the end of a period which lasted 350 years starting with the “Acta confinis” as the beginning of the Habsburg military border with the Ottoman Empire. This “Vojna Krajina” was institutionalized in 1535 by King Ferdinand I, extended under the “Statuta Valachorum” by Emperor Ferdinand II in 1630, and reached its biggest extension in 1700, when 1.2 million inhabitants lived in its almost 50,000 square kilometres. From the Adriatic Sea along the Danube to Transylvania and the Carpathian mountains a strip 1,800 kilometres in length followed the rules of the “Konfán”/Vojna Krajina. This territory was directly administered by the Imperial Military Council (first in Graz, then in Vienna) without interference from local landowners, who lacked feudal authority over the population. The Vojna Krajina was mostly populated by Orthodox, “Pravoslav” emigrants, who had fled the Ottoman Empire during the centuries of Ottoman advance. They were entitled to live as “free peasants” and, in exchange, had to serve as soldiers not only against the Ottomans in the south but also in the Silesian and other wars. Their religious beliefs were tolerated by the authorities and the Vienna administration waived its endeavours for unification with Rome as it had done in other cases. In 1691, when a big group of Serbian emigrants settled in southern Hungary, a first Pravo-Slavic metropolis was established in Sremski Karlovci, representing the beginning of religious tolerance in the Catholic empire. Inner social and political contradictions quickly arose, when Catholic Croatian landowners and the Catholic Church tried to oppose the settlement of an Orthodox, Serbian population in the middle of their traditional sphere of influence. But the Viennese court rejected all these petitions and continued to privilege and also to use the Serbian “peasant soldiers”, at the same time working to minimize the influence of the local nobility. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 caused the abolition of the Vojna Krajina in 1881 when it was submitted to the Hungarian authorities ruling Croatia. The disappearance of the
remnants of the Vojna Krajina lasted another 114 years, till the descendants of the “free Serbian peasant soldiers” were expelled from the Knin region and Slavonia in 1995. In historical times, the identity of the peasant soldiers was primarily a religious, Orthodox one. A Serbian national identity started to develop only in the 19th century, when Austrian authorities sympathized with the Serbian national awakening, including the codification of the language, as a means of interfering with the destabilization process of the Ottoman Empire and with the self-understanding and self-definition of Serbian nationalism. Retrospectively, in the light of the interethnic contradictions in Yugoslavia, the Austrian Military Border was interpreted from a national perspective, which overshadowed and determined conflicts between central and provincial authorities, as well as between the national identities of Serbs and Croats. In other words, old differences were redefined along actual lines of conflict.

The second half of the 19th century was defined by multiple ethnic and language identities in the region, showing various combinations between religion, class, national identity and political loyalty (see Komlosy, 2006):

- in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire (Carniola, Goerz-Gradisca, the littoral with Istria and Trieste, Dalmatia, the Military Border/Vojna Krajina until 1881): German Austrians and other representatives and administrators of the dynasty and the Viennese government, Slovenes, Italians, Magyars, Croats, Serbs and Romanians;

- in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire: Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Germans and Muslims; since 1867, Hungarian representatives and administrators of the dynasty and the Budapest government;

- in Bosnia after 1878: Serbs, Muslims, Croats; representatives/administrators of the occupants;

- In Serbia: Serbs, Muslims;

- In Montenegro: Serbs;

- In the Ottoman Empire (with diminishing scope): representatives/administrators of the Ottoman dynasty and the authorities of Constantinople, Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians and Bulgarians.

For Austrian politics the total change of political power relations in 1878/1881 (Bosnia was submitted to Austria and the Vojna Krajina dissapeared as an administrative body) had two implications. The occupation, conquest, pacification and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a certain extent symbolized strength and geopolitical gains. This strength relied on the chance offered by the Western powers to take over the rule of Bosnia, while, formally, Ottoman sovereignty was maintained (until annexation in 1908). Austrian occupation faced severe resistance from the provincial Muslim elites, who involved the Habsburg troops in a heavy, colonial war, leading to their subordination
Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective

to Austrian rulers. After a short period the Habsburg colonial administration was able to present itself – at least at home and vis-à-vis the so-called international community – as a civilizing and modernizing force, gaining the support of Muslim elites not only by respecting their religion, but also by acknowledging their specific Bosniak nationality, combining Slavic language with Muslim belief. While Bosnia seemed to be a success story, the Compromise of 1867 with the Hungarian elites, who insisted on political autonomy for the lands of the Hungarian Crown, realized through the setting up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (also known as the Dual Monarchy or k.u.k. (kaiserlich und königlich) Monarchy), was a sign of internal weakness. After the settlement relating to the Dual Monarchy, the Hungarian government was free to pursue independent nationality policies within its sub-empire which contradicted the Austrian ones. While Austria relied on the multi-ethnic character of dynastic rule, Hungary aimed at national homogenization through Magyarization. In Croatia-Slavonia Hungarian centralization met Croatian resistance, opening the path to the Croatian Compromise (1868), which meant a strengthening of the Croatian elites.

Austrian geopolitical strength demonstrated through its expansion into Bosnia soon turned into a trap in an economic and political sense. Expensive infrastructural projects did not pay socially and politically. A consensus could not be reached with the Serbian population in Bosnia as it was defined dynastically under Habsburg rule. Already the Compromise with Hungary, which had to be re-negotiated every ten years, as well as German-Czech tensions in Bohemia and Moravia, fuelled by Czech disappointment at being denied regional autonomy for the lands of the Bohemian Crown, showed that Vienna was not able to solve national questions within the dynastic concept. So the year 1878 can also be seen as the year of birth of a national Serbian resistance movement against Austria-Hungary.

1914-1918: from “Sarajevo” to the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the rise of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SHS)

1914

The name of Gavrilo Princip for generations was used as the shortest way to take a stand on the involvement of Austrian interests in the Balkan region. It took 70 years following the attempt on the Habsburg heir, till the memory of Princip had turned symbolically from hero into murderer in Sarajevo. Collective identity changed and again took the ideological and historic parameters of the official Austrian position in the early 1990s.

The attack on Crown Prince Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, and its effects on the Austrian perception of Balkan nationalities, cannot be understood without its pre-history, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878) and its formal annexation in 1908. In spite of its doubtful economic benefit, Bosnia and Herzegovina was an important region for
the multicultural character of Habsburg rule, including the ranking of ethnic and religious groups with regard to their cultural proximity and political loyalty to the dynasty, to state unity and to state identity. German as well as Magyar liberal circles were opposed to the Bosnian extension not only because of the costs, but because it strengthened the Slavic character of the monarchy. Muslim Bosniaks were a product of the Habsburg administration, which directly and indirectly contributed to defining a Muslim Bosniak nationality, different from the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose national identities were backed by the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia and the Serbian state. Acknowledging Bosniaks not only as a religious, but a national identity, was helpful in integrating their elites into the imperial administration of the province. Initial resistance to occupation turned into more or less loyal cooperation. Croat and Serb national identities, interrelated through different Christian traditions, were generally acceptable. While the Catholic Croats were considered part of the leading imperial Catholic culture, with a strong commitment to the House of Habsburg, Orthodox Serbs became alienated in time. They had been reliable allies of the Catholic dynasty in those parts of the monarchy bordering the Ottoman Empire, and were compensated for their loyalty by receiving religious freedom long before “tolerance” was introduced at the end of the 18th century. When Serbs successfully escaped Ottoman domination and built a state, former collaborators turned into neighbours. With the help of some liberal intellectual Habsburg Serbs, Austria-Hungary was able to influence politics and identity construction in the early years of the Serbian state. Bosnia was to become “Austro-Hungarian” in order not to allow Serbia to expand. Nevertheless Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which was squeezed between Ottoman, Russian, Austrian and Western interests, became political allies, and the young Serbian state was economically dependent on Austria, symbolized by the Trade Agreement of 1881, which opened the Serbian market to Austrian industries in exchange for Serbian agrarian exports. Of Serbian exports, 87% were directed to Austria-Hungary, which made up for 67% of Serbia’s imports in these years (Hösch, 1993: 177). As soon as Habsburg aspirations in the Balkans became opposed to those of Serbia, which were aimed at the diversification of trade and industry, a neighbour turned into a – potential – enemy. The so called Pig War of 1906-1909 – an Austro-Hungarian embargo against Serbian exports, answered by high taxation on, as well as substitution of Austrian imports – symbolized the economic side of Austro-Serbian competition, and the First World War symbolized the political-military one. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 aggravated the antagonism.

German literature under the Habsburg administration shifted between portraying Bosnia and Herzegovina as a backward and miserable or a wild, colourful and exotic province, usually amalgamating both perceptions in an orientalizing – that is, Balkanizing – discourse (see Feichtinger, 2003; Hárs, 2006, especially the contribution of Ruther). While Bosniaks faced orientalization and Croats were seen as part of “us”, Serbs first of all faced neglect. Drawing attention to Serbian culture in Bosnia would have supported Serbian aspirations for Bosnian independence or unification with the Kingdom of
Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective

Serbia. In order to undermine Serbian national aspirations, the theme of the *Antemurale Christianitas*, the defence of Christianity, was replaced by Serb nationalism as a danger for Bosnian unity, which symbolized Habsburg multicultural unity.

So Bosnian Serbs and Serbs from the Serbian state had many reasons to oppose Habsburg rule in Bosnia. Serbian nationalist organizations strove for liberation and unification with Serbia. The visit to Sarajevo of Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne, on 28 June, Vidovdan, the day which had become the symbol for the Serbs’ fight for independence, was seen as a huge provocation. The provocation was understood, it was answered and the imperial reaction was war. That this war would turn into a world war might not have been calculated at the beginning; however, the European system of alliances implied that Austria-Hungary would be backed by Germany and that Russia and the Western sea powers would oppose Austro-German ambitions, in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Serbs were seen to have caused the war, and they became a symbol for the enemy in Austria-Hungary. The famous writer Karl Kraus devoted many scenes of his anti-war epic “Die letzten Tage der Menschheit” to Austrian hatred culminating in the collective condemnation of the Serbs. This attitude also influenced the position vis-à-vis Serbian citizens within the Habsburg Monarchy. Instead of loyal citizens they were perceived as fifth column, sympathizing with the enemy. Similar to Ukrainians in Galicia and Italians in the southern provinces, Habsburg Serbs fell victim to emergency laws which easily allowed their internment. Whoever was suspected of national aspirations was arrested in internment camps, the most prominent one in the south of Austria located in Graz-Thalerhof (Hautmann, 1986). During the First World War Serbs were split into three groups, the first fighting for the Kingdom of Serbia, the second fighting for Austria-Hungary and a third one imprisoned as an internal enemy. It would be worth looking at the Serbian attitude to war-supporting activities, as well as to anti-war movements, which became stronger at the end of the war. When royal Serbs fell into the hands of the Austro-Hungarian army, they were imprisoned as external enemies. Austrian and German invaders of Serbia and other Balkan states were extremely cruel vis-à-vis their military adversaries, who faced execution rather than imprisonment, and also vis-à-vis the civil population. Conversely, Croats symbolized loyalty and were not accused of undermining the empire. Thus the war, meant to support the cohesion and stability of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in fact heightened ethnic differences, hence undermining the multi-cultural construction of Austro-Hungarian identity.

Defeat, capitulation, and the falling apart of the Habsburg Empire put border drawing at the top of the agenda at peace conferences and negotiations. German-Austria’s ambitions strongly differed from the results settled in the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain in September 1919, which the new Republic of Austria had to accept. The more the idea of forming a south-Slavic state, composed of the three state-building nations of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, reached back into the 19th century and took shape, the more the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire became evident at the end of the war. This is not the place to document the individual steps which led to the building of the Kingdom of SHS. From an Austrian perspective, borders were crucial (Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, 1977).

Differently from Czechoslovakia, where Austria claimed the Bohemian and Moravian regions with German-speaking majorities as part of German-Austria, in the case of the Kingdom of SHS, Austria insisted on maintaining the provincial (crown land) borders of Carinthia and Styria. Carinthia and Styria showed Slovene minorities, which represented majorities in the southern parts of the provinces. Slavic populations did not fit into the self-understanding of German-Austria as the German-speaking remnant of the monarchy, striving for unification with Germany. Slovene inhabitants were not considered an obstacle to German-Austria, however. Their culture and identity were considered to be a rural, traditional one, which would be assimilated into the German one in the process of modernization, eventually surviving at the level of folklore.

The Kingdom of SHS, referring to the right of (ethnic) self-determination, one of US President Wilson’s principles for a European post-war order, laid claim to Carniola and Goerz-Gradisca, Istria and the Trieste region, as well as to the Slovene-speaking regions of Styria and Carinthia to form the future Slovenia. In the case of Goerz-Gradisca, Istria and Trieste, the border dispute with Italy was settled in favour of Italy, which also incorporated Rijeka/Fiume into the Italian state. Carniola was adjudged to the Kingdom of SHS in Saint-Germain. Styria was divided into a northern part staying with Austria and a southern part adjudged to Slovenia. Carinthia was heavily disputed between Slovenia and Austria, as well as Italy, which also obtained some Carinthian regions (e.g. Kanaltal). Finally a plebiscite in southern Carinthia decided the region to stay part of Austria. As a result, Slovenes represented a minority in Austria, raising the question of assimilation versus Slovene minority rights, not settled even today. In the Kingdom of SHS and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia a German minority survived the new borders.

The Austrian attitude towards Slovenes was characterized by passive assimilation, not questioning Slovene culture in the villages and in the Church, but insisting on German as the language of administration and social ascent. The link between Germanization and social ascent was accepted by many Slovenes when they lost their rural traditions. They were called “Windische” by the German Carinthians, on the one hand underlining the success of assimilation, on the other hand maintaining the ethnic difference in spite of lingual assimilation. Ethnic diversity was no longer seen as an asset, but as a problem, with assimilation to German as the best solution. “Our” Croats, apart from a minority in the Burgenland, a former Hungarian province which was attributed to Austria and “our” Serbs did not pose a problem, because their residential regions did not belong to Austria any more. While neglecting minority rights in Austria, Austria’s interest was dedicated to German-Austrian minorities abroad, in this case in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, where the Slavic character of the state was a threat to those minorities which did not belong
to the state-building nationalities. Belonging mainly to the upper social strata, Germans suffered by losing their former social privileges and counted on Austria for protection.

The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire was realized by the non-German-speaking nations, establishing independent nation states. The German-speaking crown lands involuntarily became the “rest”, which – faced with the failure of a socialist alternative – developed a German-national self-understanding. German-Austria declared its independence as part of the German Republic. Unification (Anschluss), supported by all political parties except the small Communist Party, was denied by the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain, however. “German-Austria” was to become “Austria”. The idea of unification survived and was realized in the shadow of the social and economic crisis and the rise of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party) in Germany in 1938. In the inter-war period, relations with the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia concentrated on the border question and the German-speaking minorities, the loss of which was seen as a violation of the right to self-determination. The same principle of self-determination was not applied for the Austrian Slovenes, whose social career depended on their willingness to Germanize. Austrian towns and villages on the border developed a feeling of border defence, aimed at the preservation of their German character vis-à-vis a Slavic threat. The multi-ethnic character of the Austrian Empire was replaced by an ethnic understanding of self-determination. This attitude prevented official Austria from acknowledging the new type of multi-ethnic empire which was formed in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were perceived along the old lines of friends and foes, their unification in a state seen as an artificial tie, which was not supposed to last forever.

The attempts to consolidate the new state by supporting the build-up of national industries, privileging the Slavic as opposed to the German and Magyar population, was seen as a danger from the Austrian side. Regional economic ties were interrupted by new borders and protectionist measures. However, after a short period of disintegration, economic cooperation was begun and Yugoslavia became an important trading partner again, making up for 5.5% of Austria’s imports and 8% of Austria’s exports in 1930 (Hofbauer, 1992: 26). Trade composition followed the old pattern, Austria exporting industrial goods, while Yugoslavia delivered agricultural goods and raw materials (Teichova, 1988).

1938-1945: from German “Grossraum” to socialist Yugoslavia

1938

The annexation (Anschluss, 12 March 1938) turned Austria as “Ostmark” or “Donau- und Alpengaue” into a constitutive part of the German Reich, sharing success and failure. Austrian soldiers were put into German uniforms. Being part of Great Germany also allowed the realization of regional interests, for example the annexation of border regions contrary to the results of the Paris peace treaties after the First World War (Saint-Germain and Trianon). Territorial expansion into neighbouring countries took place in the case of South Bohemia and South Moravia, which became Ostmark-Austrian...
after the Munich agreement in 1938. The Austrian hope to get back South Tyrol failed because of the cooperation with Mussolini, who agreed, however, to the transfer of the German-speaking population to Germany. In the course of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, the formerly Austrian parts of Slovenia, Carniola and Lower Styria were annexed by the German Reich in 1941.

The idea was to increase and at the same time to homogenize the newly annexed regions and to integrate them into the division of labour of an (expanding) German “Grossraum”, according to German interests. The new ethnic mapping allowed the resolution of the Slovenian question in South Carinthia, where Slovenes were pushed to assimilate. Those who resisted, first of all the national elites, were imprisoned or deported to pure German-speaking regions. The same happened in the Slovenian regions annexed to the Reich.

German, Italian and Hungarian expansionism exercised great pressure on the unity of Yugoslavia, thus intervening in the ethnic conflict within the state. Yugoslavia turned into the peripheral hinterlands of neighbouring states, which annexed regions according to their economic and strategic interests. Thus Slovenia was partitioned and ceased to exist. The small region of Gottschee/Kočevje, a German-speaking “island” in a Slovene neighbourhood, may illustrate the ethnic redistribution which followed the changing borders. Traditionally, the income of its inhabitants was based on their specialization in trade of Mediterranean commodities in Austria. Situated in a part of Slovenia which had become Italian in 1941, they were collectively transferred into a Slovenian neighbourhood which had become German, in theory contributing to the Germanization of this region. At the end of the war, they again faced deportation, losing their regional collective identity.

Croatia took the opportunity to secede from Yugoslavia, annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina and taking over the role of a close ally of Germany in its colonizing plans for the Balkan region. Serbia was attacked in 1941 and became a military province of Germany. According to the idea of ethnic homogeneity, Croatian Serbs, mainly living in the regions of the former Austrian Military Border zone (Vojna Krajina), faced pressure to assimilate or cede; those who resisted were deported to concentration camps. Multi-ethnic Yugoslavia had failed, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as well as Bosniaks and Albanians, were used against each other, fuelling ethnic conflict as opposed to multi-ethnic cooperation. While Croatia gained independence under German protection, all other ethnic groups came under direct foreign rule, on the one hand facing assimilation, on the other oppression, with imprisonment of elites and transfer of population being a means of breaking resistance and realizing ethnic homogeneity.

1944/45

There was no sympathy on the part of official Austria towards the combination of pan-Slavism and socialism, the founding philosophies of socialist Yugoslavia. In spite of
Austria’s post-war founding myth of the Anschluss symbolizing Austria’s role as first victim of the Nazis, solidarity with Yugoslavia’s liberation was not on the agenda. Everybody knew that Austrian soldiers in German uniforms had taken part in the aggression against the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, not to speak of the older sentiments vis-à-vis Serbs as opposed to Austrians. Austria did not take up the new beginning as a chance to change its attitude towards the Slovene minority. The idea of Germanness had survived, and the minority rights of the Slovene minority were only codified when this turned out to be a condition for the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which brought full sovereignty and the end of the post-war occupation regime. Hence a strong part of the Slovene minority, in spite of its Catholic rural orientation, was pushed into an alliance with the Austrian communists, with socialist Yugoslavia as an international protector and guaranteeing power of the State Treaty. Austria, equally, felt responsible for the German minority and blamed Yugoslavia for the expulsion of Germans.

Both states became involved in different projects of reconstruction and integration. Austria, in spite of the four-power occupation (1945-1955) and the declaration of neutrality in 1955 was part of the Western project, relying on Marshall-plan aid and the embargo against socialist states in Eastern Europe. In order to receive Western aid, the state had to give up close cooperation with other successor states of the Habsburg Monarchy which was revived in the inter-war period, including Yugoslavia, although it was not a part of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, with its unique model of self-administered socialism, was not closed off by an Iron Curtain, so that economic relations could develop more easily than with the COMECON states.

From the 1960s onwards, Austro-Yugoslav economic relations became stronger. They took place in the fields of:

- tourism: Austrian tourists spent holidays on the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, which could be afforded by the lower and middle class strata;

- labour migration: Yugoslav migrant labourers satisfied Austrian demands for labour;

- trade and industrial cooperation, which grew along with Austrian demands for agricultural and labour-intensive industrial products in exchange for technology and high tech products.

So Yugoslavia obtained a new face. It was no longer perceived in terms of its ethnic and religious differences, but as a new nation:

- a holiday destination with highly estimated landscape, food and a Yugoslav folklore;

- a labour-exporting country, whose migrant labourers ranged at the lower end of the social hierarchy, united by their Yugoslav origin, called “Yugos” or, in a Viennese Slavicism, “Tschuschen” (from the Slavic word for foreign);
- a perception developed for products “made in Yugoslavia”, representing good quality food or industrial goods at affordable prices both for trading companies and for consumers.

A new perception developed, accepting Yugoslavia as a political nation, characterized by its overcoming of ethnic and religious divisions among Yugoslav citizens, up to the point that existing ethno-religious differences within the Yugoslav community were simply ignored. The old perception, based on ethno-religious differences, survived within the Catholic Church, which was aware of the religious divide between Catholic Croats and Slovenes, for whom they felt responsible, and members of the Orthodox Church and Muslims, who were part of another community. The old perception also survived within the Ustasha exile community, which had a strong foothold in Austria and did not fit into the Yugoslav identity. A revisionist nationalist Croat diaspora, they had close relationships with Austrian conservatives and the Vatican, and maintained an ethno-cultural self-definition instead of a socio-political self-definition of national identity. Serbian nationalism, which lacked similar footholds in Austrian society, could more easily identify with the Yugoslav identity. Both nationalisms challenged the idea of an all-Yugoslav identity, embracing people from all ethnic and religious groups, which gained ground in the Yugoslav diaspora during the 1970s and 1980s. After Tito’s death in 1980, which coincided with Yugoslavia’s debt crisis, social conflict developed along ethnic lines, which again came to dominate Austrians’ perception of Yugoslav citizens’ identities.

Destroying Yugoslavia: 1990 onwards

At the beginning of the 1990s Austrian politics heavily intervened in Yugoslav affairs. It was the time when ethnicization of social and economic problems took place, causing brutal eruptions and determining future cultural identity in all six republics. The weakness of the federal structures within Yugoslavia was evident and Vienna used this chance to deepen the crisis of the state by supporting the secessionist elites and movements in Croatia and Slovenia and later on in Bosnia.

The reasons for this one-sided and therefore destructive involvement were multiple. Economically the strongest regions in the Yugoslav federation were situated in the north: functioning multinational companies such as Gorenje, Lek or Elan had good international relations not just with Austrian firms at the time, not forgetting the tourist sector, where millions of Austrian visitors came to the Slovene, Croat and Montenegrin coasts every year. So foreign investment in these economic fields looked profitable after the civil wars ended in the mid-1990s, and this potential was also fulfilled in many cases, such as in the banking sector, tourism and energy.

Culturally the historic ties from Habsburg times played a certain role especially for the conservative right wing in Austrian politics that became stronger in this period of time. The Croat right wing and Catholic backed elite were therefore considered as a “natural ally” of Vienna. On the other side you could see a rebirth of historic resentment
against “the Serb” who was defined as a “descendant of Gavrilo Princip”, both nationalist and seen as responsible for the south-Slavic type of communism. To communicate this anti-Serb and pro-Croat sentiment in an easy mainstream way one must know that the Austrian state television ORF for some time employed and gave voice to prominent exiled Ustashi such as Stjepan “Stipe” Tomičić, who changed his name to Alfons Dalma when he started his post-Ustasha career. Under this name he was editor-in-chief for current political affairs in the most important media of the country between 1967 and 1974 and left pro-Croat sympathies.

Politically it was the time just after the conservative Christian Democrats (ÖVP) took over the foreign ministry with Alois Mock in the key function. Although the coalition government together with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) was led by one of them, foreign politics were in the hands of a radical right and conservative wing of the ÖVP. The mastermind behind Alois Mock was a man called Andreas Khol, whose political ideology was strengthened under the secessionist movement in South Tyrol/Alto Adige against the central state of Italy. One member of parliament within the ÖVP fraction, Felix Ermacora, openly asked if Slovenia would like to become the 10th Austrian federal state, hence using the territorial disintegration of Yugoslavia to expand Austrian state territory according to historical patterns. Ljubljana officials were not amused, as one can imagine.

On the side of the parliamentary opposition there was a small green parliamentary group, holding ten seats. Two of them belonged to members of the national minority of Croats within Austria. In 1991 it turned out that one former Austrian green parliamentarian, Karl Smolle, from a Christian Slovene minority organization, became the first ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia, even when Slovenia was not yet recognized as a state.

Geopolitically Austrian politics regarding Yugoslavia and its dissolution functioned as a testing ground for German foreign politics. What the German minister for foreign affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, did not dare to postulate, Mock expressed openly. So Austrian foreign policy flew kites for Germany to check if the United States would accept the aim of the German-Austrian axis to help in the division of Yugoslavia and thus to gain economic and political influence, especially in the northern republics.

On the 20 June 1991 one could clearly see this function of Austrian foreign policy. Only one day before US Secretary of State, James Baker, was in Belgrade to tell all six leaders of the respective republics that the USA would not recognize Croat and Slovene independence, as had been announced in Zagreb and Ljubljana (and put into practice) for the forthcoming days, Austrian foreign minister Alois Mock went to Berlin to a meeting of the Council of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; today known as the OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) to prepare for suspension of Belgrade’s membership from of the international organization. Mock took the Slovene “foreign minister” Dimitrij Rupel as a camouflaged person in the Austrian delegation to Berlin to openly affront Belgrade.
One should remember that at that time even Slovenia had not declared its independence yet. German Hans-Dietrich Genscher would not have had the diplomatic possibility to go as far as Austrian Alois Mock.

At the real beginning of the Bosnian crisis, it was again Alois Mock who this time travelled to George H.W. Bush in Washington to ask for military intervention against Belgrade. In an interview for the state-TV ORF in July 1992 he announced a possible plan to send Austrian volunteers to fight the “Serb army”. The last time this happened, it was Austrians in German uniform, such as the later UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim “doing their duty” in the Balkans.

The direct involvement of prominent Austrian politicians and diplomats can be seen right from the beginning of Tudjman’s Croatia in 1990. It was the Austrian Janko Vranyczany, a member of the old nobility and former leader of the Austrian tourism agency in Brussels, who became the first Croat minister of tourism after HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community), won the election in 1990. It was also the former high ranked Austrian diplomat Johann Dengler, former ambassador in Budapest and Helsinki and Austrian consul in Zagreb during the “Croat spring” in the early 1970s, who was adviser to Franjo Tudjman in questions of foreign affairs.

The list of Austrian involvement in the process of dissolving Yugoslavia and creating separate national states is too long to name all of the proponents (see Hofbauer, 2001). Only some important historic moments shall be remembered. All these involvements were aimed at Belgrade and supported the nationalist elites in Croatia and Bosnia. Thus it was an Austrian diplomat, Peter Hohenfellner, who smoothed the path for the UN embargo against Yugoslavia in 1992. In his function as representative of one of the members of the UN Security Council, in which Austria took part at the time, Ambassador Hohenfellner was blamed by other officials for holding back information for UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali concerning the possible author of a horrible attack on a line of people queuing in front of a bakery in the middle of Sarajevo. This attack took place on the 27 May 1992, was transmitted on television and left 16 people dead on the street. Bosnian officials immediately accused the Serbian side, which only three days later led to UN Resolution 757 setting Belgrade under a crude regime of international embargo which lasted for almost a whole decade. A UN report – like other reports – questioned Serbian responsibility by noting the lack of shell-craters. The live TV transmission on the spot by Bosnian television could also have been part of a planned covert operation by Bosnian Muslim forces to provoke international interference, which is in fact what happened. Austrian Ambassador Hohenfellner was blamed by some of his colleagues for blocking this inside-information from the Secretary-General. With no doubt as to Serbian responsibility for the attack, the UN Resolution could pass quickly.

As the economic and cultural embargo against Belgrade was realized with Austrian help, the military bombing of Yugoslavia five years later was also at least moderated by an Austrian diplomat. This time his name was Wolfgang Petritsch, delegated by the
European Union in the so-called “contact-group” of the USA, Russia and the EU to find a solution to the “Kosovo-question”. Between the “activation order” of 12 October 1998 and the conference of Rambouillet in February 1999, the war on Yugoslavia was prepared in Washington step by step. It then started on 24 March 1999. And it was Petritsch who communicated to the public that a treaty had been signed in France, to put pressure on Belgrade to withdraw its troops from Kosovo and let the NATO troops cross Yugoslavia. In reality no treaty ever was signed concerning these questions, because not only did the Serbian side reject the NATO plans, but also the Russian delegate Majorski. The result was a NATO war of 78 days on Yugoslavia. The attempts to put this aggression under the UN umbrella failed.

Petritsch later got the post of “High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina” in November 1999, which was understood by the Western international community – represented by the European Union, the United States, the International Monetary Fund and NATO – as a colonial type of regime. In this function he intervened innumerable times in internal Bosnian affairs, such as the dismissal of elected Serbian and Croatian politicians, by forbidding parties, media and companies, arguing that they were too nationalistic, and similar. His masterpiece was the blowing-up of one of the main banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the “Hercegovačka banka”, on 18 April 2001. The bank, which was located in Mostar, was attacked by 500 NATO soldiers in SFOR uniforms, 80 armed vehicles and 20 helicopters and money, securities and treasury were confiscated. With this action Petritsch broke the financial neck of the HDZ, whose leader Ante Jelavić had been dismissed only one month before as one of the three Bosnian representatives in the presidency of the federal state.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo, whose statehood was based on a protectorate with a colonial-type administration, interventions like these were on the everyday agenda. Austrian participation was always strong, using historic prototypes such as the period of occupation and annexation of Bosnia after 1878/1908.

Geopolitically Austrian involvement since 1991 followed the lines of the main players in the region. During the first half of the decade Germany and its major economic investors played a dominant role in the process of ethnicization of Yugoslavia, supporting the secessionist movements fighting for national independence, whereas the USA pursued a more defensive politics aimed at political cohesion in the Balkan region. Only in March 1994, after the bloody events of “Markale I”, when a shell killed 68 people in the Sarajevo marketplace, did the USA take over leadership on the Balkans by forming a Croat-Muslim Federation in Bosnia. This led to the “Dayton Process”, where German politics had virtually no influence on the outcome. Austrian officials always followed the direction of the stronger power, not forgetting to save its neutral face, for instance by protesting (without any result) against the overflight of NATO bombers on their way to Yugoslavia between March and June 1999, which was not backed by any UN mandate.
Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

Conclusion

In terms of cultural and national identity the relations between Austria and its south-Slavic neighbours followed a centre-periphery model, as part of a broader European international division of labour in which Austria fulfilled the role of a semi-periphery. Nation building, as well as the search for cultural identity, was at the beginning an attempt by the respective elite, or parts of it, to link with the Austrian core. Austria was establishing criteria defining who belonged to “us”, who was considered worthy and able to be adopted or civilized, and who was regarded as “the other” – the opposition or enemy. Multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity went hand in hand with establishing divisions and hierarchies along ethnic, religious and social lines according to the interests of the core. Close ties with Vienna seemed to be helpful for identity construction. A broadening of national identification followed later, opening the way for a de-linking of the Austrian core.

In the Serbian case, identity construction was a means to overcome Ottoman rule in the 18th and 19th centuries (Konfin, Vienna as centre of Serbian culture, Serbian state). In the Croatian case, it was to underline the historical Catholic, dynastic and later national ties with Vienna and, respectively, Berlin during the Second World War (Jelačić, Church and Ustashi). In the Bosnian case, occupation and annexation were accepted as the price for modernization of the society. This model failed in all cases and provoked a reaction of de-linking in cultural, political and economic terms (Princip’s attack on Franz Ferdinand, Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, and socialist Yugoslavia).

During the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s the reinvention of national identities was a means to define one’s nation’s position vis-à-vis the new order in Europe (Croatian, Slovene, Bosnian, Kosovo-Albanian elites), again hoping that close ties with Vienna would help to overcome social and economic problems and stabilize the new nations. It failed again, leading the nations into civil wars, mass killings and expulsions, which legitimized foreign military intervention that Austria could neither prevent nor stop. Austria’s role as an external reference was soon replaced by NATO, the United States and the European Union, who nowadays intervene in the process of identity construction by discrediting ethnic nationalism, which they had fuelled before, for not being compatible with “European” standards.

Also on the Austrian side, the sense of being Balkan was a constitutive factor for identity construction. As the south-Slavic regions geopolitically formed a contested field of territorial expansion, economically a hopeful territory and culturally a field to modernize along the concepts of the core, the Austrian perception of the Balkan idea served as a means to strengthen Austria’s self-assertion in military, political and cultural terms. It characterized Austrianess from imperial to constitutional and democratic times, helping to compensate for Austria’s weakness and dependency on the European West, including Nazi occupation. This self-assertion was built on feeling superior to the Balkan peoples who had to face structural racism. They were attributed orientalizing or balkanizing terms.
Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective

like “wild” or “uncivilized” and Austria’s mission was argued and justified by the necessity to civilize and modernize people and regions.

Benjamin von Kállay, Austrian-Hungarian finance minister (1882-1903), stated in an interview in 1895: “Austria is a great Occidental Empire (...) charged with the mission of carrying civilization to Oriental peoples” (Daily Chronicle, 3 October 1895, cited in: Donia, 1981: 14). Racist attitudes always accompanied the Austrian approach: from the dictum during the First World War (“Serbien muss sterben; Serbia has to die”) to the T-shirts worn by SFOR-soldiers in Bosnia in the middle of the 1990s (Neues Deutschland, 10 November 2004) (“Jeder Tschusch schweigt still, wenn mein starker Arm es will; every Tschusch (pejorative word for Slavic foreigner) will be silenced by the force of my strong arm”), a continuity of expressing chauvinism and superiority towards the Balkans and its people can be observed. It has served as a factor of Austrian identity construction throughout history.

References


Cultural policies, identities and monument building in Southeastern Europe

Milena Dragićević Šešić

Abstract
This paper deals with monument policies in Southeastern Europe in the period of transition, nationalistic uprisings, wars and divisions. Exploring the reconstruction of memories through official and populist monument projects the research will try to prove the misuse of memories and historical representations as a form of hate speech, and to deconstruct this manipulation of memories used to create a new “national”, ethnic memory using monument as a strategic tool.

At the same time the research will explore how artists have challenged official policies of “monumentalization” creating their own monument projects. Monuments as artistic projects, permanent or ephemeral, are part of the culture of dissent, platforms for debating major cultural policy issues.

This research will use the categories identified by Kodrnja and Slapšak, re-adapted and developed for the needs of this study. We therefore identified three different models of strategy and monument policy applied in different phases of postsocialist transition: the model of anti-culture (destruction strategy, appropriation strategy, ignoring “the other” and provocation strategy); the model of “culturalization” (monument building within new identity policies, decontextualization strategy, musealization of the heritage of others, “gratitude” strategy); and the model of dissent – creative dialogue (counter-culture strategy, strategy of opposing within one’s own culture).

Keywords: cultural policies, monument policies, Southeastern Europe, historical representations, memories, identities
In Southeastern Europe, as a territory where new states have been created and both majority and minority ethnic groups have been mobilized in search of identity (Appadurai, 2006), issues relating to memories are of major concern. In humanities and social sciences, the culture of memory (Kuljić, 2006) has been explored from different perspectives, from forms of memorialization of social practices to forms of construction of social, political and cultural identities. The proliferation of research within contemporary social and cultural studies focused attention on the places of memories, methods of remembrance (media construction of memories) and, to a far lesser extent, policies of memory and oblivion as part of identity policies in transitional societies.

However, in societies traumatized by long-term politics of oblivion and historical taboos, where private memories, collective memories and recorded, normative memories were not coherent, social conflicts and wars, ethnic hatred and differences between public and official opinion brought a specific interest to memory studies. Memory was studied as a key element in the construction of national, ethnic or any other group identity which is opposed to other group identities sharing the same cultural, political, geographical and historical space. In Southeastern Europe, construction and representation of the past and reinterpretation of historical facts (events, historical figures, notions) within different group identities were quite studied phenomena, in the educational system and in the media (Đerić, 2008; Stojanović, 2008), but not properly documented and researched within public cultural policies.

Cultural policies of countries in transition (Đukić, 2003) have not dared to touch on issues of memory politics directly. Even when reinforcing national cultural identity was proclaimed as a main aim, this part of national cultural strategy was defined neither in law nor through instruments. Sometimes it meant the destruction and removal of the “memory of the other”, neglect or heritage conservation, but without making it “alive”. These are three extremely different strategies regarding “dissonant heritage” (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996) and, when applied, they could provoke fear and further exodus (as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where throughout the territories monuments representing the culture of “the other” were destroyed).

Major instruments of memory policy as part of a national cultural policy intending to re-shape collective identity (through changing collective memories) are:

- the creation or representation of certain types of narrative (financing of film production, repertory theatres, translations, museum collections, etc.);
- the renaming of institutions, streets and squares, parks and bridges, etc;
- the creation of new types of festivities, awards, celebrations, “homage” policies, etc;
- the re-appropriation of institutions, sites or even the destruction of “dangerous” memories;
- a policy towards memory spaces, burial sites (mausoleums, graveyards, etc.) and monument building or removing;
Cultural policies, identities and monument building in Southeastern Europe

- burial policies and commemorative policies;
- government decisions regarding the national symbols (anthem, flag or other insignia to represent national identity).

Within policies of memory in Southeastern Europe that influence the collective consciousness, **monument policies** are most often used. Through a monument erected in a public space the message is easily transferred to the community; it enables political promotion (PR); it gives “face” to new values; it demonstrates power; it gives an illusion of creating something for eternity; it facilitates representation; it provokes “the other”; it controls “the other”, and so forth.

This paper will deal with monument policies in Southeastern Europe in the period of transition, nationalistic uprisings, wars and divisions. Through exploring the reconstruction of memories through official and populist monument projects, from Kosovo polje in 1989 to the Alexander the Great monument in Skopje in 2010, the research will try to prove the misuse of memories and historical representations as a form of hate speech, and to deconstruct this manipulation of memories used to create a new “national”, ethnic memory employing monuments as a strategic tool.

We will also study art and artists challenging the official policies of “monumentalization” of historical memories by creating their own **monument projects**. Monuments as artistic projects, permanent or ephemeral, are part of the culture of dissent, but also platforms for debating and presenting major cultural policy issues.

The methodology of the research will be based on categories identified by Kodrnja et al. (2010) and Slapšak (2009), re-adapted and further developed for the needs of this research. Thus we identified three different models of strategy and monument policy applied in different phases of the postsocialist transition:

- the model of anti-culture:
  - destruction (annihilation) strategy and strategy of oblivion
  - appropriation (renaming and re-contextualization) strategy
  - strategy of ignoring “the other”
  - strategy of provocation of “the other”

- the model of “culturalization”:
  - monument building within new identity policies
  - decontextualization (universalization) strategy
  - musealization of the heritage of “the other” (policies of respect)
  - “gratitude” strategy

- the model of dissent – creative dialogue:
  - counter-culture strategy, strategy of opposing within one’s own culture.

The research will take into account major monument projects in countries of
Southeastern Europe, but also the destruction of classified monuments and cultural and religious institutions, as well as those actions by civil society (constructive and destructive) which are supported or clearly opposed by public policies. We would like to show how cultural policies, aiming to reinforce national identity, try to represent new values through a strategy of monument building, but also through allowing populist movements to organize monument removal as a “spontaneous” practice, not pursued by law.

Phase I – Post-socialist transition: the re-creation of national identities

After the first multiparty elections held in 1990, in many republics of former Yugoslavia (especially Slovenia and Croatia), there were attempts to move towards Westernization and to become distanced from Yugoslavia and Yugoslavian common heritage, and these were first expressed through attitudes towards the socialist past. Thus, a process of renaming of schools, streets, squares and institutions in memory of anti-fascist movements and heroes of the Second World War quickly started.

A major significant event was the change of name of a square dedicated to the victims of fascism in Zagreb. On 10 December 1990 (Human Rights Day) the square was renamed in memory of famous Croatian people (Sinovčić, 2010). In Croatia and in other parts of Yugoslavia this was seen as a sign of Croatian nationalism denying the importance of anti-fascist battles and downplaying the number of victims of fascism (mostly of Jewish, Serbian and Roma origin).1

This was just a paradigm for all that would happen later in the 1990s, when the collective subconsciousness, colonized through a media war and hate speech, and supported by irresponsible academics (Đragićević Šešić, 1994), allowed its politicians to make abrupt and violent decisions and its soldiers to implement them. The policy of memory quickly materialized in present national identity policy, within which monument policy had one of the most important places.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia had brought instability, as the spatial framework started to change not only through the secession of different republics, but also through wars which changed their frontiers, at least temporarily. The destruction due both to the war and to economic transition changed urban spaces, which further destabilized communities for whom relationship to an area and its objects – tangible, non-movable heritage (buildings, especially churches, city walls, apartment buildings, factories, shops, etc.) – enabled collective memory, and gave confidence and comfort, as well as a feeling of identity. The partition of the country, with destruction of both the temporal and spatial framework, questioned values and collective memories. The physical destruction of cities, monuments and all other tangible objects which connected people with their

1 In December 2000, after political changes, the square’s original name was reinstated following a nine-year long protest by Croatian intellectuals who had formed a committee for the return of the name to the square.
environment even destroyed the possibility to keep the memory alive (Connerton, 2002: 54).

The new nationalistic ideologies have meant that most of the monuments and memory sites defined in the previous socialist system became “dissonant heritage”, as well as the buildings and sacral objects linked to the “memory of other”. Even the bridge in Mostar, built in Ottoman times and once the pride of the city community regardless of ethnicity, became, in the war situation, just a symbol of one group and was then destroyed by the other.

**Model of anti-culture**

There were several models (approaches) used in reconstructing the new social, cultural and national identities in the newly created nation states of the former Yugoslavia, through implementing “monument policy” as a main state cultural policy.

The first model – anti-culture – sought to destroy all traces of the common socialist, anti-fascist and communist past and had two major strategies: appropriation and annihilation.

*Appropriation strategy* can be seen in the disappearance of red stars from monuments (repainted in yellow as in the case of the Slovenian Route of Friendship, or covered with Catholic crosses in Croatia),² the covering of anti-fascist slogans with slogans in homage to Croatian people (this often preceded the visit of recently elected Tuđman to a certain city). Through all these activities of re-contextualization of monuments their original meaning was lost and, instead of memorializing an anti-fascist battle, for example, they became monuments to the glorious Croatian past.

The second way of dealing with a past and its monuments was a “spontaneous” cleansing of the territory through the destruction of all elements which might seem non-Croatian, non-Slovenian and non-Serbian – annihilation strategy. With the exception of Istria, this happened throughout Croatia where, even in the Serb Krajina, people saw monuments from socialist times as symbols of “denationalization”, “Yugoslavization” and atheization, the three major issues which were “threatening and destroying” Croatian or Serbian identity.

Those battles for new identities through memory policies have taken two different paths: Serbian identity in Croatia was “protected” by the Serbian Orthodox Church and intellectuals from “motherland” Serbia (from the Academy of Science), while for a new Croatian identity a whole state framework was developed, as was also the case in Serbia. The difference was that the Serbian state officially proclaimed continuity with Yugoslavia, that is, officially the policy towards the socialist past should not be changed. However, the monument to Boris Kidrič, the Slovenian communist and statesman, was removed from its

² Similar events happened later in Serbia when the opposition took over the city of Belgrade in 1997, when a red star from the city parliament was taken down at a public event.
place and put in the park surrounding the Museum of Contemporary Arts. Municipalities in Serbia also removed Tito’s monuments and streets named by Tito returned to previous names (except in Sarajevo and Skopje). All eight cities of Yugoslavia which added Tito’s name (Velenje, Korenica, Drvar, Vrbas, Užice, Mitrovica, Titograd and Velenje) have dropped its prefix or returned to the old name (Titograd – Podgorica).

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was and is still complex. In cities and regions where one ethnic army had dominated, the codes and symbols of the “mother-nation” were adopted and local historical figures, if from a minority ethnic group, removed from their pedestals, such as the Aleksa Šantić monument in Mostar. Aleksa Šantić was a poet who already in the 19th century celebrated multiculturalism, and whose poems, *Emina* and *Stay her*, have been celebrated throughout the socialist period as promoting intercultural sensitivity and understanding. On the other hand, names of streets in Banja Luka reflect medieval and heroic Serbian history, while traces of Croatian or Bosnian (Muslim) presence have disappeared from the city (Horozović, 1994).

In Serbia, schizophrenic Milošević policies, praising at the same time socialism and nationalism, reflected a semblance of continuity, while, in reality, they conquered and colonized the collective subconsciousness with an idealized past and started to search for new roots of Serbianhood and new features of identity. So, although the Milošević government did not create any memory policy, by liberating the field for nationalism and “giving wings” to nationalism in cultural institutions, they created a platform for anti-cultural behaviour (Slapšak, 2009 and Kodrnja et al., 2010), where local politicians or opinion-makers celebrated even fascism (for example Ljotić in Smederevo) or rehabilitated controversial soldier-politicians like Draža Mihajlović, claiming that they were “judged and killed by communists just for being Serbian patriots”. Unfortunately, this policy of oblivion regarding war crimes of Chetniks or the Nedić collaborator forces during the Second World War has continued after political changes in 2001.

The cities wanting to show their patriotism, started “ordering” monuments from the sculptor Drinka Radovanović, whose name in artistic circles was unknown, but who was known among nationalists as a good (realistic) sculptor of historical figures such as Karadorde, leader of the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks in 1804. So, monuments to “people’s heroes” from the Second World War disappeared, replaced by sculptures of heroes from the First and Second Serbian Uprising against the Turks, and this was especially reflected by schools, who started quickly, without any outside pressure, to change their names.

Consequently, through *annihilation* and *appropriation* strategies the landscapes in cities and regions throughout former Yugoslavia changed – new types of monuments, colours representing the emblem of a nation, flags and names of the streets, squares and institutions appeared and colonized the collective consciousness and collective memory, thus contributing to ethnicization of community memories and behaviour.
Model of “culturalization” in heritage policy

The other (rarer) model of memory policy and the relationship towards heritage and history could be called the model of “culturalization”, which in fact represented decontextualization through universalization or musealization.

Examples of this were the move of the Boris Kidrič Belgrade statue (sculptor Nikola Janković) from the centre of the city to the Sculpture Park of the Museum of Contemporary Arts, or the removal of the Tito monumental sculpture from the Main Square in Užice to the back of the Užice City Museum. In this sense sculpture lost its political and ideological meaning and became a “piece of art” with no context and thus emptied of any sense.

The other possible strategy of the “culturalization” model – respect of the heritage of “the other” – has not yet been applied in Southeastern Europe. In modern European cultural policies there are efforts by Polish cultural operators to integrate lost and forgotten Jewish culture in contemporary cultural life, mostly through festivals. In Latvia there are attempts to safeguard Liv culture. In both cases, the culture of “the other” is seen as a threat to national cultural identity except for those other communities who have disappeared. In Southeastern Europe only under the influence of the international community or international donors are monuments “of others” rebuilt or protected.

Phase II – Nation (re)building: models of culturalization and anti-culture

Strategy of monument building within new identity policies

The second phase in monument building policy as part of a memory and identity policy was the phase of creation of new monuments to express the changes in national identity and values. In countries which celebrated their independence and freedom it was clear that monuments to those who are pillars of national identity or to those who contributed to the achievement of independence had to be erected.

Through a lot of private initiatives, monuments to Ustashi leaders, such as Mile Budak and Jura Francetić, were created in their native villages, but in 2004 the Croatian Government decided to destroy them, in order not to endanger its democratic and anti-fascist image.3

Monuments or memorial plaques to Tuđman started quickly to be created in both Croatia (Selce, Kaštel Lukšić, Pitomača, Škabrnja, Slavonski brod 2006, Bibinje 2007,4 Benkovac 2008, Podbablje 2009, Pleternica 2009) and Herzegovina (Široki brijeg

4 This was 2.70 metres high, with a pedestal of 4 metres, donated by the state and the municipality. http://www.ezadar.hr/clanak/bibinjci-otkrili-spomenik-franji-tudmanu, accessed 12 April 2010.
2003, Čapljina 2007). During the presidential campaign in 2009 in Croatia, the major promise of the (non-elected) presidential candidate of HDZ (A. Hebrang) was to erect a monument to Tudman in Zagreb. Željko Kerum, mayor of Split, promised to erect a Tudman monument on the seafront promenade, contrary to the opinion of city urbanists. There are numerous examples of sculptural or name memorialization (a bust of Tudman placed in the Croatian Parliament, the bridge at Osjek, etc.).

The importance of monument policy can be seen in the decision of Split city council (October 2007) to erect 21 monuments to important figures in Croatian and Split history, which provoked a huge debate around Miljenko Smoje, a deceased humorist writer accused of pro-Yugoslavian and leftist statements, as being unworthy of having a monument in Split.6

To what extent monument policy was linked to ethnic identity could be seen through demands for “ethnic purity” in constructing the monuments. When the monument to the defenders of Makarska (Croatia) was created the rumour was spread that the grass around the monument had been brought from the Republika Srpska. The mayor had to address the media and guarantee on his honour that it was not the case. On the other side, the Serbian Church in Kosovo argued that in the reconstruction of the sacral objects destroyed after the riots in 2004 the participation of non-Orthodox workers should not be allowed.

At the same time in Serbia, monuments had been created to fulfil several tasks:

- Monuments to Nikola Pašić contribute to the Serbianization of history, as Pašić was a Serbian political leader opposing the Yugoslavian idea. Nationalists wanted to promote him as a role-model for today’s politicians. He also had to be a link towards the “glorious” Serbian past, which had been erased from history books and the collective memory of the people.

- The Draža Mihajlović monument challenged the official history of the communist anti-fascist partisan movement. It is a monument bringing a completely new narrative to the collective memory, as well as monuments to Saint Sava,7 Karadorde and Nikola Tesla.

At first sight it might seem strange why these personalities have been regarded in the same category. It is important to underline that the monument policy behind these projects was the same. This policy wanted to inscribe Serbianhood on the face of the

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5 This was 3.20 metres high, donated by the Diaspora.
7 The desecularization process was followed by the return of Saint Sava as a public figure (created by the autonomous Serbian Orthodox Church) and celebrated with a great number of his monuments erected in the 1990s.
city. Up to that moment cities were usually without symbols of Serbian national identity. Monuments to partisans, even if they were Serbs, were considered as Yugoslavian monuments, as well as the old Tesla monuments which celebrated sciences and not his “ethnic Serbian genius”.

The changes in monument policies can be seen clearly from the biography of Miodrag Živković. From the beginning of his career he participated in public competitions for the memorials and monuments devoted to the Second World War. Since 1990 he has realized projects devoted solely to Serbian medieval or heroic 19th-century history, and in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the millennium the majority of his projects were created for cities in the Republika Srpska (Brčko 1996; Bjeljina 1997; Derventa 2001; Mrkonjić Grad 2003). This represents a clear change in memory policies celebrating historical narratives that are important for only one ethnic group.

The only monument created by the Milošević government, the Eternal Flame monument, erected to remember the NATO bombing in 1999, is a sign of the incapacity of Milošević’s policy to create a monument which might mobilize emotions and become a symbol of his “independence” policy. Instead, it became an “empty hole” in the Belgrade urban landscape, an object of irony and vandalism, marginalized and away from public attention.

**Provocation of “the other” strategy**

The most important changes regarding monument policy after 2000 happened in Macedonia. As the last European nation liberated from Turkish rule (1912), then occupied by the Bulgarian army during the Second World War, and treated in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a south-Serbian province, Macedonia has not had time to create a national identity alongside other Balkan nations. In the 19th century, Balkan Slavic countries had usually taken four pillars for the creation of their national identities: national (Slavic) languages, folklore, the cultural legacy of ancient Greece and the legacy of Renaissance humanism (even if these “belonged” to the Eastern world of Byzantium culture). This tradition of acceptance of ancient Greek culture as a model has been introduced into European national cultures during the enlightenment and romanticism periods (Assmann, 1993).

Macedonia has had its chance only since 1945 to develop its distinctive south-Slavic identity. Its roots are in its Slavic origins and folkloric traditions. In dispute with its neighbours (Serbians do not accept the autonomy of the Macedonian Church, Bulgarians dispute the specificity of the language and Greeks even the name), the Macedonian state, at this very moment of nation-building, decided to claim succession rights from the ancient Macedonian state – claiming that the contemporary Macedonian nation had been developed

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8 In Croatia appropriation of Tesla as a part of the national canon is even more complex (see Buden, 2006)
following an encounter between ancient Macedonians and Slavic people who settled on this territory. That empowered them to use the ancient Macedonian heritage, incorporating it in the collective consciousness.

It started with a flag, whose main symbol was taken from the Vergina archaeological site in northern Greece, and is continued today through numerous monuments to Philip and Alexander the Great throughout Macedonia (to Philip II in Bitola in 2008, and also in Prilep, and to Alexander the Great in Skopje). Making these monuments of Alexander and Philip Macedonian is part of a policy of memory, but also a policy of provocation of the neighbouring country (Greece). It has chosen a far away past to challenge Greece in a diplomatic battle (Alagjozovski, 2010) creating cultural wars both inside and outside the country.

Before that, two things in Skopje’s monument policy had been important. These were the creation of the huge cross on the top of the hill rising above Skopje (to celebrate 2,000 years of Christianity), and the monument to Skenderbeg on horseback in Stara Čaršija (2006, Toma Damo), the Albanian part of the city, with his back turned to the Albanians, but facing the Macedonian part of the city and the Christian cross. In a certain sense both monuments are “facing the other” – applying the *provocation of “the other”* strategy.

The creation of monuments by the Macedonian community that were intended to irritate Greece and the Albanian community, and similar actions from the Albanian side, is an example of a monument policy as a model of anti-culture. The Ministry of Culture answered that they have no statement to make, as did the Agency for the Protection of Cultural Monuments: “Regarding Skenderbeg, I will not give any statement”, said Pasko Kuzman,9 director, while city mayor Trifun Kostovski said that for him this object is just illegitimate construction (*Australian Macedonian Weekly*, 2006).

This policy demands an exploration of a diachronical side to national identity, which all the countries of Southeastern Europe are developing in different ways. In monument policy, Macedonians turned to ancient Macedonia, Serbs and Croats looked to medieval history (though they also emphasized the first half of the 19th century as the birth of a modern state), Croats explored taboos and “heroes” of the Second World War, while Montenegrins have seen in the 19th century rule of King Nikola the real roots of their independence, autonomy and national specificity. Thus, cultural policies found new “heroes” and new memory sites, contributing to the renationalization of cultural policies through monumentalization of often invented memories. The territories and cultures in the post-conflict situation are continuing to fight with monuments and religious symbols which now cover the hills above multicultural cities.

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9 Paško Kuzman the ideologist of antiquitization in Macedonia claims that if Macedonians fail to prove their direct links with ancient Macedonians, they will lose the diplomatic battle with Greece, and lose their right to Macedonian identity.
“Gratitude” strategy vs. strategy of oblivion

A specific part of monument policy was to realize it through a strategy of gratitude, and this is a tradition in south-Slavic countries as part of their “civil society efforts”. The first monument to Tolstoy outside Russia was erected in the village of Selce (Brac, Croatia) in 1907, as a sign of Slavic identity and resistance towards Italianization. It is specifically gratitude to the great Slavic writer for keeping Slavic nations respected, although often considered “non-historical” (depriving them of their rights for independence and autonomous development).

The Monument of Gratitude to France in Belgrade, monuments to different French generals (e.g. Franchet d’Esperey), and the naming of streets after personalities who had helped Serbia in the First World War to be recognized as a winner (such as the Swiss A. Reiss and the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos) or had helped in war efforts (Scottish nurses such as Dr E. Inglis, B. McGregor, F. Sandes) and so forth, were part of a strategy to realize state memory (monument) policy.

This tradition had continued in the new states. In the same village where the monument to Tolstoy was erected now lie monuments to Tudman, Austrian Premier Mock and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs H. D. Genscher. This confirms the statement about Western biased foreign policies (which before negotiations and the war took a clear stand). The monument to Clinton in Priština reflects the perception of the population of Southeastern Europe of the importance of the foreign factor. The film Fuse/Gori vatra, by Pjer Žalica, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004, described those feelings (with an ironic distance towards “gratitude”).

The model of dissent – creative dialogue

The only ones who had the courage to redefine relations towards the cultural heritage of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, apart from the efforts of the Yugo-nostalgic diaspora (those who emigrated refusing to participate in the division of the country), were artistic circles. With their concepts and visions, they confronted the anachronistic monument policies of Southeastern Europe, conservative and retrograde as they were, neglecting the heritage of modernism.

In this spirit Mrđan Bajic created a series of virtual monuments for the YugoMuseum. Inspired by the artefacts, events and myths which created but also destroyed Yugoslavia, Mrđan Bajic explored the hidden memories of both Tito’s and Milošević’s time. Each Bajić virtual sculpture is a monument which memorializes crucial events leading towards the civil war and the dissolution of the country. The Memorandum monument

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10 Philanthropy was focusing national identity: merchants and rich citizens of Slavic origin gave money for theatres, as well as for monuments, such as the Monument of the Four Faiths, constructed in Čačak in 1930 and devoted to soldiers of four faiths (Christian: Orthodox and Catholic, Jewish and Islamic) killed in the First World War.
starts with the 19th century memory of Ilija Garašanin’s National Programme, then the memory of Gavrilo Princip (whose memory was kept as a freedom fighter in socialist Yugoslavia), then focusing on the role of the Academy of Science during Tito’s time (it lost credibility when it gave Tito an academic title without proper voting) and especially after his death, when the academy was obsessed with research regarding the status of Serbs in other republics of Yugoslavia.

Hundreds of “monuments” were created by Mrđan Bajić for the YugoMuseum. The Rambouillet castle, as a symbol of the absolute incapacity to negotiate on Kosovo and the lack of foresight as to the consequences of broken talks; Flower, as a symbol of the kitsch personality of Milošević’s wife – Mirjana Marković; Lathe, the monument to the working class (a machine which Tito knew how to use), and Poljud meaning solidarity, friendship, brotherhood and unity. All these monuments showed how quickly society had passed from “the rule of the working class”, to “the rule of the nation”! But, this project can also have the title of another Mrđan Bajić art project: I did it! where the artist took responsibility for all that was happening on the territory of former Yugoslavia – war crimes, refugees, burned houses, ethnic cleansing and so forth.

The Centre for Contemporary Arts in Sarajevo developed a project called “De/construction of Monument” (2004-2006) with the aim to create art works which contribute towards the deconstruction of myths and the de-ideologizing and decoding of recent and distant history.

The main tools in the project were monuments, symbols and icons, as the three major forms of representation of different societies and historical periods. By organizing several debates on crucial issues, such as monuments and memory, and monuments and violence, they regrouped artists and curators who for a long time had dealt with the “monumentalization” of public spaces, such as Braco Dimitrijević (Anti-Monuments, monuments of unknown passers-by), or Sanja Iveković (Lady Rosa of Luxembourg, provoking the Luxembourg community with her interpretation of the First World War memorial). But the crucial debate was around artists who are raising contemporary Balkan issues and confronting major monument narratives, such as Milica Tomić (the Belgrade group Spomenik/Monument), Siniša Labrović (Croatia), Sokol Bëqirë (Peja, Kosovo), and those who are making sarcastic comments on our contemporary memory and monument practices, such as the “Bruce Lee Monument Project” in Mostar, or the Kurt and Plasto project “By the Commission’s decision: Everyone to one’s own”, Sarajevo 2001.

Group Spomenik (Monument) includes Milica Tomić, Darinka Pop-Mitić, Nebojša Milekić, but also theoreticians such as Jasmina Husanović and Branimir Stojanović. Each participant of the group in their individual artistic or theoretical work is engaged

in the practice of intercultural dialogue, without creating trendy or “politically correct” projects. Working in “difficult territories”, such as Kosovo, or bringing Kosovo artists to Belgrade, or dealing with state terrorism (i.e. the work of Milica Tomic - *XY or reconstruction of the crime*), they are living and experiencing cultural diversity from its dangerous side in a xenophobic environment. By reinvestigating history, participating in the Centre for Cultural Decontamination in the programme *Politics of memory*, they are contributing to a large extent to the self-perception of different Balkan societies as to their embedded multiculturalism, as well as historical and contemporary considerations. Several of their public events happened within visual art manifestations (24th Nadežda Petrović Memorial, *Politics of Image*, Čačak and *Politics of Memory*, Prague Biennale), producing participatory monuments made of distributive objects – publications with a transcript of the Talk about an Artwork group under the title *Politics of Memory*.

An example of the third group of projects is the *Monument to the International Community* of Nebojša Šerić Shoba, erected in Sarajevo12 (steel, marble 2007), “by the grateful citizens of Sarajevo”, thus referring to the official “policy of gratitude”, but in a sarcastic manner. The Reuters report: “Sarajevo artists raised a monument to canned beef on Friday in a gesture ridiculing donors for providing such an unpopular food as humanitarian aid during the 1992-95 siege”,13 shows a misunderstanding of the artist’s intention (the artist in fact accused the international community of acting like a voyeur at a gladiator fight – sending food to keep the fighters alive longer, but not preventing the atrocities).

To what extent monument culture is a source of “inspiration” for contemporary artists can be seen from the project of Jelena Miletić (*In) visible dialogue*. This “research” project mapped monument culture in south-east Serbia, from the 19th century till today. The research included municipalities which are outside of contemporary cultural debates (Bor, Zaječar, Prokuplje, Zlot, Gornja Bela reka, Lenovac, etc.) and it ended with an exhibition and public presentation in Bor. Jelena Miletić treated monuments as artefacts gathering together different ideologies, memory politics, aesthetics and narratives of collective and individual memories. This project is one of the many in Southeastern Europe in which young artists are questioning official policies and practices of memory, insisting that these questions should be openly and publicly debated.

**Conclusion: Re-nationalization – the monument as a guardian of chosen memory**

The process of re-nationalization extensively used monument policies within the culture of memory, as an essential pillar of identity building. Monument policies and practices are acts of mediation which enable collective memory to be created and safeguarded. Representing the value system of society they create a benchmark for

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socialization practices. They are a joint venture of national political and cultural elites neglecting the real interest of communities. As in the case of Macedonia where political elites wish to prove continuity with ancient Macedonia, an atmosphere was created in which local city elites show their willingness to share common efforts in creating a “lost” collective cultural memory as part of a newly constructed national identity.

In periods of nation-building, inventing the traditions demands high symbolic, cultural but also financial investment. The national elites prefer to take history events and leaders from far away (Alexander the Great, or Skenderbeg in Skopje) re-appropriating them for today’s use (Croatia is an exception in this sense).

National identity (memory) policies through monument policies aim to achieve continuity of the present with a past, symbolic representation of the country’s identity or collective narrative, mediation of the values and the ethos of collective cultural identity, but also to control social behaviour. Thus, cultural policies were “asked” to contribute by defining key “formative” events in the construction of the community and to find ways for their memorialization.

The new European cultural policy “standards” demand that multicultural society has to develop new policies of memories and, consequently, new monument policies, policies which are not divisive, but inform communities, fostering and stabilizing intercultural dialogue. These policies have not yet been implemented in Southeastern Europe.

However, some new trends in monument policies are appearing: preparations are in process to build monuments to the coming of the Slovak community to Southeastern Europe or to the exodus of the German population. These monuments should not be constructed to divide, but to mutually inform communities and to start sharing group histories as common histories. Still, a monument which aimed to be a “bridging monument” (to the forgotten German minority in Vršac, Serbia), provoked new divisions, as the Jewish minority considered the statements linked to the erection of the monument as inappropriate (“life in Vršac was calm and mutual relations good till 1945”, the statement which ignored the genocide of the Jewish population in 1942). This shows that there is still a need for “joint histories”, and that the responsibility of the EU should be to debate neglected issues such as the exodus of the Slavic Macedonian population during the Greek civil war (politics of oblivion in Greece) which still nourishes Macedonian nationalism.

The fact that there are no monuments and memorials devoted to the Roma communities who suffered genocide in the Second World War shows double standards throughout Southeastern Europe (and Europe) about policies of memorializing. Democratic cultural policies should develop platforms for enabling private memories to enter the public sphere, especially those coming from marginal groups in societies.

This research has shown that to a formalism of ritual language (Connerton, 2002: 83), corresponds a formalism of visual language for monument use (expressions).
Conventions in representations are limiting possibilities of expression. As in the language of rituals, where certain pairs of words reappear and gestures are repeated to enable better mnemonic function, the same occurs with monument practices: certain visual codes, details, a way of constructing gives significance to a monument. The decision to create “a horseman”, or a standing or a sitting figure,\(^{14}\) gives a different message to the population, as does a chosen gesture or lack of one.

The crucial decision of policy makers to decide whether a monument should represent a person, an event, or contemporary social values was solved through a return to realistic representation in the 1990s, demonstrating the insecurity of the newly created states in their own values and showing their wish to create an understandable, readable message to their own society, and also to “the other”. Thus, the language of official sculptural representation demands respect for a certain number of conventions regardless of the event or personality. Repetition in visual formulas seems not to disturb contemporary “elites”; on the contrary, it is reassuring that the message they mediate will be understood and accepted.

As a conclusion, the national-ethnic-based dimension in Southeast European cultural policies is still predominant, in spite of the fact that the majority of countries have signed the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and are participating in the programmes on intercultural dialogue. Monument policies in the newly created Balkan countries were part of renationalization policies, recreating (inventing) specific identities based on certain traditions and chosen “memories”, and creating the conditions to enable the message to be widespread among both the community members and members of other communities, focusing on dividing memories, values and practices. Thus, a plurality of narratives was developed, but still relying on the main one and the same historical narrative of independence (glorious heroic past). It is obvious that cultural policies are still identity- and ethnic-based policies which neglect the citizen and their right to culture as an individual human right.

\(^{14}\) Authority is “choreographed” by the position of the body (Connerton, 2002: 101).
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Performing identities - national theatres  
and the re-construction of identities  
in Slovenia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Aldo Milohnić

Abstract
In this text the author examines the role of national theatres in the construction of identities in Slovenia and, rather sporadically, in other countries of the former Yugoslavia. This research question is set in the context of a historical overview, starting with early historical examples in a wider European context. National theatres were first established in Zagreb, Novi Sad, Ljubljana and Belgrade in the mid-19th century and national theatre reforms continued in the last century with the introduction of a threefold system of state, regional and municipal national theatres after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (abbreviated as SHS). After the Second World War many new national theatres emerged in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and cultural politics imposed a new role on national theatres in the new nation states after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. This historical approach is combined with an analysis of the cultural, social and political position of national theatres in the rather turbulent and nationalistic atmosphere dominated by exclusivist, radical political forces. As well as this critical reading of theatrical “identity politics” in the newly established states, predominantly in Slovenia, some other aspects are briefly discussed, namely relations between national theatres and so-called “independent” (or “non-institutional”) theatres, and subsidies and other financial incentives for national theatres, based on examples of national theatres in Slovenia and Croatia, among others.

Keywords: national theatre, theatre history, cultural identity, national identity, transition, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
The theatre is an eminent cultural institution and in that respect it is an important engine of (re)production of individual and collective identifications with certain cultural patterns. Cultural institutions and cultural patterns are historically determined phenomena; in other words, members of different societies are not likely to share the same understanding of their function and meaning. It seems that this presupposition also holds true for historically more specific appearances of theatre, such as the so-called “national theatre”. Usually, the emergence of national theatres in Europe is explained as a historical cultural phenomenon coinciding with other simultaneous social developments on at least three levels: enlightenment at the level of ideology, an emerging bourgeoisie providing its social and material background, and political processes establishing nation states (Pušić, 1997: 68). In practical terms, a national theatre is often identified by its visible components, such as monumental (usually old) buildings, permanent ensembles of actors with an excellent training in diction, and its role as a meeting-point of national cultural, political and economic elites. As pointed out by theatre theoretician and historiographer Marvin Carlson, “[t]he common image of a National Theatre is of a monumental edifice located in a national capital, authorized, privileged and supported by the government, and devoted wholly or largely to productions of the work of national dramatists”. Although “some National Theatres adhere closely to this ideal model”, says Carlson, “the vast majority depart from it in one way or another” (Carlson, 2008: 21).

As there might be different views on the role and image of today’s national theatres in Europe, it might also be true for the way they have developed over the last 200 years. Within theatre historiography, however, there is a widely accepted general division between an early (aristocratic) period in the 18th century and a more developed (nationalistic) phase in the 19th century (Wilmer, 2008; Carlson, 2008; McConachie, 2008; Kruger, 2008; Tőkei, 2006; Sušec Michieli, 2008a, 2008b). The first example of a national prototype of European theatre was the Comédie-Française, established in the late 17th century (1680) in Paris. The theatre was founded by Louis XIV with the clear intention of staging drama plays written by French authors, such as Molière, Racine and Corneille. The Comédie-Française was a model for establishing other monarchical theatres in the 18th century: the Burgtheater in Vienna (1741), the Royal Theatre in Copenhagen (1748), and the Royal Dramatic Theatre in Stockholm (1788). A second wave of national theatres emerged in the 19th century in association with a strengthening of nationalistic movements throughout Europe. Institutions like the Norwegian Theatre in Bergen, the National Theatre in Helsinki, the Abbey Theatre in Dublin and the National Theatre in Prague, among others, arose from this process. These two types are rather conceptual abstractions and some examples demonstrate various combinations, such as in the case of the Polish National Theatre: “In Poland the National Theatre followed both patterns: it was first created in 1765 under the Polish monarchy, but after Poland was carved up between Russia, Prussia and Austria, the Polish National Theatre took on the role of a National Theatre within an emerging nation, while Poles tried to regain their sovereignty” (Wilmer, 2008: 9-10).
Paradox of the national theatre

Another interesting exception, which deserves closer investigation, is the National Theatre in Hamburg. This theatre was established in 1767 and was financially supported by the rich merchants and bankers of the free trading city-state of Hamburg. The playwright and critic Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was also an important supporter of the theatre and he contributed drama texts (his comedy Minna von Barnhelm was the most popular performance in the repertoire) and one hundred essays on theatre (today known as the Hamburgische Dramaturgie). This theatre experiment lasted only two years but it had important consequences for the further development of national theatres in Europe, especially of course in German-speaking Länder. Besides German plays, it also had on its repertoire French and English authors, but all of them were performed in German. Lessing’s position was that German national theatre should stage not only plays in the German language but, equally important, those written by German authors. This request followed his standpoint that German theatre should develop its own style, not copying the French model of repertoire theatre.

In the very last essay of his Hamburgische Dramaturgie, he writes resignedly about the rather difficult mission of “getting the Germans a national theatre, while we Germans are not yet a nation”.1 This sentence is usually quoted in order to illustrate the situation in Lessing’s Germany, when people were not yet (sufficiently) acquainted with the ideology of national unity, so that an attempt to establish a national theatre was not supported by a ruling ideology providing fertile ground for that type of theatre to flourish. One could say that Lessing’s theatre was an early bird, a would-be national theatre without a nation.

Some 15 years after the publication of Lessing’s Hamburgische Dramaturgie, Friedrich Schiller propagated the idea of a national theatre as a co-creator of a nation in a public speech later on published under the title “The Stage as a Moral Institution”. According to Schiller, as one of the most influential engines for encouraging national sentiments, a national theatre institution has a moral obligation to participate in co-creating a German nation. In other words, to become a nation, Germans have to establish their national theatre – the German nation is not the predecessor of a German national theatre but, quite the opposite, a national theatre is a forerunner of the nation. As we can see, Schiller tried to shed a more optimistic light on Lessing’s rather pessimistic perception of the national theatre as a quixotic idea (a gutherzigen Einfall, as he says) in a social environment not yet constituted as a nation. In his romantic attitude, Schiller calls for unification of all artistic forces (poets, painters, etc.) in an attempt to found a national theatre as an indispensable attribute of the German nation: “If in all our plays there was one main stream, if our poets reached an agreement and created a firm

1 This sentence is frequently repeated in theatre histories but the rest of the paragraph where it appears is usually not quoted. It might be a symptom of an attempt to hide Lessing’s extremely negative views, not only of the cultural taste that comes to Germany “from across the Rhine”, but also his nasty criticism of everything associated with French people in general (cf. Hamburgische Dramaturgie, Hundert und erstes, zweites, drittes und viertes Stück, 1768).
union for this final purpose – if a strict selection led their work and their brushes dedicated
to national affairs – in one word, if we had a national theater, we would also
become a nation” (Schiller, 2005: 106; English translation in Wilmer, 2008: 15).

Lessing’s lament about problems with a national theater without a nation was
theoretically grasped by Zoja Skušek in her book Theatre as a Form of Spectacular Function
(1980). “How to make theater, which would grow up from a nation and would address
itself to a nation, if that very nation doesn’t exist yet,” asks Skušek (Skušek-Močnik,
1980: 26). She explains that Lessing’s statement is trapped in a paradox: national theater
without a nation is, according to Skušek, a “paradox of self-referentiality”:

“The highest assignment and the meaning of the national theater would be
[according to Lessing] to make possible and to foster that which otherwise enables
a national theater to be ‘prepared’. If that precondition is not fulfilled, there is no
theater; on the other hand, if there is no theater, that precondition could not exist
as well. The paradox of the national theater is thus a paradox of self-referentiality:
if one says that the theater is heteronomous (i.e. it derives its existence not out of
itself but out of something else, in that case of ‘moral character’ of a nation), it will
appear that it is autonomous (i.e. it is precisely theater which makes possible that
‘character’); in other words, if we say that the theater is autonomous, we have to
say at the same time that it is heteronomous” (Skušek-Močnik, 1980: 27).

An important point made by Zoja Skušek is that Lessing’s paradox of self-referentiality
has nothing to do with logic; it could not be eliminated just by playing with syllogisms – this
paradox is deeply embedded in the very practice of national and bourgeois theater. We can
add that Skušek’s conclusion also holds true for Schiller’s statement (“if we had a national
stage, we would also become a nation”): a simple rotation of premises cannot solve the
paradox. Stricto sensu, once the nation is established, the national theater becomes obsolete
(i.e. its “historical role” is fulfilled). Nevertheless, social reality shows a rather different
picture: although modern nations emerged many years ago, national theaters have persisted
from the late 18th century till today.

Emergence of national theaters of south-Slavic nations

Some hundred years after it was formulated in the writings of Lessing and Schiller,
the above-mentioned paradox of self-referentiality has found a rather late echo in a
pamphlet written by Slovenian writer Josip Jurčič. The elements of his “formula” were
not completely the same as in Lessing’s and Schiller’s versions but the very logic of the
argument was quite similar. In his contribution, published in the journal Slovenski narod
in 1868, Jurčič offered a patriotic plaidoyer for Slovenian national theater. Precisely the
national theater, insists Jurčič, is a precondition for dramatic masterpieces to emerge:
“Isn’t it so that the old Greeks made their theaters before they got Sophocles and
Aristophanes? Isn’t it so that Germany had its theaters before Lessing, even before
Chronegk and Gottsched? Isn’t it so that all these distinguished men came out of their
time, national necessity, visible assignment, and existing theatre? (...) We shouldn't hesitate to say directly to those people that in Ljubljana, main city of the province of Carniola, we need a Slovenian theatre due to political and national reasons” (Jurčič, 1868; quoted in Pušić, 1997: 103).

As we can see quite clearly, Jurčič’s position is that – as well as “national necessity” (narodova potreba), Zeitgeist and other ideological preconditions – the national theatre is an infrastructural fundament and a *sine qua non* for dramatic poetry with “national character” to flourish. An inherent paradox in his thesis, namely having a national theatre with only rare examples of drama plays representing that same nation (its “national character”), is veiled by Jurčič’s ad hoc solution to patch up the repertoire with “German, French and English dramaplays” as well as with “Slavic literature”:²

The roots of the national theatres of all three constitutive nations of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes date from the 1860s: national theatres were established in Zagreb in 1860, in Novi Sad a year later, in Ljubljana in 1867 ³ and in Belgrade in 1869. As we can read in the founding documents, all these south-Slavic national theatres were grounded on similar principles, such as raising national consciousness, moral education and the glorification of national history.

As stated by theatre historian Barbara Pušić, in the 19th century Slovenian theatre – like many other theatres of non-German nations in the Habsburg monarchy – was “an important substitute for political activity, statehood, and educational system. It also served as a space for linguistic, cultural, and national identification and an area of distinction from dominant neighbouring cultures, particularly German and Italian” (Pušić, 2004: 66). Being part of many different supra-national state structures until the end of the 20th century, Slovenian nationalism was always related to culture, especially the Slovenian language and printed culture.⁴ According to the same author, the type of nationalistic ideology prevailing among Slovenes in the last two centuries is cultural nationalism: “The thinking that culture is the basis, aim, justification, and main purpose of national existence was predominant in the public from the beginning of the nationalist movement at the end of the eighteenth century right up until the day Slovenia became independent. Within this there was the gradual emergence of the ideological phenomenon that the ‘nation’ is the central, fundamental, exclusive, and key bearer of cultural production” (Pušić, 2004: 65-66).

² The first play which was qualified for the national dramatic canon was precisely Jurčič’s *Tu gomer*. It was originally published in 1876 but due to theatre censorship it was staged only in 1919 as an inauguration event of the Slovenian national theatre in the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*Kraljevina SHS*).

³ Foundation of the Dramatic Society (*Dramatično društvo*) – this event is nowadays interpreted as the beginning of the Slovenian national theatre.

⁴ The first book in Slovenian appeared in 1550 and the first newspaper was published in 1797.
National theatres in “old” and “new” Yugoslavia

Until the end of the First World War and the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy, Slovenian theatre production was marginalized in comparison to German-speaking theatres which were generously supported by the not numerous but economically quite powerful German populations. After the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, however, this situation was radically changed: German theatres in Ljubljana and Maribor were closed and their buildings were taken over by two professional Slovenian national theatres. In 1919 the Council of Ministries of the Kingdom of SHS proclaimed a profound theatre reform. National theatres were arranged in three categories: firstly, national theatres (Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana); secondly, subsidized regional theatres (Skopje, Novi Sad, Sarajevo, Split, Osijek); and thirdly, municipal and travelling theatres (Niš, Kragujevac, Varaždin, Maribor).

After the Second World War, socialist Yugoslavia was established as a federal state consisting of six federal republics and two autonomous regions. The official political slogan of the ruling communist party was the “brotherhood and unity” of all Yugoslav nations. Despite some ideas to construct a unified Yugoslav nation, it remained a utopian project. Federal entities had their national cultural institutions, including national theatres. They performed in the official languages of their respective republics, in two autonomous regions also in Hungarian and Albanian. It was, of course, a very fruitful situation for writing new drama plays in national languages. Statistical data for Slovenia speak for themselves: from 1867 (foundation of the Dramatic Society) until the end of the Second World War (almost 80 years), approximately 220 new Slovenian plays were staged in Slovenian theatres; on the other hand, from 1945 to 1985 (i.e. in only 40 years of its existence as a federal republic within the Yugoslav federation), approximately 420 new Slovenian plays were shown on professional stages in Slovenia (Lukan, 1998: 65-66).

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5 Yugoslavians as a nation appeared for the first time in the 1961 census. The highest number of inhabitants declared themselves as Yugoslavians in the 1991 census – more than 1,200,000 or 5.4% of the whole population in the SFRY. After the dissolution of the SFRY, only a small number of inhabitants of the newly established states declared themselves as Yugoslavians: for instance, 80,721 in Serbia-Montenegro (2002 census) and only 127 in Croatia (2001 census).

6 Until the end of the First World War professional theatre productions were mainly based on the texts written by German dramatists – 40% of all works staged until 1918 (Pušić, 2004: 87). Even the first secular play performed in the Slovenian language was a rewriting of Josef Richter’s Die Feldmühle. In fact, it was not an isolated phenomenon – also in other countries of the Habsburg Empire the first secular performances in the national languages were mainly adaptations and rewritings of foreign plays: in Poland it was an adaptation of Molière’s Les Fâcheux, in Czechoslovakia an adaptation of J. C. Krüger’s Herzog Michel, and in Hungary a rewriting of Gottsched’s Agis, etc. (Pušić, 1997: 83-84).
Performing identities - national theatres and the re-construction of identities in Slovenia and the SFRY

Up until 1954 as many as 18 new national theatres were established all over Yugoslavia: 8 in Serbia (of which 4 in Vojvodina and 1 in Kosovo), 7 in Macedonia, 2 in Croatia and 1 in Montenegro. At that time the total number of professional theatre companies in Yugoslavia was 59 (including 5 companies with semi-professional status). The number of national theatres was constantly increasing and in 1990 there were as many as 35 national theatres in the former Yugoslavia. This trend of establishing new national theatres persists even in the 21st century. For instance, in the Slovenian city Nova Gorica, the theatre previously known as Primorsko dramsko gledališče (Primorska Drama Theatre) was renamed the Slovensko narodno gledališče Nova Gorica (Slovenian National Theatre Nova Gorica) in 2003. It is significant that this symbolic shift of the theatre in Nova Gorica from one among many regional theatres to third Slovenian national theatre (and, nota bene, the first new national theatre in Slovenia since 1918) occurred only half a year before Slovenia entered the European Union and the border between Slovenia and Italy was symbolically removed precisely between Nova Gorica (Slovenia) and Gorizia (Italy).

Slovenian national theatre after 1991

In the years preceding the collapse of federal Yugoslavia, and for various reasons, the prevailing political atmosphere in Slovenia pulled the country away from the community of Yugoslav nations. Political and cultural elites, especially their most extreme nationalist parts, stimulated secessionist tendencies. The soil was prepared and fertile, thanks to Milošević's extremely aggressive nationalism and to the controversial role played by the federal army. At a certain moment, even the economic sphere started to behave in the manner of “national economies”, preaching “national interests” and introducing protectionism in trading with companies from other federal republics. As a consequence of radicalization of inter-republic relations at the political and economic level, national and cultural stereotypes gradually penetrated the public sphere. The shift away from south-Slavic culture is traceable in “hard data”, as clearly demonstrated by Slovenian theatre historiographer Barbara Sušec Michieli:

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7 It is worth mentioning that in the late 1950s/early 1960s in Yugoslavia for every 280,000 inhabitants there was one professional theatre company; the same ratio in the USSR was 1:400,000 and in the USA 1:850,000 (Kalan, 1962: 3).

8 At that time 90 permanent theatres were officially registered in Yugoslavia. It means that almost one third of all professional theatres had in their names the word “national”.

9 Primorska is one of the regions in Slovenia.

10 In the last two decades (i.e. in the first 20 years of Slovenia as a sovereign country), three new municipal theatres were established: in Ptuj, Koper and Novo Mesto. Several commercial theatres were also opened towards the end of the 1990s.

11 The Paris Peace Treaty created a new border between SFR Yugoslavia and Italy, leaving Gorica (Gorizia), the traditional regional centre of the Soča and Vipava Valleys, outside the borders of Yugoslavia. Due to these geo-political reasons, a completely new town called Nova Gorica (New Gorizia) was built on the Slovenian (Yugoslav) side of the border after 1948.
“Analysis of a customary repertoire in Slovene professional theatres during the post-war years showed that the annual programme included 25% to 40% of Slovene plays, 5% to 10% of Yugoslav plays, while slightly more than one half of the programme was composed of foreign plays. By contrast, theatre analysis in the 1980s and 1990s shows radical changes within the programming strategy and reveals an interesting analogy among the political, economic, and cultural systems. (...) The political shift away from Yugoslavia led to the rejection of plays by authors from other Yugoslav republics. This shift was especially conspicuous within the SNG Drama Ljubljana, when during the decade leading up to Slovenia’s sovereignty, only one play by a Yugoslav author was staged” (Sušec Michieli, 2008c: 40-41).

In fact, by abandoning Yugoslav drama production in their programmes artistic directors of Slovenian professional theatres were practising the same “protectionist” politics towards other federal republics as was carried out by sales managers in Slovenian (and not only Slovenian) companies and, at the political level, by political elites and various national “associations of writers”. On the other hand, it seems plausible “that this radical break with the Yugoslav cultural space occurred only within the institutional theatrical system, and not also within alternative, independent theatre and popular culture” (Sušec Michieli, 2008c: 41).

National theatre as a useful object of revisionist theatre historiography

It is a notorious fact that all European national theatres have specific and unique histories. On the other hand, there are also some obvious similarities among them, such as a very strong emphasis on performing in national languages, staging traditional repertoire and plays by national dramatists, supporting rather than opposing the ruling ideology (or ideology of the ruling class), substantial financial revenues from public budgets, and respectable buildings representing the economic and political power of the national bourgeoisie.

All these elements can be traced in the history of Slovenian national theatre from its early manifestations in the 19th century up to recent developments in the early 21st century. Nowadays the defence and building of the nation are no longer its main functions, although the national theatre is still an important engine for constructing national and cultural identities. This operation is often highly problematic in terms of supporting political fantasies through one-sided selection of historical facts. For instance, in the period 1892-1914 “as much as half the entire acting company in Ljubljana was composed of Czech, Croatian, and Serbian actors, although in studies it is normally only the Slovenians that are dealt with and not the ‘foreigners’” (Pušić, 2004: 73). The neglect of non-Slovenian actors in the ensemble of the main national theatre in Ljubljana is further explained by an observation that “for historians, the borders of the national theatre coincided with the borders of the ethnic Slovenian lands rather than state borders, with another equally important factor being the language of performance.
Accordingly, theatre activities in Trieste (Italy), which is home to a Slovenian ethnic minority, were invariably included in Slovenian theatre history, even though the city is located across the state border. On the other hand the Jugoslovensko Narodno pozorište (Yugoslav National Theatre), which operated in Belgrade and performed in Serbian, was always treated only as a part of Serbian, and not Slovenian, Croatian, or Bosnian theatre history” (Pušić, 2004: 72).

Since 1991 national theatre historiography has not been immune to general revisionist tendencies to rewrite Slovenian history in the socialist period. It manifests itself in selective memory of the recent past, neglecting or even erasing the federal context of production and regular collaboration among theatres across the federal republics' boundaries “as if the Slovenians had never had anything in common with the Balkans”. As further stated by the same author, “there appeared the tendency for Slovenian theatre and culture to be tied to the traditions that existed prior to the founding of Yugoslavia. In the 1990s the notion of ‘Central Europe’ became fashionable, and this supposedly revived the importance of links with the nations of the former Habsburg monarchy” (Pušić, 2004: 81).

National theatres are the main users of public cultural budgets

In Slovenia, public funds for culture are distributed among public institutions and private organizations (mainly NGOs) in a ratio of 90:10% which is comparable to the majority of other European countries. Although public cultural institutions are relatively well subsidized, they are now expected to earn more from their own activities. In the socialist system, for instance, public funds amounted to approximately 85% of the total revenues of Slovenian theatres, while today this amount has decreased to approximately 75% (Sušec Michieli, 2008c: 38).

As far as national theatres are concerned, in Slovenia they are financed predominantly from the national budget. A bit less than 50% of all funds devoted for public theatres go to three national theatres (Ljubljana, Maribor, Nova Gorica), while the other half is distributed among eight regional and city theatres. If compared with the whole national budget for cultural public institutions, these three national theatres receive almost 10% of that budget.13

12 This is obviously a lapsus linguae: the real name of the theatre is the Jugoslovensko dramsko pozorište (Yugoslav Drama Theatre). The word “drama” in the name of the theatre is important due to the fact that the JDP put an immense emphasis precisely on literary classics. The JDP was founded in 1947 with the aim of attracting actors, directors and dramatists from all over the socialist Yugoslavia, and with an ambition to create the Yugoslav counterpart to the Moscow Art Theatre. Its Yugoslav character was programmatically inaugurated by staging The King of Betainov, a play by Slovenian dramatist Ivan Cankar, as an opening performance of the new theatre (3 April 1948, director: Bojan Stupica).

13 These data are for 2008. Detailed figures are available on the webpage of the Ministry of Culture:
One might say that these figures are quite balanced, especially if we compare them to some more extreme examples, such as, for instance, national theatres in Croatia. The Croatian national theatre in Zagreb has a special status: its founders are the state and the city of Zagreb, both of them contributing approximately half of the theatre's revenues from public sources. Other national theatres (in Osijek, Rijeka and Split) are financed predominantly from city budgets, while the Croatian Ministry of Culture contributes less than 10% of the funds they receive from city budgets. In this system of financing, national theatres are the main users of funds for culture in local public budgets: in 2008 the Croatian National Theatre in Split received 42% of the entire city budget for culture and the Croatian National Theatre in Rijeka spent almost 50% of the city's cultural budget in the same year. Hard data\textsuperscript{14} are maybe blind to some subtle details, but in this case it is quite obvious that national theatres still play an important, maybe even central role in the cultural systems of major Croatian cities.\textsuperscript{15}

**National theatre vs. “independent theatre”**

Researchers into the tendencies in Slovenian theatre after the political and economic changes of 1991 (independent state, new economic system and political regime, in short, the period usually called “transition”) are almost united in their assessment that the main line of division is not so much based on the difference between national and non-national theatre as based on the difference between “institutional” and “non-institutional” (or “independent”) theatre (Lukan, 1999: 17). This division is very obvious if we compare the two categories at the level of the material conditions they work in. National and city theatres have permanent ensembles, they are highly subsidized from public funds, they have their own infrastructure (halls, equipment, etc.), their collaborators are mainly employed as permanent staff, and so forth, while, on the other hand, independent theatre companies lack all these incentives. Receiving less than 10% of the public funds for culture and lacking their own infrastructure, these “independent” companies nevertheless “depend” on the good will of public financers and cultural institutions.

These differences, however, are not traceable only on the material level: they are also visible on the level of those elements which are traditionally assigned to national theatre.

\textsuperscript{14} These data are taken from two official sources: “Službeni glasnik grada Splita, no. 40/2008” and “Prijedlog godišnjeg izvještaja o izvršenju Proračuna grada Rijeke za 2008. godinu”.

\textsuperscript{15} In 1994 the national theatre in Rijeka changed its name from National Theatre to Croatian National Theatre. The renaming of the theatre provoked some critical responses from the ensemble of Italian Drama, which is one of three ensembles working together under the same roof (two other ensembles being Croatian Drama and Opera and Ballet), but their remarks were ignored by the authorities.
Performing identities - national theatres and the re-construction of identities in Slovenia and the SFRY

It is one of the findings which came out of an ad hoc study made by the Slovenian theatre journal *Maska* in 1999.\(^{16}\) A statistical analysis of the annual programmes of Slovenian theatres from 1986 up to 1998 has shown that, for instance, the number of plays originally written in Slovenian and staged in that period was almost the same in both types of theatres. In national/city theatres, as well as in independent companies, approximately one third of all plays were originally written in Slovenian. In some years even half of the plays staged by independent companies were written by Slovenian authors. This surprising finding led one of the researchers to the conclusion that “stagings of domestic authors, otherwise typical for repertoire theatres, have obviously migrated to the non-institutional production” (Orel, 1999: 23). Besides this, in the 1990s the number of plays by Slovenian authors has increased by more than a quarter (there were more English and Austrian plays as well), while Croatian and Serbian dramatists were less represented than in the 1980s (the same with German, American and Russian authors). The number of foreign collaborators in the 1990s (including those coming from other republics of the former Yugoslavia) has decreased by nearly 100% if compared with the figures from the 1980s.

One of the biggest changes in the Slovenian theatre of the late 20th century is that the national theatre still possesses an immensely strong position within the system of state cultural policy while, on the other hand, its real influence on different cultural identifications (including national identity) is rather limited. On the other hand, national theatre is still an important symbol of supposed identification with traditional culture and national resentment. It was made visible in an ironic manner through the project called the Slovenian National Theatre, an independent production dealing with the expulsion of all the members of a Roma family from their home in a Slovenian village, committed by a large group of inhabitants of the same village. This nationalistic action was represented in the performance by using the technique of so-called documentary theatre, with all the brutal details of the event as well as direct political connotations. On the symbolic level, the title of the performance functions as a metonymic displacement (*Verschiebung*); this discursive operation appropriates the notion of the national theatre and uses it precisely in its historical, traditional meaning; as a representation of a nation.\(^{17}\)

In this context, the thesis proposed by Zoja Skušek some 30 years ago is still relevant: “The sole existence of national theatres, an important position they still occupy, as well as the paradox that avant-garde theatres have to define their own position precisely in opposition to big national theatre institutions, make us believe that, when talking about contemporary theatre, we have to confront ourselves with ideology and practice of the  

\(^{16}\) Cf. special issue on Slovenian theatre in 1990s, *Maska*, Ljubljana, vol. VIII, no. 5-6/1999.  
\(^{17}\) “… the most important characteristic [of the national theatre] in its entire history is that the national dominant decides on fundamental questions of theatre as well as on general constellation: the theatre represents, stages, symbolizes and confirms the Slovenian nation” (Kreft, 1999: 30).
national theatre” (Skušek-Močnik, 1980: 26). As we tried to demonstrate in this paper, the concept of national theatre and the construction of cultural identity related to that concept, could have different ideological presuppositions: from the “nationalizing” of culture (Lessing’s option) to the “culturalization” of the nation (Schiller’s option). However, no matter which option prevails, the paradox of the national theatre remains active – and it holds true also for Slovenia and other newly established nation states of the former SFRY.

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Culture of trauma and identity politics -
critical frames and emancipatory lenses of cultural
and knowledge production

Jasmina Husanović

Abstract
This presentation reflects on the ways forward in recent knowledge production encompassing the gestures of repoliticization within the cultural politics of memory in the (post-)Yugoslav space. It builds on several critical insights and important heuristic tools provided in the respective analyses by panel speakers concerning visual and performative cultural production (monuments, theatre, etc.) in the wider context of identitarian regimes for managing affect in the Yugoslav successor states, caught up in a complex “transitional” ethnonationalist-neoliberal dynamic. The author’s aim is to focus on the emancipatory potential for challenging the culturalization of trauma within the therapeutic paradigm of governance as an ideological mechanism for the perpetuation of sovereign and identitarian terror (inter)nationally (using select empirical lenses of current conundrums of memory and identity politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina). In this regard, the presentation will attempt to gear the discussion towards the importance of artistic and scholarly interventions interrogating the politics of abjection, affect, revolt and collectivity in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFry) and post-SFry context which traverse the petrified ideological straitjackets of cultural politics today.

Keywords: culturalization of trauma, identity politics, (post-)Yugoslav space, Bosnia and Herzegovina

This text reflects on some ways forward in current and future knowledge production which questions the Leviathan called “the transitional dynamics of cultural identities” globally, through the lenses empirically provided by the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the (post-) SFry region. (It is a Leviathan because its spectre is felt in the vertigo of everyday life infused with a myriad of technologies of statecraft and governance through identity management.) We have to build upon productive critiques
of violent and exclusionary matrices of political, social and economic imagination, association and organization that underpin the culture of exception globally, hiding the new/old ways in which we are being subjected and governed in this part of the world. Within this social magic in the last 20 years, with its burdening recursive quality (we are produced as agents of social practice by structures which are no more than an objectification of our past practices as agents), visual and performative strategies are of key importance in the politics of memory and memorialization that resist selective memories and sanitized futures. It is of utmost importance to engage in a joint effort to critically frame cultural and knowledge production that transforms the shackles of imposed ideologies and practices of identity and memory.

My own critical lenses are shaped by the empirical analysis of the culturalized regimes of memory and identity operative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a (post-)Yugoslav region, Europe and globally, as layers of international lives and politics. I have elsewhere been concerned with the sovereign politics of the camp/ghetto and technologies through which trauma/terror/atrocity are being normalized, and how these technologies of governing life have been resisted and traversed at some intersectional spaces and practices in the field of art and theory, civil society, media, science and law (see more in Husanović, 2010a). Contextual optics are used in order to refract a universal crisis of current political imaginaries when it comes to global “governance of life”. This happens through the management of effect (“ethnic hatred”, for instance) and accompanying technologies for governing “traumatized nations” through culturalized liberal governance leading to peace and security, development and creative diversity. Concerning this, I will draw on several critical insights and important heuristic tools in the texts/presentations by Milena Dragićević-Šešić and Aldo Milohnić concerning the visual and performative reconstruction of identities through cultural practices and policies (monuments, theatre, etc.) by focusing on the context of identitarian regimes in managing effect in the Yugoslav successor states caught in a “transitional” ethnonationalist-neoliberal vortex (Dragićević-Šešić, 2011; Milohnić, 2011).

Viewing social life as a series of continuities out of discontinuities in a historicized and sociologized fashion is the approach of Milohnić’s text analysing the ideology and aesthetics of national theatres in Slovenia in the modern period and (post-)Yugoslav contexts. My question¹ is: how can we fight and transgress the brashness and insolence

¹ This question is particularly inspired by an insightful remark by Milohnić: “In May 2002, exchange of performances by two – Slovenian and Serbian – national theatres provoked a lot of pomp, media panegyrics and orgiastic apotheosis. Slovenian media reported frenetic applause and a delirious response from the Belgrade audience to performances by the Slovenian National Theatre (Drama SNG Ljubljana). Belgrade theatre Atelje 212 received similar acceptance during its tour in Slovenia. Interstate exchange of artistic products is not necessarily a bad thing, especially if some artistically powerful performances find themselves in such an elitist selection. In this case, however, an extra-artistic, culture-political aspect of that theatre and media circus was
of ideological recursion in the mantra of “renewing cultural ties” hiding the body of the sovereign (and the fact that the emperor is naked)? And what is this habitus of “art statism” that feeds into the representative model of governing aesthetics; what sorts of systems of classification, distinction, separation, antagonisms occur here and where is the way out? (It is worth remembering heuristic toolboxes on these themes in the works of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986; 1990a; 1990b; 1998). National theatre is all about taste and class. When Milohnić ends with a thesis proposed by Zoja Skušek some 30 years ago, we find ourselves with the question of avant-garde theatres in an oppositional political relationship they have to assume concerning the politics of aesthetics and aesthetics of politics concerning ideological conundrums of statist/sovereign incorporation at various levels.

As Ranciére would have it, genuine/avant-garde politics and art are forms of dissensus because their specificity resides in “their contingent suspension of the rules governing normal experience”, where they effect an emancipatory redistribution of the sensible, through “forms of innovation that tear bodies from their assigned places and free speech and expression from all reduction to functionality (...) forms of creation irreducible to the spatio-temporal horizons of a given factual community” (Ranciére, 2010: 1). However, the disruption that genuine artistic or political activities effect is not about institutional overturning, but “an activity that cuts across forms of cultural and identity belonging and hierarchies between discourses and genres, working to introduce new subjects and heterogenous objects into the field of perception (...) reorienting general perceptual space and disrupting forms of belonging” (Ranciére, 2010: 2).

more interesting for an independent observer. Symptomatically, journalists, critics, politicians, producers and artists emphasized in their public statements that this exchange of theatre performances was the first one after ten years of suspension of any kind of cultural collaboration between these two ex-Yugoslav republics. This messianic role of the two national theatres is of course complete mystification which reduces and castrates entire artistic production to nationally and institutionally representative art. Exchange of independent and alternative artists from both Slovenia and Serbia was never suspended, not even during the economic, political and cultural embargo imposed on Serbia by the ‘international community’. Due to many obstacles, intensity of this independent cultural exchange was reduced, its visibility in mass media was rather marginal, events were maybe not overcrowded with visitors, but it is both arrogant and ignorant to say that the recent exchange of performances of the two national theatres from Ljubljana and Belgrade means the ‘recovering of cultural ties’ between the two newly established states. These states are maybe new but the mental structure in the heads of their most influential cultural emissaries remains old: it is the same politics of art statism and ignorance of the production which cannot fit into the representative model of the ruling esthetic and art system” (Milohnić, 2011: 13-14).

2 “The sole existence of national theatres, an important position they still occupy, as well as the paradox that avant-garde theatres have to define their own position precisely in opposition to big national theatre institutions, make us believe that, when talking about contemporary theatre, we have to confront ourselves with the ideology and practice of the national theatre” (Skušek, 1980; quoted in Milohnić, 2011: 19).
So, what is this dissensus and how can we talk about it in terms of critical knowledge production and social practice concerning the politics of memorialization? Precisely these questions are productively tackled in Milena Dragićević-Šešić’s analysis of cultural policies, cultural identities and monument building – new memory policies of Balkan countries. Her text offers acute diagnoses of cultural policies in post-socialist countries and their European context oscillating between ethnic and transcultural strategies.3 There is an overview of the current and the planned and an encouragingly ambitious research into the memory politics and monument building strategies in the former Yugoslav region, based on an elaborate model embedded in taxonomies of practices of memory/identity/culture constitution, consisting of models of anticulture, models of culturalization and models of dissensus.4 It identifies the potential of particular importance for further study and action, and invites us to enrich this research transversally, building upon some disparate strands of knowledge production and activism in the region concerning the politics/aesthetics of dissensus in the politics of memory and monuments in/of our lives.

Dragićević-Šešić’s intervention maps out several productive ways of scholarly engagement for those who would like to underpin such analyses with examples from Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the materiality of memory inscription is about encircling the abject – “mapping a genocide” and “telling the story of a mass grave”,5 over our “ethnocitizen body”, leaving you breathless with its Hieronymus Bosch aesthetics, and urging us towards emancipatory gestures of repoliticization and dissent. The task ahead is to challenge the culturalization of trauma within the therapeutic paradigm of governance as an ideological mechanism for the perpetuation of sovereign and identitarian terror (inter)nationally (Husanović, 2011a).

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3 Such as this insight: “In this respect it can be said that Eastern cultural policies are Ianus faced policies – turned to the national identity and European cultural values at the same time – homophobic and antidiscriminatory at the same time. To differ from the cultural policy of socialism, which had, besides it ideological, also explicit ethical and esthetical platforms, the cultural policy of contemporary liberal societies tries to distance itself from any kind of explicit aesthetic platform – wanting to prove that freedom of creative expression is the fundamental principle and value, while support to diversities should be, at the same time, the starting point and the policy outcome” (Dragićević-Šešić, 2011: 3).

4 “The methodology of the research will be based on categories identified by Kodrnja et al. (2010) and Slapšak (2009: 17), re-adapted and further developed for the needs of this research. Thus we identified three different models:
- the model of anticulture ...;
- the model of “culturalization ...;
- the model of dissent – creative dialogue ...” (Dragićević-Šešić, 2011: 6)

5 As I have explored elsewhere – see Husanović, 2010b and 2011b.
Let me gear this discussion towards the importance of artistic and scholarly interventions interrogating the politics of abjection, affect, revolt and collectivity in the SFRY and post-SFRY context which traverse the petrified ideological straitjackets of cultural politics today when it comes to identity-memory regimes. The fracturing of biopolitics and capital, tied to the crisis of sovereignty, statehood and statecraft only attests to contemporary losses of the subject and the political, through very specific material bodies, experiences and insights. For instance, it is important to provide a critique and appraisal of those gestures that escape the post-political bind of the “culture of exception/trauma/terror” that persist despite all state-building and democratizing efforts involving a host of international and national agencies and globalizing processes (including “Europeanization”).

Globally, to agree with Boris Buden’s commentary on Frederick Jameson’s view of late capitalism, “culture expands throughout the entire area of society to a point where our entire societal life – from economic value to state power all the way to the structure of psyche itself – has become ‘cultural’ in a sense that has not been adequately reflected upon” (Buden, 2005). Even the therapeutic regimes of “transitional justice” in post-Yugoslavia are getting reduced to culturalized performativity turned into “empty politics”, with no real challenge to the dominant symbolic and ideological orders, and far away from a reimagining of solidarity and communality, inclusivity and equality as norms of transformative (universalist, cosmopolitan, democratic) politics. Behind this culturalization or bureaucratization of social and political issues is the governing paradigm of “the management of affect” through various post-political languages of law, science or techno-managerial administration, where we face culturalist dissolution of genuine political relation and action.

Attention must be turned to those visions, spaces and agencies that are on the margins, cutting across the state, below and above, horizontally, in academia and scholarship, civil society, media and arts/culture that take the risk of resisting and demystifying dominant matrices and regimes of governance, representations of identity and belonging, assertions of political power and authority, and that find creative and inspiring trajectories when it comes to political engagement. Visual and performative strategies of art and politics are of key importance here where we can engage with those practices whose innovative concepts can help us think and intervene in our global troubles. Surely, scholarship as transformative politics today, as always, has to be entwined with those emancipatory gestures concerning the renegotiation of communality and solidarity, political forms of human life, and promising political engagements towards justice and equality.

This renewed work on knowledge production in academic, activist and artistic circles that function as “school cooperatives of radical truth” (which many of us engage in and use to open space for action) must insist on the fusion between knowledge and action, critical thinking and material struggles. It has to trace out emergent politics and critical interventions that resist sovereign politics camping bare lives and managing bodies of subjects/citizens through new technologies and rationalities globally. The
politics of memory and identity is where culture becomes the main arena of governance and resistance. Inseparable from these matrices is the “post-politics”, through its depoliticization of the questions of freedom and equality and its over-celebration of difference and over-insistence on identitarian issues through rather performative techniques of bestowing “order” to societies in transition, after loss, atrocity and so forth.

However, the vectors of dissensus, resistance and radical truth in the face of abjection/affect, introduce doubt and controversy, situating art in the field of experience, politics and capitalism. It is in the marginalized fields of cultural production, arts and activism that new collective words and deeds are produced so as to assume bare life, our radical relationality and contingency as a starting point, towards new re-imaginations of the political. We see this in feminist production and art in the region where an affirmative politics of witnessing to trauma does offer ways of identification and participation that are an authentic challenge to the populist/right-wing/fascist mobilization of affect and passion on the one hand, and the aseptic liberal management of effect in white gloves and in the name of human rights, on the other (see more in Husanović, 2007). When witnessing the legacies of atrocity, ethical social relationships must be instituted anew, based on critical reflection on the origins and methods of violence, where mass atrocity is only the culmination of everyday biopolitical control over life and death. This battle is also the battle over the monument.

Instead of the over-authorization of victims as “secular saints” and the monopolization of experience where the politics of affectivity is based on the sacralization of horror in a desacralizing world, there is a political act of traumatic remembering, the attempt to speak communally and publicly about justice and equality in the face of abject politics that resurrects the dead to serve the governance of (inter)nationalized ghettoes sinking into a triple bind of poverty, banality and corruption.6 We must analyse precisely such instances and acts of the politics of witnessing to trauma in search of new coordinates of universal politics, from the field of cultural and knowledge production and public activism, where experiences are turned into critical insights and actions, collectively. This often occurs in particular forms of social activism, movements based on the politics of solidarity and equality (workers, students, women and other “others”), as well as in cultural and artistic production. It also occurs in specific forms of knowledge production that are tied to transformative action in various spaces of publicity.7 Examples abound and we have to weave them together, in critical solidarity.

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6 For more on this triple bind, see Sullivan, 2002: 136.
7 I have explored these elsewhere, especially in Chapters 6 and 7 of the monograph Između traume, nade i imaginacije (Husanović, 2010a). See also Husanović, 2009 and 2011c.
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PART TWO
Communication, media and cultural identities
Abstract

With the gaining of independence and the adoption of the new constitution, all provisions that pertained to other nations of the former Yugoslavia, including the provision on language, were left out of the new legal and formal framework in Slovenia. Although many of the people this relates to acquired Slovenian citizenship on the grounds of permanent residence in Slovenia, and despite the commitment on the part of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia that the Slovenian state would ensure “to all members of other nations the right to multifarious cultural and linguistic development”, the status and the situation of other languages of the former Yugoslavia remained unregulated. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that peoples of other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia along with their languages are non-integrated “remnants” who were excluded from the internal cultural and social division in the process of the construction of the Slovenian national identity and national state, and remained outside the cultural borders. Although their knowledge of a mother tongue should be an asset and part of their credentials, in the present social circumstances and linguistic reality this is almost a handicap and a source of stigma. The situation has accordingly been reflected in media policy through an absence of measures and actions aimed at regular production of media programme content that would reflect the specific social and cultural situation of these communities. This paper examines how the language situation of people from other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia has changed with the independence of Slovenia, how it has affected the specific post-Yugoslav reconstruction and repositioning of cultural identities, and how it is supported by the media system in Slovenia.

Keywords: language policy, cultural identity, erased residents, linguistic human rights, minority protection, nations of former Yugoslavia in Slovenia
Introduction

Twenty years of absence of a constitutional and legal framework for the regulation of language and communication rights of members of other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia – Albanians (from Kosovo), Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians and Serbs – has affected the reconstruction and repositioning of post-Yugoslav cultural identities in Slovenia.

With the gaining of independence and the adoption of the new constitution, all provisions that pertained to other nations of the former Yugoslavia, including the provision on language, were left out of the new legal and formal framework in Slovenia.

The new normative situation can be described by referring to the situation of the “erased residents” – the permanent residents of Slovenia, members of other nations of the former Yugoslavia, who were erased from the register of permanent residents in February 1992. The languages were erased from the normative framework. Instead of further regulation of language and communication rights for members of other nations of former Yugoslavia and the provision of a clear framework for the recognition and promotion of their languages and diverse post-Yugoslav cultural identities in the newly formed state, the policy of ignorance and marginalization prevailed.

Although attitudes towards languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia during the functioning of Yugoslavia signalled problems, there were some elements in the constitution and other regulations providing a framework for their status and use.

To illustrate the controversial situation of language use and regulation we will focus on the struggle of the erased residents to gain their linguistic rights and improve language competences. We will also devote attention to the general situation in Slovenia for languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia. Through deconstruction of that population fragment in the development of post-Yugoslav language situations and cultural policies we want to add a piece to the mosaic of understanding of post-Yugoslav cultural reconfigurations.

In discussing these issues, our point of departure will be Bourdieu’s position on the value of language. According to him, a speaker’s power stems from his/her position within the social structure, linguistic competence represents symbolic capital and linguistic exchanges are a means of establishing relations of linguistic domination (Bourdieu, 1992: 72).

The lack of knowledge of Slovene as a handicap

“My dears, first learn Slovene, not this gibberish!”. This was a message to Aleksandar Todorović,1 the representative of The Civil Initiative of Erased Activists.

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1 This message was in a comment on the text entitled “17 Erased Years” signed by “zz” and posted on 27 February 2009 at Vest.si. Aleksandar Todorović joined the debate under his full name, while the other commentators, with the exception of Blaž Babič, used pseudonyms. There were 214 comments on this text (http://www.vest.si/2009/02/27/17-izbrisanih-let/, 26 July 2009).
Criticism of erased people's poor knowledge of Slovene repeatedly crops up in discussions about the regulation of their status and rights. The interviews with the erased people conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2009 as part of the Peace Institute's research study “The Erased People of Slovenia – A Challenge for the Young Nation-State” reveal that many among them, but primarily first-generation immigrants, indeed do not have a good command of Slovene. Many of them speak a mixture\(^2\) of Slovene and their mother tongue – Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian or other.\(^3\)

Why is this so? Why do many erased people and other members of the first generation of immigrants lack a good command of Slovene?

Workers from other republics of the former Yugoslavia immigrated to Slovenia when the latter was still part of Yugoslavia. At the time of their immigration and until 1991, when Slovenia as a sovereign state adopted the new constitution, Article 6 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (dating from 1974) provided that citizens of other socialist republics of Yugoslavia had “the same rights and obligations in Slovenia as the citizens of Slovenia”. Provisions relating to language were laid out in Article 212 of this constitution. In accordance with this article, everyone had the right to “cultivate and express his culture and use his language and script”; the language of all bodies, organizations and individuals performing a “social function” in the Republic of Slovenia (RS) was Slovene, and everyone had “the right to use his language and script when realizing his rights and obligations and in procedures before state and other bodies and organizations that perform a social function. A body conducting such a procedure is obliged to supply the material and information on its work in his language and in the manner provided by law”.

The last paragraph of this article stated that “the lack of knowledge of Slovene cannot be an obstacle hindering anyone’s defense, exercise of rights or justified interests”. Article 213 stated that “members of other Yugoslav nations and nationalities have, in accordance with the law, the right to education and schooling in their own language”.

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\(^2\) A mixture of languages or a hybrid language is a special linguistic, cultural and social phenomenon. It has recently received significant attention and singular approval from the Slovenian public especially after the success of Goran Vojnović's book Čefurji raus! (Čefur, plural čefurji, is a derogatory term for non-Slovenes coming from the former Yugoslav republics). Hybrid languages are characteristic of many multilingual societies, particularly those where immigrants account for a large part of the population.

\(^3\) After the emergence of the new countries following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian also split into several national languages, i.e. Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and, recently, Montenegrin. For more on what happened to Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian and whether it is possible to say that this language still exists, see Bugarski’s discussion "O starom jeziku i novim jezicima" (On the Old Language and New Languages) (Bugarski, 2009: 121-127).
In December 1990, during the period when Slovenia was moving towards its independence, an important assurance concerning the linguistic situation and linguistic rights of members of the former Yugoslav nations came from the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. Before the plebiscite on Slovenia’s independence and sovereignty, the Assembly issued the “Proclamation to all citizens of the RS and all the voters in the RS”, inviting them to take part in the plebiscite on 23 December 1990. In the accompanying Declaration of Good Intentions it stated, among other things, that the Slovenian state would ensure “to all members of other nations the right to multifarious cultural and linguistic development”.

The new Constitution of Sovereign Slovenia, adopted in December 1991, laid down the new formal framework determining the linguistic situation of other nations of the former Yugoslavia living in Slovenia. Article 11 of the constitution states that the official language in Slovenia is Slovene, along with Italian and Hungarian in the areas inhabited by the Italian and Hungarian minorities. Article 62 states that everyone “has the right to use his language and script in a manner provided by law in the exercise of his rights and duties and in procedures before state and other authorities performing a public function”. The Constitution of Sovereign Slovenia no longer mentions members of other nations of the former Yugoslavia or their linguistic rights.

The reasons for the inferior knowledge of Slovene among first-generation immigrants from the former Yugoslavia lie not only in the formal constitutional and legal regulations that were in place while Slovenia was still part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), but also in the living and working conditions of immigrant workers. Silva Mežnarić described these in the book entitled “Bosanci.” A kuda idu Slovenci nedeljom? (“Bosnians. And Where Do The Slovenians Go On Sundays?”), presenting the findings of a 1983 research study that examined the situation of workers from other republics of the then Yugoslavia living in Slovenia.

Below is how one of the interviewees described his living situation at the time:

“Yeah, it’s a bit difficult to get quite used to it, because we are all alone in the flat, without, like, any potential cooperation from the outside (...) there should be a bit more of a sort of cooperation, say, among local people and people from other republics, I don’t know, connections could be better and we could visit each other, a bit more of cooperation in some way – but as it is, you come as if you fell out of the sky, fell from a plane, and as long as there’s a need, you work, when there’s no need, then when once ... when you don’t work you have to travel home, from home to the apartment, from the apartment home, and to work, you have nothing else” (Mežnarić, 1986: 8-11).

Another worker’s answer indicated the linguistic situation of the time:

“I can’t speak Slovene, I say it straightforward, you know...”
“Yes, but you certainly understand.”

“Sure I understand, but ... The child understands too, but you see, it's another thing; he plays with the boys, he memorizes some Slovene if a Slovenian child is with them, but you rarely see Slovenian children playing with our, Bosnian children.”

“They mainly keep apart?”

“It’s not that they keep apart, but they, you know – you and me, when we talk, it’s normal that you’ll seek a company of people you understand well, it’s difficult for you too, because of the language, to use our language, and for me too it is difficult to use Slovene, I mean, it’s not difficult ... I didn’t try Slovene at all – in my company it’s mostly our people, er, ... Bosnians, you cannot speak to them, you don’t have such a company, understand Slovene, so that you ...” (Mežnarić 1986, 104–105)

According to Gellner (1991), in modern industrial countries an individual can be fully included in society only if he/she goes through complex, formal training, learns the language of the dominant culture and acquires industrially relevant education of a required standard. Many members of the former Yugoslav nations living in Slovenia (“non-Slovenes”), particularly first-generation immigrants, never learnt the language of the dominant culture to an extent that would suffice for their inclusion and acceptance. This phenomenon is quite understandable, given that these people came to Slovenia as workers during the socialist era when Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia. Their labour was included in Slovenian industry, but the system did not provide mechanisms for their complete inclusion in Slovenian society.

Even now, 19 years after Slovenia became a sovereign country, more than 90% of immigrants with temporary or permanent resident status in Slovenia come from the countries that were formed after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. What is meaningful, though, is that the law providing for systemic measures towards the integration of immigrants into society was adopted only in 2008. These measures include free courses in Slovene, Slovenian culture and history, and are part of the EU tailored policy framework for migrations and integration. Information dissemination to make the integration of foreign citizens resident in Slovenia easier is provided through publications of the Ministry of Interior, also in the languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia, including an information platform within the website of the ministry. It is, however, indicative that after 20 years of independence and the establishment of the language situation in which around 10% of citizens of Slovenia have one of the languages of another nation of the former Yugoslavia for their mother tongue, the only official use of these languages by the government is through the Ministry of Interior, and is aimed at “foreigners”.

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4 This is supported by the data of the Ministry of the Interior for 2009. See http://www.mnz.gov.si/si/mnz_za_vas/tujci_v_sloveniji/statistika/ (7 February 2011).
From 1990 to 2010 the speakers of the languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia – the majority of them have the former Serbo-Croatian language, now Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian, for their mother tongue – have been categorized according to their legal status into a number of categories. The names assigned to these categories almost uniformly indicate some sort of temporality and non-stability of their stay, regardless of the formal status as a citizen or a foreigner. The categories include “immigrants from other republics of Yugoslavia”, “second/third generation of immigrants”, “erased”, “refugees”, “asylum seekers”, “migrant workers (from the western Balkans)”, “third country nationals”, and similar. In public policies relating to language and communication in Slovenia there is still no consideration and understanding of the fact that these are the same language groups whose language and communication rights and capacities need to be addressed. Systemic measures need to be set up aimed at the preservation of these minority languages and the promotion of cultural diversity. It seems that the transition to that understanding is still taking place, and the long route to it is caused not only by nation- and state-building configurations, but also by its origins in earlier developments within the former Yugoslavia.

Knowledge of a mother tongue other than Slovene as a handicap

Various statements and public discussions suggest that it is not quite clear whether and when members of other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia may use their mother tongue in public. They also raise the question as to why the speakers of these languages threaten to revert to their mother tongue or begin to use it when they feel rejected. All of this indicates that there is a unique conflict in Slovenia concerning the status and use of these languages. Why is this so and how did it come about?

The issue of the languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia vs. Slovene did not become contentious only after Slovenia became a sovereign country. That the conflict is older is indicated by responses to questions posed in the series of surveys entitled Slovenian Public Opinion conducted during the second half of the 1980s. For example, a question in the Slovenian Public Opinion 1986 survey, in the section entitled “National Relations” went as follows: “Some say that immigration from other republics poses a threat to Slovenes. Do you agree with this statement? If yes, what is it that is threatened?” The biggest portion of the respondents, 39% of them, replied that it was the Slovene language that was threatened (Toš, 1997: 533). In the following year’s survey, in the section now entitled “The Problems of the Slovenes and Relations Among Nations”, the question was: “Do you think that the Slovene language is threatened, or that it is not threatened?” Of respondents, 65.6% thought that it was threatened, and 25.2% stated that it was not. In

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5 On arguments that it is still the same, polycentric language, see Kordić 2010.

6 In the same survey, 33.8% of respondents thought that immigration of workers from the former Yugoslav republics was a threat to their employment opportunities, 23% thought that it threatened nationhood, and 20.4 % that it threatened Slovenian customs (Toš, 1997: 533)
responding to the multiple choice question about the kinds of behaviour that posed a threat to the Slovene language, 44.7% of respondents thought that the threat was coming from workers from other republics and autonomous regions of Yugoslavia who did not learn Slovene. An additional 27.6% of respondents thought that this seriously threatened the Slovene language (Toš, 1997: 587-588).

Interviews with younger members of the nations of the former Yugoslavia (so-called “second-generation immigrants”) within Admir Baltić’s survey (2006) offer an insight into the linguistic relations and the situation of the speakers of these languages. In these interviews they talked about their childhood, meaning the period of time preceding Slovenia’s independence.  

asked whether he felt free to speak Bosnian in school and in the street when he was a child (during the 1980s), an interviewee of Bosnian extraction replied: “Actually you could, but they would definitely give you a weird look if they heard you.”

asked if he spoke Bosnian with his Bosnian school mates in school, he answered: “No, actually not, not in elementary school. We mainly spoke Slovene and we used Bosnian only when we were telling a joke. But no.”

Other interviewees in Admir Baltić’s survey spoke about feeling ashamed when as children they used their mother tongue in public:

“At that time I didn’t like it. I was a bit ashamed, if, for example, my mum started talking to me, I’d immediately tell her: no, speak Slovene. I remember the kindergarten, my parents came to fetch me and sometimes, I don’t know, my father came and started to talk in Bosnian, and then I’d say: Daddy, keep quiet, not here, here you have to speak Slovene. But as I said, it was when I was a child, before school.”

Some interviewees spoke about non-acceptance of these languages in today’s Slovenia:

“No, for example, there is one such example at my workplace, one of my colleagues there is a Bosnian, they call him Bosanc. He came to Slovenia during the war, completed his studies here, and now he’s found this job and the two of us always speak Bosnian, and it’s a bit, in some way it’s quite a provocation for the Slovenes, because they are sensitive, definitely it is, but we still talk in Bosnian.

7 The interviews were conducted for the research project entitled “Diskriminacija na osnovi etnične pripadnosti z vidika Albancev, Bošnjakov, Črnogorcev, Hrvatov, Makedoncev in Srbov” (Discrimination On the Grounds of Ethnicity From the Perspective of Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians and Serbs), conducted in 2005 and 2006 by Admir Baltić for the Peace Institute. The research was part of a larger project entitled “Ali poznate vaše pravice?” (Do You Know Your Rights?), financially supported by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Slovenia.
It really annoys me that they are annoyed when we speak Bosnian between ourselves, but when, for example, two Spanish people... or two I-don't-know-who talks in their own language, they don’t mind it at all.

For example, I have a friend from Banja Luka and we talk, we used to talk, in Serbian, you know, in the bus. Now, I mean, if Englishmen talk in English, you know, or Germans, whoever, if they talk in their own language nobody minds it. So why should they mind if we talk in Serbian. (...) Hm, and there was this situation when an older man began to say ‘raus,’ you know, in that sense, ‘čefurji out, go back,’ that was the situation when I experienced it directly” (Baltić, 2006).

As linguists explain, of all the nations of the former Yugoslavia it was the Slovenes (and the Macedonians) who saw language as a vehicle of ethnic and national distinction (Bugarski, 2002: 71), and it is societies that see language as the main sign of their collective identity that are more sensitive to language issues. Accordingly, language and language policy in Slovenia were always delicate issues. Roter emphasized that the role the Slovene had in the building of Slovenian national identity was not the only source of this sensitivity. The attitude towards the language and the framework of language policy are also influenced by the wider context, namely by the notion of a small nation (Roter, 2003: 214). Roter further argues that this notion arises from the small population size and Slovenia’s geographical location, which contributed to a feeling among Slovenes during various historical periods that the surrounding nations, representing a “significant Other,” posed a threat to them (ibid: 215).

**Language policy in sovereign Slovenia**

The 1991 census in Slovenia revealed that one of the former Yugoslav languages other than Slovene was the mother tongue of more than 160,000 people (i.e. 8.40% of the total population, or 8.59% of those who stated their mother tongue in the census). In 2002, this figure was 165,000 (8.44% of the total population, or 8.67% of those who stated their mother tongue in the census). In 1991, somewhat more than 41,000 residents of Slovenia did not state their mother tongue, and in 2002 this number rose to 52,000 (Kržišnik-Bukić, Komac and Klopčič, 2003).

In the study on ethnic diversity in the City of Ljubljana the authors established that Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian or Serbo-Croatian was the mother tongue of 20% of Ljubljana residents (Komac, Medvešek and Roter, 2007: 61).

Despite the statistics and the commitment given on behalf of the Assembly of the RS in the Declaration of Good Intentions preceding the plebiscite, that the Slovenian state would ensure “to all members of other nations the right to multifarious cultural and linguistic development”, the status and the situation of other languages of the former Yugoslavia remained unregulated. The language policy of the newly formed state simply did not take into account this language situation.
According to Bugarski, language policy is part of society’s general policy and the two are harmonized. To be viable, language policy must be based on linguistic reality, that is, an actual linguistic situation (Bugarski, 1997: 20). Given the non-recognition and absence of systematic measures aimed at preserving the languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia, it could be said that Slovenian language policy is not based on linguistic reality or on a concrete linguistic situation and that it is assimilationist in relation to these languages.

Language policy influences a wide range of human interests, and assimilationist language policies harm other legitimate interests and violate the principle of fairness (Kymlicka and Grin, 2003: 11). Kymlicka and Grin emphasize that when one linguistic group struggles for the protection of its language, it is never just a struggle to protect its means of communication, but also to protect political rights, autonomous institutions, works of culture and cultural practices, and national identity. On the other hand, when a state tries to enforce a dominant language upon minorities, it is never an enforcement of the language only, but also of political and cultural demands concerning the primacy of the state, the need for common rules and centralized institutions, the need to learn a new history and literature and the need to constitute new nation-state loyalties and identities. Therefore, language disputes are never just disputes over language (ibid.).

If we regard language policy as one of the mechanisms of national integration and take into account Močnik’s thesis that “national identification occurs as an identification with the subject of national language competence” (Močnik, 1998: 204), it is possible to conclude that peoples of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia, along with their languages, are those non-integrated “remnants” which were excluded from the internal cultural and social division in the process of the construction of the Slovenian national identity and nation state and remained outside the cultural borders (ibid: 208).

According to Fishman, the situation of many ethno-linguistic minorities is so precarious that a great effort is needed to stop the process of mother tongue replacement, that is, assimilation (Fishman, 1995: 54). An ethno-cultural group’s loss of language deprives several succeeding generations of socio-cultural integration, cohesiveness and a secure sense of identity, all of which leads to alienation (ibid: 60).

The lack of linguistic human rights makes minority languages invisible. Linguicism reflects ideologies, structures and practices used to legitimize, justify and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (material and non material) among groups defined on the basis of language. Linguicism therefore contributes to the invisibility of minorities and their resources, particularly their languages and cultures, so these become non-resources that cannot be converted into positions of structural power in a society. By contrast, the dominant group’s resources, including language and culture, have a value and can be converted into positions of social power (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995: 105).

In the absence of minority status and efforts towards achieving an integral model of minority protection for the communities of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia,
Slovenia implements partial measures in the field of cultural and education policies that could be considered to be a contribution to the preservation of culture and language among these communities. In certain places, on the initiative of cultural associations, supplemental lectures (that were not part of school curricula) in Serbian, Macedonian and Albanian were organized in elementary schools or outside schools. Accordingly, for several years now, a course in Croatian has been available in certain elementary schools in Slovenia as an optional subject. Serbian and Macedonian were later accorded the same status and the syllabuses for all three languages confirmed by the school authorities, so it has been possible to include them in elementary school curricula as optional subjects since the beginning of the school year 2008/2009.\textsuperscript{8}

The Ministry of Culture provides finances for the funding of cultural activities of associations that bring together the members of the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Although the funds earmarked for cultural activities of the associations of the former Yugoslav nations in Slovenia have been increasing recently, there is still a large gap between the budget resources dedicated to these groups and those dedicated to the cultural activities of the recognized minority groups – the Italian and Hungarian minorities, as well as the Roma community.

A look at the resources set apart in 2008 by the Ministry of Culture to finance cultural activities of minority communities shows that, in 2008, the Italian minority received around 100 euros per member; the Hungarian minority received around 55 euros per member, and the Roma community 8 euros per member. The communities of nations of the former Yugoslavia received only around 1 euro per member.\textsuperscript{9} If we add to this the funds provided by the Government Office for National Minorities to only the Italian and Hungarian minorities and the Roma community, the difference between the funds intended for the cultural needs (including language preservation) of the recognized minorities and those intended for unrecognized minorities becomes even bigger.

**Demands for dialogue on policy changes**

The nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia are organized into many associations and unions, including the Union of the Associations and Societies of the Nations of the Former Yugoslavia. In October 2003, the Coordination of the Unions of Associations, as this union was called in the past, submitted an application to the National Assembly

\textsuperscript{8} There are 488 elementary schools in Slovenia. In 2008/2009, the course in Croatian was held in five schools, with 70 pupils enrolling in the classes. Although classes in Serbian and Macedonian were also available, not one group of pupils interested in attending these classes could be formed (Kržišnik-Bukić, 2008: 141).

\textsuperscript{9} Information on the amount of subsidies is available in the report by the Ministry of Culture on the (co-)financing of cultural programmes and projects in 2008, pp. 74-80. For a more detailed analysis of this data for 2006, see the author’s MA thesis "Javna govorica, družbeno izključevanje in stigmatizacija" (Public Speech, Social Exclusion and Stigmatization) (Petković, 2009: 87–88).
of the RS for the recognition of minority status. It was followed by similar initiatives and requests addressed to various state bodies and the public, but until recently there was virtually no response.

Notwithstanding the shifts made within the field of education and an increase in subsidies for cultural activities and research studies, these groups have not yet been granted minority status, nor has an integrated model of minority protection yet been established.

The dominant viewpoints, ideologies and practices in the previous 20 years contributed to the invisibility of these communities and their resources, particularly their cultures and languages. To borrow from Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, for these communities their resources have been turning into non-resources. Although their knowledge of a mother tongue should be an asset and part of their credentials, in the present social circumstances and linguistic reality, this is almost a handicap and a source of stigma.

Such a development of the social and linguistic situation can be explained by the fact that ever since it gained independence, Slovenia, that is, its institutions and dominant social groups, focused attention on the policies and instruments that strengthened or affirmed the Slovenian nation. In this context, the situation, status and languages of the former Yugoslavia represented marginal issues, and ones that carried a symbolic burden at that – connotations of the unpopular historical context. At the same time, the social status of these languages in Slovenia, particularly Croatian and Serbian, that is, Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian, conspicuously deteriorated during the 1990s. It was the time during which their home countries struggled with war and various social crises, so the members of these nations living in Slovenia lacked political and symbolic capital to assert special demands or resist language discrimination.

Gradually, their voices and those of their supporters became louder, advocating the need for dialogue that would lead to recognition of formal status and the development of a system for the protection of their cultural and linguistic rights. Individuals within academic or research institutions, organizations for human rights and cultural associations of these nations have been actively campaigning since 2002. Recently, state and local institutions have also made steps towards affirmation of the cultures and languages of these nations in Slovenia, but they have several peculiar characteristics.

Firstly, they are taken in the context of assistance provided to immigrant communities that are in all respects treated separately from the communities of the recognized minorities in Slovenia. Secondly, the finances and other resources accorded to them are low, precluding more ambitious cultural works or projects, or any significant affirmation.

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10 The request entitled “Public Initiative” was presented to the public by Dr Ilija Dimitrievski, the Chairperson of the Coordination Committee at the time, during the round table discussion held on 14 October 2003 in Ljubljana and organized by the Council of Europe to initiate a debate on the report of the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance.
Thirdly, the courses in the languages of the former Yugoslavia provided by certain elementary schools have been introduced haphazardly and only under pressure from cultural associations. As a result, and because of the social circumstances and status of these languages (which turns them into non-resources), only a small number of children are enrolled in these programmes.

**Outcome of the two decades of post-Yugoslav configurations**

It has turned out that the issue of new minorities that emerged as a result of economic migration across the former common state and its subsequent dissolution, has been a challenge too great for any government of sovereign Slovenia so far to tackle. The present extent and method of minority protection (of the Italian and Hungarian national minorities) in Slovenia rests on the basis established by the former common state, and it obviously enjoys a broad political and social consensus. However, any change in this field carries with it a major political risk and causes bitter public dispute. It was proven in 2010 when the attempt by the government to include in the law programme obligations for the production of programme items aimed at communities of nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia by public service broadcasting RTV Slovenia failed. The already adopted law with such provisions was rejected by referendum, requested by the opposition. Therefore the adoption of the declaration by the National Assembly in February 2011, establishing a formal framework for dialogue and negotiations on the protection of minority communities of nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia, with the support of the majority of political parties represented in the parliament, demonstrates a major shift after 20 years of ignorance. What the outcome will be of the establishment of the formal body to handle the dialogue is to be seen in the future.

This has been a two-decade long journey for the members of the Albanian (from Kosovo), Bosniak, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Serbian communities in Slovenia towards recognition of minority status and protection of their languages and cultural identity after dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It has been characterized by a specific form of political emancipation through the self-organization of a joint body for negotiations with the authorities. Keeping the name of the former Yugoslavia in the name of the joint body and using it in public awareness and political negotiations has contributed to a specific post-Yugoslav configuration of the political alliances and cultural identities in Slovenia.
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83


How social media enforce glocalization - the processes of identity change in selected Central and Southeast European countries

Paško Bilić

Abstract
This article deals with interactions between technological, social and cultural factors through the perspective of globalization and glocalization. In more precise terms, the process of cultural change enforced through the use of social media and seen from a global perspective is the main focus of the article. Through theoretical arguments and statistical data the article focuses on the question of redefining cultural identities through two prominent but diametrically opposite social media: Facebook and Wikipedia. We define the Internet and social media as specific types of disembedding mechanisms which create the communication backbone of the globalization processes. The global process of media and communication change through digitalization influences our understanding of what a medium is. In an institutional (meaning the social role and function of a specific medium) and the technological dimension, it is difficult to delineate precisely the traditional and mass from social media. They are also increasingly interacting within the space opened up by the World Wide Web. This space should not be seen as a reality apart from the “real” but as an integrated part and a supplement to the media and communication environment that humans use. The case of Facebook clearly demonstrates this as the specific technological preconditions of the platform enable users to make their offline social networks visible online. In that process people renegotiate their existing identities in an online environment. As a global-repository of human knowledge and as a global memory place Wikipedia also influences the process of identity re-establishment. However, it does this in an entirely different manner than Facebook. While Facebook is based on personal social networks and micro group identity management, by dealing with historical and cultural topics of national and global interest, Wikipedia redefines national identity and produces content which is publicly available in an online environment.

Keywords: glocalization, disembedding mechanisms, cultural identity, Southeastern Europe, transition, social media, mass media, cyberspace
While it might seem odd to start a text on redefining cultural identities with a quote from a former US president, it nevertheless serves a purpose of highlighting one of the main misconceptions in discussions surrounding digital media and the Internet. It is often stated that the Internet has a significant impact on cultural identities. This is certainly true to some extent but should not be left in this unidirectional form. This technological impact thesis, apart from simplifying the Internet, shows a fundamental disregard for social and cultural differences and the ways that the technology is being used or interpreted.

The quote strongly displays a kind of dualism present in the discussions surrounding the history of new media research which some authors describe as a tension between technological and cultural determinism (Lister et al., 2009). The quote obviously falls into one category of technological determinism because it predicts that a complexly fragmented and hybrid technical medium such as the Internet will cause or have a direct impact on an even more multifaceted legal, political and social phenomenon such as freedom. Of course we could debate whether Bush was thinking about Chinese democracy or market freedom which would make US companies benefit from it. Regardless of his intentions we know today that the Internet as a technical medium is spreading rapidly in China but the state has developed some of the most sophisticated censoring and monitoring mechanisms (technical and social) in efforts to control it. The Chinese case clearly points to a complex interconnection between pre-existing social structures, cultural conceptions and technological capabilities and potentials.

This interconnection between the social, cultural and technological has in recent years been further emphasized by the influences and the rise of the so-called social media which bring social and cultural aspects to the fore. These new types of social media are Web 2.0 websites which facilitate, enable and possess the potential for social action, interaction, communication and identity formation in cyberspace (Bruns and Bahnisch, 2009: 7) as well as supplementing and influencing offline social and cultural processes. Among global leaders are such websites as Facebook, YouTube or Wikipedia. They are, however, not entirely new, since they are part of a long-term process of socializing cyberspace and populating it with human communication in a process which can be tracked down to early virtual and online communities.2 What is

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1 For the lack of a better term we use the term Web 2.0. However, it should be said that its origin lies in marketing strategies attempting to revitalize the US economy after the Wall Street dot-com bubble crash in 2000 and 2001. The new and restructured web companies started using more flexible business models in attracting audiences and users to their platforms. The term was originally formulated by media expert and marketing consultant Tim O’Reilly. For more details see O’Reilly, 2005.

2 For an outline of the early development of virtual communities see Rheingold, 2000.
new then about new social media? They are mostly free of charge, easy to use and access, web based, spread across unprecedented numbers of global populations and technically more developed since they enable the manipulation of text, images and videos. They are currently dominating the usage of World Wide Web in almost all countries around the world.

Since these processes involving Web 2.0 social media are new and still not part of substantial social and cultural research we will attempt to describe the main processes and mechanisms that can and do influence the reshuffling of cultural identities in a process of glocalization in Central and Southeast European countries. We understand glocalization as the main process of cultural change in the process of globalization. Robertson defines it not as a polarity but as a complex relationship between the global and the local (1995: 35).

The argumentation in the article is mostly theoretical and conceptual. The first section deals with globalization in general and the spread of communication structures in particular which influence the processes of shaping and reshaping cultures. In the next section we describe how media communication types in contemporary network societies are being fundamentally changed. In the ensuing section we discuss how the notions of media space have evolved from hyperreality to virtual reality to digital space. In the following section we describe how Facebook as a technological context enables communication and cultural identity reshaping. Finally we discuss the ways of reshuffling national culture through the example of Wikipedia.

**Riding the globalization tide**

The main characteristics of globalization are far-reaching changes of nation states and national societies. Beck describes globalization as a process in which transnational actors increasingly interconnect and influence the reduction of power of nation states and undermine their influence. Globalization produces different, more or less autonomous logics: economic, cultural, ecological, political, and so forth (Beck, 2003: 28). However, the main characteristic of all these processes is that they change the spatial and temporal coordinates of social relations. Giddens describes globalization through a “disembedding mechanism” of lifting out the social relations from their local interaction contexts and their restructuring inside an unspecified time-space expansion (1990: 21). What Giddens means by space is, however, rather vague. Is it transborder space of interconnected national territories or is it perhaps media space in a media broadcasting or network paradigm? What influences most the disembedding of

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3 We understand cultural identity as being formed and reshaped through processes of discursive exchange of values and symbols in the process of interaction and communication.

4 “The global is not in and of itself counterposed to the local. Rather, what is often referred to as the local is essentially included within the global. In this respect globalization, defined in its most general sense as the compression of the world as a whole, involves the linking of localities” (Robertson, 1995: 35).
daily lives and everyday experiences are various media by creating new interaction spaces. The Internet is the main facilitator of global communication and “disembedding mechanisms”. It is the communication backbone of globalization processes and it influences the creation of basic communication spaces and structures reaching beyond individual societies.

The Internet evolved into its current shape from the late 1960s through incentives from the state, scientific communities and the market primarily located in the United States. In most countries it is experienced as a process of intense technological and cultural globalization with little possibility for complete control. Giddens describes this global insecurity as a consequence of modernity. This dynamism of modernity is a sort of juggernaut or “a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of control and which could rend itself asunder (Giddens, 1990: 139).”

The Internet certainly influences the creation of a sense of inconceivable complexity. However, it also creates a sense of global space due to its global network structure which causes technical innovations to be experienced instantly across nation states. Due to the availability of technical innovations it creates a sense of temporal synchronicity with highly developed countries. However, in the transitional societies, as well as any other, it should not be expected that pre-existing cultural values or social patterns would be rejected due to the availability of technological resources.

Table 1: Internet penetration levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GLOBAL</th>
<th>AUSTRIA</th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>CROATIA</th>
<th>SLOVENIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet users</td>
<td>1,966,514,816</td>
<td>6,143,600</td>
<td>4,107,000</td>
<td>2,244,400</td>
<td>1,298,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of population)</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User growth</td>
<td>444.8%</td>
<td>192.6%</td>
<td>926.8%</td>
<td>1,022.2%</td>
<td>332.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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5 The focus of this article is on disembedding mechanisms while we acknowledge the equal importance of the process of re-embedding media in specific local contexts. Hjarvard calls this double process the process of mediatization: “[m]ediatization should be viewed as a modernization on par with urbanization and individualization, whereby the media, in a similar manner, both contribute to disembedding social relations from existing contexts and re-embedding them in new social contexts” (2008: 132).

6 In whatever way we dub the political and economic transformation of Southeast European post-socialist countries one thing is certain: all of them experience intense processes of globalization which are especially evident through media globalization emphasized in consumer and advertising content, popular culture, infotainment and even social media. This is the reason why some authors use the term post-transition and cultural transition (Švob-Dokić, 2010) to emphasize the growing global influences and to a certain extent the inability to control them fully or at least utilize them in the best possible way.
If we look at the above statistics (Table 1) we notice phenomenal user growth during the last decade. However this is not enough to tell us anything about cultural changes that occurred through its usage. As stated in the introduction, the Internet is a highly complex and hybrid medium with different technical uses: e-mail, WWW, P2P, and suchlike. Krotz defines it as a hybrid communications medium which enables three different types of communication: communication with people who are not temporally or spatially present, communication through producing and receiving media content and communication with interactive technical systems (2007: 187). Social media fall in the first category when they are used for communication and managing social networks (Facebook) or in the second category when they are producing content through community rules (Wikipedia). Riding on the latest globalization tide they are a part of the new generation of Internet media.

**Mass media vs. social media**

What we consider to be a medium is rapidly changing. What was once thought to be self-evident is now being reshaped by processes of commercialization, digitalization and institutional change. In Western Europe in the period after the Second World War public broadcasting services were places where political, religious, civic, cultural events and entertainments were organized as a common domain of modern public life (Scannell, 1997: 65). In socialist states mass media were predominantly established as state broadcasters or broadcasting centres, for example in all the republics of former Yugoslavia.

However, public and state broadcasting services are experiencing institutional instability in most European countries. It is becoming increasingly unclear what social role they can fulfil and how they should be restructured. It is justified to wonder if they are becoming what Giddens calls an institutional shell which bears the same name from the outside but, because of globalization, is changed dramatically from the inside (2002: 18).

Public broadcasting media are prime examples of institutional change within nation states caused by the process of globalization. However, commercial mass media were some of the earliest players of media globalization especially in the form of powerful media companies such as CNN or MTV. They were powerful institutions behind global cultural flows or mediascapes (Appadurai, 1990: 298). Unlike most public broadcasting services they were producing and disseminating information and images to global populations. Regardless of reach, their basic communication type was centralized and organized vertically in a one-way communication type (McQuail, 1983: 34-35) with no or very limited interaction between senders and receivers (Luhmann, 2000: 2). They were recognized as mass media because of the stabilized broadcasting technology, a set of defined institutional rules which defined

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7 A valuable point about usage patterns is made through a case of “Internet cabins” in Lima, Peru, where access points were being used and rented to entire communities pointing to the fact that one access point can be used by large numbers of users (Powell III, 2003).
their structural position and broadcasting content and a reach to mass populations. However, the technical process of digitalization reshapes the technical basis of mass media and their public so the new media consumers are searching for information in multiple sources other than broadcasting space.

**Table 2: Top 10 sites on the Web**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLOBAL</th>
<th>AUSTRIA</th>
<th>CROATIA</th>
<th>SLOVENIA</th>
<th>SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Google</td>
<td>Google Österreich</td>
<td>Google.hr</td>
<td>Google.si</td>
<td>Google</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Facebook</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
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<td>3. YouTube</td>
<td>Google</td>
<td>Google</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>YouTube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Yahoo!</td>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>Google.rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Windows Live</td>
<td>Österreicher Rundfunk</td>
<td>Net.hr</td>
<td>24ur.com</td>
<td>Yahoo!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Baidu.com</td>
<td>Wikipedia</td>
<td>Index.hr</td>
<td>Slovenski Iskalnik</td>
<td>Blic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Wikipedia</td>
<td>Amazon.de GmbH</td>
<td>Jutarnji List</td>
<td>SiOL</td>
<td>B92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. QQ.com</td>
<td>Google.de</td>
<td>Yahoo!</td>
<td>Radiotelevizija Slovenija</td>
<td>Blogger.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Twitter</td>
<td>Yahoo.com</td>
<td>Telefonski imenik HT-a</td>
<td>Yahoo!</td>
<td>Windows Live</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From the table (Table 2) we can see that social media occupy high rankings but that different print or broadcasting media websites also occupy the top ten national rankings. This shows that the interested public is looking for information in media spaces other then broadcasting space. When we compare mass media to social media we can assume that social media owe their popularity to horizontal types of one-to-one and many-to-many horizontal communication. Inside the space enabled by the World Wide Web they are competing for popularity in attempts to claim reach to the largest parts of the population. The mass media becomes a term that is no longer reserved for broadcasting media since social media are being used by increasing numbers of users.\(^8\)

**The nature of borders in cyberspace**

What was considered media space and the reality that it produces has, at least in

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\(^8\) In Croatia some 850,000 citizens use social network sites (SNS), according to Gfk Croatia (2009) “Gdje smo danas u informatičkoj pismenosti? [Where are we today in ICT literacy?]”, based on a representative sample of citizens older than 15 years (n=1000). Available at: [http://www.gfk.hr/public_relations/press/press_articles/005364/index.hr.html](http://www.gfk.hr/public_relations/press/press_articles/005364/index.hr.html).
How social media enforce glocalization - the processes of identity change in selected ... a theoretical sense, changed in many ways. If we leave aside the “real” as in social, cultural and technical changes that bring about media change, and focus on media constructions or constructions of reality we can notice a shift towards a certain normalization of cyberspace. Simulations are also becoming increasingly complex and popular (Second life, Sims, Massive Multiplayer Online Games or MMOG, etc.) but their influence on offline relationships remains limited and can be described as a type of entertainment industry which is born in, instead of transferred to, or from, cyberspace.

In Baudrillard’s terms the media create hyperreality in which the reality is “sucked into” code and simulation (2001: 51). Hyperreality is a stage when the contradiction and distinction between the real and imaginary disappears (2001: 102). While his theory was extremely important for the development of cultural theory with an orientation on the study of signs and symbols, we need to break free from hyperreality if we are to understand the changes, nuances and social relevance of new web-based social media. Then we can identify the actors behind these representations, and the actors involved in the process of connecting and interacting. If we focus on the transmission model of communication we end up analysing cultural symbol flows but instead leave the analysis actor and power free. As Krotz suggests, the communication as transmission model forgets that communication is a process of agreement on perspectives and roles and only on that basis is it also an exchange of symbols (2007: 74).

Cyberspace is often theorized and regarded as an open-ended space of free-floating interactions and limitless possibilities. However, in recent years this view has come under some scrutiny in a theoretical as well as in a methodological and ontological sense. Some authors claim that a shift can be seen from early beliefs that computer-mediated communication (CMC) (or communication in cyberspace) is an impoverished type of communication in comparison to face-to-face communication towards CMC as possessing special and unique qualities (Hine, 2000; 2005). Recently, some authors have built this argument even further in claiming that the CMC and cyber-digital space is becoming a place where cultural changes and societal conditions

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9 As Luhmann noted in his book on mass media, we should not think of the media as creating a “loss of world” in which reality does not exist. Instead we should assume that “...the world is not an object but is rather a horizon, in the phenomenological sense. It is, in other words, inaccessible. And that is why there is no possibility other than to construct reality and perhaps to observe observers as they construct reality” (Luhmann, 2000: 6).

10 And we may also add that the processes of communication can be based on disagreement and conflict regarding the perspectives and roles of the involved actors.

11 Since it has no para-linguistic cues such as gestures and facial expressions which enrich face-to-face communication.
can be monitored (Rogers, 2009).

This does not mean that national borders are being transferred into cyberspace although such attempts at regulating national cyberspace do exist.\textsuperscript{12} Cyberspace is not immune to pre-existing power relations and the tension between public and private interests is built into it from its inception. At the current stage it does enable communicative potentials but under specific conditions. Through social media cyberspace is a global space which enables a drawing and redrawing of social boundaries between dispersed social actors. In that sense we can monitor cultural changes and societal conditions.

**Technological context for cultural identity play: the case of Facebook**

When it comes to social media, users do not experience the Internet as a hyperreality nor for that matter as a technical medium but through constructing meanings in relationship to technology (e.g. different web platforms) or other humans. As Hine (2000: 21) suggests “...once we think of cyberspace as a place where people do things, we can start to study just exactly what it is they do and why, in their terms, they do it”. Her approach to the relationship between culture and technology is twofold. The Internet is a cultural artefact meaning that people have ideas about what it is through its use in different social contexts (Hine, 2000: 30). The Internet is also culture since it provides an online context for social relations to be realized (Hine, 2000: 17).

Facebook is basically the result of an agreement between users who use the service without charge and the US company which draws enormous profits from advertising revenues. Unlike earlier forms of virtual communities in which communication was done through undisclosed identities which enabled the possibilities of limitless identity play (Turkle, 2004: 108), Facebook is based on high self-presentation levels (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: 63). It is not a place where people meet strangers, although it is also possible, but a service which allows individuals to articulate and make visible their pre-existing social networks (Boyd and Ellison, 2007).\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} The Golden Shield project in China, often referred to as “The Great Firewall of China” or the “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” in the US which is a part of the Homeland Security strategy.

\textsuperscript{13} Some empirical research results confirm this point (e.g. Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield, 2008; Joinson, 2008).
Table 3: Facebook user statistics over the last 6 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUSTRIA</th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>CROATIA</th>
<th>SLOVENIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Users</td>
<td>2,244,420</td>
<td>2,197,300</td>
<td>1,259,520</td>
<td>611,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>+196,720</td>
<td>+132,340</td>
<td>+77,630</td>
<td>+35,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+8.76%</td>
<td>+6.0%</td>
<td>+6.14%</td>
<td>+5.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population penetration</td>
<td>27.32%</td>
<td>29.92%</td>
<td>28.07%</td>
<td>30.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.facebakers.com/facebook-statistics/?interval=last-6-months#chart-intervals (29 November 2010)

The above statistics (Table 3) show us once more the popularity of Facebook but this time through population penetration which is close to a third of the population in all of the analysed countries. However, returning to the interplay between technology and culture, it is easy to forget the human factors and conclude directly from the global spread of the application that communication through Facebook constitutes a sort of global media flow. This stems from the transmission type of communication and content production that focuses on the transmission of symbols influenced by the media broadcasting paradigm and ignores the inner construction of meaning characteristic of all human communication. Facebook is very powerful in enabling rich human interaction and user generated content across all national borders. But even though it possesses the potential of transnational communication, this does not mean that the potential is being realized by different populations. Facebook is a type of communication with high self-presentation which means that unlike earlier forms of online communities it is in essence a type of communication platform which is based on making one’s offline identity visible online. In that process of re-establishing identity in cyberspace it is possible for it to take different shapes and qualities. It is a medium of potentials for connectivity, cooperation and interaction. How it will influence social and cultural change in the future is a matter of speculation especially with regard to its offline social significance.\(^{14}\)

We should not expect that communication always crosses national borders because the pre-existing identities as well as individuals’ pre-existing social and cultural capital are transferred into this arena of potential transnational communication. Most Facebook users around the world are younger\(^ {15}\) and better educated and it depends on their offline

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\(^{14}\) There were some media reports on political protests organized through Facebook in Croatia but to the knowledge of the author they are still not a part of social science research. On the basis of theoretical research we can infer that Facebook is not the cause of political protest but a powerful organizing tool and communication platform which influences the speed and time of organizing such an event.

\(^{15}\) In the countries under this study about two thirds of all users come from the age group of 18 to 34 years of age. Available at: http://www.facebakers.com/facebook-statistics/?interval=last-6-months#chart-intervals (29 November 2010).
formed social networks whether they will communicate across national borders or not. Whatever the span and reach of communication, by providing a global technological context for identity reconstruction and play, Facebook enables the lifting of social relations from their local (or territorial) interaction contexts.

Glocalizing national cultures: the case of Wikipedia

Unlike Facebook which is a social medium with high self-presentation, Wikipedia is a medium with low self-presentation (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: 63) but with a high level of community organization and with an orientation towards a mutual goal: making an online encyclopaedia free and open for anyone to use and edit. The online community produces content through collaboration while most communication between editors arises when there are problems with editing content: through acts of vandalism on the content or inability to settle an argument. Facebook is a platform for pre-existing social networks and mostly for casual and informal communication. Most Wikipedians, on the other hand, meet online because collaborating in the Wikipedia community and editing Wikipedia content results from sharing mutual motives like sharing knowledge or willingness to correct errors. Editors bring with them their interests and values for editing specific types of articles.

Wikipedia communities produce knowledge through three basic principles based on the possibilities enabled by the so-called wiki-soft ware. They document the current status of available knowledge in the community (content dimension), discuss and construct new knowledge (discursive dimension) through the structure of the community with relative positions of its authors (network dimension) (Halatchliyski et al., 2010). This type of knowledge is called emergent knowledge since it “occurs at the level of community and is more than the sum total of the knowledge of all individuals” (Halatchliyski et al., 2010). As Pentzold argues, through the process of knowledge production of social, cultural and historical subjects the community creates globally available collective memories: “Wikipedia is not a symbolic place of remembrance but a place where memorable elements are negotiated, a place of the discursive fabrication of memory. Wikipedia is not only a platform to constitute and store knowledge, but a place where memory – understood as a particular discursive construction – is shaped” (2009: 264).

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16 These are two of the most common motives for contributing according to Glott, Schmidt, and Ghosh (2010).

17 Wikipedia is highly organized and there is a complex structure of editors which is based on their work history, merits, etc. While there are many different roles and statuses three main editor groups can be discerned: administrators, logged authors and Internet protocols (IPs).
How social media enforce glocalization - the processes of identity change in selected ...
While often criticized for the quality of its content, Wikipedia nevertheless enjoys high popularity and a top ten ranking in popularity for global and national websites. Some recent research results also show that it is becoming one of the most trusted sources of information among Internet users. With different or shared language versions and through editing both contemporary and historical national and global events it becomes a powerful online tool for glocalizing national cultures.

Conclusion

While avoiding falling into either one of the two extremes or determinisms (technological or cultural) we have attempted to describe the complex ways in which technology, society and culture interact to influence the shaping and reshaping of contemporary cultures and cultural patterns. Through and with the Internet as a technological and communication backbone of the process of globalization, all cultures, whether intentionally or unintentionally, are becoming glocalized. This is a very broad process and taking the complexity of the Internet as a technical medium into consideration, it is impossible to comprehend as a whole without losing some of the fine-grained and Internet media specific differences. Social media are a broad term that describes one such recent Internet media change. Unlike earlier forms of online communities they are being used on a massive scale reaching very broad parts of global populations. While enabling communication, interaction and community formation in cyberspace (Bruns and Bahnisch, 2009: 7) there are nevertheless very different types of them if we take a look at the ways that they enable these processes to be performed. From their popularity, however, we cannot assume that they are replacing traditional types of mass media. Based on broadcasting communication from one to many and a set of institutional rules, mass media are also being transformed due to globalization processes. However, they are also looking for new media spaces in their struggle for audiences, so they are also launching websites in cyberspace. Notions of cyberspace have also changed. It is no longer considered a poor supplement to “real” communication but possessing special qualities in comparison to face-to-face communication (Hine 2000; 2005). In that sense it becomes a place where cultural changes can be monitored (Rogers, 2009) in a process of drawing and redrawing of social boundaries between dispersed social actors. Facebook is one such technical and cultural platform where people can realize its communicative potentials. Because it is based on making offline social networks visible in cyberspace it becomes a place of re-establishing one’s identity. While not necessarily transnational it nevertheless enables social relations to be lifted out of their local interaction contexts. Wikipedia as a quite different type of social medium enables the production of emergent and

19 According to GfK and Telekom Austria research, Internet users in Austria, Slovenia and Croatia place the highest trust on Wikipedia as an information source (61%) followed by television (53%) and newspapers (49%). Available at: http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/hrvata-facebooku-vise-slovenaca-austrijanaca-clanak-185913.
discursive knowledge to be created through community collaboration. By creating online content creation communities and in dealing with specific subjects in specific languages it becomes a sort of global memory place (Pentzold, 2009) which in effect glocalizes all national cultures.

Judging from the high number of users using the Internet, specific websites, social media, Facebook and Wikipedia, we can infer that the Central and Southeast European countries are part of a global process of reshaping territorial identities on different social and cultural levels and with different intensities. To what outcome is another question, for we cannot exclude the patterns of hate speech, insulting content and other forms of socially abusive content produced through social media. Analysing specific user-generated content would be a topic for a different type of analysis than the one presented here. The best we can do is not to judge this change in good or bad categories but try to understand the ongoing processes (both globally and locally) to the best of our abilities.

References


How modern technology shape-shifts our identity

Vladimir Davčev

Abstract
This article addresses some aspects of virtual reality as part of our social reality. For most people, the Internet is more of a medium than a technology. Moreover, it is a shape-shifting, borderless medium firmly in the hands of ordinary citizens bent on turning it to extraordinary ends. The anonymity of cyberspace enables an endless space of possible identities that humans can construct in online communication. Online characters are an expression of real-world experiences, desires, fantasies and ideas; they are connected to the offline world. If we know the endowment of an individual with different types of capital, we cannot deduce his or her online identities. Thus, cyberspace offers a niche for each of these specific facets of selfhood. Some people even talk about how we can “deconstruct” ourselves online. In cyberspace, the correlation between the choice of the name (or the picture that represents us) and our identity is not completely free from everyday cultural and political norms as the net utopians had imagined it to be. I give a several examples of how this was done through social networks in so-called “Macedonian cyberspace”.

Keywords: social network, cyberspace, identity, Macedonian blog community, Macedonian cyberspace

In modern civilization man is posited as the subject of knowledge in science and technology, animating the utopian projects of industrial civilization, and culminating in great urban conglomerates, as in the sealed universe of commodities which constitutes the omnipresent mall. Technology, “defined as the system of tools and techniques by means of which people relate to environment and secure their survival
ensemble of means” (Arnold, 1989: 184), is the driving force of social development, more important than the ends it is supposed to serve. Unfortunately, technology became an end in itself and society is organized around it. Of course, we are all aware that we need certain changes to subdue technology, but I think it is now too late to change the course of technology. However, technology is frequently pictured as the only hope for a better future and the only means of making the world more humane. And that is the sort of statement that French philosopher Jacques Ellul calls the technological bluff. Technology is a discourse on techniques: therefore, the bluff lies not in the failure of techniques as such but in presenting them in a falsely optimistic light. In 1954, the author formulated two laws of technical progress: first, it is irreversible, second, it advances by a geometric progression. Thus, a computer revolution changes nothing in the nature of technical progress, although products are new. This progress is hampered not by internal mechanisms, but by maladaptation of the social body to it, since society is rooted in the past and constantly refers to it. On the other hand, technology is future oriented and discards as valueless everything that cannot be incorporated into the web of techniques.

This leads us to the observation that real technology and virtual technology are of different natures, if real and virtual are taken to refer to the degree to which mortality composes the experiential field of their operation. The first involves conflictual meaning and the second non-conflictual meaning (i.e. the assumption that there is pure information which has a value per se). It could be argued that this is a false distinction, since all technology becomes real as it becomes past: the Gothic cathedral, the great iron structures of the 19th century and the super-computer are all the real solutions to virtual problems. The difference lies in the excess of means which characterized those earlier technologies: the cathedral or the bridge employs more strength than is necessary for the weight to be born, the technical means exceeding the effective end. The supplement is a supplement of the human imagination unsure as to the response of the material: the structure is a priori so threatened by mortality that excessive means must be used to guarantee its survival. In information technology, on the other hand, there is a convergence of means and ends. It uses the information it generates as its own material: it is the apotheosis of subjectivity projected into the domain of the material, which thereby becomes virtual (subjective-in-itself).

The speed of technological change is a function of contemporary desire to escape from the stasis of absurd to the dream of virtual reality as permanent super session. Subjectivity is the inhabiting of a complex of actual occasions, a nexus of events which is unique in its temporal occurrence, no matter how much it is a function of repetitive structures or subject to what Whitehead (1978) calls the “ingressions” of the non-actual. In that sense the subject does a function of belief, not as the object of desire but as a mode of desiring, principally desire to be conscious of the material reality of mortality. Hence the antithetical dualisms, which riddle our thinking and our culture: as Beckett writes in
How modern technology shape-shifts our identity

*The Unnamable*, “the role of objects is to restore silence” (Deirdre, 1978: 45). The role of technology has become one of abolishing silence as the belief in the reality of the object has been eroded. Yet, again, the object is no more an object of belief than belief itself is an object of thought: they are complex events seized in the spatialized time of meaning, the putative unity of finite experience. Both cultural and technical objects, whether element, individual or ensemble, are events like entering a skyscraper, reading a poem, overcoming the fear of flying, learning how to use a computer or mourning the death of a parent. All these situations can comprise elements of melancholy, anxiety or the absurd inscribed within their temporal occurrence. Creativity is multidirectional: Janus has many faces (not only two), some of which are hidden from knowledge. Meaning occurs at the interface of what exists and what does not yet exist, the one infinitely regressive, the other infinitely progressive; hence, for example, the ambivalence of art in relation to the past, and the determining function of memory in thought. Technology is what inscribes the subject in the world where absurdity and creativity are the reciprocal conditions of the event itself, rather than of the subject. Technology is the sanction of the finite subject, because it brings to bear a multiplicity of constitutive energies upon a circumscribed occasion of meaning. This is the creative, non-transcendent obverse of Husserl’s re-activation of the past: what is more urgent is to find the value of the activation of the present, its precariously creative plenitude and catastrophic self-evacuation, its paradoxical status as both temporal process and a temporal form, its inability to be either identical to itself or different from itself. The irony is that such value can only ever be performed, not thought; and this is precisely the motive of technology.

In contemporary society, for many people social life and society have an impersonal character. They feel that they do not have control of their lives and of decisions that affect them. Globalization, comodification and bureaucratization can result in feelings of alienation. In a global world, in which lifestyles and values are differentiating, intimacy is increasingly not found locally but with people who are spatially distanced and reached by means of communication technologies. There is a globalization of intimacy, the need to organize personal relationships over spatial and temporal distances. That range derives from the nature of identity, particularly the nature of identity in urban environments within advanced economies. Many people conceptualize identity as static and readily discernable, implicit in notions that “I am who I am ... and everyone can see that without much difficulty”. In reality identity is far more mutable. In most circumstances it is a manifestation of social relationships, not of innate characteristics. Those relationships may be as fundamental (and thus invisible) as gender or age, although even those attributes may be “negotiated” through mechanisms such as clothing, a haircut or ID card. They may instead be as malleable as possession of a key or clipboard, with a long history of incidents in which scammers were provided with access to a restricted facility or removed assets merely because they wore the right uniform and looked authoritative. If your identity is your credit card you may face difficulty in environments where a transaction does not necessitate directly sighting the plastic. Identity is performed. As a result it can be subverted.
Anthony Giddens defines self-identity as “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” (Giddens, 1991: 53). It would not be static but “something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” (Giddens, 1991: 52). Self-identity means the descriptions that an individual makes of his or her role in the world, of how he or she is different from others, and of what he or she has in common with others. It is influenced by and continuously produced and reproduced by social practices of humans in society. The various relationships that humans enter and the experiences they have in these relationships shape how an individual understands and describes himself or herself. Self-identity forms a foundation of communication processes in social relationships by which it is enabled and constrained. In particular phases of transition or loss, and the emergence of new roles in the life of an individual are also phases of instability of self-identity that can result in changes of self-description. In such phases, people enter or leave social groups that have certain collective identities and have to reposition their personal identities. They might enter new groups where they are confronted with new collective identities that enable and constrain their personal identities and that are influenced by actions and communications based on their personal identities. Individuals, to a certain extent, identify with the identity of the social groups in which they act or of which they are part. Individual identity is a positioning of a human being towards all group identities with which she or he is confronted. Group identities emerge from continuous communication processes, which individuals enter with their personal identities, and they enable and constrain personal identities that again influence group identities, and so on. Hence, identity is a self-referential process that permanently connects an individual and a collective level.

Some recent contributors to the literature have expressed serious doubts about whether identity and identification matter as much as social science appears to think they do. Their scepticism has some justification, and is a useful reminder that we should not take identity for granted. First, and most fundamentally, there are doubts about whether identity, in itself, actually causes behaviour. Martin (1995: 5), for example, has insisted that “identity”, despite its high profile in accounts of recent conflicts, such as in the Balkans, “fails to provide an explanation ... [for] why actors are making certain utterances or why certain events are happening”. This was a response to claims that explicitly connected identity to actions, a response to assertions that, under the circumstances, the people concerned could not have done otherwise (and were, hence, blameless). Recently Malešević (2002: 62) has also put forward arguments broadly similar to Martin’s. In order to begin thinking about this issue, we must decide what we mean by “identity”. As a very basic starting point, identity is the human capacity – rooted in language – to know “who’s who” (and hence “what’s what”). This involves us knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a multidimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals and as members of collectivities. It is a process – identification – not a “thing”. It is not something that one can have, or not; it
is something that one does. Following Martin and Malešević, it cannot be said too often that identification does not determine what humans do. Knowing “the map” – or even just approximately where we are – does not necessarily tell us where we should go next (although a better or worse route to our destination might be suggested).

In modern society, virtual reality is part of our social reality. For most people, the Internet is more of a medium than a technology. Moreover, it is a shape-shifting, borderless medium firmly in the hands of ordinary citizens bent on turning it to extraordinary ends. Cyberspace becomes a system that mediates and influences our cognition, communication and cooperation in everyday life, “the material basis on which we live our existence, construct our systems or representation, practice our work, link up with other people, retrieve information, form our opinions, act in politics, and nurture our dreams” (Castells, 2001: 203). The anonymity of cyberspace enables an endless space of possible identities that humans can construct in online communication. Online personas are connected to the social life of the individual who feels a desire to act and communicate in certain ways online. Online characters are an expression of real-world experiences, desires, fantasies and ideas; they are connected to the offline world. If we know the endowment of an individual with different types of capital, we cannot deduce his or her online identities. Thus, cyberspace offers a niche for each of these specific facets of selfhood. Some people even talk about how we can “deconstruct” ourselves online. We do not have to present ourselves in total – how we look, move, talk, our history, thoughts, feelings and personality, all in one big package. In different environments, we can divvy up and present our characteristics in packets of various sizes and content. Thanks to thousands of online groups each devoted to a distinct professional, vocational or personal topic, we can express, highlight and develop specific interests and life experiences while setting aside others. When we join an online community, we often have a choice about how much, if any personal information should be placed into the members’ profile database. Online communication tools even give us the choice about whether we want people to see how we look or hear our voice. The desire to remain anonymous reflects the need to eliminate those critical features of our identity that we do not want to display in that particular environment or group. The desire to lurk – to hide completely – indicates the person’s need to split off his entire personal identity from his observing of those around him: he wants to look, but not be seen.

The different components of who we are can be categorized as either positive or negative. There are some universal criteria that can help us distinguish the two. Most of the time we will criticize a person’s need to hurt other people and applaud compassion. But it is not necessary to present universal truisms about good and bad. Subjectively, a person can feel shame, guilt, fear, anxiety or hatred about some aspect of their identity, while accepting and appreciating other aspects. People also strive to attain new, idealized ways of being. Those who act out in cyberspace – who are in some way hurting or violating the rights of others, or hurting them – are usually discharging some negatively charged aspect of their psyche. This purely cathartic act often goes nowhere. An insecure, passive-aggressive person gets stuck in an endless
stream of online arguments. Others may use cyberspace as an opportunity to exercise their positive characteristics, or to develop new ones in a process of “self-actualization”. Online romances, even those involving a clearly recognized element of fantasy, can be growth-promoting. In some cases people may express a negative trait in an attempt to work through it. They are trying to transform the negative feature of their identity into a positive one, or perhaps change their attitude about that feature. A gay person who learns to accept his or her homosexuality as a result of participation in an online support group has changed the valence from negative to positive.

Whether we view something about ourselves as positive or negative can become a complex issue. Is it good or bad that a person tends to be quiet? Sometimes we have mixed feelings. We are ambivalent. The various environments and styles of communication on the Internet serve as a flexible testing ground for exploring those intertwining pluses and minuses. In back-channel e-mail, a fellow lurker in a listserv for professionals may help the quiet person learn the value of being silent in some situations. In a chat room, that same quiet person comes to realize the freedom and delight of spontaneously opening up, and how that leads to friendships.

The virtual world is quite different from the in-person world. Digitizing people, relationships and groups has stretched the boundaries of how and when humans interact. Identity, in traditional concepts, is established in early years of life and remains relatively stable. In post-modern approaches, it is considered as pluralistic, dynamic, and floating. Each person would have multiple identities. According to the post-modernist, identity would develop itself in the form of phases and consolidate itself more and more in the course of time. Post-modern scholars such as Judith Butler see the assumption of fixed identities as ideology and an expression of domination. They argue that all groups and individuals construct their own identities, stress difference and multiple identities identities that are free-floating, not connected to an essence - and performances (which means that one can be anything and anyone that one wants to be and communicates to be). Kenneth Gergen (2003: 56) argues that new communication technologies (especially mobile phones) undo the “bounded and centered self” and that “identity becomes fluid, shifting in a chameleon-like way from one social context to another” because “film, books, magazines, radio, television, and the Internet all foster communication links outside one’s immediate social surroundings”. According to Baym (1998), new ways of communication enable one to participate in ulterior systems of belief and value, in dialogues with novel and creative outcomes, and in projects that generate new interdependencies. New affective bonds are created outside one’s immediate social surrounds. “We can be multiple people simultaneously, with no one of these selves necessarily more valid than any other. These varied identities can have varied degrees of relation to the embodied “self” (Baym, 1998: 41).

I suspect that most people online share many characteristics of their offline identities because they want to make contacts online that also work in the offline world, which
How modern technology shape-shifts our identity

might not be possible if others discover that the offline behaviour is very different from the online behaviour of persons whom they like and have learned to know in cyberspace. The World Wide Web allows an accentuation of certain personal characteristics that individuals consider important and realize by making use of hyperlinking, pictures, videos, animations and social software that supports interaction online. We all have a choice when it comes to how much of ourselves we want to share with the world and it can be daunting to some people because they know that the Internet is forever so they have to decide how far they will put themselves out there. Everyone's comfort level is different and everyone's level of desire to share who they really are publicly is different. There is no right or wrong here. One can expect that on platforms like Facebook.com, which allow the self-presentation of individuals, most users aim at presenting and accentuating aspects of their self that can help them in creating contacts with others. Personal blogs can be considered as publicly available online diaries that allow accentuated presentations of individual selves. Online identities have characteristics that give us a hint of which topics and ideas are important for an individual. Studies show that the difference of online and offline identities is in many cases not as large as some scholars suspected in early Internet research. On the one hand, differences and discrimination concerning racial, sexual, gender, class and bodily identities can have a lower importance online due to the anonymity of online communication; but on the other hand, users might feel more disinhibited online and might hence engage in identity based discrimination more openly and directly.

How we decide to present ourselves in cyberspace is not always a purely conscious choice. Some aspects of identity are hidden below the surface. Covert wishes and inclinations leak out in roundabout or disguised ways without our even knowing it. We are not always aware of how we dissociate parts of our identity or even of the emotional valence we attach to them. A person selects a username or avatar on a whim, because it appeals to him, without fully understanding the deeper symbolic meanings of that choice. Or she joins an online group because it seems interesting while failing to realize the motives concealed in that decision. The anonymity, fantasy and wide variety of online environments give ample opportunity for this expression of unconscious needs and emotions.

People vary greatly in the degree to which they are consciously aware of and control their identity in cyberspace. For example, some people who role play imaginary characters report how the characters may take on a life of their own. They temporarily have surrendered their normal identity to the imaginary persona, perhaps later understanding the meaning of this transformation. Those who are acting out their underlying negative impulses usually have little insight into why they do so. By contrast, attempts to work through conflicting aspects of identity necessarily entail a conscious grappling with the unconscious elements of one's personality. Striving in cyberspace to be a "better" person also requires at least some conscious awareness – a premeditated vision of where one is headed. Some people,
on their own, make a fully intentional choice about who they want to be in cyberspace. Some are partially aware of their choice and with help or through experience become more aware. Others resist any self-insight at all. They live under the illusion that they are in control of themselves.

We express our identity in the clothes we wear, in our body language, through the careers and hobbies we pursue. We can think of these things as the media through which we communicate who we are. Similarly, in cyberspace, people choose a specific communication channel to express their selves. There are a variety of possibilities and combinations of possibilities, each choice giving rise to specific attributes of identity. People who rely on text communication prefer the semantics of language and perhaps also the linear, composed, rational, analytic dimensions of self that surface via written discourse. They may be the “verbalizers” that have been described in the cognitive psychology literature – as opposed to “visualizers” who may enjoy the more symbolic, imagistic and holistic reasoning that is expressed via the creation of avatars and web graphics. Some people prefer synchronous communication – like chat – which reflects the spontaneous, free-form, witty and temporally “present” self. Others are drawn to the more thoughtful, reflective and measured style of asynchronous communication, as in message boards and e-mail. There are personalities that want to show and not receive too much by using web cams or creating web pages; to receive and not show too much by lurking or web browsing; and still others who want to dive into highly interactive social environments where both showing and receiving thrive.

Contemporary culture has been technologized on a scale and with a speed that is wholly unprecedented. We live in a world where nation-state boundaries become permeable, if not insignificant, when considered in terms of the flow of digital resources, the interoperable interconnected infrastructures and the perpetual interfacing of the screened world. This new world order of reflexive or “soft” capitalism promises a reconstruction of the polity, inaugurating a process of global/glocal civic connection, reconnection and renewal. Here the new global economy, information culture and political systems are inseparably entangled within a flattened and convergent “technological culture” (Lash and Lury, 2007). The only way you make sense of people’s relationships with technology is to make sense of their broader cultural patterns, because people’s relationships with technology do not operate in a vacuum. It is very important to understand the bigger picture in which technologies exist, in order to understand why people use them. The way we think about mobile phones, the things we use computers to do – these are things we have done for hundreds or thousands of years. They are all about communicating with people. They are about sharing information, and they are about forms of social networking and reciprocity or as Geneviev Bell pointed out: “One of the things that makes a successful technology is a technology that supports experiences that people want to have” (Bell, 2004: 1).

Modern society is considered as not being responsible for the welfare of individuals, but the individual is considered as being solely responsible for his/her own welfare, fate and
future. This atomization separates individuals who have to see their friends, neighbours, classmates, fellow citizens, and so on, primarily as competitors in existential struggles for survival. The collective identities that many people shared were rather centrally defined and did not allow a great deal of participation. This situation has changed; identity has shifted from collective communities to individualization and the flexible association in various networks that might be perceived as communities or not. The reason why people are interested in virtual communities might be that they feel that society and the social systems they live and work in do not provide them with opportunities that guarantee participation and self-fulfilling activities. Many individuals feel alienated and search for new communities that function according to principles that transcend the dominant logic of competition and capitalism that today causes feelings of alienation.

Cyberspace and virtual communities are in fact substitutes for public places. They are the most visited and grow into spaces where all users have an active role, or they turn into more intimate and more private space that promotes more intimate discussions between users or several carefully chosen users. In such spatially organized ways of communication there is an unwritten, but universally accepted rule about which discussion topics are appropriate, encouraged and regarded as suitable, and which topics are banned, sanctioned or inappropriate. Particular forums, social networks or chats use the metaphor of “room” to log in or to initiate certain topics for discussion. For example, when it comes to “public rooms”, the discussions are moderate, usually monitored and follow certain norms. On the other hand, intimate discussions are usually held in private rooms and involve a dose of flirting, private and intimate discussion. Such rhetoric would be considered inappropriate in other types of rooms, unless the discussion calls for such type of language.

In cyberspace, the correlation between the choice of the name (or the picture that represents us) and our identity is not completely free from everyday cultural and political norms as the net utopians had imagined it to be. It is very important to consider the new medium as a societal framework which relates to the known practices of the economic, political and cultural environment which is still deeply chauvinistic, nationalistic and racist. Even the absence of the actual physical body which is considered to be a proof of someone’s identity, and in cyberspace is closely related to anonymity, is in doubt. Social networks, such as YouTube and others put more emphasis on “the visibility” of cyberspace users. “Revealing a user’s true identity” is sometimes unwillingly caused by other Internet users.

In Macedonia, which is a small country with a relatively small percent of Internet users, it is common for the true identity of Internet users to be revealed by other Internet users. There have been a number of cases where the identity of particular bloggers has been sought, which even led to certain accusations and construction of a virtual file. In addition, on the Macedonian blog (http://blog.mk/) there have been many cases of censorship or blocking of so called “Bulgarian bloggers”, or bloggers who write in
Bulgarian and those who disagree with the official history of the Republic of Macedonia. Often, the posts are signed by “bloggers from Bulgaria”, “Bulgarian bloggers” or “bloggers that write in Bulgarian”. Deleting or ignoring such comments is usually followed by comments such as “first learn Macedonian and then comment”, “I don’t understand what you are trying to say”, “write in our language because this is our blog”, or similar. In spite of all these comments, bloggers understand what other bloggers are saying. A proof of this are the long (both time-wise and space-wise) blog-debates between bloggers who write in Bulgarian and those who write in Macedonian. The call to censor or block “Bulgarian bloggers” actually points to the real motivation behind such acts – to define cyberspace as OURS. In such cases, the virtual community is defined both nationally and linguistically. Considering the fact that cyberspace is defined as a world without actual borders, the question that arises is: “What defines ‘blogosphere’ as a Macedonian blogosphere, when the term ‘Macedonian’ refers to a particular country, territory, people and nation?” On the other hand, it is confusing that many of the bloggers on this particular network, Blog.mk, do not live in Macedonia. In addition, we cannot claim with certainty that all bloggers who are active participants on Blog.mk feel like Macedonians (regardless of their ethnic, national or any other identity). One of the rules of the biggest Macedonian blog service is that, for example, in order to log in, you have to use the Cyrillic alphabet. If you use the Roman alphabet, your comment will not be posted on the blog. The posts written using Roman script are not shown on the main page, which reduces the number of people who will read your post. Irena Cvetkovik (2010), an author who has been studying the Macedonian blogosphere, says that “this is one of the most literal implementations of the message “I write in Cyrillic, I exist”. This is actually one of the slogans of a popular campaign in Macedonia which says, “I protect what is mine when ‘I write in Cyrillic-I exist’, which was launched by the Idea Plus Communications marketing agency and the Macedonian Information Agency (MIA) and supported by the academic, cultural and state institutions as well as the business community and media in the Republic of Macedonia. Cvetkovik (2010) poses the question: “Where does the need to construct national identity in cyberspace or computer-related space come from when cyberspace offers a world beyond borders, nations and ethnicity?” Her answer to this question is that there is “a virtual national identity” which is represented through pictures and discourses and which by the ways in which it is expressed is more or less different from national identity construction in reality. The difference lies in the absence of the physical body, or the non-existence of a body, that prevents biological and genetic identification and proving national and ethnic togetherness. Ethnic identity in cyberspace can be proven through being part of a collective interpretation of a mutual past and shared ancestors. This does not allow for someone to drastically distance themselves from the construction of the national and ethnic identity that exists in the physical and real world. In other words, the choice of pictures, topics and myths in representing one’s national identity is almost identical in both the virtual and real world.
Building a strong and stable Macedonian national and ethnic identity is done through particular strategies. In the essay called “Border cultures/cultures of borders”, Elizabeta Sheleva talks about the question of identity, here and now in the Balkans and in Macedonia. According to Sheleva, the basic definition of “identity” includes “difference” as a key distinction. In other words, “the identity is a sum of distinctive features which differentiate us from others” (Sheleva, 2003: 124). Hence, the category of identity is based on exclusion and elimination. Unfortunately, this is the “reality” of the virtual space in the Balkans, in which learning about your own identity is done only through experiencing togetherness and difference.

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Cultural identities in Southeastern Europe - a post-transitional perspective

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Abstract
This article addresses some aspects of cultural identification in Southeastern Europe in a post-transitional perspective. The period of post-transition is interpreted as a context of multiculturality, cultural diversity, human rights observance and political and economic liberalism. In this context the analysis is concentrated on the structural elements of cultural space ("institutional" culture, "independent" culture and "market oriented" culture) that illustrate the ongoing cultural changes and changes of cultural values. These occur through influences that spread from European cultures and global cultural trends which are ever more present because of new technologies, cultural industries and mediatization of culture. Regional cultural communication reflects such influences and it is ever more shaped by the observance of cultural diversity and cultural industrialization. Cultural relationships are now increasingly defined through the concept of “global multiculture” (Nederveen Pieterse), while cultural identification is more individualized.

In all Southeast European societies cultural identities tend to be less based on memories and histories and more often interpreted as a confluence of the economic (market and cultural industries), the cultural (cultural heritage and history) and the political (democratization introduced through transition from socialism to a kind of liberal capitalism).

Key words: cultural spaces, cultural identification, Southeastern Europe
This text discusses some aspects of cultural identification in Southeastern Europe in a post-transitional perspective. Post-transition provides a context that may be roughly described as a context of multiculturality, cultural diversity, human rights observance and political and economic liberalism. The present analysis is concentrated on the structural elements of cultural spaces, aspects of regional cultural communication and the establishment of a new cultural context that coincides with the cultural diversity framework largely influenced by globalization and Europeanization processes. In this respect the Southeast European societies and cultures appear to be ever closer to cultural identifications that are diverse and individualized, while the nationally and ethnically structured cultures experience processes of reconstruction and reidentification.

The structure of cultural space

The concept of space, in the sense of location or geographical place, has been largely reinterpreted in discussions on cultures and cultural globalization. Arjun Appadurai argues that “the processes of globalization have radically altered the relations between subjectivity, location, political identification and the social imagination” (Baldauf and Hoeller, 2008). However, these changes have by now contributed to the production of new content and symbols that influence the interpretation of cultures and their role in wider social and political frameworks, be they global or local. New cultural spaces have emerged. They are defined by flexible borders (linguistic, artistic, creative) that provide for cultural (re)identification and that may be subjected to the (re)established ethnic, national or professional delimitations.

Different cultural spaces have become accessible and present in the daily life of many through deterritorialization that makes globality or locality irrelevant and through ever easier technological mediation that enables entrance into the virtual world. Being omnipresent, they are subjected to various interpretations which may turn spaces into “territories, flows, hierarchies” (Storper, 1997: 19-44), or into intellectual concepts open to creative efforts and to imagination. The meaning of cultural spaces becomes linked to interpretative communities, such as Anderson’s “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983). Cultural spaces represent a context in which cultural content is produced and expressed through symbolic signs.

David Harvey (1990: 205, 306) argues that: “The social theory privileges time over space”, assuming that “temporal processes” operate within “some pre-existing spatial order”. Thus the space may be interpreted as a kind of general background for any human activity, including the establishment of cultures and cultural identification. According to Harvey, “time is always a memory of the experienced space” (Harvey, 1990: 216), and therefore aesthetic theories are primarily concerned with time, although space provides a general basis for all experiences, subsumed in a concentrated and rationalized “collapsed sense of time and space” (Harvey, 1990: 61). This would be the situation that we are facing in the present day globalized world: a collapsed sense of space and time.
Cultural identities in Southeastern Europe - a post-transitional perspective

that has already allowed for the changes in the experiences of both space and time, for
their compression and for new interpretations of such experiences. Perhaps this is what
we are talking about when we discuss cultural identities in Southeastern Europe today.

Cultural spaces in Southeastern Europe have been usually structured as national (or
ethnic) (national language, cultural values, memories, etc.) and territorially defined
(containing a majority national culture and in most cases a number of minority ethnic
cultures). Such a structure of cultural space has been rather typical of all countries in
Southeastern Europe, and as all of them except Greece entered the systemic transition
from socialism to capitalism, this structural characteristic became the starting point for
the changes that occurred. The same structure provided the context for cultural policies
that have been thought of as national and strongly culture specific.

With the influences of globalization the (imagined) borders between Southeast
European cultures and their cultural spaces have become blurred, particularly within the
former Yugoslavia where intercultural contacts were encouraged and sometimes even
enforced (for example through language policies, mediatization of cultures, common
projects, etc.). The systemic transition, clearly marked by the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
oriented all cultures to memories and prompted cultural ethnicization. At the same
time, the internal cultural differentiations within the national cultures and national
states have been increasing. The relationships between majority and minority cultures
have been gradually reinterpreted (not to say problematized) so as to incite conflicts
or, on the contrary, to support acceptance of others and enhance tolerance of cultural
diversity and multiculturalism.

Cultures have never correlated completely with the sovereign states, but cultural spaces
have been divided following the visible differences among cultures: languages, customs and
traditions, geographical settings, ethnic roots, and so forth. However, as the globalized,
deterritorialized and a-territorial contents gradually enter all cultures and cultural spaces,
the existing cultural spaces imbued by cultural communication and mediatization of
cultures open up to some common values, common cultural behaviour and common
traditions. In a way, the concept of cultural space has been gradually substituted by the
concept of (deterritorialized) culture itself.1 However, as we still speak different languages
(even at the age of technologically defined communication), and live in different cultural
settings defined by different cultural values, the need to define and redefine cultural
identities has been increasingly accepted as a justified request.

In this respect, some structural elements of the particular (national) cultural space
have been reinvented and are surviving. These are not evident in the established

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1 Terry Eagleton (2005: 31) thinks that the development of cultural theory might be a response
to the realities of the 1960s. The name of theory has been given to “the critical self-reflection”,
which has widened the concept of culture: comfort, passion, arts, language, media, body,
gender, ethnicity – all this is expressed in one word – the culture (2005: 40).
cultural values but rather in the fragmented cultural contexts. In Croatia, for instance, such fragmentation is clearly visible: the Croatian national culture has acquired a new structural shape within which the three elements are clearly discernible:

- the state-supported “institutional” culture that is very close to the concept of “national culture” and tends to preserve a kind of national identification;
- the “independent” culture clearly open to regional and global cultural communication and following multiple cultural trends and values, that inclines to what may be called individualised identification; and
- the “market-oriented” culture, with a number of combined sub-structures, very close to pop-cultural consumerism.²

In almost all SEE countries, particularly those issuing from the former Yugoslavia, very similar cultural structures can be observed. The structural fragmentations of national cultures also indicate the introduction of different types of cultural production and the gradual evolution towards cultural industrialization, which is strongly influenced by globalization processes and global cultural trends.

Such an evolution implies unavoidable differentiations between urban and rural cultural areas, local and global aspects of cultural productions, differentiation in types of cultural consumption, communication and mediatization of cultures. The final result of these processes is the transformation of cultural identities. After being personalized as “national” (or “ethnic”) at the beginning of the transition period (when it was very important to personalize one’s own national or ethnic choice), they end up now shaped as “individual” and formatted through individual choices. The processes of cultural (re)identification reflect the transitional dynamics of cultural spaces and pursue a never ending search for liberties, for freedom of expression and creativity. In a certain structural sense, the search for cultural identification in Southeastern Europe approaches transnational identification that is increasingly typical of European countries and societies. It partly springs from some common histories and memories, but is mostly defined by the post-transitional developments that have introduced some kind of liberal and “wild” capitalism, strengthened exchanges and communication with European countries, promoted mediatization of cultures and cultural values and radically changed cultural production through gradual cultural industrialization.

Regional cultural communication

The transitional changes and resulting problems of cultural reconstruction (not to mention conflicts and wars) have substantially diminished the mutual knowledge of cultures and societies in Southeastern Europe. Even the common cultural memories

have often been wiped out. The established cultural values have been problematized and
often questioned. Such processes have reflected the need to promote some of one’s own
(perhaps marginalized for years) memories and values and to use the possibility to express
the long sustained hatred of values that might have been consensually established as
common in the former Yugoslavia. Good examples of such attitudes are the questioning
of “Gorski vijenac”3 as a universal literary value by some Muslim intellectuals and its
exclusion from secondary school programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina; criticism of
the Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić’s literary achievements and the fight over whether his
works belong to either Croatian, Serbian or Bosnian cultural heritage; glorification of
the works of Mile Budak, a quite minor Croatian author who was Minister of Culture
in the Quisling Ustasha regime during the Second World War in Croatia, among others.
Such examples illustrate the problems of cultural personification (Bourdieu) where the
set of cultural values is rearranged to suit a generally defined idea of what may be the
culture to which a person belongs.

The systemic transition orientated all Southeast European cultures to their own
redesign of memories and values. Intellectuals largely concentrated on the revival of
what was clearly defined, for example, as “Slovenian”, “Croatian”, “Macedonian” or
“Serbian” cultural values and memories. This was again particularly seen in the areas of
languages and linguistics,4 but also in pop-cultures (pop music in particular, film and
audiovisual productions) and occasionally in all other cultural works and productions.

Such trends oriented cultural communication to the European and global spaces where
certain cultures tried to identify their proper positions, while the interest in regional
cultural exchange diminished and was even suppressed. It was evident that orientation to
exclusively Western cultures dominated local cultural orientation and productions, and
this was interpreted to be a typical transitional cultural asset. Moreover, an interest in
African, Latin American or Asian cultures diminished considerably, or was completely
excluded from any cultural communication and exchange.

Now, in the post-transitional perspective, the orientation to global and particularly
to European communication is being diversified. A revived interest in Asian or Latin

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3 The epic written by Petar Petrović Njegoš, Prince-Bishop of Monte Negro, first published in
Vienna, 1847.

4 The recently published book Language and Nationalism by Snježana Kordić (Jezik i
nacionalizam, Zagreb, Durieux, 2010) has triggered extreme nationalistic reactions to the
thesis that the four nations (Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Montenegrins) share the common
standard language. The author, professor and linguist Snježana Kordić says that the language
spoken by the four nations is “a common polycentric standard language”, and she goes on to
declare: “This book shows that culture transcends the national borders and that within the
same nation there are a few different cultural zones.” Cf. Matijanić, Vladimir “Bura oko knjige
Jezik i nacionalizam”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 6 November 2010.
American cultures may be noticed, although it is not strong and mainly follows the Western interest in numerous cultures of the world. The context of national cultures is often seen as limited and barely adequate in the European and global surroundings where only individual talents and achievements can be properly evaluated. This kind of individualization of achievements is reflected at the regional level as well. The works by artists, writers and intellectuals transfer over the borders among (the newly established) states. Although scrutinized from different “national” points of view, cultural contents are again circulating among the cultures of the Southeast European region. Such circulation is supported by the growing usage of new communication technologies and the fact that an ever larger number of users are able to make their own choices in cultural and media consumption, and that such choices are no longer envisaged to be ideological interpretations of the political positions taken within the states.

Possibilities to “reconnect” are being offered now in the post-transitional phase. They are particularly supported by the evolution of new types of cultural production: cultural industrialization and mediatization of cultures, which are developing under the global influences. Exchanges of cultural goods, information and cultural products are facilitated by new technologies, individualization of cultural identification and the general rise of consumerism. Cultural exchanges are increasingly broad and strong in the areas of music, particularly pop-music, in the printing industries and in the book market and in audiovisual productions, as well as in participation in different events and festivals.

Regional cultural exchange practices generally follow global influences. The prominent areas of exchange are those that are also preferred in the European and global frameworks (namely, media and particularly television programmes, films and audiovisual productions, music, etc.). They are organizationally facilitated by the same companies and organizations that are active globally and that invest in the development and formatting of the local cultural markets. These are also easily adapted to the needs and interests of local cultures.

It can be said that the overall post-transitional cultural change has led the local (either nationally or ethnically oriented) cultures towards a more open and flexible exchange and communication. The quality of the exchanged content is, however, not tested or compared to the value standards of particular cultures. The markets increasingly promote totally uncontrolled content and other cultural products while the choice is individualized.

It is important to mention that the regional concept of Southeastern Europe is more and more reflected in the frameworks of cultural communication. The Bulgarian, Albanian or Romanian authors who were not present in the book or film markets

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5 The novel „Mission: London” by the Bulgarian writer Alek Popov has been translated and published in Zagreb in 2010 by Meandar; the same author was published in Serbia in 2004.
in Croatia are now increasingly “consumed” by the Croatian public. There are no constraints imposed by either ideological or political approaches. It may, however, be mentioned that the works translated or shown in Croatia are mostly those that have already been presented in other European countries, or even those that have already attracted attention by winning some international awards (which is particularly the case of films, in recent times mostly Romanian films).

Whether such exchange and communication refers to any common cultural values or standards remains to be seen. At the moment an increased liberalization is underway and the consumers seem to be impressed by the increased cultural provision and the possibilities of individual choice regarding it.

**The European Union as a framework for cultural diversity**

The concept of culture and cultural communication within the EU has been the driving force of its integration. Ideas about cultural diversity and multiculturality have been generally accepted as a basis for the European type of integration (Bekemans, 1994: 15) and increasingly connected to human rights issues. The European integration model has not been reduced to the common market only, and the discussions on the maintenance and encouragement of cultural diversity have been a part of all European integrative ideas and practices.

Since culture tends to be interpreted as an integrative factor, it also becomes evident that different cultural elements, such as cultural identity, cultural transformation and development or cultural traditionalism, are not some given “bits of reality” (Poncelet, 1994) but parts of dynamic social realities that influence and change cultural and wider social relationships. Culture is an expression of values and references which are varied and contradictory, endogenous and exogenous, and therefore open to social forces that change social orders. At the same time, the best of tradition and creativity that survives such changes makes cultures different, not identical (Švob-Dokić, 1997: 87). The difference between “culture” and “cultures” should be briefly introduced to illustrate this point and indicate that the multicultural context developed through cultural diversity and multiculturality today defines the overall view of cultural development and cultural identities.

According to Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2007: 195) contemporary cultural trends reflect a clear distinction between a universal concept of “culture” and multiculturality reflected in “cultures”. “Culture in a general sense is human software and know-how ...”. It encompasses both “culture in the specific sense of ‘a culture’ and ‘cultures’, or forms of emotional and cognitive learning that occur in social settings such as nations, ethnic groups, localities and cities, which are usually embedded in civilizations and religions. Cultures interact, clash, or harmonize and are mediated through culture”. Jan Nederveen Pieterse reaches this conclusion after an extensive discussion of ethnicity, multiethnicity and multiculturality in a globalized world where the new architecture of cultural relations is expressed through the concept of “global multiculture”. Thus cultural globalization is reflected in the term
“multiculture”, which stands for universality that has already accepted and implanted cultural diversity and multiple meanings of particular, specific cultures.

It could be said that the concept of “multiculture” has been inspired by the previously developed concept of “world culture”. According to Ulf Hannerz (1996: 106) world culture would be “...an organization of diversity, an increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as development of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory. And to this interconnected diversity people can relate in different ways”. Notwithstanding the obvious stress on diversity that Hannerz clearly puts forward, there are still openly expressed doubts about the term “world culture”, particularly when it comes to the homogeneity and universality of its meaning. The universality and homogeneity of the notion of world culture would be tested through cultural practices and cultural life which are carried on in different places and at different cultural times, notwithstanding their possible interconnections or the possible multiplicity of their meanings.

It has been accepted now that cultural phenomena are transgressing all cultural borders, including those of virtual cultures that are said to belong to all cultures (Castells, 1996) and to reflect cultural creativity in the virtual space. We cannot be sure yet that the (mediated) cultural values and cultural creativity will not lead to the establishment of some integrated “European culture”. At the moment it is clearly visible that such cultural phenomena are diversifying the European (and global) cultural horizon. When perceived as global culture (Hannerz) they are embedded in the development of new technologies and may follow a universal concept of culture rather than of global multicultural diversity.

The tendency to stress the transnational character of contemporary cultures and cultural identities is also very much present in the analyses of particular cultures and world culture. Thus Nederveen Pieterse states that: “Transnational culture exists in global technology, industrial standards (ISOs), world products, global brands, and forms of popular culture as a broad, but thin slice of global multiculture” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2007: 198). The transnational (or global) culture is a “cultural layer of widest generality” (ibid: 200), and “... it blurs the boundaries among units; the compartments separating them (i.e. cultures) become increasingly porous because transnational culture borrows from them indiscriminately and produces novel and irregular combinations” (ibid: 201). The keynotes of global multiculture are “increasing glocalization and interplay across cultural strata”. Since the transnational (or global) culture is not an even field, multiculture best expresses the global nature of cultures.

The transnational character of cultures and cultural identities is particularly analysed in the European Union where the migration trends suggest that a number of national cultures (for example Turkish, Macedonian, Croatian, etc.) exist and function surrounded by a “majority” culture, that is, the national culture of the host country. The “emergent reality of transnational spaces” gradually eliminates “the old and assumed isomorphism between culture, polity and territory” (Robins, 2006: 30). Thus a kind
of “transnational cultural identity” develops, and the number of transnational cultures increases following the migratory trends all over the world. The “overlapping cultures” (Novak Lukanovič, 1995) have, however, always been typical of many regions of the world, and in history they have not been linked exclusively to migration, but rather are a product of the changes of political borders and power influences. The kind of cultural transnationalism that has developed in line with transnational production, trade and corporations, particularly in the media and cultural industries, differs from the phenomena of overlapping cultures in that it reflects contemporary globalization trends and developments. However, transnational cultures appear to reflect more dynamic changes (in cultural and overall development) and to be a kind of transitional phenomenon rather than an established culture.

Cultural globalization strongly influences cultural identification and all present day cultural relationships where there is integration, such as in the EU, and at local and national levels. Global multiculture refers to the interconnected diversity of cultures, and therefore offers possibilities to define particular cultural identities in a wider, global or European context. It directly addresses individuals and their social status, enabling each person to choose a type of cultural identification according to their own understanding of a cultural context and the cultural values that create it.

In the post-transitional perspective the Southeast European cultures follow such European and global trends. They are increasingly open to intercultural communication that enables their faster inclusion in European trends and at the same time their more functional internal restructuring. In this respect the EU provides a framework and a context that enable the introduction of new cultural practices and new types of cultural development at local levels, supporting at the same time cultural exchange and communication at the European and global levels.

A concluding remark

In the case of Southeastern Europe interpreted as a particular cultural space, or as a region, cultural identification is formatted through the structure of cultural space, specific cultural memories, cultural behaviour and exogeneous influences pervading the cultural space. Cultural identification interpreted as a confluence between the economic, cultural and political trends has put a strong stress on individual cultural choices, through both the interpretation of cultures and through cultural consumption. It is supported by changes in cultural production that is becoming more industrialized, commodified and mediatized through either global or local markets. Such developments indicate that processes of cultural transition are getting more defined and they show a development line connecting the departure from national and ethnic identification (legitimized through acceptance and affirmation of particular national and cultural collective identities) with a movement towards European and global open choices of values and standpoints (largely enabled by technological advances and new technologies).
To summarize, it may be said that in the Southeast European cultural space, different cultures and cultural identities have been affirmed and confirmed through ethnic and national (re)identification, and are currently opening up to global influences that provide for individualization of cultural identification. Both trends remain interconnected and submitted to individual choices and individual possibilities. This situation may be interpreted as “open”, and such openness will probably support “inner” (regional) and “outer” (global) cultural communication.

References


PART THREE
Productivity, creativity and unstable identities
Cultural identities from the bottom up - labour relations perspective

Maja Breznik

Abstract
The rise of new nation states in the region of Southeastern Europe is ironically happening at the historic moment when most nation states are progressively giving away their independence due to economic globalization. The state is no more “the omnipotent master of its territory”, but one field is exempted: this relates to control over people and determination of labour relations where “civic stratification” is paving the way for “social stratification”. The main motive behind this is a reduction in labour rights in order to achieve global competitiveness for a certain state with respect to “human resources”. For this reason, we have decided to approach the re-questioning of cultural identities from the bottom up, from the perspective of labour relations, taking as the subject of our examination “authors” or, in short, the “creative class”. We will rephrase the initial question accordingly by inverting the original phase of “cultural identities” into “identity of cultural workers” and ask ourselves what the identity of cultural workers would be in the context of their present labour relations.

Keywords: cultural identities, cultural workers, labour relations, wage, rent

Cultural and political elites have been traditionally tied in with the project of a nation state built upon the presumption of one nation with one culture or, in the case of the south-eastern region, the other way around (one culture – one nation). This relationship was temporarily modified in socialist Yugoslavia when cultural elites had another important function: the building of a unique type of socialism – self-management.
But the project of national cultural identities was enlivened again in the 1980s with a “new spring of the nations” in the south-eastern region which escalated into fratricidal wars in the 1990s. At that time cultural and political elites were commonly involved in “jingo patriotism” (Marshall, 1992) until the historic fulfilment of their nation states’ independence.

Nations were therefore constructed from above with important assistance from cultural elites, cultural ideological apparatuses and cultural ideologies. State apparatuses take hold of everybody, because nobody is simply born into one culture; each person has to learn it. It is true even for such primordial cultural institutions as a national language: literally “national language is nobody’s ‘mother tongue’ and everybody has to learn it” (Močnik, 1998: 55). For this reason, as Rastko Močnik concludes, culture constantly produces institutions, ideological institutions which culture may offer to nation state-building projects as it did in the past. But the long term partnership now seems to be in the process of dissolution or radical modification.

On the one hand, the recent creation of new “pocket states” in the region came at the historical moment when nation-state sovereignties were being exposed to overall erosion due to economic globalization. However, the limits imposed on national sovereignty are not balanced by a new “cosmopolitan law”. “Such a deficiency”, as the Italian historian of law Danilo Zolo of Yugoslav origin assesses, “favours the propagandistic distortion of the doctrine of ‘human rights’ and its transformation into a kind of aggressive humanitarian universalism – as indeed was the case of the war of Kosovo, led by Western powers against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Zolo, 2007: 39). The national political elite is, for this reason, necessarily torn between the international political elite of which it is certainly a part, even more with the progressive dissolution of national sovereignties, and the people it represents. Hence, the national political elite has lost its interest in national culture as a considerably important ideological institution.

Cultural elites, on the other hand, respond to this with “culture talk” (Mamdani, 2000), such as cultural diversity, multiculturalism and minority rights, replacing one national cultural identity with a multiplication of cultural identities. At the same time “culture talk” has many stakes in its rhetoric: from a promise to discover hidden and authentic cultural practices to better social justice and rights for minorities and discriminated groups. To this overall culturalization of life practices we can offer two brief examples which partly undermine the culturalist approach.

Firstly, national identities do not progressively dissolve, as we would expect, at least not in all social spheres equally. The lack of a new global legal order is substituted by lex mercatoria at the international level with an interesting contradiction. Although, generally, “the government becomes merely the handmaiden for the global economy” and the state is no more “the omnipotent master of its territory” (Bauman, 2005: 15),

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1 That is, the patriotism of war agitators.
Cultural identities from the bottom up – labour relations perspective

One field is exempted which concerns control over people and where the nationality of people is still very operative. Namely, the state retains control over labour relations using the reduction of labour rights as a tool for raising its global competitiveness with respect to “human resources”. Nationality, in this context, is a distinctive force in the determination of labour relations, such as, for example, in Slovenia, where temporary workers of various nationalities enjoy different labour rights. On the basis of bilateral state agreements, for example, temporary Bosnian and Macedonian workers are deprived of some labour rights, such as unemployment pay, which all other workers have, including the temporary Croatian, Serbian and some Montenegrin workers. Hence it follows that national identity might still be strongly present in some aspects of socio-economic life. Why national identity is still operative in certain fields and not in others (as well as in relationships between these fields) is a significant question for the analysis of contemporary world governance.

Secondly, as some scholars (Lockwood, 1996; Standing, 2009) have noticed there is a new identity construction (i.e. class formation) under way due to new citizenship regimes (i.e. civic stratification) and labour relations. Old labour groups (managers/professionals/skilled labour; upper class/middle class/underclass) have been changing and the borders between them progressively torn down. At the same time, as we can observe, new social groups have been created, such as the “working poor”, “proletarian high-skilled professionals”, “precariat”. New labour groups cross-cut old ones and reorganize them in new social groups with new social hierarchies and ties of dependence. An important theoretical work will be needed in the future (a study in this direction was undertaken in Močnik, 2011) in order to examine the new composition of the labour force and related modes of production.

Re-questioning of cultural identities from the bottom up

In line with this conclusion, we will put under examination part of the huge problem we have designated above. We will examine a particular labour group which once used to be relatively privileged (i.e. cultural workers) and is now, as we have seen, under transformation. We assume that if the general determinants of how a particular labour group is integrated into the production and distribution of a new value have been changed, the self-reflection would also accordingly change, as well as the aesthetic or social reflection in art practices. If we take this aspect into consideration, at least we may be able to see the range of all possible ideological positions the cultural worker might assume.

For this reason, we have decided to approach cultural identities from the bottom up, from the perspective of labour relations, taking as the subject of our examination “authors”, “artists” or, in short, the “creative class”. We will rephrase the initial question accordingly by inverting the original phase of “cultural identities” into “identity of cultural workers” and ask ourselves what the identity of cultural workers would be in the context of their present labour relations. We believe that an examination of socio-
economic arrangements for cultural workers or intelligentsia in general and their fields of production will show that they have an impact on “cultural identities”, for which this social stratum is the most responsible. Finally, this examination may help us to understand what we experience every day – why the prevailing ideology today is “competitiveness” and why the arts and sciences oppose it with a relatively modest critique on globalization.

The socio-economic position of the artist in the sociology of culture

In the tradition of sociology of culture our contribution complies with research into socio-economic relationships in the arts. According to research by Pierre Bourdieu or Natalie Heinich, we will investigate the argument about the economic independence of artists from private and public donors due to the expansion of cultural industries and copyright regulations. These two economic conditions, according to Natalie Heinich, made room for a unique artist and public figure such as Émile Zola in the 19th century, though this was rather exceptional among the numerous loft-living artists, *les bohèmes* (Heinich, 2005). The “aesthetic welfare state” after the Second World War endorsed, as Pierre Bourdieu would put it, the “autonomous principle of hierarchization” in the arts in competition with the economic principle of hierarchization (Bourdieu, 1993). In later times the aesthetic welfare state was brought to its end and culture was driven into the heart of the economy for a new cycle of capitalist expansion. Alongside this process the integration of artists into art production has changed. In the examination of this question we will focus on book publishing since it offers the simplest example among various art practices. It will, hopefully, also help to clarify the puzzling debate on contemporary “cognitive capitalism”.

Means of production in book publishing

If we examine the whole labour process (book production) from the point of view of its results (books), we see that two kinds of means of production were used: (1) the instruments and (2) the subject of labour as well as (3) labour as productive labour. We will pass from the easiest to the more difficult points, so we will start with the instruments.

(1) Instruments

When we speak about instruments in book production, we mean computers for authors, editors or designers, printing machines, means of transport and so on. Our first observation would be that less and less human labour is needed to produce a book and the modes of its distribution are faster. The instruments are the materialization of past labour which have been needed for its creation and manufacturing. At the same time instruments are also the result of multiform innovative contributions from all humankind, the fruits of general scientific development. Past labour is, for this reason, also called “dead labour” or “general intellect” and, as such, a joint property of humankind,
which may provoke the “contradiction between the development of productive forces and the relations of production, namely the regime of private property” (Cohen, 2006: 69). The Internet is today the best example of such contradiction: the technological means already make it possible that all texts from all over the world could be available to anyone at home, but the private appropriation of the technological means impedes this huge project of cultural democratization. In a situation like this, the “dead labour” is a voluntary gift to the one who has the means to explore its potentials for economic use. Therefore, examinations of technological progress demand more precaution than certain philosophers have shown, since from technological progress itself and only from it we cannot deduce revolutionary social theory.

(2) Labour

Our second point will be labour. As we know, the authors do not write books but manuscripts (Chartier, 1994: 9). Many different professions participate in the changing of an author’s manuscript into a book: editors, designers, proof readers, printers, booksellers and so on. The labour of all these people is important for the production of a new book; their working skills are rare and highly specialized, but they are nevertheless replaceable. In the context of the publishing industry they take the position of wage workers, not differing much from employees in other kinds of industries.

What about the author and his or her labour? The purpose of all the kinds of labour we have described so far is to change a manuscript into a commodity, while the author’s pursuit cannot be simply described by these terms. The manuscript comes into the publishing labour process as a semi-finished product which has in the process of publishing the function of a “raw material” or “reproductive material”. With this assessment we come to the third point, to the subject of labour.

(3) Subject of labour

The subject of labour in publishing or its raw material is the manuscript which the author has submitted to the publisher. It is, therefore, a subject of past labour from a previous labour process.

This conclusion is more important than we imagine. It marks the point at which the author joins the publishing process as part of commodity production, after the completion of the manuscript. The manuscript itself was created in circumstances which could be, with no offence to the artist, described as artisanal, by which we want to emphasize that it differs from commodity production. This means that it cannot be compared with commodity production; similarly, the work of the author can hardly be measured by the usual standards of commodity production. How many words has he

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2 Chartier here quotes Roger E. Stoddard: “Whatever they may do, authors do not write books. Books are not written at all. They are manufactured by scribes and other artisans, by mechanics and other engineers, and by printing presses and other machines” (Stoddard, 1987).
written in a certain period of time? How much material (paper, ink, electricity, etc.) has he consumed while working? Can his work be compared to somebody else’s work?

However, we must be careful with conclusions here. All these questions mean that an author’s labour cannot be directly subsumed in commodity production, but it can nevertheless be turned into a general time-labour form of value (see Table 1). An author’s efforts might be estimated in financial terms according to the current price of the labour force in a particular space and time. Socialism, for example, invented a system of fixed authors’ fees whose aim was to provide authors with payments that were comparable to wage workers of similar working qualifications. To summarize: writing of the manuscript is artisanal and different from commodity production, but they both, as we have seen, meet at the particular moment of the author’s submission of the manuscript to the publisher.

Table 1: Labour-process in book publishing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of production</th>
<th>instruments</th>
<th>&quot;dead labour&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>subject of labour</td>
<td>&quot;subject of past labour&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive labour</td>
<td>labour</td>
<td>&quot;wage labour&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expansion of market mechanisms into the arts

Conclusions so far have drawn us nearer to the question of art’s subordination to market mechanisms. The question of the expansion of market mechanisms into social spheres which were till then not subsumed into the market economy, is not a recent one. Mario Tronti, member of the Italian operaisti, wrote already in the 1960s: “The real process of proletarization is presented as a formal process of the third sector’s growth” (Tronti, 1962: 49). Tronti’s line of argumentation is that in order to augment the surplus value and, consequently, the profits, the capitalist has to diminish the value of the labour force and constantly improve the labour process, as well as to generalize and expand the capitalist mode of social production. At the end, Tronti says, all forms of labour have to become industrial labour and all social relations must swiftly change into relations of production in the third sector as well, until the whole society becomes a factory. Tronti finally draws equal signs between factory, society and state (fabbrica = società = stato).

But society as a whole is not automatically becoming a factory, since the capitalist mode of production cannot subsume automatically all spheres of social production by, for instance, separation of the labour force from the means of production or division of labour and so on. How a particular social production (as art production) gets incorporated into a capitalist mode of production may have no impact on its particular mode of production. It may remain almost the same as before, like the process of writing a manuscript, at least until machines will be able to produce novels and poems.
Incorporation of various forms of production into the market economy does not imply that they will automatically be industrialized: some may be industrialized and others may remain artisanal, such as writing a manuscript.

From this perspective, the arguments developed in the theory of “cognitive capitalism” seem simplified and the praise of “immaterial work” exaggerated (Vercellone, 2007; Virno, 2003). According to our findings so far, analyses of “knowledge-driven production” must be carried out with certain precaution. The “knowledge industry”, as it is called, was incorporated into the market economy without reversing the usual relations of production in commodity production. On the contrary, mass commodity production has been expanded to some “knowledge industries”, such as publishing or the university, for instance. As a result these two sectors converted into big production lines, similar to those in Ford factories, which produce books or knowledge as market commodities for mass consumers (Schiffrin, 2000; Krašovec, 2011). Only the work which could not be directly subsumed into commodity production, such as artistic or scientific work proper, was intact and left behind as artisanal. It was incorporated, instead, by monetary dependence in the circulation process, which we will examine in the next sections.

Conclusive remarks on production

As we said, the author gives a manuscript which enters into the production chain as a semi-finished product or a raw material to the publisher; editors, proof readers, and designers then change this manuscript into a market commodity. At this moment the author might get some remuneration for the time he has spent writing a manuscript, for materials (computer, ink, paper) and goods he has consumed during his writing. He or she can therefore receive a kind of “wage” from the publisher, but this is not the only reward to which the author has access. He or she may receive more when the finished book enters into the sphere of circulation.

Circulation

The circulation of cultural goods, such as books, is to a great extent regulated by restrictions of intellectual property rights. Legal protection of intellectual property rights has extended normal property rights for physical objects (land, real estate, etc.) to “intellectual creations” (books, paintings, etc.). The right holder thus gains a privileged position in the market or a monopoly and, particularly, the right to control and monetize the use of protected works. It means that they can, in determined situations, charge for certain uses of the protected commodity even after it has been sold to a buyer.

At first glance, the exchange of books does not differ much from the exchange of other commodities. A book is offered on the market in much the same way as a car or any other commodity. When two contracted parties exchange a car, the buyer obtains absolute ownership over the object. Let us imagine, however, that the buyer of a book wishes to
make a photocopy of the book for a friend who is also interested in the topic. The clerk at the photocopying centre will tell him that, although he is allowed to make a copy of a small part of the book, making a copy of the whole book is prohibited. He might even show him the article in the copyright law about reproduction for private purposes or the copyright notice on the back cover of the book, which sometimes includes the statement: “The photocopy kills the book.” The buyer then might come up with the idea of establishing a public or private lending library, where all the books he has bought will be available to everybody for borrowing. He will soon find out, however, that in Europe remunerations have to be paid to the authorized organization for the public lending of books. He might then get angry and decide to hold a public reading from his copy of the book, whose owner he definitely is, because in this way at least he will inform people about its content. But in this case, too, he will be approached by the collective organization of authors, which will ask him for another kind of remuneration that allows him to read from the book in public. The buyer finally realizes that, according to copyright law, he is excluded from a whole series of uses of the book – a book he has already paid for – and if he wants to gain access to them, he must pay additional remunerations to the author or rights holder. Given the prohibitions stated in copyright law, he must pay remuneration each time for each of these uses of a book he has already paid for once.

According to copyright law, only the author, not the other possible rights holders, is usually appointed to receive many of these kinds of remuneration. The author may pass rights on to the publisher, but in some cases some rights are not transferable. Legal regulation therefore gives the author rights to “secondary revenues” (like remunerations for copying, lending in public libraries, adaptation into film or theatre performance and so on). The author’s revenues are composed, as we can conclude, of two kinds of revenue: (1) a direct payment for a work which we have already described as a “wage” after the submission of a manuscript to the publisher; (2) secondary revenues which are a kind of rent following publication of the book on the basis of already accomplished and paid work and already sold commodities (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct payment for a work</th>
<th>“wage”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Secondary revenues</td>
<td>“rent”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Author’s revenues**

**Business partnership between the author and the publisher**

The publisher of course knows about both types of revenue and he thinks: if the author is justified to receive, besides a wage, also rent revenues, then the relation between the publisher and the author is no longer a contract between the author as a seller of labour or his/her ability to write a manuscript and the publisher as a buyer of labour. The publisher, accordingly, no longer feels obliged to provide, in the form of a wage or direct payment
Cultural identities from the bottom up – labour relations perspective

for the manuscript, basic payment for the author’s survival. And even less is the publisher obliged to pay for the author’s social security, pension funds and so on. Their relation thus changed into a mutual business partnership for investment in a new commodity. This leads to a fantastic metamorphosis: the author has been transformed into an “entrepreneur” and his labour into “capital”.

We draw your attention to the fact that Table 2 above is a theoretical formalization which draws a clear line between the two sources of revenue, although in reality the situation is more complex. With royalties, for example, we may find ourselves uncertain when faced with the table. Namely, royalties are a sort of postponed “wage” which can be realized in the circulation process when, as we said, the author is justified in receiving “rent revenues”. If an author receives royalties he or she has to participate with the publisher in the valorization of their common product in the market. Royalties therefore additionally reinforce the business relationship between the publisher and the author.

Since the author has a chance to receive rent revenues, the publisher considers to have the right to diminish his direct payment for a manuscript of his own free will (and a “postponed wage” or royalties are one of the methods of decreasing direct payment to the author). The author, a new entrepreneur, has to collect basic funds necessary for his subsistence by combining wage and rent revenues. What takes the form of rent revenues for the author is actually to a great extent a money value that he needs for his basic living costs and only what remains may eventually be the author’s surplus. In the frame of the research project “The Management of Author’s and Related Rights in the Digital Environment” (Breznik et al., 2008), we have conducted several interviews with authors and translators. On that occasion we found out that only 5% of their revenues derive from “rent revenues” and that this type of revenue cannot replace the rapid decrease in direct payments on the part of the publisher. It is not difficult to conclude that this system leads to considerable pauperization of authors.

Monetary dependence of authors

Once upon a time writers sought social recognition and sufficient reward for their work from private patrons, royal courts and, lately, from the aesthetic welfare state. Now they are forced to look for these in the system of copyright regulation.

As we have already said, authors are free to organize production over which market relations have no control. But social recognition and reward are accessible to authors only through publishers, valorization of their books on the market and the sale of books on which the amount of copyright remuneration strongly depends. Cultural production is

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3 For more about the project, conducted between 2006 and 2008 at the Peace Institute, see the web page http://www.mirovni-institut.si/Projekt/Detail/en/projekt/The-Management-of-Author-s-and-Related-Rights-in-the-Digital-Environment/kategorija/Cultural_policy, where the whole research report is also available.
thus subsumed into the capitalist economy through monetary dependence, since market mechanisms only provide some kind of subsistence to the authors and it is through them that the author has access to his or her readership.

Authors, for this reason, are probably inclined to adapt to a publisher’s expectations or market records which certainly influence his or her decisions in writing. But the most far reaching social effect of authors’ monetary dependence is that the field of culture cannot create an alternative system of production and circulation as an alternative to and/or in opposition to the market economy. As a consequence, market mechanisms isolate individual authors; they inhibit attempts at cooperation and collective work. They also inhibit possible self-reflection and the questioning of the social impact of artistic practice.

**Academic e-journals**

We will illustrate the argument on monetary dependence with an absurd example for all parties involved except publishers. On the list of the world’s largest publishers, if we look at their turnover, we find three (Reed Elsevier, Thomson Reuters, and Walters Kluwer) which publish academic journals that are among the top five. They manage several hundreds of journals each. Their lucrative business model is based on voluntary and free of charge work on the part of authors who submit articles and on the part of their scientific colleagues who do peer-review. Articles present research work, predominantly funded by public money, but authors must nevertheless pass all rights related to the articles on to the publishers. They, as the only right holders, have a right to fix prices, to determine the accessibility terms for e-journals and selection criteria of journals or articles, as well as the use of methodologies for citation indexes and impact factors. This is the reason that academic publishing corporations have authors in the hollow of their hand: publications in journals with the highest impact factor and citation index rates are the main criteria for the evaluation of a particular scientist, so university careers and research funding depend on them. Given that it is also a terrain of interstate comparison and competition among national scientific communities, research founders additionally urge scientists to publish in journals with the highest impact factors. Founders thus entrust sheep to the wolf, but they too do not come off with a small loss.

The same group of authors, peer-reviewers and editors is also the target readership of these journals which exceed the comprehension skills of most of the general public. Subscriptions are often too expensive for individuals: in 2007 the annual subscription for one chemistry journal cost 3,490 USD, for a physics journal 3,103 USD, for an engineering journal 1,919 USD and for a geography journal 1,086 USD (Cope and Kalantzis, 2009: 23). University libraries subscribe to these journals for which national founders mostly

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pay excessive prices, particularly in comparison to restrictive access to articles which they have already financed once through research funding. The reason that they nevertheless bargain with publishers is due to the particular position of publishers in the evaluation of scientific work. Publishers have created out of academic publishing a kind of stock exchange with a system of quantification and monetarization of not yet monetarized items, such as publications, citations, rejections of articles, and so on. Authors use this new money in exchange for university posts, research funding, rewards and prestige, the national founder as quantitative research funding criteria and as international score rates of national scientific competitiveness, while publishers sponge well off public funds for education and research. The system seems to work and each agent has obligations and benefits. The role of publishers may seem superfluous, but the “monetary dependence” they have been able to build up out of academic publishing binds all agents tightly together. The fact that commercial publishing slows down the use of digital technology for further circulation of scientific findings, that it inhibits epistemological advancement in the representation of scientific results, seems to worry only marginal groups of scientists (Cope and Kalantzis, 2009: 13-61). Despite technological progress, scientific publishing imitates the print culture, using a pdf document as a simple replacement for printed text, while peer-review is still kept highly secret. It would be possible to create a new system of electronic publishing in which editors, authors, readers and peer-reviewers could openly discuss scientific problems by means of new communication tools. It would not be so difficult to create a new model of publishing, since much of the work in scientific publishing is already free of charge, but the bonds of monetary dependence nevertheless prevent any such attempt.

**The alignment of the state with the interests of commercial publishers**

Where did the interventionist state go? The role of the state in academic publishing is a puzzling one, while the state subsidies for book publishing are really instructive. We would assume that state subsidies go where there is a lack of sufficient resources. Table 3 shows, to the contrary, that state subsidies are almost proportional to publishers’ profits. Thanks to substantial profits many publishers could easily finance books which they consider less profitable, but they nevertheless condition the publishing of these books on state subsidies. The state, giving its consent to their demands, aligns with the interests of publishers and finally defends their right to profit. Moreover, the state distributes subsidies to the publishers (see Table 3 below) paying no heed to the fact that the same publishers, by holding a monopoly in publishing as well as in distribution of books, inhibit production and circulation of non-commercial publishing programmes which the state otherwise supports through public subsidies. The position of the state is therefore ideological through the evident support of commercialization and the profit-seeking strategies in publishing despite all social consequences. It shows also the clear intention on the part of state authorities to block eventual attempts to constitute an independent publishing system on the basis of, as Bourdieu would say, the “autonomous principle of hierarchization”.
Table 3: Ranking of Slovene publishers in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLISHER</th>
<th>NUMBER OF TITLES</th>
<th>REVENUE</th>
<th>PROFIT</th>
<th>SUBSIDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mladinska knjiga</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>52,118,547.00</td>
<td>4,787,490.00</td>
<td>506,798.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Učila</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>4,484,087.00</td>
<td>1,021,101.00</td>
<td>13,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rokus</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>7,795,679.00</td>
<td>505,308.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZS</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>55,496,838.00</td>
<td>3,487,218.00</td>
<td>8,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modrijan</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>3,561,565.00</td>
<td>997,635.00</td>
<td>80,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Družina</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>7,354,500.00</td>
<td>2,058,152.00</td>
<td>160,328.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TZS</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2,007,143.00</td>
<td>509,196.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohorjeva</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>9,361,643.00</td>
<td>(-8,645)</td>
<td>95,724.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didakta</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,185,108.00</td>
<td>9,005.00</td>
<td>23,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Študentska založba</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>427,225.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cankarjeva založba</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>661,703.00</td>
<td>19,225.00</td>
<td>162,744.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identity of cultural workers

We have said that the author has a role of entrepreneur or little capitalist in business agreements with his or her stronger partner, the publisher. A devil’s advocate may argue that we simply imposed a false presentation of labour as “capital” as it is seen from the point of view of capitalists in general, in traditional and new economies alike. One may also say that the hidden objective of this particular ideological mechanism is to conceal the true nature of labour as the only producer of new value and the consequential extraction of value produced by the labourer as “surplus labour”, that is, the labour performed in excess of the labour necessary to produce the means of livelihood of the worker (“necessary labour”). We answer that the position of an author is nevertheless unique in comparison to other parts of the labour force. As we have shown in the examination of production and circulation, the author is torn between wage labour and his or her (mostly illusionary) privileges as rentier. The effect is that he or she can identify neither with wage workers nor with the capitalist class. For this reason the author is twice déclassé in respect to both the labour class and the capitalist class. He or she has no allies or identity group to which he or she might belong, so his or her uncertainties in past turbulent events should not astonish us. Authors, for instance, did not oppose labour relations reforms targeting a reduction of social benefits which were first tried out in the field of culture (for example deregulation of authors’ fees, flexible employment, self-employment, reduction of health insurance, etc.). They even applauded such reforms.
and called for a more profound “modernization of the culture sector”. Torn between the interests of wage workers and the interests of the capitalist class, authors may have a significant role in the making of a new society, a new type of capitalist society which intends to subject all social relations to capitalist production. In order to gain a more propulsive social role for the intelligentsia, they would first need to carry out a radical reform of the cultural system and find a new way of integrating authors as labour force into cultural and science production.

References


From productivity to creativity - the role of art collectives in solving the contradictions of the transitional period

Sezgin Boynik

Abstract
This essay is a commentary based on Maja Breznik’s two empirical studies on the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production of artists/authors in determining the discourse of transition. This elementary contradiction is constitutive of the ideology of visual art. I argue that the political effects of this discourse based on transition can be most explicitly shown in the example of art collectives. I will base this argument on four texts written by East European curators or art producers who have common problems relating to the issues of transition, and contradictions and collectivism in art.

Keywords: discourse of transition, contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, visual art, art collectives

One practical problematic at our starting point will eventually lead us to a more abstract sphere of discussion: how do the art systems handle their contradictions? The answer which I want to propose is that the contradictions of art systems are in most cases explained by the terms relating to the discourse of transition, and that these contradictions are handled through ideological solutions based on identity policies and psychological regulations.

We can start this discussion by naming these contradictions. Maja Breznik in her paper “Cultural identities from the bottom up – labour relations policies”, which analyses the labour processes of book production and the position of the “author” in this process, wrote that elementary contradictions between two different types of revenue determine this relationship. The “author” is torn, to use this quotidian expression, between the
“direct payment for work” (the “wage”) and “secondary revenues” (the “rent”), or between being someone who wants freely to participate and compete with his/her commodity (the manuscript) in the free market. At the same time he or she hopes to secure a guarantee from the public foundations for his/her existence as a “productive force”. This contradiction has far reaching political effects, as Breznik notes, so that an author “can identify neither with wage workers nor with the capitalist class. For this reason the ‘author’ is twice déclassé in respect to both the labour class and the capitalist class” (Breznik, 2011: 12). This elementary contradiction which could be generalized as the contradiction between the productive force and the relations of production is illustrated by the impossibility, stalemate and paradox and recapitulated as the specificity of the transitional identities. We will further magnify these identitarian discourses of the ideology of transition by shifting our focus from the “book business” to the “visual art business”. With this shift we will see that things get even more complicated.

Maja Breznik’s report dealing with the field of cultural production in the sphere of visual arts, based on interviews with the participants (Slovenian artists) in the research study “Contemporary culture in the crisis of social cohesion”, points out that the main discourse of visual art is also based on similar contradictions. These could be reduced to the contradiction between the international and the provincial art market, and more generally between the private art market and the “paternalist role of the state”. The state and the private market are no longer two antagonistic determinants, and this contradiction leads to the impossibility of any kind of cultural policy in the sphere of visual culture. This does not mean that in the transition period there is some confusion which suspends the dividing line between these two; it would be more accurate to describe this as the attempt for “complete commercialization and privatisation of the public sector” (Breznik, 2009: 79; Wu, 2002). Breznik best described this situation which leads to the impossibility or stalemate in cultural policy with the case of the collection 2000+, initiated by the Museum of Modern Art, Ljubljana. “To be able to collect for the collection [as the public sector/institution] they had to establish connections with private investors; however, the latter withdrew when the state refused to support the establishment of the foundation as a form of public-private partnership. This is when the work on the collection ground to a halt” (Breznik, 2009: 74).

This perplexity of different and contradictory tendencies in the same system is normalized by the discourse of transition. The immediate effect of this discourse is ideological, and it functions as the normalization process in the transition from the planned to the open and free market economy. Furthermore I want to propose that this ideology of transition also aims to restore the concept of “collective” in the arts by transiting the conceptualization of collective from the productive to the creative forces.

In order to penetrate and magnify these perplexed identities of the art system I propose the analysis of a few texts (two essays, an exhibition catalogue introduction and an essay) which will make the relation between the contradictions of art and the ideology of transition more explicit.
I want to start with the highly influential and frequently reproduced article of Victor Misiano (2003), “The Institutionalization of Friendship” about the Moscow and Ljubljana art communities and their relationship, which started in 1992 with the Apt-Art International exhibition organized in Moscow, and was followed by the Moscow Embassy, Interpol and Transnacionala. What all these projects have in common is their approach to dialectics between Eastern and Western Europe as a starting point, and the restoration of earlier avant-garde movements and political systems. Misiano writes that the real thing that all these projects have in common is the “[employment] of the resources of friendly relationship as part of the program”, and he calls these projects “confidential projects” with the strategy of “institutionalization of friendship” (Misiano, 2003: 169). Collectivity is almost a “natural” phenomenon in this statement on the institutionalization of friendships. It claims that these “confidential projects” are characterized by a “freedom from hierarchy and functional specializations” and an “absence of thematic programme”, as well as describing this situation as “where themes emerge spontaneously out of communication itself” (Misiano, 2003: 170). Misiano is making clear that this friendship is between artists. This transcendental friendship becomes more clear and material when Misiano tries to explain the logic of its existence; the “structure of the confidential project is nothing but an attempt to create a structure for a collective artistic practice in the situation of the absence of an art system ... which is a type of transitional society characteristic of Eastern Europe”. So, apart from the friendly relationship, which is above any kind of opportunism as Misiano claims at the beginning of his article, the reason why these two artistic communities have such a strong relationship is that they both suffer from an “institutional, ideological and moral vacuum” of transitional misfortune. This brings them together in the “last shelter of art”, which is friendship of artists. This togetherness is historically familiarized in the article through the banned conceptual artists’ strategy of “apt-art” practice during communist times. While in the 1960s and 1970s “the common affair” of avant-garde artists was the rigorous system of communism, today’s avant-garde artists are suffering from the “transitional mad dynamics of social transformations” (Misiano, 2003: 171). This is pandemic to all the post-socialist states and this is how Moscow and Ljubljana now have a “common affair” in Apt-Art International. Furthermore, this togetherness is not at all without a “thematic programme” as Misiano is suggesting. First of all, the “confidential community” is not about deconstruction, but reconstruction, and what is most significant as Misiano claims is that this “openness of confidential community can avoid ideological dogmatism, and can remain open to the chaos of the transitional epoch” (Misiano, 2003: 172). The silent political conclusion of this “reconstructive openness” is that artistic communities managed to survive communism, and can now easily adapt themselves to the chaos of capitalism.¹

¹ Misiano demonstrates this confidence of friendship by transcribing the ideological fight between participants, especially between Alexander Brener, Yuriy Leiderman and the group Irwin. Even if they are not arguing about anything; there is some invisible “glue” of friendship which ties them together.
The second text that I want to look at is the essay published in Leap into the City: Cultural Positions, Political Conditions. Seven Scenes from Europe, a publication on the project initiated by the German Cultural Foundation on the cultural affairs of seven cities of Eastern Europe in states of transition. One of the cities is Zagreb with the subject of “networking” and “cooperation” (whereas in Ljubljana the topic was “internationalism” and in Pristina “nationalism”). The text I am referring to is the essay “Recognizing networks” by one of the project leaders Boris Bakal, who starts his exposé by underlining the metaphysical or Emersonian sense of understanding the world, in which “everything teaches transition, transference, metamorphosis: therein is human power, in transference, not in creation; and therein is human destiny, not in longevity, but in removal. We dive and reappear in new places” (Bakal, 2006: 413). This continuous existence, according to Bakal, was part of “this region from the mid-nineteenth century to 1946, when the new state abolished all existing network and civic activities or placed them under centralized control”. Under this totalitarian centralized control “individuals were deprived of the possibility of being the generator of small changes, and there is the reason for the death or disappearance of socialist models of management” (Bakal, 2006: 415). As we can guess, this anti-communist discourse with very clear bourgeois ideology aims to discard the real historical collective moment (socialist self-management) in order to support the charity-based non-governmental middle-class humanitarian organizations (such as Društvo čovječnosti – the Society of Humanity). The history of artistic collectives in Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia according to Bakal, was that “European artistic context rested precisely in that their work and socialization were not determined by any material preconditions but were exclusively based on volunteering and on spiritual strength”. The fact that these collectives with “spiritual strength”, such as Gorgona, Exat, Podroom, Group of Six Artists and New Tendencies, were financed by the state foundations is just a momentary surprise for Bakal’s world view. According to his metaphysical approach, real creative collaboration started in the post-Tito period, where “Yugoslavia was turning into an inefficient obstacle to the interest groups of corporate capital” (Bakal, 2006: 417), and parallel with that, for artistic collectives the awareness of their participation in this process became more obvious. One of the first of these initiatives was the project/group Katedrala (Cathedral) initiated by Boris Bakal himself. Realized in 1987 and 1988 in Zagreb, Belgrade and Berlin this multimedia installation aimed at playing the role of conscience of a scattered society by creating a broad network of collaborations and interdisciplinary endeavours. In a very visionary manner, as Bakal claims, the visual identity of Katedrala’s catalogue from the late 1980s presents a network of spiritual antagonism by uniting all the Zagreb churches: the demolished Jewish synagogue, the Catholic cathedral, the Orthodox Church on Preradović square and the new Zagreb mosque. The most important part of this vision is that Bakal and his colleagues felt that the “[socialist] society was already deeply torn in all its aspects by great antagonisms and violent economic conflicts that, in the hands of adroit politicians, were soon to be turned into religious-nationalistic and ethnic wars” (Bakal, 2006: 416).
From productivity to creativity - the role of art collectives in solving the contradictions...

In this exposé, already by the end of the 1980s, there was a very strong tendency among the art and cultural networks to believe that Yugoslav socialist society was an obstacle to the normal flow of capital ("obstacle in the interest groups of corporate capital") and humanistic spiritual emancipation, and because of that entropic situation its destruction was inevitable. Bakal's alternative of "networking normalization" is still the prevailing one: first because it gives a broadly representative and democratically neo-liberalist justification for art collectives and, second, because it postulates that activities are still part of the lively artistic and cultural collectives and networks in the country.

In addition, Bakal and his colleagues, immediately after "the savagery of nationalist extremism", founded the Anti-War Campaign of Croatia (AWCC), which gathered together many different initiatives which did not identify with the savagery of the early 1990s. The organization, which had collaborated with various opposition groups, such as Hare Krishna and the gay movements, and also had international collaboration with the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, gave rise to the most alternative journal - Arkzin. The ideology which this network initiated, according to Bakal, led to the formation of a successful cooperation network, Zagreb Cultural Capital 3000. Bakal's advice for this social utopia is "tangible revenue", which he defines as: "surplus social value of the community, deriving from the quality and creativity of the collective, becomes a precondition for a potential surplus of the production value of community" (Bakal, 2006: 420). This definition has all the attributes of art and cultural networks ideal collaboration with managerial, national and democratic representational tendencies. According to these cultural networks and collectives they will have a crucial role in the restoration of the previous dogmatic collectives, and by the very definition of its nature this will allow the coexistence of different and antagonistic tendencies in the same system of cultural production.

With the following two examples I will try to demonstrate what has been transformed in the conceptualization of the collectives through the cultural policies determined by the transition-based discourses. My proposal is that in the ideology of transition, "productivity", as the constitutive element of the concept of the collective, has been replaced or suppressed by experiential and psychological terms, such as creation or individual emancipation. This transformation in the conceptualization of the collective is also visible in many exhibitions realized by East European curators. In order to demonstrate this transformation of the value of collectivism from productivity to creativity, it is interesting to have a look at the remarkable exhibition Collective Creativity curated by the collective WHW (What, How and for Whom), in 2005 at Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel. In the introductory text of the catalogue the curators are trying to explain the diffusion of collective-based art practice from a geographical point of view linked to places with similar "troubles with modernism", namely, according to the text, East European countries, primarily the former Yugoslavia, and some Latin American countries. But it is difficult to understand the relationship between collectivism in
art and culture and the history, economics or politics of these geographical points. Another thing clear in the text is that this “[collectivist] space is not contaminated by ideology and capital” (WHW, 2005: 16). One of the main ideological problems is that the collective is discussed using terms referring to experience, rather than to social and political emancipation. “Social struggle”, “conflict”, “society” and “political” always accompany the collective’s real driving forces such as individuality, play or creation. Nevertheless, as WHW state, “experiences of collectivity are imposed as crucial transformation forces of individual and society” (WHW, 2005: 15). In this case, where society has been stripped of its production aspect, the individual becomes the dominator of the collectivity experience. This individualism, as WHW explain, does not diminish in this collectivist experience, “rather it is only within them that we can imagine the realization of our potentialities” (WHW, 2005: 14-15). In this case, WHW suspended the productivity aspect of the collective (by not mentioning it at all) with “creativity” as the main indicator of the collectivist experience. They also managed in this valorization of collective experience to guarantee the autonomy of the artist as subject, an individual who constitutes his/herself in this experience.

Ljiljana Filipović’s essay, “Breakdown of Collective”, which appeared in the catalogue of the WHW exhibition, is even more explicit in the emancipation of collectivist experience solely through creative terms. Apart from defining this emancipation in most conservative psychological terminology, such as “the collective creation becomes the flight of fear from death” (Filipović, 2005: 106), “the isolation imposed by prohibition actually paradoxically stimulates collective creativity” or “the collective unconscious always leads us to those who create the collective” (Filipović, 2005: 108), Filipović offers an explanation for the frequent breakdowns of collectives. Even though she is silent about it, it is for us, the readers, to understand that this broken collective is in fact the collective of socialist Yugoslavia. In this metaphorical article a proposed explanation of what keeps a collective together is tolerance and experience of the “other” inside the group’s creativity. In order to fight these destructive (“death drive”) forces inside the collective, Filipović proposes an alternative which, when considering most of the contemporary artistic alternatives mentioned in this article, does not sound so different: “creative inner forces could perhaps be the only ones to transform such a situation if collectivism would be understood as a vision of transitional utopia” (Filipović, 2005: 110).

With these complementary examples I have tried to show that it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion as Breznik as to the identity problems of the authors and artists facing the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production. By emphasizing the issue of “collectives” and their discourse I have managed to explain this contradiction even further by showing the complete transformation of the conceptualization of the object in this discourse of transition. It is a necessary task for the future to carry out more rigid theoretical observations of this shift in conceptualization together with strict empirical observation and this could offer us more concrete analyses of the situation.
From productivity to creativity - the role of art collectives in solving the contradictions...

References


Culture of hits vs. culture of niches - cultural industries and processes of cultural identification in Croatia

Jaka Primorac

Abstract
The transition and transformation of the post-socialist societies have brought a shift from the homogeneous model of national cultural identity towards models that promote individual choices and tastes. The new identitarian models are open to a multiplicity of value orientations, as well as to a plurality of choices inside one’s own culture. In this paper, cultural deterritorialization, translocality and cultural globalization are discussed in order to identify the context of the recent cultural changes in Croatia. Furthermore, an analysis of cultural consumption and cultural production outlines the cultures of hits and niches as newly emerging cultures in Croatia and in SEE. They are emerging under the influence of new technologies and cultural industries, particularly those developed in contemporary Western cultures. The article shows how the opportunities that niche cultures bring are not fully developed, while the cultural objects of the global cultural industry dominate the local cultural scene.

Key words: cultural industries, culture of hits, culture of niches, new identitarian models

The transition changes that have occurred in Croatia in the last twenty years or so have brought about transformations in all fields of activity and thus in the cultural field as well. After the turbulent times of the transition period, it can be said that culture

Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

in Croatia is gradually entering the post-transition phase. Changes that have occurred include broader communication with global cultural trends, and these are visible in the alterations of modes of cultural consumption as well as cultural production. New cultural spaces are being created that include the formation of new identitarian models. We are slowly shifting from the homogeneous model of cultural identity that was linked to national culture, towards models that put individual choices at the centre and that are oriented towards new cultures. In addition, new identitarian models are open to a multiplicity of value orientations as well as a plurality of choices inside one’s own culture. New information and communication technologies (ICTs) support some of these changes and developments in the diversification of models of cultural production, distribution and consumption.

In Southeastern Europe, which Croatia is part of, the beginning of cultural industrialization was evident in the socialist period, but its true growth began with the fall of socialism and with the development of the different capitalisms in these countries. Industrialization of the cultural field implied a reshaping of the models of production, distribution and consumption. These changes included the redefinition of cultural institutions, the formation of a new cultural infrastructure, the transformation of cultural work (for example, changes in the work rights and obligations, work processes, etc.) and in the incorporation of Croatian culture in global cultural flows. Thus, we can speak about the end of the transition processes in Croatia (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007: 883; Švob-Dokić, 2008: 10), and about the gradual move to a post-transition phase at the economic, political and cultural level.

When discussing the cultural field, there are still unfinished transition processes that are a result of continuity with the former system. These relate to problems in the cultural infrastructure, cultural legislation, models of cultural financing and the general approach towards culture. As stressed by Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić (2007: 883), “Continuity with the former period is shown in such a way that financing of culture is viewed as ‘consumption’ and not as investment in production resources, as is the case with societies where processes of postindustrial modernization are underway”. In this context one can speak of Croatian society as a “mixed society” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005), where the processes of first and second modernity are intertwined.

But what could be more adequate in this context is the notion that implies, as Nederveen Pieterse (2009) stresses that different versions of hybrid combinations of premodern and modern elements still coexist in a certain society. This leads us to a multilinear perspective towards the concept of multiple modernities, where all “real existing modernities” are mixed and layered, not only in the “rest of the world” but in the “West” as well. They entail mixed social formations, where styles and customs of different cultures from past and present times are imported. Furthermore, “layered” here implies that different
components are shared by all modern societies while other components differ due to historical and cultural circumstances. Thus, transnational modernity is created, and it is “global multicultural” that is one of its expressions (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009: 25).

**Deterritorialization, translocality and cultural globalization**

Deterritorialization is one of the key cultural changes that, as a consequence of globalization, brings about the creation of new (virtual) spaces, new communities and, furthermore, new (trans)localities. Garcia Canclini (2005: xxxv) highlights how it is the authors dealing with the issue of entering and exiting modernity that presuppose the tension between deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In this way, “local” needs to be redefined: “locality is not simply subsumed in a national or global sphere, rather, it is increasingly bypassed in both directions: experience is both unified beyond localities and fragmented within them” (Morley, 1991: 8-9). Therefore, as a consequence of globalization, assisted by new information and communication technologies, the level of physical space, of specific geography is not enough – new spaces and new geographies are opened, new global flows are widened (Appadurai, 1996: 32-33).

In his analysis of deterritorialization Hepp highlights how García Canclini overlooked that deterritorialization has two aspects that have to be separated (Hepp, 2004: 2-3). These are physical deterritorialization – where the level of inequality occurs as physical deterritorialization, which is not possible for all actors but only for certain “elites” in the Castells meaning of the term (Castells, 2000: 441-442) – and, on the other side, communicative deterritorialization – where the level of inequality occurs at the level of access to communication tools and infrastructures (thus we are speaking about the digital divide, information divide, participation divide, etc.). Both of these aspects are intertwined at different levels and, due to their speed and changeability, communicative deterritorialization happens in everyday life. It is communicative deterritorialization that is vital for an understanding of media cultures in the age of globalization; they have to be analyzed as translocal phenomena (Hepp, 2004: 3-4). In this way we can speak about the new formats of the “local” where those that participate in communication are oriented towards one another, but at the global level and in new formats of communication. Both levels of deterritorialization contribute to the shaping of translocality. Nederveen Pieterse makes a distinction between closed/introverted cultures (which are tied to a certain place and oriented towards themselves), and translocal cultures (in which cultures are

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3 “With this I am referring to two processes: the loss of the ‘natural’ relation of culture to geographical and social territories and, at the same time, certain relative, partial territorial relocations of old and new symbolic productions” (García Canclini, 2005: 228-229).

4 “Speaking about media cultures I include all cultures whose primary resources of meaning are accessible by technology-based media. From this point of view, all media cultures have to be theorized as translocal; inasmuch as media make translocal communicative connections possible” (Hepp, 2004: 3-4).
viewed as a process of “translocal learning” oriented to the outside (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994: 672-674). Therefore, globalization processes are important for the newly emerged changes, where the level of cultural globalization is vital, but the levels of economic and political globalization have to be taken into account as they also influence the redefinition of old and the shape of new “localities”. Cultural globalization, which highlights stronger dependency between different cultures on a world scale, manifests itself in diverse ways: as cultural diversification and cultural reidentification (Švob-Đokić, 2008: 22), cultural reinvention (Lee, 1994: 33), cultural hibridity (Garcia Canclini, 2005, Nederveen Pieterse, 1994), and towards global multiculture/global mélange (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994, 2009). Thus, we have to research how, in what way, and to what extent the processes of cultural globalization are occurring in Croatia by observing all levels of the “locality”.

In this way we cannot view cultural changes in Croatia only through the prism of territorial borders and/or redefinition of these borders. The examination of Croatian culture has to come out of “container” categories that Beck stipulates (2003: 56), that is, from the model of a closed homogeneous identitarian system. We have entered an age of “and” (Beck, 2001: 17-20), where the culture of niches and the culture of hits coexist; we have to observe changes that come with physical and communicative deterritorialization and thus contribute to the creation of the translocal cultural forms. Furthermore, it has to be highlighted that although the processes of deterritorialization are under way, as Castells (2000: 449) stressed, people still live in certain places, that is, the differences that occur due to historical and cultural components are nevertheless relevant. This dimension is important in the case of Croatia due to the former Yugoslavian context as a broader cultural framework where cultural cooperation in the past was very strong. After years of neglect, cultural cooperation and exchange in Southeastern Europe have intensified in certain fields, especially in the audiovisual field. The broader framework of the Southeast European region is imminent, partly due to economic and political processes that are connected to EU integration processes, and partly as some of the countries are already its members.

At the global level the changes in culture and creativity are happening very fast. According to pre-recession data the cultural and creative industries were among the fastest growing industries in Europe (KEA, 2006), and in the world as well according to data from UNCTAD (2008). With the innovations in ICT, digitalization, and thus larger availability of tools for production and distribution, it is easier for everybody to create, show their work and find their audience. In addition, one can notice the upsurge of parallel cultures that are based on differentiated and specific tastes (based on the diversity of demand) and on the division into cultural tribes according to interest, creating niche cultures (Anderson, 2006: 184; Jenkins, 2006). With technological convergence and the intertwining of (tele)communications and information technologies, the new possibilities for diversity of cultural interactions are created. It has to be mentioned that convergence is not only present at the technological level – it implies the interconnection of multiple media systems, which enables the circulation and
coexistence of multiple media contents (Jenkins, 2006). These possibilities allow for the fast flow of symbols through virtual and physical borders that, as a consequence, have processes of redefinition of cultural shapes and further dynamic (local) cultural change. In this way different models of intercultural communication are developed that augment the diversity in the “real” as well as in the digital domain. This results in the emergence of a convergence culture that also presupposes the coexistence and interaction of two cultural logics: one coming from corporate convergence (that relates to the commercially directed flow of media content), and the other from grassroots convergence (informal, coming from users) (Jenkins, 2006: 162). Jenkins also stresses that it was the web that enabled the visibility of the already existing coexistence of participation and commercial culture,⁵ that is, of niche cultures and the culture of hits.

With the further development and influence of transnational companies in the cultural industries, it is more and more difficult to define the “origin” of cultural goods and services. In this sense we can speak of the translocality of a part of cultural production that circulates through global cultural flows. In the context of the culture of hits one has to mention the research into the global cultural industry by Scott Lash and Celia Lury (2007) who highlight the changed circumstances that globalization brought for culture. Lash and Lury show how culture has become ubiquitous and it is not primarily a question of mediation of representation (as in the “classical” cultural industry), but it becomes a question of a twofold process that includes the mediation of cultural objects/things, but also the “thingification of media”.⁶ This new context is highlighted by Lash and Lury with the usage of the new term “cultural objects”. Cultural objects are everywhere – as information, communication, as branded products, as financial services, as media products – they are not the exception, they are the rule (Lash and Lury, 2007: 4). Authors highlight how cultural objects are at the same time structure and form; they are dynamic and are moving in flows and fluxes (Appadurai, 1996) and it is through this movement that the value is added. Lash and Lury highlight the importance of the concept of “global microstructures”, developed by Knorr Cetina that highlights the importance of objects as locus of a global interaction order in which the actors that are geographically distanced observe each other in relation to a certain thing/object (Lash and Lury, 2007: 38). In their analysis of the global culture industry Lash and Lury (2007) deal with the cartography of trajectories of cultural objects at the global level.

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⁵ “(...) the web has made visible the hidden compromises that enabled participatory culture and commercial culture to coexist throughout much of the twentieth century” (Jenkins, 2006: 141).

⁶ Lash and Lury follow the trajectories and give an analysis of seven cultural objects, from which four are media that become thing-like (Wallace and Gromit, Toy Story, the art movement of YBA or (a group of) young British artists, and Trainspotting) and three thing-events that become mediated (Nike, Swatch and global football) (Lash and Lury, 2007: 8).
and show how meaning making is crucial at the level of production and at the level of consumption. Their analysis of the global cultural industry illustrates how culture has become an important factor in economic production and vice versa, and how local interpretations of certain global cultural objects have to be taken in a multidimensional way – the trajectories of cultural objects at the global level are welcomed by different interpretations and usage at local levels. In addition to the concept of niche cultures, the concept of the global culture industry, as offered by Lash and Lury, is important for the analysis of the Croatian context. We shall take a look at the dimension of the translocality of these cultural things/objects that have “travelled” through global cultural flows, and look at the way they have found their own place and have created new meanings in the Croatian context, as well as influencing the new processes of identification.

Cultural consumption and production between the culture of hits and niche cultures

In Croatia we can decipher new cultural identification and new spaces of cultural development and here we would like to discuss two specific contexts of their advancement. To achieve this, we shall use the available data on cultural consumption and production in Croatia, with special emphasis on the selected fields of cultural industries. Thus, when speaking about new spaces of cultural development, on the one hand we can decipher new cultural identification processes that occur through the joining of flows of cultural objects of the global culture industry (Lash and Lury, 2007), and through cultural production through localization and the reappropriation of products of this industry in the Croatian context. On the other hand new processes of cultural identification occur through the changes that happen through specific niche cultures (Anderson, 2006) that are created through modes of cultural production or cultural consumption. It has to be noted that participation in models from “below”, such as niche cultures, is primarily not commercial.8

In order to analyse general trends of cultural goods and services in (and from) Croatia we shall show cultural import and export data and trade balances for the period 2000-2005 (in millions of USD).9 During this period, the import of cultural products and services to Croatia has increased several times: according to available data, from 281 to 817 million USD. According to the same source it can be seen that the export of

7 “In global cultural industry, production and consumption are processes of the construction of difference” (Lash and Lury, 2007: 5).

8 One of first such non-commercial, innovative grassroots initiatives in the cultural field in Croatia that showed an opening towards a new model of cultural development, decision making in culture and, thus, a new model of cultural policy is Clubture a nonprofit, inclusive, participatory network of organizations in culture (Višnić and Dragojević, 2008). More details on the model of Clubture in Vidović (ed.) (2007).

cultural products from Croatia has also increased, that is, from 118 to 397 million USD. The trade balance for all reviewed years was negative (from a negative balance of -163 million USD in 2000 to a negative trade balance of -480 million USD in 2005). This data illustrates that Croatian culture is under the growing influence of foreign cultural content. It can be presupposed that in most of cases these are cultural products and services from global companies, which shall be further researched through an analysis of selected fields in cultural industries in Croatia, using available data on cultural consumption as well as cultural production and distribution.

In order to further illustrate the data presented above on the influence of global trends on cultural industries, here we shall outline selected data on the film industry in Croatia. Let us take a look at the figures regarding films and video films according to the country of origin in 2009. When analysing foreign cinematography, it can be noted that in Croatia American production has a dominant position: in total, 71.1% of films and 68.3% of video films provided in Croatia were from the US. After the US is Croatia: according to data from film distributors in Croatia in 2009, of the total provided, 5.25% films and 9.07% video films were of Croatian origin. In third place is the United Kingdom with 5% and 5.8% respectively. It is worth noting that a part of Croatian films are not presented through “classical” distribution. On the one hand this is due to film type (for example if they are oriented primarily to festivals), but it also highlights the very poor policies for film distribution in Croatia.

Concerning distribution and attendance at Croatian films in the European Union, according to available data from the LUMIERE database of the European Audiovisual Observatory, attendance at movies (usually co-productions) in the EU27 is rather low. While data was not available for films from 2008, as well as for some films from 2006 and 2007, the available data shows that attendance at Croatian movies at the European level is rather low. Here one has to stress the distribution problems of “small” cinematography, which is not only a Croatian problem, but in other countries as well. Nevertheless, one has to highlight the lack of a promotional strategy for Croatian films in Europe, where an interested audience could be found. The question of movie quality is an issue that has been


11 Accessed: http://lumiere.obs.coe.int/web/search/index.php [26 February 2010]. LUMIERE database has operated since 1996 and includes systemized data collected through the European Audiovisual Observatory, national centres and through the MEDIA programme of the European Union. It has to be noted that this data has to be taken cautiously, but nevertheless it is the only standardized data of this kind for comparative analysis at the European level.

12 According to the LUMIERE database Armin (dir. Ognjen Sviličić) had 2,989 viewers (distribution in France), Karaula (dir. Rajko Grlić) had 15,517 viewers (distribution in Poland and Slovakia), while Sve džaba/All for free (dir. Antonio Nuić), had only 611 registered viewers (distribution in Romania).
occurring since the 1990s, while the problem of financing films, although still present, has been reduced through the introduction of the Croatian Audiovisual Centre.\textsuperscript{13}

It is also important to research what kind of market structure we are dealing with in relation to the global and local levels. Not only is the ownership of infrastructure relevant, but ownership of content that is distributed through these channels is also important. When taking a look at the present situation in Croatia, it has to be stressed that the new channels of commercial television have brought about the strengthening of domestic production, but primarily through soap opera entertainment shows and, to a narrow extent, drama series. This has opened up opportunities for local production and is developing in several ways: partly as original domestic production, while on the other hand we can see the hybridization of cultural products coming from global trends, for example in the “direct translation” of available (entertainment) shows and the creation of hybrid formats.

Global influences are evident mainly in the formats of entertainment shows, such as reality shows, and different licensed shows with entertainment formats. Through global cultural flows a lot of cultural objects/things have arrived in Croatia, some of which have either stayed in their original forms or are \textit{domesticated} in their localized and hybridized formats.\textsuperscript{14} The question of quality of the content of these shows has to be raised especially as they dominate the media space. This is especially important in the context of the public broadcasting service as it is trying to compete with commercial channels using the same model of entertainment and reality shows with its relevant discourse. In this context the question of the commercialization of public television and the potential homogenization of media space has to be stressed. In conditions where public television is producing these entertainment programmes in order to compete with commercial television, one has to ask what its social role is. In addition, what is problematic is the fact that “translated” and localized formats of television programmes are classified as domestic programmes.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} The Croatian Audiovisual Centre was established in 2007 in accordance with the Law on Audiovisual Activities (67/07).

\textsuperscript{14} From localized formats we can highlight shows based on the Freemantle Media licences: brands of entertainment and reality shows – \textit{Hrvatska traži zvijezdu} (RTL) (\textit{Idol}), \textit{X Factor}, \textit{Supertalent} (NOVATV) (\textit{Got Talent}), \textit{Ljubav je na selu} (RTL) (\textit{The Farmer Wants a Wife}), \textit{Određ za čistoću} (RTL) (\textit{How Clean is your House}), and games such as – \textit{Pazi zid!} (NOVATV) (\textit{Hole in the Wall}). In addition, there are licensed shows from the Endemol corporation such as \textit{Uzmi ili ostavi} (\textit{Deal or No Deal}), \textit{Jedan protiv sto} (1vs100), \textit{Operacija trijumf} (\textit{Operation Triumph}), \textit{Fear Factor}, (RTL) \textit{Big Brother}, and shows based on BBC licences such as \textit{Ples sa zvijezdama} (\textit{Strictly Come Dancing}), \textit{Zvijezde pjevaju} (\textit{Just the Two of Us}), and \textit{Trenutak istine} (\textit{Weakest Link}), that are created in HRT production (Croatian Radio Television – public broadcasting service) and on the Channel 4 licence, for instance \textit{Jezikova juha} (\textit{Ramsay’s Kitchen Nightmares}), etc.

through which the public and commercial televisions provisionally comply with the quota required by the legislation.16 What is needed is stronger regulation and control over how the legislation is followed in order to strengthen domestic production and to diversify programmes, especially in the context of public television.

As concerns the publishing sector, when we look at the production level in 2008 in Croatia, there were 8,025 titles published (books and brochures included). It has to be highlighted that the largest number of titles come from social sciences (23.9%), followed by literature (21%), and then from applied sciences, medicine and mechanics (13.3%),17 while the other remaining percentages are other publications. Out of these published titles, one can only make a narrow analysis of the cultural consumption of citizens for fiction and non-fiction titles. To outline further the level of cultural consumption in a specific time period, and for the area of publishing, we shall analyse the data on sales in Croatian bookstores according to data from the Book Information System (KIS) for the period February-August 2007.18 The list of top bestseller titles (with the joint list of fiction and non-fiction) shows the domination of foreign authors: out of 26 titles that ended up on this list of top bestseller titles in the analysed time period only 6 titles belonged to Croatian authors. Another 20 titles that changed places on the list are works by 16 authors where some of these authors have several titles. Authors from the English-speaking world dominate, with 11 of them coming from the US, Great Britain and Ireland,19 while others come from Turkey, China, Brazil and Slovenia.20 Most of the titles are fiction titles (18), while 8 titles are non-fiction – diet handbooks, self-help books,
books of essays, and titles of a quasi-scientific nature. Among the “usual suspects” there are global hits from authors such as Paolo Coelho, Dan Brown, J. K. Rowling, J. R. R. Tolkein, Victoria Hislop, Cecilia Ahern and Patricia Cornwell, but also Wei Hui and Orhan Pamuk. This data outlines how at the level of cultural consumption in the field of publishing there is a domination of foreign authors, where the majority of the titles can be defined as global cultural objects, according to the Lash and Lury (2007) definition. Thus, part of the Croatian book audience is in this way part of global cultural flows, with a heavy domination of cultural production from the English-speaking world. On the other hand, the connecting of the Croatian book production scene to European and global (cultural) flows is very slow and sporadic and Croatian authors are at their margins. There is no strategy of book promotion at the country level and thus selected publishers are finding their own niches through which they offer their publications to foreign publishers. The support from foreign publishers exists, but it is not the result of a developed strategy of promotion of books on the foreign markets.

In order to illustrate general trends in cultural consumption in the field of music we shall take a look at data on the weekly sales of albums for the period from 28 September 2009 to 14 February 2010 from the Croatian Phonographic Association. When analysing data from the joint Croatian list of top sales (which includes sales of CDs of domestic and foreign programmes), it is interesting to note that on the lists of ten best-selling titles for the above-mentioned periods, out of 19 titles of foreign authors only 8 have managed to repeatedly show up among the top ten of the weekly charts, while the others have managed to enter the top ten only once. During the researched time period, among the ten most popular on the top list, there were 25 Croatian artists that appeared on the list (some of them with two titles) and there were seven titles of various compilations. At the top was the turbo pop-folk singer Dražen Zečić who, during his fourteen weeks on the list, stayed for six weeks in first place and then six weeks in second place. The most longstanding in the chart were chansonier Arsen Dedić and pop diva Josipa Lisac, who were at the top of the list during the whole researched period, oscillating in their positions on the list. The high number of domestic authors on the list may be attributed

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21 Examples of what is understood by quasi-scientific titles include: David Icke The Biggest Secret, William Arntz, Betsy Chasse and Mark Vincente What the Bleep Do We Know? and the book by Davor Domazet Lošo Attack of the Clones.

22 For example the Fraktura and Sandorf publishing houses.


24 Lady Gaga, Madonna, Eros Ramazzotti, Pearl Jam, Norah Jones, Backstreet Boys, Robbie Williams and Gregorian.

25 Rammstein, Michael Bublé, Michael Jackson, Dianna Crall, Tom Waits, Susan Boyle, Bob Dylan, Macedonian singer Toše, Sade, Massive Attack, and Depeche Mode.
Culture of hits vs. culture of niches - cultural industries and processes of cultural identification in Croatia

to the quota of an obligatory 20% of domestic music according to the Electronic Media Act (NN 153/09). Nevertheless, it is hard to assess music consumption, as piracy in the music sector is quite high in Croatia. But, unlike other countries from the region (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece, Romania and Serbia), where the percentage of piracy of domestic music is over 50%, data show that in Croatia this percentage is lower – 25-50% in the year 2004 (Primorac and Jurlin, 2008: 80). This situation influences the sales of CDs and digital files, but it must also be added that the drop of sales is evident at the global level. The influence of peer-to-peer exchange is also important here, although it is hard to assess due to the difficulties in gathering data. Like other artists on the global scale who are influenced by the drop in sales of CDs and digital files, artists in Croatia are also forced to orient themselves to performances/concerts as sources of income. This practice can prove to be very problematic, as it demands constant touring. It can be said that in this way the artists are going back to the times of the troubadours, or, to be in line with current trends, to “youtubeadours”.

As concerns the entrance of Croatian music production into other markets, primarily we are speaking about the regional market of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. When we speak about flowing to the global markets, it has to be noted that this occurs mainly through the niches. For example, here we would like to mention the group Bambi Molesters, who entered the global market through the niche of surfer rock. Music trajectories from niches to the global cultural industry are characteristic for hip-hop producers from Croatia who sell their beats on the foreign market, or for artists such as Tamara Obrovac, who has achieved success in the world music scene. One has to stress that it is communicative deterritorialization that is of crucial importance for these examples.

**Concluding remarks**

New features/attributes in Croatian culture are resulting from an increasingly large influence of global communication processes and, thus, from an opening up to the global cultural industry. Cultural products and services of this industry are heavily present in the Croatian cultural market. In this sense we can speak about the entrance of global cultural objects into these fields that are an important element of the global culture of hits. We can decipher such trends in cultural production through the localized and hybridized content of the global cultural industry. It is interesting to note different trends in cultural consumption, according to selected fields. In the film industry, for example, most of the films in distribution are of foreign, namely American, production. Domestic titles do not reach their audiences due to weak or non-existent distribution policies. Global cultural industry hits are present in film distribution, as well as in the content of television shows and in the book industry. Thus, as regards the publishing sector, as demonstrated by selected consumption data on books, the audience is oriented mainly to books by foreign authors, primarily English-speaking, while domestic authors are less popular. On the other hand, music consumption is oriented towards domestic
titles rather than foreign ones. These differences in cultural consumption trends are intriguing and show the multiplicity of value orientations that call for further research.

The role of information and communication technologies is important for the development of new cultural expressions, new cultural practices and new forms of participation which are especially important in the context of the development of niche cultures. Through niches selected Croatian cultural content finds its trajectories towards global cultural flows, but this option is not used to its fullest. In addition, new spaces of cultural development open up, new options of cultural identification evolve that are more and more distant from the homogeneous identitarian model that put national culture to the fore and these are moving towards a more heterogeneous model that includes a broader range of cultural interactions and exchanges. However, what is evident is the strong influence of the global culture industry, particularly from the US, and this raises the question of domination of another type of homogeneous identitarian model. Although the interpretations and usage of global cultural objects at the local level are diversified and have to be taken in a multidimensional way, their dominance asks for better policies for local cultural production and distribution.

References


Repetition of difference – the search for unstable identity

Svetlana Racanović

Abstract

The transition from a cultural paradigm strongly marked by traditional and national values towards an international, global cultural context, as well as the post-transitional situation which follows, is a process marked by many cracks, twists, quakes and ambiguities which make this transfer of values less smooth, less certain and less successful in terms of the constitution of a stable, coherent and controllable cultural identity. The creation of identity as a state of floating free, of unstable liaisons, unexpected couplings and a constant production of difference, recommends itself as a strategy for the “New Age”.

Keywords: Southeastern Europe, post-transitional state, interplay of differences, plurality, unstable identity

The transition from a cultural paradigm strongly marked or stigmatized by traditional and national cultural values towards a European or broader international, global cultural context is perceived either as a traumatic experience distinguished by a sense of anxiety, disorientation and loss or as the “flattening of the uneven spots” and the provision of a safe and stable “individualization of cultural identification” as a platform for new identity construction. When we say that we are becoming more open, more adapted, integrated, participative and productive in an international social, economic, political and cultural context, it often sounds like we have a perspective, that this is our perspective and that integration inevitably leads to a prosperous future. However, there are many cracks, twists, quakes and ambiguities which make this transition of values and the post-transitional state which follows, less smooth, less certain and less successful in terms of the constitution of stable, coherent and controllable cultural identity.
When we are talking about the “reconstruction and re-identification of nationally and ethnically structured cultures” and the “establishment of a new cultural context that coincides with the cultural diversity framework largely influenced by the globalization” (Švob-Đokić, 2011), this apparently successful transition from and transformation of “nationally and ethnically structured cultures” in East European countries tends to follow traces of Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. Namely, according to Festinger, ideologies that no longer match circumstances are reinterpreted by their believers until they appear to match them again. Some national stories from our region are just reinterpreted and disguised as now successful and promising European-type stories. In a certain way, we still exist on the border line between two incomplete states: remnants of the old system of values and fragments of the unfinished new one. Therefore, the key question and a key challenge is: how can we function in an open, participative, internationally recognized and appreciated manner but at the same time keep some distance, keep ourselves as different?

There is an example which comes from popular culture or the entertainment industry but which is illustrative of how certain identity shifts are happening. We are witnessing the great success of Turkish soap operas throughout the region and not only here. We may imagine and construct a certain hidden political background or intention behind the success of these popular or populist projects – certain Wikileaks documents related to the Turkish state authorities have even discovered a possible serious political agenda: the renewal of old Turkish political interests and aspirations in the Balkans – or we may simply talk about the impact of this TV programme on the popularization of Turkey as a tourist hot spot with direct economic benefits. But why have this particular programme or product and its protagonists become so popular here at this moment? Does it mean that our public space has become so saturated with Latino soap operas that we simply need to change one exotic Other for another one? Does it mean that we deliberately choose Turkish soap operas as an efficient tool to pacify an important segment of our history among the broadest population? Does it mean that we need to find some new, undiscovered and previously unexploited regional unifying factor? What would be that efficient unifying factor that all of us search for? Would it be proof that a particular Oriental Other, existing like we do between traditionalism and nationally marked culture on the one hand and an adoption of Western societies’ values of modern life and integration into European political and other structures on the other, becomes the promoter of those values by living them and by practising them in the everyday life of the broadest population? Would it be proof that we all share the same big goal, the same strivings, to become equal participants and beneficiaries of one, global, unifying culture which would release us from the burdens of our tradition and national cultural values? But, do things really function according to that logic? Could we imagine that this fascination with the shift from traditionalism towards modernity of a Western kind among “non-Westerners” could discover something else, something paradoxically different? Through “individualization of our choices”, and by choosing Western values

164
adoption through the Oriental Other, could we actually choose the ways to escape, the ways to re-exoticize, re-orientalize ourselves for the gaze of the Other (of the West), choose to reconstitute ourselves as Otherness, as Difference in the heart of Sameness?

Boris Groys (2006: 30-36) said that dominant discourse of cultural identity follows a person on his/her journey from a pre-modern, closed, isolated community towards an open, global, interconnected society. This man should adapt to the homogenizing and uniforming powers of modernity or contemporaneity and by that be released from his pre-modern cultural tradition. However, cultural studies nowadays consider pre-modern traditions as the point of resistance to the totalitarizing, unifying operation of global culture disguised as multiculturalism. The fact that East European art exploits the same language and methods as the art of the West, that they have become so close, so similar to each other is not a positive and encouraging development of the situation, as Boris Groys concludes. Art should always be searching for the Difference, searching for the lines of escape. And when we highlight the transfer from the national cultural matrix towards global cultural values which support “individualization of cultural identification” we have to keep in mind that Western art and the art market have only created and recognized the individual artist as an artist and free entrepreneur in a free market, while East European art production has been traditionally organized through artistic groups, and art practice in the East is still considered as a potential collective project. When we from East European countries are talking about our art production we wish to talk about the existence of the art scene as a particular art community. Therefore, East European artists and their work are often isolated in the West, placed in a context they do not belong to and in which they could not properly function: they are either ignored and degraded or exoticized and colonized.

Identity as a stable, coherent, controllable and predictably growing construct is a modernist phantasm which has crashed and decomposed in the post-modern era. To modernists, in a fast changing world where tradition counted less and less, something to compensate, to recuperate these losses had to be found: a national myth, a political ideology, a social plan, an economic model, a cultural innovation or some grand transnational or global or globalizing project (such as an EU project, such as global capitalism or pan-capitalism, global culture or multiculture, globalization in general). Modernists believed that it would reconnect us, re-anchor us and provide us with some way of dealing with the future, give us identity perspective. Peter Sloterdijk (Funcke, 2005) claims that there are three waves of globalization, of overcoming distances: the first wave was the metaphysical globalization of the Greek cosmology; the second was the nautical globalization of the 15th century. While this second wave, according to Sloterdijk, created cosmopolitanism, the third wave we live in is creating global provincialism. As things are going on now with big projects or “grand narratives” (Lyotard) say, with the (in) stability of global capitalism or pan-capitalism, with the (in) stability of EU projects and with (not) having secured the possibility for the constitution
and maintenance of a stable identity within global culture or multiculture, we cannot be sure how we can create an identity perspective.

The fact is that we from the East European region have managed, to a significant extent, to heal the wounds caused by the turbulent and tragic events of the recent past and we partly declaratively and partly effectively have entered the process of stabilization and association through Euro-Atlantic integration. This is happening in the context of the absolute domination of the mass media and advanced technologies where we are all in a position to be included, interactive and participative and to individualize our choices. However, it does not make one an individual who undeniably marks his or her place in the world with clear social, political and cultural choices or values which might be defined as identity and which would have its own sustainability in that perspective.

Dominant definitions of global culture hide the apparent paradox: that global culture presumes increased interconnectedness, blurring of the boundaries, overlapping cultures, development of transnational cultural identity, unification and cultural homogenization, as well as protection of differences, plurality and differentiation. We could assume that the global culture we should build and be part of should be based neither on a state of opposition and conflict, nor on the principle of exclusion and replacement nor on the drowning of all cultures in some huge “swimming pool” where particularities will be blanched and flattened so that they disappear or are lost in the crazy mixture. Instead, it should presume a constant state of interplay of differences, of close encounters, of interconnectedness, encroachments, overflows, interferences of things, like in Sloterdijkian foam, where everything, including identity, is in a state of floating free, with unstable liaisons and unexpected couplings of “incalculable choreographies”, as Derrida would say (McDonald, 1982).

References


The conference entitled “Questioning Transitional Dynamics in Re-defining Cultural Identities in Southeastern Europe” was held on 15 and 16 January 2011 in the CityHotel in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The conference was organized by the Peace Institute as part of the project financed by the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research. Together with the Peace Institute, the partners of the project are the Institute for International Relations in Zagreb, Croatia, the University of Vienna, Austria, and the University of Arts in Belgrade, Serbia. The event gathered together 30 participants from partner and other research institutions in Southeastern Europe, and provided an excellent platform for an intense discussion of the case studies prepared by the project partners for this conference.

The conference was opened with a welcome speech by Lev Kreft, the director of the Peace Institute, who highlighted the changing nature of cultural identities in the Southeast European region. Following his speech the conference work began with the first panel that was devoted to “Identity construction in an economic and historical perspective”, chaired by Aldo Milohnić from the Peace Institute. The first speakers were Andrea Komlosy and Hannes Hofbauer from the University of Vienna who presented their paper entitled “Identity construction in the Balkan region – Austrian interests and involvements in a historical perspective”. Their presentation consisted of two parts: in the first part Hannes Hofbauer gave a historical outline of Austrian involvement in the Balkan region, while in the second part Andrea Komlosy gave further insights that
centred on the current Austrian perception of the identities of inhabitants of the Balkans. The second presenter in the panel was Jaka Primorac from the Institute for International Relations with a paper entitled “Culture of hits vs. culture of niches – cultural industries and processes of cultural identification in Croatia” where she highlighted the emergence of two cultures that are influencing the development of new identitarian models that are becoming more dominant in Croatia. By giving an analysis of the selected data on cultural consumption and cultural production she outlined how, on the one hand, there is a strong influence from global cultural industry in Croatia (that is also present in the region) but, on the other hand, there are opportunities that are offered by the culture of niches. The following presenter was Maja Breznik from the Peace Institute with a paper entitled “Cultural identities from the bottom up – labour relations perspective” where she approached the re-questioning of cultural identities from the perspective of labour relations taking ‘artists’ and ‘authors’, that is, the ‘creative class’ as the subject of her examination. The main focus of the presentation dealt with the identity of cultural workers due to their present precarious labour relations and the ever-present reduction of their labour rights. In the next presentation entitled “From productivity to creativity – the role of art collectives in solving the contradictions of the transitional period”, guest speaker Sezgin Boynik from the University of Jyväskylä, Finland, brought collective and collaborational art practices to the attention of the panel. He analysed how the ideological implications of collective art practices in the post-Yugoslav states relate to the conception of socialist self-management and the transition from socialism to capitalism. In his analysis he gave examples of several collective art practices, mainly from Croatia. After the presentations a short discussion followed where the audience asked for clarification of selected historical data relating to certain issues of Austrian influence in the region, and of definitions of the Southeast European/Balkan region. The need for more refined explanation of the influence of global cultural industry on the culture in the region of Southeastern Europe was also stressed, which was related to the second presentation in the panel.

The second panel of the conference was devoted to “Visual and performative reconstruction of identities” and was chaired by Andrea Komlosy. The first presentation was delivered by Milena Dragičević-Šešić from the University of Arts in Belgrade, on the topic of the “Cultural policies, identities and monument building in Southeastern Europe”. Dragičević-Šešić dealt with the politics of memory, with its structures of remembering, repressing and forgetting as forms of ‘predatory nationalism’ (Appadurai), through the public cultural and educational system. By analysing a number of performances, installations and exhibitions she outlined a hypothesis that the public arts in Belgrade throughout the 1990s had an ambiguous and ambivalent role that depended on the organizers’ and/or producers’ intentions. In the presentation she focused on those aspects of public arts that questioned the official policy of remembrance and representation, and turned instead to a new official urban policy suggesting a concept for public space as space for entertainment and consumption. The next presenter was Aldo Milohnić from the
Peace Institute, Ljubljana, with a paper on “Performing identities: national theatres and re-construction of identities in Slovenia and SFR Yugoslavia” where he examined the role of national theatres in the construction of identities in Slovenia and in other countries of the former Yugoslavia. The predominantly historical approach was combined with an analysis of the cultural, social and political position of national theatres in recent and not so recent ‘turbulent times’. Together with a critical reading of theatre identity politics in newly established states, Milohnić also outlined some other important aspects of theatre policies related, for example, to the funding of national theatres, relations between national theatres and ‘independent’ theatre. In the final part of the session, guest speaker and discussant Jasmina Husanović from the University of Tuzla gave a presentation entitled “Culture of trauma and identity politics: critical frames and emancipatory lenses of cultural and knowledge production” where she reflected on the ways forward in recent knowledge production with a focus on the gestures of repoliticization within the cultural politics of memory in the (post-) Yugoslav space. By commenting on the previous papers, Husanović highlighted the importance of artistic and scientific interventions that question and redefine contemporary cultural politics in the countries of former Yugoslavia. The discussion that followed concentrated on these issues, and thus prepared the terrain for the next panel that also focused on monument policy.

The third panel consisted of a presentation of work by students from the University of Arts in Belgrade and was chaired by Milena Dragićević Šešić. The panel was opened by Jasmina Gavrankapetanović-Redžić who gave an analysis of the centre for the Srebrenica-Potočari memorial and cemetery for the victims of the 1995 genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The following presentation by Marijana Lubina was devoted to an analysis of the work by the Croatian contemporary artist Siniša Labrović “Bandaging wounds of a partisan fighter” as a response to the policy of forgetting. Next, Vladimir Miladinović spoke on the politicization of memory through the monument culture using some examples from Serbia. An interesting illustration of some of the aforementioned issues was given in the following presentation by Dušan Nešković, which analysed the monument dedicated to Karadorde and Mišar’s heroes. As an addition to this panel Jasmina Gavrankapetanović-Redžić made a short presentation of a paper from her colleague Iva Simčić that was devoted to the work by Braco Dimitrijević entitled “Under this stone there is a monument to the victims of war and the cold war”.

The rest of the Saturday afternoon was devoted to a working meeting of the project partners who discussed issues related to the continuation of the project mainly connected to the publication of the conference proceedings, dissemination of the project results and other more technical issues.

The second day of the conference continued with the fourth panel on “Mass media, social media and cultural identities”, chaired by Nada Švob-Đokić from the Institute for International Relations. The first presenter was Brankica Petković from the Peace Institute and she presented her work entitled “Erased languages, aroused alliances –
Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-) Transitional Societies

language policy and post-Yugoslav political and cultural configurations in Slovenia”. Petković examined how the language situation of other nations of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia changed with the independence of Slovenia, how it affected specific post-Yugoslav re-construction and re-positioning of cultural identities, and how it was/is supported by the media system in Slovenia. Next, Paško Bilić from the Institute for International Relations gave a presentation on “How social media enforce glocalization – the processes of identity change in selected Central and Southeast European countries”. The main focus of this paper was on the processes of cultural change and how they are enforced through the use of social media and seen from the global perspective. By using theoretical arguments and statistical data Bilić focused on the question of redefining cultural identities through social media, with the examples of Facebook and Wikipedia, while taking into account the regional context. This line of discussion was continued by the guest speaker Vladimir Davčev from the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Macedonia, in his presentation “How modern technology shape-shifts our identity”. Davčev highlighted the infinite possibilities that the anonymity of cyberspace brings for the emergence of identities that can be constructed in online communication. What needs to be remembered is that these online characters are expressions of real-world experiences, ideas and so forth. The interconnectedness of the offline and online world is thus stressed in the conclusion of the presentation.

In the discussion that followed the participants of the conference asked presenters on the panel for a more regional based approach to the issues relating to the influence of the new technologies on identification processes in the final version of their papers.

The fifth panel “Post-transitional perspectives: cultural identities and cultural education” was chaired by Milena Dragićević Šešić. The first speaker was Svetlana Jovičić from the University of Arts in Belgrade and she spoke on the “Re-shaping of identities through youth/children cultural education policies” where she focused on the cultural and educational context of identification processes. In her presentation she also reviewed selected cultural practices relating to children that dealt mainly with the Serbian context, but with references to some other countries as well. The presentation that followed by Nada Švob-Đokić entitled “Cultural identities in Southeastern Europe: a post-transitional perspective” concentrated on the structural elements of cultural space (‘institutional’ culture, ‘independent’ culture and ‘market oriented’ culture) that illustrate ongoing cultural changes. Švob-Đokić showed that such changes occur through the influences that spread from European cultures and global cultural trends that are ever more present due to the influence of new technologies, cultural industries and the mediatization of culture. In the next presentation “Repetition of difference – search for unstable identity” guest speaker Svetlana Racanović, an independent curator from Montenegro, noted how the shift to the post-transitional situation is a process marked by many ambiguities that result in an unstable identity. She opened a discussion where many issues related to the post-transitional situation were raised, from the development
of ‘independent culture’ in the region to the influence of cultural products from Turkish cultural industries (mainly soap operas) in countries of Southeastern Europe.

With this last panel the conference came to its close, and it can be said that it showed how cultural identities are a dynamic social phenomena in Southeastern Europe. The papers presented outlined a plethora of diverse issues that need to be discussed in relation to the changing nature of cultural identification processes in this region. On behalf of the organizers of the conference, Aldo Milohnić thanked the participants for their efforts and for the lively discussions that resulted from the presentations of the case studies. He also announced the deadline for submission of final papers and the publication of the conference reader in April 2011.

February 2011

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... the road to democratic transition and to EU integration for some Southeastern European countries is still rocky and long. However, the results of most of the research in this publication show that, despite slow progress, changes and improvements in the cultural sphere are already becoming visible. This only proves that by changing institutional dynamics, from within and from outside, and by implementing carefully designed cultural policy, it is possible to foster integrative processes and create new structures.

Dona Kolar Panov