

Die Reiche Mitteleuropas
in der Neuzeit
Integration und Herrschaft

Liber memorialis Jan Pirożyński

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Vorwort der Herausgeber

Vom 5. bis zum 12. September 2004 fand an der Jagiellonen-Universität in Krakau eine internationale Tagung zum Thema *Die Reiche Mittel- und Osteuropas: Mechanismen der Integration und Unterwerfung* statt. Diese Konferenz wurde von den Unterzeichneten gemeinsam mit Professor Dr. Jan Pirożyński, Krakau und Professor Dr. Karl-Erik Frandsen, Kopenhagen, organisiert. Ziel der Tagung war es, Experten und Nachwuchswissenschaftler aus verschiedenen europäischen Ländern zusammenzuführen und ihnen ein Forum zu bieten, um vergleichend über die Verfassungskulturen der Frühen Neuzeit in Mittel- und Osteuropa zu diskutieren.

Professor Dr. Jan Pirożyński, der von Anfang an die Konzeption der Tagung geprägt und die Organisation mitgetragen hatte ist leider nur wenige Tage nach der Konferenz am 9. Oktober 2004 plötzlich verstorben. Dieser Verlust traf alle Teilnehmer sehr schmerzlich, da Jan Pirożyński die Seele der Tagung gewesen war, und sich in alle Diskussionen mit lebhaften und inspirierenden Beiträgen eingebracht hatte. Seine klugen und von großem Wissen zeugenden Bemerkungen werden fest in Erinnerung bleiben.

Das vorliegende Buch wird daher dem Andenken an Jan Pirożyński gewidmet.

Ein ehrendes Gedächtnis an Jan Pirożyński ist umso mehr angezeigt, als dieser herausragende Gelehrte und wahre Gentleman alte Stils sich größte Verdienste um die deutsch-polnischen Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Erschließung der gemeinsamen kulturellen Vergangenheit erworben hat. Er war ein Freund Deutschlands und der Deutschen, deren Sprache er vorzüglich beherrschte. Als Direktor der Jagiellonen-Bibliothek und Ordinarius am Institut für Geschichte der Jagiellonen-Universität unterhielt er freundschaftliche Kontakte zu deutschen Kollegen an Universitäten und Bibliotheken, auch zu einer Zeit, als dies politisch nicht erwünscht war. Vor allem widmete sich Jan Pirożyński der Erforschung des kulturellen Austauschs in der Epoche der Renaissance und des Humanismus. Ursprünglich kam Jan Pirożyński von der klassischen Verfassungsgeschichte. Mit der hier dokumentierten Tagung, einem seiner letzten wissenschaftlichen Vorhaben, wandte er sich diesen Fragen wieder zu. Indem er beharrlich die Brücke von den institutionellen Grundlagen von Herrschaft und Integration hin zu geistigen Prägungen und kulturellen Zusammenhängen zu schlagen verstand, führte er die Breite seines Ansatzes vor Augen.

Während der Vorbereitung der Drucklegung des Bandes verstarb ein zweiter großer und nicht minder prägender Krakauer Gelehrter. Professor Dr. Józef Andrzej

Nataša Štefanec
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Croatian-Slavonian Estates in the Sixteenth Century in Central and South-East European Regional Context¹

Objectives, Sources, Approaches

The objective of the research was to compare the functioning of the Austrian, Croatian-Slavonian and to a lesser extent Hungarian estates during the 'state-making' process that was seriously and perennially challenged by the Ottomans. The investigation focused on the gradual formation of Inner-Austrian military offices on the Croatian and Slavonian Military Borders, their jurisdictions, and their effect both on the Croatian and Slavonian estates as well as on the sixteenth-century re-distribution of power in the entire region. Approaching the topic comparatively, this paper offers source based interpretations, amending dominating accounts that explained the sixteenth-century events from the perspective of *antemurale christianitatis*, national martyrdom and even bad luck, ignoring, along the way, similar comparative experiences in Europe.

This article closely examines the Viennese Assembly (Wienerische Hauptberatschlagung) held in 1577 and the General Inner-Austrian Diet in Bruck an der Mur (Universallandtag) held in 1578, with regard to the effect they had on the formation of Military Borders. The analysis is supported by numerous military, administrative and private documents from the sixteenth century, mostly from the Croatian State Archives, the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna, the Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv and the Universitätsbibliothek in Graz.

¹ In this paper – as well as in the presentation made at the international conference: *The Empires of Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanisms of Integration and Subjection (16th-20th Century)*, held in Cracow, September 5-12, 2004 – I present the most important findings and conclusions of my PhD thesis titled "Diet in Bruck an der Mur (1578) and the Estates on the Croatian, Slavonian and Kanisian Military Border" (History Department, Central European University, June 2004). The dissertation was accomplished as a research task within the International Research Project *Triplex Confinium: Croatian Multiple Borderlands in Euro-Mediterranean Context* (Director: Professor Drago Roksandić). Since it would take too much footnote space to corroborate all statements made in this paper the reader is kindly requested to consult the PhD thesis for additional argumentation and citations of sources and literature.

With regard to the theory, the dissertation owes much to the interpretations on dualist (estates – Archduke) early modern Inner-Austrian government provided by Winfried Schulze, whose research combined processes of state-territorialization and the arrangement of extensive military border infrastructure on the Inner-Austrian and Croatian-Slavonian grounds.

In comparative terms the thesis also greatly benefited from ideas and theories presented by Donna Bohanan and Hilly Zmora. Dealing with the period from the end of the fifteenth century onwards, Bohanan pointed to the all-encompassing bureaucratization of the French society, where the major role on the local level was played by the nobility, with which the crown had to contend in order to increase its direct tax income. The crown developed various patterns of behavior, siding in each province with those noble groups or strata that could execute its goals. The nobility mostly complied with royal desires if it obtained an exemption from taxes or a share in political power or both. The driving force of the Kingdom was therefore not so much centralization but taxation and control, always through institutions.

In discussing a long-lasting balancing of power between the nobility and the crown during early modern state-making, Zmora refused to view it as an ideological struggle. Large western European kingdoms were already witnessing a compromise between the nobility and the ruler in the fifteenth century. It set a basis for the development of the state. The state obtained its revenues, it could develop its institutions and the nobility solved the question of their influence through inclusion in the institutional functions. The noble stratum (heterogeneous as it was) strived for power and obtained it within a growing state mechanism. In the process it underwent a continuous transformation.

Such interpretations were supported by the examination of the early modern Austrian situation. For example, Arno Strohmayer agreed with most of the above notions, adding another dimension. He presented the political tactics and political culture of the Austrian estates as being prone to compromise rather than to seek conflict with the ruler. The struggle between ruler and estates was concentrated on the political potential of the opponent, his real legal options and his possibility to legitimize his request. The resistance could not be arbitrary since one had to achieve a goal and not provoke an irreparable conflict.

The above authors provide some of the most important theses for a comparative approach to the Croatian-Slavonian estates and the activity of the Inner-Austrian estates in the Croatian-Slavonian and Hungarian Kingdom. In fact, from the last decades of the fifteenth century, when the Ottoman threat became relentless, each of the estates in the region found its own answer to the demanding sixteenth-century state of affairs, following western-European patterns to various degrees. It depended on the institutional apparatus, system of political representation, feudal system, mentality, etc., causing great diachronic disparities between various provinces in the region.

In addition to these authors, the thesis greatly benefited from the literature on the nobility, social mobility, and military, legal and institutional history. However, con-

sidering the size and summarizing purpose of this paper, it is impossible adequately to reflect the importance of such literature here.


Changes in the Sixteenth-Century Perspective

The Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom was significantly reduced between the 1490s and the 1580s. The Ottomans managed to conquer Buda along with the great part of central Hungary, almost the entire Croatian Kingdom, and a large part of western Slavonia. A thin remaining belt of the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom stretched along the very border of the Inner-Austrian Lands, Styria and Carniola. In civil terms, in the Slavonian Kingdom there remained only three devastated counties, reduced in size – Zagreb, Križevci and Varaždin. Virovitica County was conquered in 1552. The frontiers of the Croatian Kingdom shifted northwards from its medieval core along with an extensive migration of population. Remnants of the Slavonian Zagreb County across the river Kupa were from then on called the “Croatian Kingdom”. These parts were not taxed after the 1490s due to their devastated character. At the beginning of the sixteenth century they lost their definite civil structure. Migrations of Croatian population and nobility stimulated the amalgamation of the Slavonian and Croatian Kingdom. Their diets were meeting together from 1558. In sum, as early as the sixteenth century, the territory of the border-Kingdoms was chronically depopulated and desolated, while agriculture was endangered or completely destroyed. Feudal structures mostly dissolved in these extensive areas where frequent skirmishes occurred. This was the territory that remained to be governed by the Croatian-Slavonian *Ban* (often two *Bans* in partnership) and the Croatian-Slavonian Diet. However, their authority was increasingly undermined, especially in military terms.

The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom in the sixteenth century was in its entirety a military border territory, often raided by the Ottomans. In military terms it was divided into the Croatian border between the Adriatic Sea and river Sava, and the Slavonian border between river Sava and river Drava. Squeezed between them was a small, loosely defined *Banal* border, controlled directly by the Croatian-Slavonian *Ban* and often changing its territorial scope. That is survived was mostly due to the Bishopric of Zagreb, which protected its possessions in this region, Sisak in particular. Major cities and fortresses in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom like Križevci, Koprivnica, Zagreb, Varaždin, Ivanić, Bihać and Hrastovica were all components of the border system, with their garrisons, forts and heavy artillery. Due to the Austrian engagement, they were also staffed by “German” (meaning German-speaking) troops. During the sixteenth century, the Archduke and the Inner-Austrian estates obtained military command over these fortresses and their immediate surroundings, but not yet over the entire Kingdom’s territory. This notion can not be emphasized enough. The all-encompassing control of the Aulic War Council in Graz, and later on the Aulic War Council in Vienna, was only gradually extended in territorial and jurisdictional terms. This was a complex and long-lasting development conditioned by numerous factors. In the historiography of the military border it is known as two processes,

first defined by Fedor Moačanin. First, there was "territorialization". Admittedly, the formal and final territorialization of the Croatian and Slavonian Military Borders and their separation from the "Civil Croatia" was not yet imminent in the sixteenth century. It came with major reforms in the 1750s. However, the process that enabled the transfer of the territory had already started at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Croatian and Slavonian estates began to lose their military jurisdiction over the border territory in various ways (fortresses and territories abandoned by their feudal owners, depopulation, newcomers settled by Inner-Austrian military authorities, etc.). From the 1750s "militarization" began, a highly uniform process comprising border society in its entirety. From the perspective of the sixteenth century, when it seemed that the Inner-Austrians could easily gain control over the territory of the entire Kingdom's, the territorialization of the Military Border as a part of the Kingdom territory could be even seen as a gain, although it gravely hindered the modernization processes in the area and resulted in great sacrifices endured by frontiersmen in later centuries (Drago Roksandić).

To sum up, by the last decades of the sixteenth century, the Inner-Austrian estates – though at odds with their Archduke over religious issues – managed to establish and administer a defence system in the vanguard of their own Lands with no regard to the contract signed between the Croatian estates and the Habsburgs in 1527, which obliged the Habsburg king to rule the Kingdom only personally. On the other hand, the Croatian-Slavonian estates did not manage to make a better use of private noble assets that remained after the major part of the Croatian and a great part of the Slavonian Kingdom were destroyed. Consequently, they were unsuccessful in providing a better negotiating position with regard to the Habsburgs. In the long run, they lost lands both to the Ottomans and to the Austrians. According to the research, there were several reasons for this sequence of processes and events.



Causes and Consequences

First, by the 1520s most of those Croatian magnate families that were able to lead the defence against the Ottomans were ruined in the strong initial Ottoman offensives in the region. Often, these families died out or migrated to the north. Their financial means were lost as well as their leadership potential. This also happened to a lesser extent in the Slavonian Kingdom.

Second, the remaining Croatian and Slavonian nobility failed to react properly in the first half of the sixteenth century. After electing two kings, János Szapolyai and Ferdinand of Habsburg in 1526/1527, the Slavonian and Croatian nobility spent almost a decade divided into two camps and ruining each other in the civil war that lasted until 1538. In addition, on some occasions they were contemplating various arrangements with the Ottomans, a choice made even by Szapolyai himself. All these events were taking place during the strongest Ottoman campaigns, when prompt and coordinated action against the Ottomans was indispensable. Because it failed to take place, the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom suffered great territorial losses. When the Croatian and Slavonian estates began to cooperate, the potential resources were already lacking for the reclamation of the lost territory. Both Kingdoms became highly dependant on foreign help – financially and strategically. From the 1520s, the Inner-Austrian Lands (Styria, Carinthia and Carniola) started regularly to finance the defence of the border Kingdoms. Nevertheless, the amounts that were guaranteed by Ferdinand in the 1527 accession agreement with the Croatian nobility seldom arrived in Croatia. The Habsburgs had a different policy. Habsburg military authorities reacted in those years by attracting hundreds of *uskoks* and their families from the other side of the border to the Žumberak (Sichelberg) region and the area around Senj (Aleksa Ivić, Wendy Bracewell). These soldiers did not have to be paid, and such a policy also undermined the influence of the Croatian-Slavonian nobility in the area, all contrary to the 1527 agreement.

Third, the functioning of the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom for a long time remained dependent on the Habsburg administration in Vienna and Prague, and Hungarian administration in Buda/Pozsony. From 1578 on, the Croatian-Slavonian estates were heavily reliant on the military authorities in Graz. There were the *Hofrat*, *Geheime Rat* and *Hof-Kanzlei* in Vienna, the *Hofkriegsrat* and its numerous offices (in Vienna and Graz), the Court Chamber in Vienna and the Hungarian Chamber and so on. The utter absence of such central institutions in their Kingdom deprived the Croatian-Slavonian nobility of an opportunity to participate in court life, to make a career at the royal court and in central offices, and to acquire both money and power. Kings conciliated them by titular offices (counsellor of the king or similar) that provided neither of the above.

Fourth, due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of central royal offices, the Croatian and Slavonian nobility increasingly saw these institutions as an infringement, a foreign infringement, upon their privileges. There was no consensus within the nobility on the need to collect larger taxes and resign a larger part of its income

to a central king's or even the Kingdom's treasury. This behaviour had its roots in the fifteenth century, when the fiscal reforms of Mathias Corvinus failed in Croatia. The Croatian-Slavonian nobility had comparatively wide freedoms and privileges dating from the medieval period, as well as did the Hungarian nobility. Faced with the Ottoman threat they reacted traditionally and rather conservatively, attempting to protect their privileges and fighting fervently for their tax exemptions. For example, when the Croatian-Slavonian Diet would decide to collect an internal tax called *dimnica*, then opposition was in order, in some cases escalating to rebellion. In the end, the nobility retained its privileges, but with the centres of power and decision-making firmly entrenched outside the Kingdom, the privileges lost their importance. The nobility failed to perceive that an individual noble privilege became much less important than the institution through which the power could be more efficiently exercised, as already demonstrated by Zmora, Bohanan and the others.

Fifth, such a mental stance and such attitudes had devastating consequences for the establishment and modernization of the Kingdom's institutional apparatus. Refusing to submit a part of their autonomy to the institutions, they continually failed to take into consideration other strategies for opposing the Ottomans, like the strengthening and developing of Kingdom's central institutions and finances. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Kingdom suffered from one major institutional insufficiency – the absence of a continual and stable financial office controlled by the Croatian-Slavonian Diet. The Diet only infrequently employed a treasurer. The Kingdom was able to collect meagre internal taxes. Even the more generous royal taxes collected in the Kingdom by the Hungarian Chamber amounted to 1 per cent of the official Inner-Austrian input into the Border defence, concretely, less than 5 000 golden gulden compared to the 500 000 silver gulden of Inner-Austrian military input. Consequently, there was no impetus for the modernization of the Kingdom's institutional functioning and its transformation into a modern state.

Sixth, the Croatian and Slavonian nobility alone was simply not able to organize a systematic defence of its borders or to mastermind a long-term plan that would eventually stop the Ottomans in an effective way. There was no critical mass of magnates or influential noblemen that could rethink the situation in a wider context. Individuals holding the office of the *Ban* were always influential magnates. Most of them had to take care of their private interests. In addition, they were trusted king's men. The Croatian and Slavonian Diet summoned mainly lesser nobles and could not control the private interests of the magnates. The coordination between the rich magnates and the lesser nobility in an entire Kingdom's territory was missing and the Croatian-Slavonian Diet was not able to exercise the necessary control. The defence on the level of Kingdom was mostly organized *ad hoc*, from one diet session to the other. The diet discussed how to patch the most conspicuous gaps in the defence system, how to reconstruct the most important fortresses or to collect provisions. A desirable and coordinated internal defence could not be established due to financial and coordination difficulties. In sum, the *Ban* and his men were an institution that did not suffice to cover the needs of defence in such a demanding period of war. The diet,

due to its intermittent nature and its composition was not up to the task either. They could not have a decisive influence in negotiations on the defence and politics of their own Kingdom as was the case in France or Spain or even Inner-Austria.

Seventh, it has to be emphasized that, as described by Vjekoslav Klaić or Milan Kruhek, local noblemen invested huge human and financial resources and also their lives in the defence of the Kingdom. Numerous noble families died out or were completely impoverished in these often heroic, long-lasting fights. However, the results were meagre since systematic co-ordination between them was missing. They were waging war in a traditional, old-fashioned way. They still relied on medieval military practices and military organization. Units of the noble cavalry dominated, but they were expensive and difficult to organize and control. Above all, they were inadequate for the constant defence of wide stretches of territory attacked by more numerous Ottoman light horsemen and infantry.

Eighth, the Croatian-Slavonian nobility was not able to make use of their Catholic religious orientation. It is well known that in the entire region there was religious discord. Wars with the Ottomans were constantly ideologically justified as the religious wars against the "Mohammedan servitude" and an "eternal enemy of Christianity". At the time, around 90 per cent of the Inner-Austrian nobility was Protestant (mostly Lutheran), as was the majority of the Hungarian nobility (mostly Calvinist). Only a few Croatian magnate families like the Zrinski family were Protestant while the majority of the Croatian and Slavonian nobility remained Catholic. In the 1530s and from the 1590s onwards, large numbers of Orthodox settlers arrived in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom as peasant-soldiers (Karl Kaser), settling noble lands. They caused great tension between Inner-Austrian military authorities that stimulated their arrival and the Croatian and Slavonian nobility, the Diet and the Catholic Church that opposed it, attempting to subdue the newcomers in religious and feudal terms. Though the newcomers referred to themselves exclusively as Christians, conflicts between Catholic and Orthodox hierarchies went on from the time of their arrival, openly or under the surface. During the sixteenth century, conflicts between the Inner-Austrian Protestants and Catholic Habsburg rulers were also escalating, reaching the peak at the end of 1620s, after the battle of the White Mountain. From 1604-1606 the Habsburgs also collided with Hungarian Protestants. In religious terms, the Croatian-Slavonian estates were the only Habsburg ally in the region. Bearing in mind all this, it is evident that the Croatian and Slavonian estates – apart from inexorably stressing their position as *antemurale christianitatis* – did not sufficiently use Catholic institutional channels or the influence of the Bishopric and Chapter of Zagreb as the strongest estate owner in Croatia-Slavonia to shape the situation to their benefit. This is especially clear if one has in mind that the only part of the border-adjacent Croatian-Slavonian territory that avoided Inner-Austrian military authority was the *Banal* border. This area was strongly protected by the Bishopric of Zagreb which had huge possessions there, including its jealously guarded fortress of Sisak. This demonstrated the financial and political influence of the Bishopric.

The entire situation calls for an all-embracing comparative investigation and analysis. It remains to be investigated to what extent the Bishopric of Zagreb – and some *Bans* who were at the same time the Bishops of Zagreb – identified themselves with the idea of the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom at the time, or whether they preferred to act in a wider Hungarian context.

Overall, the financial dependence of the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom on Inner-Austrian aid resulted not only from the financial exhaustion caused by the Ottoman attacks but also from internal institutional insufficiencies of the Kingdom. Being mainly concerned with the preservation of their traditional privileges in a situation when new solutions were needed to various problems and threats, the Croatian and Slavonian estates were gradually losing their power on the account of their conservative orientation. Therefore, the nobility, that is, the Croatian-Slavonian estates, never actually had a position from which to negotiate with the king on the improvement of their position within the newly emerging Habsburg structures of power. As a result the Croatian-Slavonian nobility became marginalized in sixteenth century Central-European politics. This situation became apparent to the diet only in the seventeenth century when it started to protest more strongly against the prevalent influence of Austrian and Hungarian estates in its own Kingdom.

On the other hand, the Inner-Austrian estates initially had fewer privileges and less political and legislative influence in their own lands. However, through an active and focused strategy they managed to accomplish significant gains. They acted with more unity and planning. They were actively searching the ways to improve their position with regard to the Habsburg Archduke, even if it meant higher financial costs for them. Exercising an active, though always moderate resistance towards the Archduke, they sought compromise. Furthermore, they initiated various actions to prevent superfluous spending in their lands in order to redirect resources to the Border. They were actively and jointly developing various aspects of internal and external defence systems, attempting to maintain the border region as far as possible from their frontier. The Inner-Austrian lands saw their chance for survival in the preservation of a buffer zone in a foreign territory in a way the Croatian-Slavonian estates failed to perceive half a century earlier, distracted by the civil war between Szapolyai and Ferdinand.

The Border arrangements in the Hereditary Lands were also greatly influenced by the particularistic interests of individual lands, the nobility, or special interest groups. A good example of this were the religious tensions in the Hereditary Lands that were not experienced in the Croatian-Slavonian case, as outlined briefly above. Nevertheless, the documents of Inner-Austrian Diets disclose an awareness of the need to act jointly and systematically and to use unpopular, often self-imposed measures to make important economic and political gains. Increasingly, the Inner-Austrian estates also became aware of the fact that their defence depended on their own resources and actions, and that they should not rely on foreign help, especially since the debts were piling up. It was exactly the opposite of the erroneous belief of the Croatian-Slavonian estates, which survived through foreign help, neglecting to organize on their own.

Tangible Military Results

On the Habsburg and Inner-Austrian side, the defence of the entire Border from the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania began to be systematically planned and analysed in 1556, with the establishment of the Aulic War Council in Vienna. This was followed by the preliminary defence arrangements at Inner-Austrian Diets in 1574/1575, the extensive and long analyses of the Viennese War Council in 1576, and by the large Viennese Assembly in Vienna in 1577, where many of the highest dignitaries from all the Hereditary Lands appeared. Finally, there was the General Inner-Austrian Diet in Bruck an der Mur in 1578. Hence, there was a whole sequence of large, well organized and well prepared discussions of the most qualified and influential noblemen in the Habsburg Hereditary Lands. The Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian nobility were not invited to participate or to suggest solutions to the problems of their defence. Austrians believed that their passionate approach would ruin those meetings. Hungarian magnates were furious, as is well documented.

By financially investing in the Croatian-Slavonian Border, the Inner-Austrians wanted to gain control of it. In 1578, the Habsburg Archduke took over the administration of the Croatian and Slavonian Borders, and the focus of strategic planning and administration shifted from Vienna to Graz. An entire range of actual means to entrench this influence was formulated in the Bruck discussions and decisions. Until the last third of the sixteenth century, the Inner-Austrian estates led by the Archduke resumed their own strategy of defence since there was no real alternative to it. They imposed their own military administration. The diet in Bruck enforced institutional and administrative solutions for the Border defence for centuries to come. The administration that started to develop from the 1520s was officially arranged, sorted and enlarged in 1578. The Inner-Austrian War Council in Graz ascertained the political and economic influence of the Inner-Austrian nobility within and outside their lands. The functioning and jurisdictions of several crucial military offices created for finances, provisioning, building and armament were also determined. The structure of each office was elaborated in detail as well as duties and authorities of its members. Based on the reports that were arriving from the Border from the 1560s onwards, numerous defence and provisioning plans were elaborated, from the most general to very specific ones. In return for financial contributions, an even wider range of employment possibilities opened to the Inner-Austrian nobility. Provisioning the Border created the "war economy" and profiteering, which contributed to the strengthening of the Inner-Austrian economy. The absence of such military infrastructure or a system of post-offices and information networks in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom enabled smooth infiltration by Inner-Austrian offices, throughout the 16th century.

In 1578, the *Ban's* military authority was publicly and formally transferred to the Inner-Austrian Archduke and his newly established Inner-Austrian Aulic War Council in Graz, marginalizing the 1527 agreement. The Croatian and Slavonian nobility were forced to accept this. The Archduke and the Inner-Austrian estates saw the Croatian-Slavonian estates mostly as a source of help in some concrete defence and

provisioning activities and not as a possible institutional partner. Although this increased and prevailing presence of the Inner-Austrian estates was not well accepted by the Croatian and Slavonian nobility, they protested less than Hungarian magnates and the Hungarian Diet.

The 1578 diet could be a symbol of a period with long-term consequences for the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom. It formalized and institutionalized a number of processes that were evident from the beginning of the sixteenth century, especially in defence. It also anticipated numerous economic processes and power relations in the region. Through fierce political and religious fights with the Archduke, the Inner-Austrian estates improved their overall political and military influence in the region. The Inner-Austrian military authorities were able to take the initiative on the Military Border, promoting a process of militarization and ex-territorialization of the Military Border from the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom, a process that would end more than a century later.

Streszczenie

Chorwacko-słoweńskie stany w XVI wieku w kontekście regionów Europy Środkowej i Południowo-Wschodniej

Autorka przedstawiła główne wnioski swej rozprawy doktorskiej (*Sejmik w Bruck an der Mur (1578) oraz stany na chorwackiej, słoweńskiej i kaniskiej granicy wojskowej*). Praca ta powstała w ramach Międzynarodowego Projektu Badawczego *Triplex Confinium: chorwackie pogranicza w kontekście europejsko-śroziemnomorskim* i została oparta na niepublikowanych źródłach zebranych w archiwach w Zagrzebiu, Grazu i Wiedniu.

Szczególną uwagę poświęcono zglębieniu zasad funkcjonowania chorwackich i słoweńskich stanów w drugiej połowie XVI wieku w obrębie szerszego regionalnego kontekstu Habsburskich krajów dziedzicznych (*Erblande*), uwzględniając proces „tworzenia się państwa habsburskiego”. Stany tych wymienionych regionów były bardzo aktywne w Królestwie Chorwacko-Słoweńskim, przeciwstawiając się tureckiej penetracji i budując zręby systemu Granicy Wojskowej. Było to zadanie, którego stany chorwacko-słoweńskie nie mogły samodzielnie sfinalizować z licznych względów, przedstawionych w dysertacji. W niniejszym artykule zrekonstruowano proces wyłaniania się administracji Granicy Wojskowej, w ciągu XVI wieku w poważnym stopniu finansowanej i utrzymywanej przez wewnątrzaustrackie stany oraz przez Arcyksięcia.

Chorwackie i słoweńskie Granice Wojskowe oficjalnie zostały utworzone w 1578 roku na mocy postanowień austriackiego Sejmiку Generalnego w Bruck an der Mur. Chorwackie i słoweńskie stany musiały zaakceptować decyzje podjęte w Bruck, nie mając przy tym żadnego wpływu na dyskusję sejmikową. Wywołało to dalekosiężne skutki dla Królestwa Chorwacko-Słoweńskiego, główną zaś konsekwencją było stopniowe oddzielanie się terytorium Granicy Wojskowej od tzw. Chorwacji Cywilnej. Proces ten dobiegł końca w piątej i szóstej dekadzie XVIII wieku, wywołując poważne osłabienie regionu (m.in. przez wykorzystanie licznej grupy mężczyzn wcielanych do wojska i służących w habsburskich kontyngentach militarnych na terenie całej Europy).

Wojciech Krawczuk
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Die gescheiterte Union. Zu den polnisch-schwedischen Beziehungen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Projektskizze)

Was verdanken wir der polnisch-schwedischen Union? Ein Bedenken kommt sogleich-b Bestand denn überhaupt eine Union beider Reiche? Wann und wie? Diese Frage läßt sich gemeinhin nur mit Mühe beantworten. Erst nach einiger Überlegung erinnert man sich vielleicht an die Zeit von Zygmunt Wasa, der in der polnischen Geschichtsschreibung als Zygmunt III. fungiert und in der schwedischen als Zygmunt I. Während einer kurzen Periode von vier Jahren, zwischen 1594 und 1598, war Zygmunt wirklich König von Schweden und Großfürst von Finnland, erwählter Herrscher des Königreichs Polen und Großfürst von Litauen. Wenn wir heutige politische Karten als Folie über die *composite monarchy* von Zygmunt legen, erkennen wir, daß auch die Gebiete der baltischen Staaten, Weißrußlands und der Ukraine unter Zygmunts Herrschaft zusammengefaßt waren. Auch mit modernen Maßstäben betrachtet war dies eine riesige Union, eine Vielfalt von Religionen, Ethnien und Kulturen.

Seit einigen Jahren wird an der Jagiellonen-Universität Krakau ein Forschungsprojekt durchgeführt, dessen Hauptziel die Identifikation und Beschreibung der Quellen ist, die die gegenseitigen schwedisch-polnischen Einflüsse im Bereich Mentalität erklären könnten. Die bisherigen Resultate des Projekts erlaube ich mir im letzten Teil meines Berichts vorzustellen.

Bevor wir zu diesem Punkt kommen, möchte ich in einigen Sätzen den Standort der beiden Reiche skizzenhaft vorstellen.

Schweden lag im 16. Jahrhundert am Rande Europas. Es war ein armes Land, das erst am Beginn des Jahrhunderts seine Unabhängigkeit wiedergewonnen hatte. Ein Land der freien und einflußreichen Bauern und ein Land mit wenig Adel – 400 Familien waren es bloß, die ein Wappen führten. Ein Land der strapaziösen Kommunikationslinien, wo es viel leichter war im Winter zu reisen, da gefrorene Flüsse und Seen einen guten Weg für Schlitten boten. Trotz der Bemühungen der Könige aus dem Hause Wasa waren Schweden und Finnland besonders auf dem kulturellen Sektor rückständig. Die erste Papiermühle Schwedens wurde erst unter der Regierung von Gustav Adolf gegründet – in dieser Zeit wurden allein in der Umgebung von

Krakau, am Fluß Prądnik, mehrere solcher Manufakturen mit bereits hundertjähriger Geschichte betrieben¹.

Die polnisch-litauische Adelsrepublik hingegen hatte im 16. Jahrhundert den Höhepunkt ihrer politisch-institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung erreicht. Europas Kornspeicher, wie man ihre Gebiete oft nannte, konnte auch Vorzüge in vielen anderen Bereichen vorweisen. Die Kultur blühte. Man pries die Adelsrepublik wegen der herrschenden Toleranz und republikanischen Staatsform. Aber auch das Heerwesen war europaweit geachtet und schlagkräftig. Die Taktik der berühmten schweren Adelsreiterei, der sogenannten *husaria*, wurde rasch von Gustav Adolph für das schwedische Heer kopiert, von wo aus sie dann mit den schottischen Soldaten weiter nach England überführt wurde – wir finden sie in Cromwells *New Deal Army* als die *ironsides*².

Schweden und die Adelsrepublik befanden sich aber an der Schwelle zu einer großen Wende. Polen und Litauen sollten bald der vielleicht schwersten Krise ihrer Geschichte gegenüberstehen: die Kosakenaufstände, Kriege mit Rußland, der Türkei und nicht zuletzt mit Schweden ruinierten das Land sowohl wirtschaftlich als auch politisch und kulturell. Schweden war dagegen im Aufschwung begriffen. Schon in den 30er Jahren des 17. Jahrhunderts würdigte man allgemein die schwedischen Reformen im Militärwesen, im Bereich von Steuern und Bildung. Die Begegnung beider Reiche in einer Personalunion hat zu dieser Entwicklung wesentlich beigetragen – allerdings in dem Sinne als ob sie gleichsam durch das Aufeinandertreffen in verschiedene Richtungen geworfen worden wären.

Die Historiker sind sich einig, daß eine Union solch unterschiedlicher Staatsorganismen nicht bestehen konnte, schon allein wegen des konfessionellen Gegensatzes zwischen den lutherisch-orthodox gesinnten Schweden und Polen, wo der Katholizismus in Folge der Gegenreformation seine Position immer stärker ausbaute: beide Länder konnten in einem gemeinsamen politischen und administrativen System einfach nicht nebeneinander existieren. Man könnte deshalb auch vorschnell vermuten, daß bei der so weit auseinander liegenden Mentalität und politischen Kultur wechselseitige Einwirkungen von vornherein schwach blieben.

Doch immer wieder erfährt man bei genauer Beobachtungen doch von nicht so unbedeutenden Fällen der gegenseitigen Befruchtung. In der Sphäre der Staatstheorie treffen wir z.B. auf den berühmten Aristokraten und Politiker Erik Sparre, der am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts der bedeutendste Führer des schwedischen Adels war. Bereits Michael Roberts hat in seinem Werk *The Early Vasas* darauf hingewiesen, daß König Zygmunt III. „[...] believed that Erik Sparre and his friends wished to import something like [...] *pacta conventa* into the Swedish constitution“³. Die Freiheiten des polnischen Adels waren noch am Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts der zentrale Maßstab für die Ansprüche der schwedischen Aristokraten gegenüber ihrer eigenen Krone.

¹ Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, Bd. II, Edinburgh 1958, 116.

² Ebd., 245-247.

³ Ders., *The Early Vasas*, Cambridge 1968, 341.

Obwohl Sparre im Jahre 1600 von Herzog Karl hingerichtet worden war, sind seine Ideen lebendig geblieben. Nach dem Tod von König Gustav Adolph im Jahre 1632 konnte der Traum einer Magnatenherrschaft in Schweden für einige Zeit verwirklicht werden. Wie Johan Holm kürzlich dargelegt hat, wurde die Herrschaft in Schweden gemäß dem Statut von 1634 durch fünf *kollegiecheferna* (Kollegien) ausgeübt, an deren Spitze Regenten standen, von denen allein drei der Familie Oxenstierna angehörten⁴. Von einer solchen Machtkonzentration konnten die polnischen Magnaten wiederum nur träumen, in der traditionellen Periodisierung der polnischen Geschichte wird das 17. Jahrhundert aber dennoch als die Zeit der „Magnaten-Oligarchie“ (poln. *oligarchia magnacka*) geführt, während man in Schweden von der *stormaktstiden*, der Großmachtzeit, spricht.

Es lassen sich auch mannigfaltige andere Belege für einen regen Austausch der Gedanken finden, insbesondere im schon erwähnten militärischen Bereich. Der zur Zeit wohl populärste schwedische Militärhistoriker Peter Englund schreibt oft und mit anerkennenden Worten über das polnische Heer und die militärische Organisation der Adelsrepublik⁵. Die anderen Bereiche sind zwar nicht so eingehend beleuchtet, bieten aber dennoch zahlreiche Forschungsansätze. So ist es beispielsweise fraglich, ob das schwedische Referendarsamt im 16. Jahrhundert nach dem Vorbild der gleichnamigen polnischen Institution geschaffen wurde. Ist das unter Sphragistikern berühmte, von den Wappen verschiedener schwedischer Provinzen geziert Insiegel von König Zygmunt aus dem Jahre 1594 eine Nachahmung der polnischen Majestätsinsiegel? Solche und ähnliche Fragen werden häufig unter Spezialisten gestellt, dringen aber selten bis zu den übergeordneten Synthesen der Forschung durch und bleiben auf einen engen Kreis von Archivaren und mit quellenkundlichen Arbeiten befaßten Frühneuzeit-Historikern beschränkt.

Wenn wir jetzt zu dem angedeuteten Projekt zurückkehren, muß ich einleitend bemerken, daß es uns gelungen ist, bisher unbekannte schriftliche Quellen zu Tage zu fördern, die wir zum Teil bereits publiziert haben. Es handelt sich um Briefe der Königstochter Anna Wasa (geboren 1568 – gestorben 1625) an die befreundete aristokratische Familie Gyllenstierna⁶. Anna war im Unterschied zu ihrem Bruder Zygmunt als Lutheranerin erzogen worden. Dennoch folgte sie ihrem Bruder nach dem verlorenen Krieg nach Polen zurück. Um Anna bildete sich ein kleiner Hof von schwedischen Flüchtlingen. Ihre Briefe erzählen eine intime Geschichte von Hoffnungen auf Wiederkehr in die Heimat, aber auch von Kämpfen wie z.B. um die Erhaltung des Protestantismus in Polen-Litauen: Anna Wasa mahnt die befreundeten Schweden oft, daß die Wahl der Erzieher der Kinder sehr wichtig sei; wenn man nicht aufpasse, würden man gleich einen „kleinen Papisten“ zu Hause vorfinden.

⁴ John Holm, *Skyldig plikt och trohet. Militärstaten och 1634 års regeringsform*, Historisk Tidskrift 1999, 163.

⁵ Peter Englund, *Den Oövertvinnerlige*, Stockholm 2000, 187-437.

⁶ Jarosław Dumanowski, Piotr Garbacz, Wojciech Krawczuk, Hg., in Zusammenarbeit mit Ola Svensson, *Anna Vasas Brev. Listy Anny Wazówny*, Kraków – Stalowa Wola 2002.

Die Untersuchung der Briefe erfolgte in verschiedenen Richtungen. Am Anfang stand die inhaltliche Analyse, dann aber auch die der Sprache, der sich Anna bediente, und schließlich des paläographischen Befundes. Man kann sich vorstellen, daß die Analyse auch in Richtung Frauen- und Geschlechtergeschichte erweitert werden kann. Der Fall Annas, die in Schweden höchsten sozialen Status inne hatte, und in Polen unter sehr bescheidenen, kaum königlichem Geblüt entsprechenden Bedingungen lebte, könnte auch in psychologischer Hinsicht bearbeitet werden. Das aber überlassen wir anderen Spezialisten.

Die interdisziplinären Recherchen der Historiker und Sprachwissenschaftler können, wie wir hoffen, auch weitere Spuren der längst vergessenen aber folgenreichen schwedisch-polnischen Union ans Licht bringen.

Streszczenie

Rozbita unia. Jeszcze o szwedzko-polskich związkach w XVI i XVII wieku (szkic projektu)

Artykuł dotyczy epoki, w której tak Królestwo Szwecji, jak i Rzeczpospolita stanęły u progu wielkich zmian. Szwecji przyniosły one status mocarstwa, Rzeczypospolitej zaś głęboki upadek. Ponieważ przez krótki czas te wielkie organizmy państwowe pozostawały w unii (1594 – ok. 1598), możemy znaleźć wiele śladów wzajemnych wpływów w dziedzinie rozwiązań administracyjnych czy ustroju (wpływ polskich wolności na szlachtę szwedzką). Od kilku lat w Krakowie gromadzone są źródła dotyczące tych obopólnych interferencji – owocem prac jest wydany w roku 2002 tomik listów Anny Wazówny (1568-1625), siostry Zygmunta III Wazy.

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Der Landtag im Herzoglichen Preußen und der Reichstag der Adelsrepublik im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert – Aspekte und Perspektiven eines Vergleichs

Die Ständeforschung nimmt in der Geschichtsschreibung zur polnisch-litauischen Adelsrepublik seit je her breiten Raum ein. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei traditionell auf den parlamentarischen Vertretungskörperschaften, d.h. den Reichstagen und Landtagen Polen-Litauens. Neben zahlreichen Synthesen – von den schon klassischen Werken von Adolf Pawiński¹, Stanisław Kutrzeba², Władysław Konopczyński³, bis zu den neuesten Forschungen von Wojciech Kriegseisen⁴, Edward Opaliński⁵, Stefania Ochmann-Staniszevska und Zdzisław Staniszevski⁶ – ist eine inzwischen beachtliche Reihe von Monographien erschienen, die sich mit einzelnen Landtagen, dem Verlauf ausgewählter Reichstage, den gesondert zu betrachtenden Wahlreichtagen (*sejmy elekcyjne*) während der Interregna, dem Senat sowie der Herausbildung der senatorisch-magnatischen Elite befassen. Im Vergleich hierzu ist die Literatur zur Organisation, Zusammensetzung und Funktionsweise des Landtages des Herzogtums Preußen weniger prominent. Neben der Studie von Eberhard K. B. Kleinertz⁷ existiert praktisch keine mit den oben angeführten Werken vergleichbare Untersuchung, es sei denn, man wollte die kurzen Kapitel in den übergreifenden bzw. anderen Problemen gewidmeten Darstellungen von Janusz Małek⁸, Bohdan Wachowiak und

¹ Adolf Pawiński, *Rządy sejmikowe w Polsce 1572-1795 na tle stosunków województw kujawskich* (1888), 2. Aufl., Warszawa 1978.

² Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Sejm walny dawnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Kraków 1932.

³ Władysław Konopczyński, *Liberum veto. Studium historyczno-porównawcze*, Kraków 2002.

⁴ Wojciech Kriegseisen, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej (do 1763 roku)*, Warszawa 1995; ders., *Sejmiki Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVII i XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 1991.

⁵ Edward Opaliński, *Sejm srebrnego wieku 1587-1652*, Warszawa 2001.

⁶ Stefania Ochmann-Staniszevska, Zdzisław Staniszevski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej za panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy. Prawo – doktryna – praktyka*, 2 Bde., Wrocław 2000.

⁷ Eberhard K. B. Kleinertz, *Die Politik der Landstände im Herzogtum Preussen*, Bonn 1972.

⁸ Janusz Małek, *Ustawa o rządzie (Regimentsnottel) Prus Książęcych z roku 1542. Studium z dziejów przemian społecznych i politycznych w lennie pruskim*, Toruń 1967.