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Cover image: Croatian coat-of-arms on the seal of the Kingdom of Croatia (*Sigillum regni*) from 1527

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MURUS VERSUS MONTEM: CONSTRUCTION OF THE DUBROVNIK FORTIFICATIONS AROUND THE SUBURBS UP TO THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

Irena BENYOVSKY LATIN*

This work contains an analysis of the construction of the Dubrovnik fortifications around the suburbs up to the end of the thirteenth century, primarily based on written sources.

The construction of the final section of fortifications around suburb of St Nicholas was preceded by a long process of fortification system construction which accompanied the phases of the city's urban growth in the thirteenth century, as well as the political, legal and social circumstances of that period.

Key words: Dubrovnik, Middle Ages, fortifications

The fortified walls encircling Dubrovnik, the symbol of the city, were constructed around the northern suburbs as the *new walls* at the end of the thirteenth century (except for the section around the Dominican monastery). At that time, the suburbs which developed since the pre-communal period on the crags outside of the old city walls became part of the urban space (the old city encompassed a section later called the Sexteria: *Castello*, St. Peter and *Pustijerna*). The city expanded as a result of demographic and economic growth, which necessitated new the construction of new residential structures. Although the area of the old city atop the cliffs remained a representative zone,¹ the vital core rather notably moved beyond the northern *old city walls*. At that time, the formation of an economic, political and clerical hub proceeded in the area below Pustijerna, in the eastern part of the *burgus*. The thirteenth century

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¹ See: Nada Grujić, "Dubrovnik – Pustijerna. Istraživanja jednog dijela povijesnog tkiva grada", *Radovi IPU*, 10 (1986): 7-39.

brought great changes in the structure, appearance and organization of medieval Dubrovnik. The regulations enacted in the statutes of 1272 and 1296 introduced a considerable number of public streets to the area of the suburbs of St Blaise and St Nicholas. By the end of that century, the former suburbs had become the city's residential and economic hub, encircled by the new northern city walls. This process was nonetheless complex, linked to many property-oriented, urban, political and social processes: the final form of the urban space was the result of a long-term and gradual process, so that spatially different units (typological and formational) can be discerned inside the city walls. Many planned undertakings in the city area emerged despite (or precisely because of) the natural limitations of the terrain which had to be overcome: uneven ground that was rocky at places and marshy at others.

Dubrovnik's (northern) hinterland was very important to the city's economic growth. In the twelfth century the city established sound commercial ties not only with the Italian cities, for it also concluded its first treaties and privileges with the powers in its eastern hinterland, Bosnia and Serbia. The hinterland, however, also constituted a permanent threat to the city because of the pretensions of the Serbian and Dioclean rulers to this territory. Expansion already began outside of the old city in the eleventh century, while the final northern walls were only built at the end of the thirteenth century (specific data on officials, tower construction and their position only date back to the first decades of the fourteenth century; the actual course of wall construction during the thirteenth century remains unknown.) Prior to construction of the final *versus montem* wall, there nonetheless had to be a defensive system which safeguarded the new suburb "from the mountain side" (*versus montem*). This is because political instability and the permanent threat of the city's conquest loomed not only up to the establishment of Venetian administration in Dubrovnik at the very onset of the thirteenth century, but also from the beginning of the fourteenth century onward (the Serbian Nemanjić dynasty began to expand its territory and demonstrated a desire to seize the city). Even though construction of the walls was also linked to the planning and administrative incorporation of the suburbs *infra muros*, the defensive element was certainly important until the end of the thirteenth century.

The extent of Dubrovnik's construction development in the thirteenth century continues to spur debate among historians, archaeologists and art historians. The precise developmental stages, when exactly the suburbs were incorporated or the precise phases of wall construction are not entirely clear. Opinions are not uniform: there are different views on where the northern line of the old city walls was – according to some this line ran along today's southern end of M. Kaboga and Uska streets, while others believe that the wall stood farther south, along today's Strossmayerova street.² Besides differing opinions on the wall that

² Željko Peković considered the argument that the wall passed along the southern ends of today's Uska and Kaboga streets without basis, for these streets, according to a sixteenth-century map, went to today's Strossmayerova street, not ending roughly 20 m north of this point as they

defended the old city to the north, views also diverge on whether the suburb incorporated into the city was defended in the thirteenth century. Individual researchers believe that there were temporary *middle walls* which defended the southern suburb of St Blaise that grew before the northern suburb of St Nicholas (which emerged from a space which became the city's centre at the end of the thirteenth century).³ A vital role was also played by private towers as components of the large walls of fenced-in feudal estate blocks inside the suburb.

Only meagre sources with a limited character and insufficient archaeological research exist on the fortifications until the end of the thirteenth century. The problems in researching the city are certainly also a result of the earthquake in 1667 and the resulting fire, which destroyed most of the city. The city centre was damaged, including entire residential sections. The Count's Palace, the cathedral and most churches were damaged to their very foundations. Out of the buildings surrounding the main square, or Placa, only the *Sponza* remained of the medieval structures. Even though the external walls did not sustain extensive damage, the remains of any towers or components of the fortifications inside the city incorporated into residential structures were poorly preserved, or not at all.⁴ Before this "great earthquake", earthquakes


do now. He cites archaeological research as evidence; Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le développement de la ville medievale*, (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998); Ilario Principe, "Tri neobjavljene karte Dubrovnika iz 16. i 17. stoljeća", *Dubrovnik*, 1 (1991), 191-202. **PICTURE 1** According to Lukša Beritić, today's Strossmayerova street was the former *decumanus* of the old city inside its walls, while today's Od Domina street was the former *cardo*; Lukša Beritić, *Urbanistički razvitak Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Zavod za arhitekturu i urbanizam instituta za likovne umjetnosti JAZU, 1958), 11. Marija Planić Lončarić, in her earlier works, and relying on Beritić, stated that the walls passed through the feudal estate blocks: "It would appear that the line of the older city fortifications had already been incorporated into the buildings and spaces of the actual blocks even in the 'newer' part of the city rather early, and at places it even ran adjacent to the blocks, as in the space between Gučetića, Strossmayerova and Pracatova streets." She placed the old wall between the end of Uska and Kaboga streets, and on that line she found the "at the former Mence Gate site", a narrow passage toward the aforementioned block from the west; Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 20. In later research, she accepted the view of the line in today's Strossmayerova street; Study: "Osnovna škola 'Miše Simoni' u Dubrovniku (palača i vrt u Gučetićevoj, objekti u Pracatovoj): analiza i stanje". Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1984. Peković believed that it was precisely the formation of large rectangular blocks north of Strossmayerova which signified that the wall had to have been farther south. Even so, the dating of these blocks is not certain. Before them there were elliptical blocks which crossed the line of Strossmayerova from the old city; on this, see: Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), *passim*.

³ Planić Lončarić believed that the next "genuine northern wall" was built only at the peak of Prijeko only at the end of the thirteenth century.

⁴ On the consequences of the fire in the city: Vladimir Marković, "Kuća i prostor grada u Dubrovniku nakon potresa 1667. godine", *Radovi IPU*, 14 (1990), 137-149.

were also recorded in 1520, in which “all houses inside the walls were damaged”, and in 1639, after which the houses were once more damaged and had to be demolished, while the merlons were removed from the city walls.⁵ Some of the earlier urban fabric prior to the thirteenth century may have also been damaged by the fire in 1296. According to the statute, the fire of 1296 damaged almost the entire *burgus* and most of the old city (*ortus est ignis ... qui fere totum burgum et maiorem partem civitatis antique incendio consumavit*).⁶ The city houses (mostly made of wood) were also destroyed by later fires in the fourteenth century, such as one in 1370. It was only thereafter that stone houses began to be built.⁷

Some structures prior to the seventeenth-century earthquake can be followed in older pictorial presentations and maps. For example, a preserved map of the city from the sixteenth century has been found in the Turin archives: this map shows sketched blocks and streets in the *burgus* (the map was not completed).⁸



Picture 1

⁵ Nada Grujić, “Dubrovnik - Pustijerna. Istraživanja jednog dijela povijesnog tkiva grada”, *Radovi IPU*, 10 (1986): 7-39, notes 23 and 25.

⁶ DS, VIII, 58. On the fire, see also Bariša Krekić, “Borba Dubrovnika protiv vatre (XII –XV. v.)”, *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 29-30 (1991): 169-171.

⁷ *Liber viridis*, c. 118 (*De domibus lignaminis destruendis et de novo non faciendis in Ragusio*), pp. 84–85.

⁸ Ilario Principe, “Tri neobjavljene karte Dubrovnika iz XVI.- XVII. st.” *Dubrovnik* 1 (1991): 191-202. **PICTURE 1**

Particularly valuable are the panoramic *vedutas* from the seventeenth century, because knowledge of perspective and precision in the portrayal of form help in pinpointing many buildings that fell down in the major earthquake: for example, one from the Dominican monastery in Dubrovnik, signed by the Neapolitan painter Antonio de Bellis, which was probably made on the basis of precise measurements by his associate, Didier Barra.⁹



Picture 2


A *veduta* today held in the Franciscan monastery in Dubrovnik (by an unknown artist) and one held in the Museum of the Count's Palace (also by an unknown artist), both made in the seventeenth century, are often used to analyze the urban territory.¹⁰ Although quite valuable, these portrayals cannot shed any light on construction of the fortified walls up to the thirteenth century.

A preserved seventeenth/eighteenth century *veduta* of Dubrovnik, *Prospetto della Città di Ragusa nel secolo XII.*, purportedly contains a portrayal of the city in the twelfth century, and some researchers believe shows the proportions of the city's precincts and walls accurately.¹¹ Nonetheless, this image may

⁹ **PICTURE 2** Less well known is a painting in the Church of St. Andrew at Pile (the old city core with a view of the port from the seventeenth century), today in very poor condition. Vedrana Gjukic-Bender, "Prikazi Dubrovnika u slikarstvu", *Prilozi povijesti umjetnosti u Dalmaciji* 38 (1999-2000): 232. Cvito Fisković, "Neobjavljeni radovi Bonina Milanca u Splitu", *Zbornik za likovne umetnosti Matice srpske*, Novi Sad, 3 (1967):

¹⁰ **PICTURE 3**

¹¹ State Archives in Dubrovnik, Bassegli-Gozze family archives; published already by: Josip Lučić, *Povijest Dubrovnika od 7. stoljeća do godine 1205.* (Zagreb: Historijski institut JAZU, 1973). **PICTURE 4**




Picture 3

be a reflection of descriptions of the city in the chronicles and annals (generally early modern) of the time. Even so, the data on the walls provided by individual chroniclers should not be entirely rejected, although caution should be exercised when fitting them into spatial and chronological categories.¹²

Interpretation of the development of the early medieval city is certainly incomplete without archaeological data. The debate on the city's medieval phase has been particularly intense since the 1980s in the wake of archaeological discoveries made beneath the Baroque-era cathedral. Besides the church below the cathedral, the remains of defensive architecture, i.e., a Late Antique wall, were found that ran diagonally west of the cathedral (roughly 30 m) and were expanded in their western part in the Early Middle Ages (Late Antique construction techniques were discernable in the eastern section). This Late Antique castle is one of the oldest fortification walls inside

¹² Individual writers recorded events summarily as a list of important years with brief descriptions of events (annals), while some supplemented these data with explanations of circumstances as to why and how certain things happened (chronicles): Nenad Ivić, *Domišljanje prošlosti. Kako je trinaestostoljetni splitski arhiepiskop Toma napravio svoju salonitansku historiju* (Zagreb: Zavod za znanost o književnosti Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 1992), 10. The problem with these narrative sources is that they cite as equally valid both data and “rumours”, as well as older sources of differing origin (with legendary history) and contemporary sources. Information from one and the other were transcribed with varying degrees of judiciousness, and then adapted to their own time and purpose.



Picture 4

the city.¹³ C. Fisković wrote about an early medieval settlement on the basis of a series of Early Christian fragments.¹⁴ Newer research (from the 1990s onward) has confirmed that a settlement existed in the early medieval period: a Late Antique wall was discovered below the remains of the Church of St. Bartholomew (Cosmas and Damian) which corresponds to the wall of the Late Antique castle found at the nowadays square called Bunićeva poljana. The Late Antique fortifications from the fifth/sixth centuries safeguarded the city and the harbour, which was probably on the eastern side since the earliest times. Traces of a Late Antique sacral structure (below the pre-Romanesque flooring of the Church of Christ's Transformation (Sigurata) were also discovered in the territory of the later Prijeko section. Besides this, archaeological research has also yielded the remains of certain fortifications in the *burgus* dating to the Romanesque period, which has spurred new interpretations of the written sources.¹⁵ It is this author's

¹³ Josip Stošić, "Sažeti prikaz istraživanja, nalaza i problemi prezentacije pod katedralom i Bunićevom poljanom u Dubrovniku", *Godišnjak zaštite spomenika kulture*, 12, (1986): 242; Josip Stošić, "Prikaz nalaza ispod katedrale i Bunićeve poljane u Dubrovniku", *Izdanja Hrvatskog arheološkog društva*, 12 (1988): 22-24. Željko Rapanić, "Marginalia o 'postanku' Dubrovnika", *Arheološka istraživanja u Dubrovniku i dubrovačkom području*, Zagreb 1988, 39-50.

¹⁴ Cvito Fisković, "Starokršćanski ulomci iz Dubrovnika", *Starinar*, 9-10 (1958-1959): 53-57.

¹⁵ Ivica Žile, "Naselje prije grada", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997), 97-119, 108; Ivica Žile, "Zaštitna arheološka istraživanja u palači Gučetić-Martinušić", *Obavijesti HAD-a*, XXIX/3 (1997): 109-114; Ivica Žile, "Naselje prije Grada", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997), 97-119; Igor Fisković, "Crkvice sv. Kuzme i Damjana u središtu Dubrovnika", *Dubrovnik*, 4, (1997): 261-275, 261-273; Antun Ničetić, "Pretpostavke o nastanku luke i grada Dubrovnika s obzirom na brodsku i plovidbenu tehnologiju", *Luke istočnog Jadrana, Zbornik Pomorskog muzeja Orebić*, (2006): 23-51.

hope that future archaeological research will more than anything reveal the positions of the former fortifications and their construction phases. Nonetheless, the narrative written sources concerning the earliest centuries of Dubrovnik's past, as well as the Early Middle Ages, must also be reinterpreted. Additionally, written sources generally preserved from the more contemporary period, generally in notary documents, also present a potential avenue for an attempt at an ideal reconstruction of parts of the city.

The materials produced by the Dubrovnik notaries, which abound in data invaluable for shedding light on the city's appearance, were used to analyze Dubrovnik's urban development only sporadically, and certainly not to a sufficient nor systematic degree.¹⁶ These materials contain a great deal of data which were not recorded to describe the city, but rather for the private/legal needs of its residents (property transactions, lawsuits, etc.) written by (often foreign) notaries rather than cartographers.¹⁷ Data from the Dubrovnik chronicles and annals, often from later periods, were used to some extent to unravel the question of Dubrovnik's fortified walls in the period up to the end of the thirteenth century.

The period prior to the thirteenth century

I will not delve into a lengthy discussion of the earliest beginnings of settlement in today's Dubrovnik here.¹⁸ I shall only agree with the view of Milan Prelog, who believed that regardless of the earliest phases of life in this area, the arrival of refugees from Epidaurum in the early Middle Ages marked the turning point when Dubrovnik began to grow atop its steep cliffs as a more

¹⁶ Gregor Čremošnik, "Dubrovačka kancelarija do god. 1300. i najstarije knjige dubrovačke arhive", *Glasnik zemaljskog muzeja u Bosni i Hercegovini*, 39 (1927); Gregor Čremošnik, ed., *Spisi dubrovačke kancelarije: Zapisi notara Tomazina da Savere 1278-1282* (Zagreb: JAZU, 1951), *passim* (hereinafter: MHR, I); Josip Lučić, ed., *Spisi dubrovačke kancelarije. Zapisi notara Tomazina de Savere 1282-1284*. (Zagreb: JAZU, 1984), *passim* (hereinafter: MHR, II); Josip Lučić, ed., *Zapisi notara Tomazina de Savere 1284-1286*. (Zagreb: JAZU, 1988), *passim* (hereinafter: MHR, III); Josip Lučić, ed., *Zapisi notara Andrije Beneše 1295-1305*. (Zagreb: HAZU, 1993), *passim*, (hereinafter: MHR, IV).

¹⁷ Some caution must be exercised with notary descriptions, and particularly in the description of "suburb", which during the compilation of these documents was not entirely defined, neither spatially nor verbally – so it is certain that among residents there was some confusion in the use of toponyms which were still in the process of being determined.

¹⁸ The settlement existed prior to the arrival of refugees from Epidaurum; Cvito Fisković, "Starokršćanski ulomci iz Dubrovnika", *Starinar*, 9-10 (1958-1959): 53-57; Đuro Basler, "Jedan zid stare dubrovačke tvrđave", *Beritićev zbornik*, (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1960), 19-23; Dubravka Beritić, "Još jedan kasnoantički kapitel u Dubrovniku", *Peristil*, 5 (1962): 5-6; Igor Fisković, "O ranokršćanskim spomenicima naronitanskog područja", *Izdanja Hrvatskog arheološkog društva*, 5 (1980): 213-256. Igor Fisković, "Tradicije i inovacije u urbanističkom liku starog Dubrovnika", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1994): 103-123.

important settlement. Like many other cities of early medieval Europe, Dubrovnik's genuine urban growth began after it became a refuge for a population fleeing barbarian invasions, and it was selected as a shelter mostly due to its geographic location: even though naturally unsuitable for construction given the rocky terrain and marshy ground, the deciding criterion for its development in those uncertain times was precisely its defensive potential.

The earliest sources already made use of narrative accounts on many occasions: Constantine Porphyrogenetus,¹⁹ the so-called Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea (*Pop Dukljanin*)²⁰ and Miletius.²¹ Many earlier theories derived on the basis of these narrative sources (on the origin of the city built by refugees from Epidaurum) do not correspond to the dating of the archaeological finds below the cathedral. Nonetheless, certain common elements may be discerned in them which indicate the complexity of formation of the city's space and its fortifications, the problems presented by the terrain, continuities and discontinuities, and the merger of different units into each other since the earliest times. According to R. Katičić, Constantine Porphyrogenetus the so-called Priest of Dioclea, when describing the emergence of medieval Dubrovnik, used the same source – probably an older local document predating the tenth century (possibly a commemorative text in a bishop's catalogue or pontifical cornice).²² Even one of the oldest chronicles – the so-called chronicle of Miletius which describes the city's history in hexameters (preserved in Ragnina's Annals from the sixteenth century) – may have made use of this same source.²³ Even some

¹⁹ Constantine (10th cent.), in his well-known description, stated that "they who could flee and save themselves settled places on the rocky seashore, where there is actually a city now after they built it, first small, and then later larger, and then larger still, and they thereby enlarged the extent of its walls which the city had... for they gradually expanded and multiplied..." Cited from: Radoslav Katičić, "Aedificaverunt Ragusium et habitaverunt in eo. Tragom najstarijih dubrovačkih zapisa", *Dubrovnik*, 4 ('Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika') (1997), 39-74, 40.

²⁰ A description of the early medieval city very similar to that of Constantine is contained in the twelfth century Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea: "...people from the city of Epidaurum...built the city on the sea on the rocky shore, which the Epidaurians in their language call Laus..."

²¹ In a manner similar to Constantine and the Dioclean priest, the chronicle of Miletius states: "When Epidaurum was thus razed, some of the Romans, fleeing from the civil war, by chance sailed into a Dalmatian harbour called Gruž. Here, together with the wretches who fled from Epidaurum, on the mighty coastal crags, where Dubrovnik now stands they built a fortress at the urging and effective leadership of Ivan, who was already the archbishop of the aforementioned city..." According to some, the chronicle of Miletius emerged in the twelfth/thirteenth century, and possibly even much earlier.

²² In most other descriptions, the text by the Priest of Dioclea does not correspond to Porphyrogenetus; Radoslav Katičić, "Aedificaverunt Ragusium et habitaverunt in eo. Tragom najstarijih dubrovačkih zapisa", *Dubrovnik*, 4 ('Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika') (1997), 45-46.

²³ Katičić believes that Miletius' description of the city's emergence is the second version of the same report carried by the Dioclean priest. Radoslav Katičić, "Aedificaverunt Ragusium et hab-

early modern chroniclers such as Tubero²⁴ wrote descriptions that may have been cited from these same older texts of the Dubrovnik church which were used by Constantine, the Dioclean Priest and Miletius.²⁵

Although not very reliable sources, all of them speak of the *gradual* expansion of the old city and the walls around it. Constantine mentioned a second and then third expansion of the city and the building of walls (it is commonly believed that the first expansion was when the Castello, merged into later St. Peter area, while the third encompassed the area of Pustijerna). According to Katičić, in the Dioclean priest's chronicle, these phases were expressed with the terms *construxerunt* and then *aedificaverunt*, while Miletius included this in the description of the new fortress built by the settlers from "Gruž". In later narrative sources, this legend is recorded and expanded upon through a story about the merger of two castles, Lave and Custer/Pustijerna (*castrum, castellum*) into the whole city (*civitas, urbs*).²⁶ For example, Anonymous wrote that the expansion of the city was aided by the arrival of residents from *Župa Dubrovačka*, were some refugees from Epidaurum lived in two castles (Spilan and Gradac), and at the end of the seventh century they allegedly settled next to *Castel de Lave*, in an area called *Custera* or "later Pustijerna".²⁷ They built houses there.²⁸

itaverunt in eo. Tragom najstarijih dubrovačkih zapisa", *Dubrovnik*, 4 ('Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika') (1997), 49.

²⁴ See also Vladimir Rezar, "Dubrovački humanistički historiograf Ludovik Crijević Tuberon", *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti u Dubrovniku*, 37 (1999), 47-94.

²⁵ Tubero (15th-16th cent.) wrote about the stay in *Župa Dubrovačka* – according to Katičić, the supplements were taken from older texts of the Dubrovnik church which were used as a source by Constantine, the Dioclean priest and Miletius. He also believes Thomas the Archdeacon may have used the same source. Katičić believes that this text predates the tenth century, i.e., that it constituted two fragments and was based on written tales from the time of settlement: the aforementioned writers used it independently of each other, adapting it in paraphrases. Radoslav Katičić, "Aedificaverunt Ragusium et habitaverunt in eo. Tragom najstarijih dubrovačkih zapisa", *Dubrovnik*, 4 ('Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika') (1997), 50.

²⁶ Radoslav Katičić, "Aedificaverunt Ragusium et habitaverunt in eo. Tragom najstarijih dubrovačkih zapisa", *Dubrovnik*, 4 ('Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika') (1997), 58-59.

²⁷ Anonim, 7.

²⁸ *Memoriae*, ser. 21, 571, "Origine della Città di Ragusa estratta da certe scritture antichissime con aggiunta di alcun cose più memorabili costumate in Ragusa, 1507, I. Giorgi ab M.": 49-50 (DAD), pp. 46, 172. This unpublished chronicle contains several manuscripts: one manuscript describes the city from its establishment to 1602 (pp. 1-135), on p. 136 there is an insert on statues at the Pile gate, pp. 137-170 contain a description of city customs written in another hand, p. 171 to 230 is *Aggiunta l'alcuna notizie, che mancano in questo Libro*, and the last year written on the margins is 1550 (written in the same hand as before). The later titler (the copyist I. Giorgi in the 18th cent.) may have dated incorrectly; another possibility is that a copyist may be also continued it. The first part may be a transcription of some chronicles (possibly Anonymous), while the part on customs may be from the *Diversis*; the other part which returns to unregistered events (*che mancano*) corresponds to *Ragnina* albeit not completely. On its authorship, see also: Vladimir Rezar, "Dubrovački humanistički historiograf Ludovik Crijević Tuberon", *Anali Za-*

Expansion of the city's space by encompassing different spatial units, which sometimes had a different character and appeared at different times, was also typical of later periods, for which there are more preserved documents: the thirteenth century, in which the suburbs below the old city were formed and gradually merged into a single whole. This fact is certain, as is the increase in the population caused by the city's expansion from the oldest Castle on the south-west ridge toward the east to Pustijerna. According to some researchers, expansion toward Pustijerna occurred in the ninth/tenth centuries.²⁹ The eastward movement of vital functions and the social elite was certainly tied to the location of the city's harbour, one of the city's most vital economic hubs. Chroniclers have linked the city's expansion with the construction of new walls as well. Anonymous wrote that in the eighth century a fortified wall was built around the old city.³⁰ He also described the posting of sentries at the Castle *de Lave* and Castle *de Chustera*.³¹ Between 781 and 784, according to Anonymous, *uno muro de pali da Pusterna per tuta riviera* was also made. According to Ragnina, in the eighth century the population grew and many stone houses were built, as well as new fortifications.³²

Besides formation of the city from several different settlements, the narrative sources also speak of the flooded terrain which separated the city from the mainland. The narrative sources mention a large wave and the erection of a bridge in the ninth century, a bridge that connected the old city with the mainland shore, and the gradual filled and drying of the land. Chroniclers wrote about the construction of a bridge of the marshy terrain: Ragnina described the bridge which was crossed to enter the city already in 788.³³ V. Koščak be-

voda za povijesne znanosti u Dubrovniku, 37 (1999), 47-94. Ragnina also stated that in 601 residents came to the city (*a Ragusa*) from two castles (Spilan and Gradaz) that were built in Župa at the time of Epidaurum's destruction and in which they had lived 160 years, but they came because the *castello di Lave* was prospering at the time. They settled (*feceno la habitatione*) the area called Custiera (*nella parte di Custiera sotto lo castello de Lave*); Ragnina, 179. Daniele Farlati: *Illyrici sacri tomus sextur*, Venetiis 1800, 7.

²⁹ Milan Prelog, *Tekstovi o Dubrovniku* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2003), 45; Lukša Beritić, "Ubikacija nestalih građevinskih spomenika u Dubrovniku", *Prilozi povijesti umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 10 (1956), 10; Željko Peković, "Urbani razvoj Dubrovnika do 13. stoljeća", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997): 166-212, 174.

³⁰ *Fo fato primo muro de pietra e calzina per tuto intorno, comenzando de Castel de Lave per tuti grebeni da parte de marina, et per tuto pie de monte soto burgo per fin per tuta riviera fino Castel de Chustiera. Et fornito lo muro, hano fato nome a la Tera Raguxa in lingua latina...* (Annali Storani: *nella lingua taliana fu chiamata Lachusì (la Terra), per esser sotto di quella uno lago, poi per mutazione di tempi e sta nominata Ragusci*); Anonim, 10.

³¹ There was not enough water in the latter, so it was necessary to built well – *pučevi* (zisterne sono fate per Pusterna).

³² Ragnina, 187.

³³ Ragnina, 188. There was a marble statue of Orlando on it (tied to the story of a Saracen attack). These details and Orlando may certainly be linked to later tradition. In chronicle records,

believes that the reports of the flooded tract which existed in the city prior to the ninth century were actually descriptions added by chroniclers and annalists from the early modern period. For he even believes that the flooded area appeared only in the ninth century, which he concluded on the basis of descriptions by certain writers. The earliest to write of this was the Venetian chronicler John the Deacon (eleventh century)³⁴ – he mentioned that in 850 Dubrovnik was destroyed by surging waves and strong winds (*fertur quoque tunc Ragusiensem civitatem maris et venti impetu maxima ex parte cecidisse*).³⁵ Later Dubrovnik annalists and chroniclers mentioned the same story about a wave which flooded the city in the ninth century (in 803 according to them).³⁶ Dubrovnik's chroniclers linked the story about the tidal wave, like the legends on the city's origin, to Epidaurum, and the miracle of St. Hilarion (who freed the residents of Epidaurum and its environs from a terrible serpent).³⁷ The writings of later chroniclers must be viewed within the context of the time when they were written (Dubrovnik's reputation as the successor to Epidaurum stands out in particular when Dubrovnik's independence and territorial expansion began to assert themselves).³⁸ Koščak linked rising sea levels to land filling works: when the Count's Palace was being renovated recently, it came to

Orlando, like St. Blaise, sent a message of "freedom" to the city – these symbols were used by the city to legitimize itself before neighbours and its own populace far in the past. L. Kunčević stressed that statues of Orlando (the earliest in the territory of the Holy Roman Empire during the late Middle Ages) has a somewhat different significance. In the late Middle Ages, the Orlando of Dubrovnik may have meant the autonomy and privileges conferred to the city by the Hungarian king, but in Dubrovnik historiography, beginning with Anonymous, as Kunčević stressed, Orlando also represented a protector and defender of the city from non-believers, a significance he also had in medieval epics of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Lovro Kunčević, "O dubrovačkoj libertas u kasnom srednjem vijeku", *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Dubrovniku*, 9-46; Ilija Mitić, "Orlandov stup", *Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku* 10/11 (1966): 233-254; Igor Fisković, "Skulptura u urbanističkom usavršavanju renesansnog Dubrovnika", *Reljef renesansnog Dubrovnika*. Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska, (1993) 91-95.

³⁴ On the period of writing the chronicle: G. Ortalli, "Petar II. Orseolo – *dux Veneticorum et Dalmaticorum*", *Rad Zavoda povij. znan. HAZU, Zadar*, vol. 46 (2004), 65–76.

³⁵ Vladimir Koščak, "Od Epidaura do Dubrovnika", *Dubrovnik*, 4 ('Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika') (1997), 5-39.

³⁶ Anonymous wrote that the city was hit by a 6-meter wave (*fo acrexjuto mar in alto deli sui termini più de 3 passa*); Anonim, 14. Ragnina also wrote about the rising of the sea which destroyed the area at the foot of Pustijerna; Ragnina, 188-192.

³⁷ Kosta Vojnović, *Crkva i država u dubrovačkoj republici*, Rad 119, 1894.

³⁸ In the fifteenth century, Cavtat was developed, renewing the "imaginary" Antique city; based on history, Dubrovnik, as noted by Janeković Roemer, claimed a right to the former ager of Epidaurum – from Konavale to the sea. See: Zdenka Janeković Roemer, "Stjecanje Konavala: Antička tradicija i mit u službi diplomacije", *Konavle u prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti*, Stipetić, Vladimir (ed.), Dubrovnik : Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, 1998, 31-45. Nada Grujić, *Ladanjska arhitektura dubrovačkog područja*, Zagreb 1991, 173, 228. Josip Lučić, "Kroz konavosku prošlost", *Konavoski zbornik* I, 1982.

light that there were three pavement levels: that of the present day – the same as in the fifteenth century, the second from the twelfth century and the period of filling works at the Placa (which is 80 cm lower) and the third, deeper than the latter by an additional half meter (the remains of Late Antique foundations were discovered here).³⁹ Today it is difficult to accurately reconstruct the phases and the period of expansion of the city's space based on narrative sources.

Ničetić, on the other hand, does not believe there was any marshy terrain at the area of the “fields”: he associates the differing levels of the terrain with gradually rising sea levels (approximately 1 meter over 1,000 years).⁴⁰ Ničetić believes that that there never was a “sea channel” at the site of the *campus*, rather prior to the residential buildings below the old city there was an (agricultural) field here – a *campus*.⁴¹ Ničetić believes that the toponyms *de palude* which appeared as early as the thirteenth century were due to the “living water”, i.e. wells, and not a marsh, and he rejects out of hand the previously held belief on the filling of marshy terrain.⁴² He believes that the gradually rising sea level was the reason for the gradual and layered development of the city.

According to M. Planić-Lončarić, the area north of the Church of All Saints was a marsh in the Early Middle Ages, and the mainland was accessed by some manner of bridge (in her opinion, the bridge was “in the western part of the future Placa, where the channel was the narrowest”). The line of the main exit from the city toward the sold coast was, according to Planić Lončarić, the route of today's Široka street.⁴³ She also assumed that the exit toward the mainland

³⁹ Koščak believes that the flooded tract which surrounded Dubrovnik until the thirteenth century emerged in the tenth century, and that prior to this it was not there, for which he cites as evidence the fact that the oldest church at the cathedral's site in the twelfth century was built at a considerably lower level – according to him, prior to the rise in the sea level and prior to filling. Vladimir Koščak, “Od Epidaura do Dubrovnika”, *Dubrovnik*, 4 (‘Novije znanstvene spoznaje o genezi grada Dubrovnika’) (1997), 35. Koščak believes that the cathedral built in the twelfth century was at the site of an older church that had already been filled and levelled with the surrounding terrain (and that this first church had been damaged in the flood).

⁴⁰ The intervals between the floors of the oldest basilica is lower than today's surface pavement by roughly 1.5 to 1.9 m. A. Ničetić concluded that from the onset of the eighth century to the present, the city's level increased by roughly 2-2.5 meters (assuming that the basilica was raised in relation to its surroundings). The remains of the Late Antique wall is approximately 2.8 meters lower than Bunićeva poljana; He backs this argument with the results of archaeological research in which tombs were discovered next to the Marin Držić Home (near the Church of All Saints) as well as at Bunićeva poljana square: a roughly 1 meter fill was found above this Romanesque layer, and only then a Gothic layer (about 300 years younger); A. Ničetić, *Povijest dubrovačke luke*, 15.; J. Stošić, “Istraživanja, nalazi i problemi prezentacije...”, 328. Žile, “Rezultati arheoloških istraživanja u Domu Marin Držića”, 49-57.

⁴¹ Ničetić, 18.

⁴² Ničetić, 24-25. The level of the city at the site of Široka street at the Marin Držić Home was roughly 2.2 m lower than today.

⁴³ Marija Planić-Lončarić, “Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika”, *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 159.

was “overseen by a tower from the northern – more perilous side”.⁴⁴ Possibly she made use of the data from the Dubrovnik chronicles which mention construction of fortifications and a bridge at that site, describing the establishment of the “old” Church of St. Blaise. For example, Resti stated that at the end of the tenth century, to commemorate the successful defence of the city from the Venetians,⁴⁵ a church dedicated to St. Blaise was built *in quel sito, dove al presente trovasi il monastero di santa Chiara*. Resti also mentioned that at the time, there was also construction of *una torre, vicino detta chiesa di san Biagio*, next to which the prince and the town councillors had their seat (*contigua alla torre, un'abitazione comoda, per uso dei consigli e magistrati pubblici*), and something similar was described in the anonymous chronicle of an “abbot of Mljet”.⁴⁶

Although there are analogies (as in Šibenik) of the existence of another besides the main city *castrum*, there are no archaeological confirmations of a fortress north of the Church of All Saints, nor in contemporaneous written documents. Linking the patron saint with the story about the bridge and construction of the church once more indicates a later tradition which was used by chroniclers and annalists in these descriptions: even though the text on the bridge and construction of the church may possibly be much older, the descriptions of the “assistance” of the saint and the mention of the administration, count and council indicate that this was in the context of the late medieval city. The main entrance to the city around the Church of All Saints was certainly natural.⁴⁷ This wider area has been called *Pile* (door/gate) since a very early period,⁴⁸ because there was certainly a (relatively) firm tie between the peninsula with the mainland.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Study: Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Blok između Polača; analiza razvoja i stanje, Elaborat centra za povijesne znanosti* (Zagreb: Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1984), 28-32.

⁴⁵ Resti, 29-30. According to an urban legend that emerged not later than the fifteenth century, the city was rescued by St. Blaise at that time; Lovro Kunčević, “**Dubrovačka slika Venecije i venecijanska slika Dubrovnika u ranom novom vijeku**”, *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Dubrovniku*, no. 50 (2012), 9-37, 11. For the oldest version of this story, see: Anonim, 20-22; Ragnina, 199-201; Natko Nodilo, ed., *Serafino Razzi, La storia di Raugia*. Lucca: Per Vicentio Busdraghi, 1595: 20-21.

⁴⁶ State Archives in Dubrovnik, *Memoriae*, ser. 21. 2, 18, “Origine della Città di Ragusa estratta da certe scritture antichissime con aggiunta di alcun cose più memorabili costumate in Ragusa, 1507, I. Giorigi ab M.” 49-50 (DAD), pp. 46, 172.

⁴⁷ On a promontory toward the inland, Late Antique fragments were found; Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le développement de la ville medievale*, (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998), 24-25; Marija Planić-Lončarić, “Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika”, *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 159.

⁴⁸ Milan Prelog, *Tekstovi o Dubrovniku* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2003), 45. The words “*porta del castel*” used to enter the *Castel di Laue* are written on a twelfth-century *veduta*.

⁴⁹ Igor Fisković, *Srednjovjekovna skulptura u samostanu Male braće* (Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Samostan Male braće u Dubrovniku, 1985), 465-495. There are finds testifying to settlement in this

The so-called “Mljet chronicle”⁵⁰ mentions *another Church of St. Blaise* built in the tenth century, almost the same as the one at Pile, next to which the construction of a (wooden) bridge over the marsh is also mentioned. Even according to Ragnina, there were two bridges which connected the two entrances to the city (according to him, one was next to the Church of St. Blaise at Pile, while he did not provide a precise location for the other). When the other St. Blaise Church was built,⁵¹ according to Ragnina the bridge here was renewed, because nobody crossed *the other bridge* (it was entirely covered with mud and flooded by seawater). A statue of Orlando was reportedly installed at the head of this bridge.⁵²

Anonymous also alleged that the Church of St. Blaise was built in 972 over three years together with a square (*campo de lugia*) at the site where a bridge was also built which connected the city to the mainland coast, because it was otherwise impossible to enter the city due to marshy terrain (he did not specify a location).⁵³ The demolition of this bridge is also mentioned in the descriptions

area from the earliest times: an Early Christian cemetery was discovered in Domino (All Saints) street, which ran from the eponymous church westward. Graves dated to the tenth to twelfth centuries were found next to that same church. The Church of All Saints was mentioned in 1186; Ivica Žile, “Rezultati arheoloških istraživanja u Domu Marina Držića u Dubrovniku”, *Radovi IPU*, 12-13 (1988-1989), 49-57, 52.

⁵⁰ State Archives in Dubrovnik, *Memoriae*, ser. 21. 2, 18, “Origine della Città di Ragusa estratta da certe scritture antichissime con aggiunta di alcun cose più memorabili costumate in Ragusa, 1507, I. Giorigi ab M.”: 49-50 (DAD), pp. 46, 172.

⁵¹ According to Ž. Peković, this other church was situated at the site of the later cathedral, and he found confirmation of this in a text on a *veduta* made in the eighteenth century which depicts Dubrovnik in the twelfth century. Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le développement de la ville medievale*, (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998), 128. State Archives in Dubrovnik, Bassegli-Gozze family archives; published already in: Josip Lučić, *Povijest Dubrovnika od 7. stoljeća do godine 1205.* (Zagreb: Historijski institut JAZU, 1973). Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le développement de la ville medievale*, (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998), 128.

⁵² Ragnina (who partially transcribed the work of an eighteenth-century abbot) also described two Churches of St. Blaise – one built in 972 at the site where the bridge entered the city, where a tower was also built. “The other Church of St. Blaise” was, according to Ragnina, built at the later site of the Convent of St. Clare. A tower and bridge were built at the St. Blaise Church, and a statue of Orlando was installed. Ragnina also mentioned the construction of a large tower (*una tore grande et grossa apresso Sto Biaggio*), with one side facing the sea and the other facing the marsh (*a lito de paludazzo*) at the middle of the bridge used to enter the city. This was also the city’s administration building, Ragnina, 201.

⁵³ There was a fortification at the bridge’s halfway point at which Dubrovnik’s city government sat, and on which an image of the knight Orlando was installed. He did not, however, mention another church and bridge. The story about St. Blaise and, once more, Orlando on the bridge in this description must also be viewed through the context of later times (the story about the adoption of St. Blaise, according to L. Kunčević may even be a considerably older but drastically amended variation of the legend). L. Kunčević links the story about St. Blaise, who already be-

tied to the period after the demolition of “Bodin’s tower” (in the eleventh century). Besides later narrative sources and the aforementioned *veduta*, there are no contemporaneous texts on the bridges leading to the city, or a tower which protected the city from the north in the tenth century, so some caution must be exercised in accepting this information in spatial and chronological categories.

The so-called *Castrum* (at the site of the later Count’s Palace), a fortress north of Pustijerna, which protected the old city, harbour and later cathedral as the eastern fortification, was constructed in the tenth/eleventh century at the earliest according to N. Grujić, for the lines of the walls on the oldest parts of the *castrum* correspond to the parcelization of Pustijerna which was carried out at the time.⁵⁴ According to archaeological research, the largest inlet was located at the site of today’s Prince’s Palace and the Church of St. Blaise, which would mean that it had to have been filled prior to construction of the *castrum* – thus already sometime in the eleventh, or twelfth century at the latest.⁵⁵

The *castrum* was explicitly mentioned in contemporary sources only in the provisions of the statute of 1272,⁵⁶ when it probably functioned as a separate defensible unit (fortress). In the twelfth century, a new cathedral was erected below Pustijerna at the site of an older church (with an unknown titular): the new building, together with the old city and the harbour, were defended by the *Castrum* as well, which was located to the north-east. The cathedral during this period was certainly also protected from the west, by the already mentioned Late Antique wall found along a south-west line from the cathedral. There is no way

came the city’s patron in the tenth century, with the negative image of the Venetians created in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. According to him, Dubrovnik of the alleged tenth century was actually described as the aristocratic republic of the Late Middle Ages, because there is no mention of the church hierarchy so vital in the creation of the cult and in politics in general prior to the fourteenth century, rather only the councils and princes. Furthermore, he notes that Venice certainly would not have tolerated this cult in the thirteenth century if it had been as pro-Venetian as described by chroniclers; Lovro Kunčević, “**Dubrovačka slika Venecije i venecijanska slika Dubrovnika u ranom novom vijeku**”, *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Dubrovniku*, No. 50 (2012.), 37.

⁵⁴ Nada Grujić, “Dubrovnik - Pustijerna. Istraživanja jednog dijela povijesnog tkiva grada”, *Radovi IPU*, 10 (1986): 7-39.

⁵⁵ Nada Grujić, “Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine”, *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 149-171, 166. Peković tied the report of a chronicler on the construction of the Church of St. Blaise at the end of the tenth century with the writings of chroniclers and annalists and deemed that the church at the cathedral’s site was first dedicated to St. Blaise, and then only later to St. Mary, and that the fortress described by chroniclers was the former *castrum* at the site of today’s Count’s Palace; Peković, *Dubrovnik*, 98, 102. Ničetić believes that the oldest *castrum* which protected the first basilica and harbour had already appeared in the seventh/eighth century in the area of the Late Antique castle (for the level of the flooring of today’s Palace is 80 cm lower); Ničetić, 24-25.

⁵⁶ The thirteenth-century *castrum* was also not preserved, for in the fifteenth century, as noted by Filip de Diversis, it was decided that the part of this old fortress not destroyed by fire should be demolished. Construction of the Prince’s Palace then began here.

of knowing the condition of that wall at the time – according to J. J. Stošić, it was only torn down in the fourteenth century, when the *platea s. Mariae maioris* began to be formed. Even though the notary documents which describe the boundaries of the houses in the thirteenth century do not mention this wall,⁵⁷ its presence in the thirteenth century can also be discerned by the fact that its position in north-south street direction influenced the layout of the *burgus* and the orientation of all streets planned according to the statutory provisions of 1272 and 1296. Certainly, the two structures – the cathedral⁵⁸ and the *castrum* – constituted the most significant urban-development elements in the eastern suburb and in the aspirations for the city's northward expansion.⁵⁹

The eastern part of the old city (Pustijerna and the section around the Church of St. Peter) was connected to the suburb at the Lion's Gate, i.e., with the space of the cathedral and Castrum through the Gate of Pustijerna. Administrative and political tasks in the twelfth century were still handled in the bishop's palace situated in northern part of Pustijerna (for example, the treaties with the Italian cities and Serbian rulers in the twelfth century).⁶⁰ Political and administrative tasks were also carried out in other churches in this part of the city.⁶¹ According to Grujić's research, Pustijerna developed from an initial suburb into a representative area, and parcelization was conducted here, while a wall was set up as a boundary. A *veduta* of the city from (allegedly) the twelfth century shows Pustijerna bounded by a stacked stone wall.

The role of private owners in the old city's defence

Defence of the old city was secured by the *extra muros castrum*, individual partial fortifications, as well as private agglomerations of houses in the suburbs, which were bounded by private walls and towers. During the period

⁵⁷ Josip Stošić, "Prikaz nalaza ispod Katedrale i Bunićeve poljane u Dubrovniku, Arheološka istraživanja u Dubrovniku i dubrovačkom području", *Zbornik HAD*, Zagreb, 1988, 15-38, 32.

⁵⁸ According to documents, the first builder was from Apulia, while a document dated 1199 mentions a contract between Eustachius, son of the proto-master Bernard from Apulia, according to which he was obliged to build on the new cathedral; Cvito Fisković, *Prvi poznati dubrovački graditelji*. (Dubrovnik: JAZU, 1955) 23; Smičiklas, T./Kostrenčić, M./Laszowskii, E. (eds.), *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Sclavoniae* (hereinafter: CD), vol. II. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1904), 320.

⁵⁹ Milan Prelog, "Dubrovački statut i izgradnja grada (1272-1972)", *Peristil*, 14-15 (1971.-1972.): 81-94, 84.

⁶⁰ Grujić, 153.

⁶¹ For example, in the eleventh century, a dispute between the city and the Benedictine monastery on the island of Mljet occurred in the Church of Sts. Cosmas and Damian. The church was near the gate of Pustijerna in the direction of today's Držićeva poljana, while in the document it is called the *pretorium* (courthouse). Jovan Radonić, *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*, book I, vol. I, Belgrade, 1934, 5, 6, 7.

when the city had not entirely developed its defence system, individual members of the landed nobility, the owners of residential-commercial blocks in the area between the city and the suburbs, took responsibility for the defence of the city, which also safeguarded their own property. The first such suburb which was formed considerably prior to the thirteenth century (possibly in the eleventh/twelfth century) were situated in the area in front of the Lion's Gate and east of the western city gate. M. Planić-Lončarić recognized the structure of irregular "ellipsoid" blocks in these areas,⁶² while N. Grujić referred to them as a "spontaneous model for developing space" as opposed to a planned model. These were enclosed residential-commercial blocks owned by land-owner families. This constituted organization of the urban space with an agrarian or latifundian character.⁶³ The towers and walls around the blocks were defended by the block owners but also the entire settlement.⁶⁴ The suburbs which were partially bounded by the early medieval wall of the old city thus served as a bulwark for the city gate, and these blocks were the oldest formations in the *burgus* area which emerged prior to the planned undertakings in the thirteenth century, even though they are today scarcely recognizable in the urban layout.⁶⁵

The suburbs which emerged in the east outside of the walls covered a large part of today's Bunićeva poljana square (the so-called "block next to the Jesuits") east of the present-day cathedral.⁶⁶ The inside and surroundings of introverted blocks of houses and towers were traversed by irregular street routes (Kriva and Androićeva streets).⁶⁷ Androićeva connected the Lion's Gate with the area of the cathedral (where it was overarched) and onward to the harbour. Planić Lončarić assumed that there may have also been a gate in the (Late Antique) wall of the Castrum farther south near the cathedral, which connected the church with the agglomeration of houses west of the cathedral and east with the harbour.⁶⁸

The western suburb in front of the main entrance to the city was also formed early. Irregular blocks also emerged here,⁶⁹ and they additionally

⁶² M. Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke republike*: 12-13; 18-19.

⁶³ Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 164-165.

⁶⁴ Such a house/tower may have also existed in the south-east part of today's Androićeva street (where the arched passage was situated). Elaborat, Blok Jezuita, 3.

⁶⁵ Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 18-19.

⁶⁶ "Dubrovnik. Blok uz Jezuite – Bunićeva poljana. Analiza razvoja, stanje i prijedlozi konzervatorskih smjernica", Zagreb, 194. (Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti). Today held in the Archives of the Art History Institute.

⁶⁷ Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 18-19.

⁶⁸ Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 164-165.

⁶⁹ M. Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke republike*: 12-13; 18-19.

expanded the city prior to construction of the new city walls in the thirteenth century. These first suburbs (east and west), according to Planić Lončarić, may have been connected to the *extra muros* street which passed through the *burgus* in the east-west direction (remainder of today's Gučetićeva street), and as a communication axis it may have been formed prior to the more northerly Od puča street (the main communication route in the *burgus* at the time of the statute).⁷⁰ The position of the first ellipsoid blocks was in fact determined in the north by the line of Gučetićeva street, while in the south by the old city wall. This street would have connected parts of the suburb with the city harbour through a gate found in Bunićeva poljana square.⁷¹ Today this line has only partially been preserved in the urban layout, and it may have been lost later due to property ownership issues and the loss of its importance in relation to the more northerly Od puča street.⁷² Planić Lončarić linked the disappearance of this street with possible reconstruction at the earlier cathedral building, which it was not in use.⁷³

The organization of space in the central part of the *burgus* of St. Blaise was tied to the filling of the shoals. How deep and how far the inlet and marshes extended is difficult to say. Archaeological research of the terrain by means of test trenches has shown that the greatest depths were around today's Count's Palace and the Church of St. Blaise (constructed in the fourteenth century) and at the site of today's Gundulićeva poljana. (Peković assumed that the end of the deep inlet was at today's Lučarica street, beyond which a shallow marsh extended westward to today's Božidarevićeva and Široka streets.)⁷⁴ It is assumed that already at the end of the twelfth century the central area of the *burgus* was generally suitable for development, and the first organization of

⁷⁰ This street would have linked parts of the city at the Church of All Saints through today's Prolazna and Za Rokom streets. The line of this former street was not preserved east of today's Pracatova street, but it probably continued down today's Kriva street in the direction of the harbour; Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 18.

⁷¹ Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 164-165.

⁷² The closure of the western city gate at All Saints and the change in the direction of movement at the new gate of Pile accorded even greater importance to Od puča street, which was already important.

⁷³ Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 164-16, 158.

⁷⁴ Peković, "Urbani razvoj Dubrovnika do 13. st.", 166-212, *Dubrovnik* 4, 1997, 171-172.

⁷⁵ Antun Ničetić, *Povijest dubrovačke luke*, Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 1996: 66-69. The area around the cathedral in the Early Middle Ages was marshy. This is indicated by the name "Tower of the Marsh Gate" (*Turris portae paludi*), the remains of which were found below the Church of Sts. Cosmas and Damian and the Church of the Holy Saviour of the Marsh (*Sancti Salvatoris de palude*), which was mentioned as across the way from the Prince's Palace in the thirteenth century.

space was carried out. After filling of the terrain, the first land-owners' blocks of a more modern, regular type were formed here, also owned by the landed nobility or church institutions, and also initially formed as enclosed defensible units with towers.

Fortifications on the mainland shore

North of the marsh/inlet there was a small settlement, probably formed prior to the eleventh century. The settlement was mentioned as being in the vicinity of the small early medieval Church of St. Nicholas *de campo* (according to some chroniclers the settlement was called *Dubrava*, which later gave its name to the entire city).⁷⁶ Prior to construction of the *new northern city walls*, the later Prijeko street functioned as a "transit route" (Župa-Gruž).⁷⁷ This was probably the area in which several small, pre-Romanesque churches, estate blocks with a feudal character and small groups of rurally organized houses were located.⁷⁸ Plans to expand the city toward the seashore began very early due to strategic reasons as well. The settlement became the Dubrovnik suburb of St. Nicholas only after its physical connection to the old city and the suburbs south of the marsh – after the process of drying and filling in the marshy terrain. According to the Anonymous chronicler, the side around the Prijeko way already served the commune for economic purposes, and at that time the area was already partly sub-divided into lots which could be leased (*ci voleva tiore, pagando all'anno grossi uno e ½ raguseo per braccio quadro*): in the final decades of the thirteenth century communal rent registers were introduced for this section of the city, while streets would also be regulated only after 1296).⁷⁹

It was only at the end of the thirteenth century that the former suburbs became an integral part of medieval Dubrovnik, surrounded by the city walls. City streets began to be regulated, and the area gained importance, becoming one of the city's principal economic zones, while the commune was its primary owner.⁸⁰ Some chroniclers mentioned the construction of walls around the settlement north of the marsh already in the eleventh century. Anonymous

⁷⁶ Milan Prelog, *Tekstovi o Dubrovniku*, (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2003), 60-62.

⁷⁷ Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Prilozi povijesi umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 29 (1990), 157-167, 165.

⁷⁸ Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Blok između Polača; analiza razvoja i stanje, Elaborat centra za povijesne znanosti*, (Zagreb: Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1984), 28-32.

⁷⁹ S. Nodilo, ed., *Li Annali della nobilissima Republica di Ragusa - aggiuntovi nella fine un rattamento di moderni annali o veramente cronache*, *Scriptores*, vol. I., *Monumenta spectantia historio-am Slavorum Meridionalium*, vol. 24. (Zagreb: JAZU, 1883.), 39 (hereinafter: Anonim); 28-32.

⁸⁰ Irena Benyovsky Latin and Danko Zelić (eds.), *Knjige nekretnina Dubrovačke općine (13-18. st.). Libri domorum et terrenorum communis Ragusii deliberatis ad afflictum (saec. XIII-XVIII)*, vol. 1 (Zagreb-Dubrovnik: HAZU, 2007).

and Ragnina dated the first defensive walls as early as 1017, confusing data on circumstances with those from the time of Bodin.⁸¹ According to Ragnina, the suburb of St. Nicholas was already bordered by a stacked stone fence (*con masiere, pali et legni*) in 1017.⁸² Besides the threat of a supposed attack, this fencing was necessary because that part of the “hill” of St. Sergius – Srđ (*montagna di santo Sergio*) had on it “many houses”. They described the development of this section, albeit in chronologically unspecific fashion.⁸³ It was only after many years that these walls, according to Ragnina, were built using stone and mortar (*con pietra et calcina*) and that the bridge which crossed the marsh (Paludazzo) was demolished. When the marshy terrain was filled, a flat surface was created which enabled the construction of houses and shops, and the terrain (called *borgo de Ragusa*) could be divided into streets.

These data are chronologically rather unreliable, but the need for defence during this period was certainly vital: Venetian and Byzantine authority changed hands in Dubrovnik during the eleventh century,⁸⁴ the city was attacked by the Saracens in 1032 (Byzantine authority waned after the death of Basil II in 1025), and Dubrovnik briefly recognized the suzerainty of the Normans.⁸⁵ The mid-eleventh century also signified increasing danger from the hinterland, particularly with the decline of Byzantine power, and the later departure of the Normans. If the stacked-stone wall around the settlement on the seashore was not built in the eleventh century as described by Anonymous and Ragnina, this was certainly an echo of the legend on the incorporation of this area into the city in the thirteenth century. Nonetheless, it should be said that the natural rise had to be controlled by the city so that it would not become a stronghold for conquerors.

At the turn of the eleventh into the twelfth century, Dubrovnik aroused the interest of the rulers of Dioclea, first Vojislav, then Bodin (1081-1101), who had aspirations to expand based on the clerical structure of his state. Chroniclers mentioned Bodin’s siege of Dubrovnik, which ultimately failed. In Bodin’s

⁸¹ Anonim, 27.

⁸² S. Nodilo, ed., “Annali di Ragusa del magnifico ms. Nicolo di Ragnina”, in *Scriptores* vol. I, *Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum Meridionalium*, vol. 24. (Zagreb: JAZU, 1883), 228 (hereinafter: Ragnina), 210.

⁸³ Ragnina, 28.

⁸⁴ Dubrovnik recognized Venetian rule, but during the reign of Basil II (1018), a Byzantine strategos was mentioned in the city; Josip Lučić, *Dubrovčani na jadranskom prostoru od VII stoljeća do godine 1205*. (Rad JAZU, vol. 17 (1975): 29-30; Robin Harris, *Povijest Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2006), 32.

⁸⁵ Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 27; Josip Lučić, *Povijest Dubrovnika od 7. stoljeća do godine 1205*. (Zagreb: Historijski institut JAZU, 1973), 55.

time, Dubrovnik's chroniclers were Razzi,⁸⁶ Luccari,⁸⁷ Resti⁸⁸ and Tubero,⁸⁹ and Cerva⁹⁰. The story of Bodin pursuing his enemies to Dubrovnik, where they found refuge, and then building a tower before the city was taken from the Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea and partially altered by Miletius,⁹¹ even though some believe there are reliable elements therein.⁹² The data in the later chronicles were copied and supplemented – but there is no way of knowing if in this process they had any (from any period) archival materials. During Bodin's time, Dubrovnik's chroniclers also mentioned the construction of "Bodin's tower" opposite the city (at the site of the small Church of St. Nicholas).⁹³ The already mentioned *veduta* of Dubrovnik, *Prospetto della Città di Ragusa nel secolo XII* (17th/18th cent.), this fortification was indicated by the legend of "Rocca del re Bodino".⁹⁴ To be sure, this erudite portrayal of the city may have been formulated on the basis of texts used by chroniclers. The chroniclers also

⁸⁶ Giuseppe Gelcich, ed., *Serafino Razzi: La storia di Ragusa*, (Dubrovnik: Editrice Tipografia Serbo-Ragusea, 1903).

⁸⁷ Lucari also mentioned construction of the tower of St. Nicholas by Bodin, commanded by Vuk Gredich, and da Mascogna (later received among the ranks of feudal lords). "Copioso ristretto de gli annali di Ravsa. Libri quattro. Di Giacomo di Pietro Lvccari gentilhuomo rauseo: Oue diligentissimamente si descriue la fondatione della cittàl'origine della Republica, e suo dominio, le guerre, le paci & tutti notabili...1604.", 15.

⁸⁸ Resti also described the occupation and demolition of Bodin's tower, which was somewhere next to the Church of St. Nicholas; Natko Nodilo, ed., *Cronica Ragusina Junii Restii (ab origine urbis usque ad annum 1451)*, Scriptorum vol. II, Monumenta spectantia historioam Slavorum Meridionalium vol. 25 (Zagreb: JAZU, 1893), (hereinafter: Resti); Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdnja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 17.

⁸⁹ Tubero also wrote about Bodin, who set himself up at the foot of Brgat, next to the city. Vladimir Rezar, ed., *Ludovik Crijević Tuberon, Komentari o mojem vremenu*. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2001), 91-92.

⁹⁰ Razzi, 63; Josip Lučić, *Povijest Dubrovnika od 7. stoljeća do godine 1205*. (Zagreb: Historijski institut JAZU, 1973), 87.

⁹¹ On this see: Tibor Živković, "Dva pitanja iz vremena vladavine kralja Bodina", *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta*, 42 (2005), 45-59, 50-51. In this work, Živković discussed the reasons for the different dating of Bodin's reign in the Dubrovnik chronicles.

⁹² Ivica Prlander believes that some data on Bodin from the Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea may be trusted (on the siege of Dubrovnik). According to Prlander, Bodin's army seized the suburb and set up a siege of the city – but was frustrated by the fortifications "to which they had no technological response" and could not even manage "to block maritime access"; Ivica Prlander, "Rimska kurija prema rubnim prostorima Zapada na istočnojadranskoj obali tijekom XI. i XII. Stoljeća", *Historijski zbornik*, vol. 62 (2011), 1-27, 9.

⁹³ Milan Prelog, "Dubrovački statut i izgradnja grada (1272-1972)", *Peristil*, 14-15 (1971.-1972.): 81-94; Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 28. Josip Lučić, *Povijest Dubrovnika od 7. stoljeća do godine 1205*. (Zagreb: Historijski institut JAZU, 1973).

⁹⁴ State Archives in Dubrovnik, Bassegli-Gozze family archives; published already in: Josip Lučić, *Povijest Dubrovnika od 7. stoljeća do godine 1205*. (Zagreb: Historijski institut JAZU, 1973).

mentioned a bridge linked the fortification in Pustijerna across the shoals (*Paludazzo*) to the mainland shore.⁹⁵

Bodin, according to chroniclers, did not manage to take the city after a siege in 1092/1093,⁹⁶ and after several years of the siege, Dubrovnik's residents allegedly convinced the fortress commanders to surrender, and then demolished the tower.⁹⁷ Then, according to Resti, *some walls* around the suburbs were also demolished "as unnecessary", and in the process a (wooden) bridge was also torn down, since the filling of the terrain across the marsh commenced. Chroniclers⁹⁸ described that at the time the marshy ground was filled and that the area called *borgo de Ragusa* began to be settled and spatially organized. The chroniclers generally dated this amelioration of the unfavourable terrain to the twelfth century: they described it as filling with "soil and stones" in order to create a wide field (*campus*), later the Placa.⁹⁹

After Bodin's death, Dubrovnik nominally recognized Byzantine rule, but it increasingly became a sphere of interest of the Venetians (who briefly seized the city in 1125¹⁰⁰ and 1171).¹⁰¹ During the city's seizure in 1171, the destruction of *certain city towers and walls* was mentioned. The death of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos signified a weakening of the empire, and for Dubrovnik a

⁹⁵ Lukša Beritić, *Utvrđenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255.), 17.

⁹⁶ Tibor Živković, "Dva pitanja iz vremena vladavine kralja Bodina", *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta*, 42 (2005.), 45-59, 53.

⁹⁷ Prlender believes that, after attempts at a diplomatic solution, Bodin backed down due to pressure from the Byzantine consul of Durazzo, Grand Duke John Doukas, and also due to his own death in 1100. Dioclea weakened; Ivica Prlender, "Rimska kurija prema rubnim prostorima Zapada na istočnojadranskoj obali tijekom XI. i XII. Stoljeća", *Historijski zbornik*, vol. 62 (2011), 1-27, 9.

⁹⁸ Anonim, 28; Ragnina, 210. S. Razzi also mentioned removal of the "fortress" of St. Nicholas, "which the Bosnian king built almost at the very walls of the city". According to Razzi, the people of Dubrovnik befriended castellan Hugo Gradić "which made it easier to convince him to come to their side and for the fortification to be taken without a struggle and razed to the ground, throwing its material into the sea so it could not be rebuilt". The demolition occurred twelve years after its construction. According to Razzi, the Church of St. Nicholas was built at this site. Razzi also said that in 1122 the people of Dubrovnik "adorned their city with many lovely buildings", Razzi, 46. 49.

⁹⁹ Ragnina, 210; Lukša Beritić, *Utvrđenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 17.

¹⁰⁰ In 1125, they briefly conquered Dalmatian cities with Dubrovnik, but after 20 years they were expelled from the city; Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 28.

¹⁰¹ At that time they appointed a prince; Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 31; Josip Lučić, *Dubrovnici na jadranskom prostoru od VII stoljeća do godine 1205*. (Rad JAZU, vol. 17 (1975): 29-30; 40.

new threat from its hinterland – the Nemanjić dynasty (1185).¹⁰² In the 1180s, Stefan Nemanja took Dioclea and expanded his state to the Zeta littoral and Kotor, and soon problems with Dubrovnik began (due to an interest in the islands of Korčula and Vis). Nemanja allegedly besieged the city in 1185 and *broke through its defences*.¹⁰³ Dubrovnik received protection from the Normans and the Nemanjić rulers recognized the city's *hereditas* (at the “court” of King William II in the city a peace treaty was reportedly signed in 1186).¹⁰⁴ In 1192 it returned to (weak) Byzantine rule. Although the people of Dubrovnik independently elected their own prince, the city's residents did not have a powerful protector.¹⁰⁵

According to all of these data, it is impossible to ascertain whether there was a defensive cordon in the twelfth century except for the wall of the old city and the *castrum*, or if the suburbs were encircled by some temporary wall (made of dry stacked stones). There are no data, neither in the chronicles nor in contemporary documents, on Dubrovnik's defensive walls up to the mid-thirteenth century.¹⁰⁶

Thirteenth century

The thirteenth century brought considerable changes: The Venetian fleet returned from Constantinople and easily subjugated Dubrovnik in 1205. This was the beginning of a long period of Venetian rule in Dubrovnik (until 1358), which was characterized by the development of its institutions and legal system, construction of residential and public buildings, and demographic growth. Dubrovnik entered the thirteenth century with a certain “international” status of a rising society and a growing economy. The city became the economic hub of the southern Adriatic, while its hinterland became a market for Dubrovnik's citizens.¹⁰⁷ Regardless of established Venetian authority, the thirteenth century

¹⁰² In the 1180s, Stefan Nemanja expanded his state to the Zeta littoral and Kotor, and soon thereafter problems with Dubrovnik arose (over interests in the islands of Korčula and Vis).

¹⁰³ Nemanjić rulers recognized the city's *hereditas* (at the “court” of King William II in the city a peace treaty was reportedly signed in 1186); Ivica Prlender, “Rimska kurija prema rubnim prostorima Zapada na istočnojadranskoj obali tijekom XI. i XII. stoljeća”, *Historijski zbornik*, vol. 62 (2011), 1-27, 22; Ivica Prlender, *Sve opsade Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: PEN centar, 1993).

¹⁰⁴ Ragnina, 219; Ivica Prlender, “Korčula i Dubrovnik u XIII. st.”, in : Ivo Padovan, ed., *Marko Polo i istočni Jadran u XIII. stoljeću* (Zagreb: HAZU, 1996), 63-64.

¹⁰⁵ Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 46; (Foretić, I, 46); Robin Harris, *Povijest Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2006), 31.

¹⁰⁶ Farlati, *Illyricum Sacrum*, VI, 95-96; taken from *Monumenta congregatione Sancti Dominici de Ragusio* (Wenzel Cod. Arpad. XI. 206. – Kukuljević Reg. no. 218, nepouzdana tradicija). CD, III. doc. 265; Lukša Beritić, *Utvrđenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 18.

¹⁰⁷ Milan Prelog, “Dubrovački statut i izgradnja grada (1272-1972)”, *Peristil*, 14-15 (1971-1972): 84.

was not entirely tranquil: it was marked by the desire for autonomy and further danger from its hinterland. The first conflicts with the Venetian counts began during the tenure of Giovanni Dandolo, who remained at his post for a considerable time. The Venetians sought hostages from among the most distinguished Dubrovnik families in Venice, who did not arrive. After the prince's departure for Venice, the people of Dubrovnik assumed power with count Andrew Dobrano in 1230,¹⁰⁸ but a Venetian count was called back in 1232 due to internal discord.¹⁰⁹ Venice was motivated primarily by military and mercantile interests, and Dubrovnik once more rebelled in 1251, and two deputy princes reigned in that year.¹¹⁰ Besides this instability, territorial borders (and the question of a metropolitanate) once more led to frequent conflicts with Serbian rulers in the hinterland. The period of Stephan Urosh I (1243-1276), then expanding the territory of his rule southward, was particularly perilous.

At that time, the more intensive planning certainly began, and possibly also the construction of the walls around the city's suburbs, linked to the defence and planning of consolidation of the urban space: the *Duecento* was an era of general urbanization in the eastern Adriatic seaboard, and throughout the Mediterranean.¹¹¹ The general trend was unification of different urban and functional units: suburbs were merged and encompassed into urban areas, and housing construction and street networks were planned.¹¹² The former Dubrovnik suburbs were expanded, regulated and linked during the thirteenth century, finally becoming into a consolidated urban zone encircled by defensive walls. The planning of the city walls made of durable materials as a deliberate policy began even before the filling of the terrain and expansion of the suburbs: construction of the city walls meant much more than defence prompted by an immediate threat. Besides tangible physical protection, the walls denoted a clear boundary of the city and the privileges of its citizens. Extra-urban land became city land once it was encompassed inside the walls, and walls signified a boundary for a space quite different from that which was *extra muros*. Jurisdiction over a larger urban area also had legal, political and economic connotations and constituted a prerequisite for future development.¹¹³

The construction of the city walls was nonetheless contingent upon internal accord and the level of organization of the community and city institution, and considerable funds were also required. Due to unfavourable political cir-

¹⁰⁸ At that time, the city also concluded trade treaties with Rimini, Ferrara and Fano.


¹⁰⁹ In the treaty on conditions, the doge was promised accommodation in the archbishop's palace if he visited Dubrovnik.

¹¹⁰ Robin Harris, *Povijest Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2006), 34, 43-45; Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 62-65.

¹¹¹ Bariša Krekić, *Unequal Rivals*, (Zagreb-Dubrovnik: HAZU, 2007), 9-47; Šime Ljubić, "Obodnošajih dubrovačke sa mletačkom republikom do g. 1358", *Rad JAZU*, 5 (1868), 44-113.

¹¹² Enrico Guidoni, *Storia dell'urbanistica. Il Duecento*. (Milano: Editori Laterza, 1992), 213.

¹¹³ Picture 5



Picture 5

cumstances and institutional organization, large-scale projects lasted for decades (with possible changes during individual phases).¹¹⁴ The process of transforming extra-urban zones into urban ones proceeded parallel to the process of city wall construction: parcelization, charting streets, housing construction, etc. Nonetheless, parts of the suburbs were incorporated into Dubrovnik's urban fabric gradually (first the suburb of St. Blaise south of Placa, and only later St. Nicholas north of Placa), which resulted in typologically and formationally different spatial units in the city's layout (at places irregular large blocks may be recognized which served as models for the regular ones, elsewhere contemporary double rows of houses were introduced, etc.). Was this gradualism accompanied by plans for the defence of individual sections, or were there only plans to build a northern new wall around Prijeko, which certainly took decades? The *burgus* south of the Placa was encircled by city fortifications from the south and east: the city wall of the old city to the south and the *castrum* to the east. However, up to the present these fortifications were have not been generally preserved, so their locations have been ascertained by means of archaeological and archival research.

In the thirteenth century there was a sharp rise in the population and the greater need for residential space and expansion of the boundaries of the old city: this is also backed by contemporaneous documents, and the same was described by later Dubrovnik chronicles.¹¹⁵ In the mid-thirteenth century, the

¹¹⁴ Benyovsky Latin, Irena, "Izgradnja gradskih fortifikacija u Trogiru od 13. do 15. stoljeću", *Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti.*, 28 (2010); 17-48.

¹¹⁵ For example, Ragnina mentioned 1277 as the year when many new well-to-do residents with families from Bosnia moved into the city (this was also the year in which archival books were

suburb below the *castrum* became an attractive location for settlement by some of the wealthiest families due to the necessary space, economic potential (proximity of the new political and administrative seat and harbour), as well as family ties (possibly tied to clan divisions among the landed nobles). A part of the families who resided in the suburb were new settlers.

Castrum

The already mentioned *castrum* which protected the eastern side of the old city, the already existing cathedral and harbour in the preceding,¹¹⁶ also protected the suburb in the west in the thirteenth century.¹¹⁷ The term *castrum* used until the final decades of the thirteenth century described its defensive character,¹¹⁸ while until the mid-thirteenth century the city's administration was housed in the churches and monasteries inside the *walls of the old city*.¹¹⁹

Even though there was already a clear orientation for the political seat outside of Pustijerna, toward the north,¹²⁰ and the construction of the (old) loggia at Držićeva poljana, public facilities (in front of the *castrum*) were being formed which assumed a role in the development of political affairs.¹²¹ The *castrum* from the thirteenth century has not been preserved, while the Prince's Palace was built at its site (after a fire) in the fifteenth century. In the sources, the *castrum* is only mentioned in the statute of 1272.

registered!). According to him, the gardens used by the city in the suburbs began to be transformed into residential houses; Ragnina, 222.

¹¹⁶ Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 166. Some researchers believe that the city's first harbour was situated on the eastern end (Kalarinja) beneath today's Lovrijenac, and due to the configuration of the terrain it may have always been in the east; Milan Prelog, *Tekstovi o Dubrovniku*, (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2003), 60-62. On this see also: Željko Peković, "Urbani razvoj Dubrovnika do 13. stoljeća", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997): 166-212, 168.

¹¹⁷ Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435.", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003-2004), 166; Milan Prelog, *Tekstovi o Dubrovniku* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2003), 60-62; Željko Peković, "Urbani razvoj Dubrovnika do 13. stoljeća", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997): 166-212, 168.

¹¹⁸ Philippus de Diversis de Quartigianis, *Situs aedificiorum, politiae et laudabilium consuetudinem inclytiae civitatis Ragusij*, V. Brunelli, ed., Zadar, 1882, 41 (translation in *Dubrovnik* 3). Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435.", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003-2004), 149-170.

¹¹⁹ Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435.", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003-2004), 153; Jovan Radonić, ed., *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*, vol. I/I (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1934), 5-7.

¹²⁰ I. Fisković, Kuzma, 269.

¹²¹ Also outdoors: *in publico foro eiusdem civitatis*. DS, V, 41.

Construction of walls around the suburbs

The area of the western suburb began to form even prior to the thirteenth century in front of the western city gate was already partially settled in the thirteenth century. According to a document from 1255, a church garden *fenced in by a stone wall* was located north of the Church of All Saints, while to its north there was communal tract with houses.¹²² Certain chroniclers described the construction of “new” city walls (west) around this tract already in the mid-thirteenth century.

In 1252, according to Resti, the Serbian army attacked the city with the intent of preventing construction of the *new Dubrovnik walls* which were supposed to fence off the suburb of St. Blaise.¹²³ Resti described plans to build a new wall around the city in 1252 – it was supposed to begin from the west and move toward the north, and thus connecting the suburb called *Garište*¹²⁴ or St. Blaise, because at the time Dubrovnik was settled by many new residents. At that time it was decided to repair (*remake*) the old wall as well.¹²⁵ Dubrovnik’s representative intervened with the king with regard to this construction and after diplomatic action and payments made in 1254, they concluded a peace treaty.¹²⁶ Beritić believed that this report, if at all acceptable, could refer only to the commencement of construction of the final wall, and not some *middle* wall around the suburbs.¹²⁷

A war with Urosh broke out once more in 1265, but the city then concluded a peace with payment of an annual tribute of 2,000 perpers. The year 1266 was described, again in Resti’s chronicle (and this time in Ragnina’s as well), as the beginning of construction of the *new city walls* around the suburbs.¹²⁸ The period between 1265 and 1275 (when Urosh once more attacked

¹²² CD, IV, 518; MHR, I, 1096., 323.

¹²³ According to Resti, the people of Dubrovnik attempted to intervene with the king with regard to the walls, but unsuccessfully, and he in fact expelled Dubrovnik’s merchants from his country and threatened to attack. So Dubrovnik attempted to send its Venetian prince, Marsilio Giorgio, to intervene with the king (who was Venetian on his mother’s side), but the prince did not go, so ambassadors were sent, but without success; Resti, 90. As opposed to Resti, neither Ragnina nor Anonymous mentioned this incident.

¹²⁴ In Croatian: the area demolished by fire.

¹²⁵ Resti, 90.

¹²⁶ In 1254 Dubrovnik put forward some of its revenues, from customs and butcher shops, to pay the peace tribute to Uroš; CD, IV, doc. 499.

¹²⁷ In the thus far most systematic overview of the history of Dubrovnik’s fortifications, L. Beritić asserted that prior to the northern city walls at the end of the thirteenth century, there were no other walls surrounding the city (except the old wall around Pustjerna and Kaštel); Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 20.

¹²⁸ Resti, 96; Ragnina, 221; Beritić considered Ragnina’s report on wall construction in 1266 “more reliable than Resti’s” and concluded that the descriptions pertained to the reinforcement

the city) was a time of relative peace “outside”, although there was internal unrest. The people of Dubrovnik expelled the Venetian prince, Giovanni Querini, from the city, and were hence threatened by the Venetian doge.¹²⁹

This period, 1266 to be precise, was described in the chronicles as the beginning of construction of a new wall around the suburbs.¹³⁰ Ragnina cited data on the commencement of construction of the walls in 1266, which began on the western side, starting from the high tower across the way from St. Lawrence toward the north and the Church of St. Nicholas, with many towers.¹³¹ According to him, the new wall was connected to the eastern castle (St. Luke’s Fortress).¹³² Resti alleged that the entire new city was surrounded by walls already as of 1266, when the large defensive walls were built (*una nuova grossa muranglia*) which were also supposed to encircle the suburb of St. Nicholas di Campo, and connected this section with the castle in the east (St. Luke). The wall had towers (*torrioni*), while four towers were built to defend the harbour.¹³³

The most knowledgeable expert on the history of Dubrovnik’s fortifications, Lukša Beritić, does not consider this information reliable.¹³⁴ According to Beritić, the descriptions of the walls from 1266 once more refer to the final northern wall. The high tower which ran toward Lovrijenac Tower could, according to Beritić, have been that one near the Pile Gate, because today’s Kalarinja Tower above Bokar Tower was constructed in the fourteenth century, while Puncijela Tower was built in 1305.¹³⁵ He believes that the wall on the eastern end may have reached St. Nicholas, and not St. Luke as described (for there are preserved remains of a wall at St. Nicholas which descend toward the campanile at the St. James Tower). The towers mentioned by Resti and Ragnina, according to Beritić, are the four towers at the harbour which could have been: the St. Luke Tower, the tower at the old arsenal (torn down by Austria during expansion of the pier); the tower built on the bastion of the Palace (where the arsenal’s arcades ended) and the tower of the Count’s Palace at the Ponte Gate

and construction of the section around Prijeko; Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 18.

¹²⁹ Nenad Vekarić, *Vlastela grada Dubrovnika*, vol. 1 (Korjeni, struktura i razvoj dubrovačkog plemstva, Zagreb-Dubrovnik, HAZU, 2011), 215; Gregor Čremošnik, “Odnos Dubrovnika prema Mlecima do godine 1358”, *Narodna starina*, vol. 12, no. 32 (1933), 169-178, 176.

¹³⁰ Resti, 96.

¹³¹ Ragnina, 221.

¹³² Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 18.

¹³³ Resti, 96.

¹³⁴ He considers it illogical that chroniclers placed the construction of a wall around the suburb of St. Blaise in 1252, while in 1266 they mentioned the renewed construction of an entire wall around the city.

¹³⁵ Puncijela Tower was established in 1305; Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 18.

(*turris campanaria*).¹³⁶ N. Grujić also used data on the towers, locating them close to the harbour: the towers fortifying the Count's Palace on the sea side were only mentioned by name in the fourth century: 1350 and 1366.¹³⁷

Some other researchers, for instance Ž. Peković, believed that the description of these chroniclers may have pertained to some temporary middle wall which defended the area of Dubrovnik's suburbs south of Placa prior to construction of the final wall above Prijeko.¹³⁸ Besides the information from Dubrovnik's chroniclers which mention construction of a wall around the St. Blaise suburb with relative imprecision, such statements also depended, for example, on a contemporary notary document dated to the thirteenth century, and archaeological research. A document dated 1258 was cited, in which the "new" and "old" city walls encircling the city on the northern side were mentioned, describing their distance from an estate in the *burgus*.¹³⁹ Vukas Ivanić was in a dispute with Ungara, the wife of Domanja Guererio. Ungara initiated litigation with Ivanić because he wanted to built a wall *extra muros civitatis Ragusii*, on land owned by her husband, Domanja Guerero, who was absent.¹⁴⁰

Vukas attempted to prove that he had built the foundations on his land, presenting an older document from 1255, which detailed another demarcation lawsuit involving the estate of Vukas and that of the Monastery of St. Simon. This document specified the distance of Vukas Ivanić's estate (57 *bracolaria* (roughly 60 meters)¹⁴¹ *versus montem* from the old wall, and 56 *bracolaria versus montem* from the new wall. The "old wall" was certainly the wall of the old city, while the position of the "new wall" was, based on the relevant literature, questionable: some researchers placed it along the line north of the old wall and parallel to it, thus along the line of some manner of temporary "middle wall" which would have encircled the *burgus* south of Placa as of the mid-thirteenth century.¹⁴² Some researchers believed that the old and new walls

¹³⁶ Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 19, 28.

¹³⁷ N. Grujić also used data on the towers, locating them close to the harbour: the towers fortifying the Prince's Palace on the sea side (Kaznea Tower and the Prince's Tower) were only mentioned by name in the fourth century: 1350 and 1366; Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004), 149-171, 156. *Monumenta ragusina* IV, 63-64.

¹³⁸ Željko Peković, "Urbani razvoj Dubrovnika do 13. stoljeća", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997): 166-212, 87.

¹³⁹ CD, V, doc. 612.

¹⁴⁰ CD, V, pp. 95-96.

¹⁴¹ The *bracolarius* is a measure equivalent to 2 ells. The Dubrovnik ell was 0.55 m.

¹⁴² However, it should be noted that previous researchers translated *bracolaria* as ell, so 57 ells were 31.35 m, and 56 ells were 30.8 meters. Actually, these were Venetian ells (*brazzo*, *brazzonarius*, *brazzolarius*) whose lengths varied in the Dalmatian communes, but they were generally twice as long as the communal ell (*brachium*) whose length varied by a factor of roughly 0.5 m; Marija Zaninović-Rumora, "Korčulanske mjere za dužinu i površinu u razdoblju od 15. do 19. stoljeća",

both specified as *versus montem* were set parallel, one farther north than the other. Depending on the part of the document being interpreted, some researchers believed that the distance between the old and new walls was 56 + 57 ells (!), while some (depending on another part of the description contained in the document) also place the “unknown expanse of the St. Simon estate” in the distance between the two parallel walls.¹⁴³ A more detailed analysis of the document indicates that this was possibly not a new wall north of the “old” wall, but rather a new part of the wall around the old city which was situated roughly along the same line as the old one (it would appear that part of the old wall was demolished, perhaps in a previous attack from the hinterland), so that the need arose for construction of a new wall section.¹⁴⁴ This interpretation may be tied to Resti’s report on the repair of the old wall when a new, more northerly final wall was being built. The position of the “new wall” of 1255/58 is not certain at this point.

Namely, archaeological research has indicated the possibility that a fortification existed south of Placa (north of Cvijete Zozorić street)¹⁴⁵ when the fragment of a Romanesque city wall (140 cm) was found in the Kaboga Baroque palace¹⁴⁶ (somewhat south of Između polača street) and the remains of a 150

Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, vol. 27 (2009), 103-120; Josip Kolanović, “Šibenski metrološki sustav u 15. stoljeću”, *Arhivski vjesnik*, 37 (1994), 189-207. A *bracolarij* or *brazolar* also meant a type of tool, a hoe or stick of a specific length used for measuring; Marija Zaninović-Rumora, “**Stare mjere Splita od 15. do 19. stoljeća**”, *Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru*, vol. 52 (2010), 173- 188. A comparison of the size of plots in Dubrovnik in the thirteenth century, where measurements were made in fathoms, feet, ells and *bracolaria*, are additionally illustrated by this relationship: 1 fathom (*passus*) – 2 *bracolaria* (*brazzolariii*) – 4 ells (*brachii*) – 6 feet (*pes*) – palms (*palmus*).

¹⁴³ M. Medini believed that the space regulated by the statute of 1272 must have been defended by some sort of wall to its north, and he first analyzed the data from the document on the distance of the St. Simon estate from the old and new city walls. He assumed that there was a *middle* wall “around Prijeko”, speculating that the monastery’s estate may have had a maximum length of 100 meters. He cites as an argument the fact that in 1296 Prijeki way was still called *costeria burgi* (on the rocky coast of the burg). According to Medini, this “new” city wall thus ran parallel to the old city wall – for both were *versus montem* – and north of it at a distance of 113 ells (roughly 57 meters), plus the known width of the St. Simon land (he assumed that this may have been a maximum of 100 meters); Milorad Medini, *Starine ddbrovačke* (Dubrovnik: Jadran, 1935), 150-151.

¹⁴⁴ More details in: Irena Benyovsky Latin, “Obrana dubrovačkog predgrađa sredinom 13. stoljeća. Prilog istraživanju privatnih kula na temelju notarskih spisa”, *Historijski Zbornik*, in press; Irena Benyovsky Latin – Stipe Ledić, “Posjed obitelji Volcassio u srednjovjekovnom Dubrovniku”, *Anali Zavoda za povijest HAZU u Dubrovniku*, in press.

¹⁴⁵ Ivica Žile, “Fortifikacijski sustavi u svjetlu recentnih arheoloških nalaza”, *Dubrovnik*, 2 (1993), 223-228; Ivica Žile, “Zaštitna arheološka istraživanja crkve sv. Vlaha u povijesnoj jezgri grada Dubrovnika”, *Starohrvatska prosvjeta*, 35 (2008), 185-193, 188; Ivica Žile, “Rezultati arheoloških istraživanja u palači Kaboga 2-4 u Dubrovniku”, *Radovi IPU*, 16 (1992), 19-27.

¹⁴⁶ This wall was 150 cm wide, but in the east-west direction, which indicates that it was a city and not a private wall (the western city wall that encircled the suburbs in the mid-thirteenth century also had a width of three Dubrovnik ells – 1.53 meters).

cm wide wall were found at the same level in the Ragusina area. According to Ivica Žile, the line of these wall remains in the east-west direction, which would connect these two wall fragments, may have constituted the fortification system with which the “St. Blaise suburb” was fortified (the section from the Kaboga Palace toward the very south-west edge of the Church of St. Blaise along Žerljara street to Ragusina, where the fragment of a Late Antique wall was found). The same system, according to Žile, had to have been destroyed prior to 1296 and the construction of the final northern wall. Žile speculated that the wall may have been temporary, which clearly indicated the later street regulation in the north-south direction which extended to the north of this wall. Even though Žile also mentioned the measure in ells in his interpretation, the distance from the Kaboga Palace to the old city wall would have been the sum of twice times roughly 60 meters plus a possibly small St. Simon estate. However, future archaeological and historical research will confirm or refute the claims of a “new defensive wall” in the aforementioned mid-thirteenth century document.

Besides the data from the narrative sources on construction of the walls in 1266, already interpreted in the literature, also interesting also are the lesser known data from the chronicle of Serafin Cerva (unpublished manuscript in the Dominican library)¹⁴⁷ which mention the wall around the suburbs: according to Cerva’s chronicle, in 1269 the city (at the time when Gausonius was appointed bishop) expanded so that suburbs were added to the Old City which look toward the west. According to the description, until that year “*the city street Pomerium, which was actually called Lata, was a boundary.*”¹⁴⁸ According to Cerva, in 1269 a peripheral suburb (“which was then called St. Blaise suburb because of the local Church of St. Blaise, and is today called Garište) was merged, while walls and a watchtower (*moenia qui ac propugnacula*) were raised around it, and the Pile Gate, which was until then next to All Saints, was brought from the other side of the new Pomerium”).¹⁴⁹ It can be seen that the concept of the suburb of St. Blaise, or *sexteria* of St. Blaise, changed. Cerva himself mentioned that the suburb was incorporated due to an increase in the population, and by his time the aforementioned wall had not been preserved. It is possible that this was a matter of building a wall around the suburb west of the Church of All Saints (around the *old* St. Blaise Church) as a phase in the construction of the final *new wall* which, according to the descriptions of chroniclers, ran from west to north (possibly planned from 1252/1266). In this

¹⁴⁷ Serafin Cerva, *Sacra Metropolis Ragusina, sive ragusinae provinciae pontificum series variis ecclesiarum monumentis atque historicis, chronologicis, criticis commentariis ...*; sign. 36 - IV - 14, manuscript in the Dominican monastery library in Dubrovnik.

¹⁴⁸ Cf: Daniele Farlati: *Illyrici sacri tomus sextus*, Venetiis 1800, 103: (*Octavianus S. Mariae in Via lata*).

¹⁴⁹ In a document from 1281, the Church of All Saints was located *intus a muro civitatis*; MHR, I, doc. 593.

case, the city gate also moved westward, as described in Cerva's chronicle.¹⁵⁰ Chronicler Farlati mentioned that in 1262 the western city gate was located close to the Church of All Saints (*ad portam occidentalem veteris urbis sita*).¹⁵¹ And chronicler Mattei, in the manuscript *Zibaldone*, wrote that the Domino (All Saints) Church was built in front of the Lave Castle.¹⁵² If the city gate moved westward, the former was probably later named after the owners of the neighbouring estates. According to Beritić, the former main city gate was called *porta Pisino* in the statute (based on the owner of the neighbouring estate).¹⁵³

Although he did not record the construction of walls, Ragnina alleged that in 1269 the section of St. Blaise (*santo Blasio alla piazza*) was merged with the city, so that residential homes could be constructed, for the houses and commercial buildings were pressed together in the section around the Church of All Saints up to the walls of the old city.¹⁵⁴ Let us assume that the section west and south of All Saints was more densely populated prior to 1272. In the section below Strossmayerova street (the yard of the City's primary school), late Romanesque and early Gothic houses and irregular streets were discovered. After all, the streets mentioned around the Church of All Saints in the statute of 1272 generally already existed earlier. Resti also mentioned that at the end

¹⁵⁰ According to Beritić, the gate mentioned in the statute is the gate on the western wall which can even today be seen built into the wall at the Retirement Home ("Za Rokom street at the extension in the yard of the Retirement Home where even now there is a small built-in doorway"; Lukša Beritić, *Urbanistički razvitak Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Zavod za arhitekturu i urbanizam instituta za likovne umjetnosti JAZU, 1958), 14.

¹⁵¹ Daniele Farlati: *Illyrici sacri tomus sextur*, Venetiis 1800, 108: *...rector ecclesiae Omnium Sanctorum, que ad portam occidentalem veteris urbis sita, ejusque Sacerdotio Parungerius fruebatur; nunc a S. Domino titulum habet*. Ivica Žile, "Rezultati arheoloških istraživanja u Domu Marina Držića u Dubrovniku", *Radovi IPU*, 12-13 (1988-1989), 49-57, 54.

¹⁵² Ivan Mattei: *Zibaldone*, II, (*Memorie storiche su Ragusa raccolte dal Padre Gian Maria Mattei*, MSS 434), s. 267, Knjižnica samostana Mala braća u Dubrovniku; Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le developpement de la ville medievale*, (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998, 46.

¹⁵³ According to Beritić, the remainder of this old gate was preserved at Od Domina street 6 (he also calls them the Castle Gate). The statute called them the "gate below the house of Bogdan de Pisino" (DS, V, 41), while Matijašević, in his comments on the establishment of the Domino Church, called them the gate of Lave Castle (Mattei, *Zibaldone*, II, 267). The statute calls it "the gate in front of the house of Bogdan de Pisino" (DS, V, 41), while Matijašević, in his comments on the establishment of the Domino Church, referred to it as the gate of Lave Castle (Mattei, *Zibaldone*, II, 267). This was one of the main gates to the old city, to which all of the streets in the oldest part of the city, the Castle, led. The statute describes the streets leading to this gate as "going straight to Placa". As already noted at the beginning, Peković believes that the location of the wall only somewhat south of the Church of All Saints, as proposed by Beritić, is not possible due to the terrain, and that the late Romanesque and early Gothic houses and irregular streets north of Strossmayerova are proof of the expansion outside of the walls prior to regulation of the *burgus*.

¹⁵⁴ Ragnina, 221: *1269. L'anno di Cristo 1269 li Ragusei aggiunsero lo sesterio di santo Blasio alla piazza, accio fusseno le case per popolo per habitere, perche tuttavia si adunavano le fabbriche di case fino la ecclesia de Tutti li Santi arente de muri vecchi di Ragusa*.

of 1269 the decision was made to upgrade the section called St. Blaise, because it was barren, lacking houses, and marshy, so housing construction had to be facilitated. This suburb ended at the Church of All Saints, which was *formerly* outside of the old city walls.¹⁵⁵ A document dated 1262 mentions the Church of All Saints *ad portam occidentalem veteris urbis sita*.¹⁵⁶

Even though the ground was relatively suitable for construction as early as the twelfth century, the process of “cultivating” the central *burgus* may have continued (or was very fresh in the urban memory) even in the latter half of the thirteenth century – chronicles mention filling works as even in the thirteenth century. The term *palude* to designate marshy terrain was still used in the notary documents of the thirteenth century for the area north of the cathedral and the Church of the Holy Saviour *de palude* and the gate near the same church (*porta de palude*). According to chroniclers, in the fourteenth century (1331!) houses on the Placa were threatened with collapse due to the marshy ground, so the foundations had to be reinforced and stone houses had to be built.¹⁵⁷ The filling works were certainly a long-term process which proceeded in several phases.¹⁵⁸ Already in the thirteenth century a street network began to be established as a sign of communal control of this *burgus* and the transformation of the former *territoria* of rural estate type to city lots.¹⁵⁹

Nonetheless, the systematic regulation of the central part of the *burgus* was conducted only at the time of the statute. One of the most important provisions of the statute for researching the appearance of the city's suburbs in the thirteenth century is certainly the oft-analyzed provision from 1272, “On the streets” (*De viis*), which describes the new streets in the *burgus*.¹⁶⁰ The 1270s were a period when the already developed institutions of authority demanded legal order (both the representatives of Venetian authority and the commune vying for autonomy),¹⁶¹ and this was also a result of the general developmental

¹⁵⁵ *Anzi fin dall'anno 1269, perchè il piano era paludoso e vuoto d'edificij, fu terminato d'ordinar un sestiere, che fu chiamato di S. Biagio, acciò la gente si potesse commodamente proveder di stanze. Questo sestiere si stende fino alla chiesa di Tutti i Santi, che anticamente era fuori delle mura della città vecchia.*

¹⁵⁶ Daniele Farlati: *Illyrici sacri tomus sextur*, Venetiis 1800, 108: *...rector ecclesiae Omnium Sanctorum, que ad portam occidentalem veteris urbis sita, ejusque Sacerdotio Parungerius fruebatur; nunc a S. Domino titulum habet.* Ivica Žile, “Rezultati arheoloških istraživanja u Domu Marina Držića u Dubrovniku”, *Radovi IPU*, 12-13 (1988-1989), 49-57, 54.

¹⁵⁷ Resti, 390; Antun Ničetić, *Povijest dubrovačke luke*, (Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 1996): 66-69.

¹⁵⁸ Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le developpement de la ville medievale*, (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998.), 21.

¹⁵⁹ Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 18.

¹⁶⁰ SD, L. V, c. 41.

¹⁶¹ Nella Lonza, “Dubrovački statut, temeljna sastavnica pravnog poretka i biljeg političkog identiteta”, Ante Šoljić, Zdravko Šundrica, Ivo Veselić, eds., *Statut grada Dubrovnika (sastavljen godine 1272.)*. (Dubrovnik: Državni arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2002), 11-46, 19, 37.

trends which appeared in the Mediterranean zone. The motive for codifying legal provisions (incomplete, uncollected, ambiguous) was certainly the need to bring order to Dubrovnik's laws. Besides codifying provisions, everyday legal practice was also reorganized to function as a clear legal system – the introduction of public offices and the maintenance of notary registers was also certainly tied to this.

The first sentence already indicates that the provision constitutes an attempt to regulate not only property and title affairs, but also to implement jurisdiction over a part of the *burgus* and thus add it to the “city”: “*New circumstances dictate new solutions. For, by God's will another, new city has been attached to Dubrovnik, which has until now been called a suburb, and so in the future there are no doubts as to the thoroughfares and streets of this suburb, by this law, which must remain effective for all time, we stipulate...*” According to this provision, the city expanded administratively and legally: the old city (*urbi Ragusii*) was enlarged with a new part (*nova civitas*) which was once called a suburb (*burgus*). In it, the existing were ascertained and the new streets were regulated. Herein, the new city obviously means the *burgus* east of Široka Street (All Saints section) and west of Lučarica Street (Castrum section) north of the city gate and old city wall and *campus*.

Regulatory undertakings in the suburbs of St. Blaise and St. Nicholas demonstrated the aspiration for urbanization of the entire *infra muros* area and its administrative and fiscal control. The northerly expansion of the city and the construction of new city walls altered the character of the feudal estates. During the latter half of the thirteenth century, an increasing number of public streets were laid down in the *burgus*. This can be followed in the already frequently analysed regulations from the statutes (1272 and 1296).¹⁶² The area of the *burgus* was organized as an orthogonal network, and the tracts set aside for housing construction were defined.¹⁶³ The routing of new streets through the *burgus* simultaneously raised the value of the estates and facilitated more rational use of the urban space, especially those parts along communication routes (which could be leased as shops), but it also reduced their surface area (and increased the number of smaller plots). This was in the interest of the commune as well, for it could exercise better control over this space and it facilitated developmental planning; it was also in the interest of the owners, who thus increased the value of their plots. The large noblemen's blocks gradually disappeared from the *burgus*, and this process was also associated with the dissipation of the so-called institution of *fraternita* and possibly also kinship ties. The process of laying down streets adhered to existing property relations and

¹⁶² Lukša Beritić, *Urbanistički razvitak Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Zavod za arhitekturu i urbanizam instituta za likovne umjetnosti JAZU, 1958), *passim*.

¹⁶³ Irena Benyovsky Latin and Danko Zelić (ed.), *Knjige nekretnina Dubrovačke općine (13-18. st.). Libri domorum et terrenorum communis Ragusii deliberatis ad afflictum (saec. XIII-XVIII)*, vol. 1 (Zagreb-Dubrovnik: HAZU, 2007), 24.

often followed already established boundaries between properties, which can be seen in the thus far unresearched notary materials. Equally valuable plots enabled the later construction of houses, and shops and other commercial facilities along thoroughfares. This regulation certainly indicates the effectiveness of the executive authorities and the functioning of institutions: the routing of streets certainly played a part in the demolition of individual structures and the creation of passages over private land.

Nonetheless, the possibility of reinforcing the defensive capacity of the *old wall* with some *new* parts at a time when a new northern section may have been constructed is suggested by certain other documents. Some other contemporary documents show that private owners who held the surrounding estates may have played a role in the defence of the old city, as they built private towers and thus participated in the city's defence. During the period when the city had not entirely developed its defensive system, individual members of the feudal nobility – the owners of residential/commercial blocks in the area between the city and suburbs – assumed responsibility for the city's defence while securing their own holdings. Evidence of this is indeed reflected in the designations of city gates and towers, which bear the names of members of the city elites (the statute mentions the Pisino and Mence gates...). Large land complexes constituted non-urban formations of spatial organization (which is reflected in the term *territoria*), while their structure reflected, besides social relations, the need for security. Dead-end passages led into the interior of these large introverted building complexes which were isolated from each other by private walls. Besides the fortified home of the owner, there were also courtyards with outbuildings (storage spaces, ovens, sources of water) and (wooden) huts for dependent residents, later renters, without access to the streets.¹⁶⁴

The population surged in the thirteenth century, and this led to an increased need in housing and expansion of the old city's boundaries: this is confirmed by contemporary documents, and also described by later Dubrovnik chronicles.¹⁶⁵ According to the earliest documents of the thirteenth century, the estates of magnate families and church institutions can be located in the central *burgus* south of the Placa. For example, the sons of *Valius* Gondola (*1234-1282), Benedict and Damian. They inherited the estates outside of the Lion's

¹⁶⁴ The oldest blocks that emerged prior to the planned undertakings were non-uniform and irregular units, which are today scarcely discernable in the urban layout. They did influence the development of the later regular blocks Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Zajednički prostori stambenih zona srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Radovi IPU*, vol. 12-13 (1988-1998), 65-75, 70. Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), vol. 12-13, 18.

¹⁶⁵ For example, Ragnina mentioned 1277 as the year when many new well-to-do residents with families from Bosnia moved into the city (this was also the year in which archival books were registered!). According to him, the gardens used by the city in the suburbs began to be transformed into residential houses; Ragnina, 222.

Gate¹⁶⁶ from their uncle, John Gondola (*illum terrenum extra portam Leonis qui mihi pertinet*). They were, therefore, west of the cathedral and east and south-east of the Lion's Gate. John Gondola left the remaining houses to another brother in Pustijerna).¹⁶⁷

There are indications that the first estates were considerably larger than those that existed in the latter half of the thirteenth century, for which there are more systematic documents indicating that they were held by church institutions – St. Simon, Holy Saviour, St. Barbara, the cathedral chapter and some noble families: Crossio, Balislava, Guerero and Ceria. Already from the 1330s onward, there is mention of the *magnum mercatum* in the *burgus*, above which the houses of the most respected families and shops were located.¹⁶⁸ There were houses owned by the most important city families: for instance Ragnina,¹⁶⁹ and Manana.¹⁷⁰

Already in the thirteenth century a street network began to be established as a sign of communal control of this area and the transformation of the former *territoria* of rural estate type to city lots.¹⁷¹ Regulation of the streets certainly began even prior to their enactment in the regulations of 1272 and 1296.¹⁷² Even in the decree of 1272, some streets were defined as “already existing” (nevertheless generally closer to the western, earlier regulated All Saints section). But except for this detail, certain earlier documents (1258) reveal the existence of streets which passed through the central *burgus*. Prior to the statutes, there were services for these communal lands in the *burgus* which regulated relations between private owners. Regulation of the *burgus* of St. Blaise proceeded gradually in the thirteenth century, in compliance with communal

¹⁶⁶ According to Peković, the Lion's Gate was located at the intersection of Strossmayerova and Lučarica streets, and he confirmed this by means of archaeological research conducted in the Monument Protection Department in 1987, when a circular structure was found here which Peković believed was the city tower with gate; according to Beritić, the Lion's Gate was at the bottom of the stairway at Uz Jezuite.

¹⁶⁷ Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 12-13, 18-19.

¹⁶⁸ CD, III, no. 328.

¹⁶⁹ In 1235, before Dubrovnik returned to Venetian rule, Petar Ballislava and Teodor Crossio were recorded as the city's *vicecomes*; Irmgard Mankhen, *Dubrovački patricijat u 14. veku*, vol. I (Belgrade: SANU, 1960), 394.

¹⁷⁰ CD, V, no. 636, 4.4.1259. CD, V, no. 637.

¹⁷¹ Marija Planić-Lončarić, *Planirana izgradnja na području Dubrovačke Republike* (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest umjetnosti, 1980), 18.

¹⁷² Ante Šoljić, Zdravko Šundrica, Ivo Veselić, *Statut grada Dubrovnika sastavljen godine 1272* (Dubrovnik: Državni arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2002) (hereinafter: SD), L. V, c. 41; Lukša Beritić, *Urbanistički razvitak Dubrovnika*. (Zagreb: Zavod za arhitekturu i urbanizam Instituta za likovne umjetnosti JAZU, 1958), 14-15; Milan Prelog, “Dubrovački statut i izgradnja grada (1272–1972)”, *Peristil*, 14-15 (1971-1972): 81-94.

planning and development of administration, but also with complex property and familial relations among the estate owners (magnates).

Streets running south to north were determined by flows from the city gate to the city wall (Pisino, Celenga and Mence gates). In the east-west direction, besides the main street (*Ulica od puča*), only a shorter street is also mentioned, today's Cvijete Zuzorić street (from streets Lučarica to Miha Pracata).¹⁷³ No *middle wall* is mentioned here that would have constituted some sort of northern boundary of the incorporated suburb, or passed through this suburb at all. Streets running east to west were the communication axis in the suburb and later the entire city, and attractive places to own real property (the city's northward development also moved the communication axis – at the time of the statute of 1272, the main communication axis was Od puča street, while later this role would be played by the Placa. As to streets running north to south, they followed the line of the Late Antique wall west of the cathedral (roughly north-south) – from Široka in the western suburb of All Saints, like the later routes of streets regulated in the central suburb.¹⁷⁴ In the thirteenth century, the heart of the *burgus* was Od puča street, which led to the *castrum* at its eastern end (in the preceding period the castrum was oriented toward the old city's south, but now it assumed the role of political seat).¹⁷⁵ The political, administrative and economic hub of the city developed here. The line of public squares and buildings from (Placa) to the south (the space around the cathedral) was characterized by buildings and spaces with vital significance: the customs office, *camerlengaria*, *fontico*, and communal shops (at the end of C. Zuzorić according to the 1272 statute).

It is possible that the section (suburb) west of All Saints had already been regulated and encompassed by the new city wall, the western side of which had already been made by the 1260s/1270s. According to the statute of 1272, street regulation began east of the Church of All Saints – i.e., Široka street (obviously because the area west of Široka had already been regulated). According to the statute, in 1272 the street in front of the Church of All Saints ran west of the (new?) city wall and the (new?) city gate. (According to Cerva, the old city gate at Pile was formerly next to the All Saints Church, while later it was moved “from other side of Pomerium”.) One street next to All Saints in 1272 was mentioned as “already existing”,¹⁷⁶ and it was located between the houses of Marin Villani and Michael Bincola, and ended at All Saints street (which in turn ran

¹⁷³ Later extensions in 1296 were oriented north to south.

¹⁷⁴ Igor Fisković, *Srednjovjekovna skulptura u samostanu Male braće*, (Zagreb- Dubrovnik: Samostan male braće u Dubrovniku, 1985), 465-495; Marija Planić-Lončarić, “Ceste, ulice i trgovi srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika”, *PPuD*, 29 (1990), 157-167.

¹⁷⁵ Nada Grujić, “Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine”, *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 149-171, 153. See also: Lukša Beritić, “Ubikacija nestalih građevinskih spomenika u Dubrovniku”, *PPDU*, vol. 10 (1956), 61.

¹⁷⁶ Today the small street called Hliđina.

to the gate on the city wall).¹⁷⁷ In a document dated 1281, the garden and Church of All Saints (*territorium et ortum positum apud dictam ecclesiam Omnium Sanctorum*) were located *inside* the city wall - *intus a muro civitatis* (it may be assumed that this pertained to the final northern city wall - i.e., that it had already been sufficiently built by then).¹⁷⁸ Besides codification of provisions, everyday practices were also too complex to function without a clear legal system - the introduction of public chancelleries and the maintenance of notary journals was certainly tied to this. This is why the latter half of the thirteenth century generated a considerably higher quantity of data on plots in the burgus and their owners.

The city wall was probably built intensively and there were plans to incorporate the suburbs into the city, for there was a permanent threat from the hinterland: in the war with Urosh in 1275, the Serbian army plundered certain estates outside of the city but did not manage to take the city. After Urosh was deposed by his son Stephan Dragutin, a period of peaceful relations ensued (1276-1282) when the tempo of transactions was quite lively - this was generally a period of great demographic and economic growth as well as increasingly intensified activities by the communal administration (statutes, notary service, registers of communal leases).

Notarial documents from the final decades of the thirteenth century point to the fact - and this is described by all of the Dubrovnik chronicles - that the city's population was growing. Some came from the hinterland, from various social classes. Some of the families who were lived in the suburbs were original inhabitants while some were new settlers: Ragnina specified 1277 as the year when a multitude of new residents, wealthy and with families, came to the city from Bosnia. At that time the gardens used by the city in the suburbs began to be developed with residential buildings, and a city gate was built (Pile), above which a statue of St. Blaise was installed.¹⁷⁹ Resti also stated that as of 1277 (this was also the period of entries in the archival registers began!) the city's population grew suddenly due to immigrants from Bosnia and Rascia, and that they prompted the construction of houses in the suburb, the city gate at Pile, etc.¹⁸⁰ As opposed to Cerva, who dated the new gate to 1269, they now mentioned the construction of Pile in 1277.

¹⁷⁷ *Et via que est inter domum Marini Villani et Michaelis de Bincola, eundo ad viam Omnium Sanctorum, que vadit ad portam muri civitatis, debeat stare sicut est; SD, L. V., c. 41.*

¹⁷⁸ MHR, I, doc. 593.

¹⁷⁹ Ragnina, 222.

¹⁸⁰ 1277. *Cresceva intanto il popolo in Ragusa per il gran numero de' Bossinesi e Rassiani, che tuttavia con le famiglie e con le facoltà si ritiravano in questa città. E vedendo la repubblica, che la città era poco capace a ricever tanta moltitudine, ordinò, che nessuna casa potesse aver giardini, ma tutto il vacuo dovesse esser fabbricato. Allora si fabbricarono le porte delle Pille, e nel piano della città le case, che ora fano i lati alla piazza, comunemente chiamata maggiore.*

The flooded terrain which separated the old city with suburbs from the mainland shore was certainly filled in the first half of the thirteenth century. However, the *burgus* north of the Placa (later St. Nicholas), only began to be more systematically settled in the latter half of the thirteenth century (generally on communally owned land). Even though the commune leased out plots even prior to 1296, it was only after the fire that this area was parcelized, and new regular streets were introduced. Whether some (stacked stone) wall existed prior to this to protect (parts of) the suburb north of the Placa cannot be ascertained based on the already mentioned narrative sources.

A city wall around the northern suburb is, however, mentioned in a document dated 1228. Farlati reported that in that year the Church of St. James was accorded to the Dominicans “*sacellum quoddam ad moenia civitatis*”, while in the same year a certain Palmota donated the Church of Mary’s Assumption to them, with a house and garden, where the present-day monastery was built (*nobilis quidam civis de Palmota anno domini 1228. eccelsiam virgini in coelos assumptae sacram, domum et hortum tunc extra muros et iuxta praefatum sancti Jacobi sacellum perpetua donatione publicis tabulis exarata fratribus concessit*). T. Smičiklas and L. Beritić had already proclaimed this information an unverified legend, because they believed that these were wall regulated only in 1296. While the small Church of St. James was later inside the walls, they did not encompass the Dominican monastery (the remains of this wall have been preserved to this day along the monastery’s western side).¹⁸¹

Some documents indicate that the new wall around St. Nicholas suburb was almost complete in the 1280s. Its construction commenced from the west. A will dated 1284 mentioned a legate for the new *monasterium de pulcellis*, with construction planned within the following year, which also indicated a completed wall.¹⁸² The question arises as to the condition of the remaining portion of the city wall? The statute of 1272 mentioned three communal works foremen who were paid 500 perpers annually from customs until the new city wall was finished.¹⁸³ It was also specified that in the interest of security, no building could be constructed within a distance of three fathoms from the new wall, neither inside nor outside. If anybody had private land within that distance from the wall, the commune purchased it and provided replacement land.¹⁸⁴ North of the new city wall the terrain ascended toward Srđ Hill, on which there were vineyards belonging to owners of the surrounding land.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255.), 18.

¹⁸² CD, VI, pp 459-460, doc. 384.

¹⁸³ SD, L. VII, c. 18 (*De superstantibus super laboreris Comunis*).

¹⁸⁴ SD, L. V, c. 9 (*De edificacione prope murum novum non facienda*).

¹⁸⁵ SD, L. V, c. 27.

It was also stipulated that all land outside of the city wall had to adhere to the boundaries which applied through the city.¹⁸⁶

The new wall ran along the line which partially extended through private land. It would appear that exchanges of land did not always proceed smoothly, so that disputes did arise. For example, a document dated 1285 mentions a dispute between the commune and private owners who, it would appear, owned land at the construction site of the new northern wall. The priest Rosim de Bayslava initiated litigation over the possession of his estate, and in the process there was a description of the former appearance of the street which led from the Sigurata Church (today in the Prijeko section, near the Franciscan monastery) to the corner of the city wall (*ubi sunt due ballasterie prope angulum muri ciuitatis, qui est ex parte occidentis*) and then descended to a point where there was a gate at the time (*locum illum ubi nunc est porta* (!), ending at the Rosin estate *extra murum civitatis*). The Sigurata Church is described in the 1285 document as *intus in ciuitate*.¹⁸⁷ Thus, the wall (at least around the western part of the *burgus* of St. Nicholas) was built. According to another lawsuit in that same year, between Volcosclau de Crossio and the commune, the official in charge of building the wall (*officialis supra laborerio muri communis*) made a foundation (for the city wall) (*fundamentus*) using stones from the stacked-stone fence on its estate outside of the city (*maceria longa*). Witnesses testified that this stacked-stone fence had been there for a long time and they described its length (*xx vargis*) from east to west. The estate with vineyards was also used to hold livestock, and it belonged to the land Petar Spualdi (Crossio) or *illorum de Crossio*.¹⁸⁸ That there was a city wall on the eastern side in 1286 (north of the customs station gate) is indicated in the register of communal leases from that year, which mentions butcher shops east of the city wall, probably situated somewhere above the later Sponza, which points to the conclusion that the eastern side of the suburb was already enclosed by a wall.¹⁸⁹

Expansion north of Placa began considerably earlier, and it became more intense already by the mid-thirteenth century. Construction of public structures outside of the walls of the old city and also outside of the *castrum* which protected the harbour in the east certainly began during the period when more

¹⁸⁶ SD, L. V, c. 20 (*De teritoriis que sunt extra murum civitatis*).

¹⁸⁷ MHR, III, doc. 232, pp. 77.

¹⁸⁸ MHR, III, doc. 135, pp. 50. Vidi i: CD, IV, doc. 484 (year 1254): *Terrenum comunis Ragusii a capite quod uocatur caput ficus insursum usque ad terrenum Andree Certelli*.

¹⁸⁹ The register of communal leases of 1286 mentions the sites at which there were butchers' tables (*territoria in quibus sunt beccarie*): A total of 18 tables (*tabulae*) were set up in four rows; *in primo ordine* (on the eastern side, facing the city wall) while *in quarto ordine* (facing west) there were four each, and in the internal rows (*in secundo, in tercio ordine*) there were five tables each; Irena Benyovsky Latin – Danko Zelić (eds.), *Knjige nekretnina Dubrovačke općine (13-18. st.) Libri domorum et terrenorum communis Ragusii deliberatis ad afflictum (saec. XIII-XVIII)*, vol. 1 (Zagreb-Dubrovnik: HAZU, 2007).

northerly protection existed. The area to the east around the Castrum no longer had a defensive character, and the city's political, administrative and economic hub was formed here. The old fortification was oriented toward the south, for it was oriented toward the cathedral and the old city – after development of the *burgus* in the west which became a vital centre of the city, the communal square (*platheia communis*) formed farther north, while the Count's Palace was reoriented toward the western façade (toward the suburb).¹⁹⁰

Role of the landed nobles in the city's defence

Until the completion of the final northern wall above St. Nicholas suburb, private owners who held the surrounding estates played an important role in the city's defence with the private towers they built. After the terrain in the central part of the *burgus* became suitable for construction, roughly in the twelfth century,¹⁹¹ here as well (as already mentioned) the formation of new, more regular blocks began, which emerged under the influence of the older ellipsoid blocks in the first suburbs. Evidence of this is indeed reflected in the designations of city gates and towers, which bear the names of members of the city elites (the statute mentions the Pisino and Mence gates...).¹⁹²

The source documents mention that across the way from the Church of All Saints there was a tower, *Budisclave* – it was situated *a boream* (NW)¹⁹³ in relation to the estate of Bogdan Pissino,¹⁹⁴ known for the fact that the city gate was named after his house in the statutory regulation (the street which led to the gate below the house of Bogdan Pissino¹⁹⁵ should have led toward *campus* according to the new regulation).¹⁹⁶ According to Beritić, the *Turris Budislava* was at the same site as Bogdan Pissino's tower, although in the documents there is no mention anywhere of Bogdan Pissino's tower, only his house, gate and estate.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁰ Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 149-171, 162.

¹⁹¹ Željko Peković, "Urbani razvoj Dubrovnika do 13. stoljeća", *Dubrovnik*, 4 (1997): 166-212, 171-172. Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 149-171, 166.

¹⁹² The discovery of an existing although rebuilt house/tower was published by conservation specialists from the Monument Protection Department in Dubrovnik in 1988 (N. Nađ, D. Šikić, M. Vetma, "Blok Domino, elaborat sanacije").

¹⁹³ MHR, IV, 529 (1301).

¹⁹⁴ MHR II., doc. 871., pp. 201; doc. 824., pp. 254.

¹⁹⁵ MHR, I, doc. 408., pp. 117.

¹⁹⁶ Domino street and its extension in the *burgus* – Široka street.

¹⁹⁷ According to L. Beritić, only the walls of the old city existed, and later the new ones which encircled the entire city north of Prijeko. The old city wall, according to him, ran from the cliffs of St. Margaret to Domus Christi, and they had three towers on them: Bogdana Pissino or Turri Budi-

Yet another tower was mentioned in the immediate vicinity of All Saints: the Villano Tower was mentioned south of the church in the fourteenth century.¹⁹⁸ The estate of Savino de Poca Bogdan Pissino's grandson!) was west of this tower, while to its north was the estate of Orsat de Bodacia. Since the Pissino/Poca estate here was west (*ex parte ponentis*) of the tower, while in the case of the Budisclave Tower, it was *a boream*, and there is a possibility that it was another tower (perhaps tied to the Celenga Gate or its line). The Villano family was mentioned in a provision of the statute of 1272 according to which the streets near All Saints were regulated: "the already existing" street (which according to the statue had to remain the same), passed between the houses of Marin Villani and Miho Bincola, and ended at All Saints street (which in turn ran to the gate on the city wall).¹⁹⁹ It is possible that the house of Marin Villani was the same as that of Marin *Millano* from 1279, located west of the house that Slava de Pecorario²⁰⁰ sold (for as much as 500 sdg.) in 1279 to Katena, the wife of Šimun Benese *ad portam de Zalenga*. According to Beritić, the Celenge Gate was east of the Villani house, i.e., about 12 meters from the Bogdan Pissino Gate. The positions of the city gates up to the present have been located, although there is no agreement on their actual positions.²⁰¹ Thus, south of the Church of All Saints there was at least one tower, if not two, owned by magnate families (Pissino/Poca and Villano). They may have been along the same line as the towers in the eastern suburb (Zereva). These sections may have been defended by only a few fortifications and towers – M. Planić Lončarić assumed the existence of a fortification (but necessarily a wall) which was located north of the All Saints Church which played a role in the defence of this already city sub-section already settled with houses and the additional defence of the main entrance into the city.

The movement of the main axis toward the north and Od puča street, which led out of the centre toward the Castrum, signified the opening of the castle area to the suburb (previously the castrum was oriented toward the

slavi, the second tower of Marin Celippe (*Turri Marini Celippe*), according to Beritić, was somewhere next to Tmušasta street and the tower of Ivan Zereva (*Turri Iohanis de Zereva*), according to Beritić somewhere near Kabožina or Uska street; Lukša Beritić, *Urbanistički razvitak Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Zavod za arhitekturu i urbanizam instituta za likovne umjetnosti JAZU, 1958), 15.

¹⁹⁸ Nikoleta, the widow of Dimitrio de Vilano, with the consent of her son Marin, sold (for 400 pp) half of the tower and court (*mediam turri et mediam curiam*) to his wife Bona on 11 December 1313. State Archives in Dubrovnik, *Diversa de cancellariae*, vol. 1 (1313.).

¹⁹⁹ SD, L. V, c. 41.

²⁰⁰ MHR II., doc. 959., pp 228.

²⁰¹ Ž. Peković believed that the intervals between the remaining towers was roughly 60 meters, so it is possible that the gate here was so close. The documents nonetheless indicate the proximity of the Bogdana Pissino Gate and the Celenge Gate; Željko Peković, *Dubrovnik: nastanak i razvoj srednjovjekovnoga grada = la fondation et le developpement de la ville medievale* (Split: Muzej hrvatskih arheoloških spomenika, 1998), 46.

south of the old city), and it assumed the role of political centre (which was previously in the archbishop's palace).²⁰²

Some documents from the final quarter of the thirteenth century still mention walls that surrounded the estates of feudal owners in the *burgus*²⁰³ (for example the estate of the Volcassio brothers, who acquired it in an exchange with the Gondola brothers in the *burgus, outside of the old city walls*).²⁰⁴ The noblemen estates during this period were often encircled by walls and they often had entry access gates. (It is possible that such were "the gates used to entered the Gondola estate" at the southern end of Kabogina street described in the regulation of 1296.)²⁰⁵

These walls generally disappeared after the regulation of 1296. After the defensive system was developed, these private walls generally lost their function. Additionally, their existence, like that of the private towers, did not fit into the idea of the newly-emergent communal system, so they were gradually torn down.²⁰⁶

This document specifies that in the exchange the Gondolas received a notary certificate proving that the Volcassios purchased their estate from the St. Simon Monastery (and this was located *extra antiquum murum civitatis*).²⁰⁷ It is interesting that a wall (a former city wall with crenellation) is mentioned south of the Gondola estate, which was purchased in mid-century by the southern neighbour Nicholas son of Marin Ceria, who enlarged this same wall by building a new section.²⁰⁸ So it is possible that these were truly estates near the line of the old city wall which was partially demolished: the commune sold parts of the wall to pri-

²⁰² The term *castrum* was later replaced with *castello*, and only then with *palatio*. In 1296, provision of the statute mentions *castellum* – the change in terms indicates a change in function; N. Grujić assumed that at the time the *castellum* was already an administrative centre; Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 149-171, 153. At the time when the statute was being written, the area around the castle began to be called *Plathea communis* (investiture of the prince under the statute occurred in *plathea* and the canons then followed him to the *castellum*. They then continued to the archbishop's palace (*archiepiscopatum*), where at that time other important events were held and important guests were received). See also: Lukša Beritić, "Ubikacija nestalih građevinskih spomenika u Dubrovniku", *PPDU*, vol. 10 (1956), 61.

²⁰³ MHR, I, pp. 335; 1119.

²⁰⁴ The 1258 document specifies "*de muro veteri civitatis Ragusii*" (CD V, 612, p. 9), while the document on the exchange of estates in 1282 states "*extra antiquum murum civitatis*". In both cases, it is possible that they refer to the old city wall on which the first three *sexteria* were fortified (Kaštio, St. Peter and Pustijerna).

²⁰⁵ SD, VIII, 57.

²⁰⁶ Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Zajednički prostori stambenih zona srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Radovi IPU*, vol. 12-13 (1988-1998), 65-75, 70.

²⁰⁷ MHR, I, 1119.

²⁰⁸ MHR, II, doc. 939, pp. 221.

vate owners, who participated in defence by building new sections of the wall. Another neighbour of Benedict Gondola and Nicholas Ceria was Martol Cereva,²⁰⁹ who owned two towers on the communal wall in 1282 (*quod due turre sunt laborate super muro communis Ragusii*), and he had to tear them down or reach an arrangement with the commune over their use. On this occasion, Martol testified that the towers *antiquo tempore* were also held previously by his father and grandfather.²¹⁰ According to Martol, the towers were built to defend the city at a time *when the new city wall did not yet exist* (thus, during the time of his grandfather, perhaps the 1340s).²¹¹ It is possible that Martol's father and grandfather built the towers to defend the city (perhaps the old wall was in dilapidated).²¹² It was not unusual for private owners to participate in the construction of the new wall which emerged along that line (as in the case of Nicholas Ceria). The construction of the new city wall began at that time. The participation of private owners in the construction of the city walls, primarily to protect their own estates but also entire city sections, would not have been an unusual situation (for example, in thirteenth-century Trogir, private owners participated in the city's defence by building private towers on the city wall). The wall of the old part of Dubrovnik may have been in poor condition after the attack in the twelfth century. In fact, in mid-century parts of the old city wall were sold even at the Pustijerna Gate. A document dated 1254²¹³ is known, according to which the commune sold Matia *filius Balatie* a part of the old city wall which ran from the Gate at Pustijerna²¹⁴ to the Gondola house, which was south of that wall.²¹⁵ Beritić considered the sale of part of the wall evidence of the old wall's non-functional condition and the completeness of the final one around St. Nicholas suburb (so called Prijeko section). Peković, however, believed it possible that the final wall was already constructed in the mid-thirteenth century. He believes that part of the old wall was sold so that owners could lean their houses on it. In the mid-thirteenth century, during a

²⁰⁹ Irmgard Mankhen, *Dubrovački patricijat u 14. veku*, vol. I (Belgrade: SANU, 1960.), 459.

²¹⁰ One of these towers was probably that of Ivan Cereva, Martol's father, which was located below the territory of Benedikt Gondola in 1282.

²¹¹ MHR II., doc. 1305, pp 345.

²¹² Martol de Zereva's territory, according to the statute of 1296, was located south-west of Benedikt Gondola's estate; SD, VIII, 57.

²¹³ CD, IV, pp. 547.

²¹⁴ Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 11.

²¹⁵ Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika*. (Dubrovnik: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1255), 14; Mihajlo J. Dinić, *Odluke veća dubrovačke republike*, vol. I (Belgrade: SAN, 1951); Marija Planić-Lončarić, "Zajednički prostori stambenih zona srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika", *Radovi IPU*, 12-13 (1988-1989), 65-75, 70. Grujić located this house in Pustijerna in the central section of the block between Stulina and Gradićeva streets: the Grubiša house farther north and the Ivan house farther south, at the very southern end of the block. Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004), 36 (footnote 55).

time of real danger from the hinterland, the old city could not have remained unprotected: the sale of parts of the wall suggests either the existence of a more northerly defence system or the assumption of defence and repair of the old wall by private owners. It is difficult to assume that the final northern wall was already built by the mid-thirteenth century, as proposed by Beritić.

In the mid-thirteenth century, during a time of real danger from the hinterland, the old city could not have remained unprotected: the sale of parts of the wall suggests either the existence of a more northerly defence system or the assumption of defence and repair of the old wall by private owners. It is difficult to assume that the final northern wall was already built by the mid-thirteenth century. Thus, the central *burgus* may have possibly been defended by individual towers and walls around private estates. Nonetheless, it would appear that construction of the final new northern wall around Prijeko began (perhaps with interruptions) in the 1250s and 1260s from the western side toward the north, so the oldest and most populated suburbs around the Church of All Saints were probably encircled by a wall.

Wall construction after the fire of 1296

The final decades of the thirteenth century were not good for the city. Stefan Dragutin abdicated in favour of his brother Stephan Urosh II Milutin (1282-1321), who waged a war with the city in 1301 due to territorial problems, but the conflict was no longer open as it was during his father's reign.²¹⁶ This was obviously a renewed period of "uncertainty": Resti mentioned that construction of the St. Clare Convent next to the old Church of St. Blaise began in 1290 (up to that point, they lived in the Church of St. Vitus alle Pille), due to a potential attack on the city.²¹⁷ According to Ragnina, the construction of the Convent of St. Clare across the way from the Church of St. Blaise began in 1290 – 80 daughters of noble families were accommodated in the convent.²¹⁸ Besides problems in the hinterland, according to chroniclers the city was also hit by some type of epidemic which allegedly lasted two years, accompanied by starvation. According to Anonymous, in 1293 the city was devastated by great hunger and disease (at the time a church dedicated to the patron St. Vitus was built across the way from Pustijerna).²¹⁹ Ragnina also mentioned great hunger in the city in 1292, which lasted two years and was responsible for high mortality among the common citizens.²²⁰

²¹⁶ Robin Harris, *Povijest Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2006), 47; Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808.*, vol. I (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1980), 88-89.

²¹⁷ Resti, 101-102.

²¹⁸ Ragnina, 222-223.

²¹⁹ Anonim, 35.

²²⁰ Ragnina, 223.

The greatest misfortune was the fire, but this was followed by a new regulation of the city. According to Resti, after the disease and hunger, the city was hit by a fire which, after beginning in the suburb of St. Nicholas in the north came to the very edge of the old city and the Church of St. Mary *de lavi*. It also burned in the area of the archdiocese complex (later called Garište).²²¹ Resti wrote that his fire resulted in a organization of the city streets (ushered in by the statutory regulation of 1296), and the new rules on construction in public (i.e., communal) areas. Ragnina²²² mentioned the fire in 1296, when the entire suburb below the Church of St. Mary *de Castello* burned down, as well as major portion of the old city. A great deal was spent to repair the city. At that time the city was merged (?) and a suburb was developed from the Church of All Saints to the western city wall – streets in the *sexteria della piazza* were regulated and subdivided and houses and shops belonging to the commune were marked from the Church of St. Nicholas *de Campo* to the city wall in the north and west, and toward the east and west in the direction of the *borgo dello archiepiscopato* (the block west of the Široka street was owned by the archbishop).

The fire of 1296 may have destroyed the existing wall and many houses, but it thereby also created the conditions for reorganization of the urban space. Street regulation in the *burgus* may be further followed on the basis of the well-known provision of the 1296 statute in which new streets were routed though the *burgus* south of Između polača street (i.e., the Placa), while new streets north of the Placa were also laid out based on a new system of rows.²²³ Između polača street at the end of the thirteenth century, and the Placa in the early fourteenth gradually became defined as the boundary between the southern “private” *burgus* and the northern, “communal” *burgus* of St. Nicholas.

Besides the Church of St. Nicholas and the Sigurata Church, there were no more important buildings in the *burgus* of St. Nicholas, north of the Placa, prior to the regulation of 1296, and this regulation was simplified by the fact that it was always a largely communal terrain. This formerly uncultivated land became among the most valuable for the commune, and the commune became the largest property owner. This enabled the construction of a new wall in the final decades of the thirteenth century.

The street regulation of 1296 was accompanied by parcelization – which may have proceeded without problems, because the territory was largely under municipal ownership, and the level of development was considerably lower (the existing houses were primarily made of wood and destroyed by fire). The new regulation established a modern model for using and planning urban space: streets were regulated in the north-south direction, while the terrain

²²¹ Resti, 101-102.

²²² By the section of St. Blaise, Ragnina obviously meant the central *burgus*, for in 1296 after the fire, he described houses built in the sections of St. Blaise and St. Nicholas; Ragnina, 223.

²²³ DS, VIII, 57.

between was divided into plots of equal value, intended – as before – for leasing. The ideal plan on plots that were 3 fathoms deep was to build houses in double rows – the rear sections were to face each other, divided by a ditch, the façades were to face the street in the north-south direction, while the sides would face neighbouring houses.

The statutory street regulation of 1296 clearly indicates the city wall north of the newly-regulated streets at Prijeko. Clearly the street regulation and construction of the northern wall signified a new phase of the city's urban and administrative growth. The already entirely constructed wall was already reinforced in the early fourteenth century. This assertion is backed by the statutory provisions on construction of a tower at the onset of the fourteenth century. The prince used the revenues from St. Mary's as a loan to build *the tower and fortifications* on the city wall in 1309 (...*ad faciendum turres et fortificias in muro civitates...*).²²⁴ Beritić believed that the statutory regulation served as the most reliable evidence that prior to this wall, no walls built in the thirteenth century existed.²²⁵

Fortifications inside the city lost their function after construction of the northern section of the wall which encircled and consolidated the urban space. In 1290, the *castrum* was called the *castellum*, which possibly reflected a change in its defensive purpose to an administrative and political function: *sub turre castelli ante portam fundici*.²²⁶ It lost its defensive character, and the space in front of the city hall and cathedral became increasingly oriented toward the western *burgus*. According to the statutory provision of 1296, there were still communal shops here.²²⁷ In the coming fourteenth century, the *castellum* began to be called the communal palace – *palatium*, or the *pallazzo magior*,²²⁸ while the *fontico* was enlarged (the construction of walls and doors, and also pilasters, was commissioned).²²⁹ Josip Stošić believed that the castle's western defensive wall separated the cathedral district from the suburb of St. Nicholas until the beginning of the fourteenth century, since its demolition was only mentioned when the construction of a campanile west of the cathedral was being planned in 1325. Thus, a square in front of the cathedral was formed in the suburb only in the fourteenth century, although even before this some kind

²²⁴ SD, L. II, c. 12.

²²⁵ Lukša Beritić, *Utvrdjenja grada Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Društvo prijatelja dubrovačke starine, 1955), 18.

²²⁶ Irena Benyovsky Latin – Danko Zelić (eds.), *Knjige nekretnina Dubrovačke općine (13-18. st.)*. *Libri domorum et terrenorum communis Ragusii deliberatis ad afflictum (saec. XIII-XVIII)*, vol. 1 (Zagreb-Dubrovnik: HAZU, 2007.), 133. Nada Grujić, "Knežev dvor u Dubrovniku prije 1435. godine", *Prilozi za povijest umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 40 (2003/2004): 149-171, 153-154.

²²⁷ MHR II., doc. 1068., pp. 261.

²²⁸ *Monumenta Ragusina*, V, 239.

²²⁹ Lukša Beritić, "Ubikacija nestalih građevinskih spomenika u Dubrovniku", *Prilozi povijesti umjetnosti u Dalmaciji*, 10 (1956), 40.

of shops and houses were mentioned here (in the descriptions of the boundaries of these houses there is no mention of the city wall).²³⁰

The *burgus* south of the Između polača street had new streets laid out in it in the north-south direction (today's Uska, Kaboga and Božidarevićeva streets). Even though the lines of the streets adhered to existing property rights, they nonetheless influenced the reduction of large feudal estate blocks and their structure. Under the new circumstances, the walls and towers around the feudal estates were replaced with the large communal city walls and towers, and outdoor public spaces – streets and squares – acquired increasing significance.²³¹

Conclusion

Dubrovnik's fortified walls – their extent and position, reflect physical planning and the ambitions of the city authorities to encompass existing suburbs (not just those under the old city but also those across the “marshy” ground). The fact is that construction lasted for a considerable time (and expansion of the walls possibly underwent several phases, from a stacked stone structure, etc.) and that part of this area was non-urbanized (except for smaller settled cores on the slopes of the hill which later gave the entire city its name).

In the city surrounded by walls at the end of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the preceding period was marked by integration of several spatial units under varying forms of ownership: the old city formerly encircled by fortified walls (along the line of today's Strossmayerova street) expanded northward toward the suburbs. The processes of merging these suburbs, the filling of marshy ground, the regulation of streets and blocks within them, the establishment of property rights and the construction of private and public structures were very complex and reflected various types of real property and types of ownership which influenced the city's ultimate appearance. The question of the walls, besides defence, is closely tied to the planned expansion of the urban space – the incorporation of the *extra muros* suburbs into the city's *infra muros* administrative sphere, which was often linked to the processes of preparing the terrain, parcelizing estates or levels of construction development.

The links between individual units functioned at the level of the old city and the suburb, i.e., the settlement across the marsh. Some researchers assumed that regardless of the unfavourable configuration of the terrain, or precisely because of it, plans to consolidate these spatial units into a single one actually emerged rather early, and their result became possible during periods of stable political circumstances and legal conditions, and it proceeded gradually.

²³⁰ In 1300 there were certainly shops in front of the cathedral: MHR, IV, 350 (1300).

²³¹ Marija Planić-Lončarić, “Zajednički prostori stambenih zona srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika”, *Radovi IPU*, vol. 12-13 (1988-1998), 65-75, 72.

Expansion of the city which already began in the early Middle Ages came to fruition at the turn of the thirteenth into the fourteenth century. The finally formed urban space was the result of a long-term and gradual process. This long duration is reflected in the city, which consists of different planned units (typological and formational). Very early planned undertakings emerged despite (or perhaps precisely because of) the natural limitations of the terrain which had to be overcome. Some of these units were planned several times over in association with political circumstances, ownership issues, and the city's degree of security. Enclosing the suburbs into the city walls was a sign of the city's expansion on the one hand, and the desire to unify the urban space on the other: the legal, administrative and spatial equalization of the *burgus* with the *civitas*.

***Murus versus montem*: der Bau von Fortifikationen der Stadt Ragusa zum Hinterland bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts**

Zusammenfassung

Die Stadtmauer von Ragusa, ein Symbol der Stadt, wurden Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts um die nördlichen Vororte als *neue Stadtmauer* gebaut (den Teil um das Dominikanerkloster ausschließend). Die Vororte, die in der vorkommunalen Periode außerhalb der *Mauer der Altstadt* (Die Altstadt umfasste die Viertel Kaštio, Sv. Petar und Pustijerna) an den Felsen entstanden worden waren, wurden damals in das Stadtgebiet eingeschlossen. In diesem Aufsatz wird vor allem auf Grund von schriftlichen Quellen der Bau von Fortifikationen der Stadt Ragusa zum Hinterland bis zum 13. Jahrhundert analysiert. Dem Bau der definitiven Version von Stadtmauern über der Stadtviertel Prijeko ging der lange Prozess der Errichtung des Fortifikationssystems voraus, der den Phasen der urbanen Entwicklung der Stadt im 13. Jahrhundert sowie politischen, rechtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen jener Zeit folgte.

THE CZECH MINORITY BETWEEN GLOBALISM AND MONARCHISM

Vlatka DUGAČKI*

The purpose of this work is to examine the similarities and differences between the development, organization and status of the Czech minority in Croatian territory over the past century, from the years 1911 to 2011. A reference to its present status constitutes an attempt to show that it is also a result of many centuries of effort initiated in the area which the members of this minority inhabit even today.

Key words: Czech minority, Republic of Croatia, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Introduction

The intent of this work is to present the development, organization and status of the Czech minority in Croatia during the past one hundred years, from 1911, when their first newspaper was launched in today's territory of Croatia, to 2011. This shall also entail a comparative analysis of the organization of the Czech minority in the interwar period, i.e., in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (hereinafter SCS Kingdom, 1918-1929) and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929-1941), when the organization of minority life truly began, and its present status in the Republic of Croatia at the threshold of accession to the European Union, as well as its stance toward with the Republic of Czechoslovakia and vice versa. In order to understand the current status and organization of the Czech minority, the work has been conceived as a reverse chronology, setting forth from the present status and situation of the minorities in general and the Czech minority specifically, and returning to the past, to the

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onset of the twentieth century, when it began to organize. This is why this paper was given the title “The Czech minority between globalism and monarchism”.¹ In this regard, the work has been divided into two basic chapters under the headings *globalism* and *monarchism*, thus underlining the dominant feature of the given period. The comparative analysis of the status and level of organization of the Czech minority was prompted by the fact that the Czech minority is not among those minorities covered in scholarly research. It was not necessarily marginalized, but at the same time there has been no comprehensive historiographic study on its development, particularly in the aforementioned period, not to mention the comparison to its present-day status. It may be said that the Czech minority belongs among the “generally accepted” minorities. Its existence in Croatian territory is generally known, and everyone has heard of the term “*Pemec*”, as the members of this minority were called in derogatory fashion,² and is familiar with the first Zagreb bishop, Duh, and Daruvar as this minority’s centre. However, this is where all knowledge and interest ends.

Since the intention of this work is not to provide an overview of the historiography on the Czech minority, it should be noted that besides the numerous lexicons and encyclopaedias in which it or its representatives are mentioned, some of the more important authors who dealt with it are Jan Auerhan, Josef Matušek and Damir Agičić, as well as Zoran Janjetović, who compiled an overview of all minority communities in interwar Yugoslavia.³ Besides published materials on the Czech minority, unpublished archival materials held in the Croatian State Archives, the State Archives in Osijek and the State Archives in Bjelovar and the official legislation of the Republic of Croatia were also consulted in the preparation of this work. Over and above all of the materials consulted, thanks for their kindness and for providing information go to Libuša

¹ The backbone of this work emerged for the needs of the Round Table on “National Minorities in the Age of Globalization – Croatia and Europe”, organized by the Migrations and Nationalities Institute, Zagreb 12 May 2011.

² The original inhabitants called the first Czech newcomers the derogatory names *Pemec*, *Pemci*, *Pemak*, or *Pemija* according to the names from church registers for Czech settlements (*Pagus Bohemicus*, *Pagus Bohemiae*, *Colonia Bohemica*, *Colonia Bohemia*). Jan Auerhan, *Československá větve v Jugoslaviji* (Prague: Knihovna Československého ústavu zahraničního, 1930).

³ See also: Stanoje Stanojević, *Narodna enciklopedija srpsko-hrvatsko-slovenačka*, 4 vols. (Zagreb: Bibliografski zavod d.d., 1925-1929); *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, 5 vols. (Zagreb: Naklada Konzorcija Hrvatske enciklopedije: Naklada Hrvatskog izdavačkog bibliografskog zavoda, 1941-1945; *Hrvatski leksikon*, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Leksikon d.o.o., 1996-1997); *Mali hrvatsko-češki biografski leksikon* (Prague: Veleposlanstvo Republike Hrvatske u Pragu, 2002); *Hrvatska opća enciklopedija*, 11 vols. (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 1999-2009); *Zagrebački leksikon*, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2006); Jan Auerhan, *Česlovaci v Jugoslaviji, v Rumunsku, v Mađarsku a v Bulharsku* (Prague, 1921); Josef Matušek, *Česi u Hrvatskoj* (Daruvar: Jednota, 1996); Damir Agičić, *Hrvatsko-češki odnosi na prijelazu iz XIX. u XX. stoljeće* (Zagreb: Ibis grafika, 2000); Zoran Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva, Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941* (Belgrade: INIS, 2005).

Stranjikova, the editor of the newspaper *Jednota*, Vjenceslav Herouta, the manager of the Czech Alliance archives, and the Office of the Czech and Slovak Representative, Zdenka Čuhnil, in the sixth convocation of the Croatian Parliament.

In order to facilitate easier consultation of the text, certain terms, not otherwise original, were used in the presentation of the development of the Czech minority organization. This mostly pertains to the names of minority associations, for which the original names were used, but with the Croatian adjective as currently established (Češka beseda Zagreb, Čehoslovačka obec Osijek). The names of Czech periodicals mentioned in the work, as well as the names of Czech events, are written in original form, but with a translation when first mentioned to allow for a better understanding of the topics being discussed. The titles of articles in the footnotes are specified in the original without translation, as opposed to citations, which have been translated. The names of the authors of articles in Czech periodicals were also cited in their original form as they appeared in the by-lines accompanying the text.

It is worthwhile noting that the territory of the former Sava Banovina, in which the highest number of this minority lived, was used as representative for research into the interwar period. The members of the Czech minority had been active there – as will be seen below – since the end of the eighteenth century, when they began to be resettled here more intensively. This became particularly notable at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, slowing down somewhat during the First World War, but then intensifying again in the interwar period.

Since the overall results of the 2011 census had not yet been published during the preparation of this work, the author was compelled to use the 2001 census, and the data had an exclusively model character, i.e., they served to obtain a general picture of the number of Czech minority members in Croatia and for comparison with the numerical data from the interwar period, whereby the aspiration was to obtain the most comprehensive possible insight into the status of the Czech minority over the past one hundred years.

Globalism

Minorities

Prior to examining the topic at hand, it would be worthwhile to clarify the term “minority” and the status of national minorities in the independent Republic of Croatia. According to contemporary political theory, minorities are “...groups of inhabitants of a state, who by their ethnicity differ from the majority of that state’s population”, and who are “most often components of nations which are the majority nation in another state (or states), such as, for

example, the Czech, German or Italian minorities in Croatia”.⁴ More specifically, a minority is a “stable group of people who racially, culturally (linguistically) or religiously/confessionally differ from the majority population or components of the population of a given state”.⁵ The status of national minorities in the independent Republic of Croatia began to be regulated in the first years of its existence. According to its Constitution, the Republic of Croatia is established “as the nation state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of its national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others who are its citizens and who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the exercise of their national rights in compliance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and the countries of the free world”⁶ Under its Standing Orders adopted in March 1992, the Croatian Parliament established the Human Rights Committee and the Interethnic Relations Committee,⁷ while under the Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia adopted on 24 September 1992, these two committees were merged into the Committee on Human Rights and Rights of Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities; on 19 June 1998, the name was once more changed to the Human and National Minority Rights Committee.⁸ The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was ratified in 1997, while in 1998 the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages entered into force.⁹ Pursuant to Articles 3, 14 and 15 of the Croatian Constitution, the Croatian Parliament, in the desire to safeguard human and national rights and enable citizens from numerically smaller ethnic and national communities to freely develop their specific qualities within the framework of the

⁴ *Hrvatska opća enciklopedija*, s. v. “etnička ili nacionalna manjina”, 3: 526-527; Emil Heršak, ed., *Leksikon migracijskoga i etničkoga nazivlja* (Zagreb: Institut za migracije i narodnosti: Školska knjiga, 1998). s. v. “etnička manjina”, p. 54, s. v. “manjina”, pp. 132-134.

⁵ Dieter Nolan, ed., *Politološki rječnik. Država i politika* (Osijek-Zagreb-Split: Pan liber, 2001), s. v. “manjina”, p. 195.

⁶ Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, <http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/232289.html>.

⁷ Standing Orders of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1992_03_17_401.html.

⁸ Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1992_09_59_1578.html, Decision on Amendments to the Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1992_09_59_1578.html.

⁹ Aleksander Tolnauer, “Ostvarivanje prava nacionalnih manjina – primjer Republike Hrvatske”. In: Siniša Tatalović, ed., *Etničke manjine i sigurnost u procesima globalizacije: zbornik radova* (Zagreb: Centar za sigurnosne studije Fakulteta političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu: Politička kultura, nakladno istraživački zavod, 2007), pp. 163-170.

majority community of citizens or majority communities (without abuses by either the majority or minority) enacted the Constitutional Act on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights and Freedoms of National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia in 2000,¹⁰ while the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act was passed on 13 December 2002.¹¹ This legislation stipulated national minorities in the Republic of Croatia and their rights for the first time, and also clearly defined the term “national minority”. According to Article 6 of the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act, these are “groups of Croatian citizens whose members traditionally reside in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and they have ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious traits and are guided by the desire to preserve these traits”.¹² Article 7 of this same law guarantees national minorities the right to use their languages and scripts privately, publicly and officially, to education in the languages and scripts that they use (more thoroughly stipulated in Article 11), the use of their emblems and symbols, the right to cultural autonomy through maintenance, development and expression of their own culture and preservation and protection of their cultural resources and traditions, the right to practice their religions and to establish religious communities together with other members of these faiths, access to means of public communication and public media activities (receiving and disseminating information) in the languages and scripts that they use, self-organization and association in order to further common interests, representation in representative bodies at the national and local levels and in administrative and judicial bodies, participation by members of national minorities in public life and administration of local affairs through national minority councils and representatives, and protection from any action which threatens or may threaten their existence and the exercise of their rights and freedoms. It is particularly important to stress that under the same Constitutional Act national minority councils were established at the local level to secure participation of national minorities at the local level (Article

¹⁰ Decision on the Proclamation of the Amendments to the Constitutional Act on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights and Freedoms of National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_05_51_1127.html, Constitutional Act on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights and Freedoms of National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_10_105_2072.html.

¹¹ The law is aligned with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the principles of the United Nations charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Final Act of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Paris Charter for a New Europe and other OSCE documents pertaining to human rights http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2002_12_155_2532.html. On 16 June 2010, the Amendments to the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act were enacted, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2010_06_80_2275.html.

¹² See also: Siniša Tatalović, *Nacionalne manjine u Hrvatskoj* (Split: Stina, 2005), p. 22.

23-33).¹³ Councils of the Czech national minority operate in Sisak-Moslavina, Bjelovar-Bilogora and Požega-Slavonia Counties, in the cities of Zagreb, Daruvar, Kutina, Grubišno Polje, Lipik and Pakrac and in the municipalities of Končanica, Dežanovac and Sirač.

In the interest of participation of national minorities in Croatia's public life, and particularly in the interest of consideration and proposal of management and resolution of issues tied to the exercise and protection of national minority rights and freedoms, Article 35 of the Constitutional Act stipulates the establishment of the state-level National Minorities Advisory Board. In this vein, the Advisory Board cooperates with the relevant national and local authorities, national minority councils and representatives, national minority associations and legal persons engaged in activities in which national minority rights and freedoms are exercised. The National Minorities Advisory Board consists exclusively of minority representatives, seven nominated by the national minority councils and five from the ranks of distinguished cultural, scholarly, professional and religious personalities nominated by minority associations and other organizations. It is important to stress that the representatives of national minorities in Parliament are also members of the Advisory Board. The Czech and Slovak minorities have elected their joint representative to Parliament since 1993. It is also vital to point out that the finances at the Advisory Board's disposal are secured from the central state budget, and every year HRK 3,500,000 are allocated for the needs of the Czech minority, while at the same time, the Czech Republic has assisted Czech associations and schools in Croatia during the 1997-2008 period with almost HRK 15,000,000.¹⁴

The Czech minority

According to the 2001 census, 22 minority communities live in Croatia, among them the Czechs. The Czech minority community in Croatia is not the most numerous, but it is considered among the best organized Czech communities in Europe. Thus, it would be worthwhile to ascertain the relevant statistics. According to the already mentioned census (in the expectation of the official results from the 2011 census), a total of 10,510 persons in Croatia declared themselves members of the Czech national minority, or 0.24% of the total population. Out of this number, most are in Bjelovar-Bilogora County,

¹³ In self-governmental units in which the members of individual national minorities account for a minimum of 1.5% of the total population or in local self-governmental units in which over 200 members of a national minority live or in regional self-governmental units in which over 500 members of a national minority live, the members of such national minorities are entitled to elect national minority councils. 10 members are elected to municipal national minority councils, 15 are elected to city national minority councils, and 25 are elected to county national minority councils.

¹⁴ České besedy http://savez-ceha.hr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4&Itemid=5

with 5.33% (7,098), followed by Požega-Slavonia County with 0.9% (775) and Sisak-Moslavina County with 0.36% (670), while the smallest number of members of the Czech minority according to this same census are in Lika-Senj County with 0.02% (or only 10 declared persons).¹⁵ Looking at the percentages of Czech minority members among the municipalities and towns/cities in comparison to the overall percentage in individual counties, the most Czechs in Bjelovar-Bilogora County are in Končanica (46.67%), Dežanovac (23.48%) and only then in Daruvar (18.9%), in Požega-Slavonia County the most Czechs are in Lipik (3.52%) and Pakrac (3.03%) and Kaptol (2.49%), while in Sisak-Moslavina County the most Czechs are in Lipovljani (2.43%). Even though the accepted view is that in Croatia there are “almost no territorially homogenized national minorities”, because all “national minorities, including the Serbian community, are dispersed”,¹⁶ it may be said that the Czech minority is among the exceptions, for – as will be shown – since they first arrived they have resided in virtually the same area.

Today 28 Czech associations are active in the territory of the Republic of Croatia. They are united in the Czech Federation in Croatia, established 1921 as the Czechoslovak Federation, which will also be discussed in greater detail below.¹⁷ The Federation’s seat is in Daruvar, in Bjelovar-Bilogora County which, as noted above, has the highest concentration of Czechs. The Federation handles the cultural, social and educational activities of the Czech minority (including associations, schools and publishing). The operations of the various Czech associations proceeds in the Czech national halls, mostly built during the interwar period, with the first built in Hercegovac in 1930, followed by Zagreb in 1937. Thirteen associations have their own national halls, eight associations received premises from municipalities on a permanent basis, while three were accorded such premises for use. In them, these associations support the work of folklore groups, amateur theatre troupes, brass bands, choirs, social libraries and handcraft clubs. In general, today 110 of the most diverse groups function within the framework of these Czech associations, all with the objective of nurturing their mother tongue and preserving their cultural heritage. The activity of these groups comes to the fore during the observation of important dates in Czech history, both at home and abroad. The Czech Federation also organizes the Amateur Theatre Review, the Review of Czech Songs, and the observation of the establishment of the Češka Beseda associations, and among the most notable are the children’s folklore review

¹⁵ 2001 census: <http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/Hdefault.html>.

¹⁶ Siniša Tatalović, *Nacionalne manjine*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁷ Češka beseda associations operate in Daruvar, Doljani, Prekopakra, Kaptol, Bjeliševac, Nova Gradiška, Slavonski Brod, Rijeka, Jazvenik, Međurić, Ljudevit Selo, Dežanovac, Zagreb, Treglava, Lipovljani, Sisak, Gornji Daruvar, Daruvarski Brestovac, Hercegovac, Virovitica, Bjelovar, Končanica, Veliki and Mali Zdenci, Ivanovo Selo, Donji Sređani, Garešnica, Dubrava and Šibovac, and Golubinjak.

Naše jaro ('Our Spring') and the traditional *Dožinky* (harvest festivities). The *Dožinky*, organized by the Association of Rural Youth in Končanica in 1935, were partially filmed, and this is how the first documentary on the life of the Czech minority in Croatia was made.¹⁸ Naturally, attempts to preserve the traditional use of the Czech language are not limited to the work of various associations, but also by means of schooling in Czech. The right to education in their languages and scripts is exercised by national minorities in compliance with the Croatian Constitution, the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act, the National Minority Language and Script Education Act and the National Minority Language and Script Use Act, and in this regard the Municipality of Končanica and the City of Daruvar guarantee the official use of the Czech language in their charters.¹⁹ Members of national minorities may receive education in their mother tongue at all levels, from preschool to college.²⁰ Their constitutional right to education is exercised according to three models and special forms of schooling. These are model A: instruction in a national minority language and script, whereby the Czech minority is educated in primary schools; B: bilingual instruction, whereby the Czech minority is educated in secondary schools; and C: nurturing language and culture, which is also done by the Czech minority.²¹ To be sure, minority representatives propose and select the model and curriculum themselves in line with existing laws and their capabilities for implementing curricula. For example, in 2008, the Czech minority had 920 attendees in 22 institutions.²² Czech minority pupils attend-

¹⁸ Josef Matušek, *Česi u Hrvatskoj*, p. 143.

¹⁹ Decision on Proclamation of the Republic of Croatia National Minority Language and Script Use Act http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_05_51_1128.html, Decision on Proclamation of the National Minority Language and Script Education Act http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_05_51_1129.html, Correction of the National Minority Language and Script Education Act http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_06_56_1258.html, Daruvar City Charter, <http://www.daruvar.hr/docs/STATUT%20GRADA%20DARUVARA.pdf>, Končanica Municipal Charter http://www.koncanica.hr/sluzbeni_glasnik/Sluzbeni_glasnik_03.2009.pdf.

²⁰ According to the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, and the Decision on Ratification of the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, the languages in which instruction is conducted may be classified into two groups, so-called territorial or minority languages and non-territorial.

²¹ Report on implementation of the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act <http://public.mzos.hr/Default.aspx?sec=3154>.

²² Instruction in the Czech language based on model A is conducted in the Jan Amos Komenský Primary School in Daruvar, the Josip Ružička Primary School in Končanica and the Ivan Nepomuk Jemeršić Primary School in Grubišno Polje. Model B is implemented in the Daruvar classics gymnasium with bilingual instruction (in Czech and Croatian), while the schools with instruction (nurturing) of the Czech language and culture under model C are the Dežanovac Primary School, the Ivan Nepomuk Jemeršić Primary School in Grubišno Polje, the Czech Josip Ružička Primary School in Končanica, the Vilim Korajac Primary School in Kaptol, the Banova Jaruga Primary School in Banova Jaruga, the Lipik Primary School in Lipik, the Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević Primary School in Zagreb, the Vladimir Nazor Primary School and the Ivana Brlić

ing classes in the Czech language are also able to choose whether they wish to take the national Czech language matriculation examination in Czech or Croatian.²³ In compliance with Article 15 of the National Minority Language and Script Education Act, educational institutions with instruction in national minority languages and scripts may use textbooks from their mother countries. Thus, for example, 27 translated textbooks, 23 imported textbooks from their original homeland and 3 specifically written textbooks were used for the needs of the Czech minority in 2008. Also noteworthy is that the Faculty of Arts and Letters of the University of Zagreb offers undergraduate and graduate double majors in the Czech language and literature.²⁴ The professional qualification of facilitators, teachers and lecturers is carried out by the Education Agency, while seminars are held in both Croatia and the Czech Republic. Czech kindergartens also operate in Končanica and Daruvar.

The Czech language is also nurtured through publishing activities, such as the Czech minority newspaper *Jednota* (Unity), which was launched in 1946 as something of a successor to the newspaper *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci* (Yugoslav Czechoslovaks; 1922-1941). Its mission is to inform members of the Czech minority of all social, cultural and educational events relevant to them, and beyond, and to report on current events from the Czech Republic, which for most members of the Czech minority is their sole contact with the Czech press.²⁵ A semi-annual supplement in *Jednota* is *Studnice* (Wellspring), which since 1961 has published literary works by the members of this minority community. *Český lidový kalendář* (Czech National Calendar) has been published since 1953, providing an overview of the activities of the Federation and all minority associations and schools. *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školních otázek* (Overview of Cultural, Literary and Educational Issues) has been published since 1962, when it was edited by Josef Matušek, whose aim was to complete the cultural awakening of the Czechs in Croatia. Today it may be considered something of a Slavist anthology specializing in Croatian-Czech relations, with emphasis on literature, linguistics, economics and ethnography.²⁶ The

Mažuranić Primary School in Virovitica, the Zdenko Turković Primary School in Kutjevo, the Josip Kozarac Primary School in Lipovljani, the Sela Primary School in Sela, the Sirač Primary School in Sirač, the Podmurvice Primary School in Rijeka, the 22. lipnja ('22 June') Primary School in Sisak, and the Bjelovar Primary School in Bjelovar. http://savez-ceha.hr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=10.

²³ Rules on taking the national matriculation examination: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2008_08_97_3007.html.

²⁴ Based on this author's experience, during the 1990s, it was less a matter of ethnic Czechs than it was lovers of Czech culture who enrolled in this major.

²⁵ During the 1966-1969 period, *Jednota* had a circulation of 9,000, of which 6,000 went to Czechoslovakia, while today the circulation is 1,500, which more than clearly testifies to assimilation, as well as a lack of understanding or interest in knowing the Czech language by the younger generation.

²⁶ Jaroslav Pánek, "Přehled kulturních, literárních a školních otázek-svědectví o vkladu české menšiny v Chorvatsku do české a chorvatské vědy", *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školních*

Jednota publishing concern was established in 1965, and besides the newspaper of the same name, it also publishes other Czech periodicals, such as the children's magazine *Dětský koutek* (Children's Corner), which has come out continually (as a supplement and then independently) since 1928,²⁷ as well as numerous historical and ethnographic studies, illustrated children's booklets, the book series *Knihovna Jaro* (Spring, since 1954) and *Knihovna krajské tvorby* (Minority Creativity, since 1961), textbooks for Czech minority schools in Croatia (since 1951) and other publications, all with the financial support of the National Minorities Advisory Board.²⁸ Additionally, the station Radio Daruvar airs programs in the Czech language every day. Since the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act allows the use of national symbols together with the official symbols of the Republic of Croatia, since 2007 the Czech minority has had its own flag and coat of arms.²⁹ Worth mentioning also is that the members of the Czech minority worldwide are also linked by the website www.krajane.net, which complies with the stance of representatives of the Czech minority in Croatia: "Assimilation cannot be stopped, but it can be slowed".³⁰

Monarchism

Cultural contacts

After this overview of the more than well organized Czech minority in the Republic of Croatia, let us now return to the beginning and their arrival, to see how the Czech minority was organized in comparison to the present, and particularly how its status was regulated by legal norms. One of the oldest instances in which Croatian-Czech relations were mentioned is the legend of the brothers Čeh, Leh and Meh,³¹ while the first Croatian-Czech contacts began

otázek, 17(1997):15-26; Josef Matušek, "Znovuvydávání českých novin v Chorvatsku po r. 1945.", *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školních otázek*, 17(1997): 5-14; "50 let vydavatelské činnosti. Přehled vydání 1946-1996", *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školních otázek*, 17(1997): 49-60.

²⁷ Alois Daněk, "60 let Dětského koutku", *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školních otázek*, 16(1996): 51-86.

²⁸ The Advisory Board provides 70% of the finances, while the remaining 30% is generated by advertising and subscription fees. http://jednota.hr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=238&Itemid=34.

²⁹ This Czech flag is identical to the flag of the Czech Republic: white and red rectangular stripes with a blue triangle next to the hoist with its tip at the halfway point of the white and red rectangles. The emblem is a shield with three fields: red, white and blue, with a red and white chessboard at its base. A silver lion is in the middle. Above the shield there is a gold banner bearing the inscription "Češi v Republice Chorvatsko" ('Czechs in the Republic of Croatia'). Czech National Minority Council: <http://www.cesi-zagreb.hr/Index-hr.asp>.

³⁰ Jednota: http://jednota.hr/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=5&Itemid=27

³¹ Ljudevit Gaj, *Die Schloesser bei Krapina* (Karlstadt: Gedruckt bei Joh. Nep. Pretner, 1826), pp. 10, 14-23; Vjekoslav Klaić, "Krapinski gradovi i predaje o njima", *Vjesnik hrvatskog arheološkog*

with the brother saints, Cyril and Methodius.³² Individual migrations began in the eleventh century with the first bishop of Zagreb, Duh (Duch), who was of Czech origin.³³ He was followed by many Czech clergymen, but also soldiers who took part in the anti-Ottoman wars.³⁴ The age of manufacturing in Croatia was marked by the intensified arrival of Czech artisans, most notably printers and glassblowers.³⁵ Czechs began to arrive to a greater degree after 1791, when they settled in Croatia in two large waves of migration. The first wave proceeded from 1791 to 1830, while the second wave occurred after the Military Frontier was decommissioned in the 1870s, and lasted until the 1920s. Namely, after the Great Turkish War (War of the Holy League) of liberation (1683-1699), which ended with the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Austrian-Ottoman border moved to the Sava and Danube Rivers, and the Military Frontier was reorganized. In an effort to revitalize its devastated and largely deserted lands, especially Slavonia, the Austrian authorities encouraged the settlement of Czechs and Germans in the newly-liberated territories. The Czech settlers were

društva, 10(1908-1909): 1-32; Vjekoslav Klaić, "Priča o Čehu, Lehu i Mehu", *Obzor*, 12 February 1889, pp. 1-2; Ferdo Šišić, *Povijest Hrvata u vrijeme narodnih vladara* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1925), pp. 182-183; Stjepan Ortner, *Povijest gradine i trgovišta Krapine* (Zagreb, 1899), pp. 15-25; Nikola Maslač, *Čeh, Leh i Meh, hrvatska povijest od najstarijih do najnovijih vremena* (Varaždin, s. a.); Marijan Tenšek, *Krapina i priče o Čehu, Lehu i Mehu* (Krapina: Elektronika-Nakladnik, 2005).

³² Jovan M. Popović, "Kulturne veze Čehoslovaka sa Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima", *Narodna prosveta*, 10. October 1929, p. 3; 17. October 1929, p. 3; 20 October 1929, p. 3; 24. October 1929, pp. 3-4; 27. October 1929, p. 4; Vaclav Burian, "O kulturno-nacionalnim odnosima između Čehoslovaka i Jugoslovena", *Sokolski glasnik*, 25 June 1930, pp. 8-9; Julius Dolanský, "Česko-slovensko-jihoslovanské vztahy v oblasti kultury", *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školských otázek*, 3(1964): 1-27.

³³ Franjo Buntak, *Povijest Zagreba* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1996), pp. 36, 41, 45; Lelja Dobronić, *Biskupski i kaptolski Zagreb* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1991), pp. 5, 10, 137; Nada Klaić, *Povijest Zagreba* (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1982), pp. 301, 306-307, 312, 398, 487-488, 491, 517; Nada Klaić, *Povijest Hrvata u srednjem vijeku* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), p. 152; *Zagrebački biskupi i nadbiskupi*, (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1995), pp. 1-2; Josef Matušek, "Vnykající Češi v životě Chorvatska", *Naš koutek*, 58(1992), no. 2: 20; Marijan Lipovac, *Biskup Duh* (Zagreb: Hrvatsko-češko društvo: Vijeće češke nacionalne manjine grada Zagreba, 2006).

³⁴ [Josef Matušek], "Jihoslované a Češi v minulosti", *Jednota*, 3 March 1979, p. 15; 10 March 1979, p. 15; 17 March 1979, p. 15; 24 March 1979, p. 15; 7 April 1979, p. 15; Josef Matušek, "Češi v jihoslovanských zemích", *Jednota*, 22 January 1983, p. 19; Josef Matušek, "Vnykající Češi v životě Chorvatska", *Naš koutek*, 58 (1992), no. 3-4: 20-21.

³⁵ Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević, "Čeh Vinko Vošicki (1885-1957) zlatni tiskar Koprivnice", *Přehled kulturních, literárních a školských otázek*, 18 (1998):77-90; Vjekoslav Klaić, "Zagrebačke štamparije do osnutka Gajeve tiskare", *Grafičke revija*, 3 (1925), no. 6: 173-182; Miroslava Despot, "Staklana *Perlasdorf* i njen vlasnik markiz Perlas de Rialp", *Starine*, 49(1959): 321-348; Miroslava Despot, *Pokušaji manufakture u građanskoj Hrvatskoj u 18. stoljeću* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1962), pp. 34-45; Miroslava Despot, "Postanak, razvoj i proizvodnja staklane u Sušici", *Zbornik muzeja primenjenih umetnosti*, 4 (1958), no. 3-4: 151-155; Rudolf BIČANIĆ: *Doba manufakture u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji (1750-1960)* (Zagreb: Izdavački zavod Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 1951), pp. 121-122, 321.

mostly from eastern and southern Bohemia, and they mostly moved to the Sava-Drava interfluvium, with their highest concentration in the wider environs of Daruvar.³⁶ As opposed to rural villages, the movement of Czechs into Croatian towns and cities proceeded individually from the mid-eighteenth century. These were civil servants, artisans, teachers, soldiers and musicians, and many played a vital role in the development of Croatia's scholarly and cultural life. Most of them were active in Zagreb as a cultural hub. They assisted the establishment of today's Croatian Academy of Arts and Science, and they were noted as the first professors at the University of Zagreb.³⁷ According to the census of Croatia and Slavonia in 1890, the highest number of Czechs moved to the territory of today's Požega-Slavonia County (11,782), followed by these historical counties: Bjelovar-Križevci (9,738), Virovitica-Podravina (2,876), Zagreb (1642) and Srijem (975), while the fewest settled in the territory of Modruš-Rijeka (174) and Lika-Krbava Counties (56).³⁸ In the interwar period, according to the 1921 census conducted in the SCS Kingdom, there were 46,777 Czechs, or 32,424 in Croatia, Slavonia and Međimurje, and 348 in Dalmatia.

³⁶ Karl Czöring, *Etnographie der österreichischen Monarchie* (Vienna, 1857), p. 63; Jan Auerhan, *Čehoslovaci v Jugoslavii*; Jan Auerhan, *Československá větve v Jugoslavii*; Zlatko Pepeonik, *Česi u Hrvatskoj, Prilog poznavanju dijela Savsko-dravskog međurječja* (Zagreb, 1968).

³⁷ Josef MATUŠEK: "Češi v Záhřebu", *Jednota*, 15 January 1994, pp. 19-20; 22 January 1994, pp. 19-20; 29 January 1994, pp. 19-20; 5 February 1994, pp. 19-20; 12 February 1994, pp. 19-20; 19 February 1994, pp. 19-20; 26 February 1994, pp. 19-20; 5 March 1994, pp. 19-20; 12 March 1994, pp. 19-20; 19 March 1994, pp. 19-20; 26 March 1994, pp. 19-20; 2 April 1994, pp. 19-20; 16 April 1994, pp. 19-20; 23 April 1994, pp. 19-20; 30 April 1994, pp. 19-20; 7 May 1994, pp. 17-18; 14 May 1994, pp. 19-20; 21 May 1994, pp. 19-20; 28 May 1994, pp. 19-20; 4 June 1994, pp. 19-20; 11 June 1994, pp. 19-20; 18 June 1994, pp. 19-20; 25 June 1994, pp. 19-20; 2 July 1994, pp. 19-20; 9 July 1994, pp. 19-20; 16 July 1994, pp. 19-20; 23 July 1994, pp. 19-20; 30 July 1994, pp. 19-20; 20 August 1994, pp. 19-20; 27 August 1994, pp. 19-20; 3 September 1994, pp. 19-20; 10 September 1994, pp. 19-20; 17 September 1994, pp. 19-20; 24 September 1994, pp. 19-20; 1 October 1994, pp. 19-20; 8 October 1994, pp. 19-20; 15 October 1994, pp. 19-20; 22 October 1994, pp. 17-18; 29 October 1994, pp. 19-20; 5 November 1994, pp. 19-20; 12 November 1994, pp. 19-20; 19 November 1994, pp. 19-20; 26 November 1994, pp. 19-20; Marijan Lipovac and Franjo Vondraček, *Česi Zagrebu - Zagreb Česima* (Zagreb: Vijeće češke nacionalne manjine Grada Zagreb, 2009); Ivan Esih, *Što su Česi i Slovaci dali Hrvatima? Uloga Čeha i Hrvata u izgradnji hrvatske kulture* (Zagreb, 1939); Ivan Esih. "Što su Česi i Slovaci dali Hrvatima", *Nova riječ*, 24 November 1938, pp. 2-3; 1 December 1938, pp. 2-3; 8 December 1938, pp. 2-3; 15 December 1938, pp. 2-3; Ivan Esih, "Co dali Česi a Slovaci Charvatum", *Československo-jihoslovanská revue*, 9(1939): 147-156; "Česi među prvim nastavnicima na hrvatskom sveučilištu u Zagrebu", *Alma Mater Croatica*, 1 (1937-1938), no. 7: 203-209; *Češi a Jihoslované v minulosti. Od nejstarších dob do roku 1918*. (Prague: Academia, 1975), p. 527.

³⁸ Croatian State Archives (hereinafter: HDA), Provincial administration for Croatia and Slavonia, Presidency, National minorities – data for execution of International Treaty, vol. 6-14, 10605-11350/1922, box 27; Report of Esad Ćimić to the Internal Affairs Ministry, State Protection Department, HDA, Presidency of the provincial administration, vol. 6-14, 10605-11350/1922, box 27; Marko Rimac, "Etnička i socijalna struktura stanovništva Hrvatske i Slavonije prema popisu iz 1890. godine", *Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*, 25(2007): 269-270.

According to the 1931 census, based on nationality there was a total of 110,662 “Czechoslovaks”, or 35,372 of them by nationality and 43,728 by mother tongue in the Sava Banovina, and 479 by nationality and 539 by mother tongue in the Primorje (Littoral) Banovina. Looking at Czech as a mother tongue, according to the 1931 census there were 1,715 Czechs in the Bjelovar District, and 632 in the town of Bjelovar itself, 8,426 in the Daruvar District, 2,682 in Pakrac, 2,806 in the Požega District, and 241 in the town of Požega.³⁹

In the new homeland

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the creation of new states, among them the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, some of the denizens of the former Monarchy became national minorities in them. The obligation to protect national minorities were imposed upon defeated states by peace treaties,⁴⁰ while in international law the system of protecting national minorities began within the framework of the League of Nations, and the Nationalities Congress sat in Geneva once every year until 1938.⁴¹ Nonetheless, the status of national minorities in the SCS Kingdom was not, as a rule, regulated and mostly depended upon their numbers and population density, financial aid from their ‘mother’ country, and ratified bilateral treaties between the latter and the SCS Kingdom. In the SCS Kingdom, Slavic minorities were treated as “little brothers”, who were accorded somewhat greater rights than non-Slavs, but their status was still not equal to those of the “members of the leading Yugoslav nations”.⁴² Thus, the Czech minority, as “Slavs”, with a native country, the newly established Czechoslovakia, that formed the Little Entente with the SCS Kingdom and Romania from 1920 to 1921, had a somewhat more favourable status. This status was partially regulated by a decision of the Interim

³⁹ HDA, fund 367, Republic Statistics Bureau of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (RZZS SRH) (1857-1948/1961), Census of 1921, box 47; HDA, fund 367, Republic Statistics Bureau of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (RZZS SRH) (1857-1948/1961), Census of 1931, box 53. According to the 1921 census, there were 1,897 Czechs in the Bjelovar District, 609 of them in the city of Bjelovar, 8,378 in the Daruvar District, 2,244 in the Pakrac, 2,407 in the Požega District, and 270 in the city of Požega.

⁴⁰ Under the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye signed on 10 September 1919 between the Entente and Austria, the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy was confirmed and the matter of the newly-established states was regulated. Besides establishing the League of Nations in Article 1, under Articles 51-52, the SCS Kingdom undertook the commitment to respect the rights of national minorities, and to adopt new agreements that would regulate these issues, while Articles 56-57 required Czechoslovakia to respect the rights of national minorities and to adopt new agreements to regulate these issues. See also: Livia Kardum, “Pitanje jednakosti velikih i malih država na primjeru zaštite nacionalnih manjina”, *Međunarodne studije*, 8(2008), no. 3-4: 69-80.

⁴¹ Klemens Ludwig, *Leksikon etničkih manjina u Europi* http://dokumenta.scd-lunjina.org/free/Leksikon_manjina_Evropske.pdf.

⁴² Zoran Janjetović, *Deca careva*, p. 445.

National Assembly and the Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day) Constitution (1921), while under Article 9 of the electoral law of the Interim National Assembly citizenship (for the purpose of elections) was recognized for all persons who up to the time of compilation of the electoral rolls had been permanently settled in any municipality in the SCS Kingdom insofar as they were ethnically and linguistically Slavs. Suffrage for the Constitutional Assembly elections was therefore granted to all permanently residing Czechs, who were once more enjoyed a far better status than the non-Slavic minorities.⁴³ After obtaining suffrage, one of the greatest problems confronted by the Czech minority during the interwar years was the genuine acquisition of citizenship. For, as stated, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and unification on 1 December 1918, no legislation governing citizenship was enacted.⁴⁴ According to Article 70 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, all residents who had rights to citizenship in territories formerly within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were granted nationality in that state which obtained sovereignty over that territory, even though those who acquired rights to citizenship after 1 January 1910 in the territory accorded to the SCS Kingdom or Czechoslovakia gained nationality only insofar as this was approved by the state whose nationality they sought.⁴⁵ However, since a large number of Czechs had not resolved their citizenship rights, they were unable to settle the issue of nationality and the SCS Kingdom essentially had no obligations to them.⁴⁶ Although the Citi-

⁴³ Nada Engelsfeld, *Prvi parlament kraljevstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Privremeno narodno predstavništvo*, (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), p. 257; Ferdo Čulinović, *Državnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX. i XX. vijeka*, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1959), pp. 243-245. Suffrage for the Constitutional Assembly elections was denied to most national minorities, with the exception of the Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns, with the justification that it would have been “pointless to grant the right to decide on the constitution to outgoing citizens, enemies of our country who will later become the citizens of other countries”. Branislav Gligorijević, *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju: Narodna knjiga, 1979), p. 70.

⁴⁴ Even though Stojan Protić, the minister in charge of preparing the Constitutional Assembly and the alignment of laws, proposed a citizenship law to the Interim National Assembly in May 1919, which underwent procedures and passed a vote during a general debate, during an examination of the details in June 1919 it was set aside. Nada Engelsfeld, *Prvi parlament*, p. 250.

⁴⁵ Insofar as this was not sought nor acquired, these persons were granted citizenship in that state which exercised sovereignty over the territory in which they had domicile rights (Art. 76). Art. 78 stipulated the one-year right to opt for those who lost Austrian nationality, while Art. 80 granted the members of national minorities the right to opt for Austria or some other successor state. *Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 6 December 1920, p. 1; Otomar Pirkmajer, *Zakon o državljanstvu sa tumačenjem i Zakon o manjinama* (Belgrade: Izdavačka knjižara G. Kona, 1929); Zoran Janjetović, *Deca careva*, p. 139.

⁴⁶ An additional problem for the Czechs in gaining nationality was that they did not seek admittance to Croatian territoriality, which according to the Territoriality Act for Croatia and Slovenia of 30 April 1880 was tied to the citizenship rights, and territoriality could be acquired “only by the citizen of a Hungarian crown land”, while each citizen had to have territoriality, and only in a single municipality. See also: Koloman MUTAVDJIĆ: *Zavičajno pravo. Zakon od 30. travnja 1880. ob uređenju zavičajnih odnošaja i prijašnji propisi o stečenju i gubitku zavičajnoga*

zenship Act become effective on 21 October 1928, while the Czechoslovak Federation called on all members of the Czech minority to file their nationality requests, only a small number of them did so.⁴⁷ At the time of establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939, many members of the Czech minority still did not have their citizenship status resolved, and instructions for acquiring it were once more issued.⁴⁸

First steps

Regardless of the legal regulations, due to the growth in the number of Czech emigrants the need for gathering the Czech minority arose. While much of the peasant population was preoccupied by the struggle for existence, while the working classes were assimilated, intellectual circles in the cities attempted to establish a link with the original homeland through national, cultural and sporting associations. Prior to the First World War, Czech associations were few in number. Besides the *Češka beseda* in Zagreb, established in 1874, the *Češka beseda* in Dubrovnik, established in 1899, and the *Češka beseda* organizations in Daruvar and Prekopakra, established in 1907, the establishment of Czech associations was in a nascent stage, so that members of the Czech minority in all of the South Slav lands gathered around the minority newspaper *Český list*, launched in Zagreb in 1911. Upon the establishment of the SCS Kingdom, the number of Czech associations grew, under the names *beseda* or *obec*, with the modifier *Češka* (Czech) or *Čehoslovačka* (Czechoslovak). The number of associations was the highest during the 1930s, while in the latter half of that decade many of them ceased functioning, primarily on financial grounds.⁴⁹ Their purpose was to engage in educational/instructional and entertainment activities, while politics were generally excluded. Due to growth in the number of Czech associations, and with the objective of linking not only associations but also the Czech and Slovak minorities, an initiative was launched to establish an umbrella organization under the name *Československý Sváz* (Czechoslovak Federation), which was established in Osijek in 1921. Novi Sad was selected as the Federation's first seat. It was then in Belgrade from 1924 to 1937, and in Zagreb from 1937 to 1941.⁵⁰ This is actually the Czech Federa-

prava (Zagreb: Naklada Knjigotiskare C. Albrechta, 1894); Otomar Pirkmajer, *Zakon o državljanstvu*, pp. 390-391; Dalibor Čepulo, "Pravo hrvatske zavičajnosti i pitanje hrvatskog i ugarskog državljanstva 1868-1918., pravni i politički vidovi i poredbeni motrišta", *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu*, 49(1999), no. 6: 795-825.

⁴⁷ -ž-: "Stydět se musíme", *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 16 May 1929, p. 1.

⁴⁸ Bjelovar State Archives (hereinafter: DAB), *Češka obec Bjelovar, 1935.-1940.*, General files, 344, box 3.

⁴⁹ Jos. Bezdiček, "K nové práci", *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 2 February 1939, p. 1.

⁵⁰ Establishment of the Federation was endorsed by 19, mostly Czech, associations: *Čehoslovačka obec* in Belgrade; *Čehoslovačka obec* in Osijek, *Čehoslovačka obec* in Zagreb, *Čehoslovačka obec* in Međuriće, *Čehoslovačka obec* in Subotica, *Čehoslovačka obec* in Usora,

tion in Croatia, which still operates today. The Federation was intended to play a supporting role, and it was supposed to be an apolitical organization, with the objective of bringing together the members of the Czech minority, “who are today neither Czechs nor Croats” with the Slovaks.⁵¹ The Federation was supposed bring together all members of the “Czechoslovak nation who live in the territory of the SCS Kingdom into common cultural, national economic and national political work and to provide mutual moral support and national representation”.⁵² It was also supposed to foment the process of assimilation and elevate the national consciousness to a higher aim, which was, they believed, the nurturing of Slavism.⁵³ Views somewhat less predisposed to assimilation appeared simultaneously, stressing that “assimilation is inevitable, the laws of nature need not be resisted, but we can slow it down until such time as our environment is such that this assimilation will not mean a minus for the Yugoslav side but rather a plus for the Czechoslovak side”.⁵⁴ The Czechoslovak Federation generally advocated and furthered the interests of the Czech minority, but it also upheld the policies of Yugoslav unitarism and centralism, which led to a rift within the Czech minority itself, i.e., between a smaller group led by the newspaper *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, seated in Daruvar, and the Federation, seated in Belgrade.⁵⁵ After the division of the country into provinces, or banovinas, in 1929, all branches of the Federation in the Sava Banovina operated in Zagreb, thus successfully unifying most members of the

Češka beseda in Sarajevo, Češka beseda in Dubrovnik, Češka beseda in Zenica, Češka beseda in Tomašica, Češka beseda in Prekopakra, Čehoslovačka beseda in Prijedor, Čehoslovačka beseda in Karlovac, Čehoslovački kružok in Tuzla, the Czech Club in Maribor, Čehoslovačka beseda in Bingula, Čehoslovačka beseda in Derventa, and the Industrial Readership Circle in Bački Petrovac.

⁵¹ Since the Federation, in line with the policies of Czechoslovakism, did not accord excessive concern to the interests of the Slovak minority in the SCS Kingdom, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in 1932 the independent Slovak organization *Matica slovačka* was established, which aroused the ire of the Czech minority leadership until 1934, when a formal truce was signed, after which *Matica slovačka* became a permanent member of the Czechoslovak Federation. “Založenie Matice slovenskej v Juhoslávii”, *Národná jednota*, 20 August 1932, p. 1; “Zakladujúce valné zhromaždenie Matice slov. v Juhoslávii”, *Národná jednota*, 20 August 1932, pp. 1-3; J. Kvačala, “Pri otvorení činnosti matičnej”, *Národná jednota*, 1 October 1932, p. 1; J. Kvačala, “Pri otvorení činnosti matičnej”, *Národná jednota*, 8 October 1932, p. 1; M. Topolský and J. Bulík, “Matica slovenská”, *Národná jednota*, 1 October 1932, p. 1; Dr. Milutinović, “Slováci a Srbi vo Vojvodine”, *Náš život*, 1 (1933), no. 3-4: 133-136; “II. výroční zpráva Matice slovenskej v Juhoslávii na rok 1933.-34.”, *Náš život*, 2 (1934), no. 2: 83-96.

⁵² The Belgrade-based associations *Havliček* and *Lumir* began working on the Federation’s establishment in 1919. *Československé listy*, 12 March 1921, p. 1.

⁵³ Franta Burian, “Zůstaneme Čechoslováci?” *Československé listy*, 17 February 1921, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Stanislav Kukla, “Svaz československých spolků v Jihoslávii”, *Československé listy*, 18 March 1921, p. 1; Dr. F. Smetánka, “V Zahřebě, 31. března”, *Československé listy*, 2 April 1921, p. 1.

⁵⁵ DAB, Češka obec Bjelovar, 1919-1934, General files, 344, box 2; J. P.: “O našem tisku”, *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, no. 12, 22 March 1923, pp. 88-89; Alois Munzar, “O našem tisku”, *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 24 December 1925, pp. 481-482.

Czech minority in Croatian territory. The Federation also had numerous departments. With the aim of organizing and promoting minority schooling, in 1926 the *Matica školska* (Schooling Matrix) was established as a working body of the Federation. All Czech schools and courses in the territory of the Sava Banovina, and then the Banovina of Croatia, came under its wing. The Education and Economics Committee was established in 1931 with the objective of developing the cultural and social life of the Czech minority in the Sava Banovina. The Education and Economics Committee and the *Matica školska* also functioned jointly in the establishment of schools, but as soon as this task was accomplished, *Matica* took over sole concern for such schools.⁵⁶

For the question of minority schools was not resolved immediately upon establishment of the SCS Kingdom, so during the 1918-1922 period, the newspaper *Československé listy* vigorously advocated for their establishment, and it published the Czech language primer in 1920.⁵⁷ The publication of this Czech language primer prompted Czech associations to join the campaign for the establishment of schools. Since minorities were granted the right to instruction in their native languages under the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921,⁵⁸ already in the next year the first Czech schools were opened, as up to that point most Czech children attended the Hungarian Julian schools.⁵⁹ During the 1922-1925 period, Czech private and supplemental schools were established at an intense rate. In 1922 the Czech private Jan Amos Komenský School was established in Daruvar, which also organized a course in Czech orthography and Czech history for adults.⁶⁰ During 1922, the Czechoslovak Education Min-

⁵⁶ Josef Matušek, *Česi u Hrvatskoj*, p. 109.

⁵⁷ The primer was published as part of the section "České mládeži, která chodí do srbsko-chorvatské školy nebo ji vychodila" (Czech youths who attend or have completed Serbo-Croatian schools), *Československé listy*, 15 May 1920, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Article 16 of the Vidovdan Constitution: "minorities of other races and languages shall be granted an elementary education in their mother tongues under arrangements to be stipulated by law". Ferdo Čulinović, *Dokumenti o Jugoslaviji. Historijat od osnutka zajedničke države do danas* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1968), p. 218.

⁵⁹ The establishment of Hungarian schools in the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia was conducted through the Julian culture and education association, and particularly between 1904 and 1919 these schools were called Julian. A series of Julian schools functioned in Daruvar in the 1904-1921 period. The Julian schools could be established in Croatia not only on the basis of valid Hungarian legislation, for they were also aided by the Croatian Schooling Act, which allowed the establishment of public, rural, remote, confessional and factory schools, which opened the doors wide to the Hungarian Julian campaign, as well as similar German and Italian campaigns. See also: Ivan Balta, "Pravnopovijesni hrvatsko-mađarski odnosi od dualizma do propasti monarhije, s posebnim osvrtom po pitanjima obrazovanja", *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu*, 43(2006), no. 2-3: 61-475; Ivan Balta, "Julijanska akcija kroz mađarske škole u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji te Bosni i Hercegovini krajem XIX. i početkom XX. stoljeća", *Motrišta*, 5(2001), no. 22: 79-96.

⁶⁰ DAB, Češka osnovna škola "J. A. Komenský" Daruvar 1923-1938, General files, 359, box 52; DAB, J. A. Komenský Czech Primary School, Daruvar, 1923-1927, Records of the School Board, 359, box 56; DAB, J. A. Komenský Czech Primary School, Daruvar, General files, 1939-1941,

istry began to compile a list of teachers who would be willing to work in the SCS Kingdom, who would be paid by the Czechoslovak ministry.⁶¹ At the same time, a teacher-training course for Czechs outside of their homeland was organized in Prague. The unfulfilled wish of the Czech minority in the interwar period was the establishment of a secondary school in Daruvar, but a major problem was the shortage of pupils, teaching staff and supplies.⁶² However, in 1927 the *Prokúповé odborné hospodářské školy* (Prokup Vocational Economic School) was established in Veliki Zdenci. For a time, Czech lectures were held in the classics gymnasia in Daruvar and Bjelovar in the form of language course and, for a brief time, at the teacher academy in Pakrac, while attempts to teach the Czech language also appeared in Osijek. In Osijek during the 1937/1938 school year, the Czech language as a non-mandatory elective was introduced in the Royal State Mercantile Academy, and in the form of courses for higher level pupils at the State General Gymnasium and the Men's Real Gymnasium. As of November 1940, a Czech language course was held for pupils of the Bjelovar State General Gymnasium in the Masaryk School and it had 33 attendees.⁶³ The educational activity of the Czech minority during the interwar period proceeded with the great assistance of the Czechoslovak Education Ministry, which besides instructing teachers, also provided funds for the construction of school premises and the overall form of educational activity of the underwriting association Ilova in Chicago,⁶⁴ and up to 1927 minority schools were financially supported by the Komenský Association from Prague, which already in 1925 sent a letter to the Czech associations in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia that it had no financial possibility for the further opening and construction of minority schools.⁶⁵ As of 1927, the Czechoslovak Education Ministry also reduced its allocations for minority schools, and most of the burden fell on the back of the Czechoslovak Federation's Matica školska. This aid ceased with the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939, and Matica školska was financed by Čehoslovačka banka (called Čehobanka as of 1941),⁶⁶

359; box 53, DAB, J. A. Komenský Czech Primary School, Daruvar, Class directory, 1933-1934, 359; box 1, DAB, Register of school decisions, J. A. Komenský Czech Primary School, Daruvar, 1922-1941, 359. A decision of the Education Ministry dated 11 October 1926 stipulated the curriculum for national minority schools, whereby all of them had to retain four hours weekly for the native language and four hours for the official state language.

⁶¹ "Československé besede Daruvar", *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 1 and 15 July 1922, p. 47.

⁶² F. B., "Česká střední škola", *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 28 July 1927, pp. 243-244.

⁶³ DAB, Češka obec Bjelovar, 1935-1940, General files, 344, box 3.

⁶⁴ The association was established in 1913 by Václav Procházka from Veliki Zdenci. *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 2 May 1940, p. 1.

⁶⁵ DAB, Češka obec Bjelovar, 1919-1934, General files, 344, box 2.

⁶⁶ DAB, Češka obec Bjelovar, 1919-1934, General files, 344, box 2. DAB, J. A. Komenský Czech Primary School, Daruvar 1923-1938, General files, 359, box 52. In 1922, the Czechoslovak Education Ministry already cautioned the Jan Amos Komenský School that it did not have sufficient funds for its complete maintenance and that local residents would have to help defray these costs.

until April 1941 when Matica ceased functioning.⁶⁷ In July 1940, Ivan Šubašić, the ban (governor) of the Banovina of Croatia, issued a decision to open primary schools for minority children.⁶⁸ Czech minority schools functioned until 16 June 1941, when Mile Budak, the religion and education minister of the pro-Axis Independent State of Croatia, issued a decision to abolish “all Serbo-confessional primary schools, all private Czech primary schools, and all departments in Croatian primary schools with Czech instruction throughout the entire territory of the Independent State of Croatia”.⁶⁹

Besides the Czechoslovak Federation, the Češka beseda associations and the Czech supplemental and private schools, as well as amateur theatre (including puppeteering) troupes, numerous libraries also operated during the interwar years, which fostered the Czech written word. Some Czech associations had their own libraries, but there were also mobile libraries which attempted to reach the Czech then largely rural minority. Thus, in 1928 the Czechoslovak Federation’s Central Library was established with its seat in Daruvar, while in 1932 this institution was divided into the Czech Federation Central Library and the Štefánik Slovak Central Library of the Czechoslovak Federation with its seat in Stara Pazova. Since the Czech minority’s social activities in interwar Yugoslavia were quite diverse, many Yugoslav-Czechoslovak leagues dedicated to promoting Panslav solidarity were also active during this period.⁷⁰ Besides these leagues, which were established on a mass basis from 1932 to 1935 in both urban and rural areas, as of 1934 the Academic Section of the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak League operated at the University of Zagreb. The Czechoslovak Commission functioned in 1920-1921. It was established by 25 respected “Yugoslav culture activists” precisely during the time when the Little Entente treaties were signed, with the primary goal of promoting Yugoslav-Czechoslovak reciprocity.⁷¹ Although the existence of this organization should not be overlooked, it did not in fact have any contacts with the Czech minority, and although it was established as a non-political association it nevertheless rather obviously played something of a political role, given that it was dissolved after the signing of all treaties which led to the formation of the Little Entente.⁷² Besides all of the

⁶⁷ HDA, Čehobanka d.d. (1921.-1948.), 526; Josef Matušek, *Česi u Hrvatskoj*, p. 111.

⁶⁸ DAB, Češka obec Bjelovar, 1935.-1940., General files, 344, box 3; “Otvaranje pučkih škola za djecu manjina”, *Novosti*, no. 197, 19. VII. 1940.

⁶⁹ DAB, Češka obec Bjelovar, 1935-1940, General files, 344, box 3.

⁷⁰ State Archives in Osijek (hereinafter: DAO), Yugoslav-Czechoslovak League of Osijek, 1933-1939, 387, bk. 1, box 1; *Pravila Saveza Jugoslovensko-čehoslovačkih liga u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade, 1936), pp. 1-3. Since neither the Czech nor Slovak minorities did not show any interest in the league’s work, by decision of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1926, all of the Federation’s members, meaning all associations, had to become members of the Central Alliance of the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak League, established in Rogaška Slatina in 1925.

⁷¹ HDA, Czechoslovak Commission (1920-1922), 1216.

⁷² *Hrvatska opća enciklopedija*, s. v. “antanta”, 1: 268.

above factors, during the interwar period the Czech minority was also superbly economically organized, for already in 1921 an incorporated Czechoslovak bank (Čehoslovačka banka d.d.) began operating in Daruvar. In 1929, it moved its head office to Zagreb, while in 1930-1931 it took over the Slovak bank in the Danube Banovina.⁷³

Even though members of the Czech minority lived in the territory of the Sava Banovina, much of what was achieved would not have been possible without the bond that brought together the Czech minority: the minority press. Without the latter, research into the status and activity of this minority would have been largely incomplete, and perhaps even attempting to do so would have been pointless. The Czech minority press not only brought the members of the Czech minority together in both its urban and rural centres (Zagreb-Daruvar), it also gave them organizational guidance. As already noted, the first Czech minority newspaper in the territory of today's Croatia were already published during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Zagreb in 1911 under the name *Český list* (Czech News), and it was highly successful until the outbreak of World War I. During the interwar period, the newspapers *Československé listy* (Czechoslovak News, 1919-1921), *Hlas* (Voice, 1922-1923), *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci* (1922-1941) and *Daruvarčan* ('Daruvarite', 1924-1935), with numerous and very interesting supplements, and among the latter, *Dětský koutek* became a separate magazine in 1932, and it is still published today.

On the topic of unifying this minority and providing guidance, it was precisely via one newspaper of that time, *Československé listy*, and its editor-in-chief Vojta Režný that the Czechoslovak Progressive Agrarian Party was established in 1920. In that same year it participated in elections for the Constitutional Assembly. That was the first, and unfortunately last, attempt at political organization by the Czech minority. Even though the party did not manage to win even a single seat and was soon dissolved, its existence highlighted the divisions among the Czech minority into a leading class, which operated in Zagreb without any insight into the actual status of the minority but with a desire to participate in the SCS Kingdom's political life, and the bulk of the Czech minority, who lived in rural areas, struggling for their basic existential needs without perceiving the need for political participation. The actual members of the Czech minority did not even show any particular interest in political events at the local level, while at the same time their leadership, in the minority press, complained that as foreigners the Czechs did not have equal voting rights and could not elect representatives even in entirely Czech-populated municipalities, while all they wanted was equality with the rest of the population.⁷⁴ An example is the fact that members of minorities were denied participation in municipal elections. In Međuriće, the local Czechs were denied

⁷³ HDA, Čehobanka d.d. (1921.-1948.), 526.

⁷⁴ Vojta Režný, "Naše státní občanství", *Československé listy*, 18 June 1920, p. 1.

the vote in municipal elections with these words: "It would be the same as though someone from Asia came and sought exercise of rights in Croatia".⁷⁵ Municipal elections in Bulinac were voided after the Czechs won more votes than the Croats, and they were denied the vote in renewed elections, while the Czechs in Dežanovac were banned from participating in elections "even though they do more than the Vlachs, who just drink".⁷⁶ What should be noted and stressed is the division of the Czech minority into those who lived in rural settlements and those in urban centres. The elections of 1936 may be cited as an example of this rift, during which there was a division between support by (most) of the Czech minority for the Croatian Peasant Party and the Yugoslav Radical Union.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The intent of this comparative analysis of the status of the Czech minority, i.e., a comparison of the number of the Czech minority had during the inter-war period and its number now, which areas it settled and which areas it lives in today, the rights they had in the SCS Kingdom/Yugoslavia and their rights in the independent Republic of Croatia, how they were organized then and now, is to demonstrate that the present status of the Czech minority ensued from the effort, advocacy or, simply, the struggle for minority rights. In any case, it grew on foundations set almost a hundred years earlier. In this regard, it is vital to stress that the Czech minority even today largely occupies the area in which it lived in the first half of the twentieth century, and thus, in contrast to most other minority groups, constituting a homogenous minority community. Even though partial assimilation has occurred in numerical terms, another cause of the reduction in this minority group's size which must not be disregarded is post-war re-emigration, rural depopulation and so forth. Regardless of this, cultural assimilation (acculturation) was successfully avoided through the nurturing of customs and traditions in a manner almost identical to that initiated at the dawn of the twentieth century. The level of social and cultural organization has remained virtually unchanged. The *Češka beseda* associations continue to function, while the Czech Federation is still the umbrella organization. Moreover, it may be asserted that the work of these associations is now even more focused on folklore elements, nurturing and reviving tradition, than in the first half of the twentieth century, when the members of minorities during the period when they were not legally protected made efforts to survive and preserve their national identity at all levels. Today they are acknowledged as a minority, specifically cited in the Croatian Constitution,

⁷⁵ "Z Medjuříče", *Český list*, 10 September 1911, p. 3.

⁷⁶ *Český list*, 17 February 1912, p. 4; *Český list*, 16 March 1912, p. 3; Ant. Vlk, "Z Malých Zdenců", *Nový český list*, 24 January 1914, p. 4.

⁷⁷ "Volby do obcí", *Jugoslávští Čechoslováci*, 12 November 1936, p. 1.

their status is legally regulated, they have the possibility of expressing themselves through the National Minorities Advisory Board, and in Daruvar and Končanica the Czech and Croatian languages have equal status. During the interwar years, they unsuccessfully attempted to participate in the political life of the SCS Kingdom by establishing a political party, while today they have a representative for the Czech and Slovak minorities in the Croatian Parliament. The question may be posed as to the extent to which local communities acknowledge and value the instructions of the Czech National Minority Council, as well as the response of this minority population to calls for participation in the Council's work. Certain problems do indeed exist, but the situation can by no means be described as similar to the past, when local communities looked upon the Czechs "as though someone from Asia who comes here seeking exercise of rights". The Czech minority, as before, receives financial aid from its core country, but today the state in whose territory they live also contributes to this financing. It is also interesting to note that the principle of regulating minority schooling does not greatly differ in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, particularly if one considers the present-day model C of nurturing the Czech language and culture, which is rather similar to the supplemental schools of the past. It is particularly noteworthy that the Czech Jan Amos Komensky Primary School established in 1922 continues to operate successfully to this day. Publishing activity still flourishes, although besides periodicals – which were once the sole means of connecting Czechs in the South Slav lands and beyond – today they are linked world-wide by the Internet, while the term *Pemec* has become so ordinary that the members of this minority no longer even see it as derogatory as it once was, which also shows that legal regulation of their minority status has contributed to a feeling of security and safety among its members. If the stance on assimilation cited at the beginning of this study, "assimilation is inevitable, the laws of nature need not be resisted, but we can slow it down until such time as our environment is such that this assimilation will not mean a minus for the Yugoslav side but rather a plus for the Czechoslovak side" is compared to the modern view, "Assimilation cannot be halted, but it may be slowed", it may be concluded that time has literally shown that the Czech minority, while straddling the line "between globalism and monarchism", has successfully done all it can to keep from being submerged.

Die tschechische Minderheit zwischen Globalismus und Monarchismus

Zusammenfassung

Aufgrund der komparativen Analyse der Lage von der tschechischen Minderheit in der Zwischenkriegszeit und heute beabsichtigte die Autorin zu zeigen bzw. zu beweisen, in welchem Maße die heutige Lage dieser nationalen Minderheit aus den damaligen Anstrengungen und Bemühungen, ihre gesellschaftliche Lage zu verbessern, oder einfach aus dem Kampf um die Minderheitsrechte hervorgegangen ist. Folgende Parameter wurden dabei untersucht: die Zahl der Angehörigen der tschechischen Minderheit in der Zwischenkriegszeit und heute und die von ihnen besiedelten Gebiete in den genannten Zeiten, das Ausmaß ihrer Rechte im Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen beziehungsweise in Jugoslawien und in der unabhängigen Republik Kroatien sowie die Organisierung ihrer Vereine damals und heute. Ihre heutige gesellschaftliche Lage beruht jedenfalls auf den vor etwa hundert Jahren gelegten Fundamenten. Es muss dabei betont werden, dass die tschechische Minderheit auch heute größtenteils dasselbe Gebiet besiedelt, auf dem sie auch in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts gelebt hat, so dass sie, im Unterschied zu den meisten anderen Minderheitsgruppen, eine homogene Minderheitsgemeinschaft darstellt. Obwohl es, nach Zahlenangaben gesehen, zur partiellen Assimilation kam, darf man als Ursachen von Verminderung der Zahl der Angehörigen dieser nationalen Minderheit Reemigration in der Nachkriegszeit, Depopulation der ruralen Bevölkerung und andere Faktoren nicht außer Acht lassen. Unabhängig davon wurde kulturelle Assimilation (Akkulturation) dieser Minderheit durch Pflege von Traditionen und Bräuchen erfolgreich vermieden und zwar fast auf dieselbe Weise wie am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ihre Gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Organisation blieb unverändert. Wenn man die offiziellen Standpunkte über Assimilation vom Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts („Assimilation ist unvermeidbar, den Naturgesetzen sollte man sich nicht widersetzen, sie kann aber bis zu jener Zeit verzögert werden, wenn unsere Situation solche sein wird, dass diese Assimilation nicht ein Minus für die jugoslawische Sache, sondern einen Gewinn für die tschechoslowakische Sache bedeuten wird“) mit jenen zeitgemäßen vergleicht („Assimilation kann nicht aufgehalten werden, sie kann aber verlangsamt werden“), ist doch nur festzustellen, dass die Zeit wortwörtlich gezeigt hat, dass die tschechische Minderheit – „zwischen Globalismus und Monarchismus“ erfolgreich balancierend – ihr Bestes getan hat, um auf diesem Gebiet nicht zu ertrinken.



NATIONAL MINORITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA 1918-1941

Zoran JANJETOVIĆ*

The aim of this article is the analysis of national minorities in the first Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Focusing on its multicultural structure and shaping its political, social and religious diversity, the author takes into account the problems of various minority groups in Yugoslavia and the failure of its global minority politics as well.

Key words: Kingdom of Yugoslavia, national minorities, minority politics, political organization, education

The first common state of Southern Slavs was founded in 1918 at the end of WWI. Although it purported to be a national state on the Western European model, it was in fact as multi-national as the defunct empires it has replaced.¹ Among the patchwork of nationalities making up its population, were numerous national minorities most of whom were non-Slavs. They made up some 12 % of the total population, but not all of them were officially recognized as national minorities and the existence of some of them was denied altogether.²

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¹ The state was founded under the name the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and was renamed Yugoslavia only in 1929. However, for convenience, we'll call it simply Yugoslavia throughout this paper.

² The existence of Aromunians in Macedonia and Romanians in Eastern Serbia were acknowledged but they were not legally recognized as national minorities. (Cf. Nikola Trifon, *Cincari. Narod koji nestaje* (Belgrade, 2010), pp. 358-359; Tihomir Đorđević, *The Truth Concerning the Rumanes in Serbia* (Paris, 1919); Military Archive (henceforth:VA), pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 6.) The existence of Bulgarians in Eastern Serbia was admitted sub rosa, but publicly denied. (Archives of Yugoslavia (henceforth: AJ) F. 398, f. 1; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (henceforth: PA AA) , Abt. I Ib, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6 Jugoslawien, Bd. 4; Association Yougoslave pour la Société des Nations. La Serbie de Sud depuis 1918 (Belgrade, 1926);

Even those who were recognized enjoyed different position in various parts of the country. This had to do with historical reasons to be discussed presently.

The origin of parts of the minority population was a moot point in some cases. This held true particularly for Albanians who claimed they were descendants of the ancient Illyrians, being thus the original population of Kosovo³ and Western Macedonia. According to the Serbian version, which seems better grounded in historical records, they came in larger numbers only since late 17th century, ousting gradually the local Serbs.⁴ Similarly, Romanians claimed they were descendants of the Romanized Dacians and thus the original inhabitants of the Banat.⁵ Here also historical records, at least for the Western part of the

Association Yougoslave pour la Société des Nations, Bulgares et Yougoslaves. Language-Religion-Traditions-Aspect Politique-Etat actuel-Conclusion (Belgrade, 1928); Leopold Lenard, "Narodne manjine u SHS", in: *Jubilarni zbornik Života i rada SHS 1918-1928* (Belgrade, 1928), p. 733; Živko Avramovski, *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaji britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921-1938, I (1921-1931)* (Zagreb, Belgrade, 1986), pp. 147, 161.) Slavs of Macedonia, Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims, most of whom had no clear national consciousness anyway, were also denied ethnic recognition and were considered part of the majority population (Vladan Jovanović, *Vardarska banovina 1929-1941* (Belgrade, 2011), pp. 47-59; Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika* (Zagreb, 1988), pp. 299-307, 336-351; Srećko M. Džaja, *Die politische Realität des Jugoslawismus (1918-1991). Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Bosnien-Herzegovinas* (Munich, 2002), pp. 174-184, 235).

³ For practical reasons we shall adopt here the practice of English-speakers and call the Southern Serbian province simply Kosovo, but understanding under that term its whole territory including the Metohija.

⁴ This was a centuries long process in which violence, all sorts of pressure and assimilation (by conversion to Islam, adopting of Albanian dress and language etc.) played the part. (*Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji* (Belgrade, 1989), pp. 133-193; Dušan T. Bataković, *Kosovo. La spirale de la haine* (Lausanne, 1993), pp. 23-24; Đoko Slijepčević, *Srpsko-arbanaški odnosi kroz vekove sa posebnim osvrtom na novije vreme* (Himmelstir, 1983, 2nd ed.), pp. 99-126; Atanasije Urošević, "Ethnic Processes in Kosovo During the Turkish Rule," in: *Kosovo. Past and Present* (Belgrade, 1989), pp. 41-47; Dimitrije Bogdanović, *Knjiga o Kosovu* (Belgrade 1985), pp. 85-125.)

⁵ G[eorge] Bratianu, *An Enigma and a Miracle of History. The Romanian People* (Bucarest, 1996) (1st ed. 1937); N[icolae] Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la romanité orientale, I. Les ancêtres avant les Roumains* (Bucarest, 1937), pp. 14-16; Idem, *Istorija Rumuna i njihove civilizacije*, (Belgrade, s.a.), pp. 46-47). This theory is hotly disputed by Hungarian and some other scholars who claim Romanians came only in 14th century from Valachia in the wake of their flocks, inhabiting gradually Transylvania and the Banat. (Paul Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn* (Budapest, 1877), pp. 334-350; Ludwig von Thallóczy, "Die Theorie der wlachischen oder rumänischen Frage," in *Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, I*, ed. Ludwig von Thallóczy (Munich, Leipzig, 1916), p. 39; Ladislaus Makkai, ed., *Geschichte der Rumänen*, (Budapest, 1942), pp. 5-45; Bela Köpeczi (ed.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, (Budapest, 1990), pp. 57-113, 181-185; Gottfried Schramm, "Die Katastrophe des 6. bis 8. Jahrhunderts und die Entstehung des rumänischen Volkes," *Südosteuropa Jahrbuch*, 17 (1983): 93). For a summary of the two centuries long debate cf. Dietmar Müller, "Neue Fragestellungen – alte Antworten", *Zeitschrift für siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, XXIV (2001), no.1; Georges Castellan, *A History of the Romanians* (New York, 1989), pp. 18-22).

Banat, seem to speak against the Romanian version.⁶ Whereas the perception of Albanians as violent late-comers deeply affected the way Yugoslav authorities handled them during the inter-war period, thanks to less violent previous history, cultural affinity, smaller number and, last but not least, friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Romania, Romanians in the Banat never stood in such bad odor.⁷

Other ethnic groups who could claim an early date of settlement were Germans in Slovenia⁸ and Hungarians in the Vojvodina⁹ – although most of the latter left the territory of the province during Ottoman invasion, only to return later on from 18th century onwards. Turks settled down in Macedonia and Kosovo during the Ottoman rule, but many left already before the foundation of Yugoslavia. Members of other ethnic groups (Germans, Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians, Czechs) also settled down in the Vojvodina during 18th and 19th centuries in the course of the planned colonization aimed at strengthening the economy, increasing the number of working hands, tax payers and soldiers.¹⁰ The privileges these colonists had been granted (particu-

⁶ Borislav Jankulov, *Pregled kolonizacije Vojvodine u XVIII i XIX veku* (Novi Sad, 1961), p. 52; Radivoj Simonović, *Etnografski pregled Vojvodine* (Novi Sad, [1924]), p. 22; Dušan Popović, *Srbi u Banatu od kraja XVIII veka. Istorija naselja i stanovništva* (Belgrade, 1955), p. 16; Mirjana Maluckova, *Narodna nošnja Rumuna u jugoslovenskom Banatu* (Novi Sad, 1973), p. 13; Gligor Popi, *Rumuni u jugoslovenskom Banatu između dva rata (1918-1941)* (Novi Sad, 1976), p. 4.

⁷ On predominantly friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Romania between the two world wars cf. Gligor Popi, *Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi 1918-1941* (Novi Sad, 1984); Milan Vanku, *Mala Antanta 1920-1938* (Titovo Užice, 1969). However, the allied relations didn't exclude occasional outbursts of irredentist sentiments on part of more radical Romanian nationalists throughout the interwar period. (Cf. Dragoljub Petrović, "Pregled rumunskih revandikacionih težnji na teritoriju severoistočne Srbije do Drugog svetskog rata", *Branicevo*, XIV (1968), no. 2-3; Andrea Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Grenzziehung in der Dobrukscha und im Banat und die Folgeprobleme* (Frankfurt, Berlin, New York, Paris, Wien, [1994]), pp. 467-470.

⁸ Hugo Grothe, *Deutsche Sprachinsel Gottschee in Slowenien. Ein Beitrag zur Deutschtumskunde des europäischen Südostens* (Münster in Westfalen, 1931), pp. 18. ff; Herbert Otterstädt, *Gottschee. Verlorene Heimat deutscher Waldbauer* (Freilassing, [1962]), pp. 6-8; Ivan Simonič, "Zgodovina kočevskega ozemlja," in *Kočevski zbornik. Razprave o Kočevski in njenih ljudeh* (Ljubljana, 1939), pp. 51-58; *500 leta mesta Kočevja* (Kočevje, 1971), pp. 8-10; Karl Schemitsch, *Das war Gottschee* (Landskron, Kitchener, [1977]), p. 18; *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums* (henceforth: HWBGAD), III, (Breslau, 1938), p. 322; Doris Kraft, *Das untersteirische Drauland. Deutsches Grenzland zwischen Unterdrauburg und Marburg*, (Munich, 1935), p. 127; Balduin Saria, "Die mittelalterliche deutsche Besiedlung in Krain," in *Gedenkschrift für Harold Steinacker (1875-1965)* (Munich, 1966), pp. 85-94; Bogo Grafenauer, "Ptuj v Srednjem veku," *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXIV (1970), no. 3-4; Janez Cvirn, *Trdnjavski trikotnik. Politična orijentacija Nemcev na Spodnjem Štajerskem (1861-1914)* (Maribor, 1997), pp. 10-11.

⁹ The term the Vojvodina will also be used for convenience's sake to designate parts of the historical South Hungary which fell to Yugoslavia after WWI.

¹⁰ Among many surveys cf. Dušan J. Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini. Od Karlovačkog mira 1699 do Temišvarskog sabora 1790*, vol. 2, (2nd ed.) (Novi Sad, 1990), pp. 23-54; Oskar Feldtänzer, *Donauschwäbische Geschichte, Bd. I. Das Jahrhundert der Ansiedlung (1686-1805)* (Munich, 2006);

larly Germans) and their economic prowess which helped them gradually gain ground at the expense of the indigenous Slavic population would leave bad blood and would subsequently influence the treatment of national minorities in the inter-war Yugoslavia.

After the unoccupied land had been exhausted in the Vojvodina, the immigration wave slopped over into Slavonia, mostly in the second half of 19th century.¹¹ Finally, the last bunch of settlers came to Bosnia after the Habsburg occupation in 1878. It was mostly Poles, Germans and Ruthenians who founded few dozens of poor villages.¹²

The official numbers of minority inhabitants were disputed as is often the case. However, private conscriptions some minorities have undertaken seem to show that the official figures were more or less accurate. Thus the census of 1921 showed 505,790 Germans, 467,658 Hungarians, 439,657 Albanians, 231,068 Romanians,¹³ 150,322 Turks, 115,535 Czechs and Slovaks (lumped together as

Jankulov, o.c.; Konrad Schünemann, *Österreichs Bevölkerungspolitik unter Maria Theresia*, I (Berlin, 1935); Erik Roth, "Die planmäßig angelegte Siedlung im Deutsch-Banater Militärbezirk," in *Gedenkschrift für Harold Steinacker (1875-1965)* (Munich, 1966), pp. 133 ff; Sonja Jordan, *Die Kaiserliche Wirtschaftspolitik im Banat im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1967); Márta Fata, "Einwanderung und Ansiedlung der Deutschen (1686-1790)," in *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Land an der Donau*, ed. Günter Schödl (Berlin, 1995), pp. 91-196.

¹¹ Vladimir Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu i Đakovštini* (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 3-17; Vlatka Dugački, "Češka i slovačka manjina u međuratnoj Jugoslaviji (1918.-1941.)," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Zagreb, 2011), pp. 24-31, 39-45; Carl Bethke, *Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und der Vojvodina 1918-1941. Identitätsentwürfe und ethnopolitische Mobilisierung* (Wiesbaden, 2009), pp. 76-88; Georg Wild, "Deutsche Siedlungen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Bosnien," *Südostdeutsches Archiv*, XIV (1971); Valentin Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien Slawonien und Kroatien bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Donauschwaben* (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 17-19; E. Meynen, ed., *Das Deutschtum in Slawonien Syrmien. Landes- und Volkskunde* (Leipzig, 1942); Vidosava Nikolić, "Prilog proučavanju kolonizacije stanovništva Češke i Moravske na području Varaždinskog generalata i Slavonije 1824-1830. godine," *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 46 (1967); Slavko Gavrilović, "Naseljavanje Slovaka u sremska sela Sot i Bingulu godine 1835," *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, 6 (1961); Idem, "Rusini u Šidu od 1803. do 1848. Prilog istoriji nacionalnih manjina u Vojvodini," *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, I (1956); Zdravka Zlodi, "Rusini/Ukrajinci u Hrvatskoj. Etape naseljavanja i problem imena," *Scrinia slavonica*, 5 (2005): 408-431.

¹² Tomislav Kraljačić, "Kolonizacija stranih seljaka u Bosnu i Hercegovinu za vrijeme austrougarske uprave," *Istorijski časopis*, vol. XXXVI (1989); Ferdo Hauptmann, "Regulisanje zemljišnog posjeda u Bosni i Hercegovini i počeci naseljavanja stranih seljaka u doba austrougarske vladavine," *Godišnjak Društva istoričara BiH*, XVI (1965); Hans Maier, *Die deutschen Siedlungen in Bosnien* (Stuttgart, 1924); Artur Burda, "Poljski naseljenici u Bosni," *Zbornik krajiških muzeja*, III (1969); Adnan Busuladžić, "Pojava grkokatoličkog stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini (od 1878. do najnovijeg doba)," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, XXXV (2003), no. 1; Vaso Strehaljuk, "Ukrajinci u Bosni," *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine* (Novi Sad, 1978); Dušan Drljača, *Kolonizacija i život Poljaka u jugoslovenskim zemljama. Od kraja XIX do polovine XX veka* (Belgrade, 1985), pp. 8-43.

¹³ All Romanians and Aromuns were counted together, but only the Romanians in the Banat were recognized as national minority.

was customary in those days), 25,615 Ruthenians etc.¹⁴ Ten years later, Albanians became the largest minority with 508,259 inhabitants. Germans were second-largest with 499,969, Hungarians came out third with 468,185. Czechs and Slovaks were now counted separately: there were 52,909 Czechs and 76,411 Slovaks. Furthermore, there were 132,924 Turks, 130,255 Romanians, 27,681 Ruthenians, etc.¹⁵ Due to incomplete data, it isn't possible to say how much emigration influenced the changed number of respective nationalities,¹⁶ but one should keep in mind that the first census was taken at the time the emigration triggered off by the outcome of WWI was still in progress. Apart from political reasons relevant above all for Hungarian and German officials and professionals in the first years after WWI,¹⁷ the reasons of emigration were primarily economic (in the case of Germans and Hungarians) or religious and national (in the case of Turks and Albanians). Large part of the migrations during the inter-war period was only the continuation of the processes that had started already in the late 19th century. This concerned Muslim population which was retreating before the advancing Christian states between 1878 and 1913 and the movable population of Austria-Hungary desirous of better living, among whom Germans and Hungarians were traditionally overrepresented.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Statistički pregled Kraljevine Jugoslavije [1921] po banovinama* (Belgrade, 1930), p. 5.

¹⁵ Publikationsstelle Wien, ed., *Gliederung der Bevölkerung des ehemaligen Jugoslawien nach Muttersprache und Konfession, nach den unveröffentlichten Angaben der Zählung von 1931* (Wien, 1943).

¹⁶ Particularly hotly disputed was the number of Albanians who emigrated, mostly to Turkey, since the pressure on them to emigrate was the strongest. (Mile Bjelajac, "Die Volksgruppe der Albaner. Migrationen in der Kosovo Region 1918-1950," in *Zwangsmigrationen im mittleren und östlichen Europa. Völkerrecht, Konzeptionen, Praxis (1938-1950)*, ed. Ralph Melville, Jiří Pešek, Claus Scharf (Mainz, 2007), pp. 331-345; Vladan Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918-1929* (Belgrade, 2002), p. 205; Idem, *Vardarska banovina*, pp. 106-117; Janjetović, pp. 69-72; Aleksandar R. Miletić, *Journey under Surveillance. The Overseas Emigration Policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Global Context, 1918-1928* (Belgrade, 2009), pp. 119-121).

¹⁷ Enikő Sajt, *Hungarians in the Vojvodina 1918/1947* (Boulder, Col., 2003), p. 20; Šandor Mesaroš, *Položaj Mađara u Vojvodini 1918-1929* (Novi Sad, 1981), pp. 88, 93-94; Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933* (Belgrade, 1971), p. 274; Istvan A. Mocsy, "Partition of Hungary and the Origins of the Refugee Problem," in *Trianon and East Central Europe. Antecedents and Repercussions*, ed. Béla K. Király, Lásylo Veszprémy (New York, 1995), p. 242.

¹⁸ Radoslav Đ. Pavlović, "Seobe Srba i Arbanasa u ratovima 1876, 1877, 1878. godine", *Glasnik Etnografskog instituta SAN*, book IV-VI (1955-1957); Bogdanović, pp. 136-141; Ejup Mušović, "Crnogorski muhadžiri i njihova kretanja", *Istorijski zapisi*, XXXIX (1986), no. 1-2: 139-148; Safet Bandžović, "Tokovi iseljavanja muslimana iz Bosne i Sandžaka u Tursku", *Novopazarski zbornik*, 17 (1993): 137-139; Miloš Jagodić, "The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions 1877/1878", *Balkanologie*, II (1998), no. 2; Laszlo Katusz, "Die Magyaren" in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. III. Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka, Peter Urbanitsch (Wien, 1980), p. 429; Zoltan Đere, "Iseljavanje iz Torontalske, Bačko-Bodroške i Sremske županije u periodu od 1900. do 1910. godine", *Istraživanja*, 13 (1990): 166; Lazar Rakić, "Iseljavanje iz Vojvodine krajem XIX i početkom XX veka", *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 23 (1981): 153; Jan Sirácky, "On the Problem of Lowland Slovak Emigration in the Late Nineteenth and Twen-

The ways in which members of these peoples accepted the Yugoslav state were different and they depended on their numbers, dispersal, historical background, differences in topography and mentality. Turks, if they didn't chose to emigrate, acquiesced in their new role of a minority and even started collaborating with Serbian authorities right after the First Balkan War.¹⁹ The Albanians, on the other hand, offered armed resistance after the break down of the Ottoman rule, as well as after WWI. Their resistance lasted until mid-1920s, when the safe haven of the insurgents was effectively stamped out after the change of the regime in Albania.²⁰ Not very numerous Germans in Slovenia also toyed with putting up resistance for a short while, but were very soon thwarted by military preponderance of the Serbian Army and the majority Slovenian population.²¹ The Vojvodina was occupied peacefully by Serbian troops after the Belgrade armistice on November 13, 1918. National councils, other than Serbian ones, were dissolved and the non-Slavic population disarmed. However, Hungarians and Hungarian-friendly Germans continued to offer passive resistance for the next few years.²² Minority population in Slavonia and Bosnia was just a drop in the South-Slavic ocean which couldn't even think of independent political action.²³

tieth Centuries", in *Overseas Migrations from East-Central Europe 1880-1940*, ed. Julianna Puskás (Budapest, 1990), p. 210; Miletić, pp. 109-121.

¹⁹ Bogumil Hrabak, *Džemijet: organizacija muslimana Makedonije, Kosova, Metohije i Sandžaka 1919-1928* (Belgrade, 2003), p. 85.

²⁰ Ljubodrag Dimić, Đorđe Borozan, "Političke i bezbednosne prilike na Kosovu i Metohiji u prvoj polovini 1920. godine", *Istorija 20. veka*, (1999), no. 1-2; Živko Avramovski, "Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi 1918-1939", *Ideje*, (1987), no. 5-6: 72-73; Ljubodrag Dimić, Đorđe Borozan, ed., *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci*, I, (Belgrade, 1998); *Ibid.*, II, (Belgrade, 1999); "Reokupacija oblasti srpske i crnogorske države s arbanaškom većinom stanovništva u jesen 1918. godine i držanje Arbanasa prema uspostavljenoj vlasti", *Gjurmene albanologjike*, (1969), no. 1; Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo. A Short History* (London, 1998), pp. 273-279.

²¹ Grothe, p. 180; HWBGAD, III, p. 76; Dušan Biber, "Kočevski Nemci med obema vojnama, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XVII (1963): 27; Janko Orožen, *Zgodovina Celja in okolice* (Celje, 1971), II, p. 314; Lojze Penič, "Konec avstrijske oblasti v Mariboru 1918-1919, *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje*, L (1979), no. 1-2; Lojze Ude, *Boj za severno mejo 1918-1919* (Maribor, 1977); Anton Vončina, "Maribor v letih 1918-1919, *Kronika*, IV (1956), no. 2.

²² Bethke, pp. 135-144; Dim[itr]ije Kirilović, "Novi Sad u danima oslobođenja", *Glasnik istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu*, book VI, vol. 3 (1933); Petar Pekić, *Povijest oslobođenja Vojvodine* (Subotica, 1939); *Spomenica oslobođenja Vojvodine 1918*, (Novi Sad, 1929); Mesaroš, pp. 37-70; Sajti, pp. 10-12; Ljubomirka Krkljuš, "Pitanje organizacije vlasti u Vojvodini 1918-1919", in *Srbija na kraju Prvog svetskog rata* (Beograd, 1990); Арпад Лебл, "Народни совети во некои градови на Банат (ноември 1918 година), *Гласник на Институтот за национална историја*, 3 (1968); Toma Milenković, "Banatska republika i mađarski komesarijat u Banatu (31. oktobar 1918-20. februar 1919), *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 32 (1985).

²³ Josip Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, II, (2nd ed.) (Zagreb, 1989), pp. 85-98; Fritz Hoffmann, Josef Zorn, eds., *Franz-Josefsfeld – Schönborn. Geschichte einer deutschen Gemeinde in Bosnien* (Freilassing, 1963), p. 57.

Yugoslav leaders were far from delighted to have such a large number of ethnically alien minorities in their new state, particularly since the relations with most of them (except for Czechs and Slovaks)²⁴ had been rather bad than good throughout the history and because these minorities inhabited mostly sensitive border regions to which the neighboring countries cherished aspirations throughout the interwar period.²⁵ The fact that minority population made up actually the majority in areas such as the Vojvodina and Kosovo, made the situation even worse. Furthermore, part of the minorities had economic (and sometimes cultural) supremacy over the local South-Slav population making in that way the situation of the local “majority population” and its state precarious.²⁶ Throughout the inter-war period the minorities in these parts were seen as a destabilizing factor and a potential danger.

For that reason the new powers-to-be wanted to keep the national minorities down and, if possible, to encourage them to resettle in their mother countries. Partial curb on such ambitions was put by the Convention on Protection of Minorities which was forced upon Yugoslavia at the Paris peace conference. It was reluctantly signed by Yugoslav representatives after protracted opposition on December 5, 1919, and it would be applied equally reluctantly throughout the inter-war period. It granted basic nationality rights to minorities – in accordance with the then international standards. Actually, its chief aim was preservation of the stability of host-countries rather than preservation of minorities as such. For that reason, it was disliked by the states which had to apply it²⁷ and criticized by minority experts. Otherwise Yugoslav governments

²⁴ Cf. Dugački, o.c. Even the relations with Slavic, but mostly Greek-Catholic Ruthenians were strained. (Slavko Gavrilović, “Prilog istoriji Rusina u Bačkoj sredinom XVIII veka”, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 48 (1967), p. 113; Idem, *Rusini u Bačkoj i Sremu od sredine XVIII do sredine XIX veka*, in: *Iz istorije Rusina do 1941. godine*, (Novi Sad, 1977), pp. 39-43; Sima Tomović, *Šid. Monografija* (Šid, 1973), p. 36; Vladimir Biljnja, *Rusini u Vojvodini. Prilog proučavanju istorije Rusina u Vojvodini (1918-1941)*, (Novi Sad, 1987), p. 26.)

²⁵ Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, pp. 147-163; Avramovski, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi*; Vinaver, o.c.; Idem, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941* (Belgrade, 1976); Đorđe Borozan, *Velika Albanija. Porijeklo – ideje-prakasa*, (Belgrade, 1995); Anikó Kovács-Bertrand, *Der ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Der publizistische Kampf gegen den Friedensvertrag von Trianon (1919-1931)* (Munich, 1997); Gyula Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy 1919-1945* (Budapest, 1979); G. Bajdaroff, *La Question macédonienne dans le passé et le présent* (Sofia, 1926); George P. Genoff, “The Minority Question and Revision of Treaties”, in *Bulgaria and the Balkan Problem* (Sofia, 1934); Petrović, “Pregled rumunskih revandikacionih težnji...; Schmidt-Rösler, pp. 467-470.)

²⁶ This was made manifest in a number of ways ranging from the feeling of unease, over economic dependency to outright panic in moments of foreign political crisis.

²⁷ The fact that old established Western powers (including the defeated Germany) were not obliged to sign such a convention jarred the new or enlarged smaller states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe the more. (Zoran Janjetović, “Pitanje zaštite nacionalnih manjina u Kraljevini SHS na konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919-1920”, *Istorija 20. veka*, XVIII (2003), no. 2; Andrej Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919-1920* (Beograd, 1968), pp. 200-206; Ivo

refused to commit themselves except for a few exceptional cases when minority rights were anchored in bilateral treaties with other countries.²⁸ On the whole, legal acts regulating the situation of minorities were in most cases government ordinances and not laws - except for a few concerning minority religious communities.

Having belonged mostly to privileged nationalities until 1913/1918 (Hungarians, Germans, Albanians, Turks), national minorities often (but by no means always) enjoyed better living standards and greater economic power than Southern Slavs. Thus the Germans in Slovenia dominated the industry, commerce and partly liberal professions;²⁹ most of the landowners in the Vojvodina were Hungarian, German or Jewish, although there were large numbers of landless German, and particularly Hungarian peasants;³⁰ in that region members of minorities also controlled larger part of industry and certain crafts.³¹ In the Southern

J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking* (New Haven, London, 1963), pp. 225-226, 239-249, 254-257; Bogdan Krizman, Bogumil Hrabak, ed., *Zapisi sa sednice delegacije Kraljevine SHS na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-1920* (Belgrade, 1960), pp. 141, 143-144, 164, 168, 170, 176-195; Ilija Pržić, *Zaštita manjina* (Belgrade, 1933), p. 111-118; László Rehak, *Manjine u Jugoslaviji. Pravno politička studija* (Ph.D. dissertation, Novi Sad, Beograd, 1965), pp. 163-175; David Sherman Spector, *Romania at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I.C. Bratianu* (Iași 1995) (2nd ed.) p. 269.

²⁸ This concerned above all the tiny Italian minority in Dalmatia whose rights were regulated by several bilateral agreements in 1923-1925. It was the fruit of Yugoslavia's policy of appeasing the big and dangerous neighbor. Another case in point was the convention about minority primary schools in the Banat signed, also grudgingly, with Romania in 1933. (Pržić, pp. 143-149; Rehak, pp. 182-196, 204; Pierre Jaquin, *La question des minorités entre l'Italie et la Yougoslavie* (Paris, 1929), pp. 49-52; Popi, *Rumuni...*, p. 102; Idem, *Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi...*, p. 98; Branislav Gligorijević, "Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija o uređenju manjinskih škola Rumuna u Banatu 1933. godine, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 7 (1973): 86-88; *Die jugoslawisch-rumänische Schulkonvention: eine vorbildliche Regelung, Nation und Staat*, VII, 10/11, 1933, pp. 657-658.)

²⁹ Dušan Biber, "Socijalna struktura nemačke nacionalne manjine u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, (1978), no. 1-4: 405-406; Bruno Hartman, "„Südmarkini“ knjižnici v Mariboru, *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje*, LIV (1983), no. 1-2: 235; Tone Zorn, "Dva poročili iz leta 1929 o nemški manjšini v Sloveniji", *Kronika*, XXIV (1976), no. 2: 91; Ervin Kržičnik, *Gospodarski razvoj Maribora. Gradivo k zgodovini industrijalizacije mesta Maribora* (Maribor, 1956), pp. 15-30, 35-41; Stefan Karner, *Die deutschsprachige Volksgruppe in Slowenien. Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung 1939-1997* (Klagenfurt, Ljubljana, Wien, 1998), pp. 47-52, 58-60.

³⁰ Laslo Kevago, "Statistička ispitivanja društveno-ekonomskog položaja južnih Slovena u Ugarskoj početkom XX veka", *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 54 (1969), p. 53; Nikola Gaćeša, "Posedovni odnosi u Vojvodini pred Prvi svetski rat", in *Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije* (Novi Sad, 1995), pp. 44-45; Idem, "The Germans in the Agrarian Reform and Land Ownership Patterns in the Vojvodina Province During the Period from 1919 to 1941", in *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945* (Belgrade, 1977), p. 85; Slavko Šećerov, *Socijalno agrarni odnosi u Bačkoj pred izvođenje agrarne reforme* (Belgrade, 1929), pp. 119, 125.

³¹ Gordana Krivokapić-Jović, *Oklop bez viteza. O socijalnim osnovama i organizacionoj strukturi Narodne radikalne stranke u Kraljevini SHS (1918-1929)* (Belgrade, 2002), pp. 312-314; Todor Avramović, *Privreda Vojvodine od 1918. do 1929/30. godine s obzirom na stanje pre Prvog svet-*

part of the country, large landowners were almost exclusively Albanians and Turks – although there were also many poor Albanian peasants too.³² The authorities strove to weaken this dominant position of minority upper classes through measures such as nationalization of banks or agrarian reform, but they failed to win over the minority poor by giving over part of the appropriated wealth to them.³³ Colonization of Slavic patriots and WWI volunteers in the Vojvodina, Slavonia, Macedonia and Kosovo was clearly aimed against minorities, since in most cases they were excluded from the land distribution.³⁴ The goal was to strengthen the Slavic element both numerically and economically at the expense of unreliable minorities but only a limited success was achieved.³⁵

Yugoslavia, being on paper a democratic state, couldn't withhold political rights from its minority citizens. However, the government tried to restrict it in northern parts until the possibility to opt for Austria or Hungary stipulated by the Minority Convention, expired in 1921. Thus the first to make use of civic liberties were Albanians and Turks who set up the Cemiyet, the party of Southern Muslims which at first had primarily interests of Muslim landlords at heart. It secured indemnification for confiscated land for them on the occasion of the passing of the first Yugoslav constitution in June 1921. Later on, it enlarged its base and became increasingly Albanian-tinged. When it grew too strong and when the regime didn't need it any more, it was effectively busted by 1924.³⁶

skog rata (Novi Sad, 1965), p. 255; Dobrivoj Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu u prošlosti i sadašnjosti* (Novi Sad, 1941), p. 150; Daka Popović, *Banat, Bačka i Baranja. Savremeni nacionalni, politički i društveni profil* (Novi Sad, 1935), p. 13; Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije, I. Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1918-1941* (Beograd, [1989]), p. 58; HWBGAD, I, (Breslau, 1933), p. 282; Biljnja, p. 35.

³² Vladan Jovanović, "Turci u Južnoj Srbiji 1918-1929", *Srpska slobodarska misao*, III (2001), no. 10: 135; Ali Hadri, "Okupacioni sistem na Kosovu i Metohiji 1941-1944", *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 2 (1965): 57-58; Hajredin Hoxha, "Proces nacionalne afirmacije albanske narodnosti u Jugoslaviji (Izabrana poglavlja)", *Časopis za kritiko znanosti*, IX (1982), no. 51-52: 285.

³³ Nikola Gaćeša, Radovi...; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj 1918-1941* (Novi Sad, 1968); Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu 1919-1941* (Novi Sad, 1972); Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Sremu 1919-1941* (Novi Sad, 1975); Zdenka Šimončić-Bobetko, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj 1918-1941* (Zagreb, 1997); Milovan Obradović, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu* (Priština, 1981); Boris Kršev, *Bankarstvo u Dunavskoj banovini* (Novi Sad, 1998); Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 313; Branko Bešlin, *Nacionalizacija banaka sa isključivo stranim kapitalom u Vojvodini posle Prvog svetskog rata* (Mscr.); Josip Vrbošić, "Kategorije i brojčano stanje kolonista u Slavoniji i Baranji između dva svjetska rata", *Društvena istraživanja*, VI (1997), no. 2-3; Snježana Ružić, "Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Slavoniji, Srijemu i Baranji 1918-1929 – odnos lokalnog stanovništva i naesljenih dobrovoljaca", *Scrinia slavonica*, I (2001). (Some Croatian authors interpret the agrarian reform and colonization as aimed against the Croats).

³⁴ Even the otherwise preferred Slovaks and Czechs didn't get their rightful share of the land subject to the agrarian reform. (Nikola Gaćeša, "Vojvođanski Slovaci u agrarnoj reformi posle Prvog svetskog rata", in *Radovi...*)

³⁵ Janjetović, o.c., pp. 330-345.

³⁶ Bogumil Hrabak, *Džemijet: organizacija muslimana Makedonije, Kosova, Metohije i Sandžaka 1919-1928* (Belgrade, 2003); Krivokapić-Jovičić, pp. 164-165.

In the Northern parts, it was the Slovaks who set up a party of their own which had to suffer a long chain of disappointments due to unfulfilled promises by the governing Serbian parties.³⁷ By 1922 Germans, Hungarians and Romanians also founded their parties.³⁸ The only one which could claim comparative success was the German one which strove to stick with the governing parties in order to secure benefits for the German minority. Depending on the parliamentary constellation, it scored some minor successes. Because the majority parties never thought about really sharing power with the German Party, and due to the fact that large part of Germans voted for South-Slav parties: Radical, Democratic or Croatian Peasants' Parties its influence wasn't commensurate with the number of German voters.³⁹ As for the two other minority parties, they were riddled with dissent and under government pressure as irredentist.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the Romanian Party could count only on small number of voters, whereas the Hungarian one never managed to find the common cause with Hungarian masses. After political parties were abolished in 1929, only few minority representatives played a token role in political life.⁴¹ They could voice their grievances but the strength and influence of their respective mother-countries carried far more weight than they themselves.⁴²

³⁷ Dugački, pp. 216-281; Branislav Gligorijević, "Politička istupanja i organizacija Slovaka i Čeha u Kraljevini SHS", *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 24 (1981).

³⁸ PA AA, Abt. IIB, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2; AJ, 14, box 104, document no. 401; Oskar Plautz, *Das Werden der deutschen Volksgemeinschaft in Südslawien* (Novi Sad, 1940), pp. 47-48; Mathias Annabring, *Volksgeschichte der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien* (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 31; Hans Rasimus, *Als Fremde im Vaterland. Der Schwäbisch-deutsche Kulturbund und die ehemalige deutsche Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien im Spiegel der Presse* ([Munich, 1989]), pp. 206-254; Sajti, pp. 32-47; Mesaroš, pp. 154-156; Popi, *Rumuni...*, pp. 54-55; Idem, "Formiranje, razvoj i delovanje Rumunske stranke (1923-1929)", *Istraživanja*, 3 (1974).

³⁹ PA AA, Abt. IIB, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2; Ibid., Bd. 3; Plautz, pp. 35-36, 53-55, 58, 64-65, 77; Annabring, pp. 32-38, 41; Branislav Gligorijević, *Parlament...*, pp. 140, 158, 217-218, 294. According to Johann Wüsch, only a third of German voters actually voted for the German Party. (Johann Wüsch, *Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Jugoslawien für den Zeitraum von 1933 bis 1944* (Kehl a. Rh., 1966), p. 53). The same was true of other minorities. (Krivokapić-Jović, p. 173; Hrabak, *Džemijet...*, p. 10, Sajti, p. 50; Hadri, p. 67.)

⁴⁰ AJ, 14, 109/413; 124/444; 118/430; 148/514; 105/404; 98/385; 69, 8/18; Aleksandar Kasaš, *Mađari u Vojvodini 1941-1946* (Novi Sad, 1996), pp. 14-15; Sajti, pp. 34-38. In cases of some members of minority parties the suspicion was completely justified. (Cf. Mesaroš, p. 252; Popi, *Rumuni...*, p. 73.)

⁴¹ PA AA, Abt. IIB, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; VI A Bd. 18, 640/39; Janjetović, pp. 196-210; Šandor Mesaroš, *Mađari u Vojvodini 1929-1941* (Novi Sad, 1989), pp. 79-80, 83, 115-116, 121, 124, 132-135, 147-148, 158, 172-173; Sajti, pp. 94-97, 101; Annabring, p. 63; Dušan Biber, *Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji 1933-1941* (Ljubljana, 1966), pp. 188-193.

⁴² This held true particularly for German and Hungarian minorities. (Cf. Sajti, pp. 103-108, 121; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 193, 199-205, 211, 223-226.)

The field in which minority rights were guaranteed to a limited extent was education. Yugoslavia was obliged to set up minority primary schools (with just four grades) in minority languages. Oversized German (in Slovenia) and Hungarian (in the Vojvodina and Slavonia) education system was rapidly dismantled and minority classes set up at majority schools. The school system was brought completely under state control. The government wanted to raise minority children, as well as all citizens, in the spirit of loyalty. Teachers and schoolbooks were lacking and enrolment was restricted whenever a legal possibility presented itself. Albanian and Turkish-language schools were abolished altogether,⁴³ as were all private schools. The number of secondary schools was very limited and few of them existed above all for Germans, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks. The success of this heavy-handed school system was rather limited: some members of minorities learned the official language well, but that didn't make them better Yugoslav patriots.⁴⁴

Other avenues minorities could use to build up their separate national existence were various associations and press. Both were almost exclusively developed in the North. Tribal Albanian pre-literate society felt almost no need for either press or for civic associations. The level of culture was much too low to demand that way of organization. Turks sank into general apathy which often ended in emigration to Turkey and their undefined cultural and political clubs from the late Ottoman times, weren't renewed.⁴⁵

It was in the North, in the former Habsburg territories with their higher cultural and living standard and long tradition of associations that all sorts of organizations thrived. Many of them originated in the decades before WWI, and

⁴³ They were not numerous anyway, particularly the Albanian ones. Aromunian schools suffered the same fate, even though Yugoslavia was on good terms with their protector, Romania. (Ljubodrag Dimić, *Prosvetna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije, III. Politika i stvaralaštvo* (Belgrade, 1997), p. 193; Max Demeter Peyfuss, *Die aromunische Frage von den Ursprüngen bis zum Frieden von Bukarest (1913) und die Haltung Österreich-Ungarns* (Wien, Köln, Graz, 1974), p. 121; Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich, 1996), p. 355).

⁴⁴ PA AA, Unterrichts- und Erziehungs- und Schulwesen, Politik 17, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Ervin Dolenc, *Kulturni boj. Slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS* (Ljubljana, 1996), pp. 30-33; Muhamet Pirraku, "Kulturno-prosvetni pokret Albanaca u Jugoslaviji (191-1941)", *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* 1-4 (1978); HWBGAD, III, p. 76; Kraft, p. 134; Biljana Šimunović-Bešlin, *Prosvetna politika u Dunavskoj banovini (1929-1941)* (Novi Sad, 2007), pp. 187-211, 272-284, 297-303; Dimić, pp. 11, 59-66, 77-78, 110, 122-135, 138, 154; *Ibid.*, I, pp. 76, 86, 88, 120; Jovanović, "Turci...", pp. 143-144; Sajti, pp. 146-152; Josef Volkmar Senz, *Das Schulwesen der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien* (Munich, 1969); Popi, *Rumuni...*, p. 49; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 167, 179-189, 193-195, 202-205, 151; *Idem*, Mađari, pp. 50, 136, 147, 379; Andrej Vovko, "Nemško manjšinsko šolstvo v obdobju stare Jugoslavije", *Zgodovinski časopis*, XL (1986), no. 3; Janjetović, *Deca careva...*, pp. 231-263; Branislav Gligorijević, "O nastavi na jezicima narodnosti u Vojvodini 1919-1929", *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 5 (1972); Biljnja, pp. 52-54; Lenard, *Narodne manjine*, p. 731-733; Dugački, pp. 310-317.

⁴⁵ To be sure, there were few – but really very few – exceptions. (Pirraku, pp. 359, 369; Mustafa Memić, *Velika medresa i njeni učenici u revolucionarnom pokretu* (Skopje, 1984), pp. 68-69.

some even in 18th century.⁴⁶ They comprised general cultural associations, choirs, drama clubs, reading rooms, libraries, humanitarian societies etc. According to the official Yugoslav data, there were some 700 various minority associations in Yugoslavia in the late 1920s: 415 German, 195 Hungarian, 48 Romanian etc.⁴⁷ The level of their activity varied depending on local conditions.

Basically all minorities strove to set up their national cultural organizations which would be blanket organizations for all kinds of cultural and social activities on local and national levels. Czechs and Slovaks, enjoying the government benevolence were relatively successful.⁴⁸ Romanians wanted much, but due to lack of leaders and resources, as well as, due to disunity, ultimately achieved little: after unsuccessful attempts at founding a blanket organization in 1923 and 1936, their cultural life remained fragmented.⁴⁹ Ruthenians organized their association Prosvita in 1919, and another one, leftist in nature, in 1930, which started competing for Ruthenians' hearts and minds with Prosvita without notable success.⁵⁰ Hungarians had a number of cultural and other associations which, due to government pressure and emigration of many opinion leaders, had difficulties weathering the first years after WWI. Their activities were consolidated later on, but were never unmolested and the authorities kept a watchful eye to prevent their unification into a large blanket association. This was permitted only in 1941, few months before Yugoslavia was plunged into WWII. Their standing wish for a professional theater was granted only in 1940 and then not in the Vojvodina but in Belgrade!⁵¹

The unification of forces was achieved by Germans in 1920 when Kulturbund was founded in Novi Sad to serve as a clearing house of all cultural, economic and social activities of the German minorities. Later on its economic branches became independent, and some additional ones were founded, whereas the Kulturbund remained the major minority cultural organization.⁵²

⁴⁶ The [German] Philharmonic Association in Ljubljana was founded as far back as 1702! (Adolf Lenz, *Die deutsche Minderheit in Slowenien* (Graz, 1923), p. 65).

⁴⁷ AJ, 38, 93/225.

⁴⁸ Dugački, pp. 184-193, 201-203, 317-327; Rudolf Bednárík, *Slováci v Juhoslávii. Materiály k ich hmotnej a duchovnej kultúre* (Bratislava, 1966), pp. 57-58; Josip Hanzl, Josip Matušek, Adolf Orct, *Borbeni put prve čehoslovačke brigade „Jan Žižka z Trcnova“* (Darugar, 1968), pp. 36-38.

⁴⁹ Popi, *Rumuni*, pp. 127-141, 136-141.

⁵⁰ Biljnja, pp. 23, 45-59; Nikola Gačeša, "Rusini između dva svetska rata" in *Radovi...*, pp. 349-351; Vlado Kostelnik, "Klasno i nacionalno u emancipaciji jugoslavenskih Rusina-Ukrajnaca" in *Klasno i nacionalno u suvrremenom socijalizmu, II* (Zagreb, 1970), p. 574; L. Lenard, "Slovenske narodne manjine u Jugoslaviji", *Narodna odbrana*, December 29, 1929, no. 52, p. 855.

⁵¹ AJ, 38, 93/225; 93/225; 63, 47/145; F. 398, f. 1; 305, 8/18; 66 (pov.), 71/184; Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 80, 86; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 224-234; Idem, *Mađari*, pp. 53-55, 148-149, 158, 180, 219, 380; Sajt, p. 119-120.

⁵² Despite that, it would comprise less than 10% of the *Volksdeutsche* until late 1930s. (Anthony Komjathy, Rebecca Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich. Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe Between the Wars* (New York, London, 1980), p. 130).

Its work was also not free of government pressure and molestation – depending on political situation and interests of the ruling parties, relations with Germany, as well as on the part of the country where its branches were active.⁵³ Just like the German Party it strove to achieve a complete cultural autonomy of the *Volksdeutsche*.⁵⁴ Between 1933 and 1938/39 it experienced the struggle between the old leaders and the young Nazis comparable to similar struggles in other European countries with German minorities. Eventually the Nazis came to the top with the direct aid of the Third Reich. Henceforth the Kulturbund would increasingly become the vehicle for spreading Nazi propaganda and *Gleichschaltung* of the *Volksdeutsche*. It would unite bulk of Yugoslavia's Germans and cover all fields of their activities – becoming the willing tool of the Reich's foreign policy.⁵⁵ In any case, the Kulturbund remained the model other minorities wished to emulate.

Just like associations, minority press was developed mostly in Northern parts. The Cemiyet had its short-lived newspaper which was banned for political reasons in 1924 as part of the government offensive against the party, and several other Turkish-language newspapers which were of even shorter duration.⁵⁶ On the other hand, minority press, particularly Hungarian and German, had strong tradition and a number of various publications. These two national minorities had several influential dailies, read not only by members of these two minorities, but also by the educated South-Slavs. Some of them, particularly Hungarian ones, received financial support from the mother-countries of their respective minorities.⁵⁷ To be sure, all this press had to write within the limits set by the official censorship – which held true for all publications. In other words, not all minority problems could be discussed freely in the press. This, however, was partly rectified by import of newspapers and journals from Germany, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although some of the papers published there were banned in Yugoslavia because of their “unfriendly writing”.

⁵³ It was abolished in 1924 and 1929. (Annabring, p. 41; Plautz, p. 35; Biber, Nacizem, p. 34; Rasimus, pp. 429-431; Josip Mirnić, *Nemci u Bačkoj u Drugom svetskom ratu* (Novi Sad, 1974), p. 30).

⁵⁴ Bethke, pp. 272-286; Plautz, p. 26, 34; Senz, pp. 51-52; Biber, Nacizem, pp. 32-34; Annabring, p. 40, 53; Rasimus, p. 16-199, 445-47; Mirnić, pp. 25-36.

⁵⁵ Biber, Nacizem, pp. 167-211; Rasimus, pp. 489-509; Mirnić, pp. 36-75; Annabring, pp. 65-69; Wüsch, pp. 148-153.

⁵⁶ Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 8, 82, 234, 238; Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 345; Ismail Eren, “Turska štampa u Jugoslaviji (1866-1966)”, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju XIV-XV* (1964-1965): 375-380.

⁵⁷ Branko Bešlin, *Vesnik oluje. Nemačka štampa u Vojvodini (1933-1941)* (Novi Sad, Sremski Karlovci, [2001]); Tanja Žigon, *Nemško časopisje na Slovenskem* (Ljubljana, 2001); Smilja Amon, “Nemško časopisje na Slovenskem”, *Teorija in praksa XXV* (1987), no. 9-10; Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 157, 160, 220-222, 243; Idem, Mađari, pp. 57, 367-378; Sajti, pp. 41, 155-157; Dugački, pp. 50-70; Janjetović, *Deca...*, 268-287; Popi, *Rumuni...*, pp. 70-71, 146; László Rehák, “Štampa u Vojvodini” in *Vojvodina 1944-1954* (Novi Sad, 1954), pp. 355-356.

One might conclude that the situation of various national minorities wasn't the same in various parts of the country. Indeed, the same national minority could receive different treatment in various parts. Thus the pressure on Germans was the strongest in Slovenia, weaker in Slavonia, whereas in the Vojvodina it was the mildest thanks to the policy of weaning them from Hungarians. At the same time, some minorities hadn't the same position in various spheres of life: Albanians and Turks were politically more influential than their economic strength would warrant; Germans in Slovenia had economic influence far beyond their political one; in the Vojvodina they had some political influence and economic power, but in Bosnia they were absolute underdogs. Hungarian leaders were influential enough to file lawsuits before the League of Nations, but many ordinary Hungarians lived in complete poverty. Thanks to accords with Italy the tiny Italian minority in Dalmatia enjoyed benefits other minorities could only dream of etc. Some, like Czechs, and especially Slovaks, were upgraded within the new state, whereas others were deprived of the privileged position they had enjoyed prior to the Balkan wars and WWI. Historically created social, political, religious and other differences within each national minority, foreign policy considerations and many other factors should also be kept in mind.

On the whole, the situation of national minorities was tolerable, although far from good. At the same time, it was on the then European average, sometimes even surpassing in quality the situation of national minorities in many other countries.⁵⁸ However, it was not good enough to win the loyalty of members of the minorities, which would have tragic consequences in WWII. Bad historical experience, real or imagined strength of certain minorities, nationalism and the threat some of the neighboring countries represented for Yugoslavia's integrity, prevented the minority policy from being more generous and maybe from winning hearts and minds of members of minorities for the young state. Thus, the Yugoslav minority policy must be, in the last resort, declared a failure: it didn't achieve its main objective of making loyal citizens out of members of national minorities and of securing the possession of territories they inhabited.

⁵⁸ This was particularly true if one takes into consideration the situation of Slovenes in Austria, Macedonians in Greece or Serbs in Albania. A contemporary overview of the situation of national minorities in the early 1930s see in: Ewald Ammende, ed., *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas. Sammlung von Lageberichten* (Wien, Leipzig, 1931).

Nationale Minderheiten in Jugoslawien 1918-1941

Zusammenfassung

Nationale Minderheiten bildeten etwa 12% der Gesamtbevölkerung des Königreiches der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen/Jugoslawiens und das Verhältnis der Behörden ihnen gegenüber war nicht gleich im ganzen Staate. Der Druck auf Deutsche war am stärksten in Slowenien, etwas schwächer in Slawonien und am schwächsten in Vojvodina und zielte darauf, sie von der ungarischen Minderheit zu trennen. Die nationalen Minderheiten genossen auch nicht die gleiche Lage im gesellschaftlichen Leben des Königreiches. Albaner und Türken hatten größeren politischen Einfluss, als dass es ihnen ihre wirtschaftliche Macht ermöglichen würde. Auf der anderen Seite verfügten die Deutschen in Slowenien über starken wirtschaftlichen Einfluss, jedoch nicht über politische Macht, während sie in Vojvodina politische und wirtschaftliche Macht innehatten. Die Führer der Ungaren waren wiederum politisch so einflussreich, dass sie beispielsweise sogar eine Klage bei der Liga der Nationen erheben könnten, während viele ihrer Volksgenossen in bitterer Armut lebten. Dank der mit Italien getroffenen Abkommen genoss die an Zahl kleine italienische Gemeinschaft in Dalmatien solche Begünstigungen, von denen andere Minderheiten nur träumen konnten. Andere Minderheiten - wie Tschechen und Slowaken - waren in den neuen Staat eingewebt und gewisse Minderheiten genossen privilegierte Lage auf Grund des Erbes der Balkankriege und des Ersten Weltkrieges. Im Ganzen genommen war die Lage der nationalen Minderheiten in Jugoslawien nur erträglich. Deswegen kann man die jugoslawische Politik den nationalen Minderheiten gegenüber als unerfolgreich bezeichnen, denn sie erfüllte ihr Ziel nicht: die Angehörigen der nationalen Minderheiten zu loyalen Staatsbürgern zu machen und auf diese Weise den Besitz der von ihnen besiedelten Territorien zu sichern.



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**HUMAN LOSSES OF THE CROATS IN WORLD
WAR II AND THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR
PERIOD CAUSED BY THE CHETNIKS
(YUGOSLAV ARMY IN THE FATHERLAND)
AND THE PARTISANS (PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY AND THE PARTISAN
DETACHMENTS OF YUGOSLAVIA/
YUGOSLAV ARMY) AND THE YUGOSLAV
COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES
NUMERICAL INDICATORS**

Vladimir GEIGER*

On the basis of the most important historiographic, demographic and victimological works, the human losses of Croats caused by the Chetniks/Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland and the Partisans/People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army and the newly-established communist authorities are shown. This work presents the initial, most often arbitrary estimates and claims, followed considerably more reliable statistical/demographic calculations, and finally individual name and numerical indicators based on more systematic research.

Key Words:

In the total human losses suffered by Croatia and the Croats during the Second World War and the immediate post-war period, a considerable number were casualties of the Chetniks – the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland – and the Partisans – the People's Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army – and the Yugoslav communist authorities.

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Demography, historiography and victimology, which also dealt with the issue of human losses in Yugoslavia and Croatia in the Second World War and the post-war years, resulted in many works which may help shed light on the human losses of Croatia and the Croats during the Second World War and the immediate post-war period which were caused by the Chetniks – the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland – and the Partisans – the People's Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army – and the Yugoslav communist authorities.

Previous research into the demographic and actual human losses of Croatia, and Yugoslavia, in the Second World War and the post-war years¹ has provided insight on the approximate, and also potential, number of fatalities, casualties and victims.² There are no notable divergences among researchers in the establishment of the demographic and actual human losses of Croatia and Yugoslavia in the Second World War and the post-war period, but there are serious doubts surrounding the number of casualties and victims based on national/ethnic and ideological/military affiliation, and based on the site and circumstances of death and perpetrators or initiators of death.

Debating the human losses of both Croatia and Yugoslavia in the Second World War and immediate post-war years, particularly the number and structure of fatalities, casualties and victims is today a thankless task. This is because human losses of both Croatia and Yugoslavia in the Second World War and immediate post-war years, despite many estimates, calculations and censuses, constitute one of the most controversial research tasks and, furthermore, one of the most sensitive (current) political topics.³

The long duration and intensity of the war in the territory of Croatia, or rather in the Independent State of Croatia (known by its Croatian acronym NDH), and the presence of considerable occupying forces from the Third Reich, Italy and Hungary and the operations of the NDH armed forces, the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland and the People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army, resulted in direct clashes

¹ Demographic losses encompass deaths (in combat or otherwise) during wartime, declining birth-rates due to wartime circumstances and the migration balance. Actual losses mean those who were killed or died during the war.

² The term fatality applies first and foremost to civilians slain or killed as a result of war, as well as prisoners-of-war who were killed or died. The term casualty refers to soldiers killed in combat. The term victim applies to those who survived the war, but who in various ways suffered damage due to the war, i.e., they were wounded or contracted illnesses, or were displaced or exiled.

³ Estimates imply claims, more or less founded, on the number of human losses for individual periods and for individual regions and for individual categories of casualties and/or victims. Calculations imply mathematical and statistical computations, more or less founded, on the number of human losses for individual periods and for individual regions and for individual categories of casualties and/or victims. Censuses imply lists of individual casualties and/or victims by name, for individual periods and for individual regions and for individual human loss categories.

between the warring sides, leading as well to high human losses both among combatants and among civilians. The irreconcilable ideologies and the political and military interests of the warring sides as well as civil war multiplied these human losses.

*

After the Second World War, the number of fatalities, casualties and victims of the war was intentionally exaggerated, while their origin and structure was *suppressed* and *obscured*, which facilitated the manipulation of human losses.

Three censuses of Second World War human losses were conducted in Yugoslavia, from 1944 to 1946/1947, in 1950 and in 1964. These censuses dealt with those casualties and fatalities caused primarily by the occupying forces and their collaborators.⁴ The post-war Yugoslav system and society demonstrated *incivility* and extreme ideological bias, dividing human losses into *acceptable* and *unacceptable* or into *desirable* and *undesirable*. The Yugoslav censuses of human losses in the Second World War were not, obviously, intended to gather data and list and publish all casualties and fatalities, both military and civilian, with indication of all perpetrators among the warring political and military sides, regardless of national/ethnic, religious, political or military affiliation.

The censuses of 1944/1947, 1950 and 1964 did not encompass casualties and fatalities who lost their lives at the hands of the People's Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army or the forces of the anti-Axis coalition. Since these censuses did not result in the expected, official, public and *desirable* number of human losses of 1.7 million, but rather a considerably smaller number of casualties and fatalities, their results were not released to the public. Moreover, the data of the Commission on the Registration of War Victims working under the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1964, the most systematic Yugoslav census of Second World War human losses, were placed under an embargo, and this resulted in the extreme multiplication of Yugoslavia's (and Croatia's) human losses in the Second World War, particularly the Serb victims of the NDH and the Jasenovac camp.⁵

⁴ See Vladimir Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili 'okupatori i njihovi pomagači'. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 43 (2011), no. 3: 702-709, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁵ See Franjo Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti. Rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja* (Zagreb, 1989, Zagreb, 1990) or F. Tuđman, *Irrwege der Geschichtswirklichkeit. Eine Abhandlung über die Geschichte und die Philosophie des Gewaltübels* (Zagreb, 1993); Vladimir Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1992); V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945* (Zagreb, 1997); Josip Jurčević, *Nastanak jasenovačkog mita. Problemi proučavanja žrtava Drugog svjetskog rata na području Hrvatske* (Zagreb, 1998) or J. Jurčević, *Die Entstehung des Mythos Jasenovac. Probleme bei der For-*

In research into the human losses of Yugoslavia, and Croatia, during the Second World War and the immediate post-war period, the priority has most often been placed on those human losses that are, as a rule, *ours*, which provoked a not inconsiderable emotional charge required for public discourse by *left* and/or *right*, while neglecting the fact that all casualties and fatalities are entitled to a grave and commemoration.

The Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia has, from 1992 to 1999, gathered data on the human losses of Croatia (and Bosnia-Herzegovina) during World War II and the post-war years, and in the registration of casualties and fatalities it has dedicated attention mostly to Croats, generally those who were not registered in previous censuses of human losses in Croatia (and Bosnia-Herzegovina) in the Second World War, while others were only *incidentally* registered.

Using this *selective* approach, the Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia has registered a total of 261,415 fatalities and casualties, of whom 153,700 were persons from Croatia's territory and 99,228 were from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly Croats, who lost their lives during World War II and the post-war period. According to these data, from Croatia's territory 31,855 persons lost their lives as members of the NDH armed forces, 38,732 lost their lives as members of the People's Liberation Army (NOV) and the Partisan Detachments (PO) of Croatia/Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Army, and 38,000 civilians lost their lives, while from Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory, 12,924 lost their lives as members of the NDH armed forces, 5,259 lost their lives as members of the People's Liberation Army (NOV) and the Partisan Detachments (PO) of Croatia/Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Army, and 44,027 civilians lost their lives (*Tables 1 and 2*).

According to data from the Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia, 79,318 Croats from Croatia's territory, both soldiers and civilians, lost their lives during the Second World War and immediate post-war years. According to these data, in Croatia's territory the Chetniks, i.e., the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, were responsible for the deaths of 4,203 persons, of whom 1,628 were civilians, while the Partisans, i.e., members of the NOV and PO of Croatia/Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Army, were responsible for the deaths of 37,881 persons, of whom 7,404 were civilians (*Table 3*).⁶

schungsarbeit zu den Opfern des II. Weltkrieges auf dem Gebiet von Kroatien (Zagreb, 2007); Josip Pečarić, *Srpski mit o Jasenovcu. Skrivanje istine o beogradskim konc-logorima* (Zagreb, 1998); J. Pečarić, *Srpski mit o Jasenovcu, II, O Bulajićevoj ideologiji genocida hrvatskih autora* (Zagreb, 2000); Mladen Ivezić, *Jasenovac. Brojke* (Zagreb, 2003); Vladimir Mrkoci, Vladimir Horvat, *Ogoljela laž logora Jasenovac* (Zagreb, 2008); V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili okupatori i njihovi pomagači. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", pp. 700-736, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶ *Izješće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine* (Zagreb, 1999), pp. 15-16, 19. See V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u

The Commission's data on human losses in Croatia (and Bosnia-Herzegovina) during the Second World War and post-war years are additionally deficient due to the memory effect, i.e., the fact that people remember events mistakenly or simply forget, which could only be expected. This was also noted even in the case of the most systematic Yugoslav census of Yugoslavia's human losses during the Second World War conducted by the Commission on Registration of War Victims formed by the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1964.⁷ Namely, nationality/ethnicity was not ascertained for many human losses for which the Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia gathered data, nor was it determined whether the fatalities or casualties were soldiers – and if so, to which army they belonged – or civilians. Thus, in the case of 32,920 persons from Croatia's territory, it is unclear as to whether they lost their lives as soldiers and to which army they belonged, or as civilians, while the nationality/ethnicity of 53,768 fatalities or casualties from Croatia has not been determined (*Table 1*).⁸

The Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia was dissolved in May 2002, and the registration of Croatia's human losses in the Second World War has not been completed.⁹

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The question of Yugoslavia's human losses in the Second World War became a first-class political issue in the immediate post-war phase, and has remained so to this day. For the vast majority of the debates on the human losses of both Croatia and Yugoslavia in wartime and the post-war period have no basis in science and they are recognizably rooted in ideology and propagan-

Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili 'okupatori i njihovi pomagači'. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", p. 712.

⁷ See Srđan Bogosavljević, "Nerasvetljeni genocid", in Nebojša Popov (ed.), *Srpska strana rata. Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju* (Belgrade-Zrenjanin, 1996), pp. 196-198 (Belgrade, 1996), pp. 165-167 or S. Bogosavljević, "Drugi svetski rat – žrtve. Jugoslavija", *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 4 (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 497-499; V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili 'okupatori i njihovi pomagači'. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", p. 708.

⁸ *Izješće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, pp. 15-16. See V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili 'okupatori i njihovi pomagači'. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", p. 712.

⁹ Josip Kolanović, Milan Pojić, "Popis žrtava Drugoga svjetskog rata, poraća i Domovinskog rata. Rezultati i perspektive", in Nada Kisić Kolanović, Mario Jareb, Katarina Spehnjak (eds.), *1945. – razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti* (Zagreb, 2006), p. 465; J. Kolanović, "Svaka žrtva ima svoje ime. Poimenični popis žrtava Drugoga svjetskoga rata i poraća u Hrvatskoj", in Zvonimir Šeparović (ed.), *Žrtva znak vremena. Zbornik radova Petog Hrvatskog žrtvoslovnog kongresa* (Zagreb, 2011), p. 30.

da.¹⁰ Stated simply, it is most often of case of who and/or whose side most convincingly formulates fabrications and lies.

The systematic public re-evaluation of the human losses of Yugoslavia, and Croatia, in the Second World War only appeared only in the 1980s, when Yugoslav governing structures and the communist ideology began to irretrievably lose their credibility.¹¹ The most systematic statistical calculations of human losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War conducted by B. Kočović abroad in 1985¹² and V. Žerjavić in Yugoslavia in 1989,¹³ differ negligibly in national/ethnic and regional structure, but not in the total number of casualties and fatalities.

Kočović's estimate of the actual losses for Yugoslavia is 1,014,000 and 1,985,000 in demographic losses, while Žerjavić's estimate of actual losses for Yugoslavia are 1,027,000 and 2,022,000 in demographic losses. Kočović's estimates for Croatia are 295,000 actual and 605,000 demographic losses, while Žerjavić's estimates for Croatia are 271,000 and 295,000 actual and 604,000 demographic losses. According to Kočović, the decline in birth rates for the Yugoslav population due to wartime circumstances was 333,000, while according to Žerjavić it was 326,000. The war also caused great migrations outside of Yugoslavia, and Croatia. Most of these migrants were Germans, followed by Italians. The number of migrants from Yugoslavia prompted by wartime circumstances was 638,000 or 654,000 according to Kočović, while according to Žerjavić this figure was 669,000. According to Kočović, 57,000 Croats migrated from Yugoslavia, while according to Žerjavić 39,000 migrated. According to Žerjavić, the total number of migrants from Croatia from 1939 to 1948 was 157,000 persons (Tables 4, 5 and 6).¹⁴

¹⁰ V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1992); V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1997); Mihael Sobolevski, "Između Jasenovca i Bleiburga", *Erasmvs* 4 (1993), pp. 42-47; B. Kočović, *Nauka, nacionalizam i propaganda (Između gubitaka i žrtava Drugoga svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji)* (Paris, 1999).

¹¹ For example, see Ljubo Boban, *Kontroverze iz povijesti Jugoslavije*, 2 (Zagreb, 1989); Kosta Nikolić, "Polemike o genocidu u NDH u jugoslovenskoj istoriografiji 1985-1989.", in Jovan Mirković (ed.), *Genocid u 20. veku na prostorima jugoslovenskih zemalja* (Belgrade, 2005), pp. 425-452, as well as the sources cited therein.

¹² B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985, Sarajevo, 1990).

¹³ V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1989).

¹⁴ See B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985), pp. 38, 41-42, 47, 65-66, 173, 180-184 (Sarajevo, 1990), pp. 24, 27-28, 33, 51-52, 163, 170-174; V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 54, 63, 70, 72, 80; V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 150, 159, 166-167, 175; V. Žerjavić, "Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 24 (1992), no. 3: 158; V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27 (1995), no. 3: 146, 550-551, 553; V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, pp. 146, 151, 154-155, 166.

However, there are also estimates and calculations showing a higher number of migrants, both among Croats and Serbs, as well as estimates and calculations showing a higher total number of migrants from Croatia. The number of Italian migrants in particular is dubious.¹⁵

During the Second World War, most fatalities and casualties were from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e., in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia. According to Kočović, out of Yugoslavia's actual losses of 1,014,000 in World War II, most were from Bosnia-Herzegovina: 382,000, of which 209,000 were Serbs and Montenegrins, 79,000 were Croats, 75,000 were Muslims, 10,000 were Jews and 9,000 were Others, followed by Croatia: 295,000, of which 125,000 were Serbs and Montenegrins, 124,000 were Croats, 17,000 were Jews and 29,000 were Others, and then Serbia proper: 141,000, of whom 114,000 were Serbs and Montenegrins, 1,000 were Croats, 5,000 were Muslims, 8,000 were Jews and 13,000 were others (*Table 7*).¹⁶

According to Žerjavić, out of Yugoslavia's actual losses of 1,027,000 during World War II, most were from Bosnia-Herzegovina: 316,000, of whom 164,000 were Serbs, 64,000 were Croats, 75,000 were Muslims, 9,000 were Jews and 4,000 were Others, followed by Croatia: 271,000, of whom 131,000 were Serbs, 106,000 were Croats, 2,000 were Muslims, 10,000 were Jews and 22,000 were Others, and then Serbia proper: 167,000, of whom 142,000 were Serbs, 13,000 were Muslims, 7,000 were Jews and 5,000 were others. Žerjavić added roughly 80,000 Yugoslavs to his computations of actual losses by republics and provinces and national/ethnic groups, of whom 33,000 were Serbs, 24,000 were Jews, 14,000 were Croats, 3,000 were Muslims and 6,000 were others, who lost their lives abroad during the Second World War (*Table 8*).¹⁷

¹⁵ See Vladimir Stipetić, "Jedno stoljeće u razvoju nacionalne strukture stanovništva na teritoriju SR Hrvatske (1880 - 1981)", *Suvremeni ekonomski problemi* 8 (1987), pp. 81, 119-120; Ivan Crkvenčić, "Emigration of Italians and Germans from Croatia during and immediately after the Second World War", *Društvena istraživanja* 9 (2000), no. 1 (45), pp. 19-38; Ivo Nejašmić, *Depopulacija u Hrvatskoj. Korijeni, stanje, izgledi* (Zagreb, 1991), p. 141 or I. Nejašmić, *Stanovništvo Hrvatske. Demografske studije i analize* (Zagreb, 2008), p. 56; Marica Karakaš Obradov, *Dobrovoljna i prisilna preseljenja u Hrvatskoj tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata i poraća* (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Zagreb, 2011); V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugome svjetskom ratu i u poraću koje su prouzročili Narodnooslobodilačka vojska i Partizanski odredi Jugoslavije/Jugoslavenska armija i komunistička vlast. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi). Case study: Bleiburg i folksdojčeri", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 42 (2010), no. 3: 711; V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili 'okupatori i njihovi pomagači'. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", pp. 745-747, as well as the sources cited therein.

¹⁶ B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985), p. 182 (Sarajevo, 1990), p. 172.

¹⁷ V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, p. 73; V. Žerjavić, *Opsestije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, p. 168; V. Žerjavić, *Yugoslavia - manipulations with the numbers of Second World War vic-*

Thus, according to Žerjavić's computations by republics and national/ethnic groups, the total numbers of actual losses may have been negligibly different, i.e., higher. For according to Žerjavić, during the Second World War Croatia lost approximately 295,000 persons, of whom 137,000 Serbs and 118,000 Croats. Bosnia-Herzegovina lost approximately 328,000 persons, of whom 170,000 were Serbs, 78,000 were Muslims and 66,000 were Croats.¹⁸

However, in his calculations/estimates of human losses in Yugoslavia, and Croatia, Kočović did not, as Žerjavić did, delve into ascertainment of the number of casualties and fatalities based on ideological/military factors and the parties responsible for their death.

There are more recent extensive critical examinations of Kočović's and Žerjavić's computations of demographic and actual losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, such as, for example, those by K. Katalinić, R. Petrović, Ž. Đorđević, J. Jurčević, T. Dulić and D. Vručinić, more or less founded and sustainable.¹⁹

The Yugoslav censuses of human losses in the Second World War, from 1945 and 1946/1947, 1950 and 1964, the Yugoslav general censuses of 1931 and 1948 and the estimates of wartime and direct post-war migrations outside of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs who lost their lives on the *enemy* side provide a general number of demographic and actual losses. Taking into account all unavoidable indicators and estimates in the computation of Yugoslavia's human losses in the Second World War, the demographic losses may have been

tims/Yougoslavie - manipulations sur le nombre des victimes de la Seconde guerre mondiale/Jugoslavien - Manipulationen mit Kriegsoffern des zweiten Weltkriegs/Jugoslavija - manipulacije žrtvama Drugog svjetskog rata (Zagreb, 1993), pp. 27, 60, 91, 119; V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču", pp. 551, 553; V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 156.

¹⁸ V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 61, 63, 70, 73; V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 157, 159, 166, 168; V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču", pp. 551, 553; V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 156.

¹⁹ See Kazimir Katalinić, "Hrvatsko-srpski sukob u svjetlu brojaka", *Republika Hrvatska XXXVI* (1986), no. 153: 17-58; K. Katalinić, "Hrvatske i srpske žrtve 1941.-1945.", *Republika Hrvatska XXXVIII* (1988), no. 160: 15-63; K. Katalinić, *Argumenti. NDH, BiH, Bleiburg i genocid* (Buenos Aires-Zagreb, 1993); Ruža Petrović, "Ratni gubici Jugoslavije u II svjetskom ratu", in Radovan Samardžić (ed.), *Genocid nad Srbima u II svjetskom ratu* (Belgrade, 1995), pp. 341-359; Životije Đorđević, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svjetskom ratu* (Belgrade, 1997); J. Jurčević, *Nastanak jasenovačkog mita. Problemi proučavanja žrtava Drugog svjetskog rata na području Hrvatske* (Zagreb, 1998) or J. Jurčević, *Die Entstehung des Mythos Jasenovac. Probleme bei der Forschungsarbeit zu den Opfern des II. Weltkrieges auf dem Gebiet von Kroatien* (Zagreb, 2007); Tomislav Dulić, *Utopias of Nation. Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-42* (Uppsala, 2005); Dušan Vručinić, *Demografski gubici Srbije prouzrokovani ratovima u XX veku* (Belgrade, 2007).

approximately 2 million, while actual losses may have been approximately 1 million. More significant increases in demographic and actual losses in Yugoslavia in the Second World War were most often adjusted by computation methodologies for the needs of *acceptable* demographic and actual losses for individual national/ethnic groups.

In research into both the number and ethnicity/nationality and social and regional and gender and age structures of human losses in Croatia, and Yugoslavia, during the Second World War and immediate post-war years, the problem is mainly a lack of original archival materials. However, in research into the human losses of Croatia, and Yugoslavia, during the Second World War and immediate post-war period, the problem is most often not only a lack of sources and reliable indicators, but also the “good will” to properly examine specific issues.

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In Croatian émigré historiography and popular current affairs publishing, the numbers of Croats who lost their lives during the Second World War at the hands of the Chetniks, i.e., the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (JVuO) vary, and are generally *exaggerated*, often up to the impossible claim that the Chetniks/JVuO and the communists killed a million Croats.²⁰ In Croatian historiography, various numbers of casualties and fatalities at the hands of the Chetniks/JVuO are cited for Croatia's territory, up to 20,000, and up to 50,000 to 65,000 in the territory of the NDH. The data from name lists of casualties and fatalities and the estimates of historians and computations of demographers are also often at odds with each other.

The Territorial Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators registered 1,729 civilians in 1945 whose deaths in Croatia's territory were caused by the Chetniks/JVuO.²¹ Citing the available sources, in 1989 Franjo Tuđman stated that in Croatia's territory, the Chetniks/JVuO were responsible for the death of 1,372 persons, generally members of the NOV and PO of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army, which is numerically the smallest estimate in historiography.²²

Thereafter, in 1993, M. Sobolevski, Z. Dizdar, I. Graovac and S. Žarić, using research results, primarily identification by individual names, estimated that the Chetniks/JVuO were accountable for the death of approximately 3,500 per-

²⁰ For example, see Ivo Omrčanin, *Diplomatische und politische Geschichte Kroatiens* (Neckargemuend, 1968) or I. Omrčanin, *Diplomatic and Political History of Croatia* (Philadelphia, [1973]) or I. Omrčanin, *Diplomatska i politička povijest Hrvatske* (Washington, 1991).

²¹ Croatian State Archives, Zagreb, ZKRZ, GUZ, 2624/45.

²² F. Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti. Rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja* (Zagreb, 1990), p. 372.

sons in Croatia's territory.²³ Žerjavić's calculations and estimates on the number of those whose death in Croatia's territory was caused by the Chetniks/JVuO are different. Žerjavić's initial figures in 1994 were that the Chetniks/JVuO were responsible for the death of approximately 20,000 persons on Croatia's territory and approximately 45,000 persons – about 12,000 Croats and 33,000 Muslims – in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for a total of approximately 65,000 persons. According to Žerjavić's later figures, in the territory of the NDH the Chetniks/JVuO were responsible for the death of approximately 47,000 persons, of whom 18,000 were Croats and approximately 29,000 were Muslims.²⁴ In 1995, Dizdar estimated that in Croatia's territory the Chetniks/JVuO were responsible for the death of approximately 3,750 persons, and then, citing Žerjavić's calculations and estimates, he rather drastically changed course and stated that the Chetniks/JVuO were responsible for the death of approximately 32,000 Croats, approximately 20,000 in Croatia's territory and approximately 12,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 33,000 Muslims, for a total of approximately 65,000 persons.²⁵ In 1999, Sobolevski, using identifications by individual names, estimated that in Croatia's territory the Chetniks/JVuO were responsible for the death of 3,000 persons, and, based on Žerjavić's calculations, for approximately 20,000 Croats in Yugoslavia's territory.²⁶ (Sobolevski later explained that the estimate 20,000 was not his figure.)²⁷ Graovac first estimated that the Chetniks/JVuO caused the death of approximately 3,500 persons in Croatia's territory, and then in 1995, using

²³ M. Sobolevski, Zdravko Dizdar, Igor Graovac, Slobodan Žarić, *Zločini četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1993 [manuscript].

²⁴ V. Žerjavić, *Poginuli, ubijeni i umoreni 1941-1945 /u tisućama/* [Croats and Muslims in the territory of the NDH] [Tabular overview] (Zagreb, 1994); V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću", p. 557; V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 95; V. Žerjavić, "O stradanjima u Drugom svjetskom ratu: stradali Hrvati od četnika, stradali Srbi i broj stradalih u Jasenovcu", *Dijalog povjesničara - istoričara* 5 (Zagreb, 2002), pp. 565-569.

²⁵ Z. Dizdar, Milivoj Kujundžić, *Doprinos Hrvatske pobjedi antifašističke koalicija* (Zagreb, 1995); Z. Dizdar, "Četnički zločini genocida nad Hrvatima i Muslimanima u Bosni i Hercegovini i nad Hrvatima u Hrvatskoj tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata (1941.-1945.)", *Hrvatski iseljenički zbornik 1995.-1996.* (Zagreb, 1996), pp. 239-270; Z. Dizdar, "Četnički zločini nad Hrvatima i Muslimanima u Bosni i Hercegovini tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata (1941.-1945.)", in Z. Dizdar, M. Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 1999), pp. 81-146; Z. Dizdar, *Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 2002).

²⁶ M. Sobolevski, "Četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj u Drugom svjetskom ratu (1941.-1945.)", in Z. Dizdar, M. Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 1999), pp. 25-79; M. Sobolevski, "Zločini četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj u Drugome svjetskom ratu", *Rijeka V* (2000), vol. 1-2, pp. 21-32.

²⁷ I. Graovac, "Otvara li demokracija mogućnost prestanka manipulacije stradalima? Primjer: razlike u utvrđivanju broja stradalih od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj", in I. Graovac, Dragan Cvetković, *Ljudski gubici Hrvatske 1941.-1945. godine: pitanja, primjeri, rezultati...* (Zagreb, 2005), pp. 186-187.

identifications by individual names, he established that the number of casualties and fatalities was not less than 2,786, or, based on a subsequent correction, an increased number of 2,905 persons,²⁸ and then he abruptly halted both his research and conclusions. For it is evident that Graovac, in an *old/new* work in 2011, did not consult the available archival materials and literature which became available in the meantime.²⁹

That the number of fatalities and casualties in Croatia's territory caused by the Chetniks/JVuO should be different is also indicated by many published victim lists for Croatia and the report of the Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims, which accorded attention in the determination of human losses primarily to Croats, particularly those not registered in the earlier censuses which were the foundation for the individual name list cited by Graovac. For in 1999, the Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims registered 4,203 persons whose death in Croatia's territory was caused by the Chetniks/JVuO (*Table 9*).³⁰

After all this, in 2012 Dizdar stated that Chetnik crimes were generally suppressed (sic!) after 1945 and that most victims were not registered, so that the exact number of casualties caused during World War II by the Chetniks/JVuO is unknown, and further claimed that up to the present over 50,000 slain Croats and Bosniaks, mostly civilians, have been documented, researched and registered. However, this figure of casualties caused by the Chetniks/JVuO of "over 50,000" is obviously a "guesstimate", for he does not indicate the victim lists and similar publications in which such figures were registered, how many casualties are registered in individual lists and whether and how a verification and audit of these data were done.³¹

²⁸ I. Graovac, *Žrtve četnika u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. godine. Sociološki aspekti* (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Zagreb, 1995); I. Graovac, "Posljedice državotvorne ideje i nacionalno-integralističke ideologije četničkog pokreta na primjeru stradalih Hrvata i Srba od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj", *Dijalog povjesničara - istoričara 1* (Zagreb, 2000), pp. 207-224; I. Graovac, "Otvora li demokracija mogućnost prestanka manipulacije stradalima? Primjer: razlike u utvrđivanju broja stradalih od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj", *Dijalog povjesničara - istoričara 4* (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 553-564 or I. Graovac, "Stradali Hrvati i Srbi od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj", in I. Graovac, D. Cvetković, *Ljudski gubici Hrvatske 1941.-1945. godine: pitanja, primjeri, rezultati...* (Zagreb, 2005), pp. 161-178 and I. Graovac, "Otvora li demokracija mogućnost prestanka manipulacije stradalima? Primjer: razlike u utvrđivanju broja stradalih od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj", in I. Graovac, D. Cvetković, *Ljudski gubici Hrvatske 1941.-1945. godine: pitanja, primjeri, rezultati...* (Zagreb, 2005), pp. 179-196.

²⁹ I. Graovac, *Stradali od četnika u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. godine. Prilog istraživanju: strukture stradalih* (Zagreb, 2011).

³⁰ *Izvešće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, p. 19.

³¹ Z. Dizdar, "Opet će Srbija krenuti na Hrvatsku i Vukovar ne suprotstavi li se Hrvatska rehabilitaciji četništva", *Hrvatski list*, 29. March 2012, p. 41 (Interview/Marko Čurać).

The primary role of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland was to resist the occupiers in Serbia, and it mounted active resistance while avoiding wider-ranging conflicts. However, the Chetnik movement in the territory of the NDH was nonetheless something entirely different. Its members did not simply protect the Serb population, for they were also struggling against an independent Croatian state, whatever its nature. In the Italian occupation zone they managed to reach an arrangement with the Italian military authorities. Thus, they continued to wage battle against the NDH, Ustasha and Partisans, but not against Italian military forces. In the territory of the NDH, some Chetnik groups mounted resistance to the German forces and the armed forces of the NDH, while others made deals with them and engaged in joint military campaigns against the Partisans. Individual Chetnik groups in the NDH received equipment, arms and pay from the NDH, officially participated in celebrations of NDH statehood day (10 April), etc. The conduct of the Chetniks during the Second World War and their collaboration with German, Italian and Croatian armed forces and the authorities in NDH territory essentially showed that their primary adversaries were the communists and Partisans. Individual Chetnik groups in the NDH, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, exhibited marked anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim intentions and actions. There can be no question that the Chetnik movement advocated the continuity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with Serbia's primacy. The Chetniks in the NDH protected Serbian populations from the Ustasha. However, in their vendettas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many Catholics and Muslims who did not take part in Ustasha crimes were also killed. Among the Chetniks, there were many of those who deemed the Croats and Muslims collectively guilty for Ustasha crimes against the Serbs in the NDH. The Chetnik movement in the NDH was primarily aimed against the members of the NOV and PO Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army and their collaborators, regardless of nationality, and against the Croats and Serbs who cooperated with the Partisans, and against Serbs who demonstrated loyalty to the NDH.³²

Among the fatalities and casualties, besides the civilian population there were also those who were killed on combat against the Chetniks/JVuO, and some of them were also killed as captives. However, it is notable that sometimes, in both original sources and in the secondary literature, the crimes perpetrated by the Italian and German armies, and even the Partisans, are ascribed to the Chetniks/JVuO.³³

³² See Jozo Tomasevich, *The Chetniks* (Stanford, California, 1975) or J. Tomasevich, *Četnici u Drugome svjetskom ratu, 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 1979); Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Četnici u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. godine* (Zagreb, 1986), as well as the sources cited therein.

³³ For example, see Z. Dizdar, M. Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 1999); Petar Bezina, *Župljani župa povjerenih Franjevačkoj provinciji Presvetog Otkupitelja žrtve rata 1941.-1945., 1990.-1995.* (Split, 2003); Mira Pelikan, Miroslav Gazda, *Spomenar hrvatskim žrtvama Virovitičko-podravске županije stradalim 1941.-1945. i 1991.-1995. godine* (Osijek, 2003); I. Graovac, *Stradali od četnika u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. godine. Prilog istraživanju: strukture stradalih* (Zagreb, 2011).

The question of how many deaths of Croats and Bosniaks during the Second World War were the responsibility of the Chetnik/Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, despite the frequent and *fierce* debates on the methods for ascertaining this number, remains open. This is because there continues to be a stubborn insistence on differently derived indicators and numbers, whose advocates cite either lists of individual names or calculations or even estimates, while ignoring different indicators. It is noticeable that these are generally cases of *recycling*, while no systematic research is actually being conducted.

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In the citation of a high number of Second World War human losses in Yugoslavia, a neglected fact was that a certain number of them lost their lives on the enemy side, or were killed in combat against the People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army or were their victims during the war or post-war period.

Numerous allegations, data and documents have been published in both historiography and popular history which testify to how the NOV and POJ/JA dealt with and treated captured enemy soldiers and civilians during and, especially, at the end of the Second World War, and in the immediate post-war years.³⁴

³⁴ See, for example, *Odmetnička zvjerstva i pustošenja u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj u prvim mjesecima života Hrvatske Narodne Države* (Zagreb, 1942, Zagreb, 1991); *Greuelthaten und Verwüstungen der Aufrührer im Unabhängigen Staate Kroatien in den ersten Lebensmonaten des kroatischen Nationalstaates* (Zagreb, 1942); Konrad Hans Klaser, *Mörder am Frieden. Agonie der Balkananarchie. Ein Tatsachenbericht* (Zagreb, 1942); *Das wahre Gesicht der Partisanen im Unabhängigen Staate Kroatien* (Zagreb, 1943); *Črne bukve. O delu komunistične osvobodilne fronte proti slovenskemu narodu* (Ljubljana, 1944, Ljubljana, 1990); *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, vol. V, *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien* (Düsseldorf, 1961, München, 1984, Augsburg, 1994, München, 2004); *Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, vol. I, *Ortsberichte über die Verbrechen an den Deutschen durch das Tito-Regime in der Zeit von 1944-1948* (München - Sindelfingen, 1991) or *Weißbuch der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien. Ortsberichte 1944-1948* (München, 1991); *Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, vol. II, *Erlebnisberichte über die Verbrechen an den Deutschen durch das Tito-Regime in der Zeit von 1944-1948* (München - Sindelfingen, 1993) or *Weißbuch der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien. Erlebnisberichte 1944-1948* (München, 1993); *Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, vol. III, *Erschießungen - Vernichtungslager - Kinderschicksale in der Zeit von 1944-1948* (München - Sindelfingen, 1995) or *Weißbuch der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien. Erschießungen - Vernichtungslager - Kinderschicksale in der Zeit von 1944-1948* (München, 1995); *Verbrechen an den Deutschen in Jugoslawien 1944-1948. Die Stationen eines Völkermords* (München, 1998); *Genocide of the Ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia 1944-1948* (München, 2003); *Genocid nad nemačkom manjinom u Jugoslaviji 1944-1948* (Belgrade, 2004); Jurij Štesl, *Pohorska afera. Krvavi ispadi štajerskih partizanov med jesenjo 1943 in pomladjo 1944* (Ljubljana 2009); Roman Ljeljak, *KNOJ 1944-1945. Slovenska partizanska likvidacijska enota* (Radenci, 2010); Jera Vodušek Starič, *Prevzem oblasti 1944 - 1946* (Ljubljana, 1992) or J. Vodušek Starič, *Kako su komunisti osvojili vlast 1944. - 1946.* (Zagreb, 2006); Juraj Batelja (ed.), *Crna knjiga o grozovitostima komunističke vladavine u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb, 2000); Tonči Erjavec, *Španovica. Kronika nastanka i nestanka* (Zagreb, 1992); Josip Jurjević, *Pogrom u Krnjeuši 9. i 10. kolovoza 1941.* (Zagreb-Banja Luka, 1999); *Izvjješće o radu*

In a report (dated 15 January 1945) on the reasons for the liquidation of Croatian Home Guard officers and troops who responded to the "Last Call", i.e., the amnesty proclaimed by Josip Broz Tito on 30 August 1944, the Third Sector of the People's Protection Department (OZN) of the NOV and POJ 6th Corps proffered the view that "All of those whom we know are our enemies and who will oppose us tomorrow must be liquidated without qualms".³⁵

Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine (Zagreb, 1999); Joško Radica, *Sve naše Dakse. Hrvatski jug u vrtlogu Drugog svjetskog rata i jugokomunističke strahovlade* (Dubrovnik, 2003); Zvonimir Despot, *Vrijeme zločina. Novi prilozii za povijest koprivničke Podravine 1941.-1948.* (Zagreb - Slavonski Brod, 2007); Branko Kranjčev, *Crni potok. Najveće poratno stratište i grobište pripadnika Oružanih snaga Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u našičkom kraju* (Našice, 2009); Bojan Dimitrijević, *Građanski rat u miru. Uloga armije i službe bezbednosti u obračunu sa političkim protivnicima Titovog režima 1944-1954.* (Belgrade, 2003); Srđan Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića. Represija u Srbiji 1944-1953.* (Belgrade, 2006); S. Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića 2. Politička represija u Srbiji 1953 - 1985.* (Belgrade, 2011); Michael Portmann, *Die kommunistische Revolution in der Vojvodina 1944 - 1952. Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Kultur* (Wien, 2008); J. Jurčević, *Bleiburg. Jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima* (Zagreb, 2005); J. Jurčević, *Crna knjiga komunizma u Hrvatskoj (zločini jugoslavenskih komunista u Hrvatskoj 1945. godine)* (Zagreb, 2006); Martina Grahek Ravančić, *Bleiburg i Križni put 1945. Historiografija, publicistika i memoarska literatura* (Zagrebu, 2009); Florian Thomas Rulitz, *Die Tragödie von Bleiburg und Viktring. Partisanengewalt in Kärntner am Beispiel der antikommunistischen Flüchtlinge im Mai 1945* (Klagenfurt - Ljubljana - Wien, 2011) or F. Th. Rulitz, *Bleiburška i vetrinjska tragedija. Partizansko nasilje u Koruškoj na primjeru protukomunističkih izbjeglica u svibnju 1945.* (Zagreb, 2012); Mitja Ferenc, *Prikrito in očem zakrito. Prikrita grobišča 60 let po koncu druge svetovne vojne* (Celje, 2005); M. Ferenc, Želimir Kužatko, *Prikrivena grobišta Hrvata u Republici Sloveniji/Prikrita grobišča Hrvatov v Republici Sloveniji/Hidden Croatian Mass Graves in the Republic of Slovenia* (Zagreb, 2007); Janez Črnej, *Grobišča na Štajerskem* (Ljubljana, 2009); Poročilo Komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za reševanje vprašanj prikritih grobišč 2005-2008 (Ljubljana, 2008, Ljubljana, 2009) or *Prikrita grobišča. Izvješće komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za rješavanje pitanja skrivenih grobišta 2005.-2008.* (Sarajevo, 2010); M. Ferenc, Mehmedalija Alić, Pavel Jamnik, Huda jama. *Skrито za enajstimi pregradami* (Ljubljana, 2011); Branislav Kovačević, *Stradanje crnogorskih četnika 1944-1945.* (Podgorica, 2005); Savo Gregović, *Pucaj, rat je završen. Zlim putem bratoubilaštva: slovenačko krvavo proljeće 1945.* (Budva, 2009); Z. Dizdar, V. Geiger, M. Pojić, M. Rupić (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti* (Slavonski Brod, 2005, Zagreb, 2009); V. Geiger (ed.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti. Slavonija, Srijem i Baranja* (Slavonski Brod, 2006); V. Geiger, *Partisan and Communist Repression and Crimes in Croatia 1944 - 1946. Documents. Slavonia, Srymia and Baranya* (Bismarck, North Dakota, 2011); V. Geiger, M. Rupić, Mario Kevo, Egon Kraljević, Z. Despot (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti. Zagreb i središnja Hrvatska* (Slavonski Brod - Zagreb, 2008); M. Rupić, V. Geiger (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Dalmacija* (Slavonski Brod - Zagreb, 2011); V. Geiger, "Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Lici 1945.", *Hereticus IX* (2011), no. 1-2: 54-71, as well as the sources cited therein.

³⁵ J. Jurčević, *Bleiburg. Jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima*, p. 333; Z. Dizdar, V. Geiger, M. Pojić, M. Rupić (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti*, p. 54; V. Geiger (ed.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti. Slavonija, Srijem i Baranja*, p. 103; V. Geiger, *Partisan and Communist Repression and Crimes in Croatia 1944 - 1946. Documents. Slavonia, Srymia and Baranya*, p. 100.

The instructions issued by the First Army's OZN Third Sector to authorized subordinate division OZN sections on 6 May 1945, when Yugoslav Army units were preparing to liberate Zagreb, clearly demonstrate the procedures for captives. ("[...] all captives and other persons who are captured and sent to the division by brigades are to be processed and purged. This does not mean that brigades must send all captives to us, rather they are to sort on site, and those that remain who are gathered thereafter which the brigades will not have time to purge as a result of combat operations are to be sent to you. [...] The stance toward captured officers and captives applies in accordance with earlier instructions. Officers must be all be purged, unless you receive from the OZN or Party indication that a given individual need not be liquidated. In general, purges must be conducted energetically and mercilessly. [...]")³⁶ The OZN's instructions on the liquidation of captured enemies were clear and unequivocal: "All Ustasha and SS troops must be liquidated, officers in particular. Also liquidate Home Guard officers, except those who, according to information from Party organizations or the OZN, cooperated with the People's Liberation Movement."³⁷ Particularly notable was the brutal attitude toward captured enemy soldiers who were wounded or ill, who were subject to extrajudicial liquidation.³⁸

The individual name data on human losses among the Croats, and others as well, during and particularly at the end of the Second World War and the immediate post-war years caused by the Chetniks/JVuO and primarily the Partisans, i.e., the NOV and POJ/JA and communist authorities, are provided by many victim lists, which register the casualties and fatalities from various parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁹ There are also numerous works

³⁶ Military Archives, Belgrade, Vojnobezbednosna agencija, kut. 5, sv. 3, list 79, br. 1175, 6. maj 1945.; M. Ferenc, "(Zle) Huda Jama. Zločin u rudarskom oknu Barbara rov u Hudoj Jami kod Laškog", *Hereticus* IX (2011), no. 1-2: 49.

³⁷ Military Archives, Belgrade, Vojnobezbednosna agencija, 1 – 6.3.03.2, Izvještaji OZN-e MNO, 6. armije, JRV i JRM za 1945. i 1946., p. 7.; Dmitar Tasić, "Sovjetski Savez i formiranje jugoslovenskih snaga bezbednosti (1944-1945)", in Aleksandar Životić (ed.), *Oslobođenje Beograda 1944. Zbornik radova* (Belgrade, 2010), p. 276; M. Ferenc, "(Zle) Huda Jama. Zločin u rudarskom oknu Barbara rov u Hudoj Jami kod Laškog", p. 48.

³⁸ For example, see Želimir Žanko, Nikola Šolić (ed.), *Jazovka* (Zagreb, 1990); Srećko Božičević, *Jame (kao) grobnice* (Zagreb, 1991); L. Šturm (ed.), *Brez milosti. Ranjeni, invalidni in bolni povojni ujetnici na Slovenskem* (Ljubljana, 2000); Milan Marušić, *Žrtve komunističkih zlodjela u Zagrebu svibanj 1945. i sljemenskim stratištima bolnica Brestovac i Gračani* (Zagreb, 2001); Blanka Matković, "Odvođenja i likvidacije ranjenih pripadnika Hrvatskih oružanih snaga (HOS) iz zagrebačkih bolnica u svibnju i lipnju 1945. kroz arhivsko gradivo Državnog arhiva u Zagrebu", *Arhivski vjesnik* 54 (2011): 179-214, as well as the sources cited therein.

³⁹ For example, see Ivan Čičak, Andrija Zirdum, *Stradanje Hrvata plehanskog kraja 1941-1947* (Derventa, 1991); *Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, vol. IV, *Menschenverluste - Namen und Zahlen zu Verbrechen an den Deutschen durch das Tito-Regime in der Zeit von 1944-1948* (München - Sindelfingen, 1994) or www.totenbuch-donauschwabens.at; Vladimir Krpan, Ivan Rizmaul, Davor Salopek, *Petrinjski žrtvoslov* (Petrinja, 1995); Luka Pavičić, *Kronika stradanja Hrvata Južne Like* (Zagreb, 1996); L. Pavičić, *Kronika stradanja Hrvata Južne Like. Dop-*

and victim lists testifying to the great suffering and fatalities sustained by the Catholic Church in the Second World War and the post-war period caused by the JVuO and primarily the NOV and POJ/JA and communist authorities.⁴⁰

una i ispravci (Zagreb, 1997); Ivan Jurić, *Borbe i stradanja Hrvata kotara Metković 1918.-1945.* (Metković, 1997); Damjan Raguž, Jozo Čirko, Milan Lauc (eds.), *Poginuli iz župe Studenci za vrijeme Drugoga svjetskog rata* (Studenci, 1997); Zvonko Farago, Ruža Lenac-Brleković, Zlatko Verhaz, Alojz Vragolović, *Garešnički žrtvoslov* (Garešnica, 1997); Florijan Boras (ed.), *Spomenica ljubuškim žrtvama* (Ljubuški, 1998); Josip Jozo Suton, *Posuški žrtvoslov. Ljetopis stradanja ljudi iz posuškog kraja u Drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1998); V. Geiger (ed.), *Radni logor Valpovo 1945.-1946. Dokumenti* (Osijek, 1999); Karlo Rotim, *Žrtvoslov Širokog Brijega u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču* (Mostar, 2000); Gordana Turić, *U temelju kamen. Spomenica žrtvama idealu hrvatske države. Imotska krajina (od 1941. do 1990.)*, vol. I (Zagreb, 2000); Željko Ceboci, Vlado Hajnić, Kazimir Sviben, Josip Škof, Franjo Škrlec, Stjepan Turk (eds.), *Žrtve zlatarskog kraja u temeljima hrvatske slobode* (Zlatar, 2000); Ivica Puljić, Stanislav Vukorep, Đuro Bender (eds.), *Stradanje Hrvata tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata i porača u Istočnoj Hercegovini* (Zagreb, 2001); Amleto Ballarini, M. Sobolevski (eds.), *Le vittime di nazionalità italiana a Fiume e dintorni (1939-1947)/Žrtve talijanske nacionalnosti u Rijeci i okolici (1939.-1947.)* (Roma - Zagreb, 2002); P. Bezina, *Župljani župa povjerenih Franjevačkoj provinciji Presvetog Otkupitelja žrtve rata 1941.-1945., 1990.-1995.* (Split, 2003); Mira Pelikan, Miroslav Gazda, *Spomenar hrvatskim žrtvama Virovitičko-podravске županije stradalim 1941.-1945. i 1991.-1995. godine* (Osijek, 2003); Vinko Šepić Čiškin, *Gubici liburnijskog kraja u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Pregled gubitaka ljudstva, stambenih i privrednih zgrada, škola i crkava na području Liburnije i Opatijskog Krasa u Drugom svjetskom ratu 1941.-1945. godine* (Rijeka - Opatija, 2003); Mirko Kovačić, *U potrazi za istinom. Martirij Hrvata u Vukovaru 1941.-1945.* (Vukovar, 2004); Katica Nevistić, Tomislav Brković, Janko Ljubos, *Svoju zemlju i oni su voljeli. Poginuli i nestali iz bugojanskog kraja: u Prvom svjetskom ratu (1914-1918), Drugom svjetskom ratu (1941-1945) i poraču te u ratu 1991-1995.* (Sarajevo - Zagreb, 2004); Ante Jurić-Arambašić, *Kijejski žrtvoslov ratova dvadesetog stoljeća* (Kijevo, 2005); Marijan Karaula, *Knjiga bola. Stradanje Hrvata livanjskog kraja u dva posljednja rata* (Sarajevo - Zagreb, 2005); Ivan Stržić, *Žrtvoslov slunjskog kotara. Hrvatske vojne i civilne žrtve Drugoga svjetskog rata i porača* (Slunj - Zagreb, 2005); Adam Zahirović, *Sisački žrtvoslov* (Sisak, 2006); Đuro Mikašek, *Našička spomenica žrtvama komunizma* (Našice, 2007); Mladen Šomek, Nikola Katić, Božidar Kovačević, Davorin Derda, Ivan Prekratić (eds.), *Zatajena grobišta i prešućene žrtve Drugoga svjetskog rata i porača u Karlovačkoj županiji* (Karlovac, 2007); Mato Lukačević, Mladen Đaković, Stjepan Jakab, Ivo Tubanović (eds.), *Prešućene žrtve Đakova i Đakovštine u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču* (Đakovo, 2007); Zdravko Brnjarski, Antun Potnar, M. Lukačević, M. Đaković, S. Jakab, I. Tubanović, Pero Šola (eds.), *Žrtvoslov Ruševa, Djedine Rijeke, Sovskog Dola, Pake i Imrijevača. Žrtve partizanskog pokreta i komunističkog režima. Drugi svjetski rat i porače* (Đakovo, 2007); V. Geiger, *Logor Krndija 1945.-1946.* (Zagreb - Slavonski Brod, 2008); Vinko Juzbašić, *Bošnjaci u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Vojno-politički zapisi i sjećanja* (Bošnjaci, 2008); Đuro Škvorc, *Križevački žrtvoslov* (Križevci, 2008); I. Tubanović, Stipo Pilić, Ivo Aščić, Mirko Blažević, Mara Crnoja, Zdravko Žunić, Branko Bungić (eds.), *Žrtve Drugoga svjetskog rata, porača i Domovinskog rata na području župa Dobretići, Jajce, Korićani, Ključ, Liskovica, Podmilačje i Varcar Vakuf - Mrkonjić Grad* (Nova Bila, 2009); Zdravko Ivković, Josip Vusić, Anita Blažeković (eds.), *Jugoslavensko nasilje i prešućivane žrtve Drugoga svjetskog rata i porača s područja današnje Bjelovarsko-bilogorske županije* (Bjelovar, 2010); Alojz Buljan, Franjo Horvat, *Prešućivane žrtve Drugoga svjetskog rata i porača na području bivšeg kotara/općine Novska (Grad Novska, općine Jasenovac i Lipovljani, Grad Kutina - dio i Grad Sisak - dio)* (Novska, 2011); B. Matković, Josip Dukić, *Dugopoljski žrtvoslov (1941.-1948.)* (Dugopolje, 2011), as well as the sources cited therein.

⁴⁰ For example, see Lucijan Kordić, *Mučeništvo crkve u Hrvatskoj* (Chicago, 1988); Anto Baković, *Drinske mučenice* (Sarajevo, 1990, Zagreb, 1990, Zagreb, 1991); P. Bezina, *Franjevci Provin-*

The emphasis of most victim lists has been placed on wartime and post-war losses of Croats. This is an obvious reason for this. For the highest number of these persons, Croats first and foremost, were not registered in earlier censuses of Second World War human losses, for whatever reason. Regardless of their incompleteness and potential errors, the data provided on those who were killed, slain or who died as a result of injury or illness, on the thousands and tens of thousands of those who lost their lives, particularly on the “Way of the Cross” and in post-war detention, internment or imprisonment in camps, cannot be disputed.⁴¹

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In terms of the number of human losses, the case of Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross” are prime examples of Partisan and communist repression and crimes, i.e., the “settling of accounts with the people’s enemy” in Yugoslavia, and Croatia, at the end of the Second World War and the immediate post-war years.

In historiography, the terms Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross” mean the events at the end of the Second World War on the Yugoslav (Slovenian)-Austrian border in May 1945, particularly those events connected to the final combat operations and the activities of the Yugoslav Army, which surrounded and captured the military units of the Third Reich and the Independent State of Croatia and other Yugoslav anti-communist forces, mostly Serbian and Montenegrin Chetniks, who were withdrawing along the Celje-Slovenj Gradec-Dravograd-Bleiburg route, followed by the British extradition of captives from Austria to the Yugoslav Army, when an undetermined number of members of the armed forces, primarily those of the NDH and Third Reich, but also Slovenian Home Guards, Montenegrin and Serbian Chetniks, as well as civilians in the refugee camp, were executed next to Dravograd and Maribor, in Kočevski

cije Presvetog Otkupitelja žrtve rata 1942-1948 (Split, 1995); Stjepan Kožul, *Spomenica žrtvama ljubavi Zagrebačke nadbiskupije* (Zagreb, 1992) or S. Kožul, *Martirologij Crkve zagrebačke. Spomenica žrtvama ljubavi Zagrebačke nadbiskupije* (Zagreb, 1998); M. Karaula, *Žrtve i mučenici. Stradanje bosanskih franjevaca u Drugom svjetskom ratu i komunizmu* (Sarajevo, 1999); Anto Orlovac, *Banjolučki martirologij. Svećenici banjolučke biskupije – žrtve ratova dvadesetog stoljeća* (Banja Luka-Zagreb, 1999); P. Bezina, *Progoni biskupa, svećenika i redovnika Splitske metropolije i Zadarske nadbiskupije 1941.-1992.* (Split, 2000); Ivan Damiš, *Franjevci Hrvatske franjevačke provincije sv. Ćirila i Metoda žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata, poraća i jugokomunizma* (Zagreb, 2000); Miroslav Akmadža, *Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945.-1966.* (Rijeka, 2004); Antun Jarm, *Pribrojeni zboru mučenika. Svećenici Đakovačke i Srijemske biskupije svjedoci i žrtve u vrijeme i neposredno nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata* (Đakovo, 2007); A. Baković, *Hrvatski martirologij XX. stoljeća: Svećenici - mučenici Crkve u Hrvata* (Zagreb, 2008), M. Akmadža, Slađana Josipović Batorek, *Stradanja svećenika Đakovačke i Srijemske biskupije 1944. – 1960.* (Slavonski Brod - Đakovo, 2012) as well as the sources cited therein.

⁴¹ See V. Geiger, “Osvrt na važnije žrtvoslove o Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću objavljene u Republici Hrvatskoj 1991.-2004. godine”, *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 9 (Zagreb, 2005), pp. 621- 639.

Rog and at some other Slovenian towns and during the so-called “death marches” or “Ways of the Cross”, whence the captives were returned to camps in Yugoslavia.⁴²

In the abundant literature on Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross”, which provide various estimates, calculations and claims, the number of casualties and fatalities ranges from roughly 50,000 to – particularly among the Croatian but also Serbian émigré authors – most often 200,000, 250,000 and as much as 500,000 and 600,000, and even the unbelievable figure of over 1 million slain and killed captured Ustasha, Home Guardsmen, and civilians from the NDH.⁴³ The total actual losses tied to the Bleiburg case may be, based on the generally accepted and possible statistical calculations, a minimum of approximately 70,000 to 80,000, while the Croat losses may be roughly 50,000 to 55,000.⁴⁴ According to Žerjavić, at Bleiburg and on the “Way of the Cross”, it was mostly Croats, 45,000, and Muslims, 4,000 who lost their lives, or rather 45,000 to 55,000 Croats and Muslims, followed by 8,000 to 10,000 Slovenes and approximately 2,000 Serbs and Montenegrins.⁴⁵

The most recent research into archival sources and the mass graves in Slovenia indicate that the final number of actual losses tied to the Bleiburg case could be higher than the above-cited calculations and – by all accounts – that the number of actual losses of certain national groups, primarily the Slovenes and Montenegrins, may be considerably higher than those indicated in the above calcula-

⁴² See M. Grahek Ravančić, *Bleiburg i križni put 1945. Historiografija, publicistika i memoarska literatura* (Zagreb, 2009), as well as the sources cited therein.

⁴³ For example, see George J. Prpic, *Tragedies and Migrations in Croatian History* (Toronto, 1975); Oton Knezović, *Pokolj hrvatske vojske 1945. Dokumenti o zvjerstvima Srba nad Hrvatima* (Chicago, 1960); John Ivan Prcela, Stanko Guldescu, *Operation Slaughterhouse. Eyewitness Accounts of Postwar Massacres in Yugoslavia* (Philadelphia, 1970, Pittsburgh, 1995); Danijel Crljen, “Bleiburg”, *Hrvatska revija* XVI (1966), vol. 2-4: 263-296; Borivoje M. Karapandžić, *The Bloodiest Yugoslav Springs 1945 - Tito's Katyn and Gulags* (New York, 1980) or B. M. Karapandžić, *Jugoslovensko krvavo proleće 1945. Titovi Katini i Gulazi* (Cleveland, 1976, Belgrade, 1990); Ivo Bogdan (ed.), *La Tragedia de Bleiburg. Documentos sobre las matanzas en masa de los croatas en Yugoslavia comunista en 1945* (Buenos Aires, 1963); Vinko Nikolić, Frano Nevistić, *Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda* (Barcelona, 1976, Barcelona, 1977, Zagreb, 1993); F. Th. Rulitz, *Die Tragödie von Bleiburg und Viktring. Partisanengewalt in Kärntner am Beispiel der antikommunistischen Flüchtlinge im Mai 1945* (Klagenfurt-Ljubljana-Vienna, 2011) or F. Th. Rulitz, *Bleiburška i vetrinjska tragedija. Partizansko nasilje u Koruškoj na primjeru protukomunističkih izbjeglica u svibnju 1945.* (Zagreb, 2012).

⁴⁴ See M. Grahek Ravančić, “Razmišljanja o broju pogubljenih i stradalih na Bleiburgu i križnom putu”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 40 (2008), no. 3, pp. 851-868; M. Grahek Ravančić, *Bleiburg i Križni put 1945. Historiografija, publicistika i memoarska literatura*, pp. 317-333, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁴⁵ V. Žerjavić, “Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.”, p. 161; V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 75-79; V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 95.

tions.⁴⁶ According to some calculations, such as those by Katalinić, the actual losses of Croats (including Muslims) tied to Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross” are 85,000 at a minimum, probably 135,000 and 198,500 at a maximum.⁴⁷ Lists of individual names of those who lost their lives at Bleiburg and on the “Way of the Cross” are non-systematic and incomplete. The most extensive list of the Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia in 1999 provides data on 13,300 persons who lost their lives at Bleiburg and on the “Way of the Cross”.⁴⁸ But M. Šimundić estimated that the total actual losses of Croats at Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross” may have been approximately 125,000.⁴⁹ Based on a systematic comparison of the estimates, calculations and lists of human losses caused by the Partisans and communists in Yugoslavia during the war and post-war years conducted by M. Portmann, approximately 80,000 Croatian, Bosniak, Serbian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and German prisoners-of-war, mainly soldiers, but also civilians, lost their lives at Bleiburg and on the “Way of the Cross”.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Dizdar, citing the numerous victim lists, stated that the Croatian fatalities of Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross” exceeded 50,000, and then he noted that according to the victim lists, approximately 62,000 post-war Croatian fatalities were ascertained based on personal identification, mainly at Bleiburg and on the “Way of the Cross”. But these figures, although statistically possible, are obviously rough estimates, for he did not indicate which victim lists and similar publications were consulted, how many fatalities were specified in individual lists and how the verification and auditing of data was done (*Table 10*).⁵¹

According to the information provided by Yugoslav military historiography, during the final battles and operations preceding the final offensive in 1945, the Yugoslav Army inflicted great losses on the German and various “domestic” anti-communist forces of over 100,000 dead, while approximately 340,000 were captured, which means in Austria it managed to kill something

⁴⁶ See M. Ferenc, *Prikrito in očem zakrito. Prikrita grobišča 60 let po koncu druge svetovne vojne* (Celje, 2005); *Poročilo Komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za reševanje vprašanj prikritih grobišč 2005-2008* (Ljubljana, 2008, Ljubljana, 2009); *Prikrita grobišča. Izvješće komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za rješavanje pitanja skrivenih grobišta 2005.-2008.* (Sarajevo, 2010); S. Gregović, *Pucaj, rat je završen. Zlim putem bratoubilaštva: slovenačko krvavo proljeće 1945.* (Budva, 2009).

⁴⁷ K. Katalinić, “Hrvatske i srpske žrtve 1941.-1945.,” pp. 15-63; K. Katalinić, “Broj bleiburških žrtava,” in Jozo Marević (ed.), *50 godina Bleiburga* (Zagreb, 1995), pp. 49-61.

⁴⁸ *Izvješće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, p. 20.

⁴⁹ Mate Šimundić, *Hrvatski smrtni put (Prilog novijoj hrvatskoj povijesti)* (Split, 2001).

⁵⁰ See M. Portmann, “Communist Retaliation and Persecution on Yugoslav Territory during and after WWII (1943 - 1950),” *Tokovi istorije* (2004) 1-2, pp. 45-74.

⁵¹ Z. Dizdar, “Stradanja Hrvata u II. svjetskom ratu i neposredno nakon njega,” in Vicko Kapitanović (ed.), *Crkva i društvo uz Jadran. Vrela i rezultati istraživanja. Zbornik* (Split, 2001), p. 179; Z. Dizdar, “Prilog istraživanju problema Bleiburga i križnih putova (u povodu 60. obljetnice),” *Senjski zbornik* 32 (2005), no. 32: 188.

more than 240,000 German and other soldiers. In inflicting these losses upon the enemy, the most efficient were the Third (25,000 dead and over 100,000 captured) and Fourth Armies (25,664 dead and 52,260 captured) which operated on the wings of the battlefields. Out of the approximately 340,000 prisoners-of-war, 221,287 were German soldiers, while approximately 120,000 were members of the NDH armed forces (Ustasha and Home Guardsmen), Serbian and Montenegrin Chetniks and others.⁵²

However, some Croatian historians advocate the old *émigré* belief that only or mostly Croats were the victims of Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross”, and that “genocide” against the Croats had occurred in May 1945, i.e., they present everything superficially and schematically as *hatred of all that is Croatian*.⁵³ Croats were undoubtedly the most numerous among the fatalities at Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross”, but a fact that may not be overlooked is that among the captives and then slain there were many Germans, Slovenes, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks and others, both soldiers and civilians.

Today’s “Croatian anti-fascists”, although it may be said that often these are persons who never discarded the discredited communist worldview, generally members of the Alliance of Antifascist Veterans and Antifascists of the Republic of Croatia, actually former members of SUBNOR (Alliance of Associations of Veterans of the People’s Liberation War), and advocates of the *leftist* worldview in Croatia, go even farther, despite of their declarations condemning all crimes, in silencing and disparaging research into Bleiburg and the “Way of the Cross” that do not uphold their “antifascist” picture of the past. At the same time, they attempt to minimize events and crimes which have become publicly known and verified, and provide peculiar explanations for them.⁵⁴ It is noticeable that the Croatian media largely serve as a conduit for precisely such efforts.

⁵² Mladenko Colić, *Pregled operacija na jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945* (Belgrade, 1988), p. 401.

⁵³ For example, see M. Ivezić, *Genocid nad Hrvatima zapovijeda Tito* (Zagreb, 1999); M. Ivezić, *Titova umjetnost mržnje* (Zagreb, 2001); J. Jurčević, *Bleiburg. Jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima* (Zagreb, 2005); J. Jurčević, *Crna knjiga komunizma u Hrvatskoj (zločini jugoslavenskih komunista u Hrvatskoj 1945. godine)* (Zagreb, 2006); Ante Milinović, *Kalvarija bosansko-hercegovačkih Hrvata* (Zagreb, 2012).

⁵⁴ V. Geiger, “Osvrt na istraživanja i odjeke problematike Bleiburga i Križnog puta 1945. u Republici Hrvatskoj”, *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 8 (Zagreb, 2004), pp. 409-428; V. Geiger, “Josip Broz Tito i Bleiburg”, in Tomislav Jonjić, Zlatko Matijević (eds.), *Hrvatska između slobode i jugoslavenstva. Zbornik* (Zagreb, 2009), pp. 339-366 or V. Geiger, “Tito i likvidacija hrvatskih zarobljenika u Blajburgu 1945”, *Istorija 20. veka XXVIII* (2010), no. 2: 29-52. For example, see Nikola Anić, *Antifašistička Hrvatska. Narodnooslobodilačka vojska i Partizanski odredi Hrvatske 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 2005); Slavko Goldstein, *1941. Godina koja se vraća* (Zagreb 2007); Juraj Hrženjak (ed.), *Bleiburg i Križni put. Zbornik radova* (Zagreb, 2007); Ivo Goldstein, *Hrvatska 1918 - 2008.* (Zagreb, 2008).

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Prisoner-of-war and forced labour camps in Croatia's territory were set up by the People's Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Croatia immediately after the establishment of their authority in individual areas, already during the summer and autumn of 1944, which would subsequently become quite frequent and common by the end of the Second World War and the immediate post-war period.⁵⁵ After their surrender and apprehension in the final battles and their extradition at Bleiburg, columns of captured soldiers and civilians set off, with the armed accompaniment of JA troops, on an exhausting return through Slovenia, toward Croatia and beyond to POW camps in Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ Numerous mass graves in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia testify to just how unconditional and unforbearing the goading of captives was.⁵⁷

At the end of 1945, there was a total of 355,785 prisoners-of-war in POW camps in Yugoslavia, among whom most were Germans and Austrians, while among the 114,000 "Yugoslavs", obviously most were Croats, with 7,797 Yugoslav Germans (Volksdeutscher). The chairman of the National Committee of Yugoslavia's Liberation and the supreme commander of the Yugoslav Army, Josip Broz Tito, ordered the release of Croatian and Slovenian Home Guardists in September 1945, while at the beginning of March 1946 he also ordered the release from camps of persons of "Yugoslav nationality – members of enemy

⁵⁵ V. Geiger (ed.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Slavonija, Srijem i Baranja*, p. 51; V. Geiger, *Partisan and Communist Repression and Crimes in Croatia 1944 - 1946. Documents. Slavonia, Syrmia and Baranya*, pp. 51-52; V. Geiger, M. Rupić, M. Kevo, E. Kraljević, Z. Despot (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Zagreb i središnja Hrvatska*, p. 74; M. Rupić, V. Geiger (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Dalmacija*, pp. 88-89.

⁵⁶ Z. Dizdar, V. Geiger, M. Pojić, M. Rupić (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti*, pp. 117-118; M. Grahek Ravančić, "V kolonah po štirje skozi Slovenijo", *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* XLVIII (2008), no. 2: 95-116; M. Grahek Ravančić, *Bleiburg i Križni put 1945. Historiografija, publicistika i memoarska literatura*, pp. 203-316, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁵⁷ See *Izvešće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine* (Zagreb, 1999); M. Ferenc, *Prikrito in očem zakrito. Prikriva grobišča 60 let po koncu druge svetovne vojne* (Celje, 2005); M. Ferenc, Ž. Kužatko, *Prikrivena grobišta Hrvata u Republici Sloveniji/Prikriva grobišča Hrvatov v Republici Sloveniji/Hidden Croatian Mass Graves in the Republic of Slovenia* (Zagreb, 2007); Janez Črnež, *Grobišča na Štajerskem* (Ljubljana, 2009); *Poročilo Komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za reševanje vprašanj prikritih grobišč 2005-2008* (Ljubljana, 2008, Ljubljana, 2009); *Prikriva grobišča. Izvešće komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za reševanje pitanja skrivenih grobišta 2005.-2008.* (Sarajevo, 2010); M. Ferenc, "Istraživanje prikrivenih grobnica u Sloveniji", *Istorija 20. veka* XXVIII (2010), no. 1: 9-22; M. Ferenc, M. Alić, P. Jamnik, *Huda jama. Skrito za enajstimi pregradami* (Ljubljana, 2011); S. Cvetković (ed.), *Državna komisija za tajne grobnice ubijenih posle 12. septembra 1944. Godišnji izveštaj 2010* (Belgrade, 2010); J. Jurčević, *Prikrivena stratišta i grobišta jugoslavenskih komunističkih zločina* (Zagreb, 2012).

military formations”, except those against whom criminal prosecution was being conducted.⁵⁸ In the meantime, since the end of active combat in May 1945, thousands of soldiers, prisoners-of-war, were killed or died in prisoner marches, transitional camps and at forced labour.⁵⁹

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Revolution implied and sought fatalities. In all areas, the establishment of communist authority in Croatia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia was followed by a wave of arrests and liquidations. Opponents or assumed opponents of communist authority, regardless of nationality/ethnicity, were removed in summary proceedings or after trials, usually show trials.⁶⁰

The communist showdown with real and assumed opponents without qualification, institutional and extra-institutional, during the Second World War or the post-war period, was massive and merciless. Excessively broadly defined, real or imagined collaboration with the occupier was an exceptional instrument for eliminating class and ideological/political enemies.⁶¹ Enemies and perceived enemies had to be removed. As the most significant force opposing the new system besides the Croatian Peasant Party, which found itself at odds with the new authorities in Croatia, was the Catholic Church. It was a threat to the communists in philosophical terms, for it gathered all anti-communists and the population in general, to which numerous events and documents testify.⁶²

⁵⁸ Antun Miletić (ed.), “Prilog proučavanju istorije Jugoslovenske narodne armije kroz izabrana dokumenta maršala Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita u svojstvu ministra narodne odbrane i vrhovnog komandanta Oružanih snaga FNRJ u periodu 1945-1956. godine”, *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* XXXVIII (1987), no. 1, pp. 327, 350-351, 357-358; Jere Jareb, “Titove naredbe o hrvatskim ratnim zarobljenicima i uništavanju hrvatskih domovinskih pobunjenika od 30. lipnja 1945. do 2. ožujka 1946.”, *Hrvatska revija* XXXIX (1989), vol. 3: 609-610, 617-618.

⁵⁹ See Boris Vlašić, Aleksandar Vojinović, *Križni put - povijest, svjedočanstva, dokumenti* (Zagreb, 1991); M. Grahek Ravančić, *Bleiburg i Križni put 1945. Historiografija, publicistika i memoarska literatura*, pp. 203-314, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶⁰ For example, see N. Kisić-Kolanović, “Vrijeme političke represije: ‘veliki sudski procesi’ u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1948.”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 25 (1993), no. 1: 1-23; J. Vodušek Starič, *Prevzem oblasti 1944 - 1946* (Ljubljana, 1992) or J. Vodušek Starič, *Kako su komunisti osvojili vlast 1944. - 1946.* (Zagreb, 2006); Rajko Danilović, *Upotreba neprijatelja. Politička suđenja u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991.* (Belgrade, 2001, Belgrade, 2002, Belgrade, 2010); S. Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića. Represija u Srbiji 1944-1953.* (Belgrade, 2006), as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶¹ Ekkehard Völkl, “Abrechnungsfuror in Kroatien”, in Klaus Dietmar Henke und Hans Woller (eds.), *Politische Säuberung in Europa. Die Abrechnung mit Faschismus und Kolaboration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (München, 1991), pp. 366-394; J. Vodušek Starič, “Kako se čistila Jugoslavija”, *Gordogan* II (XXI) (2004), no. 4-5 (48-49): 36-49, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶² For example, see Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941.-1950.* (Zagreb, 1996); A. Baković, *Hrvatski martirologij XX. stoljeća: Svećenici - mučenici Crkve u Hrvata* (Zagreb 2008); Z. Dizdar, V. Geiger, M. Pojić, M. Rupić (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti* (Slavonski Brod, 2005, Zagreb, 2009); V. Geiger (ed.), *Partizanska i*

Through the People's Protection Department (OZN – later the State Security Administration, or UDBa), the new Yugoslav communist authorities waged an uncompromising and merciless campaign in the post-war years against the so-called Crusaders (members of the defeated NDH armed forces who were mostly Ustasha, and much less Home Guardsman or Croats who were members of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, but also members of the Ustasha movement outside of military units who formed guerrilla formations after the war, and who fought against the new communist authorities to restore the NDH, or they were in hiding for fear of reprisals, as well as those who deserted from the Yugoslav Army and those who fled recruitment). Something similar occurred with members of the Chetnik movement, i.e., the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, who continued their struggle against the communist system in Yugoslavia after the war in an effort to restore the monarchist system and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.⁶³

A notable role at the end of 1944 and the first post-war months of 1945 in Yugoslavia and Croatia was played by courts martial, which had jurisdiction over the most important criminal acts regardless of whether the perpetrators were military personnel or civilians, namely for war crimes, acts by enemies of the people and crimes perpetrated by military personnel and prisoners-of-war.⁶⁴ Guided by the same objective encapsulated in the slogan "Death to fascism – Freedom of the people!", the courts martial uniquely exercised their purpose as revolutionary organs, believing that all who harmed the interests of "the people and the people's liberation struggle" must be convicted.⁶⁵ The pas-

komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti. Slavonija, Srijem i Baranja (Slavonski Brod, 2006); V. Geiger, *Partisan and Communist Repression and Crimes in Croatia 1944 - 1946. Documents. Slavonia, Strymia and Baranya* (Bismarck, North Dakota, 2011); V. Geiger, M. Rupić, M. Kevo, E. Kraljević, Z. Despot (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. - 1946. Dokumenti. Zagreb i središnja Hrvatska* (Slavonski Brod - Zagreb, 2008); M. Rupić, V. Geiger (eds.), *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Dalmacija* (Slavonski Brod - Zagreb, 2011), as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶³ See Z. Radelić, *Križari: gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1950.* (Zagreb, 2002, Zagreb, 2011); B. Dimitrijević, *Gradanski rat u miru. Uloga armije i službe bezbednosti u obračunu sa političkim protivnicima Titovog režima 1944-1954.* (Belgrade, 2003); Ivica Lučić, "Hrvatska protukomunistička gerila u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1945. do 1951.," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 42 (2010), no. 3: 631-670, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶⁴ Marko Kalodera, *Vojni pravosudni organi i pravne službe JNA*, (Belgrade, 1986), pp. 13-25, 34-35; J. Jurčević, Katica Ivanda, "Ustrojavanje sustava jugoslavenskih komunističkih vojnih sudova tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata i poraća," *Društvena istraživanja* 15 (2006), no. 4-5: 891-914; Tomislav Sabljak, "U redu za smrtnu kaznu. Egzekutori Vojnog suda II. armije Koče Popovića u Zagrebu, godine 1945.," *Hrvatska revija* XLIII (1993), vol. 4: 432-441; Tatjana Šarić, "Osuđeni po hitnom postupku: uloga represivnih tijela komunističke vlasti u odnosu na smrtnu osudu u Hrvatskoj u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću, na primjeru fonda Uprava za suzbijanje kriminaliteta Sekretarijata za unutrašnje poslove SRH," *Arhivski vjesnik* 51 (2008): 341-361, as well as the sources cited therein.

⁶⁵ M. Kalodera, *Vojni pravosudni organi i pravne službe JNA*, pp. 13-14; Miloš Gojković, *Istorija jugoslovenskog vojnog pravosuđa* (Belgrade, 1999), pp. 127-128.

sage of the Court Martial Organization and Jurisdiction Act in August 1945 limited courts martial to military personnel and prisoners-of-war,⁶⁶ while non-military persons were tried only for “the act of diminishing the people’s defence and divulging military secrets”. For all other crimes, the standard people’s courts were accorded jurisdiction.⁶⁷ According to official Yugoslav information, the courts martial in Yugoslavia pronounced 5,484 death sentences during the course of 1945, of which 4,864 were handed down to civilians.⁶⁸

The post-war forced-labour prison camps in Yugoslavia were established during the period of most intense repression by the communist authorities, from 1945 to 1951. Security for the forced-labour prison camps was provided by the Yugoslav Army and the People’s Defence Corps of Yugoslavia (KNOJ). Special forced-labour prison camps were also set up under the exclusive administration of the People’s Defence Department. It was only in the summer of 1945 that jurisdiction over the forced-labour prison camps was transferred from the military authorities to internal affairs.⁶⁹ Labour camps in Croatia were established in the summer of 1945 for those who were sentenced to detention with forced labour. They were first called “penal camps”, and then, as of early 1946, “forced labour institutes”. After the forced labour camps/institutes were abolished in the summer/autumn of 1946, the convicts served out their sentences in penal/correctional halls (Stara Gradiška, Lepoglava, Slavonska Požega, Glina, and elsewhere).⁷⁰ From 1945 to 1951, during the period of “people’s democracy”, courts martial, tribunals for the protection of the national honour of the Croats and Serbs in Croatia sentenced thousands of persons, men, but also women, to detention with forced labour. The work performed by

⁶⁶ See Jelena Đ. Lopičić (ed.), *Ratni zločini protiv ratnih zarobljenika. Sudska praksa* (Belgrade, 2005); Đorđe N. Lopičić (ed.), *Nemački ratni zločini 1941-1945. Presude jugoslovenskih vojnih sudova* (Belgrade, 2009); Jelena Đ. Lopičić-Jančić (ed.), *Ratni zločini nemačkih okupatora u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945. godine. Presude jugoslovenskih vojnih sudova* (Belgrade, 2010); Đ. N. Lopičić (ed.), *Mađarski ratni zločini 1941-1945. Presude jugoslovenskih sudova* (Belgrade, 2010).

⁶⁷ Konstantin Bastaić, “Razvitak organa pravosuđa u novoj Jugoslaviji”, in Ferdo Čulinović (ed.), *Nova Jugoslavija. Pregled državnopravnog razvitka. Povodom desetogodišnjice Drugog zasjedanja AVNOJ-a* (Zagreb, 1954), p. 109; M. Kalodera, *Vojni pravosudni organi i pravne službe JNA*, pp. 34-35; M. Gojković, *Istorija jugoslovenskog vojnog pravosuđa*, pp. 139-140.

⁶⁸ M. Kalodera, *Vojni pravosudni organi i pravne službe JNA*, pp. 256-257.

⁶⁹ J. Vodušek Starić, *Prezmem oblasti 1944 - 1946*, pp. 192-194, 269-271 or J. Vodušek Starić, *Kako su komunisti osvojili vlast 1944.-1946.*, pp. 216-217, 302-304.

⁷⁰ See Augustin Franić, *KPD Lepoglava mučilište i gubilište hrvatskih političkih osuđenika* (Zagreb, 2000, Dubrovnik, 2010); A. Franić, *KPD Stara Gradiška mučilište i gubilište hrvatskih političkih osuđenika* (Dubrovnik, 2009); Željko Marenic (ed.), *Kazneno popravni dom - Dom za preodgoj maloljetnica Slavonska Požega 1946-1986* (Slavonska Požega, 1986); Kaja Pereković, *Naše robijanje. Hrvatske žene u komunističkim zatvorima* (Rijeka - Zagreb, 2004); V. Geiger, “Lišavanje slobode i prisilni rad u hrvatskom/jugoslavenskom zakonodavstvu 1945.-1951.”, in V. Geiger, M. Grahek Ravančić, M. Karakaš Obradov (eds.), *Logori, zatvori i prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945./1945.-1951. Zbornik* (Zagreb, 2010), pp. 151-166, as well as the sources cited therein.

these convicts was generally the most difficult physical labour, so when serving out their sentences of detention with forced labour, many had their health permanently impaired, while many lost their lives as well.

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Well-founded figures for the number of those who lost their lives in Yugoslavia's territory at the hands of the NOV and POJ/JA and the communist authorities during the Second World War and post-war years are generally around 200,000, with some minor lower or higher deviations, depending on the various calculations and/or estimates.

According to Žerjavić's calculations/estimates, a total of 209,000 Yugoslavs on the *enemy* side lost their lives during World War II, most of them from Bosnia-Herzegovina with approximately 70,000, followed by those from Serbia, at approximately 69,000 (ca 27,000 from Vojvodina, ca. 7,000 from Kosovo), Croatia with approximately 52,000, Slovenia with approximately 10,000, Montenegro with approximately 7,000 and Macedonia with approximately 1,000 (*Table 11*).⁷¹ According to the estimates of Austrian historian M. Portmann, based on previous information, there were approximately 180,000 fatalities in Yugoslavia's territory during the Second World War and post-war period, from the end of 1943 to the beginning of 1948, caused by the NOV and POJ/JA and the communist authorities, among whom a minimum of one third of those who lost their lives may have been Croats (*Table 12*).⁷²

According to Žerjavić's calculations/estimates, 1,027,000 Yugoslavs lost their lives during the Second World War, of whom 947,000 lost their lives in Yugoslavia, and the remainder abroad under various circumstances, while 271,000 persons lost their lives in Croatia, of whom 66,000 were members of the NOV and POJ/JA, 52,000 were members of collaborationist and Quisling forces, and 153,000 were civilian fatalities (*Table 13*).⁷³ According to Žerjavić, during the

⁷¹ V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, p. 116; V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, p. 214; V. Žerjavić, "Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.", p. 160; V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću", p. 554; V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 186.

⁷² M. Portmann, "Communist Retaliation and Persecution on Yugoslav Territory during and after WWII (1943 - 1950)", pp. 45-74. See V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugome svjetskom ratu i u poraću koje su prouzročili Narodnooslobodilačka vojska i Partizanski odredi Jugoslavije/Jugoslavenska armija i komunistička vlast. Brojiddbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi). Case study: Bleiburg i folksdojčeri", p. 718.

⁷³ V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, p. 116; V. Žerjavić, "Stradanja Jugoslavena u drugom svjetskom ratu", *Viktimologija* 1 (1990), no. 1-2, p. 44; V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, p. 214; V. Žerjavić, *Yugoslavia - manipulations with the numbers of Second World War victims/Yougoslavie - manipulations sur le nombre des victimes de la Seconde guerre mondiale/Jugoslawien - Manipulationen mit Kriegsopfern des zweiten Weltkriegs/Jugoslavija -*

Second World War and post-war years, 175,000 or 178,000 Croats lost their lives as members of the NDH armed forces, 69,000 or 71,000 lost their lives as members of the NOV and POJ/JA and 46,000 or 43,000 lost their lives as civilians, while 60,000 or 64,000 lost their lives in direct terror or in camps (*Table 14*).⁷⁴

If Croatian collateral victims in the Second World War, that is, persons who died of starvation and infirmity and in epidemics, mostly typhus, and persons killed by explosive devices, mostly in air raids, are added to these calculations/estimates, it follows that the actual losses of Croats in the Second World War and post-war years may have been roughly 200,000, with minor higher or lower deviations.

According to Žerjavić's more systematic and detailed calculations/estimates, 106,000 Croats from Croatia lost their lives during the Second World War and post-war period, 28,000 as members of the NOV and POJ/JA, 45,000 as members of the NDH armed forces and 33,000 as civilians, followed by 5,000 Croats from eastern Srijem, 1,000 as members of the NOV and POJ/JA, 2,000 as members of the NDH armed forces and 2,000 as civilians, as well as 2,000 Muslims from Croatia, 1,000 as members of the NDH armed forces and 1,000 as civilians. Out of this number, the Chetniks/Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland caused the deaths of 20,000 persons, 8,000 members of the NOV and POJ/JA and 12,000 civilians. The NOV and POJ/JA caused the deaths of 56,000 persons, 48,000 members of the NDH armed forces and 8,000 civilians. According to Žerjavić, 64,000 Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina lost their lives during the Second World War and the post-war period, 17,000 as members of the NOV and POJ/JA, 22,000 as members of the NDH armed forces and 25,000 as civilians. Out of this number, the Chetniks/JVuO caused the deaths of 12,000 persons, 6,000 members of the NOV and POJ/JA and 6,000 civilians. The NOV and POJ/JA caused the death of 28,000 persons, 22,000 members of the NDH armed forces and 6,000 civilians. According to Žerjavić, 75,000 Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina lost their lives during the Second World War and post-war period, 11,000 as members of the NOV and POJ/JA, 28,000 as members of the NDH armed forces and 36,000 as civilians. Out of this number, the Chetniks/JVuO caused the deaths of 33,000 persons, 2,000 members of the NOV and POJ/JA, 11,000 members of the NDH armed forces and 20,000 civilians. The NOV and POJ/JA caused the deaths of 17,000 persons, 15,000 members of the NDH armed forces and 2,000 civilians. During the Second World War and post-war period, out of the 175,000

manipulacije žrtvama Drugog svjetskog rata, p. 61; V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću", p. 554; V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 186.

⁷⁴ V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, pp. 75-76; V. Žerjavić, *Poginuli, ubijeni i umoreni 1941-1945 /u tisućama/* [Croats and Muslims in NDH territory] [Tabular overview] (Zagreb, 1994); V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću", pp. 556-557; V. Žerjavić, *Population Losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, p. 94.

Croats and 77,000 Muslims from the NDH who lost their lives, the Chetniks/JVuO caused the deaths of 68,000 and the NOV and POJ/JA 101,000 persons. If the 17,000 Croats and Muslims from the NDH who lost their lives in various ways outside of the NDH as members of the NDH armed forces, members of the NOV and POJ/JA or as civilians, it follows that during the Second World War and immediate post-war period, 189,000 Croats and 80,000 Muslims from the NDH lost their lives (*Table 15*).⁷⁵

However, individual researchers who assert the inevitability of using identification of casualties and fatalities by individual names have raised serious objections to Žerjavić's calculations/estimates of human losses by using standard statistical methods and consolidation of data from various sources, pointing out that such an approach is insufficient and unreliable in determining the number and character of casualties and fatalities, as well as the affiliation of the perpetrators of the crimes, i.e., those who caused the loss of lives.

The calculations of statisticians/demographers, the estimates of historians and lists of individual names of human losses in both Croatia and Yugoslavia during the Second World War and post-war years are often quite different.

According to Katalinić's calculations/estimates, which differ considerably from those of Žerjavić and Kočović, the demographic losses of Croats (Catholic and Muslims) in the NDH during the Second World War and post-war period were 543,000 (Croatia 279,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina 264,000), of whom 384,000 were Catholic Croats (Croatia 274,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina 110,000), and 159,000 were Muslim Croats (Croatia 5,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina 154,000). The actual losses of Croats (including Muslims) in the NDH during the Second World War and post-war period, according to Katalinić, were 427,000 (Croatia 228,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina 199,000), of whom 307,000 were Catholic Croats (Croatia 225,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina 82,000), while 120,000 were Muslim Croats (Croatia 3,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina 117,000). According to Katalinić, the actual losses of Croats (including Muslims) in the NDH during the Second World War and post-war period were a minimum of 326,000, probably 427,000 and a maximum of 553,000 persons. The actual losses of Croats in Croatia during the Second World War and post-war period, according to Katalinić's calculations, are a minimum of 168,000, probably 225,000 and a maximum of 323,000 persons (*Tables 16 and 17*).⁷⁶

According to V. Stipetić's calculations, Croatia's human losses during the period from 1931 to 1948, with emphasis on the events of the Second World

⁷⁵ V. Žerjavić, *Poginuli, ubijeni i umoreni 1941-1945 /u tisućama/* [Croats and Muslims in NDH territory] [Tabular overview] (Zagreb, 1994). See V. Geiger, "Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili 'okupatori i njihovi pomagači'. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)", pp. 743-744.

⁷⁶ K. Katalinić, "Hrvatske i srpske žrtve 1941.-1945.," pp. 15-63; K. Katalinić, *Argumenti. NDH, BiH, Bleiburg i genocid*, pp. 91, 137.

V. GEIGER, Human losses of the Croats in World War II and the immediate post-war period caused...

War, are: total demographic losses of 716,000, of which most were Serbs, 227,000, followed by Croats at 190,000, Germans and Austrians at 102,000 and Italians at 83,000, while total actual losses were 337,000, of which most were Croats, with 149,000, followed by Serbs with 130,000, Roma with 20,000 and Jews with 18,000 (*Table 18*).⁷⁷

Due to a lack of systematic research, even today many figures are arbitrary estimates, in which individual categories of human losses in Croatia, and Yugoslavia, during the Second World War and post-war years are either exaggerated or minimized. The exaggeration or minimization, or even concealment, of individual categories of human losses, are most often due – besides a lack of knowledge of the relevant facts – to personal, national or political reasons, for casualties and fatalities are “ours”, while the perpetrators are “theirs” or, conversely, the casualties and fatalities are “theirs” while the perpetrators are “ours”.

There are even differences, sometimes considerable, among the statistical calculations of human losses in both Yugoslavia and Croatia during the Second World War, although most calculations of demographic and actual losses were done using a similar methodology. But in their calculations/estimates of Croatia's human losses in the Second World War, Croatian demographers did not, as a rule, resort classifying the number of casualties and fatalities based on ideological/military affiliation and the ideology or military formation of the perpetrators or parties responsible for the deaths.⁷⁸

There are various estimates, calculations and even name lists on the human losses of Croatia, and Yugoslavia, during the Second World War and post-war period and their national/ethnic structure. However, not even the lists of individual names of casualties and fatalities can be deemed final. Changes are also possible based on the reduction in the number of individual categories of casualties and fatalities. Together with the requisite and unavoidable supplements and corrections to the data in name lists, also notable are the more significant *changes* in the number and structure of casualties and fatalities and the *transfer* from one national/ethnic and ideological/military group to another, and even one site of loss of lives to another, which indicates potential manipulations.

Additionally, there is actually no scholarly dialogue on the matter of human losses in Croatia during the Second World War and post-war period.

⁷⁷ V. Stipetić, “Jedno stoljeće u razvoju nacionalne strukture stanovništva na teritoriju SR Hrvatske (1880 - 1981)”, pp. 81, 119-120. See V. Geiger, “Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili ‘okupatori i njihovi pomagači. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi)”, p. 746.

⁷⁸ For example, see Jakov Gelo, *Demografske promjene u Hrvatskoj od 1780. do 1981. godine* (Zagreb, 1987), p. 192; V. Stipetić, “Jedno stoljeće u razvoju nacionalne strukture stanovništva na teritoriju SR Hrvatske (1880 - 1981)”, pp. 81, 119-120; I. Nejašmić, *Depopulacija u Hrvatskoj. Korijeni, stanje, izgledi*, p. 141 or I. Nejašmić, *Stanovništvo Hrvatske. Demografske studije i analize*, p. 56.

However, in research into the human losses of Croatia, and Yugoslavia, in the Second World War and post-war years, *confronting the past* is inevitable. Thus far, we have not demonstrated a readiness and capacity for such thinking. The question remains as to how much today's Croatian society and its individual members, rather obsessed with "victimomania", are capable of *confronting the past*, or the extent to which they are intentionally prevented from doing so by politics.

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The establishment of human losses in Croatia, and Yugoslavia, during the Second World War and post-war period, including soldiers and civilians, those who died, were killed or lost their lives as a result of the war, and missing persons, cannot be approached on the basis of improvisation and speculation, but rather on the basis of specific actual indicators, in order to reach the most accurate possible data on the number and names, national/ethnic, age, gender, and ideological/political and military or even civilian character of casualties and fatalities. Establishing human losses is not only a scholarly and research pursuit, it is a civilizational necessity. The question of the human losses of Croatia, and Yugoslavia, during the Second World War and post-war period is one of the most complex research themes which must be constantly re-examined and supplemented.

Table 1

Structure and number of actual losses of Croatia during the Second World War and the post-war period based on data Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia, 1999 ¹			
Lost lives as		Lost their lives, by nationality	
Partisans	38,732	Croats	79,318
Civilians	38,000	Serbs	18,410
Ustasha soldiers	18,814	Germans	752
Croatian Home Guard	13,908	Roma	701
NDH armed forces	9,133	Jews	293
German army	1,621	Hungarians	119
Italian army	206	Czechs	98
Yugoslav Army	147	Slovaks	94
Kingdom of Yugoslavia Army	101	Italians	65
Chetnik units	85	Rusyns	26
Allied military forces	22	Slovenes	16
Axis powers	9	Poles	11
Serbian paramilitaries	2	Ukrainians	10
Unknown	32,920	Russians	7
total	153,700	Austrians	4
		Greeks	3
		Albanians	1
		Bulgarians	1
		Montenegrins	1
		Romanians	1
		Vlachs	1
		Unknown	53,768
		total	153,700

* *Izveštće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine* (Zagreb, September 1999.)

¹ These are previous indicators. The Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia was dissolved in 2002, and recording of Croatia's human losses during the Second World War and the post-war period was not completed.

Table 2

Most represented categories of actual losses in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Second World War and post-war period based on data Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia, 1999			
Croatia		Bosnia-Herzegovina	
153,700		99,228	
Lost lives as			
members of NDH armed forces	31,855	members of NDH armed forces	12,924
members of NOV and POJ/ Yugoslav Army	38,732	members of NOV and POJ/Yu- goslav Army	5,259
as civilian	38,000	as civilian	44,027

* *Izvešće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, (Zagreb, September 1999)

Table 3

Human losses in Croatia during the Second World War and in the post-war period, caused by the Chetniks/Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland and the Partisans/People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army according to data Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia, 1999	
Caused human losses	
Chetniks/Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland	4,203 1,628 civilians
Partisans/People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/Yugoslav Army	37,881 7,404 civilians

* *Izvešće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, (Zagreb, September 1999)

Table 4

Human losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War according to B. Kočović and V. Žerjavić		
Kočović	demographic losses	1,985,000
Žerjavić		2,022,000
Kočović	actual losses	1,014,000
Žerjavić		1,027,000
Kočović	reduced natality	333,000
Žerjavić		326,000
Kočović	emigration	638,000 / 654,00
Žerjavić		669,000

* B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985, Sarajevo, 1990) – V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1989) – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1992) – V. Žerjavić, “Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 24 (1992), no. 3, – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27 (1995), no. 3, – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1997).

Table 5

Human losses in Croatia during the Second World War according to B. Kočović and V. Žerjavić		
Kočović	demographic losses	605,000
Žerjavić		604,000
Kočović	actual losses	295,000
Žerjavić		271,000 / 295,000

* B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985, Sarajevo, 1990) – V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, (Zagreb, 1989) – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1992) – V. Žerjavić, “Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 24 (1992), no. 3 – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27 (1995), no. 3 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1997).

Table 6

Migrated from Yugoslavia during the Second World War and post-war period according to B. Kočović and V. Žerjavić	Kočović	Žerjavić
	638,000 / 654,000	669,000
Germans	396,000	425,000
Italians	4,000 ¹	163,000
Serbs	60,000	80,000
Croats	57,000	39,000
Hungarians	33,000	32,000

* B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985, Sarajevo, 1990) – V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1989) – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1992) – V. Žerjavić, “Doseljavanja i iseljavanja s područja Istre, Rijeke i Zadra u razdoblju 1910 - 1971.”, *Društvena istraživanja* (1993), no. 6-7 – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27 (1995), no. 3 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1997).

¹ Data are shown for the areas inside the borders of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Table 7

Actual losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War according to B. Kočović						
	Serbs and Montenegrins	Croats	Muslims	Jews	Others	total
Bosnia-Herzegovina	209,000	79,000	75,000	10,000	9,000	382,000
Montenegro	45,000	-	4,000	-	1,000	50,000
Croatia	125,000	124,000	-	17,000	29,000	295,000
Kosovo	4,000	-	-	1,000	5,000	10,000
Macedonia	7,000	-	1,000	6,000	11,000	25,000
Slovenia	-	-	-	1,000	34,000	35,000
Serbia	114,000	1,000	5,000	8,000	13,000	141,000
Vojvodina	33,000	3,000	1,000	17,000	22,000	76,000
Total	537,000	207,000	86,000	60,000	124,000	1,014,000
Out of the total number of actual losses of Serbs and Montenegrins, 537,000, Serbs were 487,000, and Montenegrins were 50,000 In the total number of actual losses of Others there were: 6,000 Albanians, 5,000 Hungarians, 7,000 Macedonians, 26,000 Germans, 27,000 Roma, 32,000 Slovenes and 21,000 others						

* B. Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985, Sarajevo, 1990).

Table 8

Actual losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War according to V. Žerjavić							
	Serbs	Montenegrin	Croats	Muslims	Jews	Others	total
Bosnia-Herzegovina	164,000	-	64,000	75,000	9,000	4,000	316,000
Montenegro	6,000	20,000	1,000	4,000	-	6,000	37,000
Croatia	131,000	-	106,000	2,000	10,000	22,000	271,000
Kosovo	3,000	-	1,000	2,000	-	17,000	23,000
Macedonia	6,000	-	-	4,000	-	7,000	17,000
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	-	33,000	33,000
Serbia	142,000	-	-	13,000	7,000	5,000	167,000
Vojvodina	45,000	-	6,000	-	7,000	25,000	83,000
abroad	33,000	-	14,000	3,000	24,000	6,000	80,000
total	530,000	20,000	192,000	103,000	57,000	125,000	1,027,000
In the total number of actual losses of Others there were: 18,000 Albanians, 2,000 Hungarians, 6,000 Macedonians, 28,000 Germans, 8,000 Roma, 42,000 Slovenes and 11,000 others							

* V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1989) – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1992) – V. Žerjavić, *Yugoslavia - manipulations with the numbers of Second World War victims/Yougoslavie - manipulations sur le nombre des victimes de la Seconde guerre mondiale/Jugoslawien - Manipulationen mit Kriegsoffern des zweiten Weltkriegs/Jugoslavija – manipulacije žrtvama Drugog svjetskog rata* (Zagreb, 1993) – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27 (1995), no. 3 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1997).

Table 9

Actual losses of Croats and Muslims caused by Chetniks/Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland during the Second World War, 1941-1945 based on various lists, calculations and estimates			
	Croatia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Independent State of Croatia
Territorial Commission on War Crimes of the People's Republic of Croatia, 1945	1,729	-	-
F. Tuđman, 1989	1,372	-	-
M. Sobolevski, Z. Dizdar, I. Graovac, S. Žarić, 1993	3,500	-	-
V. Žerjavić, 1994/1995→	20,000	45,000 12,000 Croats 33,000 Muslims	65,000
	-	-	47,000 18,000 Croats 29,000 Muslims
Z. Dizdar, 1995/1996→	3,750	-	-
	20,000	45,000 12,000 Croats 33,000 Muslims	65,000
M. Sobolevski, 1999/2000→	3,000	-	[20,000 Croats] ¹
	3,000	-	-
I. Graovac, 1995/2000/2011	3,500	-	-
	2,905	-	-
Commission on Establishment of War-time and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia, 1999 ²	4,203	-	-

* Croatian State Archives, Zagreb, ZKRZ, GUZ, 2624/45. – F. Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti. Rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja* (Zagreb, 1989., Zagreb, 1990) – M. Sobolevski, Z. Dizdar, I. Graovac, S. Žarić, *Zločini četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1993 [manuscript]) – V. Žerjavić, *Poginuli, ubijeni i umoreni 1941-1945 /u tisućama/ [Croats and Muslims in NDH territory] [Tabular overview]* (Zagreb, 1994) – V. Žerjavić, "Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27 (1995), no. 3 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1997) – V. Žerjavić, "O stradanjima u Drugom svjetskom ratu: stradali Hrvati od četnika, stradali Srbi i broj stradalih u Jasenovcu", *Dijalog povjesničara - istoričara*, 5 (Zagreb, 2002) – Z. Dizdar, M. Kujundžić, *Doprinos Hrvatske pobjedi antifašističke koalicije* (Zagreb, 1995) – Z. Dizdar, "Četnički zločini genocida nad Hrvatima i Muslimanima u Bosni i Hercegovini i nad Hrvatima u Hrvatskoj tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata (1941.-1945.)", *Hrvatski iseljenički zbornik 1995.-1996.* (Zagreb, 1996) – Z. Dizdar, "Četnički zločini nad Hrvatima i Muslimanima u Bosni i Hercegovini tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata (1941.-1945.)", in: Z. Dizdar, M. Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 1999) – Z. Dizdar, *Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb, 2002) – M. Sobolevski, "Četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj u Drugom svjetskom ratu (1941.-1945.)", in: Z. Dizdar, M. Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.*, Zagreb, 1999. – M. Sobolevski, "Zločini

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četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj u Drugome svjetskom ratu”, *Rijeka*, year V, vol. 1-2, *Rijeka*, 2000. – I. Graovac, *Žrtve četnika u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. godine. Sociološki aspekti*, Doctoral thesis, Zagreb, 1995 – I. Graovac, “Posljedice državotvorne ideje i nacionalnointegralističke ideologije četničkog pokreta na primjeru stradalih Hrvata i Srba od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj”, *Dijalog povjesničara - istoričara*, 1, Zagreb, 2000 – I. Graovac, “Otvara li demokracija mogućnost prestanka manipulacije stradalima? Primjer: razlike u utvrđivanju broja stradalih od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj”, *Dijalog povjesničara - istoričara*, 4, Zagreb, 2001. – I. Graovac, “Stradali Hrvati i Srbi od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj”, in: I. Graovac, D. Cvetković, *Ljudski gubici Hrvatske 1941.-1945. godine: pitanja, primjeri, rezultati...*, Zagreb, 2005. – I. Graovac, “Otvara li demokracija mogućnost prestanka manipulacije stradalima? Primjer: razlike u utvrđivanju broja stradalih od četnika 1941.-1945. u Hrvatskoj”, in: I. Graovac, D. Cvetković, *Ljudski gubici Hrvatske 1941.-1945. godine: pitanja, primjeri, rezultati...*, Zagreb, 2005. – *Izvešće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, Zagreb, rujna 1999. – I. Graovac, *Stradali od četnika u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. godine. Prilog istraživanju: strukture stradalih*, Zagreb, 2011.

¹ M. Sobolevski later explained that this number published in the book by Z. Dizdar, M. Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.*, Zagreb, 1999 was not his figure.

² These are previous indicators. The Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia was dissolved in 2002, and recording of Croatia's human losses during the Second World War and the post-war period was not completed.

Table 10

Bleiburg and the "Way of the Cross", 1945 estimates, calculations and lists		
G. J. Prpic estimate	over 1,000,000	mainly Croats
O. Knezović and J. I. Prcela estimate	600,000	mainly Croats
D. Crljen estimate	500,000	mainly Croats
B. M. Karapandžić estimate	250,000	Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Montenegrins
I. Bogdan i V. Nikolić estimate	ca. 200,000	200,000 Croats and 12,000 Slovenes
V. Žerjavić calculation	ca. 70,000	45,000 to 55,000 Croats and Muslims 8,000 to 10,000 Slovenes ca. 2,000 Serbs and Montenegrins
K. Katalinić calculation	minimum 85,000 probably 135,500 maximum 198,500	Croats and Muslims
M. Šimundić estimate	ca. 125,000	Croats
Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia name list	13,300 ¹	mainly Croats
M. Portmann estimate	ca. 80,000	Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Slovenes and Germans
Z. Dizdar estimate	over 50,000 ca. 62,000	Croats

¹ G. J. Prpic, *Tragedies and Migrations in Croatian History*, Toronto, 1975 – O. Knezović, *Pokolj hrvatske vojske 1945. Dokumenti o zvjerstvima Srba nad Hrvatima*, Chicago, 1960. – J. I. Prcela, S. Guldescu, *Operation Slaughterhouse. Eyewitness Accounts of Post-war Massacres in Yugoslavia*, Philadelphia, 1970, Pittsburgh, 1995 – D. Crljen, "Bleiburg", *Hrvatska revija*, year XVI, vol. 2-4, Paris, 1966 – B. M. Karapandžić, *The Bloodiest Yugoslav Springs 1945 - Tito's Katyn and Gulags*, New York, 1980 – B. M. Karapandžić, *Jugoslovensko krvavo proleće 1945. Titovi Katini i Gulazi*, Cleveland, 1976, Belgrade, 1990. – I. Bogdan (ed.), *La Tragedia de Bleiburg. Documentos sobre las matanzas en masa de los croatas en Yugoslavia comunista en 1945*, Buenos Aires, 1963 – V. Nikolić, F. Nevistić, *Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda*, Barcelona, 1976, Barcelona, 1977, Zagreb, 1993 – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1992 – V. Žerjavić, "Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, year 24, no. 3, Zagreb, 1992 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, Zagreb, 1997 – K. Katalinić, "Hrvatske i

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srpske žrtve 1941.-1945.”, *Republika Hrvatska*, year XXXVIII, no. 160, Buenos Aires, 1988 – K. Katalinić, “Broj bleiburških žrtava”, in: J. Marević (ed.), *50 godina Bleiburga*, Zagreb, 1995. – M. Šimundić, *Hrvatski smrtni put (Prilog novijoj hrvatskoj poviesti)*, Split, 2001. – *Izvješće o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava od osnutka (11. veljače 1992.) do rujna 1999. godine*, Zagreb, September 1999 – M. Portmann, *Kommunistische Abrechnung mit Kriegsverbrechern, Kollaborateuren, “Volksfeinden” und “Verrätern” in Jugoslawien während des Zweiten Weltkriegs und unmittelbar danach*, Magisterarbeit, Vienna, 2002 – M. Portmann, “Communist Retaliation and Persecution on Yugoslav Territory during and after WWII (1943 - 1950)”, *Tokovi istorije*, 1-2, Belgrade, 2004 – Z. Dizdar, “Stradanja Hrvata u II. svjetskom ratu i neposredno nakon njega”, in: V. Kapitanović (ed.), *Crkva i društvo uz Jadran. Vrela i rezultati istraživanja. Zbornik*, Split, 2001. – Z. Dizdar, “Prilog istraživanju problema Bleiburga i križnih putova (u povodu 60. obljetnice)”, *Senjski zbornik*, year 32, no. 32, Senj, 2005.

¹ These are previous indicators. The Commission on Establishment of Wartime and Post-war Victims of the Republic of Croatia was dissolved in 2002, and recording of Croatia’s human losses during the Second World War and the post-war period was not completed.

Table 11

Yugoslavs who lost their lives on the <i>enemy</i> side during World War II, 1941-1945 according to V. Žerjavić	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	70,000
Serbia	69,000
Croatia	52,000
Slovenia	10,000
Montenegro	7,000
Macedonia	1,000
total	209,000

* V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1989 – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1992. – V. Žerjavić, “Manipulacije žrtvama drugoga svjetskog rata 1941.-1945.”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, year 24, no. 3, Zagreb, 1992 – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, year 27, no. 3, Zagreb, 1995 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, Zagreb, 1997.

Table 12

Fatalities caused by the NOV and POJ/JA and communist authorities in Yugoslavia, 1943 to 1948 according to M. Portmann			
1943 to 1945	Dalmatia, Istria Croatian Littoral	Italians, generally civilians, but also soldiers, Italian and German prisoners-of-war and other "people's enemies" and political opponents	10,000
Autumn 1944	Belgrade	Serbs, Quislings, collaborators, "people's enemies" and political opponents	10,000
autumn 1944	Serbia and Vojvodina	Serbs, Quislings, collaborators, "people's enemies" and political opponents	10,000
since autumn 1944	Vojvodina	Hungarians, mainly civilians	5,000
from end of 1944 to beginning of 1948	Banat, Bačka, Baranja, Srijem, Slavonia and Slovenia	German civilians, killed or generally lost their lives in camps	50,000
from January to March 1945	Kosovo	Albanians, generally civilians	2,000
from May to August 1945	Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina	Croat, Bosniak, Serb, Montenegrin, Slovenian, and German prisoners-of-war, mainly soldiers, but also civilians	80,000
May 1945	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian and Montenegrin Chetniks, prisoners-of-war	10,000
from May 1945 to 1948	in Yugoslavia's territory	Quislings, collaborators, "people's enemies" and political opponents	3,000
			total 180,000

* M. Portmann, *Kommunistische Abrechnung mit Kriegsverbrechern, Kollaborateuren, "Volksfeinden" und "Verrätern" in Jugoslawien während des Zweiten Weltkriegs und unmittelbar danach*, Magisterarbeit, Vienna, 2002. – M. Portmann, "Communist Retaliation and Persecution on Yugoslav Territory during and after WWII (1943 - 1950)", *Tokovi istorije*, 1-2, Belgrade, 2004.

Table 13

Structure of actual losses of Yugoslavia during the Second World War and post-war period according to V. Žerjavić						
Republic or province	total	fallen soldiers	total fatalities	of this		Quislings and collaborators
				in settlements	in camps	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	316,000	72,000	174,000	89,000	85,000	70,000
Montenegro	37,000	15,000	15,000	14,000	1,000	7,000
Croatia	271,000	66,000	153,000	105,000	48,000	52,000
Macedonia	17,000	14,000	2,000	2,000	-	1,000
Slovenia	33,000	12,000	11,000	8,000	3,000	10,000
Serbia	273,000	58,000	146,000	67,000	79,000	69,000
Serbia proper	167,000	42,000	92,000	39,000	53,000	33,000
Vojvodina	83,000	10,000	46,000	20,000	26,000	27,000
Kosovo	23,000	6,000	8,000	8,000	-	9,000
Yugoslavia	947,000	237,000	501,000	285,000	216,000	209,000

* V. Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1989 – V. Žerjavić, “Stradanja Jugoslavena u drugom svjetskom ratu”, *Viktimologija*, year 1, no. 1-2, Zagreb, 1990. – V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1992 – V. Žerjavić, *Yugoslavia - manipulations with the numbers of Second World War victims/Yougoslavie - manipulations sur le nombre des victimes de la Seconde guerre mondiale/Jugoslawien - Manipulationen mit Kriegsopfern des zweiten Weltkriegs/Jugoslavija - manipulacije žrtvama Drugog svjetskog rata*, Zagreb, 1993. – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, year 27, no. 3, Zagreb, 1995 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, Zagreb, 1997.

Table 14

Structure of actual losses of Croats in the Second World War and post-war period according to V. Žerjavić		
NDH armed forces	69,000	71,000
NOV and POJ/JA	46,000	43,000
civilians, direct terror and camps	60,000	64,000
total	175,000	178,000

* V. Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb, 1992 – V. Žerjavić, *Poginuli, ubijeni i umoreni 1941-1945 /u tisućama/ [Croats and Muslims in NDH territory] [Tabular overview]*, Zagreb, 1994 – V. Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, year 27, no. 3, Zagreb, 1995 – V. Žerjavić, *Population losses in Yugoslavia 1941 - 1945*, Zagreb, 1997.

Table 15

Structure of actual losses of Croats and Muslims in the NDH according to V. Žerjavić				
Croatia + eastern Srijem	total	as members of NOV and POJ/JA	as members of NDH armed forces	as civilians, casualties of direct terror and camps
Croats	106,000	28,000	45,000	33,000
Croats in Srijem	5,000	1,000	2,000	2,000
Muslims	2,000	-	1,000	1,000
total	113,000	29,000	48,000	36,000
death caused by				
Germans	12,000	8,000	-	4,000
Italians	6,000	3,000	-	3,000
NDH armed forces	19,000	10,000	-	9,000
Chetniks	20,000	8,000	-	12,000
NOV and POJ/JA	56,000	-	48,000	8,000
total	113,000	29,000	48,000	36,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats				
death caused by				
Germans	5,000	2,000	-	3,000
Italians	3,000	1,000	-	2,000
NDH armed forces	16,000	8,000	-	8,000
Chetniks	12,000	6,000	-	6,000
NOV i POJ/JA	28,000	-	22,000	6,000
total	64,000	17,000	22,000	25,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims				
death caused by				
Germans	10,000	5,000	1,000	4,000
Italians	5,000	1,000	1,000	3,000
NDH armed forces	10,000	3,000	-	7,000
Chetniks	33,000	2,000	11,000	20,000
NOV and POJ/JA	17,000	-	15,000	2,000
total	75,000	11,000	28,000	36,000
death caused by Croats and Muslims in NDH				
Germans	27,000	15,000	1,000	11,000
Italians	14,000	5,000	1,000	8,000
NDH armed forces	45,000	21,000	-	24,000
Chetniks	68,000	16,000	11,000	41,000

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NOV and POJ/JA	101,000	-	85,000	16,000
Croats and Muslims lost lives in NDH	252,000	57,000	98,000	97,000
Croats and Muslims from NDH who lost lives abroad	17,000	4,000	1,000	12,000
Croats	14,000	4,000	-	10,000
Muslims	3,000	-	1,000	2,000
Croats and Muslims from NDH overall total lost lives	269,000	61,000	99,000	109,000

* V. Žerjavić, *Poginuli, ubijeni i umoreni 1941-1945 /u tisućama/* [Croats and Muslims in NDH territory] [Tabular overview], Zagreb, 1994.

Table 16

	Catholic Croats			Muslim Croats			Croats – Catholics and Muslims		
	maximum	minimum	probable	maximum	minimum	probable	maximum	minimum	probable
Croatia	373,000	216,000	274,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	378,000	221,000	279,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	122,000	101,000	110,000	171,000	117,000	154,000	293,000	218,000	264,000
total	495,000	317,000	384,000	176,000	122,000	159,000	671,000	439,000	543,000

* K. Katalinić, "Hrvatske i srpske žrtve 1941.-1945.", *Republika Hrvatska*, god. XXXVIII, no. 160, Buenos Aires, 1988. – K. Katalinić, *Argumenti. NDH, BiH, Bleiburg i genocid*, Buenos Aires-Zagreb, 1993.

Table 17

	Catholic Croats			Muslim Croats			Croats – Catholics and Muslims		
	maximum	minimum	probable	maximum	minimum	probable	maximum	minimum	probable
Croatia	323,000	168,000	225,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	326,000	171,000	228,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	94,000	74,000	82,000	133,000	81,000	117,000	227,000	155,000	199,000
total	417,000	242,000	307,000	136,000	84,000	120,000	553,000	326,000	427,000

* K. Katalinić, "Hrvatske i srpske žrtve 1941.-1945.", *Republika Hrvatska*, god. XXXVIII, no. 160, Buenos Aires, 1988. – K. Katalinić, *Argumenti. NDH, BiH, Bleiburg i genocid*, Buenos Aires-Zagreb, 1993.

Table 18

Structure of human losses of Croatia during the Second World War and post-war period from 1931 to 1948 according to V. Stipetić						
	population 1931	estimate of expected population			actual number	demographic losses
		1941	1945	1948	1948	
Croats	2,680,900	3,025,300	3,063,000	3,180,600	2,990,600	-190,000
Croatia	3,785,300	4,235,000	4,326,900	4,495,000	3,779,900	-716,100
	emigration from Yugoslavia	migrations within Yugoslavia		losses of life	assimilation	total
		immigration	emigration			
Croats	40,000	6,000	7,000	149,000	-	190,000
Croatia	239,000	15,000	91,000	337,000	62,000	716,000
demographic losses				actual losses		
Croats		190,000		Croats		149,000
Serbs		227,000		Serbs		130,000
Germans and Austrians		102,000		Roma		20,000
Italians		83,000		Jews		18,000
Croatia total		716,000		Croatia total		337,000

* V. Stipetić, "Jedno stoljeće u razvoju nacionalne strukture stanovništva na teritoriju SR Hrvatske (1880 - 1981)", *Suvremeni ekonomski problemi*, no. 8, Zagreb, 1987.

**Die menschlichen Verluste der Kroaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg
und in der Nachkriegszeit, verursacht von Tschetniks,
bzw. der Jugoslawischen Armee im Vaterland, von Partisanen,
bzw. der Volksbefreiungsarmee und Partisaneneinheiten
Jugoslawiens/von der Jugoslawischen Armee und jugoslawischen
kommunistischen Macht
*Zahlenangaben***

Zusammenfassung

Aufgrund der wichtigsten historiographischen, demographischen und viktimologischen Studien werden in dieser Arbeit die menschlichen Verluste der Kroaten dargestellt, verursacht von Tschetniks, bzw. der Jugoslawischen Armee im Vaterland, von Partisanen, bzw. der Volksbefreiungsarmee und Partisaneneinheiten Jugoslawiens/von der Jugoslawischen Armee und der neuen kommunistischen Macht. In dieser Arbeit werden die ersten, meistens willkürlichen Schätzungen und Angaben, dann die viel genaueren späteren statistischen/demographischen Rechnungen und schließlich die neuesten, auf den systematischen Forschungen basierten Namen- und Zahlenangaben dargestellt und miteinander verglichen.

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THE WORK OF THE LAND COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES OF THE OCCUPIERS AND THEIR COLLABORATORS: ANALYSIS BASED ON SET TASKS AND CASES

Martina GRAHEK RAVANČIĆ*

Through the presented cases in which the Commission for Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators ascertained accountability, this work constitutes an attempt to depict all levels of collaboration and perpetration of war crimes (their forms in particular), both through individual and group decisions. The range was genuinely quite broad, covering the integrated apparatus of occupation, destruction of the people's liberation movement, the struggle against Partisan units, crimes against civilians, plundering of assets and violence of all types.

Key words: Land Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, Croatia, NDH [Independent State of Croatia], Second World War, occupation, reprisal, mass crimes, Serbs, Jews

Based on the Instructions of the Land Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators issued on 25 August 1944 (no. 9/44), pursuant to the decision of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), of 30 November 1943 on the establishment of the State Commission for Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators and based on Article 9 of the Operating Rules of the State Commission adopted at a session of the National Committee of the Liberation of Yugoslavia (NKOJ) on 6 May 1944, the principal tasks of the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators were: gathering of evidence on criminal acts perpetrated by the occupiers and their

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collaborators in the territory of the city of Zagreb, as stipulated in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 13 of the Act on Crimes Against the People and State and Investigation of Crimes, for which the gathered materials were forwarded to the Croatian Land Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators. In this sense, the Commission for Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, as an investigative body, was obliged to conduct all necessary hearings and, if necessary, on-site inspections.¹ Studies on mass crimes had to be compiled, and crimes had to be classified based on individual categories (Serbs, Jews, reprisals, summary military tribunals courts, courts martial, etc.). A final task was the issuing of certificates pursuant to Article 53 of the State Registries Act.

In its work, the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators depended on the assistance of citizens, who, according to one proclamation, were expected to cooperate with it: "It is the duty of each citizen to report to the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators in Crime and Criminals".² More rapid and higher quality data gathering had to be organized, as stated frequently, "from house to house" with the aid of literate youths or members of the Antifascist Women's Front (AFŽ).³ Criticism was also levelled at the people's authorities, who "are accessing the archives left behind by the enemies and their collaborators with insufficient understanding". The archives of enemy organizations and institutions were destroyed without inspection, even though according to some claims they contained data vital to the Commission's work.⁴ "Since our army was not cautioned earlier, it destroyed or discarded all of the printed and written materials found in buildings (from that little that the enemy left behind), so that we were only able to find very meagre data". Therefore, the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators turned to the local Command with the request that it order all units accommodated in such buildings, "to place all written or printed materials that they found under watch, and to notify the local Command thereof".⁵

¹ *Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske. Zbornik dokumenata 1944./III* (as of 10 May to 31 December) (Zagreb, 1975), p. 266.

² Croatian State Archives (hereinafter: HDA), Zagreb, fund 306 – Territorial Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators (*Zemaljska komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača*; hereinafter: ZKRZ) Main Registration Record (Glavni urudžbeni zapisnik; hereinafter: GUZ), box 1, Parole.

³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Enemy assets (*Neprijateljska imovina*; hereinafter: NI), box 659, no. 2364, 11 July 1945.

⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Central City Commission (*Centralna gradska komisija*; hereinafter: CGK), box 719, no. 1984/45, 15 June 1945.

⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 711, no. 18/45, 30 May 1945. The Zagreb City Command sent a letter to the Central Commission, in which it stated that this letter was forwarded to all of its subordinate units. See: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 711., no. 59/45, 4 June 1945.

Some of these tasks were certainly also performed by the People's Protection Department (OZN) as one of the vital components of the investigative apparatus in wartime and post-war Yugoslavia. Thus, for example, during September and October 1944, the OZN IV for the Zagreb District entered 447 persons in the card file who were numbered from 1,296 to 1,743, while the records of the investigative materials had 59 numbers.⁶ Already in February 1945, the list for Zagreb and its environs grew to 3,341, while the investigative materials numbered 104 cases.⁷ Over the next month the District's card files had 4,800 new criminals registered, and its completion soon after was announced.⁸

Also interesting were the so-called "Black Books" which contained lists of persons who had to be liquidated, while the assets were to be seized. Their importance was already noted in May 1944, when the District Committee of the Croatian Communist Party (KPH) for Makarska noted that "all war criminals would receive their deserved penalty for the crimes they committed against our people. 'Black Books' must be made [...]. The precise day on which the crime was committed, who perpetrated it and where must be indicated. The descriptions of the occupiers' crimes must indicate the military unit to which the criminal belonged, so that he may be sought after the end of the war, so that no criminal will remain unpunished".⁹ Two months later, the Municipal Committee of Gradac (Makarska) submitted a list of 99 persons, but also sought instructions pertaining to the further compilation of the "Black Book", i.e., whether to specify in it "all clerks serving in the NDH apparatus up to the present day, and whether to also include those who served but are now in the NOV [People's Liberation Army]".¹⁰

According to the aforementioned, it is apparent that the investigative bodies of the new authorities took the task entrusted to them quite seriously. It is likely that the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators already had some of these data at its disposal at the very beginning of its work. How valuable these data were, given the tasks which the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators forwarded to the territorial commissions and their subordinate units is difficult to say. What certainly is a fact is that these were all-encompassing matters that required a great deal of time, particularly if one takes into account the new assignments placed before the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators and the chronological circumstances that accompanied them.

⁶ Vladimir Geiger et al., ed., *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Zagreb i središnja Hrvatska* (Zagreb – Slavonski Brod, 2008), p. 123.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 241.-242.

⁹ Mate Rupiċ et al., ed., *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Dokumenti. Dalmacija* (Zagreb-Slavonski Brod, 2011), p. 95, 117-118.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 119-120.

According to a circular released on 23 July 1945, the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, given the possibility that the Peace Conference in Paris would soon be convened (upon which the entire work of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators was also contingent), sent a request for the urgent gathering of statistics on crimes committed in Yugoslavia. According to instructions, the number of victims had to be classified by location, while the types of crimes according to different categories, and the perpetrators of crimes according to nationality.¹¹ Thus, the gathering of data in the field was urgently initiated, while the delegates “must take the lead in work [...] each delegate must constantly be in the field, touring villages [...] collecting reports [...] It is the duty of delegates to [...] inspect all fascist archives”.¹² However, it would appear that these activists did not take the task entrusted to them seriously enough and help the commission’s work. Despite the public proclamation that perpetrated crimes had to be punished, too many criminals were still free, particularly in the villages, where “not one activist has yet submitted a report to the commission”. They had to be given to their “deserved penalty” and this was primarily a task of the activists, “for when we clean these pro-fascist elements from the people, then we will no longer have anyone to agitating among them and the people will support our authority because they will be convinced that our authorities are taking care of them”.¹³

The State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators set a one-month deadline for the gathering of statistics, while in the forwarded letter to the district and city commissions a period of 20 days was specified.¹⁴ After roughly a month, after which another rush order was released in the meantime, the work had not moved past its initial phase, and the gathered data were still incomplete. “The data on the number of slain victims are particularly deficient, for in reality they far surpass the number specified in the reports from the District Commissions”.¹⁵ In order to eliminate these operational shortcomings, on 12 September 1945 a conference of all heads of district commissions for the investigation of crimes of the occupiers and their collaborators was convened, at which they had to present the summary reports on completed work. The same shortcomings were ascertained in the areas covered by other territorial commissions the investigation of crimes of the occupiers and their collaborators, so at a conference of all territorial commissions (24-26 May 1946) held in Belgrade, it was decided that

¹¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no. 1751/45, 8 July 1945.

¹² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ District Commission (*Okružna komisija*; hereinafter: OK), box 701, no. 669/45., 24 September 1945.

¹³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ OK, box 700, 59/1945., 14 July 1945.

¹⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 711, no. 2624/45., 23 July 1945.

¹⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no number, 1 July 1946.

already gathered data were to be re-collected and re-examined.¹⁶ It was decided that one person would be selected in each District Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborator who would tour all district, city and municipal commissions for the investigation of crimes of the occupiers and their collaborators and instruct them on further work.¹⁷ Responding to the same circular, a letter to the City People's Liberation Committee was also forwarded by the head of the Central City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, Dragan Kastl. According to him, the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, through its street-level committees, had already gathered the relevant statistical data, but "as a result of insufficient or deficient organization in operations, this assignment was done in slipshod fashion. [...] Data on the number of slain victims are particularly deficient, for in reality they far surpass the number cited in the reports sent over to us at one point by the street-level committees." Since the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators ordered a renewed audit of the data, Milan Polak, a member of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators sought the assistance and support of the City People's Committee, more precisely its secretary Mika Špiljak, in the coordination of further work.¹⁸ A meeting was already held the next day, so the City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators sent the City People's Committee 200 forms, with the note that this task would be effectively fulfilled only if "ongoing daily contact is established between our Commission and individual regions."¹⁹ What these statements clearly indicate is that communication between individual institutions was not entirely functional, which prevented comprehensive and satisfactory performance of assigned tasks. However, there are also protests from activists, in which they characterize such expectations as unjustified and point out that their work is above all voluntary.²⁰ It is apparent that matters did not proceed smoothly and that the planned task could not be completed within a month, particularly since regular communication with the central office was difficult, requiring urging on this issue.

In further efforts, an assigned member was charged with touring each village in which there was a local People's Committee and contacting its members. The greatest difficulty was "going from place to place in the field. The field

¹⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no number, 1 July 1946. See also: *Zemaljska komisija Hrvatske za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača. Zločini u logoru Jasenovac (fototipsko izdanje) / Croatian State Commission for Establishing Crimes of Occupying Forces and their Assistants. Crimes in the Jasenovac Camp* (Banja Luka, 2000), p. XVII-XVIII.

¹⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no number, 1 July 1946.

¹⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1467/46., 9 July 1946.

¹⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1467/46., 11 July 1946.

²⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 712, no. 1252, 9 September 1945.

is rather extensive, and often the search for local People's Committees, or certain members [...] takes too much time. [...] [T]he effort and time spent are certainly not reflected in the results." As a result, it was concluded that the quality of work was not satisfactory in this manner and it was "impossible to ascertain when the list will be finished [...]"²¹

A document from the Montenegrin Territorial Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators testifies to this same problem: "Over time, the number of officials has grown to only 10 persons, of whom four were typists. This was during the highest volume of work, in the second half of 1945. [...] The success of this Commission is thus all the greater because materials were gathered in trackless areas and in war-torn Montenegrin villages."²²

Special assistance was also provided to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, which was also lagging in its work, mostly due to the enormity of the task and the shortage of qualified staff.²³

Such complaints obviously made their way up to the federal level, so the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators had to be aware of these ongoing problems. However, no significant progress was effected. The assistance offered (in the sense of coordinating work) was not even close to sufficient, so despite all efforts, the task remained incomplete, since correspondence from early 1947 still contains complaints over the failure to deliver the rest of the list of "victims of fascism". Further, there is a demand that without "further delay you assume the task and urgently, within a period not to exceed 8 days, send the relevant lists, for we shall otherwise be compelled to notify the relevant authorities thereof."²⁴ The sought-after remaining lists were not found, so it is possible – and quite likely – that this task was never fully completed. However, given its enormity and the time involved, this task was virtually impossible from the very start.

According to the assignments specified by the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, systematic crimes had to be processed and classified into categories. One of them pertains to "reprisals" perpetrated during the time of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) which were processed together.²⁵ All cases were based on the Legal

²¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1937 and 1704/46, 5 August 1946.

²² Archives of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: AJ), Belgrade, fund 110 – State Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators (hereinafter: DK), box 1-1, Report of Dr. Nedeljković on the work of the State Commission, p. 13.

²³ AJ, fund. 110 – DK, box 1., 1-63.

²⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 718, no. 48/47., 13 January 1947.

²⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17227-17302.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547., Study on crimes - reprisals.

Decree on protective measures due to acts of sabotage against public order and safety of 30 October 1943 (no. CCXXXIII – 2728 – D. V. – 1943), which, as often mentioned, was issued so that “the mass killing of our people could be concealed in any form”.²⁶ The common motive of them all was also to retaliate against completed Partisan military campaigns.²⁷ A special task was also the mass killings organized in Zagreb and its environs (Rakov Potok and Maksimir). A particular issue was the persecution of Serbs and Jews. Additionally, the activities of the Mobile Courts Martial (PPS) and the Public Order and Safety Directorate (RAVSIGUR), later the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate (GRAVSIGUR), were examined in great detail.²⁸

In its Instructions, it is stressed that the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators “must proceed quickly, moving aside all formalities and delays or postponements”.²⁹ Additionally, according to a circular from the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, on the matter of crimes it

²⁶ The system of reprisals was also legalized by the Legal Decree on Procedures Pursuant to Communist Attacks When No Perpetrator is Found, of 2 October 1941. In such cases, this provision stipulated that the relevant agencies had to “determine and execute for each slain individual the shooting of ten persons from among the ranks of communist leaders as determined by the police authorities”. These provisions were adopted after most of the reprisals were actually carried out. This primarily pertained to the shooting of hostages, which became increasingly frequent, beginning in July 1941. An example which may be cited is the case in which a group of communist youth activist attacked a parade march of Ustasha university students in Zagreb, for which 185 hostages, “Jews and communists”, were shot. See: Nikolina SRPAK, “Kazneno pravo u doba Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941. – 1945.)”, *Hrvatski ljetopis za pravo i praksu*, vol. 13/2006, no. 2., p. 1129.; *Hrvatski narod* (Zagreb), year III., 5 and 7 August 1941. Thus it is obvious that these Legal Decrees had only declarative significance. See: Ivo Goldstein, *Hrvatska 1918. – 2008.* (Zagreb, 2008), p. 267.-268.

²⁷ Ljubomir Bošnjak, “Diverzije i sabotaže na području sjeverozapadne Hrvatske 1941 – 1945.”, *Sjeverozapadna Hrvatska u NOB-u i socijalističkoj revoluciji*, Ljubo Boban et al., ed. (Varaždin, 1976), p. 194.-210.; Ivan Šibl, *Iz ilegalnog Zagreba 1941.* (Zagreb, 1965).

²⁸ The Public Order and Safety Directorate (RAVSIGUR) was established as part of the NDH Internal Affairs Ministry, functioning as a special department in that Ministry. It was conceived as a standard policing institution of the NDH and it was charged with supreme oversight of the work of all police jurisdictions and agencies. At the same time the Ustasha Supervisory Agency (UNS), modelled after the German Gestapo, was established, becoming the Ustasha regime’s special police. Ante Pavelić appointed Eugen Dido Kvaternik to head the RAVSIGUR and UNS, which consolidated the work of the entire police system. After his dismissal, the UNS became increasingly weaker. In early 1943, the RAVSIGUR expanded its operations to include those under the jurisdiction of the UNS, and its name was changed to Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate (GRAVSIGUR). See: Leopold Kobsa, “O organizaciji ustaškog aparata vlasti za provođenje terora u tzv. NDH”, *Zagreb u NOB-i i socijalističkoj revoluciji* (Zagreb, 1971), pp. 241-242; Davor Kovačić, *Redarstveno – obavještajni sustav Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od 1941. – 1945. godine* (Zagreb, 2009).

²⁹ *Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske. Zbornik dokumenata 1944./III*, p. 266.

was necessary to cite the primary crimes, meaning intellectual initiators, those who gave orders and the most active perpetrators of crimes. Probably as a result of this immense task and the need for the greatest possible expeditiousness in its completion, in almost all “major” cases, including the resolution of reprisal cases, a letter from the Territorial Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators of 7 November indicates that it will “specify Ante Pavelić as the main criminal, and the remaining actors as accomplices”.³⁰ The same instruction was repeated on several occasions, so it was formulated thusly: “As to criminals, and this will be for all crimes, Ante Pavelić jointly with the min[ister] of internal affairs, the director of public order and safety, etc.”³¹ Pursuant to these notations, in all such documents, Ante Pavelić is almost formulaically specified as the main criminal who issued the aforementioned Legal Decree and that he is guilty under Article 13 of the Court Martial Decree, as he “organized, ordered and intellectually fathered the mass killings”.³² Because he issued the Legal Decrees whereby, as alleged, a large part of the Serbs in the NDH lost their lives and property, Ante Pavelić was cited as the primary accountable individual. In the qualification of his crimes, he was described as the progenitor and “organizer of systematic terror and plunder against the Serbian population. The forced expulsion of the Serbs and their internment. Seizure of sovereign rights. Inciting the enemy to operate and interfere in the internal affairs of this country”.³³ On the question of crimes committed against Jews, a circular issued by the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators very similarly states that specific emphasis should be placed on the primary criminals, meaning those who intellectually initiated, ordered and most actively perpetrated crimes, and there was supposed to be a brief description of the stance and collaboration of individual organizations which actively participated in crimes against Jews. Additionally, the “main domestic collaborators in the looting of Jewish property” had to be specifically cited.³⁴ Thus, Ante Pavelić was named as the primary criminal for mass and individual forced removals, as he formulated the overall anti-Jewish policy, also initiated by the issuing of the Legal Decrees targeting Jews.³⁵ The foundation for the entire legal system

³⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 3584., 7 November 1945.

³¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 713, no. 2349, 20 November 1945.

³² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no number; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, CGK no. 253/2; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15169-15182.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 252.

³³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 485, no. 7555/46.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, CGK no. 618/88.

³⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 10, no. 2056/45, 27 July 1945.

³⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 714, no. 3232, 18 December 1945. On the accountability for what was perpetrated see: Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu* (Zagreb, 2001), p. 579-595.

was the Legal Decree on the Defence of the People and State of 17 April 1941.³⁶ The system was further supplemented by: the Legal Decree on Racial Affiliation, the Legal Decree on Protection of the Arayan Blood and Honour of the Croatian Nation (30 April 1941) and the Legal Decree on the Protection of the People and Arayan Culture of the Croatian Nation (4 June). These provisions were followed by an entire series of other laws, according to which Jews had to be registered, i.e., they had to be reported to a special station of Ustasha Security, charged with supervision of the Jews.³⁷ They were given special insignia (the star of David, the letter Ž – for *Židov*, the Croatian word for Jew) and it was decreed that they could only shop in Jewish stores.³⁸ At the beginning of June, the Legal Decree on Prevention of Concealment of Jewish Assets and the Legal Decree on Nationalization of Assets of Jews and Jewish Enterprises were also passed, and these were intended to establish complete control over Jewish assets.³⁹ As noted in the Commission's conclusion: "In a word, everything was done to eliminate Jews from all vocations and occupations and isolate them from the rest of society."⁴⁰

Ante Pavelić was described as the individual who bore primary accountability for the crimes perpetrated by the GRAVSIGUR.⁴¹ The explanation for this asserted that the intellectual initiators bore the primary responsibility even though they did not participate in the Directorate's specific operations and work. Particular attention in the work of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators was accorded to the activity of the Mobile Courts Martial (*Pokretni prijeki sudovi* – PPS). Even though the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, as stated in the documents, often could not ascertain the composition of the PPS in individual cases⁴² so based on a similar analogy, the list of criminals was also compiled, which in this case was truly lengthy. Following the principle outlined in previous cases, Ante Pavelić was designated as bearing primary accountability, but the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and

³⁶ *Zakoni, zakonske odredbe, naredbe NDH I* (Zagreb, 1941), p. 15; Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatske 1941. – 1945.* (Zagreb, 1978), pp. 159-160.

³⁷ *Hrvatski narod* (Zagreb), year III, no. 88, 11 May 1941, p. 5. According to a statement by Božidar Cerovski this station was in Bogovićeveva street no. 7, and it was headed by Ivica Baraković.

³⁸ *Hrvatski narod* (Zagreb), year III, no. 113, 7 June 1941, p. 2. According to the newspaper *Novi list* of 30 May 1941, 8,860 Jews are wearing Jewish insignia.

³⁹ *Hrvatski narod* (Zagreb), year III, no. 112, 6 June 1941, p. 14.; *Narodne novine* (Zagreb), year CV, no. 149, 10 October 1941, p. 2.; *Hrvatski narod* (Zagreb), year IV, no. 570., 1 November 1942, p. 6.

⁴⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 714, no. 3232, 18 December 1945. The German press, although it approved and praised these measures, added the hope that new decrees would follow which would settle the Jewish question.

⁴¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45227, 620/1075. The same decision with the same signature can also be found in box 741.

⁴² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 290, no. 16744.

Their Collaborators did not name him as the primary criminal “because this is understood in and of itself”.⁴³ This latter aspect was somewhat expected and justified, so this overall approach in determining the accountable parties was not overly surprising, particularly since the senior leadership of the NDH did indeed formulate overall policy and make decisions, so it also bore the corresponding accountability. However, it is noteworthy that not one case, even when individual decisions were considered, included specific evidence against Pavelić related to a perpetrated act, rather it was noted that the perpetrator of a given act was not known, so Pavelić was mentioned as the most prominent individual due to his status and significance. Thus, for example, one of the testimonies on mass crimes against the Serbs contains this statement: “I have no information on those Ustasha who removed him from the train station and took him to the camp. [...] For this physical abuse of my son, which contributed to the worsening of his illness and probably led to his death, I blame Ante Pavelić as the initiator and person who ordered the extermination of the Serbian population, and the bodies and individuals subordinate to him”.⁴⁴

There is some question as to whether the data obtained from other territorial commissions for the investigation of crimes of the occupiers and their collaborators were even additionally verified and compared to those gathered in Croatia's territory, for one of the subsequently received resolutions contains this statement: “Since there are many decisions against Pavelić for the grave crimes of mass slaughter and executions of Serbs, attach this file to the single ‘decision’ for Pavelić”.⁴⁵ One of the final supplements to this case arrived in mid-April 1947, containing the order that the documents be added to the existing file, for in the case of certain ‘persons’ who are mentioned but who were not earlier processed as criminal, “there are insufficient grounds for new decisions”.⁴⁶ Pursuant to the above, it should come as no surprise that on 8 July 1945 the news was released that the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, through the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, sought the extradition of the war criminal Ante Pavelić. Among many other things, it was noted that he, as a collaborator with the Italians and Germans, aided the fall of the Yugoslav army and introduced a Quisling regime in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1941.⁴⁷

⁴³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 290, no. 16734-16743; 16744-16749; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42227.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 612.

⁴⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 280, no. 15697, 24 August 1945; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 724, no. 344., 24 August 1945.

⁴⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 7623/46, 27 August 1946.

⁴⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 486, no. 312/47, 14 April 1947.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, no. 312/47, 14 April 1947.

⁴⁷ “Od saveznika je zatraženo izručenje ratnog zločinca Pavelića”, *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), year V, no. 68., 8 July 1945, p. 2.; “Zločinac Ante Pavelić treba da bude neodložno izručen našim vlastima”, *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), year VI, no. 311, 25 April 1946, p. 1.; “Kažnjavanje Draže Mihailovića i neodložno izručenje Ante Pavelića”, *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), year VI, no. 345, 6 June 1946, p. 4.

Loyalty to the *Poglavnik* ('Leader', i.e. Pavelić), was deemed particularly incriminating, so the list of war criminals/accomplices was generally filled with ministers in the NDH Government in charge of specific portfolios. However, it is important to note that since the primary criminal had already been determined in advance, the list of accomplices was rather broad and encompassed almost everyone who, by virtue of his/her status, could be included in any conceivable case. Among them, the name Andrija Artuković, the NDH internal affairs minister, was quite often notable. His work was almost always presented as collaborative with a high degree of accountability. Thus, Artuković was considered responsible in cases dealing with reprisals because, as stated, he was responsible for issuing the aforementioned legal decrees whereby reprisals were performed (justified).⁴⁸ The same case applied to crimes perpetrated against Serbs and Jews, wherein Artuković, as minister, implemented the policies stipulated by the legal decrees based exclusively on the racial and ethnic principles.⁴⁹ This principle, according to Artuković himself, implied that the NDH Government would "settle the Jewish question in the same way that it was settled by the German government".⁵⁰ In descriptions of the RAVSIGUR's work, it was also asserted that Artuković was one of the persons who played "an active part in persecution", i.e., he was among those who were characterized as "direct perpetrators in specific cases".⁵¹ It is interesting that the summary report tied to the RAVSIGUR's operations contains the conclusion that "it was not possible to ascertain, neither then nor now, the identity of all executive organs, nor was it possible to ascertain on whose command an individual victim was arrested, where such individual was taken to prison and his/her fate". This conclusion resulted from the fact that the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators was given "a relatively small number of reports [...]" on this specific case, but this led to application of the already well-known system of analogies which was omnipresent in the Commission's work.⁵²

Pavelić appointed Eugen Dido Kvaternik the director in charge of public order and safety, both in Zagreb and throughout the NDH, and he remained at this post until roughly the end of October 1942.⁵³ In this regard, he was most

⁴⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.

⁴⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 15, no. 2235/30., pp. 3733-3734; F. Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatske 1941. – 1945.*, p. 158.

⁵⁰ I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, p. 109. Cf. Mirko Peršen, *Ustaški logori* (Zagreb, 1990), p. 34.

⁵¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382., 619/374.

⁵² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42227., 42324.

⁵³ Ante Pavelić dismissed him from his duties on 13 October 1942. Kvaternik remained in Zagreb until February 1943, when he moved to Slovakia with his family. During September 1944 he went to Austria, where he remained until May 1945, and afterward he spent the next two years in Italy. In June 1947 he departed for Argentina, where he remained until his death. See:

often cited as the principal criminal in these cases, whether it was a matter of cases in which he personally conducted arrests and interrogations or this was done by subordinate agencies acting on his orders.⁵⁴ According to some interpretations, he was at the top of the chain of command that made decisions on killings, and he was also a member of the closest circle of people surrounding Pavelić.⁵⁵ Since the cases of mass killings (particularly the crimes in the Maksimir forest) involved numerous liquidations done over an extended period and that in most cases there were only vague statements as to the responsibility for the perpetrated crimes, most often Kvaternik's accountability was specified as unquestioned, for it was stated that as the director general of the GRAVSIGUR he organized mass persecution and killings.⁵⁶ In this task, the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators accomplished a great deal and "caught" the most important culprits, each of whom, by virtue of their posts, participated in the perpetration of these crimes. In this regard, on 27 November 1945 a decision was compiled which included a proposal to initiate criminal prosecution against Eugen Dido Kvaternik and accomplices for the shootings carried out in Maksimir, and on 13 March 1946 it was forwarded to the Public Prosecutor for the city of Zagreb.⁵⁷ The name Eugen Dido Kvaternik, as a co-perpetrator, was also mentioned in cases involving crimes against Serbs. His involvement pertained to the receiving and implementation of orders, often at his own initiative. At the first level of accountability, as the director general of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate, Kvaternik "issued directives for the removal of Jews and managed these criminal activities."⁵⁸ In all cases, his accountability was interpreted through his role and importance in the GRAVSIGUR. Although his name specifically was rarely mentioned in reports or testimonies, it is certain that his accountability was immense. However, it is important to note that in this case as well, his close personal relationship with Pavelić was underscored as exceptionally incriminating.

According to a report from a Commission envoy compiled on the basis of data gathered "in the field", it follows that upon perpetration of mass crimes "Ustasha officers" first came to the scene of the killing and conducted "judgment and justification" next to the open pits for the bodies. The killing methods were diverse, which was reflected in the field tours: "Scattered brain tissue, bones from the skull and tufts of hair were found at the site". The conclusion reads: "These crimes were committed by Ustasha. All that could be approxi-

Marko Grčić, ed., *Tko je tko u NDH. Hrvatska 1941. – 1945.* (Zagreb, 1997), pp. 224-225. On Eugen D. Kvaternik as director see: D. Kovačić, *Redarstveno – obavještajni sustav Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od 1941. – 1945. godine.*, pp. 71-88.

⁵⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42326.

⁵⁵ I. Goldstein, *Hrvatska 1918 – 2008.*, pp. 213-214, 236.

⁵⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 728, no. 834., CGK no. 534/42, 11 September 1945.

⁵⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 394/1946, 13 March 1946.

⁵⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 15, no. 2235/30, pp. 3733-3734.

mately ascertained is that they were mostly Ustasha from the UNS in Zagreb. Furthermore, the Ustasha rail battalion [...] The remaining Ustasha formations as perpetrators of these crimes could not be ascertained.” However, the principal offender designated in this case was Mirko Puk, the minister of justice and religion at the time, who, “as defender of justice should have been called upon first and foremost to protect and safeguard the lives and other moral and physical goods of citizens, but instead he was the first to trample on these things, and he was the protector of all crimes”.⁵⁹ Mirko Puk, as minister, co-signed the aforementioned legal decrees upon which the policy against the Serbs is based, thereby “identifying himself with Pavelić’s policy of persecuting Serbs”.⁶⁰ His role was similar with reference to the formulation of anti-Jewish policies in the NDH, so already at the end of April 1941, Justice Minister Mirko Puk stated that “the foundation for a law on Jews” was being prepared.⁶¹ This included Jewish-owned property, so Puk, as one of the signatories of the legal decree that nationalized the assets of Jews and Jewish-owned enterprises, was deemed the principal offender in this regard. In the description of the crime, he is described as: “initiating and ordering the plunder of the assets of Jews, initiating and ordering mass removals to camps, a high functionary of the terrorist apparatus”.⁶² His portfolio also included the functioning of the Extraordinary Tribunals and the PPS, so in this regard, Puk, as the relevant minister, was also accountable as the organizer of these courts, who enforced the enacted legal decrees.⁶³

The names Mladen Lorković (foreign affairs minister), Ante Nikšić and Mato Frković, who implemented policies as dictated by legal decrees, were cited along these same lines. This applied in particular to the case of mass crimes against Serbs. Lorković in particular was singled out with regard to the deportation of Serbs from the NDH.⁶⁴ The plan for the mass expulsion of Serbs was confirmed in an agreement between the Third Reich and the NDH,

⁵⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 407, no. 1776/46, 31729-31768.

⁶⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 485, no. 7555/46.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, CGK no. 618/88.

⁶¹ *Hrvatski narod* (Zagreb), year III., no. 71, 24 April 1941, p. 7.

⁶² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 115, no. 5281/46.

⁶³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 290, no. 16734-16743; 16744-16749; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42227; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 612.

⁶⁴ “Nijemci su otjerali stotine hiljada Srba i Slovenaca s njihovih ognjišta. Saopćenje Državne komisije za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača”, *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), year V, no. 209, 21 December 1945, 3. Cf. Andrija Ljubomir Lisac, “Deportacije Srba iz Hrvatske 1941.”, *Historijski zbornik IX* (1956), no. 1-4: 125-145.; Slobodan D. Milošević, *Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine* (Belgrade, 1981); Ivo Goldstein, “Iseljavanje Srba i useljavanje Slovenaca u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941. godine”, *Med Srednjo Evropo in Sredozemljem. Vojetov zbornik*, Sašo Jerše, ed., (Ljubljana, 2006), p. 595-605; Marica Karakaš Obradov, “Migracije srpskog stanovništva na području Nezavisne Države Hrvatske tijekom 1941. godine”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 43 (2011), no. 3: 801-826.

concluded in the German embassy in Zagreb on 4 June 1941.⁶⁵ The signed agreement stipulated that “a population exchange must be conducted from 4 July and to 31 October”.⁶⁶ The aforementioned three were also mentioned on a rather long list of co-participants in a case dealing with the RAVSIGUR’s activities. In this case, all three were described as persons who “took an active part in the programs. These are direct perpetrators in specific cases.”⁶⁷ However, in a similar explanation for the same case, something quite different is stated: “The direct perpetrators of the crimes committed in this manner cannot be ascertained, but for all such acts committed by police organs [...] he also bears accountability with the others as an organizer and command authority.”⁶⁸ Nikšić was called to accountability with regard to the seizure of Jewish-owned assets.⁶⁹ Frković was also mentioned as a co-perpetrator in cases of mass crimes against Serbs and in the analysis of RAVSIGUR’s activities and its authority.⁷⁰ A letter containing the names of the persons who were ascertained by the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators as participating in crimes against Serbs was forwarded to the Investigations Department of the Public Prosecutor in the city of Zagreb, with the note that the complete files were in the archives of Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, “for the whereabouts of all commanding authorities and direct perpetrators are unknown, as they are in flight”. However, the letter states that insofar as the prosecution initiates criminal proceedings prior to extradition in individual cases (informants were particularly stressed, since it was believed that they would be simpler to locate than those who issued orders), it would submit the portions of files that pertained to these individuals. Placement of the documents in the archives clearly indicated that the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators was aware that most of the commanding authorities would probably never answer for their crimes.

The circle of the “most accountable” persons closed with these names, even though no specific breakdown existed, although the names that followed con-

⁶⁵ S. D. Milošević, *Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine*, p. 31–32. The expulsion of Serbs from the territory of NDH was accompanied by the simultaneous expulsion of Slovenes. The Nazis wanted to vacate parts of Slovenian territory so that they could settle it with Germans. Initially the NDH authorities were not pleased with this idea, but later they upheld the task. See also: A. Lj. Lisac, “Deportacije Srba iz Hrvatske 1941.”, p. 126; Rafael Brčić, “O iseljavanju Slovenaca u Bosni 1941. godine”, *Prilozi*, (1973), no. 9/1: 303.; I. Goldstein, “Iseljavanje Srba i useljavanje Slovenaca u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941. godine”, pp. 595–596.

⁶⁶ S. D. Milošević, *Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine*, p. 31–32.

⁶⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.

⁶⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42328.

⁶⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 115, no. 5281/46.

⁷⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 485, no. 7555/46; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, CGK no. 618/88; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.

sisted of persons from the NDH administrative apparatus who were each one in a series of perpetrators of individual acts characterized as war crimes. In this first place, this pertains to Ljudevit Zimperman,⁷¹ Filip Crvenković,⁷² Milutin Jurčić⁷³ and Erih Lisak,⁷⁴ the directors general of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate. These names could be found on almost all lists of accomplices in cases which the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators processed. Zimperman was thus one of the primary co-perpetrators in the implementation of mass crimes, particularly with emphasis on crimes committed in the area of Maksimir.⁷⁵ Since Zimperman followed Kvaternik at the top post in RAVSIGUR, it is not surprising that his name was mentioned near the top of the list of those accountable for crimes perpetrated by RAVSIGUR officials. More precisely, the names of these four individuals and their role, according to the interpretation of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators is best described by the following citation, according to which the

⁷¹ Ljudevit Zimperman, attorney and Ustasha official. After establishment of the NDH he became a departmental chief in the Ministry of Justice and Religion, and in June 1942 he was appointed commissioner in the Chamber of Attorneys. In mid-October of that same year he succeeded Kvaternik as director of the Public Order and Safety Directorate, but at the end of the year he was placed at the disposal of the Justice and Religion Ministry. In early 1943 he was head of the Office of the State Council, and as of the end of March he became a state councillor. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 431.

⁷² Filip Crvenković earned a law degree and a doctorate, and practiced law in Sisak. At the end of 1941 he became administrator of the State Monopolies Directorate in Zagreb. He succeeded Kvaternik as UNS commander. From December 1942 to October 1943, he served as director general of GRAVSIGUR. After this, he was once more named chief administrator of the State Monopolies Directorate. In May 1945 he withdrew to Austria, and thereafter to Argentina. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 74.

⁷³ Milutin Jurčić earned a doctorate of laws at the Law School in Zagreb, after which he worked as an intern in Kosovo and as a judge in Samobor. From the establishment of the NDH until November 1942, he participated in combat as an Ustasha captain. From September 1942 to the end of August 1943 he was commander of the Bilogora Ustasha Command Staff in Bjelovar. From October 1943 to the end of August 1944 he was director general of GRAVSIGUR, after which he was arrested as a participant in the Lorković-Vokić putsch. On the night of 10/11 February 1945 he was taken from his home in Samobor, where he was killed by members of the Ustasha Defence. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 175.

⁷⁴ Erih Lisak emigrated to Italy 1933, whence he returned in 1941 with Pavelić, immediately becoming his personal adjutant. During 1941 he held the post of public order and safety commissioner in the Internal Affairs Ministry, organizing the police in individual cities. From August 1942 to October 1943 he was head of the Supervisory Section in the Ustasha Army command. After this he was appointed the Grand Prefect of Gora-Prigorje Grand County. From September to November 1944 he was appointed director general of GRAVSIGUR. Until May 1945 he held the post of state secretary in the Internal Affairs Ministry, and then he retreated to Austria. In September 1945 he stole back into Croatia, where he was arrested ten days later and sentenced to death. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 234.

⁷⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 295, no. 17250, CGK no. 534/59c.

conclusion was reached that thanks to them it was “possible to maintain such a system, in which all of these crimes could be committed with impunity”.⁷⁶ The overall operations of this agency were described as the “matrix through which all violence was perpetrated, and it set the tone for the notorious police system over which it presided”.⁷⁷ Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Zagreb Command’s Court Martial sentenced Zimperman to death on 21 July 1945.⁷⁸

Filip Crvenković, also the director general of the Supreme Directorate (incriminating by virtue of this agency’s overall operations) attended the session held in the Directorate’s premises in Zagreb at the request of Siegfried Kasche at the end of April 1943, at which it was decided that all remaining Jews be arrested and interned (except those deemed the most essential, “honorary” or in mixed marriages),⁷⁹ and “in this sense the persecution of the remaining Jews commenced.” During May 1943 they had to be transferred to camps in Germany.⁸⁰ According to one interpretation they participated in the decision on the final “cleansing of the Jewish element”, which was being planned in harmony between the Germans and the NDH authorities. These persons, among them Crvenković, were deemed among the persons most accountable for the fate of Zagreb’s Jews who were arrested in May 1943.⁸¹

The role of Milutin Jurčić, director of the Public Order and Safety Directorate, was particularly underscored in the processing of perpetrated reprisals. According to the gathered testimonies, reprisals were carried out so that the local police submitted a written proposal to the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate (GRAVSIGUR). According to testimony, the “reprisal” order was issued by the director of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate, who also determined the extent and manner in which reprisals would be conducted. This decision was made after the proposal and in agreement with the director of the Police District of the city of Zagreb and the chief of the police district’s political section and commander of the police armed forces. “The police district then sent a written proposal with the list of persons, the number of whom was even higher than previously ascertained”. This proposal was delivered to the director “who then selected persons from the list to be subjected to reprisal, and immediately pencilled in a brief order which read, roughly, ‘to be executed’ and his signature.”⁸² After this, the political section of the Supreme Directorate would

⁷⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45227, 620/1057.

⁷⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.

⁷⁸ *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 431.

⁷⁹ This agreement was not consistently observed as seen from the example: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 10, no. 89.

⁸⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/489; I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, p. 470.

⁸¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 721, no. 3232, CGK no. 91/4.

⁸² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 252.; I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, p. 274.

draw up the necessary files and press notices.⁸³ Therefore, it is clear that according to the gathered data, Jurčić issued the order, after which the proposal was accepted and an agreement was concluded with Josip Vragović, the administrator of the Police District in the city of Zagreb, and Franjo Lucić, the chief of that district's political section, and Joso Rukavina, the commander of the Police Armed Forces. The aforementioned notices were drawn up by Vjekoslav Paver – so that “they have also been made accountable” for the perpetrated crimes.⁸⁴ The same level of accountability was transferred, given the function, to the case of mass crimes and crimes against Serbs, and in general where this pertained to the operation of the agency he led.

The case of Josip Vragović was also one of the more prominent, since besides serving as director of the Police District in Zagreb, he also held a post in the GRAVSIGUR. In individual testimonies he was charged for “organizing and ordering individual mass arrests, detainments, torture and killings”.⁸⁵ The minutes with Josip Vragović were compiled before a task force of the Central City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators in the Kanal camp (today's Central Bus Station). In the decision it compiled, his last residence was registered as prison, while his “remaining personal data” specify that he was sentenced to death by the People's Court.⁸⁶

Erih Lisak was Pavelić's adjutant, a grand county prefect, and the director of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate in the NDH Internal Affairs Ministry.⁸⁷ He signed decisions on reprisals, arrests, removals to camps and fire squad shootings.⁸⁸ His accountability on the matter of mass crimes was underscored in particular.⁸⁹ In cases of crimes against Serbs, it was stated that Lisak was among the group of people who received and carried out orders, not infrequently at their own initiative. Besides group decisions and joint studies, the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators also dealt with individual responsibility (which was later incorporated into group decisions). So there was also a decision on Lisak as the di-

⁸³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 3847/45.

⁸⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 11627; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.

⁸⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42327; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 722, no. 141.

⁸⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 730, no. 616/2. After the fall of the NDH, Josip Vragović was arrested on 15 May 1945, and, in 1946, sentenced to 20 years in prison, which was transformed into a death sentence. After an appeal, he was given 20 years in prison. He served almost half of his sentence in Leopoglava, Stara Gradiška and Srijemska Mitrovica. He was released from prison on 15 May 1954. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 418-419.

⁸⁷ *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 234.

⁸⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15169; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 252.

⁸⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 728, no. 834, CGK no. 534/42, 11 September 1945.

rector of GRAVSIGUR, who was responsible for “illegal arrests, detention, restriction of personal freedoms, removals to camps and killings”. In four specific cases, persons were arrested as activists of the People’s Liberation Movement (*Narodnooslobodilački pokret* – NOP), during October and November 1944. Most were taken to the prison on Savska road in Zagreb and transferred to the concentration camp in Jasenovac three months later, where they were known to have been for a time, after which all trace of them was lost. Others deemed guilty besides Lisak were Franjo Lucić, at the time he was head of the political section of the Police District in the city of Zagreb, Miroslav Mak, the chief of the sub-section for the prevention of anti-state activities in that same Police District, and Hinko Dominik Picilli, the administrator of the camp in Jasenovac. According to the attached minutes, the informants did not specify even one “accountable” name, so it is clear that even in such cases accountability was established, if not illogically, then nonetheless rather expectedly.⁹⁰ Given the aforementioned, the reports in the press at the time, asserting that in the trials against Lisak, Ivan Šalić and others the witness testimonies exceeded the indictment itself, should not be surprising.⁹¹ The trial against Lisak and Šalić began on) September 1946 before the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of Croatia (NRH). On 11 October 1946, a verdict was pronounced “in the name of the people”. Lisak was sentenced to death by hanging, while Alojzije Stepinac and Ivan Šalić were sentenced to restriction of freedom for a duration of sixteen and nineteen years respectively, with compulsory labour and loss of political and civil rights for five years.⁹²

The next names on the lists of criminals were those who were often cited as “lower” ranking persons, i.e., those who actually carried out crimes formulated by the primary accountable parties, but thanks precisely to these individuals it was “possible to maintain such a system in which all of these crimes could be

⁹⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 281, no. 15988.

⁹¹ On the trials mentioned, see also Nada Kisić-Kolanović, “Vrijeme političke represije: ‘veliki sudski procesi’ u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1948.”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 25 (1993), no. 1: 10-17; “Optužnica teško tereti izdajnike, ratne zločince i njihove pomagače na čelu s Erihom Lisakom i Ivanom Šalićem”, *Vjesnik*, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 424a., 10 September 1946, p. 1.; “Optuženi Gulin: ‘Ja vidim da je to usko povezano prijateljstvo, odnosno veza između ustaša i klera, između nadbiskupa i ustaša’”, *Vjesnik*, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 431, 18 September 1946, p. 1.; “Pred Vrhovnim sudom Narodne Republike Hrvatske započelo je suđenje grupi ustaških zlikovaca sa Erihom Lisakom i Ivanom Šalićem, sekretarom nadbiskupa Stepinca”, *Borba* (Belgrade), year XI, 10 September 1946, p. 3.

⁹² “U ime naroda, Vijeće Vrhovnog suda NR Hrvatske donijelo je pravednu osudu Lisaku, Stepincu i družini”, *Vjesnik*, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 452, 12 October 1946, p. 2.; “Tekst osude Vijeća Vrhovnog suda NR Hrvatske. Zbog čega su osuđeni Lisak, Stepinac, Šalić i družina”, *Vjesnik*, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 453, 13 October 1946, p. 2.-3. For some documents, see: Joža Horvat and Zdenko Štambuk, ed., *Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu i zločinima jednog dijela katoličkog klera* (Zagreb, 1946) or Božidar Dugonjić, ed., *Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu i zločinima jednog dijela katoličkog klera* (Zagreb, 2008), pp. 357-410.

committed with impunity”.⁹³ Most often this list began with persons such as Božidar Cerovski,⁹⁴ Viktor Tomić,⁹⁵ Nikola Rajković, Stjepan Cerjak, Franjo Lucić, Nikola Bogojevski⁹⁶ and others.⁹⁷ Most of these names were associated with the perpetration of mass crimes during the war. Their personal initiative particularly came to the fore in the case of Cerovski, F. Lucić and Rajković, and it was decisive in the prosecution of crimes against the Serbs.

The same names were also inescapable with regard to the Jewish question, so Božidar Cerovski, the public order and safety commissioner in the city of Zagreb, who assumed “all command responsibilities” from this post, was mentioned as an accountable individual.⁹⁸ The list also included the Ustasha assistant commissioner for the city of Zagreb, Nikola Rajković, and Ivica Baraković, the chief-of-staff of the Jewish Section in the Ustasha Police Force. Joso Rukavina was also considered accountable for the deportation of Jews in January and August 1942, as he issued directives against the Jews. Siegfried Kasche, the Third Reich’s ambassador in Zagreb and, as alleged, a confidant of Hitler, was charged, along with others, for “killings and massacres, systematic terror, torture of civilians, deportation of citizens and their internment under inhumane conditions” during the last removal drive, in May 1943. Kasche was also charged with “aligning the policies of the NDH with the policies of national socialism and Germany’s interests”.⁹⁹ Filip Crvenković and Josip Majić were mentioned as the individuals who carried out these same arrests and deporta-

⁹³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45227, 620/1057.

⁹⁴ Božidar Cerovski was a police officer and civil servant: In April 1941 he was appointed Ustasha commissioner for public order and safety in Zagreb. In June he was appointed director of the Ustasha Police Directorate in charge of measures against “hostile elements”. In May 1945 he withdrew to Austria, whence the British authorities extradited him to Yugoslavia. In early 1947 he was sentenced to death by the new authorities. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, pp. 67.-68. The Commission had data according to which Cerovski was allegedly in the English occupation zone and his extradition was sought through the State Commission. See: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1346/46.

⁹⁵ Viktor Tomić was administrator of the UNS Security Agency from the summer of 1942. When this agency was dissolved he transferred to the PTS Security Agency in January 1943, after which he was appointed head of the Intelligence Department of the Ustasha Army and promoted to the rank of Ustasha lieutenant colonel. In May 1945 he left Croatia and spent almost two years in camps in Austria and Italy. When he was informed that he would be extradited to the Yugoslav authorities, he committed suicide. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 401.

⁹⁶ Nikola Bogojevski was a police officer. In May 1941 he joined the Ustasha movement and worked as an assistant in the RAVSIGUR commission at the Ustasha Headquarters in Banja Luka. As of early 1942 he transferred to the Protective Police in the city of Zagreb and the Prigorje Grand County. At the end of 1942 he was appointed chief of the anti-communist section. He had a reputation as the most capable investigator. In May 1945 he withdrew to Austria, and later to Egypt. See: *Tko je tko u NDH*, pp. 43-44.

⁹⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 295, no. 17250, CGK no. 534/59c.

⁹⁸ I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, pp. 154-155.

⁹⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/488.

tions.¹⁰⁰ For each of these persons there were also individual indictments which were later incorporated into the joint case.¹⁰¹ Thus, Cerovski was specified as one of the primary perpetrators of the persecution conducted by the NDH Public Order and Safety Directorate. Since he was a commissioner for the Public Order and Safety Directorate and he led the Political Department, his participation in these persecutions was the “most active”. Not only did he “administer the work of subordinate organs, he also personally conducted arrests, personally interrogated, abused and tortured victims, held them in jails, sent them to camps and took them to shootings and hangings”.¹⁰² One testimony indicates that interrogations in Petrinjska street (in Zagreb) were conducted by Cerovski, and “his agents subjected me to severe physical abuse”.¹⁰³ It was quite similar in the jail in Franje Račkog street (Zagreb), although there Viktor Tomić took the lead in inflicting abuse. “They beat me, hung me by my arms, blindfolded me and then about 10-15 of them beat me.”¹⁰⁴ Many statements confirm that they genuinely distinguished themselves in this abuse: Nikola Rajković, the Ustasha assistant commissioner for Zagreb, and Viktor Tomić, who was described in a number of instances as one of the most brutal Ustasha police officers.¹⁰⁵

An agent particularly noted in the jail on Square “N” (Zagreb) was Franjo Lucić, who interrogated and abused arrested persons.¹⁰⁶ Krešimir Fibić delivered his testimony before the Central City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators and in it he imputed Franjo Lucić, an official with the police force in Đorđićeva street. Namely, on the night of 16/17 October 1944, “Ustasha police agents” burst into his home due to reports that he illegally possessed a radio receiver which he was using to send news to London and Moscow. The radio was taken from him, and the accused

¹⁰⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 721, no. 3232, CGK no. 91/4.

¹⁰¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/494; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/495; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/496.

¹⁰² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42324, 42330.

¹⁰³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42324, 616/134; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 725, no. 395.

¹⁰⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42324, 616/147; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557 no. 45240, 620/1088.; One of the testimonies is also available in: Lutvo Ahmetović et al., ed., *Zbornik sjećanja Zagreb 1941 – 1945.*, vol. 2, (Zagreb, 1983), pp. 218-219.

¹⁰⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 730, no. 616/2; I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, p. 551. According to Jere Jareb’s interpretation, Vjekoslav Luburić and Viktor Tomić carried out the orders which they received directly from Ante Pavelić. See: Jere Jareb, ed., Eugen D. Kvaternik, *Sjećanja i zapažanja 1925 – 1945* (Zagreb, 1995), p. 284. On his biography, see: *Tko je tko u NDH*, p. 401.

¹⁰⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/80; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 581, no. 45227, 620/301, 620/357.

was sent to the police for questioning, where his case was handled by Lucić.¹⁰⁷ Given the numerous statements, it comes as no surprise that the Public Prosecutor was given a proposal for criminal charges against Franjo Lucić and an order to place his assets under temporary management and supervision.¹⁰⁸

In the majority of cases, officers of the Police Force who conducted arrests and interrogations were mentioned as co-participants. Thus, for example, the arrests were conducted by: “Miroslav Mak and Marko Prpić, officers, who made the decision to hang the victim as a form of reprisal”.¹⁰⁹ In the other reports, Ivan Čeko, Zvonimir Draženović, Vilim Dugi, Tomo Filipović, Stipe Radić, Danijel Rogić, Ante Skelin and Franjo Sučić were indicated as co-participants in this crime as the police agents who most often participated in the arrests of individuals and in the statements of survivors their names were the only ones noted as guilty parties.

Allegedly not even Zvonimir Draženović was left behind. As commander of the Police Force and later chief of the political section, he administered operations but also personally conducted arrests and abuse.¹¹⁰ Đorđe Radovanović delivered testimony on the matter of Zvonimir Draženović. In it, he said he was taken to the Armed Forces Police in Zvonimirova street, where he was handed over to Draženović, who then abused him. From there he was transferred to Savska street, where he was also abused for over six weeks. In this testimony, he said Draženović “using all possible terrorist means to physically and mentally torture me” until he forced him to admit that he intended to flee to the Partisans, “even though he found no real evidence for this”.¹¹¹ His final destination was Đorđićeva street, where he awaited amnesty on 23 December 1944.¹¹² According to the testimony of Pavao Kralj, he was in jail from 30 July 1944 to 7 May 1945. During his stay there were beatings, suffocation, hangings on a pole, confinement in a bunker for seven days, starvation, tearing out of hair and nails, to which an attached physician’s report testified.¹¹³ That Draženović issued orders for arrests was also confirmed by the case of Ivan Slade, who was first held in Zvonimirova street no. 9, and then transferred to Savska road, where he remained for five months. He had to be hospitalized due to torture, and after

¹⁰⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 228., Zh 9565. Cf. HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK Zagreb, box 711, no. 177/45.

¹⁰⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 650, 611/P.

¹⁰⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15169-15182.

¹¹⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 525, no. 42337.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 97, no. 4289/46; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 245, no. 11579, 11605; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15160; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 291, no. 16843; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45239, 620/1087.

¹¹¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 197, no. 6229.

¹¹² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK Zagreb, box 721, no 24.

¹¹³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 184, no. 5059a.

this he was transferred to the jail in Nova Ves, where he was sentenced to two years in jail the Court Martial of the Zagreb City Command. He was moved to Lepoglava, and from there, prior to the arrival of the Yugoslav Army, he was transferred to Jasenovac, where all trace of him was lost.¹¹⁴ One of the cases in which Draženović was cited as the primary culprit pertained to the victims Antun Berc, the Senjarić brothers and Slavko and Draga Jeršić, who were arrested in early November 1944 and taken to Savska road, where they were interrogated for five days in the presence of Ante Skelin and Ivan Toth. At the end of the year, Drago Jeršić and Antun Berc were taken to Stara Bistra, where they were hung, while the Senjarić brothers were hung in Odra as a form of reprisal in January 1945.¹¹⁵ Therefore, it was to be expected that soon after the formation of the Department in charge of “enemy assets” the property of Zvonimir Draženović was among the seven completed cases (which also included major enterprises).¹¹⁶ In this vein, his entire assets were placed under the interim management of the Territorial People’s Assets Administration and an interim administrator for it was appointed.¹¹⁷ A high number of decisions compiled on war crimes perpetrated by Draženović prompted a request for his extradition to the Allied countries, since the Commission had at its disposal data according to which Draženović was in the Fermo camp in Italy.¹¹⁸

Danijel Rogić, a referral officer for the Police District in the city of Zagreb, was also mentioned in several testimonies.¹¹⁹ In the case of Ivan Filipčić, he conducted interrogations in Petrinjska street, wherein the prisoner was hung on a pole between two chairs with hands and legs bound. The file also contains a decision of the State Security Administration (*Uprava državne bezbednosti* – UDBa) which defines Rogić as a war criminal.¹²⁰ Numerous testimonies noted that Rogić was in the jail in Savska road. In its letter to the District Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, the Central City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators stated that he was “sentenced to death by the People’s Government”.¹²¹ Arrests were mostly conducted on the basis of various denunciations, and their perpetrators were frequently identified by name, and while the agents conduct-

¹¹⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 242, no. 11269; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 247.

¹¹⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 184, no. 5032; Z. Draženović is also specified as the primary culprit in: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 725, no. 375.

¹¹⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 720, no. 48/45, 23 June 1945.

¹¹⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 649, no. 318/P.

¹¹⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 242, Criminals in flight abroad.

¹¹⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 216, no. 8018-8019; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 226, no. 9416; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 228, no. 9679-9680; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 525, no. 42338.

¹²⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 217, no. 8313/95.

¹²¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1451/46.

ing interrogations were largely named as the accountable persons, although this information was cited provisionally or taken from secondary sources.¹²² A portion of testimonies, as already stated, confirmed that physical abuse was frequent during interrogations. A part of the information was gathered during visits when families came to take possession of the bloody clothing of prisoners.¹²³ However, this was normally followed by: "Who beat her, I don't know. I'm old and illiterate so I don't know any details".¹²⁴ Most often they stated that the arrests, trials and shootings involved participation by "a certain" someone, e.g. Sabljak, Skelin, Bracanović, etc. who were agents in Ustasha jails and who truly participated in arrests and abuse, to which the high number of statements testifies. However, more detailed accompanying information was lacking, so generally the following was mentioned: "I have no greater details on these crimes, nor do I know of any greater details on the manner of their perpetration."¹²⁵ Despite this, at this level it was not difficult to compile decisions on war crimes, particularly because the names of the persons employed at the Police Force very often appeared as the culpable parties in various cases. The guilt of its staff members intertwined with cases of reprisals, mass persecution, mobile extraordinary courts, courts martial, etc. Their accountability was generally described with the comprehensive qualification: "mass killing, persecution and abuse".¹²⁶ All of these persons who were specified as culprits/co-culprits for the perpetrated crimes truly were, each within his own framework, participated in perpetration of these crimes. What is difficult to ascertain is the extent to which they incited these crimes, and the extent to which they were mere performers of individual activities, particularly if one takes into consideration that the criminal systems often made innocent persons guilty.

The analyzed cases provide a picture of all levels of collaboration (categorical structure) and perpetration of war crimes (particularly their forms), both through individual and through group decisions. The first category would encompass the chief collaborators, the organizers, ideologues and order-issuing authorities for the perpetration of crimes. The next group would consist of those who implemented these orders and the persons who implemented policies to benefit the occupying powers, while the third group would consist of members of military formations, staff in institutions, and others who participated in shootings, hangings and any other form of reprisal. The range was

¹²² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. "Maksimir" crimes – evidentiary material, CGK no. 534/21.

¹²³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. "Maksimir" crimes – evidentiary material, no. 24/45.

¹²⁴ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. "Maksimir" crimes – evidentiary material, no. 289/45, CGK no. 534/25.

¹²⁵ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. "Maksimir" crimes – evidentiary material, CGK no. 534/36.

¹²⁶ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 291, no. 16827.

truly broad and covered: the integrated occupation apparatus, destruction of the people's liberation movement, the struggle against Partisan units, crimes against civilians, looting of assets and violence of all type. However, all of them, as often stated, shared the common interest of the occupiers, which determined and assigned each individual role and task.

Looking at the overall picture, it is important to note that in most cases, the list of co-perpetrators, given that the primary criminal was – as already noted – determined in advance – was quite broad and included almost every person who may have been involved in a given case by virtue of his status. Even though the culpability of most of them was not in question, in most cases the question of their specific and individual accountability was not clearly delineated, rather the principle was stressed that their accountability was implied in and of itself. This is also partially confirmed by the letter from the Central City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators sent to the Territorial Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators which sent general instructions due to their return of 16 cases (dealing with perpetrated reprisals) which had to be “supplemented” according to the newest instructions. At the city level, criticism was levelled at this case “because here it is case of entirely different crimes, perpetrated over several years at different locations and, most importantly, under different crimes”. Additionally, it was stated that such a task would be difficult to complete from the technical aspect as well, for the broadness of the case meant it would be incomplete and difficult to review.¹²⁷ However, as concluded, this was only an opinion, while decisions were made at other levels. This criticism was not accepted, because on 20 November a response was forwarded to the Central Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators which reinforced the position that all reprisals be treated as a single case, which was, as stated, also the “stance of the State Commission”.¹²⁸ In this vein, a final report on reprisals was compiled, citing numerous common elements in their perpetration.¹²⁹ This report concludes with this statement: “It is certain and unambiguous that many other criminals participated in this massacre, but even though this commission could not ascertain anything about them, they will have to be detected and justly tried”.¹³⁰ This type of crime may be one of the most detailed to be researched by the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators. An extenuating circumstance was the notices on perpetrated reprisals published in the NDH press. This was a sound foundation upon which further cases could be built, but most of them were missing statements from any manner of witness, so

¹²⁷ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 713, no. 2159, 12 November 1945. The same document is available in box 296 under the same call number.

¹²⁸ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no 3584, 20 November 1945.

¹²⁹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.

¹³⁰ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.

there were not even more detailed data on what was done. Therefore, it was convenient to ascribe accountability to those who held the highest posts in the system and occasionally expand the list with the names of individuals who conducted interrogations in a flagrantly brutal manner in the various jails in Zagreb at the time.

According to the conclusion concerning the operations of RAVSIGUR/ GRAVSIGUR, “it was not possible to establish, neither then nor now, the identity of all executive organs, nor was it possible to ascertain the orders under which individual victims were arrested, where they were taken to detention and what their fate was”. This conclusion was a consequence of the fact that “the commission was given a relatively small number of reports [...]”.¹³¹ According to the available records, from March 1943 to May 1945, a total of 1,170 victims were processed, who were recorded in 1,074 reports.¹³² Computation of the total damages incurred due to this crimes remained equally undefined, for only some reports contain damage claims. This is backed by reports which, not knowing specific culprits for a given crime, accused: “We deem the Ustasha *poglavnik* and unidentified Ustasha from the Petrinjska police [the police in Zagreb’s Petrinjska street] guilty of this crime”.¹³³ In order to secure a more complete picture, it is important to emphasize that this case was one of the more extensive, but given the extensive tasks, even here the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators was not entirely satisfied with the final result. Even though one may gain the impression that the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators did not entirely complete any task, such a conclusion would not be absolutely warranted. Given the as-yet methodologically unknown operating formula and the fact that the set tasks were truly all-encompassing, while the deadlines were rather short (which does not mean that there was no time), a considerable amount was accomplished. Another interesting matter is the Department in charge of “enemy assets”, which was charged with compiling an overall view of the property transfers in the land registers during the “occupation”, but with time it became clear that such a task would be difficult to implement, so a decision was made subsequently to set it aside, while the proposal for an asset sequester was only sent in those cases when individuals owned specific property if it had greater value. This was particularly so because it quickly became apparent that seizure of assets of an increasing number of people would be burdensome to the state, so efforts were dedicated to the more “feasible” cases.

In assessing its overall work, I cannot overlook the evident shortcomings in this service, which first and foremost pertained to its considerable lack of

¹³¹ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42227, 42324.

¹³² HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 97, no. 2396/46; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 741 no. 620/1075; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 583, no. 45227-45560.

¹³³ HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42324., 616/14.

objectivity, frequent use of ideologically tainted terminology, bias and unsystematic approach, which are clearly indicated by the available documents. The gathered evidence (reports), of which a considerable portion is rather vague in matters of locations and times of crimes, as well as the accountability for these acts, may only serve as testimony on crimes perpetrated during the war after considerable comparison with other documentation (which I believe was not greatly practiced in the work of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators), but they are not the most accurate indicators of accountability. Additionally, the principle underlying the work was not individual, i.e., the approach for establishing the accountable parties often took the form of “collective responsibility”. Moreover, at the state level non-uniform criteria for the establishment of guilt was noted. Individuals were treated differently for the same behaviour by different territorial commissions. “The drastic difference between Territorial Commissions appeared when dealing with civilians serving or acting as associates to the occupiers and Quislings. Further research will show that there was a territorialization of criteria, that political subjectivity was introduced and that there was a non-uniform application of criteria in the work of the territorial commissions when they proclaimed individuals perpetrators of war crimes”.¹³⁴ Nonetheless, from the overall standpoint, Dušan Nedeljković, the chairman of the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, noted in his final report without any particular euphoria that the ultimate result of the work was “immense and satisfactory”.¹³⁵ According to many statements made by the actual staff in the in his final report, the research apparatus was exceptionally faulty, so that this shortcoming had to be rectified by legal experts who did the bulk of the work. If the research teams did not do their job well, the question arises as to the manner in which they gathered the research material that served as the foundation for determining accountability for any possible perpetrated crimes. However, this question was not within the realm of the work done by the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, rather it was a matter for the courts, which had to launch or halt further proceedings pursuant to the proposal of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators. However, it is worth noting that it was stressed on several occasions that the work should not be “shackled by legal norms”. The justice of the time, as extolled by the Yugoslav Army Generals Koča Popović and Peko Dapčević upon their entry into Belgrade, “also includes retribution”.¹³⁶ And it truly was present.

¹³⁴ Miodrag Đ. Zečević and Jovan P. Popović, ed., *Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije*, vol. I (Belgrade, 1996), p. 14.

¹³⁵ AJ, fund. 110 – DK, box 1, 1-74.

¹³⁶ Ivan Janković, *Smrt u prisustvu vlasti. Smrtna kazna u Jugoslaviji i svetu* (Belgrade, 1985), p. 174.

**Die Tätigkeit der Landeskommission für die Feststellung der von
Okkupanten und ihren Helfern begangenen Verbrechen: Analyse
nach den gesetzten Zeilen und Fällen**

Zusammenfassung

Mittels dargestellter Fälle, für die von der Landeskommission für die Feststellung der von Okkupanten und ihren Helfern begangenen Verbrechen die Verantwortung festgestellt wurde, versucht man in dieser Arbeit alle Ebenen von Kollaboration und Verübung von Kriegsverbrechen (besonders ihre Formen) darzustellen. Die Forschung basiert sowohl auf den auf Einzelne, als auch auf Gruppen bezogenen Urteilen der genannten Kommission. Spannweite dieser Verbrechen war sehr breit und umfasste Verbrechen gegen integratives Okkupationsapparat, Vernichtung der Volksbefreiungsbewegung, Kampf gegen Partisaneneinheiten, Verbrechen gegen Bürger, Plünderung des Eigentums und Gewaltakte jeder Art.



THE CROATIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PLANS FOR REVISION OF THE YUGOSLAV- HUNGARIAN BORDER IN 1945-1946

Petar BAGARIĆ*

The Border Commission attached to the Presidency of the Government of the Federal State of Croatia prepared plans to revise the Yugoslav-Hungarian border during the period from the end of the Second World War to the Paris Peace Conference. This work introduces the Commission's staff and presents its operating methods and the results of its work, as well as its relations with federal institutions in Belgrade.

Key words: Federal state of Croatia, Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, Hungary, Baja Triangle, Border Commission, alteration of borders.

Introduction

At the end of the Second World War in Europe, preparations commenced for a peace conference that would determine the peace conditions for the defeated states. The status of the defeated states was influenced by various factors: the time of their transfer to the Allied side, their armed contribution to the Allied victory or the number and strength of the victorious states which had territorial demands against their territories. The Democratic Federal, or Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia came out of the war as a victor and as the legal successor to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This meant that it could place before Hungary the matter of Hungarian occupation of territories such as Prekomurje, Međimurje, Baranja and Bačka during the Second World War and seek material and territorial compensation.

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Croatia, like the other federal units, organized its own border commission. In setting its priorities and operating methods, the “Border Commission attached to the Presidency of the Government of the Federal State of Croatia” was autonomous, although ultimately federal interests – as formulated by the Institute for the Study of International Issues under the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Belgrade – proved crucial. The Commission’s work reflected the aspirations of Croatian academic circles, from among whose ranks its leading members and associates, who compiled studies for the Commission’s need, were appointed.

The Croatian Border Commission

The Border Commission attached to the Government of the Federal State of Croatia was established in 1945 for the purpose of preparing the borderline between Croatia and the remaining federal units inside the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia of the time and the borderline between its sections of Yugoslavia’s border and neighbouring countries (Italy, Hungary).¹

As part of preparations for the establishment of the border between Croatia itself and the aforementioned states, the Croatian Commission prepared materials for the borders between Yugoslavia and Hungary not only along the Croatian-Hungarian border but also for the area of the Baja Triangle, a territory in Hungary in the vicinity of the town of Baja, in today’s county of Bács-Kiskun (Bač-Mala Kumanija).²

Hungary bordered three Yugoslav federal units: Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia (in the latter case, through Vojvodina, an autonomous province of Serbia). The work of the border commissions attached to the governments of the federal units was coordinated by the Institute for the Study of International Issues, a body of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Belgrade.³

The first attempts to establish the Border Commission under the Presidency of the Government of the Federal State of Croatia commenced in April 1945. At the time, the government was seated in Šibenik, because Zagreb was still under the control of the pro-Axis government of the Independent State of

¹ Egon Kraljević, *Analitički inventar arhivskog fonda HR HDA 1166 – Komisija za razgraničenje pri Predsjedništvu Vlade Narodne Republike Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv, 2006), p. 6; Croatian State Archives (HR-HDA), Border Commission (1166), box 1, signature 1, point 2. Outline for the work of the Border Commission 12 June 1945.

² The Baja Triangle encompasses these settlements: Bácsalmás, Bácsbokod, Bácsborsod, Bácsszentgyörgy, Madaras, Bátmonostor, Baja, Csátalja, Csávoly, Csikéria, Dávod, Felsőszentiván, Gara, Hercegszántó, Katymár, Kelebia, Kunbaja, Mátételke, Mélykút, Nagybaracska, Szeremle, Tataháza, Tompa, Vaskút. The names of the settlements are cited in Hungarian because they are today in Hungary, while the Croatian forms of their names are not uniform.

³ Egon Kraljević, *Analitički inventar arhivskog fonda HR HDA 1166...*, p. 7.

Croatia (NDH). An obstacle confronting its formation was the lack of a professional staff, which is reflected in the correspondence between state bodies concerning candidates for work in the future Commission, and this was exacerbated by the fact that only Croatian university was in Zagreb. Some of the candidates were overburdened by duties in state and other agencies. The Commission was finally formed from persons who lived in Zagreb and were inaccessible to the authorities of the Federal State of Croatia.

The Commission was established on 1 June 1945. The written evidence of its work can be found from the beginning of that month. One of the first ambiguities that the Government had to resolve was how to establish the border commission. The documentation indicates that at first there were plans to have one commission for the "external" borders, which were Yugoslavia's borders with Italy, Hungary and Austria, and another commission that would deal with setting the "internal" borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia.⁴

The first challenges to setting the borders came from Vojvodina. Work on this border showed that a single consolidated commission was necessary, because the outcome of setting the border between Croatia and Vojvodina depending on the outcome of setting the border between Yugoslavia and Hungary.⁵

The Croatian contribution to the plans for revision of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border is the subject of this work.

Two principles for setting borders were instituted, and they applied to neighbouring federal units and neighbouring states such as Italy and Hungary. The first principle was ethnic, whereby the ethnic majority of the population was supposed to serve the deciding factor. But this was modified by the second principle: economic factors and transport gravitation, which was meant to serve as a corrective factor.⁶ Above these principles was the fact that Yugoslavia was a victor, while Hungary a defeated country in the Second World War, which put Yugoslavia in a more advantageous position than Hungary.

⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, Presidency of the Government of the People's Republic of Croatia, box 1, signature I, point 1. Correspondence from Justice Ministry of Federal Democratic Croatia to District People's Liberation Committee of Dalmatia, court section, of 26 April 1945.

⁵ HR HDA 1166, Border Commission, Presidency of the Government of the People's Republic of Croatia, box 16, signature 3.2.2., point 1. On the demarcation of Vojvodina, a study submitted by the Ministry for Croatia in the Government of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia to the Presidency of the People's Government of Croatia.

⁶ HR HDA 1166, Border Commission, Presidency of the Government of the People's Republic of Croatia, box 1, signature I, point 2. Outline for the work of the Border Commission 12 June 1945.

Staff of the Border Commission

The principle underlying the recruitment to the Commission was: the individuals must be experts, but also politically reliable. The fact that many members of the Commission spent the war either in the civil or public service of the Independent State of Croatia and published scholarly works during that time aroused suspicions of “the crime of cultural cooperation with the enemy”. Nonetheless, since their expertise was needed, the authorities overlooked these misgivings.

The members of the “northern border group”, a body within the Border Commission charged with drafting a proposal for the border with Hungary, were Josip Roglić, Vinko Žganec, Juraj Andrassy, Milovan Zoričić, Rudolf Maixner and Krešimir Filić. Among the Commission’s associates in individual task forces were Kamilo Firinger, Josip Bösendorfer, Jerko Zlatarić and Blaško Rajić.

Most members of the Commission in the “northern border group” were exemplars of the Zagreb, or rather, northern Croatian academic elite.⁷ Indeed, three (Zoričić, Andrassy and Maixner) were leaders of the pre-war Friends of France Society (*Cercle Français de Zagreb*).

At first, the acting chief official and chairman of the Commission, Josip Roglić, originally from Dalmatia, was the sole exception in terms of geographic origin and the fact that he studied and earned his doctorate in Belgrade, where he also worked in the local secondary schools, whence he moved to Zagreb in May 1941. Even in Zagreb he continued to work in the secondary school system, and he secretly collaborated with the Partisans in the eighth district of the Unified People’s Liberation Front (JNOF: *Jedinstvena narodno-oslobodilačka fronta*).⁸ He established contacts with many future members of the Commission during the war itself, and using pseudonyms, they wrote texts which Ivan Meštrović managed to publish through the University of Lausanne in Switzerland.⁹

A member of the northern border group was Vinko Žganec Ph.D., from Vratišinec in Međimurje, who was a governmental commissioner in Međimurje in 1925/26. He learned Hungarian in primary school, which was deemed a rare skill.¹⁰

Dr. Juraj Andrassy was a university law professor from Zagreb, a professor at the International Law Academy in The Hague prior to World War II, the

⁷ HR HDA 1166, Border Commission,, Presidency of the Government of the People’s Republic of Croatia, box 1, signature I, point 1, unit: Lists of Commission experts, List of Commission members.

⁸ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 1, signature I, point 1. Lists of Commission experts; *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol. II, L-Ž, (Zagreb, 1997), p. 374.

⁹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission,, box 1, signature I, point 2. Outline for the work of the Border Commission 12 June 1945; Exhibit A.

¹⁰ *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol. II, pp. 728-729.

secretary of the Friends of France Society, and a winner of the Legion of Honour in 1937.¹¹

Milovan Zoričić, Ph.D. was a justice in the Supreme Court of Croatia and served as a member of the government of the Saarland in 1932-35 in charge of the judiciary, religion and education. (The Saar [Territory of the Saar Basin, or Saargebiet] was a region in western Germany under a League of Nations mandate pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles). He served as president of the Friends of France Society, president of the Hunting Federation (the Federation of Hunting Associations of Croatia and Slavonia since 1925) and president of the Football Federation (Football Sub-committee of the Croatian Sports Federation, 1912-1914).¹²

Rudolf Maixner Ph.D. was born in Varaždin, studied in Paris, and earned a doctorate in at the University of Zagreb. Prior to the war, he worked as a correspondent from Paris and Geneva for the newspaper *Obzor*, of which he eventually became editor. He was a member of board of the Friends of France Society.¹³

Krešimir Filić, was born in Bjelovar, but he spent his entire life in Varaždin, where he lectured in history and geography at the classics gymnasium, and was the *spiritus movens* of the city's cultural life. He established and presided over the mountaineering association, the museum society, the choir society, etc.¹⁴

Among the members of the sub-group was Kamilo Firingner, born in Daruvar, who headed the Archives of Slavonia in Osijek. He studied the Hungarian language at the University of Zagreb. He earned a doctorate in law. Prior to the war he was active in the Croatian Popular Party. He established the Archaeology Society in Osijek. He also encouraged skiing and hiking in Slavonia.

Firingner was recommended to head the Archives of Slavonia by Josip Bösendorfer, Ph.D., the director of the Museum of Slavonia in Osijek, also one of the Commission's associates, who was born in Lukač, near Virovitica, and earned his doctorate in Zagreb.¹⁵

¹¹ *Ko je ko u Jugoslaviji, biografski podaci o jugoslovenskim savremenicima* (Belgrade, 1957), p. 18; *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol. I, p. 15.

¹² Maria Zenner, *Parteien und Politik im Saargebiet unter dem Völkerbundsregime 1920-1935* (Minerva-Verlag Thinner und Nolte, 1966), p. 423; *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol. II, p. 717.

¹³ Josip Horvat, *Živjeti u Hrvatskoj, Zapisci iz nepovrata 1900.-1941.* (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1984), pp. 239, 251; *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol. II, p. 52.

¹⁴ Mladen Vezmarović, "Krešimir Filić (1891.-1972.) život i djelo" in *800 godina slobodnog kraljevskog grada Varaždina: 1209.-2009.: zbornik radova s međunarodnog znanstvenog skupa održanog 3. i 4. prosinca 2009. godine u Varaždinu* (Zagreb; Varaždin: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, Zavod za znanstveni rad u Varaždinu: Grad Varaždin, Varaždinska županija, 2009), pp. 871-873.

¹⁵ <http://essekri.hr/bio/70-kamilo-firingner>. (Accessed on 12 July 2012); *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol I, pp. 130, 351.

Jerko Zlatarić, a peasant from Gajić in Baranja, was the politically highest-ranking Croat from Baranja who participated in setting the border as a member of the “Commission of the AVNOJ¹⁶ Presidency to Draft the Proposal for the Border Between the Territories of Vojvodina and Croatia” (the so-called Dilas Commission), which set an interim border between Croatia and Serbia (Vojvodina). Prior to the war, he was a deputy senator of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party [IO HRSS] as of 29 June 1945, and a member of the Interim People’s Assembly [*Privremena narodna skupština* – PNS]. His support of Imre Filaković in 1946 showed that he was parting ways with the pro-communist leadership of the IO HRSS. Due to this opposition to the establishment of peasant labour cooperatives, he was expelled from the People’s Front [*Narodna fronta* – NF]. In 1950, he was sentenced to eight years in prison, and released after serving two years.¹⁷

Blaško Rajić, a priest and an exceptionally important Croatian national activist in the preceding decades, and politician Grga Skenderović, both from Subotica, also worked with the Commission.¹⁸

Individual collaborators were given different assignments. Juraj Andrassy’s letter to Josip Roglić on 22 March 1946 shows that cartographers [Vojislav] Rubin and Ivan Kreuziger were engaged, that Vaso Bogdanov was preparing a report on war crimes, and Ivan Esih was working on a critique of Hungarian official statistics.¹⁹ Stjepan ‘Stevo’ Šaravanja, according to that same letter, was doing field work.²⁰ A receipt signed by Rudolf Maixner indicates that Šaravanja spent 34 days in the field, from 5 March to 8 April 1946, and that he travelled along this route: Belgrade – Novi Sad – Osijek – Sombor – Osijek – Varaždin

¹⁶ Antifaštičko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije – Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

¹⁷ Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941.-1950.* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1996), p. 189.

¹⁸ *Hrvatski leksikon*, vol. II, 1997, p. 346.

¹⁹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, Presidency of the Government of the People’s Republic of Croatia, box 1, signature I, point 1, unit: Lists of Commission experts, List of Commission members; “Esih, Dr. Ivan: Official of Group V – Born in Ljubuški on 7 Aug. 1898. Doctorate in Slavic linguistics, 1923, passed professorial examination in 1927. Began teaching at the 1st Men’s General Gymnasium in 1923, and after specialization at Jagiellonian University in Krakow he assumed post of secretary in the staff of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Science in Zagreb in 1928, where he remained until 1940, when he joined the staff of the Education Department of the Banovina of Croatia. During the N.D.H. he worked as a clerk in the Education Ministry. After liberation he transferred from the Education Ministry to the Border Commission on 24 June 1945. He has served 26 years in the civil service”.

²⁰ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.6. Correspondence, 1. Letters point 4. Andrassy’s letter to Roglić of 22 March 1946.

– Kotoriba – Maribor – Osijek – Beli Manastir – Ljubljana – Varaždin – Čakovec – Kotoriba – Osijek – Sombor – Virovitica – Kotoriba.²¹

The importance of knowing the Hungarian language was emphasized on a number of occasions. This is why on 8 January 1946, permission was sought from the 2nd Classics Gymnasium in Zagreb for Vaso Bogdanov to travel to Vojvodina, because he was “well versed in recent Hungarian history and the language”.²²

In a letter to the Justice Ministry of the People’s Government of Croatia, the District People’s Committee for Slavonia proposed seven experts for work on determining the border with Hungary, of whom two (Jerko Zlatarić and Slavko Belešlin) were recommended as good speakers of the Hungarian language, while a third candidate, Valent Šokec, in fact mentioned that Hungarian speakers must be found for such work.²³

Principles of the Commission’s work

On 12 June 1945, the Commission compiled its Draft Operations.²⁴

At a meeting of Commission members with Rade Pribičević, the deputy prime minister of the Government of the Federal State of Croatia, held on 1 August 1945 at the initiative of then acting Commission chief and later chairman Josip Roglić, Pribičević laid out the following political guideline on how to approach the requests for revision of the border with Hungary: “On the matter of our northern border [with Hungary], we must be guided by objective demands that will not be saturated in chauvinism”.²⁵

Maixner asserted that the Commission had no idea what the Hungarians were doing, but that they were certainly doing a great deal, Andrassy stressed the importance of gathering data on cross-border owners, while Filić submitted a more extensive report.

²¹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.6. Correspondence, 2. Letters point 12. Field work expenses of S. Šaravanja.

²² HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.6. Correspondence, 2. Letters point 12. Josip Roglić on 8 January 1946 to secretary general of the Government’s Presidency, associate Vasa Bogdanov.

²³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.6. Correspondence, 2. Letters point 8. Letter no. 400/45 of 13 August 1945. District People’s Committee to the People’s Government of Croatia, Justice Ministry. Subject: Experts – persons knowledgeable in ethnographic data, collection of names.

²⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 1, signature I, point 2. Outline for the work of the Border Commission 12 June 1945.

²⁵ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 1, signature I, point 3. Border Commission’s operating plan, 13. Minutes to the 1st session of Commission members and associates on 1 August 1945.

Filić's report illustrated the perceptions of the border problem held by the Commission a month after its establishment. The secretary recorded:

“Prof. Filić presented the issue of the northern border, beginning with Prekomurje and going all the way below Segedin on the Tisa River. The question of Medjimurje for us is outside of any discussion, but all of the material must nonetheless be compiled so that at a given moment we can stand in defence of this region of ours. We must nonetheless think about how to secure for us those Croatian villages that are across the Mura River, at the nearer side of Velika Kanjiža, such as Molnari, Szemjenháza, Fitjehaz, Bajča, Murakerstur and others. The border was furthermore supposed to be corrected such that Belezna belongs to us, and descend to Gyekenyes and continue to that side of the Podravina rail line so that the entire left bank of the Drava River would remain in our hands. All Croatian villages should be rounded off above Barč, going along the border north-east of Šikloš to Haršanj, encompassing all Croatian and Serbian settlements below Pečuh and Pečudvard, so that Somberek and Dunasekće remain ours. The border would continue along the main Danube riverbed, next to Szent Istvan above Baja and run almost in a straight line toward Subotica, encompassing the entire Baja Triangle, in which 35-40,000 Croats /Bunjevci/ line”²⁶

Andrassy submitted a report with the following guidelines for the Commission's work:

“1.) The request to change the border should be justified. The national aspect today comes into consideration as the principle justification: we may demand regions which are inhabited by our populations and in which our people have an overriding interest. This circumstance is proven by demographic/statistical data.

“2.) The aspect of gain here should not be considered in the material sense, but rather in the sense of every advantage which comes to the fore in a given area. (...)

“Once we decide to place our demands for certain tracts on the basis of the national aspect, we will only then acquire data which will seem necessary to us and which will particularly encompass these points:

- a) Land based on cultivation types (...)
- b) Other natural wealth (...)
- c) Nature of human settlements and occupations of their inhabitants
- d) Since these are areas on a river – fishing and its prospects
- e) The interests of our border population from our side in that area /e.g. fishing on the opposite bank, the vineyards of Đelekovac and other villages across the Drava/, cross-border ownership of land, etc.

²⁶ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 1, signature I, point 3. Border Commission's operating plan, 13. Minutes to the 1st session of Commission members and associates on 1 August 1945.

- f) The transit value of the area – transportation routes which exist or may be opened.
- g) Industrial importance: the possibility of creating new industries in this area or subsidizing our industry with raw materials from this zone”.²⁷

The relationship between Zagreb and Belgrade

Andrassy, in his report to the Border Commission in Zagreb on the meeting at the Institute for the Study of International Issues held in Belgrade on 18 December 1945 (where he represented the Croatian side), listed its participants: Institute secretary Sreten Draškić, its director Vasilije Jovanović, its president Aleksandar Belić (a member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science), and members Prof. Petar Jovanović and Prof. Balugdžić, and Dr. Jože Vilfan.²⁸ He wrote:

“With reference to our demands, there is a great discrepancy between the Institute’s views and our commission’s views. The Institute has established the principle to everywhere seek a sound natural boundary. This is why, besides the Baja Triangle, it is also seeking a large portion of Baranja from Mecsek and with Pecs, and a larger sector at Nagykanizsa that would encompass many settlements south of Kanisza together with known significant petroleum sources. These demands are being supplemented [*this word was misspelled in the original document*] with demands for some triangle at Segedin and in the area of the Rába Slovenes. I am unaware of the extent of these territories. By contrast, the Institute is not proffering any demands for the villages on the left bank of the Drava River, because this demand would not be covered by the principle of sound boundaries. My comment that in part these are not our national regions received the response that there are Germans there who are now moving out, so that our present ethnic element together with those who would replace the Germans would create a majority. Facts which demonstrate the inhumane conduct of the Hungarians during the occupation serve as further grounds for our demands, so that it would be just for our state to receive some compensation in territory for the bloodshed perpetrated by the Hungarians. At the session, I declared that I could not share this opinion, neither in principle nor in terms of the extent of the demands.”²⁹ Our commission was

²⁷ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5., point 2. Dr. J. Andrassy: Border of Yugoslavia with Hungary at the Mura-Drava section, pp. 1-4.

²⁸ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Report of Juraj Andrassy to the Border Commission on his travel to Belgrade, 22 December 1945, p. 1.

²⁹ Stricken from the record: “I could not share this opinion, neither in principle nor in terms of the extent of the demands”.

guided strictly by the principle of nationality in its work. I used my cartographic sketches to prove that outside of that sphere which our commission processed, there were none of our people even in the distant past. With reference to sites on the left bank of the Drava, I stated our wish that this matter be studied from the standpoint of the costs of regulating the Drava, for perhaps the scope of these costs would not allow us to put forth this demand, since the state would incur disproportionately high costs that would not correspond to the small profit derived from these few villages”³⁰

The Institute for International Issues at the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Belgrade also had at its disposal considerably greater resources than the Commission. Andrassy noted:

“The Institute does not have sufficient information on the current situation in the Triangle and in Baranja and on the status of schooling (for minorities) in post-Trianon Hungary. They would gladly receive this information from our commission, at which point I noticed that the Institute’s resources are much greater than the commission’s, both in terms of staff and in terms of documentation /the archives and library of the foreign affairs ministry/, so when the Institute [*misspelled as Ijstitut in the original document*] cannot find a way to do this, the commission in Zagreb can do even less”³¹

In the report from the next meeting, held in Belgrade on 6 March 1945, Andrassy noted that the discussion was opened by the president of the Institute for International Issues, Academy-member Aleksandar Belić:

“The discussion was opened by comrade Belić with an exhaustive report on the criminal acts perpetrated by the Hungarian occupiers in Vojvodina. He maintained that this report provided a strong argument in favour of our demands, which he narrowed down to these points: 1/ Full compensation of all damages perpetrated by the Hungarian people 2/ Complete expulsion of all Hungarian inhabitants from our regions and from those regions which we would obtain by correction of the borders”³²

This meeting as well, held in the office of the deputy foreign affairs minister, [Aleš] Bebler, on 6 March 1946, was attended by Institute president Aleksandar Belić, Pera Jovanović, the senior official in charge of the Hungarian border, Stevo Šaravanja and Juraj Andrassy. Differences and discrepancies between the plans of the Zagreb Commission and the Belgrade Institute became apparent, as noted by Andrassy:

³⁰ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Report of Juraj Andrassy to the Border Commission on his travel to Belgrade, 22 December 1945, p. 2.

³¹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Report of Juraj Andrassy to the Border Commission on his travel to Belgrade, 22 December 1945, p. 2.

³² HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Dr. Juraj Andrassy, Report on travel to Belgrade, 9 March 1946, p. 1.

“As to Baranja, comrade Jovanović drew the line so that it crossed the Danube north of Baja and continued diagonally along the Mecsek Range all the way to the outskirts of Pecs, and then ran down south to the Harsanyi Hills, then bending to reach the Drava at precisely the same place as the Zagreb proposal. (...) Then the discussion immediately turned to Prekomurje. I asked why the Drava sector was not mentioned, to which Jovanović responded that it had been decided to refrain from including this sector in the demands. When I noted that nothing of this was known in Zagreb and that this is why – pointlessly it seemed – work on sector Drava was continuing, comrade Jovanović said that the matter had not yet been definitively decided, but he did not explain who made the aforementioned decision and why”.³³

Andrassy was soon given the opportunity to present the Croatian Commission’s accomplishments:

“The settlements south of Kanisza were presented briefly on the basis of the Zagreb document. Since comrade Bebler observed that there were not many of our people there, he was surprised when I mentioned that these villages were entirely Croatian. The question of the Rába River zone was also mentioned, so I noted that the Yugoslav border would then be in the immediate vicinity of the Burgenland Croats, so that we could then also demand the southern part of Burgenland with the Croatian villages in the border area which were still in Hungary. To this Bebler remarked that he had not known that this area was so close, and that the question had already been resolved in London whereby we would seek migration, that is, population exchanges”.³⁴

Andrassy conveyed the Croatian complaints in an informal conversation with Aleš Bebler after the conference:

“After the conference concluded, comrade Bebler expressed the desire to hear from me any remarks on those points made during the conference, and I particularly emphasized the need to approach the study of moving populations even if there is only a small chance that this matter is broached during peace talks. This issue is very complex and its resolution requires the participation of economics and social policy experts. I also felt it was my duty to express my opinion that all of these vital matters had to be discussed on the broadest possible platform by the largest groups of experts”.³⁵

Andrassy once more stressed the focus of the Ministry’s attention:

“In completing this report, I must point out that in the ministry the most attention is accorded to the question of Baranja and the Baja Triangle, while it

³³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Dr. Juraj Andrassy, Report on travel to Belgrade, 9 March 1946, pp. 2-3.

³⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Dr. Juraj Andrassy, Report on travel to Belgrade, 9 March 1946, p. 3.

³⁵ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Dr. Juraj Andrassy, Report on travel to Belgrade, 9 March 1946, p. 4.

would appear that the demand for the Drava sector and Prekomurje are not deemed acceptable”³⁶

The Commission's work

In an undated report, Andrassy provided an overview of what had been done:

“The Border Commission (...) right at the beginning of its work took into consideration the matter of the border with Hungary. Besides Commission member Prof. Filić, this issue was also handled by Dr. Vinko Žganec and Prof. Andrassy as outside associates. The former thoroughly processed the statistics from the censuses from the years 1880 to 1910, while Žganec gathered considerable historical data and collected reports during his travels along the border of Međimurje. Since both were called to other posts, Andrassy remained in the commission as a permanent expert associate, who as time passed delivered a considerable number of papers on the issue of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border, from the historical, ethnographic and, to a certain extent, economic standpoints. These papers were forwarded to the foreign affairs ministry, or rather the Institute for International Issues, which had the task of preparing the materials for peace negotiations. Besides the general issue of borders, the official of the Zagreb commission covered these sections of the border: Prekomurje / the area south of Kanizsa/, the Drava sector /from Gyekenyes to Stara, north of Slatina/, Gornja Baranja, and the Baja Triangle. Various cartographic sketches are attached to these papers.

“The Border Commission's research and proposals set forth from the standpoint of strict adherence to the ethnic principle. For this purpose, the commission wanted to obtain realistic data from the field that would provide a picture of the present situation with all changes that occurred in the past few years. In this, an ideal that presented itself was the national cadastre, like the one compiled for the Julian province.³⁷ However, in the case of the northern border this could not be implemented in the same manner, because these are tracts under the authority of a foreign state. Here the commission received assistance precisely at the right moment from the top leadership such that field contacts were established through comrades Biber and Šaravanja, and the commission already received and began to process the first such data and it drafted comments on that data, which can then be re-examined in the field, thus securing new data with maximum assurance of their reliability”³⁸

³⁶ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Dr. Juraj Andrassy, Report on travel to Belgrade, 9 March 1946, p. 5.

³⁷ *Cadastre National de l'Istrie (d'après le Recensement du 1^{er} Octobre 1945)* (Sušak: Edition de l'Institut adriatique, 1946)

³⁸ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 14, signature 2.3.1.1. Border Commission reports, point 1. Dr. Juraj Andrassy, Short report on work on the border with Hungary, p.1.

Referring to the written sources with which the Commission wanted to prove the unreliability of Hungarian official statistics to the detriment of the Croats, Andrassy asserted:

“The untrustworthiness of Hungarian ethnic statistics has been emphasized sufficiently enough. We have allies on this among all of Hungary’s neighbours, especially the Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and even Germans”.³⁹

As a major work which proves the bias of Hungarian statistics, he cited Adolf Rieth: *Die geographische Verbreitung des Deutschtums in Rumpfungarn...*, Stuttgart, 1927. Particularly valuable were those works that provided data from the eighteenth century, e.g. [Johann Matthias] Korabinsky: *Geographisch-historisches und Produkten-Lexikon von Ungarn*, 1786, and [Ignác] Acsády: *Magyarország népessége a Pragmatica Sanctio korában 1720-1721*, Budapest, 1896.⁴⁰ Church censuses and school reports also came into consideration. Some works, however, such as one by Aleksandar Belić and Stevan Mihaldžić, *De la statistique de la Baranya*, he assessed as insufficiently convincing.⁴¹ He expressed admiration for the famed map by Count Teleki and stressed the need for the creation of a map which would resemble the map by Károly Kogutowicz: *Magyarország néprajzi térképe, Ethnographical Map of Hungary* at scale of 1:1,000,000, from 1927.⁴²

Međimurje and Croatian Prekomurje Task Force

Individual sections of the border were assigned to smaller sub-groups. The task force for Međimurje, consisting of Žganec, Filić and Andrassy, was dedicated to gathering data on cross-border owners, people who owned property in Croatia and in Hungary, as well as compiling documentation on changes in Croatian surnames to Hungarian counterparts, e.g. Kos into Rigó, Režek into Murai, etc.

In a report dated 29 September 1945, Vinko Žganec proffered the opinion that the border should be the Donja Lendava-Nagykanizsa road, while across the road the villages of Murarátka (Ratkovica), Ratkovička Gora and Stara

³⁹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 2. Dr. J. Andrassy: Border of Yugoslavia with Hungary at the Mura-Drava section, p. 6.

⁴⁰ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 2. Dr. J. Andrassy: Border of Yugoslavia with Hungary at the Mura-Drava section, p. 6; Korabinsky: *Geographisch-historisches und Produkten-Lexikon von Ungarn*, 1786; Most likely, since the book was not explicitly mentioned: Acsády Ignác(z), *Magyarország népessége a Pragmatica Sanctio korában 1720-1721*, Budapest: Athaenaeum, 1896.

⁴¹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 2. Dr. J. Andrassy: Border of Yugoslavia with Hungary at the Mura-Drava section, p. 9.

⁴² HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 2. Dr. J. Andrassy: Border of Yugoslavia with Hungary at the Mura-Drava section, p. 8.

Gora should be sought. Below the road, the following villages were to be sought: Tótszerdahely, Molnari, Semyénháza (Pustara), Fityeház, Murakeresztúr, Tótszentmárton, Petrivente (Petriba), Szentmiklós, Bajcsa, Belezna, Tilos, Zákány (Zakon), Szepetnek, and Sormás. He noted that signatures for annexation to Yugoslavia were collected in Sormás, Szepetnek, Mlinarci (Molnari), and Tótszerdahely and that they were being held by the People's Protection Department [Odjeljenje zaštite naroda – OZNA] in Prelog. He also proposed the annexation of the municipalities of Vöröcsök (Žofija), Felsőszemenye, Szentmargit and Murarátka, although only Murarátka had a Croatian majority population. He proposed the rest due to cross-border ownership.⁴³

Particularly high numbers of cross-border owners were found under the jurisdiction of the people's committees in Podturen, Dekanovec, Goričan and Kotoriba. The municipality of Legrad (which came under the District People's Committee in Koprivnica) was in a similar situation as Kotoriba, Žganec recalled the 1920s, when he was the chief administrator in Međimurje, although he did not reach Legrad on his inspection tour in September 1945.⁴⁴

Annex D, besides Žganec's report, also contains the minutes to a meeting which Žganec held in the Kotoriba People's Committee on 21 September 1945, which mention that a delegation came to Prelog from villages in Prekomurje [the trans-Mura zone] – Mlinarci, Tótszerdahely, Szepetnek and Sormás – in May 1945 for the first great people's assembly, asking the army to occupy these villages and annex them to Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ In Annex B, this statement is clearly delineated in the minutes to the meeting between Žganec and the People's Liberation Committee in Donji Vidovec:

“In the month of May, during the meeting in Prelog, a deputation of people from villages across the Mura in Hungary came, led by a local peasant Stjepan Salaj and sought the annexation of those villages to Yugoslavia.”⁴⁶

The participants in the meeting in Kotoriba said of the character of the population:

⁴³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, p. 4.

⁴⁵ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, Exhibit D.

⁴⁶ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, Exhibit B.

“Those present are aware that across the Mura, that is, across the current border, lie the following villages: Tot Szerdahelj, Mlinarci, Semjenhaza / Pustara/, Fićehaz, Murakerestur, Tot Szt. Marton, Petriba and Szt. Miklos at Nagykaniza, Bajča, Belezna, Tilos, Zakon /Zakany/ which are purely Croatian villages, there are Croats in them as indigenous inhabitants, who speak the same dialect as the people of Međimurje, who completely retained their Croatian language, folk customs, folk songs, and the Hungarians call them Croats. It is true that as a result of Hungarian schooling some of the youth have learned something of the Hungarian language, but at home they speak their Croatian mother tongue, and there are certainly 90 percent of them who do not speak and do not understand Hungarian”.

The minutes further contain this statement:

“In the case of the municipality of Mlinarci we know that they collected signatures there and also for the municipality of Tot Serdahelj, with which they sought annexation to Yugoslavia. Sometime in the month of May 1945, delegates of the people from Mlinarci came here to our municipality, and we heard that they went to the OZNA in Kotoriba, and they asked for people from Kotoriba to come, with whom they would liberate these municipalities with our authorities. (...) [T]hose attending believe that the most favourable border would be one that runs from Donja Lendava along the road – the main road to Nagykanizsa, so that the road would remain in Yugoslavia, whereby all Croatian villages would be a part of Yugoslavia. Those attending⁴⁷ believe that in Velika Kaniža [Nagykanizsa], in case of a plebiscite, a majority would vote in favour of Yugoslavia, even though there are few Croats there, and especially in the so-called area of Mala Kaniža. They – the Hungarians – believe, according to those attending, that they would prosper more in Yugoslavia, for if the upper Croatian villages were annexed from Kaniža and they are also left without Međimurje, than Kaniža would lose its economic hinterland, and be condemned to decline and stagnation, which most of the Hungarians see for themselves”⁴⁸

The conclusion made in Kotoriba was met with approval in Donja Dubrava on 27 September 1945:

“The best border with Hungary would therefore be one that would run from Gyekenyes along the main road to Nagykanizsa, so that all Croatian villages

⁴⁷ Vinko Žganec, Ph.D., the Border Commission's envoy, and Josip Šalamon, the chairman of the Kotoriba People's Liberation Committee, committee member Franjo Radmanić, secretary Ignac Markač, chief-of-staff Ivan Matjanec, and cantor Vinko Balog. HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, Prilog D.

⁴⁸ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, Exhibit D.

would go to Yugoslavia. As to Nagykanizsa itself, once the Croatian villages are annexed it would gravitate to Yugoslavia. One of the many proofs that there are many Croatian inhabitants there is the example of the cemetery in Nagykanizsa in which 60% of the tomb inscriptions show that Croats are buried there”.⁴⁹

The pastor in Vratušinec presented a circular from the Spiritual Desk [of the Zagreb Archdiocese] which calls upon parishioners to provide data on cross-border owners.⁵⁰ With regard to the mood of clerical circles, it is worthwhile mentioning the letter from catechism teacher Andrija Dolenčić.⁵¹ He wrote an entire study on his stay in Međimurje in 1943 and what he learned then about Prekomurje, including notes on the mood of the inhabitants, the religious education of the Prekomurje Croats, etc. He mentioned that in 1943 the Prekomurje Croats came to Kotoriba for confession, because it was important to them to give confession in the Croatian language:

“...[I] took advantage of the Kotoriba literary parish fair, to which people from all Prekomurje villages came. By asking around, I learned that the Prekomurje Croats are unusually pleased and happy that they can again come into contact with their own people, and especially to have the opportunity to have their confession heard and listen to sermons in Croatian. This is precisely the reason why so many people from Prekomurje came to the parish fair that they could not even have their confession heard due to the small number of priests, weeping as they went home, saying: “We’ve waited for this for years and years, for we have not properly confessed in years, but we already have to leave without having our confession heard in Croatian”.⁵²

He described the Hungarian pressure on the Croats there:

“The Hungarian authorities greatly fear that this populace could seek annexation to Croatia /Yugoslavia/. During the N.D.H. [Independent State of Croatia] they scared people by saying that they would all go to Bosnia, and now they frighten them that there is ‘communism’ here”.⁵³

⁴⁹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, Exhibit A.

⁵⁰ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Report of Dr. Vinko Žganec to the Border Commission on the status of cross-border owners and cross-border property of Međimurje residents in Hungary, along the Mura, 29 September 1945, p. 4.

⁵¹ Andrija Dolenčić (Kotoriba, 1909-1983), religious instructor, priest and collector of folk materials who recorded folk customs and beliefs; Marija Novak, “Uloga Vinka Žganca u poslijeratnom razvoju narodnih plesova u Međimurju”, *Narodna umjetnost*, P.I.3, (1991): 133-142, p. 136; Suzana Marjanić, “Dragon and Hero or How to Kill a Dragon – on the Example of the Legends of Međimurje about the Grabancijaš and the Dragon”, *Studia mythologica slavica*, XIII (2010): 127-150, p. 129, footnote 6.

⁵² HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 5. Andrija Dolenčić, Report on Prekomurje, p. 1.

⁵³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 5. Andrija Dolenčić, Report on Prekomurje, pp. 3-4.

He also mentioned how important the Croatian language was for Prekomurje residents subjected to Magyarization, citing some of the people with whom he spoke in Prekomurje:

“It’s difficult for those of us not allowed to speak Croatian and who have difficulty understanding Hungarian sermons /this is especially true for older residents – not so much for the younger people!/ We would request that they do something so that we can speak Croatian again, and listen to Croatian sermons. We would kindly ask, that they be told that we want a Croatian pastor. We constantly complain that they separated us from the Croats and Međimorje [*sic*] by force”.⁵⁴

Dolenčić asserted that the Prekomurje Croats were averse to the standard Croatian Shtokavian dialect, which they called ‘Vlach’ and Orthodox:

“Despite intense Magyarization, even today the population does not have a proper knowledge of Hungarian. When questioning them, it is worthwhile to adopt a cautious approach, for if they respond to unpleasant questions that it is all the same which language they speak, since they know both for everyday use. It is particularly important to exercise caution with regard to the Shtokavian dialect, because they have a certain aversion toward it because they cannot understand individual words, to some extent exhibiting the same attitude as the natives of Međimurje in 1918. They consider the Shtokavian dialect a ‘Vlach,’ ‘Orthodox’ language”.⁵⁵

An unidentified Commission associate said that the Prekomurje villages of Molnari, Fityeház, Tótszentmarton and Murakeresztúr were the “most Croatian”, while he noted that the villages of Fityeház and Molnari were commended by [Mátyás] Rákosi personally, because they voted for the Hungarian Communist Party in a higher percentage than any others throughout Transdanubia:

“Additionally, the Croatian villages in this region are rather progressive in the political sense. They give considerable support to the democratic forces of Hungary, as opposed to the villages of the Baja Triangle, which did not comport themselves in the best way. So, for example, Ficsehaz and Molnari both received commendations from Rakoši because in all of the Transdanubia they voted for the MKP [Hungarian Communist Party] in the highest percentage”.⁵⁶

The following were cited as Croatian villages in Prekomurje: Fityeház, Molnari, Tótszerdahely, Tótszentmarton, Semjénháza, Bajcsa, Murakeresztúr,

⁵⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 5. Andrija Dolenčić, Report on Prekomurje, p. 3.

⁵⁵ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 5. Andrija Dolenčić, Report on Prekomurje, p. 3.

⁵⁶ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 1. Croatian Prekomurje [Trans-Mura zone]; Transdanubia is the term for Hungary west of the Danube, Dunántúl in Hungarian.

Kolocsek, Petrivente, Becsehely, Szepetnek (the only one with less than a 50% share; to be exact 35% Croats, but with some Germans), Szentmiklós, Belezna, Zákány, Őrtilos and Berzence. For Berzence, Zákány and Becsehely there was no estimate of the percentage of Croats. The note for Becsehely states that a negligible number of Croats live in it.⁵⁷

From the standpoint of the territorial demands pertaining to the territory for which this task force was responsible, the need arose for the revision of the border in the territory of the Croatian Prekomurje, so that the ten villages inhabited by Croats in Zala County would go to Croatia. Until spring 1946, after numerous investigations into the status on the Hungarian side of the border by commissioners, associates, people's committee members in the border zone, etc., the settlements to which Croatia was claiming a right were finally defined, and Yugoslavia was expected to pose this question at the upcoming peace conference in Paris. This were settlements in the Letenye District: Molnari, Murarátka, Petrivente, Semjénháza, Tótszentmárton and Tótszerdahely; and in the Nagykanizsa District: Bajcsa, Fityeház, Murakeresztúr and Szepetnek.⁵⁸ Proposals motivated solely by economic benefit, such as the annexation of the Krka (Kerka) River Valley with the main Hungarian oil fields, did not receive the green light, even though their importance and potential economic benefits were elaborated:

“...sources of petroleum which yield over a million tons annually or over three quarters of Hungarian production, and much more than our annual production.

“This is the valley of the Krka River /from Lendava Ujfal to Kutfej/ and the settlements of Lispe and Budafapuszta (...) ... from Muraratka, which we could seek nationally, approximately 10 km. This would only be about 70 square kilometres of territory, if we would want to encompass all of those wells, while for wells in the Krka Valley it would be barely 20km²”⁵⁹

Vinko Žganec, in his paper called “Comments by Dr. V. Žganec of 18 March 1946 on the Paper by Dr. Andrassy on the Croatian Prekomurje” dedicated his attention to an explanation of reserve options, minimum demands, and seeking only the former tracts of the Međimurje municipalities which remained on the Hungarian side due to changes in the course of the Mura River.

Žganec meticulously explicated the reasons for obtaining land under cross-border ownership across the Mura, the former municipal tracts of Međimurje which remained in Hungary due to changes in the course of the Drava River,

⁵⁷ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 1. Croatian Prekomurje.

⁵⁸ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 4. Dr. Vinko Žganec to Border Commission: Comments on Dr. Andrassy's paper on the Croatian Prekomurje, 18 March 1946.

⁵⁹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 2. Dr. J. Andrassy: Border of Yugoslavia with Hungary at the Mura-Drava section, p. 5.

wherein part of the land farther from the border would be compensated by Hungarian state-owned land or landed estates along the border itself.⁶⁰

Table 1. Cross-border ownership in Medimurje

Settlement (municipality)	No. of CRO cross-border owners	Property across the border	No. of Hung. cross-border owners	Source
Mursko Središće	3			
Gardinovec (Belica)	15-16			
Vratišinec (Vratišinec)	No cross-border owners			
Peklenica (Vratišinec)	No cross-border owners			
Križovec (Vratišinec)	Several			
Po(d)turen (Podturen)	ca. 300			
Other settlements in Podturen Municipality	ca. 500			
Novakovec (Dekanovec)		127 c.j. and 1170 sq. hv. of vineyards; 42 c.j. and 1091 sq. hv. of pastures, 1 c.j. of ploughfields and 300 sq. hv. of forest		
Turčišće (Dekanovec)		15 c.j. of vineyard		
Dekanovec (Dekanovec)	111	80 c.j. and 900 sq. hv. of vineyards + recently alienated (sold) 9 c.j. and 350 sq. hv. of vineyards		
Domašinec (Domašinec)	As in Dekanovec Municipality, estimate			
Goričan	272	Over 100 c.j., mostly vineyards, some ploughfields and pastures; local community holds over 200 c.j. of forest, fields and pastures		Annex C

⁶⁰ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 4. Dr. Vinko Žganec to Border Commission: Comments on Dr. Andrassy's paper on the Croatian Prekomurje, 18 March 1946.

Settlement (municipality)	No. of CRO cross-border owners	Property across the border	No. of Hung. cross-border owners	Source
Kotoriba	Over 450: a) vineyard owners with scattered properties b) ca. 450 for whom the border traversed the municipal land; 322 registered	a) 400 c.j. of vineyards, scattered b) 1100 c.j. of fields, pastures and forest		
Donji Vidovec	34	37 c.j. in fields, pastures, forests and vineyards		Annex B
Dolnja Dubrava	382	120 c.j. of fields, pastures, and forests + 30 c.j. of local PC in Dolnja Dubrava which holds them as tax municipality (of this 9 c.j. of forest)		Annex A
Abbreviations: c.j. = cadastral <i>jutro</i> (a <i>jutro</i> , approximately 5,754.64 square meters, is analogous to an acre) sq.hv. = square <i>hvat</i> (a <i>hvat</i> , a unit of length, 1.896 m, is roughly equivalent to a fathom)				

Source: HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Međimurje, point 1. Cross-border Ownership, Report of Vinko Žganec.

Drava River Zone (Drava Sector) Task Force

The Internal Affairs Ministry [*Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova* – MUP] of Federal Croatia sent a letter to the District People's Committee [*Okružni narodni odbor* – ONO] in Bjelovar, with which it forwarded the list of the Local People's Committee [*Mjesni narodni odbor* – MNO] in Gola, in which annexation of the train stations and Lecko Forest (with a size of 150 *jutra* or 300 *rali* [a *ral* is a half-*jutro*, roughly analogous to a half-acre]) to Croatia was sought.⁶¹

⁶¹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. point 3. Letter from MUP of Federal Croatia to Border Commission of the Presidency of the People's Government of Croatia, no. 4234/45, Subject: state borders, correction at rail station at Gola, 17 August 1945; HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 7. Data on border question, letter from ONO in Bjelovar to the Border Commission with data on the number of Croats on the Hungarian side of the border, 19 April 1946, 2; Abbreviations: MUP [Internal Affairs Ministry], ONO [District People's Committee], MNO [Local People's Committee].

Although the Bjelovar ONO had already sent the first data on the situation at the Hungarian border facing its territory on 26 September 1945, it was only on 19 April 1946 that it sent revised data in which it cited that Brežnica (Hun. Berzence) was in first place in terms of size and percentage of Croats, and that next to the village of Belezna (Cro. Blizna) there is a village called Porog Szent Kiralj, in which there is a Croatian-Hungarian boundary stone in front of the church sacristy door, which came there from the so-called Crni jarak (Fekete Viz – ‘Black Ditch’), the old border between Hungary and Croatia. The village of Sveti Mihalj is described as inhabited by Croats, and it is noted that Legrad lost the forests of Szent Háromság (Holy Trinity), covering a surface of roughly 1200 *rali*, and Gjurgjanec, with roughly 800 *rali*, after the First World War. The attachments also contain the number of cross-border owners, Croatian and Hungarian citizens from the territory of the Bjelovar District.⁶²

Table 2. Number of Hungarian cross-border owners and surface area of their properties in Croatia in the territory of the Bjelovar ONO

No.	Home settlements of Hungarian cross-border owners	Number of cross-border owners	Total area of cross-border owner properties in <i>rali</i>	Where these properties lie
1.	Đekenješ, Zakanj	40	52	In the Ervenj section below village of Gotalovo and in Hintovo below Gola
2.	Sveti Mihalj, Zakanj, Mura Kerestur, etc.	76	46	In Legrad t.m.
3.	Gjekenješ, Zakanj, Csurgovo	90	50	In Drnje t.m. next to rail bridge on Drava
4.	Babocsa and various other places	168	473	In Virje t.m. and Ferdinodovac
5.	Total	374	621	
Abbreviations: t.m. = tax municipality				

Source: HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 7. Letter from the District People's Committee in Bjelovar to the Border Commission: Statement on the number of Hungarian cross-border owners and surface area of their cross-border property, 19 April 1946.

Cross-border ownership was so important because the number of cross-border owners from Croatia was palpably higher than the number of cross-border owners from Hungary, as illustrated by the table below:

⁶² HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 7. Data on border question, letter from ONO in Bjelovar to the Border Commission with data on the number of Croats on the Hungarian side of the border, 19 April 1946, 1-3 and Statements on the number of cross-border owners and surface area of cross-border property, 19 April 1946.

Table 3. Evidence of the number of Croatian cross-border owners from the territory of the Bjelovar ONO and the surface area of their properties in Hungary

No.	Home settlements of the Croatian cross-border owners	Number of cross-border owners	Total area of cross-border owner properties in rali	Where these properties lie
	Legrad	371	1571	Ortilos Murakerestur and Belezna
	Gjelekovac	112	193	Ortilos and Zakanj
	Ždala	1	1	Udvarhelj
	Gola and Gotalovo	190	230	Gjekenješ, Zakanj, Lecka
	Ferdinandovac and Novo Virje	98	263	At Vizvar and Belovar
	Podr. Sesvete	29	33	-
	Križnica	1	1	-
		802	2292	

Source: HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 7. Letter from District People's Committee in Bjelovar to the Border Commission: Statement on the number of our cross-border owners and surface area of cross-border property, 19 April 1946.

A list of surnames of Croats on the Hungarian side of the border was also sent from Bjelovar:

Table 4. Surnames by settlements on the Hungarian side of the border

No.	Settlement	Surnames	Note
1.	Brežnica (Berzence)	Maronić, Grotić, Husić	
2.	Csurgovo		
3.	Đikiniš (Gjekenješ)		
4.	Zakanj (Žakanj)	Navračić, Brođarić and Sekovanić	
5.	Tiloš (Örtiloš)	Ivančić, Navračić	
6.	Belezna (Blizna)	Župek, Slavec, Andrić, Bednjak, Habijanec	
7.	Porog Szent Kiralj		
8.	Čićov		
9.	Sveti Mihalj	Čižmešija, Vinci, Burković, Belušić, Deždjek, Novak	
10.	Fićehaz	Matuš, Zadravec	Greet each other with phrase <i>Hvaljen budi Jezus</i> ('Praise be to Jesus')
11.	Kalacek and Mura Kerestur	Tišljer, Plavić, Jadan, Jasek, Kiš, Belí, Kalinić, Radanović, Perušić, Gjurmanec and Jakupanec	
12.	Šurda		

No.	Settlement	Surnames	Note
13.	Szent Mikloš		
14.	Fekete Šar		
15.	Janka pusta		
16.	Bajča (Babocsa)		
17.	Mlinarci (Molnari)		
18.	Sepetnik		
19.	Letina		
20.	Dvorišće (Udvarhelj)	Bošnjak, Kovaček, Grčić	
21.	Taranj		
22.	Nadjatad (Fatac)	Gašparović, Vindić, Mihoković, Putić	
23.	Nadj Belavar (Veliki Belovar)		
24.	Vizvar		
25.	Babocsa (Bobovec)		
26.	Rasinja		
27.	Bolhovo		
28.	Kiš Belavar (Mali Belovar)		
29.	Lakoča		

Source: HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.2. point 7. Data on border question, letter from District People's Committee in Bjelovar to the Border Commission with data on the number of Croats on the Hungarian side of the border, 1-3.

The proposed border at the Drava sector was compiled by Krešimir Filić:

"...we have the right to also seek the left bank of the Drava and the railway that runs from Mura-Keresztúr somewhat along the (lower) Mura River, and thence continues its way down the Drava Valley to Gyékényes, Berzencze, Belavár, Babócsa and Barč. (...) And it was precisely below Barč that compact Croatian settlements were located along the left bank of the Drava ... (...) We are seeking the correction of this [Drava] border precisely on the basis of ethnic data, as well as economic, transport, and commercial reasons, which complement the former entirely. The Hungarians have no rights to this bank, except to refer, based on old customs, to the rights of the Crown of St. Stephen, which has already exasperated everyone. One state finally has to hold both banks of the Drava River, and that can only be Yugoslavia, and regulate it so that transit can flourish on it, which will be of great and inestimable value to the people".⁶³

⁶³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 3. Krešimir Filić: Proposed border from Bajča below Nagy-Kanizsa to Sara on the Drava (securing the Drava, so it remains inside our borders), pp. 1-2.

Filić explained the northern part of the Drava sector in greater detail:

“Below Zákány and past the train stations of Zákány and Gyékényes, the border would run to the end of Gyékényes close to the Podravina railway, whence next to Lomkócz it would cross the Dombo Canal, and then around Berzenca, which is particularly interesting to us. (...) Our state must also include 5) Somogyudvarhely (...) Because of this, for this settlement is almost entirely Hungarian, it could be set aside and the border could be drawn right at the train station, but this would have to be carefully considered. Approximately 2,000 Hungarians would fall out as a result. In the desire to separate as many Hungarians as possible, the border could also be drawn from Lankócza across the railway in the direction above Ždala and below Somogyudvarhely coming out again on the Podravina railway. Thus would leave out Gyékényes, Berzenca and Somogyudvarhely, while on our side, in this case we would have to build a part of the railway above Gola across Ždala and below Somogyudvarhely, - only about 12-13 km. (...) [I]nside our border, we must certainly leave Tarany, where according to Hungarian statistics there was a large Croatian majority in 1900... Even today, this settlement is certainly 2/3 Croatian, so we certainly cannot, and will not forsake it”⁶⁴

Furthermore, he sought the following Croatian settlements: Vizvár, Keresznye, Aracs, Babócsa, Bolhó, and Peterhida. He left some places out:

“We left out the settlements of Komlósd and Szentcsanak, because they exhibit a high majority of Hungarians, so it would be better not to burden ourselves with too many foreign elements”⁶⁵

But he sought Barcs and Dráva Tamási, which seemed necessary to him to ensure control of both banks of the Drava.

“East of Dráva Tamási, more distant from the Drava (...) is Gardony... This settlement would be difficult to exclude due to the need to secure the Drava River. Next to Gardony there is the already mentioned Croatian village of Potony”⁶⁶ (...)

From Potony, he cited an entire series of Croatian villages: Tótujfalu (Slov. Novo selo), Lakócsa, Szent-Borbás, Dráva Szent-Márton, Dráva Keresztúr, Révfalu and Sztára.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 3. Krešimir Filić: Proposed border from Bajča below Nagy-Kanizsa to Sara on the Drava (securing the Drava, so it remains inside our borders), pp. 4-9.

⁶⁵ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 3. Krešimir Filić: Proposed border from Bajča below Nagy-Kanizsa to Sara on the Drava (securing the Drava, so it remains inside our borders), p. 12.

⁶⁶ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 3. Krešimir Filić: Proposed border from Bajča below Nagy-Kanizsa to Sara on the Drava (securing the Drava, so it remains inside our borders), pp. 13-14.

⁶⁷ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 3. Krešimir Filić: Proposed border from Bajča below Nagy-Kanizsa to Sara on the Drava (securing the Drava, so it remains inside our borders), pp. 12-17.

“Further along the Drava River from the last mentioned Croatian settlement of Sztára (Stara) to Also Szent Márton, we have a length of about 40 kilometres, which we are demanding right along the Drava River only between 2 to 9 km wide. We propose a boundary that separates all settlements that are Hungarian, and leaving us with only individual abandoned marshy lands and parts of the old Drava spurs, where there are only larger homesteads with few settlements, having 1,000-2,000 people at most, if that much. (...) We took territory along the Drava only so much as to secure it for our state, to which it must certainly belong. The border from Stara would run like this: From the settlement of Sztára it descends below Erzsébet puszta, crossing the railway, which runs across the Drava to Podravska Slatina, and continuing below the settlement of Zalata along the road and below Zala puszta, separating the settlements: Veji, Czún, Szaporcza (coming to an elevation of 94 m), then continuing from that (Hungarian side) settlement: Csehi, Dráva Palkonya, Szabolcs, Gordisa and Matty (Haraszti), while after Matty it would encircle Dravski Sveti Martin, a fully Croatian settlement and below Old it would ascend north-west above Beremend. Although it may appear odd that we are seeking such a narrow belt on that side of the Drava River, we have nonetheless secured the entire course of this large river for Yugoslavia in this manner, and this means a great deal in every sense. We have justified our demands with accurate ethnographic data, which cannot be refuted, for it is generally based on unreliable Hungarian statistics”⁶⁸

Baranja Task Force

The task force dedicated to Baranja had the most members (J. Andrássy, V. Bogdanov, J. Bösendorfer, K. Filić, K. Firinger, J. Zlatarić and M. Zoričić), and it only completed its work at the end of May 1946. It collected data on cross-border owners and examined the territory on the Hungarian side of the border through a network of informants, focusing on the territory’s ethnic composition, the population’s political views, etc. In an undated letter to Roglić, an unidentified Commission associate said:

“One paper deals with general matters, while the remaining 4 individually cover 4 border sectors, as follows: Prekomurje, Drava sector, Baranja and the Baja Triangle. The paper on Baranja is incomplete. I compiled it in a hurry, since you have not yet received the study by Professor Bösendorfer”⁶⁹

⁶⁸ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.5. point 3. Krešimir Filić: Proposed border from Bajča below Nagy-Kanizsa to Sara on the Drava (securing the Drava, so it remains inside our borders), pp. 23-25.

⁶⁹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, sig. 2.3.1.6. point 1. Letter 5 to Josip Roglić, undated.

At the very beginning of their work, Krešimir Filić gave Josip Bösendorfer instructions on how to write a commissioned brochure, which clearly show where attention was to be accorded and what was to be expected from the Hungarians:

“We request most cordially that when preparing brochures you accord the utmost importance to the ethnic approach, which is the most convincing, and then emphasize natural, economic and commercial links. Only thereafter include some history, of which the Hungarians will make abundant use, so it would not be advisable for us to offer them an opportunity for unwanted debates. Make it as concise and clear as possible, because this works best and is actually read.”⁷⁰

Nothing was left to chance, so Filić also drafted an overview of the population along the Drava in Croatia-Slavonia in which there was a certain percentage of Hungarians and Germans, which encompassed data for 26 municipalities: Gola, Molve, Virje, Ferdinandovac, Sesvete, Pitomača, Špišić-Bukovica, Lukač, Gradina, Sopje, Podravska Moslavina, Viljevo, Donji Miholjac, Podravske Podgajci, Vanjsko Valpovo, Valpovo, Petrijevci, Retfala, Osijek, Sarvaš, Bijelo Brdo, Aljmaš, Erdut, Dalj and Borovo.⁷¹

On 12 January 1946, the Border Commission received a letter from Sreten Draškić, the Institute’s secretary, in which he wrote:

“The Institute for the Study of International Issues at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, in its session held on 18 December 1945 (...) reached the conclusion that ethnic research be conducted in Baranja at the suggestion of Prof. Andrassy. (...) The Institute would have the honour of asking the border commission to immediately initiate an investigation into the ethnic status in Baranja through trusted and suitable individuals on site.”⁷²

Cross-border ownership was investigated all along the border, and generally the situation found in Međimurje and Podravina also applied in Baranja: there were more cross-border owners from Croatia with property in Hungary than cross-border owners from Hungary with property in Croatia. While the district of Darda (which is in Croatia) had nine villages with cross-border owners, on the Hungarian side of the border there were only three villages with cross-border owners, with a considerably smaller number of cross-border owners than on the Croatian side of the border.⁷³

⁷⁰ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, sig. 2.3.2.3.1. point 4. Letter from Krešimir Filić to Josip Bösendorfer, 25 Aug. 1945.

⁷¹ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.3.1. point 4. Statistics from municipalities along the Drava River in the territory of former Croatia and Slavonia where there is a certain percentage of Hungarians and Germans.

⁷² HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.6., 2. Letters point 3. Correspondence of Foreign Affairs Ministry, Belgrade, Letter from Sreten Draškić to Border Commission in Zagreb of 12 January 1946.

⁷³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. point 1. Statement on cross-border owner passes in the Darda district, 6 Oct. 1945.

Table 5. Evidence of issued cross-border owner passes in the Darda district

No.	Settlement	Number		Land (in c.j.) held by owners for whom passes were approved
		of cross-border owners	persons crossing over	
1	Baranjsko Petrovo Selo	30	79	56 c.j. 614 sq.hv.
2	Beli Manastir	5	17	20 c.j.
3	Bolman	3	8	13 c.j.
4	Jagodnjak	2	13	10 c.j. 597 sq.hv.
5	Kamenac	1	3	3 c.j.
6	Karanac	3	9	27 c.j. 1,100 sq.hv.
7	Luč	96	235	300 c.j. 907 sq.hv.
8	Petlovac	1	4	4 c.j.
9	Torjanci	21	59	42 c.j. 17 sq.hv.
Total		162	427	477 c.j. 35 sq.hv.
Evidence of Hungarian citizen cross-border owners, who cross into our district to work their land				
No.	Settlement	Number		Land (in c.j.) held by owners for whom passes were approved
		of cross-border owners	persons crossing over	
1	Beremend	7	12	25 c.j. 13 sq.hv.
2	Šikloš	3	-	1 c.j. 1500 sq.hv.
3	Kašad	4	11	15 c.j. 200 sq.hv.
Total		14	23	42 c.j. 113 sq.hv.
Abbreviations: c.j. = cadastral <i>jutro</i> sq. hv. = square <i>hvati</i>				

Source: HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.1. Medimurje, point 1. Cross-border ownership, other; Statement of issued cross-border owner passes in the Darda district

After the conferral of two districts in Baranja (Batina and Darda) to Croatia, Baranja was the topic of reports at sessions of the Croatian Communist Party's Central Committee (CK KPH) on several occasions.

Thus, on 11 September 1945, Moša Pijade, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CK KPJ), intentionally or not, cited Baranja as part of Vojvodina, although it had already been allotted to Croatia:

“Čiča Janko [Moša Pijade]: noted that the Agrarian Advisory Council was formed in Belgrade.

“We wanted a considerable number of people transferred to Vojvodina.

“There were plans to have 9 thousand families of veterans from Croatia settle in Vojvodina. Of these 9 thousand, one thousand families will be settled

in Baranja. Some will be settled in Srem, around the villages of Lovas, Sotin and Berak, and the rest in Bačka.

“How many veterans’ families, and from which regions they want to move to Vojvodina must be sent to me as soon as possible.

“There are plans for roughly 5,500 Croatian families, and 3,500 Serbian families from Croatia to come to Vojvodina. You should also consider this and make proposals”.⁷⁴

Baja Triangle Task Force

The Croatian Commission formed a task force for the Baja Triangle, consisting of Andrassy, Rajić and Žganec, in connection with the decision of the “Commission of the AVNOJ Presidency on Preparation of the Proposed Border between the Territory of Vojvodina and Croatia” (the so-called Đilas Commission),⁷⁵ which the AVNOJ Presidency established on 19 June 1945.⁷⁶ Its members were Milovan Đilas, its chairman and the minister in charge of Montenegro in the federal government, Vicko Krstulović, the internal affairs minister of Croatia, Milentije Popović, the internal affairs minister of Serbia, Jovan “Žarko” Veselinov, the secretary of the Vojvodina Unified People’s Liberation Front (JNOFI), and Jerko Zlatarić, the deputy chair of the County People’s Committee in Sombor.⁷⁷ The territory along the Hungarian border on which the AVNOJ Presidency was deciding in June 1945 encompassed six districts, two in Baranja (Batina and Darda) and four in Bačka (Apatin, Odžaci, Sombor and Subotica), as well as the border in Srijem.

Since the district of Sombor – which extends between Baranja, conferred to Croatia, and Subotica, with its Croat majority – had a Serb majority, and given the views and mood of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership, the only way for Croatia to receive Subotica with its large Croat population would be the annexation of the Baja Triangle to Yugoslavia.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ *Zapisnici Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Hrvatske 1945-1952.*, vol. 1. 1945-1948. (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv, 2005), “Zapisnik sa sjednice CK KPH održane dana 11. rujna 1945. godine u Zagrebu”, p. 111.

⁷⁵ The Commission appeared under several names: Commission of the AVNOJ Presidency on the Border between Croatia and Vojvodina, Commission on the Interim Border between Croatia and Vojvodina.

⁷⁶ Miodrag Zečević, Bogdan Lekić, *Granice i unutrašnja teritorijalna podela Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Građevinska knjiga, 1991), p. 27; Archives of Yugoslavia, Central Komitee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) (CK SKJ (KPJ)), X-2-I/1.

⁷⁷ Mario Bara, “Đilasova komisija i sudbina bačkih Hrvata”, *Pro tempore - časopis studenata povijesti*, IV (2007), no. 4: 47-58; Interview with Jerko Zlatarić.

⁷⁸ Zečević, Lekić, *Granice i unutrašnja teritorijalna podela Jugoslavije*, p. 129.

At a session of the CK SKJ Politburo held in Belgrade on 26 June 1945, the report of the "Commission of the AVNOJ Presidency on Preparation of the Proposed Border between the Territory of Vojvodina and Croatia" was approved. On the same day, Commission member Vicko Krstulović submitted a report compiled at a session of the Croatian Communist Party's Central Committee (CK KPH) held in Zagreb on 26 June 1945:

"Comrade Vicko [Krstulović]: During work in the commission on delineating the border between federal Serbia and Croatia, greater chauvinism was observed in Srem. Vojvodina residents launched elections for the People's Liberation Committee with a slogan calling for a great Vojvodina. Insofar as there are any points of contention between Vojvodina and Croatia, they refuse to negotiate and come to terms with our comrades from Slavonia, rather they say they have their sole and central authority in Belgrade (Dr. [Aleksandar] Moč).

"In the course of setting the border, the Serbs are endeavouring to remain in Vojvodina. In the course of these struggles, there was no brotherhood nor unity in the party organization in the army nor in the field. I heard one District Committee secretary who said: 'We Serbs and Hungarians form a majority'. They add that the Serbs fought and they have a right to rule. The People's Liberation Committee does not have the corresponding percentage of Croats. Houses are being repaired for Serbs, but not for Croats. Subotica is 65 percent Croat. Dejection and insecurity has beset the Croats. In Osijek they are doing good things. Vukovar's population is approximately 60 percent Serb. The chauvinism which developed in Srem was such that some of our soldiers and masses killed [Croatian] Home Guard prisoners, while they even gave German prisoners water. They purposely identify Croats with the Ustasha. Serbs are joining with the Slovaks and Rusyns (who conducted themselves poorly during the occupation) in activity and work against Croats.

"With reference to the border between federal Serbia and Croatia, the decision was made that the border be the Danube (i.e. that Baranja goes to Croatia), while in Srem the border would run so that Vukovar and Borovo belong to Croatia, while Ilok and Šid would go to Serbia. The final decision will be made subsequently."⁷⁹

The AVNOJ Presidency's Commission completed its work on 1 July 1945 and submitted a report to the AVNOJ Presidency, which forwarded it to the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia's Ministerial Council on 10 July 1945.⁸⁰ The close link between the fate of the Baja Triangle and the demarcation of the border between Croatia and Serbia (Vojvodina) in Bačka was underscored in the Commission's report to the AVNOJ Presidency:

⁷⁹ *Zapisnici Politburoa Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Hrvatske 1945-1952.*, "Zapisnik sa sastanka CK KPH održanog 26. jula [sic!] 1945. god. u Zagrebu", p. 76. Recording secretary Branislava Vojnović assumed that the meeting was held on 26 June 1945, i.e., that this was an error (footnote 244, p. 75 op. cit.).

⁸⁰ Zečević, Lekić, *Granice i unutrašnja teritorijalna podela Jugoslavije*, p. 28.

“Even though the district of Subotica is settled by a compact Croat population in an absolute [*this word misspelled in original text*] majority, the commission could not come to the conclusion that a belt could be set aside north of the city of Sombor which would, together with Subotica, belong to Croatia. This belt would be an unnatural formation, which, in order to have an enormous Croat majority, would not be comprehensively linked, while Subotica, as a major economic and cultural [*this word misspelled in original text*] centre, would become a peripheral city, with communications and its entire economic life flowing south, rather than westward. Incorporation of all aforementioned districts into Croatia cannot even be considered for the simple reason that in some of these districts the Serbs have a relative (among the Slav inhabitants) majority. This is why the commission believed that this entire territory must remain in Vojvodina. To be sure, if this territory expanded northward over the old Yugoslav-Hungarian border and encompassed the Croats in the Baja zone now in Hungary, this matter would once more have to come under consideration. Thus, the question of the border in the territory is, among other things, closely tied to the question of the definite establishment of the border of Yugoslavia at peace and other conferences [*this word misspelled in original text*].”⁸¹

The question of the Baja Triangle and Subotica was considered at a session of the CK KPH bureau held on 14 December 1945:

“Comrade Vlado [Bakarić]: [Antun] Karagić from the Banja [Baja] Triangle was here, and he sought assistance in his work. I asked him who he was, Kardelj said that this same man headed the Front and that he had worked with us, and told us to give him the most possible assistance and that we manage the political campaign in the Baja Triangle, since most people there are Croats, and to help them be as vocal as possible in their demand for annexation to Yugoslavia.

“Comrade Stevo [Ivan Krajačić]: The Croats in Subotica have been neglected, I believe that we should look into this, that is, that we send someone there and then forward the results to higher instances. We should also dedicate more attention to the Burgenland Croats, to enable them to have their own press and so forth.

“Comrade Vicko [Krstulović]: When Pajo [Pavle Gregorić] was in Subotica, he spoke there, but the Subotica press did not carry anything, even though he is the minister for Croatia in the Federal Government.

“Comrade Stevo [Ivan Krajačić]: The only solution for Subotica and its surroundings would be to attach this area to Croatia. Since there is a Croat majority there and the relationship to them is unfair, when the Red Army withdraws from Hungary, if matters are not settled first the local malcontents could find support in Hungary, such as Janka Pusta for example.”⁸²

⁸¹ IBID. p. 129.

⁸² *Zapisnici Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Hrvatske 1945-1952.*, “Zapisnik sa sjednice biroa CK KPH održanog 14.XII.1945. god. u Zagrebu”, p. 155; Janka Puzta: an agri-

In a study on “The Croats of Bačka and Baranja in the light of statistics”, Juraj Andrassy presented his views on the reliability of earlier official statistics:

“Based on these numerical results, which are based on official data, either Hungarian (from the time prior to Yugoslavia) or Serbian (and it is certain, that neither the former nor latter were compiled to the benefit of the Croats, rather the opposite...)”⁸³

He also specified the reasons why the Baja Triangle was not given to Yugoslavia under the Treaty of Trianon in 1920:

“In this triangle, whose annexation Yugoslavia also sought at the peace conference after the First World War (we did not get it through the fault of [then Serbian Prime Minister Nikola] Pašić, because he said he did not need that many ‘Latins’, so he much rather advocated for some Serbian villages in the Tisa River zone)...”⁸⁴

The presidency of the government of the People’s Republic of Croatia received a telegram from Sreten Draškić of the Institute for International Relations in Belgrade on 27 February 1946:

“...we believe that you should look after the question of Baranja, while we will take over the matter of the Baja Triangle”⁸⁵

On 1 May 1946, Vladimir Bakarić informed the CK KPH:

“Comrade Vlado [Bakarić]: It appears as though we will not even proffer a demand for the Baja Triangle”⁸⁶

After this, the Baja Triangle only appeared in the context of aid to Croatian national minorities along the border at a session of the CK KPH Plenum held on 27 December 1946:

“...The press department also instituted control over the import of hostile foreign and émigré newspapers. It was assigned with organizing agitation and

cultural estate near Nagykanizsa in Hungary and a training camp for members of the Ustasha movement in the 1930s.

⁸³ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.3.1. point 6. Croats of Bačka and Baranja in the light of numbers, p. 4; HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 16, signature 3.2.1. point 8. Croats of Bačka and Baranja in the light of statistics, p. 4.

⁸⁴ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.2.3.1. point 6. Croats of Bačka and Baranja in the light of numbers, p. 2.

⁸⁵ HR-HDA-1166, Border Commission, box 15, signature 2.3.1.6., 2. Letters point 3. Letters of Foreign Affairs Ministry, Belgrade, letter from secretary in Foreign Affairs Ministry to the Border Commission in Zagreb of 27 February 1946.

⁸⁶ *Zapisi Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Hrvatske 1945-1952.*, vol. 1. 1945-1948., “Zapisnik sa sjednice biroa CK KPH održanog 1. maja 1946. godine u Zagrebu”, p. 212.

propaganda for our emigrants, particularly for Croats in Gradište [Gradišće - Burgenland] and the Baja Triangle. A calendar was prepared for this purpose, and there are also plans for other publications”⁸⁷

Conclusion

The work of the Commission on the border with Hungary can be followed from the summer of 1945 to July 1946. During this period, numerous studies and papers were compiled, and a broad array of respected lawyers, historians, geographers and other members of the academic community were charged with preparing them. These studies and papers remained unused due to the decision to refrain from launching a revision of the border, made at higher levels. However, their content provides valuable insight into the atmosphere of the time and a picture of the situation in the 1945/46 period where this concerns cross-border ownership.

Kroatischer Beitrag zu den Plänen für die Revision der jugoslawisch-ungarischen Grenze 1945-1946

Zusammenfassung

Die Abgrenzungskommission bei dem Vorsitz der Regierung der Föderativen Republik Kroatien bereitete Pläne für die Revision der jugoslawisch-ungarischen Grenze in der Zeit vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Pariser Friedenskonferenz vor. In diesem Aufsatz werden die Mitglieder dieser Kommission, Methoden und Resultate ihrer Tätigkeit sowie ihre Beziehungen zu den föderalen Institutionen in Belgrad dargestellt. Die Tätigkeit der Kommission für die Abgrenzung mit Ungarn kann man vom Sommer 1945 bis zum Juli 1946 verfolgen. In diesem Zeitraum wurden zahlreiche Studien, Elaborate usw. verfasst und für ihre Ausarbeitung wurden manche angesehene Juristen, Historiker, Geographen und andere Mitglieder der akademischen Gemeinschaft engagiert. Die genannten Studien und Elaborate wurden aber nicht ausgeführt wegen der auf höheren Machtebenen getroffenen Entscheidung, den Prozess der Revision der Grenze nicht in Gang zu setzen. Inhalt dieser Elaborate bietet einen wertvollen Einblick in die Atmosphäre jener Zeit und kann auch als ein Bild der Verhältnisse betreffend der Doppeljurisdiktion in den Jahren 1945-1946 fungieren.

⁸⁷ IBID., “Zapisnik sa sjednice plenuma CK KPH održane 27. XII. 1946. u 16 sati u Zagrebu”, p. 291.

DISCUSSION • DISSKUSION



INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE ON RACE AND CULTURE IN CROATIA 1900-1945

(A reply to the article by Tomislav Jonjić, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', published in the *Review of Croatian History*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010)

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The following article is a reply to certain criticisms made by Tomislav Jonjić in the *Review of Croatian History*, Vol. 6, 2010, in relation to arguments I presented in an earlier article on the Independent State of Croatia (RCH, Vol. 3, 2007). This article examines the intellectual and ideological discourse on race and cultural identity in Croatia in the first half of the twentieth century. It highlights the important role racial anthropology played in the formulation of a distinct Croat ethnolinguistic identity in the works of leading anti-Yugoslavist intellectuals.

Key words: race, Dinaric, Aryan, Germanic, barbarian.

Introduction

An article rarely allows the historian the opportunity to explain all of his arguments at length. This was certainly the case with my article in the *Review of Croatian History* (RCH) from 2007, 'The NDH as a "Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism": An Assessment of Croatian-Italian Relations within the German "New Order" 1941-1945', in which I examined the complex political relations between Fascist Italy and the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, NDH), and explored some of the ideological differences between Fascism and Ustashism, particularly with regard to the question of race.¹ The article was, admittedly, a little too ambitious in its scope, but I still stand by its main arguments, even if they require a more detailed analysis.

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¹ Nevenko Bartulin, 'The NDH as a "Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism": An Assessment of Croatian-Italian Relations within the German "New Order" 1941-1945', *Review of Croatian History* (hereinafter: RCH), 3 (2007), no. 1: 49-74.

My 2007 article provoked Mr. Tomislav Jonjić into writing a somewhat rambling critical piece entitled, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', which was published in *RCH* in 2010.² Jonjić's commentary clearly highlights that he did not read my article carefully and that he has a rather simplistic understanding of the cultural theories of Ustasha, and other anti-Yugoslavist, ideologists. In particular, he has a clichéd view of anti-Yugoslavist nationalist attitudes toward Croatia's historical and cultural relationship to both the 'West' and 'East.' He erroneously argues that Ustasha and anti-Yugoslavist nationalist ideologists held the view that the Croats were an exclusively Western people with no ties to the East. Furthermore, Jonjić appears to possess little knowledge of the history of racial anthropology. He rightly argues that the ideology of Yugoslavism had a 'racialist and racist foundation,'³ but also implies that anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals had no interest in the question of racial identity and racial anthropology. Although I had already explored the subject of Yugoslavist racial ideology in some detail in two articles written prior to 2010,⁴ Jonjić completely ignored my analysis of this topic. I will not attempt here to answer every single criticism Jonjić made in his article, but will instead offer a more detailed examination of the three most important questions regarding my 2007 article, namely, the questions of racial anthropology, Western civilizational identity and the cultural notion of 'barbarism.'⁵

Racial anthropology and ethnography

Jonjić makes the assertion that the conclusions reached in my 2007 article reveal 'the deep impression' left upon me 'by the theories of sociologist Dinko Tomašić and his epigones on the allegedly dramatic differences and divisions between "Dinaric" and other Croats,' then adding that 'this is not the place to discuss the roots and motives underlying Tomašić's quasi-scientific assessments, nor the role played in this motivation by the Serbian ethnographer Jovan Cvijić and the political manipulation of his nonsense about the racial

² Tomislav Jonjić, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', *RCH*, 6 (2010), no. 1: 227-250.

³ *ibid.*, p. 228.

⁴ See Nevenko Bartulin, 'Ideologija nacije i rase: ustaški režim i politika prema Srbima u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941-1945', *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest* 39 (2007): 209-241; and Nevenko Bartulin, 'The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia', *RCH* 5 (2009), no. 1: 189-219.

⁵ Jonjić cited my 2007 article three times in an article published in the *Journal of Contemporary History* in 2008. He made only one criticism, namely, that the Ustasha marching song, 'Forward Sailors from the Blue Adriatic' was not in fact banned by the Ustasha government at the insistence of Italian diplomatic representatives, as I had previously argued in my 2007 article (See Bartulin, 'The NDH as "Central European Bulwark"', p. 65). I accept that I made an error in this case. See Tomislav Jonjić, 'Jadranske teme u *Hrvatskom narodu* od travnja 1941. do rujna 1943', *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 40 (2008), no. 3: 915, 918, 920.

features of the “Yugoslavs.”⁶ Firstly, I did not even mention Tomašić in my article, but more importantly, Jonjić’s remarks show that he is on unfamiliar historiographical territory, for he makes no distinction between the two disciplines of ethnography and racial anthropology, and gives a very brief and otherwise vague description of the ethnographic and anthropogeographic theories of Dinko Tomašić and Jovan Cvijić.

Dinko Tomašić (1902-1975) was a Croatian sociologist connected to the pan-Slavist Croatian Peasant Party. In his main pre-war studies Tomašić promoted the theory of the ethical and moral superiority of the democratic and collectivist culture of the Slavic *zadruga* (commune), found in the Pannonian lowlands of northern Croatia. In contrast to this cultural type, Tomašić argued that the tribal and patriarchal culture of the Dinaric mountain areas (Lika, the Dalmatian hinterland, Bosnia-Herzegovina) was ‘based on an egocentric and competitive foundation, where individuals vied for power and social relations were based on hierarchic principles.’⁷ He further argued that both the Pannonian ‘communal culture’ (*zadružna kultura*) and the Dinaric ‘tribal culture’ (*plemenska kultura*) were the two basic types of autochthonous Croatian cultures – in contrast to the Western civilization of the Croatian nobility and bourgeoisie – but he regarded the ‘communal culture’ as the preferred basis for the socioeconomic re-organization of a future peasant Croatia.⁸ Tomašić’s cultural types were largely based on ethnographic and geographical, rather than racial-anthropological, factors. He was critical of theories of Dinaric and/or Nordic racial exceptionality or superiority.⁹ In particular, Tomašić was very critical of the theories of Serbian Dinaric racial supremacy and expansionism articulated by leading Serbian intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century. According to Tomašić, ‘the outstanding theorist of this Serbian imperialism was Jovan Cvijić.’¹⁰

The Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927), for his part, had formulated an ethnographic and anthropogeographic theory to explain the peculiarities of what he saw as South Slav culture and way of life, and his theory was to have a marked influence on subsequent anthropological, historical and sociological studies of the South Slav peoples. Cvijić promoted the idea of the common Dinaric racial identity of the greater part of the ‘Yugoslavs’, and in that sense one could describe him as a Yugoslav nationalist, but Cvijić also considered the ‘Serbian type’ of Dinaric man as the core or leading component of the South Slavs. According to Cvijić, two-thirds of the population of the

⁶ Jonjić, ‘From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions’, p. 228.

⁷ Dinko Tomašić, *Politički razvitak Hrvata: Rasprave i eseji* (1938; reprint Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 1997), p. 113.

⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 109-114, 118-121.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 139-188.

¹⁰ Dinko Tomašić, ‘Sociology in Yugoslavia’, *The American Journal of Sociology* 47 (1941-42): 54.

mountainous Dinaric area were Serbs, and 'the best example of the really pure patriarchal Dinaric type is certainly the Serbian variety.'¹¹

Although Cvijić also described the Dinaric race in anthropological terms, his approach to South Slav ethnography and anthropology was in essence an anthropogeographic one. Cvijić defined this approach as the study of the psychic constitution of a people in a particular environment and the influences of geographic factors on that people.¹² He also considered the influences of historical, ethnic and social elements on the development of human psyches. Geographic factors (both direct and indirect) were of predominant concern to Cvijić; these included climate and soil characteristics, natural resources and settlement patterns, forms of economy, food, clothing and so on.¹³ In his influential work, *La Péninsule balkanique* (1918), Cvijić identified four ethnographic-psychological types among the South Slavs: Dinaric, Central, Eastern Balkan and Pannonian.¹⁴ He thus paid little attention to the classic taxonomies employed by racial anthropologists, which had divided Europeans into several racial (physical-psychological) types, such as the Nordic, Dinaric, Alpine and Mediterranean races.

The theories of Cvijić and Tomašić were ideologically opposed to one another, but both were similar in their methodological approach and ethnographic classifications. The main difference lay in their contrasting estimation of the psychological characteristics of the main South Slav types of Dinaric and Pannonian; while Cvijić praised the typical Dinaric virtues – heroism, patriarchy, love of freedom and bravery – Tomašić valued the pacifist and democratic traits of the Pannonian type. Jonjić fails to compare and contrast the theories of Cvijić and Tomašić, and furthermore, he dismisses these ideas, in a decidedly unscholarly fashion, as 'quasi-science' and 'nonsense', and claims that these theories were nothing more than politically motivated 'preconceived beliefs, prejudices and stereotypes',¹⁵ which is not to say that certain stereotypes and political beliefs played no part in their formulation.

What Jonjić further fails to note is the fact that leading anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals, such as Ćiro Truhelka (1865-1942), Filip Lukas (1871-1958) and Ivo Pilar (1874-1933), used the discipline of racial anthropology in order to present a scientifically based critique of the ethnographic and anthropogeographic theories of Serbian nationalist intellectuals. Jonjić seems to be

¹¹ Jovan Cvijić, 'Studies in Yugoslav Psychology', trans. Fanny Foster, *The Slavonic and East European Review* 9 (1930-31): 377-378.

¹² Karl Kaser, 'Planinski ljudi, ravničarski ljudi: Prostor i etnografska reprezentacija' in Tihomir Cipek and Josip Vrandečić eds., *Nacija i nacionalizam u hrvatskoj povijesnoj tradiciji* (Zagreb: Alinea, 2007), p. 231.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 233.

¹⁵ Jonjić, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', p. 229.

unaware of the fact that in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century there was nothing 'quasi-scientific' about racial anthropology at all. As Christopher Hutton notes, the science of race

'[...] became a branch of scientific learning at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the application of morphological techniques from animal and human anatomy, botany and zoology to the study of humankind. Many physical or racial anthropologists had zoological or medical training [...]. The basic premise of this discipline was that human beings could be divided into distinct races, and that their physical and mental characteristics were shaped by climate and geography.'¹⁶

It should be pointed out that racial anthropologists were as interested in the question of racial differences among Europeans as they were in the more obvious differences between the main races of white (European), yellow (Asian) and black (African).¹⁷

As an anthropological term, the 'Dinaric race' was first used by the French anthropologist Joseph Deniker (1852-1918), who divided the European population into six main or 'primary' races: Northern, later to be known as the Nordic race (characterized by fair hair, a dolichocephalic head and tall height); Eastern (fair, sub-brachycephalic, short); Ibero-insular (dark, dolichocephalic, short); Cevenole or Western (dark, brachycephalic, short); Littoral (dark, sub-dolichocephalic, tall); and Adriatic or Dinaric (dark, brachycephalic, tall).¹⁸ Deniker explained that the Adriatic or Dinaric race received its name from the Adriatic Sea and/or the Dinaric Alps 'because its purest representatives are met with along the coast of the Northern Adriatic and especially in Bosnia, Dalmatia,

¹⁶ Christopher M. Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich: Linguistics, Racial Anthropology and Genetics in the Dialectic of Volk* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 21. By the 1920s new developments in the science of genetics had highlighted the 'increasing uncertainty about the status of anthropological features such as hair colour and skull shape.' Under the influence of the laws of Mendelian inheritance, many scientists began to view race as a 'set of hereditary features', which were inherited independently of one another so that there was no necessary direct correlation between the observable physical characteristics of a person (phenotype) and the totality of the inherited genetic constitution of that person (genotype). See *ibid.*, pp. 25, 31-32. All the same, traditional racial taxonomies continued to be employed by physical anthropologists and, to a lesser extent, by geneticists and biologists. See, for example, an article by the Slovenian born Croatian biologist Boris Zarnik (1883-1945): Boris Zarnik, 'Rasa i duševna produktivnost', *Priroda: Popularni ilustrovani časopis Hrv. Prirodoslovnog društva u Zagrebu*, Prof. dr. Miroslav Hirtz ed., Vol. XXI (1931), Nos. 5/6 (May-June 1931): 129-140.

¹⁷ Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich*, p. 24.

¹⁸ Joseph Deniker, *The Races of Man: An Outline of Anthropology and Ethnography*, Havelock Ellis ed. (London: Walter Scott, Limited, 1900), pp. 325-326. One of the basic measurements employed in determining race was the 'cephalic index' (the percentage of breadth to length in any skull), first coined by the Swedish scientist Anders Retzius (1796-1860) in 1842. The cephalic index was able to distinguish between brachycephalic (broad-headed) and dolichocephalic (long-headed) skulls.

and Croatia.¹⁹ Although Deniker referred to the Croats as ethnic 'Serbo-Croats', he had pointed to a possible racial distinction between the Croats and/or western South Slavs on the one hand and the Serbs in Serbia on the other. Thus, while the Croats/Dalmatians/Bosnians were the 'purest representatives' of the Adriatic or Dinaric race, the Serbians of Serbia proper were only 'probably' marked by the 'same [Dinaric] characters, somewhat softened.'²⁰

The anthropological theory that Croats and Serbs were separated by different racial types was very important for anti-Yugoslavist intellectuals keen to disprove the idea of the common racial origin of the Croats and Serbs. This is a significant point, for Jonjić would have his readers think that anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals had no interest in the question of race. These intellectuals, most notably Truhelka, Pilar and Lukas, stressed the predominance of the Dinaric and Nordic racial types in the racial composition of the Croats. Ćiro Truhelka, a noted archaeologist, was the first anti-Yugoslavist intellectual to write a detailed study of the subject of racial anthropology in the western Balkans. In a booklet published in 1907 Truhelka argued that the Catholics and Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged predominantly to the same fair Slavic-Croatian 'ethnic element' in an 'anthropological sense', while the Orthodox Bosnian Serbs were largely the dark-skinned descendants of the Balkan Romanic Vlachs.²¹ Truhelka described the authentic racial features of the Bosnian Catholics and Muslims as fair hair, blue eyes, a brachycephalic head and broad chest; although he did not specifically name this racial type, it is clear he was speaking of a Nordic-Dinaric racial admixture.²² In 1934 Truhelka wrote an article on the racial origins of the Bosnian Muslims, arguing that they belonged to the tall Dinaric race.²³ In this article Truhelka stated that there was little difference among the Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox in Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to height and skull shape.²⁴ However, he continued to anthropologically distinguish the Muslim and Catholic population

¹⁹ *ibid*, p. 333.

²⁰ *ibid*, pp. 333-334, 344-345.

²¹ [Ćiro Truhelka], *Hrvatska Bosna (Mi i "oni tamo.")* (Sarajevo: Tiskara Vogler i drugovi, 1907), pp. 13-15. Truhelka wrote this text anonymously. He argued that the 'pure Slavic race' (*čista slovjenska pasmina*) was distinguished by the traits of fair hair and blue eyes. See *ibid*, p. 14.

²² See *ibid*, pp. 13-15. Deniker had argued that the Dinaric race was probably closely related to a 'secondary race' with similar features. He suggested the name of 'Sub-Adriatic' for this secondary race, which was 'not quite so tall and less brachycephalic, but having lighter hair and eyes'. Deniker hypothesized that the Sub-Adriatic type had probably emerged from a mixture of the Adriatic/Dinaric race with the secondary 'Sub-northern race', a tall, fair and mesocephalic (medium headed) type. The Sub-Adriatic race was located mainly in Bavaria, Austria, south-east Bohemia and parts of northern Italy. See Deniker, *The Races of Man*, p. 334.

²³ Ćiro Truhelka, 'O podrijetlu bosanskih muslimana' (1934) in Petar Šarac and Miljenko Primorac eds., *Hrvatsko podrijetlo bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana: Rasprave i članci* (Zagreb: Hrvatska tiskara, 1992), pp. 11-19.

²⁴ *ibid*, p. 18.

from the Orthodox on the basis of pigmentation, which was at least as important, if not more, as 'a factor in forming and determining race.' The Catholics and Muslims were thus said to possess a greater percentage of fair hair, light eyes and fair skin.²⁵

Truhelka's anthropological arguments were echoed in the work of the sociologist Ivo Pilar, who, in a book published in 1918, wrote that the medieval 'old Croats' had been a 'Slavic-Aryan people of pure Aryan type: fair-haired, blue-eyed, tall height and [with] dolichocephalic heads.'²⁶ To substantiate his theory that the ancient Slavs were of Nordic-Aryan type, Pilar cited the English racial theorist and philosopher Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927) as a source. In his famous work, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (1899), Chamberlain argued that the old Slavs were, alongside the Germanic and Celtic peoples, part of the 'Germanic race.' Chamberlain preferred the term 'Germanic' to 'Indo-European', which was 'a mere theoretical and hypothetical term.'²⁷ Pilar explained that 'in Chamberlain's sense, I understand Germanics to include all Aryans, Teutons, the old Slavs and Celts.'²⁸ While Pilar admitted that the old Croats had assimilated other peoples (Illyrians, Romans, Avars and Vlachs), he also argued that the Croats had preserved the Nordic-Aryan heritage of their Slavic ancestors to a far higher degree than the Serbs. According to Pilar, the typical Serb had inherited his predominant physical features of black hair, dark eyes and dark skin from the Romanic Vlachs.²⁹ As he further noted, anthropological studies had confirmed that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'there are more than two times [the number] of fair, Nordic types among the Catholics and Muslims than among the Orthodox', the latter belonging largely to 'some other dark, pre-Aryan type.'³⁰

²⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

²⁶ See L. von Südland (Ivo Pilar), *Južnoslavensko pitanje: Prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja*, trans. Fedor Pucek (1943, reprint: Varaždin: Hrvatska demokratska stranka, 1990), pp. 19-20. Pilar's book was first published in German as L. von Südland, *Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg. Übersichtliche Darstellung des Gesamt-Problems* (Vienna: Mans Verlag, 1918)

²⁷ Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 1, trans. John Lees (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1910), p. 498.

²⁸ Pilar, *Južnoslavensko pitanje*, 18f, p. 419. Chamberlain also remarked that 'the thick-set body, round head, high cheek-bones, dark hair, which we to-day consider to be typically Slavonic, were certainly not characteristics of the Slav at the time when he entered European history [...]. In Bosnia one is struck with the tallness of the men and the prevalence of fair hair.' Chamberlain cited the work of the Austrian anthropologist Augustin Weisbach (1837-1914), who had argued that there had been some transformation of the skull shape among the Bosnians, for the present day population was predominantly round (or broad) headed, in contrast to the greater number of long-headed skulls (of the Nordic type) found in ancient and medieval graves in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the shape of the typical Bosnian face had remained long (which was characteristic of Nordics). See Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 505.

²⁹ Pilar, *Južnoslavensko pitanje*, pp. 108, 121-122, 170, 316.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 122.

The geographer and geopolitical theorist Filip Lukas offered the first detailed critique of Jovan Cvijić's theory of Serbian-Dinaric racial exceptionalism in an essay from 1925.³¹ Lukas was keen to disprove one of the central tenets of Cvijić's Dinaric theory, namely, that it was the Serbs who made up the bulk of the South Slav Dinaric population. Lukas observed that Cvijić's 1918 publication ("The Balkan Peninsula") was largely 'anthropogeographic' in its approach, and while there was no doubt that his book represented an 'expert and thorough work', Cvijić was not an anthropologist and the areas in the book that dealt with anthropology contained many imprecise or incorrect claims.³² Lukas argued that contemporary anthropological research had established that 'the Dinaric race is represented in purer form in regions populated predominantly by Croats.' In contrast, the entire Serbia proper (including Šumadija) east of the Kolubara River was inhabited by a population that was racially closer to the non-Dinaric Bulgarians. The 'core' of the Dinaric race was thus found along the Adriatic coast.³³

Lukas based his arguments on race on the work of the Swiss anthropologist Eugène Pittard (1867-1962).³⁴ According to Pittard, the Croats belonged predominantly to the Dinaric race, which was very different to the main racial type of the northern Slavs (Poles and Russians), which led him to hypothesize that the Croats (along with the Bosnians and Slovenes) were probably a 'Slavonized folk.'³⁵ As far as the racial difference between Croats and Serbs was concerned, Pittard found that, according to the preliminary anthropological research, the Serbs tended to be more dolichocephalic in skull shape and thus seemed to be more closely related to the equally long-headed Bulgars.³⁶ The Swiss anthropologist concluded that 'in these Yugo-Slavs we have a very good example of the anthropological mistakes to which a linguistic label may lead.'³⁷ He noted that it was unfortunate that 'even to-day we hear of "the Latin", "the Germanic" or "the Slavonic" races in current speech, in any number of textbooks and in journalistic parlance', despite the fact that no such categories existed in an anthropological sense.³⁸ Pittard's distinction between racial and linguistic identity was a universally accepted tenet among leading racial anthropologists and race theorists.³⁹ The main popularizer of racial anthropol-

³¹ Filip Lukas, 'Geografska osnovica hrvatskoga naroda' (1925) in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatska narodna samobitnost*, Mirko Mađor ed. (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 1997), pp. 108-118.

³² *ibid.*, 33f, p. 111.

³³ *ibid.*, 33f, p. 113.

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ Eugène Pittard, *Race and History: An Ethnological Introduction to History*, trans. V. C. C. Collum (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1926), pp. 258-261.

³⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 285-286.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 260.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 46.

³⁹ Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich*, pp. 84-85.

ogy in Germany during the interwar period, the race theorist and anthropologist Prof. Hans F. K. Günther (1891-1968), had also stressed the importance of being on 'guard against confusing Race and People (generally marked by a common language), or Race and Nationality, or (as in the case of the Jewish people) Blood kinship and Faith.'⁴⁰

The distinction between racial and linguistic identity was very important for anti-Yugoslavist intellectuals such as Lukas in their effort to prove Croatian national individuality. As Lukas explained in one of his most important essays, 'The Problem of Croatian Culture' (1938), 'language is not a blood and racial characteristic.'⁴¹ In the case of Croat ethnic-racial history, Lukas explained that, during the course of their migration from their proto-Slavic homeland (located somewhere between the Vistula and Dnepr rivers) to the western Balkans, the proto-Croats had already interbred with various Caucasian, Tatar-Mongol and Germanic tribes, such as the Antes, Avars and the Goths.⁴² The Croats received their greatest 'blood admixture', however, in their new Adriatic homeland, where they subsequently intermarried with 'the large number of Romanized Illyro-Celts, Romans, remnants of the Avars and Germanic tribes, and some other ethnic splinters.'⁴³ Lukas argued that the dominant Dinaric racial type among the Croats emerged from a 'crystallization' of this ethnic-racial admixture.⁴⁴ Accordingly, as a result of all this mixing, 'the Croats, regardless of how much they belong to the Slavic group by their language, have come to be racially closer to some neighbouring tribes than to the Slavic Russians.'⁴⁵

The Dinaric race was today found predominantly in the Balkan regions of Croatia where the first independent Croatian state was established and which had been historically inhabited by the strongest Croatian clans and families.⁴⁶ Alongside the Dinaric racial type, Lukas noted, other races existed among the Croats, though usually not in their original purity, but rather mixed with other types: in the lowlands of northern Croatia one could find many members of the Alpine and, to a lesser extent, East-Baltic races, while the Adriatic littoral contained some individuals of the Mediterranean race. Croatia had also been settled by members of the Nordic race, 'who, merging with the old [Dinaric] inhabitants, gave our culture many beautiful contributions.'⁴⁷

⁴⁰ Hans F. K. Günther, *The Racial Elements of European History*, trans. G. C. Wheeler (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1926), p. 2.

⁴¹ Filip Lukas, 'Problem hrvatske kulture' (1938) in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatska narodna samobitnost*, Mirko Mador, ed. (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 1997), p. 252.

⁴² *ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 251.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 252. According to Lukas the Russians had acquired a good deal of non-Aryan blood through admixture with Finno-Ugric and Mongol tribes. See *ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 251.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

Lukas stressed that no nation belonged to one and the same race, but one 'does not have to be a proponent of an exaggerated racism' to accept that 'every nation must have a blood core as a dominant and hereditary biological mass'.⁴⁸ In the case of the Croats, Lukas argued, the dominant racial type was the Dinaric race, since the mountainous Dinaric region was better protected from the infiltration of foreign blood than the fertile land of northern Croatia, which did not have natural barriers such as mountains protecting it from foreign immigration.⁴⁹ In 1936 Lukas had argued that the heterogeneous nature of Croatian culture and history had resulted in the emergence of distinct Croatian 'geo-psychic' types, the three most important being the Mediterranean, the Pannonian-Alpine and the Patriarchal (Dinaric) type.⁵⁰ He added that the 'patriarchal [Dinaric] part of our nation, a-musical, hard, frugal, serious, persevering and warlike, represents the purest type of our people'.⁵¹

Ethnographic and anthropological taxonomies were regularly employed by nationalist intellectuals and Ustasha ideologists in the NDH, a topic I have examined in some detail in an article on racial anthropology in the NDH, published in *RCH* in 2009.⁵² Jonjić seems to think that only Yugoslavist ideologists referred to 'the allegedly dramatic differences between "Dinaric" and other Croats', but the Ustasha government accepted the standard anthropological classification of the European races (which had undergone changes since the time of Deniker's authoritative classificatory model but generally tended to include five or six main races). This was expressed in both the legal and cultural spheres of the NDH. The NDH's Law Decree on Racial Affiliation, issued on 30 April 1941, stated that an Aryan citizen of the NDH was one 'who descends from ancestors, who are members of the European racial community or who descends from ancestors of that community outside of Europe'.⁵³ In the Ustasha daily *Hrvatski narod*, on 3 May 1941, an official article explaining the racial decrees defined the European racial community as 'a group of those races that have for centuries been mixing with one another in Europe: Nordic, Dinaric, Alpine, Baltic and Mediterranean'.⁵⁴ The article noted that there was no such thing as a separate Croatian race, for 'the Croats, as all European nations in general, are a mixture of the Nordic, Dinaric, Alpine, Baltic and Mediterranean races with small admixtures of other races'.⁵⁵ While the Croats

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 261. Also see Filip Lukas, 'Zašto je Dubrovnik bio velik' (1938) in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatska narodna samobitnost*, Mirko Mađor, ed. (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 1997), p. 224.

⁴⁹ Lukas, 'Problem hrvatske kulture', p. 261.

⁵⁰ Filip Lukas, 'Za hrvatsku kulturnu cjelovitost' (1936) in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatski narod i hrvatska državna misao* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1944), p. 198.

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² See Bartulin, 'The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type', pp. 189-219.

⁵³ 'Krv i čast hrvatskog naroda zaštićeni posebnim odredbama', *Hrvatski narod*, 1 May 1941, p. 1.

⁵⁴ 'Tumačenje rasnih zakonskih odredbi', *Hrvatski narod*, 3 May 1941, p. 7.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

exhibited traits of all the European races, the NDH's scholars and ideologists who wrote on the subject of race stressed the ideal physical and spiritual qualities of the Dinaric and Nordic races, which were regarded as the leading and decisive types in the Croatian nation's racial composition.⁵⁶

The Croats and Western Civilization

Jonjić argues that my 2007 article 'overlooks not just one, but thousands of examples of prewar and wartime propaganda by Croatian nationalists (from Pilar and Lukas, through Šufflay to Pavelić and the Ustasha) in which the Croats are extolled as a highly civilized Western nation.'⁵⁷ Jonjić, for his part, obviously overlooked the following sentence in my article: 'Although the Ustasha movement consistently stressed Croatia's Western, Catholic, Latin-Germanic cultural heritage, the movement also asserted that the authentic Croatian spirit and culture were to be found in the patriarchal tribal communities of the mountainous Dinaric areas of the NDH, and especially among the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.'⁵⁸

Furthermore, if Jonjić had read the work of Filip Lukas more closely he would have realized that Lukas specifically defined the Croats as a 'Western-Eastern' people. In a speech given in 1930 Lukas argued that the Croats were an 'Eastern people' by their origin, and were geopolitically rooted in the Balkans and linked racially and linguistically to the Slavic East.⁵⁹ The Eastern characteristics of the Croats had, however, been successfully adapted to Western civilization, from which the Croats had received their Catholic faith, notions of law and state, art, literature and philosophy.⁶⁰ This Western-Eastern dualism represented the 'spirit' of Croatian culture.⁶¹ The Croats had preserved their autochthonous patriarchal culture, which was also expressed in the beautiful epic folk songs of the 'Islamicized Croats' (i.e. the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims).⁶² The Croats thus represented a 'bridge' between the West and East.⁶³

In an article from 1932 Lukas referred to the Croats as a 'Western-Eastern [nation] in its full complexity, but [which] in its psychic depth and racial struc-

⁵⁶ Bartulin, 'The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type', pp. 203-213.

⁵⁷ Jonjić, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', p. 229.

⁵⁸ Bartulin, 'The NDH as a Central European Bulwark', p. 61.

⁵⁹ Filip Lukas, 'O duhu hrvatske kulture' (1930) in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatski narod i hrvatska državna misao* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1944), pp. 125, 129.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 124-125.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, p. 129.

⁶² *ibid.*, p. 127.

⁶³ *ibid.*, p. 125.

ture has more Eastern characteristics.⁶⁴ Lukas defined the West as the product of the Romanic and Germanic cultures, while the East was represented by the Slavic peoples (which did not, however, represent a uniform cultural or racial entity).⁶⁵ According to Lukas, the strong autochthonous character and spirit of Croatian culture had ensured that the Croats had not completely 'lost' themselves and their originality within the West, as had happened to the Slovenes. At the same time, in having accepted Western civilization as a framework, the Croats had secured their place as a 'cultured nation.'⁶⁶

It should be pointed out that the theory of the Eastern origins of the Croats did not bring into question their Indo-European/Aryan racial identity. In 1929 the Croatian economist Dr. Ivan Krajač (1877-1945?) argued that the Croats derived their origins from one of the main areas of historical settlement of the Indo-Europeans, and as he explained, 'the cradle of the Aryan race is in the mountains of central Asia.' It was from this original homeland that the Aryans began to spread forth and settle other lands.⁶⁷ One of the new centres of Aryan settlement was the Carpathian Mountains and the surroundings of Cracow, which, according to tradition, was the former homeland of the Croats.⁶⁸ The Aryan race, Krajač noted, possessed a deep spiritual connection to mountains and this was clearly expressed in the history of the Croats. As members of the 'great Aryan family of peoples', the Croats carried a 'more or less inherited relation and love toward the world of mountains and the majesty of its phenomena.'⁶⁹

The Iranian theory of Croat origins, which was supported by many intellectuals and ideologists in the NDH,⁷⁰ enabled Croat nationalists to forge a direct link between their people and the home of the first great Indo-European civilization, ancient Persia. The French diplomat, historian and race theorist, Joseph-Arthur Comte de Gobineau (1816-1882) had argued that 'in very remote times the white race began to settle into its first home in the heights of Asia.' The name 'Irany', Gobineau noted, 'is nothing other than "Aryan" or "Arya", which was the name common to all the white races at their origin.'⁷¹ In

⁶⁴ Filip Lukas, 'Smjernice i elementi u razvoju hrvatskoga naroda' (1932) in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatski narod i hrvatska državna misao* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1944), p. 96.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶⁷ Dr. Ivan Krajač, 'Narodne planine i Hrvati', *Hrvatski Planinar* XXV (1929), No. 4 (April 1929): 85.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ Dr. Ivan Krajač, 'Narodne planine i Hrvati', *Hrvatski Planinar* XXV (1929), No. 5 (May 1929): 111.

⁷⁰ See Bartulin, 'The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type', pp. 197-199, 207-213.

⁷¹ J. A. de Gobineau, *The World of the Persians*, John Gifford ed. (Genève: Editions Minerva S. A., 1971), p. 6. According to Gobineau, the white race had consisted of Celts, Thracians, Latins, Hellenes, Slavs, Hindus and Persians. See *ibid.*

1940 the Croat archaeologist Dr. Zdenko Vinski (1913-1996) noted that the Medes and Persians, who represented the ruling elite of ancient Iran, had both belonged to *homo europaeus* (Nordic race).⁷² According to the theory of the Polish anthropologist Jan Czekanowski (1882-1965), the Dinaric race itself was the anthropological product of an admixture that had occurred between the Nordic race and the Armenoid (or Near Eastern) race.⁷³ One can find acceptance of this theory on the origins of the Dinaric race in the works of Filip Lukas from the period of the NDH.⁷⁴

In his chapter on the NDH's geographical and geopolitical position, published in a 1942 textbook on Croatian geography, Lukas noted that the greater part of the NDH's territory belonged to the Balkan Peninsula. This Dinaric part of Croatia was the 'gravity centre of our people', in which the medieval Croatian state had been founded and which had best preserved the Croatian language and original culture.⁷⁵ According to Lukas, in a cultural and racial sense the Balkans formed a world of its own, which was distinct from both East and West.⁷⁶ He argued that the 'peculiarity of the Balkans and its cosmic forces' were so strong that even four hundred years of Turkish rule had not led to a 'process of degeneration.' On the contrary, after the collapse of Ottoman rule, the Balkan peoples reappeared on the stage of history 'full of vital force and anthropological freshness.'⁷⁷ Although the peripheral western parts of Croatia had been heavily exposed to Western cultural influences, the Croatian people as a whole had not lost their 'spiritual peculiarity', and this was due to

⁷² Dr. Zdenko Vinski, *Uz problematiku starog Irana i Kavkaza s osvrtom na podrijetlo Anta i Bijelih Hrvata* (Zagreb: "Grafika", 1940), 45f, p. 15.

⁷³ Jan Czekanowski, 'Anthropologische Struktur der Slaven im Lichte polnischer Untersuchungsergebnisse', *Etnolog*, Vol. 10/11, 1937/1939, p. 239. Czekanowski argued that the old Slavs had been predominantly of Nordic race. See *ibid*, p. 233. Hans Günther also regarded the earliest Slavs (or at least their ruling class) as Nordic. According to Günther, the Dinaric race probably shared a common origin with the Hither Asiatic (Near Eastern) race in the Caucasus region; a part of this common Caucasian group left its homeland and afterwards 'a change in the process of selection under different conditions must have formed two groups out of the original single group.' Despite their common origin, Günther argued that the Dinaric and Hither Asiatic races differed considerably according to their physical and (especially) mental characteristics. He had a very high opinion of Dinaric mental traits (such as bravery in war and love of nature and home), which he felt were similar to those of the Nordic race. See Günther, *Racial Elements of European History*, pp. 58-59, 67-70, 111, 225.

⁷⁴ Nordic-Armenoid admixture occurred in the western Balkans in the late Stone Age. See Filip Lukas, 'Osebnost hrvatske kulture' in Filip Lukas, *Hrvatski narod i hrvatska državna misao* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1944), p. 144.

⁷⁵ Filip Lukas, 'Zemljopisni i geopolitički položaj' in Dr. Zvonimir Dugački ed., *Zemljopis Hrvatske: Opći dio*, Vol. 1 (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1942), p. 32.

⁷⁶ *ibid*, pp. 32-33.

⁷⁷ *ibid*, p. 33.

the dominant blood of the Balkan-Dinaric Croats and their original patriarchal culture.⁷⁸

Contrary to Jonjić, who views anti-Yugoslavist Croat nationalism as having an exclusively Occidentalist concept of cultural identity, Ustasha ideologists and nationalist intellectuals in the NDH had a much more complex attitude toward the Balkans and the 'East' in general. For one thing, the Ustashe considered the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be of authentic Croatian ethnic descent and were more than tolerant of their Islamic faith.⁷⁹ What counted above all in the NDH in terms of national affiliation was not religious and/or civilizational identity, but racial origin. As an article in the Zagreb daily *Novi list* (from May 1941) stated, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were Croats according to their 'blood, language and history'.⁸⁰

The European Idea of 'Barbarism'

In my 2007 article I noted that, as Croatian nationalists, the Ustashe were not necessarily ashamed of the Croats being referred to as barbarians by Italian nationalists, including the Fascists, and that 'this was something they shared with the Nazis, at least in the sense of using the notion of "barbarism" to counter Italian claims of Latin-Mediterranean or "Roman" cultural superiority.' As I further argued in my article, 'barbarism' in this context would refer to the virtues of the ancient Germanic 'barbarians' as described by the Roman historian Tacitus in his *Germania*: 'the simple, brave and honourable Teutons as compared to the urban, decadent and civilized Romans'.⁸¹ This idea of 'barbarism' thus applies specifically to the Germanic tribes and to what Tacitus saw as their positive traits. The argument that Croatian nationalists may have had a similar view of this European idea of 'barbarism' is particularly disagreeable to Jonjić. Completely ignoring the reference to Tacitus, Jonjić adopts a sort of postcolonialist position in an attempt to refute what he sees as my unacceptable accusations of 'barbarism' aimed against the Croats. In complete contradiction to his 'Occidentalist' argument concerning Croatian political and cultural identity, Jonjić likens the historical experiences of the Croats in relation to their 'foreign antagonists' in 'Vienna, Budapest and Rome' to the history of 'African or American natives' under European colonial rule.⁸²

⁷⁸ *ibid.*

⁷⁹ Ante Pavelić (1889-1959) even authorized the building of a mosque in the centre of Zagreb, which was completed and opened in August 1944 as 'The Poglavnik's Mosque.' For more on this topic, see Nada Kisić Kolanović, *Muslimani i hrvatski nacionalizam 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2009), pp. 292-300.

⁸⁰ 'Hrvatstvo bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana: Zvjerstva Srba nad muslimanima, *Novi list*, 8 May 1941, p. 7.

⁸¹ Bartulin, 'The NDH as a "Central European Bulwark"', pp. 68- 69.

⁸² Jonjić, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', p. 229.

One has to understand that the notion of barbarism we are discussing is linked to a long European intellectual tradition. Firstly, the very word 'barbarian' acquired a positive connotation during the Middle Ages. While, in the Roman period, the term defined 'anyone alien to Mediterranean society and culture and to Roman political norms', from the third century onward, as the Roman army began to fill with many 'barbarians', the word came to acquire the meaning of 'soldier' and the connotation of courage.⁸³ This meaning of 'barbarian' entered the Romance languages; the English word 'brave' comes (via French) from the Italian word 'bravo' (meaning 'fine' or 'spirited'), which itself originates from 'brabus' (a corruption of 'barbarian').⁸⁴

There was also a strong cultural tradition in Germany, dating to the Humanist rediscovery of *Germania*, which praised the virtues of the honest, courageous and freedom-loving ancient German barbarians in contrast to the decadent and civilized Romans of the south.⁸⁵ From the late nineteenth century to the end of Adolf Hitler's regime, German scholars generally held that 'the ancient Germans were morally and culturally superior,' and 'they owed this superiority to a miraculous combination of cultural skill and barbaric vigor,' or in the words of the National Socialist historian Otto Höfler (1901-1987), to a combination of 'state-building power' and 'heroic ecstasy.'⁸⁶ As the Czech historian Jan Peisker (1851-1933) had noted in 1911, 'the primitive German was as savage in war as the mounted [Asiatic] nomad, but far superior in character and capacity for civilisation.'⁸⁷

As I clearly noted in my 2007 article, the National Socialists saw themselves, somewhat paradoxically, as both the defenders of historical Western civilization and as the defenders of their own autochthonous Nordic-Germanic culture, so that there was a 'problematic opposition' between ancient Germanic 'barbarism' and classical Greek and Roman civilization (even if the original Greeks and Romans were also considered Nordic-Aryans).⁸⁸ As Christopher Hutton explains, 'one strategy was to reject the historiographic tradition that defined the northern tribes as primitive savages and affirm a Germano-centric view of history in which the Germanic peoples were viewed as having their own institutions and cultural order.'⁸⁹ Overall, the most important intel-

⁸³ David Gress, *From Plato to Nato: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), pp. 203-204.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p. 204.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 206.

⁸⁷ [Jan] T. Peisker, Chapt. XIV, 'The Expansion of the Slavs,' *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II, H. M. Gwatkin and J. P. Whitney, eds. (1911; reprint Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 433.

⁸⁸ See Bartulin, 'The NDH as a "Central European Bulwark"', p. 69 and Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich*, p. 105.

⁸⁹ Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich*, p. 105.

lectual strategy was to differentiate between Aryan/Indo-Germanic/Indo-European heroic 'barbarism' and wild Asiatic-Turanian-Semitic 'nomadism'. Among others, Hans Günther and the National Socialist ideologist Walther Darré (1895-1953) 'rejected the idea that the Nordic race should be seen solely as marauding [nomadic] invader, arguing that the history of the Nordic race showed the qualities both of peaceful agricultural settlement and of warlike heroism.'⁹⁰ Nomadism was thus restricted to non-Aryan peoples such as the Jews, Gypsies and, in the case of Ustasha ideology, to the Balkan Romanic Vlachs. The NDH's intellectual and ideological discourse on race and culture stressed the fundamental racial/cultural/social difference between the settled, warrior Indo-European Croats and the nomadic, racially Near Eastern peoples, consisting of Vlach-Serbs, Jews and Gypsies.⁹¹

According to Ustasha racial ideology, the Croats were predominantly of Indo-European (Iranian-Slavic-Gothic-Illyrian-Celtic) anthropological-racial origin, which meant that they had also inherited (in a spiritual sense) the martial qualities of their Aryan warrior ancestors.⁹² Anti-Yugoslavist Croat nationalists, including the Ustashe, considered their people a warrior nation, or as the historian Kerubin Šegvić (1867-1945) had described the Croats, a heroic *Herrenvolk* (meaning a 'nation of masters' and not 'master race').⁹³ This idea was in line with German race theories which held the Nordics to be a heroic warrior race (*Kriegerrasse*).⁹⁴ The tradition of Indo-European martial heroism was viewed by a number of European intellectuals as a healthy and positive trait. Among others, the Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) 'saw the dichotomy between Aryans and Jews in terms of the vital, youthful, bar-

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ I could cite a great many works dealing with this topic, but I would point the reader to the two following specialist articles: Ćiro Truhelka, 'O podrijetlu žiteljstva grčkoistočne vjeroispovijesti u Bosni i Hercegovini' in Dr. Ćiro Truhelka, *Studije o podrijetlu: Etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Hercegovine* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1941), pp. 29-43; and Franjo Ivaniček, 'Beiträge zur Anthropologie und Rassengeschichte der Kroaten (Eine Untersuchung an Schülern aus Gau Hum.)', *Zeitschrift für Morphologie und Anthropologie* 41 (1944), no. 1: 177-192. In his article Truhelka argued that the nomadic Orthodox Vlachs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were 'the descendants of pre-Aryan, pre-historic Mediterraneans.' See Truhelka, 'O podrijetlu', p. 30. The anthropologist Ivaniček argued that the Croat population of the NDH belonged predominantly to the Dinaric race, while the Orthodox minority was mainly of Near Eastern race (*Vorderasiatische Rasse*). See Ivaniček, 'Beiträge', pp. 178-181, 192.

⁹² See Bartulin, 'The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type', pp. 197-199, 203-213.

⁹³ Prof. Cherubin Segvić (Kerubin Šegvić), 'Die gotische Abstammung der Kroaten', *Nordische Welt* (Berlin: Verlag Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1935), pp. 35-36. Šegvić argued that the Croats were of Germanic-Gothic origin. According to the German historian Ernst Förstemann (1822-1906), in the Middle Ages, the Germanic-Gothic adjective 'hrôthi' (from 'hrôt', meaning 'victory' or 'glory') had a number of forms, such as 'Hruat' and 'Chrouat'. Šegvić argued that the Gothic name Hruat 'completely corresponded' to the Croat ethnic name (*Hrvat*). See *ibid.*, p. 35.

⁹⁴ Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich*, p. 104.

barian versus the over-refined and overcivilized.⁹⁵ In the case of the Ustashe, James Sadkovich also notes that ‘rather than a race of cultured cosmopolitans, the Croats were presented by Ustaša propaganda as a “warrior people”, renowned not because of the sharpness of their intellect, but for their prowess with a sword.’⁹⁶ To be more precise, the Ustashe regarded the Croats as both a warrior people and a nation that had achieved great cultural feats.

The idea of the Indo-Germanic combination of cultural skill, high morality and ‘barbarian’ heroism can also be found in discourses on culture and race in the NDH. In 1943, in an article in the newspaper *Spremnost*, Ivan Krajač argued that the ‘essential features of the untainted Croatian national character’ consisted of the following three characteristics: ‘The first [trait] is the feeling of honour, honesty and the straight path, which is completely contrary to the typical trait of the Orient. The second is military heroism, bravery and ability. The third is cultural ability [...]’.⁹⁷ As was made clear in Žarko Brzić’s article in the 1942 *Ustasha Annual*, which I analysed in my 2007 article, the Croatian notion of barbarism – and Brzić used the word ‘barbarian’ – specifically referred to old Croatian heroism and bravery, ‘victory or death, the motto of our race and blood.’⁹⁸

A short entry on German history in a 1944 Ustasha handbook for Croatian soldiers noted that the young Germanic tribes, which were ‘morally uncorrupted’, had, through centuries of warfare with the Romans, overthrown the ‘corrupt Roman Empire.’⁹⁹ An article in *Novi list* had already argued in May 1941 that the Roman Empire began to disintegrate at the point when ‘the large contribution of foreign, in good part Semitic, blood took a firm hold of Rome.’ Thus began the ‘degeneration’ of old Roman blood and nothing could no longer be done to save the Empire from collapse.¹⁰⁰ In an article in the Ustasha newspaper *Neue Ordnung* from May 1942, Dr. Božidar Murgić argued that ‘the ancient autochthonous culture’ of the Croats came from the ‘high north’ and was related to the *urgermanisch-nordische Kultur* (‘original Germanic-Nordic culture’).¹⁰¹ Basing his argument upon the work of the eminent German art historian Josef Strzygowski (1862-1941), who had argued that Old Croatian art was of Nordic origin, Murgić stated that even in their ‘southern homeland’

⁹⁵ *ibid*, p. 13.

⁹⁶ James J. Sadkovich, *Italian Support for Croatian Separatism 1927-1937* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987), p. 154.

⁹⁷ Dr. Ivan Krajač, ‘Kulturna sposobnost Hrvata’, *Spremnost*, 6 June 1943, p. 9.

⁹⁸ Žarko Brzić, ‘Vizija prošlosti’, *Ustaški godišnjak 1942* (Zagreb: Glavni ustaški stan, 1942), p. 209.

⁹⁹ *Hrvatu u borbi: Vojnički godišnjak za godinu 1944*. (Zagreb: Odgojni odjel Ministarstva oružanih snaga, 1944), p. 133.

¹⁰⁰ ‘Povjesna važnost zakonskih odredaba o zaštiti arijske krvi’, *Novi list*, 3 May 1941, p. 5.

¹⁰¹ Dr. Božidar Murgić, ‘Die Kulturbeziehungen des kroatischen und deutschen Volkes’, *Neue Ordnung*, 26 May 1942, p. 13.

along the 'blue Adriatic', the Croats 'have remained a Nordic people', as they had retained 'their Nordic soul, their Nordic bravery [...] their honour and their Nordic art.'¹⁰²

The German, and Croatian, racial concepts of 'barbarism' were essentially intellectual reactions to Italian arguments of Roman-Latin cultural superiority. Jonjić fails to observe that Ustasha Croatian nationalism was far more ideologically compatible with German National Socialism than with Italian Fascism precisely because of the question of race. From the mid- 1930s, Italian racial theory was caught between the increasing political-ideological need on the part of Benito Mussolini to confirm the Aryan racial identity of the Italians, on the one hand, and upholding traditional Italian racial anthropology, which stressed the unique Mediterranean (Eurafrican) racial origin of the Italians, on the other. The leading Italian anthropologist of the early twentieth century, Giuseppe Sergi (1841-1936), had rejected the influential German (and Anglo-Saxon) theory of the Aryan and Nordic origins of Roman civilization. He argued that the Mediterranean, black African and Nordic races all originated from a Eurafrican species (with the Mediterranean and Nordic races migrating to Europe from Africa in the Neolithic period).¹⁰³ The Aryans or Indo-Europeans were of Asiatic (Eurasian) origin (from the Hindukush region) and, according to Sergi, were not responsible for the origin of the Mediterranean Greek and Latin civilizations even though they somehow eventually managed to impose their Indo-European speech upon the Mediterranean race. Though they shared a common origin with the Mediterranean race, the Nordics had, Sergi maintained, contributed very little to the civilization of antiquity.¹⁰⁴ The brunet Mediterranean type was the 'greatest race in the world', which 'derived neither from the black nor white peoples' and thus formed 'an autonomous stock in the human family.'¹⁰⁵

By the late 1930s, as Italy moved to a closer political relationship with Germany, pro-Nazi Italian racial anthropologists such as Dr. Guido Landra (1913-1980) started to erect 'a barrier between the Mediterranean Italians on one side and the Jews and Africans on the other,' so that the 'Mediterranean race had to be understood in a more narrow sense than it had been previously.'¹⁰⁶ The official Fascist Manifesto of Racial Scientists from 1938 stated that the Italians were 'of Aryan origin' and that 'Italian racial concepts must be informed by Italian ideas and Aryan-Nordic in orientation.'¹⁰⁷ This Manifesto did not, how-

¹⁰² *ibid.* Also see Mirko Kus-Nikolajev, 'Nordijsko podrijetlo starohrvatskog pletenca', *Spremnost*, 10 April 1942, p. 7.

¹⁰³ Aaron Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 25.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁰⁷ Aaron Gillette, 'The Origins of the "Manifesto of racial scientists,"' *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 6 (3) (2001): 319.

ever, stop the strong intellectual and ideological influence of the Mediterranean race theory, and many Italian scholars and Fascist ideologists 'would fight a virtual intellectual and political war against those advocating the "Nordic orientation" from the time the Manifesto was first published until the fall of Mussolini in July 1943.' The Mediterranean racial theory implicitly contained an 'anti-German, anti-Aryan bias.'¹⁰⁸ As the German anthropologist and anatomist Prof. Eugen Fischer (1874-1967) stated in a letter in November 1940, one of the leading Mediterranean racial theorists, Giacomo Acerbo (1888-1969), had described the Nordic-Germanic tribes as culturally inferior peoples 'whose aim was not the creation of States but only pillage and plunder', while 'descendants of the Goths [...] have been absorbed into the lowest strata of the Italian population.'¹⁰⁹

In contrast to the Fascist intellectual and ideological emphasis on Italy's fundamentally Mediterranean racial identity, the NDH's leading scholars and ideologists, who dealt with the topic of race, argued that the Mediterranean racial type was insignificant in the racial composition of the Croatian people.¹¹⁰ What Jonjić further fails to note, or is perhaps unaware of, is the fact that the German National Socialists had a far more positive attitude toward the Croats and their ethnic-racial value than the Italian Fascists. The National Socialists did not, of course, consider the Croats to belong to the upper northern Germanic group of European nations, but, in their eyes, the Croats stood far higher in their racial hierarchy than the Mongol-Slav masses of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.¹¹¹

To conclude this section, I would like to comment briefly on the topic of the Ustasha use of the phrase, 'offspring of wolves and lions' (*porod vuka i arslana*), to describe the Croats, a subject that Jonjić went into some detail in his article. Admittedly, in my 2007 article I did not mention the fact that this phrase originates from a poem written by the Croatian poet Vladimir Nazor (1876-1949), but I did not claim that this phrase was 'an invention of Ustasha propaganda', as Jonjić implies.¹¹² In any case, I am not a historian of Croatian

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p. 316.

¹⁰⁹ Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*, pp. 135-136.

¹¹⁰ For example, the Croatian ethnographer Mirko Kus-Nikolajev (1896-1961) argued that the influence of the Mediterranean racial type was not 'decisive' in the Croatian racial composition. Mirko Kus-Nikolajev, 'Rasni sastav Hrvata: Nordijske primjese pojačavaju i onako visoku životnu i kulturnu vrijednost hrvatskog naroda,' *Spremnost*, 12 July 1942, p. 5. The Ustasha journalist and editor Milivoj Karamarko (1920-1945) noted that while 65% of Croats belonged to the Dinaric race (and a further 10% to the Nordic race), only 1% of Croats were of Mediterranean racial type. Milivoj Karamarko, 'Dinarska rasa i Hrvati: Osebuje naše značajke i pozitivni prinos nordijske rase,' *Spremnost*, 22 November 1942, p. 7.

¹¹¹ For more on this topic, see Bartulin, 'The NDH as a "Central European Bulwark"', pp. 59-61, and Bartulin, 'The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type', pp. 213-216.

¹¹² Jonjić, 'From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions', p. 233.

literature and do not possess expertise on the subject of the use of literary metaphors by Croatian poets and writers. However, it is still possible to argue, as I did in my 2007 article, that the use of the above phrase by the Ustashe reflects their ideological predilection for the folk culture of the Dinaric regions. As the Croatian sociologist Josip Županov points out, Nazor had in mind the Dinaric ‘tribal’ folk culture, which extolled martial virtues and heroism, when he wrote that ‘we are the offspring of wolves and lions [*Mi porod jesmo vuka i arslana*].’¹¹³

Conclusion

When discussing the NDH’s intellectual and ideological discourse on culture, one cannot, as Tomislav Jonjić did in his article, overlook the question of race, namely, the subjects of race theory and racial anthropology. By race theory, one should understand a theory that presents a racial interpretation or philosophy of history and culture, while racial anthropology postulates that human races possess distinct mental/spiritual traits alongside their physical attributes.¹¹⁴ The racial idea in the NDH shared much in common with National Socialist racial thought (*Rassengedanke*), including the notion of inherited ‘cultural skill’ combined with ‘barbarian vigour.’ On the other hand, the question of racial politics in the NDH, in other words the complex relationship between race theory and racist practice, is another question altogether that requires a further detailed and nuanced study.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Josip Županov, ‘Aktualnost Tomašičeve sociologije’, *Društvena istraživanja* 2 (1993), no. 6: 951. Jonjić fails to note that ‘arslan’ is in fact a Turkish loanword in the Croatian language. See Petar Šimunović, *Hrvatska prezimena* (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2006), p. 154. Jonjić also does not take into consideration the fact that the Ustasha government allowed the literary use of Turkish words in deference to the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who traditionally used many Turkish (and via Turkish, Arabic and Persian) loanwords. See Marko Samardžija, *Hrvatski jezik u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1993), p. 67.

¹¹⁴ For more on the topic of race, race theories, the history of racial anthropology and some of the controversies surrounding the question of race, see Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*, Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich*, Leon Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe*, trans. Edmund Howard (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1974), and Pierre L. van den Berghe, ‘Does Race Matter?’, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1, 3, 1995, pp. 357-368.

¹¹⁵ The histories of all states based on a racial *Weltanschauung* have highlighted the difficulty of translating race theory into actual government policy. National Socialist Germany was, without doubt, history’s ultimate example of a racialist state, but the German State Secretary of Aviation, Field Marshal Erhard Milch (1892-1972), had a Jewish father. The case of Milch, and tens of thousands of other Germans of Jewish and/or partly Jewish descent (*Mischlinge*) serving in the Wehrmacht and Nazi Party, draws attention to the complexity of the Third Reich’s racial policies. For more on this topic consult Bryan Mark Rigg, *Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers: The Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military* (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2002).

Die intellektuellen Diskussionen über Rasse und Kultur in Kroatien von 1900 bis zum Jahre 1945

Zusammenfassung

Der Autor veröffentlichte im Jahre 2007 in dieser Zeitschrift den Artikel unter dem Titel „The NDH as a Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism: An Assessment of Croatian-Italian Relations within the German ‘New Order’ 1941-1945’ (Der Unabhängige Staat Kroatien (NDH) als mittel-europäisches Bollwerk gegen den italienischen Imperialismus: Eine Beurteilung der italienisch-kroatischen Beziehungen innerhalb der deutschen ‘Neuen Ordnung’, Vol. 3, Nr. 1), in dem er auch Unterschiede zwischen Faschismus und Ustascha-Ideologie besonders in Rassenfrage behandelte. Tomislav Jonjić setzte sich mit dem genannten Artikel im Text „From Bias to Erroneous“ (Von Parteilichkeit bis zum falschen Folgern) kritisch auseinander, der ebenfalls im *Review of Croatian History* veröffentlicht wurde (Vol. 6, Nr. 1, 2010). Dieser Text ist die Antwort des Autors auf die von Tomislav Jonjić ausgesprochene Kritik, wobei der Autor zusätzlich die Genesis theoretischer Debatten über Rasse und Kultur in Kroatien zwischen 1900 und 1945 darstellte. Beurteilend, dass die kritischen Bemerkungen von Tomislav Jonjić auf ungenügenden theoretischen Kenntnissen von rassistisch-anthropologischer Problematik begründet sind, erklärt der Autor in diesem Text ergänzend die Fragen der Rassenanthropologie, der Identität der westlichen Zivilisation und der kulturologischen Auffassung des Barbarismus. Nachdem er einen Überblick über theoretische Auseinandersetzungen mit genannten Fragen, besonders in kroatischen nationalistischen Kreisen, gegeben hat, zieht der Autor die Schlussfolgerung, dass man bei Behandlung von intellektuellen und ideologischen Diskussionen über Kultur im Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien (USK, kroatisch: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) keinesfalls den Einfluss von Rassentheorien und Rassenanthropologie vernachlässigen darf. In seiner Antwort auf die von Tomislav Jonjić ausgeübte Kritik erklärt der Verfasser zusätzlich, dass die Ustascha-Ideologen und nationalistische Intellektuellen im USK keine ausschließlich okzidentale kulturelle Identität hatten, sondern dass sie viel kompliziertere Auffassung vom Balkan und vom Osten im Allgemeinen pflegten. Die Rassenidee im USK hatte mit dem nazistischen Rassengedanke viel Gemeinsames, zog aber gleichzeitig auch geerbte „kulturologische Fertigkeiten“ und „barbarische Kräfte“ in Betracht.



**BARTULIN'S *TILTING AT WINDMILLS*:
MANIPULATION AS A HISTORIOGRAPHIC
METHOD**

**(A reply to Nevenko Bartulin's "Intellectual Discourse
on Race and Culture in Croatia 1900-1945")**

Tomislav JONJIĆ*

In this article, which is written in a polemical tone, the author is making an effort to problematize a point of view from which the ideology of Croatian nationalism, the Ustaša movement and the Independent State of Croatia are even today being observed by a part of historiography. According to the author, the ideology of Croatian nationalism has not suffered much vital modification since the mid-19th century until the end of the Second World War, rather it has kept itself occupied with justifying the right of Croats as a multi-confessional European nation to establish an independent state. Not just political manifestations, but also literary and cultural achievements of the nationalist ideology protagonists clearly speak in that direction. The geopolitical position of Croatian lands, as well as the influence of foreign powers have not made the achievement of such a right of Croatian people and the evolution of Croatian nationalist ideology possible. As a result, that same nationalist ideology sometimes takes on foreign ideological and political influences which are visible only on its surface and purely out of tactical reasons. The Ustaša movement, being one of the manifestations of Croatian nationalism, is also characterized by ideological eclecticism. Thus, different and sometimes contrastive statements made by the leading persona of Ustaša movement regarding their attitude towards the ideologies dominating Europe in the time after the First World War are therefore understandable.

Key words: Croatian nationalism, Ustaša movement, Ustaša principles, Independent State of Croatia, racial theories, racial legislation

Introduction

In the foreword to the Croatian edition of his book *Italian Support for Croatian Separatism 1927-1937*, American historian James J. Sadkovich referred to some of the texts which deal with the same or similar themes: Croatian nation-

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alism in the period prior to the Second World War and the Croatian nationalists from that period, who – naturally – advocated separatist solutions vis-à-vis the Yugoslav state.¹ In the context of assessments of those scholars who do not notice socially and militarily/politically influenced changes in the ideological-political toolkit of the Ustasha movement nor the amplitude of the differences between the Ustasha ideology and fascism during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (which means they do not distinguish between cause and effect and, thus, “statically and therefore incorrectly interpret history”), Sadkovich pointed out Nevenko Bartulin in one footnote.

In three sentences dedicated to Bartulin's dissertation *The Ideology of Nation and Race: The Croatian Ustasha Regime and its Policies towards Minorities in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945* (University of New South Wales, 2006), Sadkovich noted that Bartulin “claims that the Ustashe not only attempted to create a Croatian ‘nation-state’ but also ‘eliminate ethnic, racial and religious minorities’ that would have despoiled the ‘organic’ nature of state, which are two rather different tasks which can only be combined if one assumes that the Ustashe intended to perpetrate genocide (or something similar thereto) at the very onset of the movement”. Obviously deeming this thesis faulty, Sadkovich added that Bartulin, in an attempt to prove his “theoretical postulate”, employed something that constituted a “classic example of an imploded chronology”.²

The texts by Bartulin which I have seen thus far lead me to a conclusion similar to Sadkovich's, although I would formulate it much more sharply, with an incomparably less favourable assessment of his work.

To be sure, there are no personal motives involved. I am unacquainted with Bartulin personally. The comments on his dissertation I have heard from those better informed than myself were such that I considered it not worth the effort to seek it out. Bartulin's texts published in Croatian periodicals only reinforced my initial stance: it would be a wasted effort to deal with the works of scholars who, while perusing the relevant literature (foreign, to be sure, due to the belief that this creates the impression of being academic!), stumble upon some, quite often ill-conceived, theoretical model, and then believe it would be rather original and very *scholarly* to use this model to reinterpret and construe Croatian history, compiling the texts of others in the process, while sorting through data and concealing, fabricating and modelling facts in compliance with a preconceived formula. If, in the process, these and similar parvenus employ *politically correct* constructions in order to yield very recognizable and palpable earthly objectives, then I believe they should be ignored even more, for I feel that such intellectual artisans and – to once more use Sadkovich's turn of phrase – *academic entrepreneurs*, are worthy of nothing more than contempt.

Briefly, Bartulin as a historian and *scholar* in general, was and remains entirely uninteresting to me.

¹ James J. Sadkovich, *Italija i ustaše 1927.-1937.* (Zagreb, 2010), pp. 327-369.

² *Ibid.*, p. 333, note 28.

I did not want to deal with him even when his article “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’: An Assessment of Croatian-Italian Relations Within the German ‘New Order’ in Europe 1941-1945” was published in the respected *Review of Croatian History* (3/2007, 1, pp. 49-73). However, I highlighted some of the formulations in this text, rooted in a dismaying ignorance of the facts, in a note to one of my articles intended for another Croatian scholarly journal. This note was formulated similarly to Sadkovich’s observations, although it was half the length and – certainly – much more sharply worded.

Nonetheless the editorial board of this journal assessed that this brief note identified a tendency of some authors, despite a troublesome degree of ignoring basic facts, to boldly offer their own interpretations and make conclusions which overlook context and chronology, but are thus from today’s perspective *politically correct*. An additional problem is that these *academic entrepreneurs* are horrified by serious scholars and which they denounce for not noticing what had to be noticed: that racial teaching and racism were the alpha and omega, *ceterum censeo* of the Ustashe, and perhaps even Croatian nationalist ideology in general.³

For, if racist standpoints – as Bartulin suggested in his article – were advocated not only by “Ustasha intellectuals” (Mladen Lorković, Mile Starčević, Milivoj Karamarko and so forth), but also those whose lives ended when the Ustashe were only just beginning to emerge as an organization or were a marginal force (Ivo Pilar, Milan Šufflay), as well as those who viewed the Ustashe with diffidence or reproof for various reasons (Filip Lukas, Zvonimir Dugački, Živko Jakić, etc.), and even those who notably despised the Ustashe and the Independent State of Croatia (Josip Horvat, Ante Tresić Pavičić and so forth), or were Marxists, and in any case imprisoned during the time of the Independent State of Croatia (Mirko Kus-Nikolajev), then the conclusion is entirely clear: the Croatian intelligentsia, generally speaking, advocated racist views.

If one adds to this that, according to Bartulin, racist views in a nation that is mainly Catholic were advocated by people who matured or worked as Catholic priests (Kerubin Šegvić, Stjepan Sakač, Filip Lukas, Ivo Guberina, Lovre Katić), the problem becomes even more serious. When one bears in mind that the NDH, according to Bartulin’s suggestion, whole-heartedly accepted writers who were at one point in their lives Yugoslav integralists (Lukas, Tresić Pavičić, Kus-Nikolajev), but later accused of Trotskyism (Kus-Nikolajev), as well as those who were not even Croats (Boris Zarnik) or were so only in the first generation (Ćiro Truhelka), or (actually or allegedly) advocated racist views and made their way from the margins of society to the focus of attention, then what Bartulin wants to say is clear: these writers were accepted by the Croatian public precisely because of their racism.

³ Bartulin defined this stance even more clearly in the article “The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia”, *Review of Croatian History* (hereinafter: *RCH*), 5 (2009), no. 1: 189-219.

The circle closes: a nation of racists whole-heartedly accepted even those who were foreigners or were “outcasts”, only if they were – racists. The Croats, thus, are racists and there is nothing in twentieth-century Croatian history that is not racist. And if there is by chance some Croat who is not a racist, he certainly did not advocate the idea of an independent Croatian state, nor accept it.

The syllogism is impeccable (which, in Bartulin's case, is a genuine miracle!): the political stances of Croatian nationalists are not only inextricably tied to racist convictions, they are also its expression and legitimate offspring. And if one neglects, as Bartulin does, saying even a word to the effect that the works by the writers whom he mentions in his formulations indicate different, and even contradictory conclusions, and if one fails to mention that among the Croatian nationalist intelligentsia there were dozens and even hundreds of those who, in the anthropological sense, advocated markedly anti-racist (and, in the political sense, anti-totalitarian) views, then the didactic purpose of this *quasi-scholarly prattle* and its political message become crystal clear.

I have no doubt that there are “intellectual” circles that will greet such “scholarly” theories with enthusiasm, for we know that there were “great humanists” (such as, for example, Ernst Bloch), who proclaimed the Croatian nation “fascist”, and that during Croatia's efforts to gain independence this and similar “scholarly”, “humanist” and “democratic arguments” were proffered against Croatia and the Croats. I similarly have no particular doubt that in his *scholarly* endeavours, Bartulin is vying for the sympathies of precisely such “scholars”, “humanists” and “democrats”.

Those who know me know that nothing delights me more than a vigorous debate. Perhaps this is why the editorial board of that journal proposed that I remove that note from the text to which it originally belonged, and to instead write a more extensive critique of Bartulin's article, listing his factual errors and grappling with his claims, which were derived from prejudices and ignorance of the facts. At first I accepted this proposal. While I did not think it was useful to waste time on him (for he deals with politics, not scholarship), I maintained that it would be worthwhile to warn readers – particularly those not from Croatia – that Bartulin had misfired, and that prior to making any manner (even petty political) interpretation, it would have been fruitful if he had versed himself in the basic facts at the very least. For the magnitude of his ignorance is nothing less than insulting. However, due to other commitments and a lack of time, I could not fully develop my thesis. I apologized to the journal's editorial board, both verbally and in writing, and then subsequently submitted a small part, actually the germ of my critique which may function as an independent text, to the *RCH* editorial board. My concisely formulated review of Bartulin's article was in fact published in 2010.⁴

⁴ Tomislav Jonjić, “From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions”, *RCH*, 6 (2010), no. 1: 227-228.

Given the prehistory of this review as outlined above, I was unable to write even a word about a subsequent article on a similar topic which Bartulin published in that very same journal,⁵ because I was unaware of it at the time. Although published later (2010), my review emerged earlier and – as clearly indicated by its content – it pertains exclusively on Bartulin's 2007 text, and not the article published in 2009. In it, I pointed out four or five of the most notable examples which demonstrate that Bartulin has no knowledge of the basic facts pertaining to the matters which he apparently deals with, and that he very uncritically assumes the assertions of writers who are proverbially unreliable. The majority (as much nine tenths!) of that review was dedicated to proving that Bartulin, due to his unfamiliarity with the classic works of Croatian literature, devised the most fantastic confabulations on the methodology and objectives of Croatian ("Ustasha") propaganda at the time.⁶ The problem was compounded by the fact that it was a matter of very well-known verses by Vladimir Nazor, a poet who was never an Ustasha, rather prior to the Second World War he was known as voting for Yugoslav rather than Croatian parties, while during the war – despite the commendations and literary awards conferred to him by the Ustasha regime and the press under its control, and despite the fact that Ustasha regime leader Ante Pavelić appointed him to full membership in the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science – he was on the opposing side, on the side of the Yugoslav Partisans, while after the war he assumed formally high posts in Yugoslavia's communist apparatus.

I deemed it worthwhile to publish at least this fragment, for I believe Bartulin's logic and historiographic acrobatics merit a place among the top ranks of quasi-scholarly manipulation in recent decades. Lacking time, I did not specify all of Bartulin's errors and oversights, but only a few, in the belief that doing otherwise would have contradicted my own Samaritan compassion. At the same time, I maintained that these several examples would underscore the reasons for which the review was written. One of them, as I said, was to point out to mainly foreign readers that Bartulin's assertions should not be blithely accepted. Any more serious Croatian historian does not require such a caveat, but since *RCH* is published in English language, I thought a possible outcome would be that Bartulin's text could be used by those who would then proclaim themselves experts in Croatian history, and perhaps even become mentors for some new Bartulins. For, as we know, while many commendable doctoral dissertations have been submitted and defended at Croatian and foreign universities, there are also, unfortunately, many others which do not merit this appellation, defended as they were before mentors who can scarcely be called experts, much less authorities on Croatian history. This is, to be sure, a general problem that exceeds the bounds of this article and does not pertain to Bartu-

⁵ This would be Bartulin's already mentioned article "The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia".

⁶ T. Jonjić, "From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions", pp. 228-238.

lin's dissertation, which still remains unavailable to me up to this point. Of course, it goes without saying that I have certain preconceived notions about it based on Bartulin's available writings published in Croatian periodicals.

Some time after I submitted my brief review, the germ of an unwritten article in another journal, to the editorial board of *RCH*, the editor-in-chief at the time, Jure Krišto, notified me that the text had been approved for publication, and that the editorial board had immediately sent my review to Bartulin and offered him the opportunity to reply in the same issue of the journal. That would have been an opportunity for readers to *hear both bells ringing* in the same issue of *RCH*, and thus, a chance for Bartulin to refute my arguments in that same issue. If I was right, he should have apologized to the readers for his lack of knowledge; if I was wrong, he could have pointed this out and subjected me to at least the same level of ridicule to which I had subjected him. Not a great deal of effort was being sought: if he were an expert on this topic, he could have done so in a short time, because my review – as any reader can easily see – did not contain more than five or six main points. However, Bartulin rejected this possibility, which speaks sufficiently in and for itself. As seen in his most recent reply, Bartulin did not manage to prove me wrong in any single case, but naturally - he did not apologize. This would require more dignity and intellectual honesty.

I admit that I received Bartulin's silence with Christian clemency, because I understand that it is not easy to acknowledge the four or five major factual errors that I mentioned incidentally, and simultaneously confront the fact that Bartulin's entire edifice of "the Croats as the 'progeny of wolves and lions'" emerged due to his dramatic ignorance of primer-level reading. In my naïveté, I even thought that Bartulin was grateful for the rather benevolent approach in my article. For if I have had the time to write that stillborn critique of his text, I would have identified a considerably higher number of instances which show that Bartulin is generally at war with the facts, so that not even his arcane interpretations should be taken too seriously.

While abstaining from delving into any interpretive differences, I could have pointed out that Bartulin often formulated his assertions in conditional form, or by using the words "seems", "appears", "probably", etc.⁷ This happens to other writers as well. However, it is troubling that Bartulin, without hesitating or wavering, takes premises so devised to formulate exceptionally creative constructs which he serves up as apodictic conclusions.⁸ Even the old Aristotle

⁷ Nevenko Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", *RCH*, 3 (2007), no.1: 51, 53, 55, 62, 63, etc.

⁸ Here is rough illustration of Bartulin's *logical* reasoning: regardless of the fact that everyone can see that man is being which walks on two legs, it is possible that he is nonetheless a quadruped. And if he is a quadruped, than he probably also has a fur coat. However, Bartulin does not stop at this spectacular discovery, rather in the following pages he will continue with a sage discussion of the qualities of human fur, the means to nurture and care for it, and then conclude

warned that such syllogisms are among the classic logical fallacies. This means that Bartulin's relationship with logical reasoning has more than simply historiographic implications. However, they do not belong in this discussion, so I will not deal with them here.

But now that he has forced my hand by depriving me of the right to treat him as he deserves – that is, to ignore him – on this occasion I will not only shed light on Bartulin's vivid imagination, but also underscore his habit of making factual errors even when not using conditionals. As opposed to Bartulin, who needed several years to respond to my review, I will now use the example of his article from 2007 to cite approximately sixty (!) examples which would have, had there been time in 2008, appeared in my *statistics* of Bartulin's stubborn, merciless and endlessly brutal war with the facts.

* * *

Thus, this is how Bartulin approaches what he calls “intellectual discourse” and which I – on the journal's behalf, not Bartulin's – will not describe using the words best suited to his process. This was not a difficult task, because the errors, superficialities, imprecisions, ambiguities and outright manipulations began already on the second page of Bartulin's text.

Without any hesitation, he claimed that the first Ustasha camp was established in Bovegno (Italy),⁹ which, as it turns out, is not accurate. For the Ustasha chronicler Mijo Bzik already asserted that the first camp was established “in the north”, i.e., in Hungary.¹⁰ There can be no doubt that Bartulin – who otherwise has an acute fear of archives and source material – could not have known that in the unpublished sources held in private hands, such as the secret correspondence of Stanko Hranilović to the members of the so-called first Ustasha (military) section in the homeland (including to his imprisoned brother Marko), already mentioned “our men from Jankovac” in the spring of 1930. This turn of phrase may indicate the accuracy of Bzik's assertion. If he does not know this, Bartulin should have known about Bzik. Even though everything this Ustasha propagandist said should not be believed, a serious historian would nonetheless have mentioned and assessed his statement. I would also mention that one of the most important Ustasha propaganda publications very clearly suggests that prior to the “first Ustasha camp in Italy” there was a “real Ustasha military camp” that was located “across the Drava”, in Hungary.¹¹ The importance of this formulation, which was probably also formulated by Bzik,

by observing that the human fur trade is quite lucrative. And then to top it off, he will be shocked that other scholars were unable to understand this until he came along.

⁹ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 50.

¹⁰ Mijo Bzik, *Ustaška pobjeda. U danima ustanka i oslobođenja* (Zagreb: Naklada Glavnog ustaškog stana, 1942), pp. 20-22.

¹¹ “Ustaški pokret u inozemstvu”, *Spomen-knjiga prve obljetnice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 10. 4. 1941. – 10. 4. 1942.*, (Zagreb: Državni izvještajni i promičbeni ured, 1942), p. 12.

is all the greater since the best known commander of this camp in Hungary, Gustav Perčec, is mentioned nowhere in it. When this book was published, the camp in Hungary, unlike Perčec's name, obviously could not be concealed any longer – and perhaps there was no desire to do so. However, for Bartulin, quite simply, none of this exists. He has no knowledge of this information, so he fails to evaluate it.

But, let us say that this oversight can be tolerated. It is different when Bartulin begins to write about the “first constitution of the Ustasha organization, written in 1932”.¹² Logically, this does not mean that the Constitution of the Ustasha - Croatian Revolutionary Organization, was amended and modified, rather without doubt it means that this organization had several constitutions. It is entirely unclear where Bartulin found a second constitution (or perhaps he thought that there were more?), because nothing like this exists.

Bartulin's claim that Italy provided refuge to the Ustasha organization during the 1930s is neither accurate nor precise,¹³ for it is incomplete, since the Ustasha organization at the time still operated in a series of other European and even transoceanic countries, and especially in Croatia. This is precisely why it managed to survive, and even become stronger during the period when the European revisionist powers (Hungary, Bulgaria and, ultimately, Italy) denied assistance.

Bartulin's implication that the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) did not seek foreign assistance¹⁴ is also inaccurate, because thousands of pages of historiographic literature have been written about the attempts of that party's leadership to obtain foreign (even Italian) assistance.

It is not true that this attitude toward foreign assistance, combined with the decision on the use of (non-)violent methods, was the key difference between the Ustashe and HSS, as Bartulin thinks.¹⁵ The key difference is the fact that the HSS leadership generally advocated reform, while the Ustashe sought the destruction of Yugoslavia.

Bartulin's assertion that Italian claims on the eastern Adriatic coast were limited to the boundaries foreseen by the secret Treaty of London of 1915 is similarly inaccurate.¹⁶ Bartulin maintains that he used Ciano's diaries. If he failed to consult any sources more serious than this, he could have at the very least read it more carefully. How did he manage to overlook the fact that in this diary (in the entry under 1 May 1941), Ciano mentioned that a circle of not

¹² N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 50.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

exactly insignificant persons in Italian political life demanded that Croatia not be “ceded” even “a centimetre” of the seacoast?¹⁷ Is this not a somewhat more than the concessions granted to Italy by the Treaty of London?

And it is obvious that the 1915 Treaty of London is not entirely clear to Bartulin. At the time, Italy was promised considerable concessions in Croatia, as well as in Montenegro and Albania.¹⁸ A vast majority of Italian politicians, and especially military leaders, wanted more across the board, and they very reluctantly settled for less (Mussolini: “*Io non posso essere rinunciatore!*”). It is interesting that Italy obtained much more in Albania and Montenegro in 1939-1941 than promised by the Treaty of London, while in Croatia it obtained – much less.

What prevents Bartulin from seeing these facts? And, if he had bothered to notice them, would this have had any impact on his conclusions?

It is a blatant falsification of the facts to reduce – as Bartulin does – the Ustasha techniques of struggle to terrorism.¹⁹ Just as Bartulin is entitled to utilize the term employed by the Yugoslav kingdom’s propaganda machine, and even – if he so desires – identify with it, so too are readers entitled to draw certain conclusions from his terminology.²⁰ However, when using this term, a serious historian would note that in their foundational documents (number 8 of the Ustasha Principles) the Ustasha wrote that the Croatian nation has the right to achieve their independent state “by all means, including force of arms”, which means that they did not limit themselves solely to violent methods, but rather indicated that the latter were acceptable. A serious historian would have also cited the entire series of appeals, memoranda, and petitions which Pavelić and his associates – just like the leaders of the HSS – submitted to the League of Nations and many European governments, regularly calling for the application of democratic principles, the holding of plebiscites and respect for the right to self-determination, which always – without exception – fell on deaf ears.²¹ Violence was thus not the first choice, but rather a course dictated by necessity. An honest individual would have mentioned that in the documents compiled by Pavelić

¹⁷ Galeazzo Ciano, *Tagebücher 1939-1943*, 1. 5. 1941. (Bern, 1946), pp. 316-317.

¹⁸ For the text of the Treaty of London, see: *Jadransko pitanje na Konferenciji mira u Parizu. Zbirka akata i dokumenata*. Collected and published by Ferdo Šišić (Zagreb, 1920), doc. 1, pp. 5-9.

¹⁹ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, pp. 50-51.

²⁰ As we know, the use of the term “terrorism” for a national liberation struggle reflects not only the national/political stance of the person using said term, but also depends on the success or failure of that struggle. Jewish, Irish, Palestinian and other freedom fighters were “terrorists” until they became notable statesmen, and sometimes even Nobel Peace Prize Laureates.

²¹ For more on these appeals and memoranda, see Ante Pavelić, *Aus dem Kampfe um den selbstständigen Staat Kroatien. Einige Dokumente und Bilder* (Vienna, 1931), pp. 95-125; Rudolf Horvat, *Hrvatska na mučilištu* (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 447-451; Marko Sinovčić, *N. D. H. u svietlu dokumenata*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 91-94; Mario Jareb, *Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine*, pp. 107-108, etc.

and his associates, they stressed hundreds of times that Yugoslavia was a threat to Europe's peace, and that the establishment of a Croatian state was a prerequisite for that peace.²² Finally, an honest individual would have emphasized that even after a series of armed actions, Pavelić reiterated that "no reasonable person rejects regular and peaceful means of action and struggle..."; but their value could be assessed in relation to the realistic prospects for success in achieving the ultimate objective: an independent Croatia.²³

Bartulin's claim that Pavelić met with an Italian politician named "Roberto Forges D'Avanzati" in 1927 is a fabrication,²⁴ for this individual's name was Davanzati. The relevant literature contains differing interpretations of this meeting and its content, so a serious historian would have mentioned them at the very least, for he/she would know that Bogdan Krizman not only cited selectively, but that he also not infrequently forged sources.²⁵ However, even Krizman, as opposed to Bartulin, was sufficiently honest to recount the source document, which indicates that in his conversation with Davanzati, Pavelić stressed that he came privately (and not as a representative of any political party) and that he was not seeking any aid. Anyone who suggests differently belittles him-/herself by doing so.²⁶

Bartulin certainly fails to mention this so he can continue his manipulations based on forgeries.

It is utter nonsense to claim that the Ustasha wanted to achieve "at least formal reality of an independent Croatian state"²⁷ because independence may be real or formal (apparent) but it cannot be "formally real".

²² Pavelić's program article "Uspostava hrvatske države, trajni mir na Balkanu" (1929) was published in several newspapers, and possibly also as a separate brochure (M. Jareb, *Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine*, pp. 108-110)

²³ A. Pavelić, "Oslobodjenje", *Nezavisna Hrvatska Država. Godišnjak 1934*. Mile Budak, ed., s. l., s. a. [Berlin, 1933 or 1934], p. 22.

²⁴ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 51.

²⁵ As. [A. Pavelić], "Značenje i uloga emigracije", *Hrvatska* (Buenos Aires), no. 2 (78), 20 Jan. 1951; *Ibid.*, *Doživljaji II* (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 141-142; *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, ser. VII, Vol. V (Rome, 1967), doc. 273, 286, 313 and 324, pp. 270-271, 280, 302-305, 317-318; Jere Jareb, "Šest dokumenata o prvom dodiru dra Ante Pavelića s talijanskom vladom 1927", *Hrvatska revija*, 20 (1970), no. 4 (80): 1165-1168; B. Krizman, *Ante Pavelić i ustaše* (Zagreb, 1978), pp. 12-16; Vjekoslav Vrančić, *Branili smo Državu. Uspomene, osvrti i doživljaji*, 1 (Barcelona-Munich, 1985), pp. 275-281; T. Jonjić, "Povijesno-politički okvir postanka ustaškog pokreta", (1), *Hrvatska obzorja* (Split, 2001), no. 2: 386-402; M. Jareb, *Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine*, p. 40; Stjepan Matković, *Izabrani portreti pravaša* (Zagreb, 2011), pp. 178-179.

²⁶ This sentence (previously published by J. Jareb in the cited article!) was published again in B. Krizman, *Ante Pavelić i ustaše*, p. 12. However, Krizman, in his pro-Yugoslav fervour and lack of historiographic objectivity, was *clever* enough to refrain from comparing this memorandum with similar documents sent to the Italians before and after Pavelić by other (not only émigré) Croatian politicians, including Stjepan Radić, August Košutić and Vladko Maček.

²⁷ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 51.

Bartulin falsely claims that Pavelić exclusively saw the following alternative: Croatia as a part of Yugoslavia under Serbian hegemony, or statehood in cooperation with Italy,²⁸ since he also petitioned the League of Nations and the European public in general, and concluded agreements with the Bulgarians (Sofia Declaration), Hungarians (Hungarian Revisionist League) and the Albanians (Kosovo Committee), all with the objective of creating Croatian state independence. It is therefore untrue that he wanted to achieve this objective only in an alliance with Italy, rather he was prepared to accept anyone's assistance.

When speaking of the "Little Entente" and its members,²⁹ Bartulin forgot that after March 1939 there was no Czechoslovakia, so its weakening (or rather disappearance), as well as the disappearance of the "Little Entente" could not have influenced German policy in the final two years prior to establishment of the NDH.

It is entirely untrue that Pavelić sent the document entitled the 'Croatian Question' (*Hrvatsko pitanje; Die kroatische Frage*) to the German government.³⁰ This document was sent to Prof. Carl von Loesch, with the request that he pass it along "at the right place at the right time".³¹ Von Loesch was never a member of the German government.

Bartulin's assertion on the same page (!) that the German foreign ministry did not receive this document until April 1941³² typifies his method of playing fast and loose with the facts. Thus, he first claimed that the document was sent to the government, then he said the ministry did not receive it for a full five years. This means that Bartulin has no idea that the foreign ministry was also a part of the government, or perhaps he is suggesting that the package travelled from Italy to Berlin for almost five years, or, in his attempt at manipulation he meant to say that the German government received the document in 1936, but only forwarded it to the foreign ministry five years later?

Is there any sense in this nonsense?

This is why it is entirely futile to expect someone like Bartulin to describe the circumstances in which Pavelić compiled this document, or to mention that in the mid-1930s he made vain attempts to move to Switzerland or move the bulk of his activity to Belgium.³³ Naturally, Bartulin does not mention that

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 52.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ M. Jareb, *Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine*, p. 430.

³² N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 52.

³³ J. J. Sadkovich, *Italija i ustaše 1927.-1937.*, p. 79., 192., 303.; B. Krizman, *Ante Pavelić i ustaše*, p. 295. Naturally, in his manipulations, Bartulin did not mention that the first death sentence against Pavelić was pronounced in mid-1929, so this fact alone limited not only the possibility of him settling down but also his freedom of movement.

this document by Pavelić remained unknown to the public and even his adherents before the spring of 1941, while it was only published in the Croatian language the next year, in 1942,³⁴ for this would lead a reader of even middling intelligence to the conclusion that it was not intended for the ideological/political indoctrination of adherents of the Ustasha movement.

To be sure, Bartulin passes over all of this in silence in order to construct his thesis on the Ustasha ideological dependence on the National Socialists.

Why did he not apply an analogous procedure to Pavelić's multiple and fruitless appeals to the League of Nations? Why did he not derive from this the conclusion that Pavelić thus wanted to orient his adherents to a democratic way of thinking and acting, but that the so-called democratic forces ignored Croatian appeals and instead supported the dictatorial Yugoslav regime, by this very act limiting the room for manoeuvre and selection of methods for struggle by Croatian nationalists? Would this suggestion contain less logic? Is it possible that this is precisely why Bartulin disregards these appeals and attempts, and precisely why he insists upon "terrorism" as the key, and perhaps sole method of the Ustasha struggle?

And alongside this demonstration of his inability to differentiate between cause and effect, Bartulin's factual errors keep coming, as though tumbling from a conveyor belt.

He does not appear to know that during the period of Hitler's rule there was no such thing called Soviet Russia,³⁵ because no such geographic term ever existed, while east of Poland as of 30 December 1922 there was a state called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

It would have been good if Bartulin had known that a state called Yugoslavia was not formed in 1918,³⁶ rather this name was given in 1929 to a state which was until then called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes".³⁷

Bartulin imagines that the coup d'état in March 1941 toppled "the government of Prince Pavle Karadorđević",³⁸ although Pavle Karadorđević was never the prime minister, so "his government" could not have been toppled.

Also scarcely convincing is Bartulin's contention that in April 1941 Slavko Kvaternik was the 'unofficial head' of the Ustasha movement in the homeland.³⁹ If it can even be said that this section of the Ustasha movement had an 'unof-

³⁴ M. Jareb, *Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine*, p. 430.

³⁵ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 52.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

³⁷ In the original: Kraljevstvo Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca from 1918 to 1921 and Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca from 1921 to 1929.

³⁸ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 52.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

ficial head', then one can say that from mid-1938 such a position would have been held by writer and politician Mile Budak, who did not participate directly in the proclamation of the state because he was in the hospital at the time. Budak's status in this regard was derived from his formal post as deputy leader [*doglavnik*] (since 1935), as well as his reputation and the fact that since 1939 he was editor of the Zagreb-based weekly *Hrvatski narod*, the central Ustasha publication, and the fact that on 13 April 1941, something of an interim government was formed (the 'Croatian state leadership') which was not headed by Kvaternik, but rather by Budak.⁴⁰

Bartulin fabricates that Pavelić, during his meeting with Mussolini in March 1941, agreed to concede parts of the Croatian coast so that in return he would be installed as the "leader" of the Croatian state.⁴¹ Much has been written about the two meetings between Mussolini and Pavelić (in March and April 1941), and I have written quite extensively about this topic as well, analyzing documents and the testimony of their contemporaries.⁴² This is why I invite Bartulin – who simply confabulates about the circumstances surrounding the proclamation of the NDH and the Karlovac conversation between Pavelić and Edmund Veessenmayer (not understanding the context, not knowing the facts, depending on unreliable sources and even then demonstrating the inability to correctly transcribe the work of others) – to offer evidence for his assertion.

It should be incidentally noted that it is typical of Bartulin's manipulative methods that, in the brief description of that Karlovac meeting between Pavelić and Veessenmayer, he apparently only mentions as an aside that the latter was "a German with SS rank",⁴³ even though Veessenmayer's post in the SS was entirely irrelevant to this meeting. However, it has blatantly obvious implications in Bartulin's *scholarly* method: it is important that Pavelić spoke to a member of the SS, but Bartulin never mentions that he and other Croatian politicians (including, therefore, Ustashe) also contacted democratic politicians and democratic organizations.

Another complete fabrication without any supporting evidence is that Hitler was at least partially sympathetic to the establishment of the Croatian state due to the so-called Gothic theory of Croat origins,⁴⁴ because – first – this

⁴⁰ This is also indirectly indicated by the fact that Budak, on behalf of Croatian nationalists (Ustashe), occasionally paid visits to the Zagreb Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, that groups of Croatian nationalists sent their protests specifically to him (such as the notable protest concerning the rumours of partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina), and that Slavko Kvaternik, in contacts with Veessenmayer, stressed that he had authorization to act from Budak. Thus, not even Kvaternik's activities on 10-13 April, including the enactment of certain laws and the appointment of the Croatian State Leadership, does not supersede Budak's leading role.

⁴¹ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 53.

⁴² T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.* (Zagreb, 2000), pp. 288-296.

⁴³ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 53.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

theory was never the official theory of the Ustasha movement nor the NDH,⁴⁵ and second – Hitler did not favour the establishment of a Croatian state at all, rather he viewed its emergence as unwanted and unexpected.⁴⁶

Bartulin's stance on chronology is demonstrated by the fact that as support for his fabrication he cites Hitler's alleged words in July 1941 (thus, in the period *after* the Croatian state was proclaimed). And understandably, he never posed this question: if the Croats wanted to present themselves as Goths to the Germans, why then in a propaganda publication intended for German readers, did one author (Lovre Katić) claim that the Croats were a people of Iranian origin who came into contact with the Goths in the fourth century and, under strong Slavic influence, soon became a single nation, while another author (Milovan Gavazzi) claimed that the Croats were the inheritors of the Carpathian Slavic culture?⁴⁷ This publication was printed by the Croatian Publishing and Bibliographic Department (Hrvatski izdavački bibliografski zavod – HIBZ) “at the order of the State Information and Publicity Office under the governmental Presidency”,⁴⁸ which probably means that it was published at Pavelić's behest and under this supervision, and certainly with his knowledge.

On the eve of the Second World War (or ever at all during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries!), Trogir was not, nor is it today, among the ten largest Croatian sea ports.⁴⁹ This is why it would be unclear why Bartulin contends that it was among the “main ports”,⁵⁰ if we did not know the purpose of his manipulation: the territory grabbed by Italy in 1941 had to be as large as possible, so if it was not in fact large enough, then Bartulin enlarged it by resorting to – a confabulation.

He also confabulates that on 12 April 1941, Hitler talked to the “newly-appointed German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau”,⁵¹ even though Glaise von Horstenau was only conferred this title on 1 November 1942.⁵² Until then he was only a “German general in Zagreb”.

⁴⁵ Cf. M. Jareb, “Jesu li Hrvati postali Goti? Odnos ustaša i vlasti Nezavisne Države Hrvatske prema neslavenskim teorijama o podrijetlu Hrvata”, *Spomenica dr. Jere Jareba. Časopis za suvremenu povijest* (hereinafter: ČSP), 40 (2008), no. 3: 869-882.

⁴⁶ For more, see T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, passim.

⁴⁷ *Kroatien in Wort und Bild*, Bd. 1.: *Kroatien* (Zagreb, 1941), p. 38, 53.

⁴⁸ *Spomen-knjiga prve obljetnice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 10.4.1941.-10.4.1942.*, p. 177.

⁴⁹ Cf. Todor Radivojević, *Jugoslavija (za osmi razred srednjih škola)*, 8th ed. (Belgrade, 1939), pp. 170-174; *Statistički godišnjak 1940*, “Kraljevina Jugoslavija – Opšta državna statistika”, bk. X (Belgrade 1941), p. 202, 206; Zvonimir Dugački (ed.), *Zemljopis Hrvatske. Opći dio. Drugi svezak* (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 587-591; Zvonimir Lušić, Serdo Kos, “Glavni plovidbeni putovi na Jadranu”, *Naše more*, 56 (2006), no. 5-6: 198-205.

⁵⁰ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 54.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁵² Ladislaus Hory, Martin Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat* (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 58.; T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, p. 390.

Only uncritical writers can claim that on 11 April 1941 Mussolini placed before Pavelić a demand for the cities on the Dalmatian coast with an expressly Italian character.⁵³ There is no evidence for this except a subsequent claim by a single witness (F. Anfuso) who had reasons to be biased (and who made no attempt to conceal this bias, manifested in the appellations with which he honoured the Croatian representatives). However, as Vjekoslav Vrančić pointed out a few decades ago, not a single serious historian gave Anfuso any credence, and he himself showed that elementary logic and the course of events refuted the claims of this witness.⁵⁴

However, there are no facts nor logic for Bartulin, as utility is the sole criteria that he applies: whatever supports his constructs is fact, whatever challenges them does not exist.

Another of Bartulin's typical imprecisions is when he claims that Italy held Istria, Rijeka, Zadar and the islands of Cres, Lošinj and Palagruža under occupation already after the First World War.⁵⁵ An entire series of errors is contained in that single sentence! For Bartulin demonstrates that he does not know that Kastav is a part of Istria, although under the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) it was accorded to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. My Christian mercy could compel me to forgive him this, just as I could forgive his ignorance of those few villages around Zadar and several small islets that he forgot, but I cannot forgive him for a 50 km² island just like that: this individual wants to be a scholar, writes about Croatian-Italian relations between the World Wars, but does not know that the island of Lastovo was also ceded to Italy under the Treaty of Rapallo, nor that Rijeka and its environs formally constituted an independent state until the conclusion of the Rome Treaties in 1924, after which this area was incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy!⁵⁶

He knows none of this.

Besides being something even non-historians should know, these facts are not unimportant to the history of the Ustasha movement – with which Bartulin purports to deal as a *scholar* – for Lastovo (like Zadar and Rijeka) served as a base for Ustasha activity, and it was there, by all accounts, that contact with the Ustasha was established by Peter Oreb, who made a failed attempt on the life of King Aleksandar in December 1933.⁵⁷

⁵³ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 54, note 25.

⁵⁴ V. Vrančić, *Branili smo Državu*, 1, pp. 287-305; T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 295-296.

⁵⁵ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 54.

⁵⁶ *Rapallski ugovor. Zbirka dokumenata*. Selected and edited by Vojislav M. Jovanović (Zagreb, 1950), doc. 46, pp. 41-45.

⁵⁷ Ante Moškov, *Pavelićeva doba*. Prep. by Petar Požar (Split, 1999), p. 23, 83, 153, 177.

Is there even a point in attempting to explain to such an individual something even more complex and intellectually challenging, i.e., the content of the term *occupation* and its legal and political meaning? For the *de facto* status of these areas (occupation) was legalized in Rapallo in 1920, so the aforementioned parts of the Eastern Adriatic seaboard were no longer occupied, rather they became integral parts of the Kingdom of Italy, except for the provisional state of Rijeka, which only existed as such – as noted above – for not quite four years afterward. To be sure, certain other areas were under Italian occupation for a time, albeit not those specified by Bartulin, but these other areas went to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Treaty of Rapallo.

These are not trivial matters, but they are matters which Bartulin obviously does not understand, so it comes as no surprise that he completely fails to understand the military/political and state/legal course of events in April 1941.

At that time, Germany and its allies attacked and occupied the state which was called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, so Italian forces in the territory of the newly-proclaimed NDH had the status of an occupation army until 18. May 1941. After this, they had the status of a garrison force in the territory of the NDH in the international legal sense, and they retained this status until September 1943, regardless of the fact that they very often behaved like an occupation force. It simultaneously follows from this that the Croatian side in the negotiations with Italy in April and May 1941 did not have the status of a stable, internationally recognized state with clearly delineated borders, rather it had the negotiating status of an emerging state, which means that it was incomparably internationally legally, politically, militarily and economically weaker.⁵⁸

Bartulin's identically superficial approach comes to the fore even when he claims that according to the Rome agreements of 1941 "some autonomy" was foreseen for Split and the island of Korčula.⁵⁹ No such autonomy was foreseen, rather Croatian civilian administration was stipulated, and the problem is that Bartulin does not distinguish between these two very different things. If he had asked some passer-by on the streets of Split, he probably would have received a more precise response.

Also inaccurate is Bartulin's claim that three agreements were signed in Rome on 18 May 1941,⁶⁰ for at the time a considerable number of documents were compiled, of which three were called treaties or agreements, while a fourth one ("Concluding Protocol") also has the character of a treaty, for it stipulates

⁵⁸ I have discussed the entire series of foreign and domestic political reasons dictating the Croatian position at length in the book T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 343-389, ff.

⁵⁹ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", 55, note 29.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 55.

rights and obligations for the signatories.⁶¹ Something like this could never have happened with a serious historian like, say, Ljubo Boban.⁶² But, Bartulin is not capable of even copying from people that are more adept than him.

It is inaccurate that Mussolini agreed to Croatian sovereignty “over Bosnia”,⁶³ for Herzegovina also shared the same fate as Bosnia. Moreover, it was precisely with reference to the eastern Croatian border in Herzegovina (and not in Bosnia) that the Croatian-Italian Treaty on Establishment of the Border between the Independent State of Croatia and Montenegro was concluded on 27 October 1941. Bartulin, naturally, knows nothing of this.

The Italians supported the Serbian Chetniks practically in the entire territory south of the demarcation line, and not only “throughout their entire zone of occupation”,⁶⁴ but Bartulin, as we have seen, does not distinguish between an occupation and garrison zone, nor does he know that the legal status of the area south of the demarcation line changed, so it is roughly all the same to him.

That Bartulin not only finds history, but also geography, challenging is shown by his contention that Croatia was not in the “first ring” of German influence, which - according to him - encompassed “the entire Danube valley”.⁶⁵ In other words, Bartulin believes that Croatia is not a Danubian country. If the Danube constituted part of the border of the NDH (and it did!), how then was Croatia not even partially in “the entire Danube valley”? For example, the Grand County of Vuka and its administrative seat, the city of Vukovar – which is located on the banks of the Danube – were part of the NDH. This river formed the Croatian border not only upstream (to the mouth of the Drava River), but also downstream, almost 140 kilometres to Zemun, which was also part of the NDH. If the entire “Danube valley” was in Bartulin’s “first ring” of German influence, then how was that part of Croatia, for which the Danube formed an almost 200 kilometre-long border, not in the Danube valley?

One precludes the other, but Bartulin completely fails to see this. This is why it almost goes without saying that Bartulin’s knowledge of the military and political schemes surrounding the colloquially designated “Zemun triangle” is more than meagre.⁶⁶

⁶¹ T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, p. 476.

⁶² Lj. Boban, *Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1993.*, 47, wrote that among the Rome agreements of 1941, “three [were] particularly important...”.

⁶³ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 55, note 29.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶⁶ T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 738-751 and the sources cited therein. Incidentally, it is worthwhile mentioning that Pavelić published a discussion of the Danube valley – which includes, according not only to every geography textbook but also in his opinion, Croatia – in 1932 in several foreign languages, which was released in Croatia under the title

With a lack of criticism typical of copyists and compilers, Bartulin cites the assertion that the territories of the so-called zones 2 and 3 were already in the hands of the Yugoslav Partisans in June 1942.⁶⁷

According to Partisan sources, just prior to Christmas 1941 the Partisan movement had approximately 250 armed members in throughout Dalmatia, including the Livno region. Soon the districts of Bugojno, Glamoč and Tomislavgrad came under the jurisdiction of the Dalmatian command staff in addition to Livno. In mid-December 1941 the Partisan detachments in Croatia did not have more than 6,370 members, and the General Staff did not have any direct contacts with Slavonia, the Croatian Zagorje and Dalmatia. An interesting fact is that at the time, besides the aforementioned 250 Partisans in Dalmatia, there were, according to Partisan data, an additional three hundred or so in Slavonia, and only about thirty Partisans in the Croatian Zagorje. In the entire territory under the command of the Dalmatian Staff in mid-March 1942, the Partisans only numbered 610, while in southern Dalmatia “from Dubrovnik to Kotor” there was no Partisan movement at all up to then (and not even then).⁶⁸ According to the data of the command staff of the Fourth Operative Zone of the People's Liberation Partisan Detachments (NOPO) of Croatia (which encompassed Dalmatia and the south-west parts of Bosnia) of 1 July 1942, this Operative Zone had about 1,800 Partisans under its command. However, goodly portion of them were not armed, and among the heavier artillery this entire Operative Zone had only “a smaller grenade launcher”.⁶⁹

Zdravko Dizdar believes that at the end of 1942, the Croatian armed forces had between 148,700 and 220,000 members.⁷⁰ These forces were, in fact, deployed both north of the demarcation line and to its south, in the garrison zone – thus in the territory which Bartulin claims was largely in the hands of the Yugoslav Partisans – in which, according to Dizdar, there were approximately 220,000 Italian troops in mid-1942, and their number grew to 250,000

Ekonomska obnova podunavskih zemalja – Razoružanje – Beograd i Hrvatska (Economic Renewal of the Danubian Countries – Disarmament – Belgrade and Croatia; Zagreb, 1999).

⁶⁷ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 56, note 39. In the same context, Bartulin uncritically accepts the speculation that the foreign minister, Mladen Lorković was conducting – probably in relation to Pavelić – some sort of parallel foreign policy and a “parallel diplomatic war” against Italy in 1941/42. These subsequent conjectures by unreliable authors are not backed by original sources nor in the memoirs of contemporaries. If he had not selectively transcribed the claims of unreliable authors, Bartulin would have known that the protests against Italian pretensions and the attempts to curtail Italian influence were an integral component of overall state policy, and not just something undertaken by Lorković alone.

⁶⁸ T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 630-631, and the sources cited therein.

⁶⁹ *Narodnooslobodilačka borba u Dalmaciji, Zbornik dokumenata*, book 2, January-July 1942 (Split, 1982), doc. no. 147, pp. 363-368.

⁷⁰ Z. Dizdar, “Brojbitbeni pokazatelji odnosa vojničkih postrojbi na teritoriju Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941.-1945. godine”, *ČSP*, 28 (1996), no. 1: 171.

by the end of that year.⁷¹ Dizdar believes that in the entire territory of the NDH in mid-1942 there were approximately 20,000 Partisans, and that a goodly portion of them were north of the demarcation line.⁷² According to Velimir Ivetić, who dealt with the Yugoslav data *less gallantly* than Dizdar, in mid-August 1942, there were 12,990 Partisans in the NOPO of Croatia, of whom there were roughly 1,800 Partisans south of the demarcation line in Dalmatia, 2,138 in the Croatian Littoral, Gorski Kotar and Istria, and 2,052 in Lika.⁷³

Whether Dizdar, who uses *very rounded numbers* to suggest that in mid-1942 there were ten to fifteen thousand Yugoslav Partisans south of the demarcation line, or Ivetić, who claims that there were only 5,990 of them and perhaps a few thousands more in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is right is all the same to this discussion. For what is important here is the following: does Bartulin truly think that six or twelve thousand Partisans, who generally did not have modern means of communication nor heavy weapons (a single light grenade-launcher!), were able to hold “in their hands” roughly 40,000 km² of hilly and forested terrain, on which at least the (majority!) Croatian population was not particularly fond of them, and on which close to 300,000 enemy soldiers were stationed at the same time?⁷⁴ Does he truly believe that something like this can be asserted in a serious discussion? Or does he finally comprehend that historiography is not simply copying, and that even copying requires some critical thought?

Let us go on, for Bartulin’s superficiality has not been exhausted in the above cases.

Contrary to his claims, in April 1941 Pavelić did not meet with anyone named Weesenmayer,⁷⁵ but he did meet with Edmund Veessenmayer. Even though Italy was truly the weaker partner, it is not true that in 1941 it was “completely subordinate” to Hitler’s Germany,⁷⁶ so it would be good if Bartulin had explained in advance what he meant, and then offered some evidence for his contention. Does this mean that in 1941 Italy was a German colony or protectorate? Or perhaps it means that Italy was implementing German, and not Italian, policy? For Bartulin has a tendency to proclaim a single analysis produced by the NDH foreign affairs ministry – and such ministries produce

⁷¹ Ibid., 173.

⁷² Ibid., 175.

⁷³ Velimir Ivetić, “Srbi u antifašističkoj borbi na područjima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945. godine”, *Vojnoistorijski glasnik*, no. 1 (Belgrade, 1995), pp. 154-155.

⁷⁴ The fact that the Yugoslav Partisans proclaimed uninhabited areas “liberated” may to some extent be compared to people who manage to register their “property rights” to Mars or Saturn in some countries. This comparison did not originate with me: it was made by the Partisan general and Yugoslav diplomat Vladimir Velebit. In 1998 he wrote something similar about the appearance of “liberated territories” (T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, p. 636).

⁷⁵ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 58.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 59.

dozens, and even hundreds of similar documents on a daily basis – as representative of overall state policy. If one such analysis, which emerged on 11 September 1944, indicates that the NDH at that time (1944!) must be the Central European bulwark against Italian imperialism,⁷⁷ how was it then possible that in 1941 Italy was already “completely subordinate” to Germany. Mussolini's Italy was incomparably weaker in 1944 than it was in 1941, so if it was “completely subordinate” to Germany in 1941, how could it have endangered “Central Europe” in 1944? That is Bartulin's idea of chronology and logic.

It is completely untrue that the Ustasha preferred Croatia as “a ‘confederated province’ within a German Europe”,⁷⁸ so it would be useful if Bartulin had backed this assertion with even a single piece of evidence. When and where did the Ustasha ever speak of Croatia in any other way except as an independent state?

It is utter nonsense to claim that Pavelić believed that only “a militarily strong, racially pure Croatian state, centred in the ‘Dinaric heartland’ of Bosnia” and closely allied with Germany could preserve Croatian independence, and only after establishment of just such a state could Dalmatia be restored to Croatia.⁷⁹ Except in his imagination, can Bartulin find any evidence for this? Did Pavelić, on 10 September 1943 upon the annulment of the Rome agreements, say that this apparent prerequisite had been fulfilled: a militarily strong and racially pure Croatian state? Was its centre in Bosnia?

Why does Bartulin concoct such notions? Who has any use for such fabrications, since they have nothing to do with scholarship?

It is not true that Eugen Dido Kvaternik was “the chief of all Ustasha police and security forces” in early June 1941,⁸⁰ for Kvaternik was appointed director of public order and safety on 18 April 1941, while on 4 May 1941 he became state secretary in the Internal Affairs Ministry, which were state, and not party (Ustasha) functions. Bartulin makes no distinctions here. Even when Kvaternik was appointed the Ustasha supervisory commander of the Ustasha Supervisory Agency (UNS) on 23. August 1941, which was established seven days earlier (on 16 August 1941), he did not formally oversee the entire police and security apparatus in the NDH, even though he attempted to acquire such authority.⁸¹ The UNS did, in fact, outlive Kvaternik's command, but even as long as it existed, this agency was not superior to the military intelligence service in the Croatian Home Guard Ministry, which also means that Kvaternik

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 59.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 61.

⁸⁰ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 60.

⁸¹ V. Vrančić, *Dr. Andrija Artuković pred sjeveroameričkim sudom* (Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 76-77, 79-80.

was not superior to it. Also, neither the UNS nor Kvaternik were placed above the repression/security apparatus nor the regular courts, nor even the analogous Ustasha Disciplinary and Criminal Court.

In other words, Bartulin is making things up.

In fabricating, as well as in uncritical transcribing, he is tireless. He thus states that the Ustashe constantly claimed that “Dalmatia had been sacrificed” in the interest of state independence.⁸²

I am unfamiliar with any instances of the Ustashe saying precisely this, but even if they had done so, a scholar should point out that they could not have made such a claim with any grounds, for most of Dalmatia remained within the NDH (more precisely: it went to a new state in the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration). This means in the creation of the Croatian state, Dalmatia was not sacrificed, rather only a (smaller!) part of it. Namely, during its second period under Austrian administration (1814-1918), the province of Dalmatia – which later became synonymous with Dalmatia in the geographic sense, regardless of subsequent changes in political borders – covered an area of 12,840 km².⁸³ The Croatian-Italian border in compliance with the Rome agreements of 1941 was never actually delineated in the field, but it is estimated that at the time approximately 5,400 km² went to Italy. However, this surface also pertains to its gains in Istria (Kastav!), Gorski Kotar and in the Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia (including Boka Kotorska and the Konavle region).⁸⁴ In other words, Italy gained approximately 3,800 km² in Dalmatia.⁸⁵

⁸² N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 61.

⁸³ According to: Dinko Foretić, “O ekonomskim prilikama u Dalmaciji u drugoj polovici XIX stoljeća do Prvog svjetskog rata”, *Hrvatski narodni preporod u Dalmaciji i Istri, Zbornik*, ed. Jakša Ravlić, Matica hrvatska, 1969, 9, p. 39. The same area is cited by Šime Peričić, “Glavne značajke gospodarstva Dalmacije od 1835. do 1848.”, *Dalmacija u narodnom preporodu 1835-1848. Prilozi sa znanstvenog skupa u Zadru od 8. do 9. svibnja 1986, održanog u povodu 150. obljetnice jubileja Ilirskog pokreta i 30. obljetnice Filozofskog fakulteta u Zadru, Zadarska revija*, no. 4-5/1987. Zadar, 1987, p. 315 (29). There are negligibly different data. Thus M. Lorković, *Narod i zemlja Hrvata*. (Zagreb, 1939), p. 141, claimed that in 1818-1910 the territory of Dalmatia encompassed 12,934 km², while in the entry “Dalmacija”, *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. 4. Zagreb, 1942, p. 441, he claimed that Dalmatia has 12,829 km². It is possible that this difference was due to the fact that Rab, normally considered a Kvarner rather than Dalmatian island, was part of Austro-Hungarian Dalmatia. In 1929 it was separated from the Split district and attached to the Sava Banovina. In any case, after the territorial losses which Croatia incurred in post-war Yugoslavia, Dalmatia as a part of the Socialist Republic of Croatia had an area of 11,758 km². (*Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije*, ed. Ivan Bertić. Zagreb, 1987, p. 123).

⁸⁴ T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942*, p. 476. Data cited from: Holm Sundhaussen, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens im nationalsozialistischen Grossraum 1941-1945. Das Scheitern einer Ausbeutungsstrategie* (Stuttgart, 1983), p. 82.

⁸⁵ Adding the surfaces of the districts and parts of districts which went to the Kingdom of Italy results in roughly the same number, but a precise determination is not possible, because the border – as mentioned – remained unestablished on the ground. But, for example, the island of Krk alone has a surface of 410 km².

Thus, if he claims that the Ustasha declared that Croatia had lost (more accurately: did not obtain) all of Dalmatia, then Bartulin must show that they said precisely that, and then point out that the claim is not entirely correct, since under the Rome agreements two thirds of this Croatian province went to Croatia. However, the difference between two thirds, or 7,000-8,000 square kilometres, does not mean much to Bartulin's *scholarly* approach, for this surface is negligible: it is two, but not three, times larger than today's surface area of Luxembourg! To a thorough-going scholar like Bartulin – *quantité négligeable*.

For Bartulin, facts exist only to be ignored.

Also completely unfounded is his contention that Pavelić, at least temporarily, sacrificed “hundreds of thousands of Dalmatian Croats”.⁸⁶

This figure assumes that it was certainly a case of over 300,000 Croats. However, after the Rome agreements, Italy obtained territory in which – according to Sundhaussen – approximately 280,000 Croats lived.⁸⁷ However, this encompassed the entire annexed territory (and not just its Dalmatian part!) and estimates of its population before the war, which depended on the last pre-war census conducted in 1931, but did not take into account that a high number of people had moved to Zagreb or other parts of Croatia prior to the onset of the war, and particularly after it broke out.⁸⁸ Bearing in mind that in 1940 the estimated population of Sušak was 37,034, Krk 20,043, Kastav 10,535, Rab 14,598, and Čabar 10,223,⁸⁹ which together accounts for 92,433 people, then – even if we leave out the remaining non-Dalmatian areas which Italy annexed on 18 May 1941 – it is entirely clear that less than 200,000 Dalmatian Croats came under Italian sovereignty in May 1941. This is why it is entirely baseless to speak of the sacrifice of “hundreds of thousands”.

In other words, Bartulin – like all manipulators – has a very casual stance on numbers, and thus his political and ethical (dis)qualifications should not be taken seriously, regardless of whether it is a matter of his assessment of the ethical responsibility of individuals and groups for territorial solutions,⁹⁰ or for the fate of populations. For under the Treaty of Rapallo (1920), Italy expanded

⁸⁶ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 63.

⁸⁷ H. Sundhaussen, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens im nationalsozialistischen Grossraum 1941-1945*, p. 82

⁸⁸ Just how deceptive common notions of “hundreds of thousands” can be is shown by the far more scrupulous approach of Krunoslav Draganović, “Hrvatske biskupije (Sadašnjost kroz prizmu prošlosti)”, *Croatia sacra. Arhiv za crkvenu poviest Hrvata. 11-12/1943.*, no. 20-21. *Svečani broj u čast prve godišnjice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, ed. K. Draganović (Zagreb, 1943), pp. 78-130. Draganović, as is known, analyzed church data and edited *Opći šematizam Katoličke crkve u Jugoslaviji* (Sarajevo, 1939).

⁸⁹ Data from: *Statistički godišnjak 1940*, pp. 80-82.

⁹⁰ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 63

its sovereignty over 10,000 km² of Croatian and Slovenian territory, and over a half million new Croats and Slovenes came into its borders.

Did Bartulin anywhere proclaim the signatories of this agreement criminals against their own (Croatian) people? If not, why? Perhaps because this territorial sacrifice was made on the altar of Yugoslavia? After the collapse of the NDH, the entire territory of Austro-Hungarian Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Srijem and Boka Kotorska were carved out from Croatia and the area of the remainder of Croatia was cut into two sections at Neum and Klek Peninsula. Did Bartulin somewhere, in his *scholarly* fervour, proclaim the participants in this demarcation criminals against their own (Croatian) people? If not, why? Perhaps again because these territorial losses were (again) carried forward in order for Yugoslavia to exist?

And when Bartulin expresses disgust for Pavelić due to his responsibility for the deaths of tens of thousands of his innocent co-nationals killed in the massacres perpetrated by the Yugoslav Partisans after the surrender at Bleiburg in May 1945,⁹¹ at first glance this seems to be his interpretation, which would not qualify for my list of Bartulin's factual errors. But only at first glance. For this theme is interesting and it opens a series of different questions and potential interpretations. However, since Bartulin formulates it conclusively and as a generally-known fact, then it necessarily follows that his assessment assumes a minimum of two facts in the logical, legal and ethical senses. First, Pavelić may have been responsible for that massacre, if he had known or had to have known that the Western Allies would, contrary to international law, surrender Croatian soldiers and civilians to the slaughterhouse of the Yugoslav authorities; and second, if he had known or had to have known that the latter would conduct killings indiscriminately and without conducting any, and particularly not fair, trials.

So I am interested in Bartulin's explanation: was Pavelić aware of these facts or could he have been aware of them, and if so, how did Bartulin arrive at such a conclusion? Does he believe that Pavelić held séances at which he consulted with the Almighty? Or perhaps Bartulin arrived at this conclusion on the basis of practical knowledge on the ethics and legality of conduct of the Anglo-American and Yugoslav armed forces? Why is Bartulin afraid to pose this question? Is he incapable of thinking logically, or does he want to avoid being *politically incorrect*? Or perhaps he simply believes that scholarship consists of uncritically transcribing the confabulations of others?

His assertion that Pavelić criticized Dalmatian Croatian nationalists, while he was allegedly also something of a regionalist, primarily interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other Dinaric regions, should similarly not be taken seriously.⁹² It certainly does show that Bartulin does not know that Ustasha

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 62.

propaganda not infrequently underscored Dalmatia as the “heart of the Croatian state” and the “purest Croatian region”.⁹³ Even worse, it shows that Bartulin does not know that all of Dalmatia (and not perhaps just its inland section, Dalmatinska Zagora!) belongs to the Dinaric zone.⁹⁴

This is interesting for someone who built his entire *scholarly house of cards* on the alleged dichotomy between Dalmatia and the Dinaric region. But this does not stop him from writing about it while considering himself a – *scholar*.

And the assertion that Pavelić was a regionalist is simply – absurd. It can only be made by someone who has little – and erroneous at that – knowledge of Pavelić's political activity, while someone who uncritically cites such an assertion shows that he knows even less (even if he calls himself a scholar). However, even someone like that – if he were honest – would have mentioned an entire series of commands and orders issued by Pavelić aimed at preventing discord based on regional mentalities and disputes among the Ustashe in the pre-war émigré milieu. Even someone like that would have asked whether any of Pavelić's legal decrees or personal solutions contain a shred of evidence of this “regionalist” preference. Perhaps Bartulin came to this conclusion on the basis of the fact that the Dalmatian Croats were overrepresented in the political and administrative organs and in the diplomatic corps of the NDH, and particularly in its propaganda and culture, which is clearly indicated by the following names: Edo Bulat, Stijepo Perić, Branko Benzon, Nikola Rušinović, Danijel Crljen, Ivo Bogdan, Tias Mortigijja, Josip Berković, Andrija Karčić, Ivo Lendić, Antun Nizeteo, Jerko Skračić, Vinko Nikolić, Filip Lukas, Dušan Žanko, Marko Soljačić, Marko Tarle, Ante Sugja, Ivan Petrić, Luka Fertilio, Ante Bonifačić, Mirko Eterović, Ivo Guberina,

⁹³ Cf. “Naše more i obale”, *Hrvatski narod* (hereinafter: *HN*), 3 (1941), no. 64, 17 Apr. 1941, 2; “Dalmatinska Hrvatska bila je središte stare hrvatske države”, *HN*, 3 (1941), no. 65, 18 Apr. 1941, 1; “Ustaška borba u Dalmaciji. Kolijevka hrvatske države prednjači u oslobodilačkoj borbi i ustaškoj organizaciji”, *HN*, 3 (1941), no. 65, p. 18 Apr. 1941, 5; “Dalmatinski Hrvati kod Poglavnika. Poglavinik pozdravlja dalmatinske Hrvate i ističe svoju naročitu ljubav prema dalmatinskim Hrvatima”, *HN*, 3 (1941), no. 65, 18 Apr. 1941, p. 7; Ivica Katusić, “Najčišći hrvatski kraj”, *Ustaška mladež*, 1 (1941), no. 15, p. 7. Omladinski prilog *Ustaše. Vijesnika hrvatskog ustaškog oslobodilačkog pokreta*, 1 (1941), no. 19, p. 9, Nov. 1941; K. Draganović, “Hrvatske biskupije (Sadašnjost kroz prizmu prošlosti)”, o. c., p. 95, etc.

⁹⁴ T. Radivojević, *Jugoslavija*, pp. 20-35; Filip Lukas, “Geografska osnovica hrvatskoga naroda”, *Zbornik Matice Hrvatske: Hrvatskome narodu, njegovim prošlim naraštajima na spomen, sadašnjima i budućim na pobudu, o tisućoj godišnjici hrvatskog kraljevstva* (Zagreb, 1925), pp. 26-50; Lukas, “Geopolitika Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, *HN*, 3 (1941), no. 128, 2 Jun. 1941, p. 7; Lukas, “Die Geopolitik Kroatiens”, *Kroatien in Wort und Bild*, Bd. 1: *Kroatien* (Zagreb, 1941), pp. 12-14; F. Lukas– Nikola Peršić, *Zemljopis Nezavisne Države Hrvatske za više razrede srednjih škola* (Zagreb, 1941), pp. 18-22; Z. Dugački (ed.), *Zemljopis Hrvatske. Opći dio. Prvi svezak* (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 8-11 ff.; Z. Dugački, “Zemljopisni položaj Hrvatske”, *Spomen-knjiga prve obljetnice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 10.4.1941.-10.4.1942.*, p. 367; “Dalmacija”, *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. 4 (Zagreb, 1942), p. 441; Nikola Žic, *Zemljopis Nezavisne Države Hrvatske za niže razrede srednjih škola* (Zagreb, 1944), pp. 20-33; “Dinarsko gorje”, *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. 5 (Zagreb, 1945), pp. 23-25; “Dinarsko gorje”, *Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda*, vol. 2 (Zagreb, 1956), pp. 319-320.

Mate Ujević, Luka Puljiz...? Perhaps his conclusion on Pavelić's animosity toward the Dalmatian Croats is based on the fact that Pavelić selected the Dalmatian Franciscan Dionizije Juričev as his spiritual guide and confessor? Or perhaps he drew this conclusion on the basis of the fact that the national radio broadcaster (the Croatian State Radio Station) aired Dalmatian songs everyday, much to the chagrin of the Italians, and that those songs which testified to the Croatian character of the regions which Dalmatia annexed were performed publicly, and even on official occasions (among which the best known was that anthem of Split, "Marjane, Marjane...")?

But Bartulin mentions none of this.

And nothing more can be expected from someone who, without any qualifications, entirely uncritically cites Ivan Meštrović's confabulations,⁹⁵ as well as an entire series of claims made by Pavelić's opponents, both the elder and junior Kvaternik (who were both dismissed in autumn 1942, and until then were colloquially referred to as the "dynasty"),⁹⁶ and who entirely and without compunction accepts the statements made by individuals standing at the gallows,⁹⁷ and despite this wants to be considered a *scholar*. This is why I do not even dare comment on Bartulin's statement that "Pavelić was adamant that the NDH had to be led by the Dinaric 'spirit' of Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina."⁹⁸ I consider it impolite to say, much less write down what I think of this.

As we have seen, the *scholar* Bartulin does not notice the contradictions in his own statements. First he says that Pavelić and the Ustashe considered the designated king, a member of the Italian royal dynasty, as entirely irrelevant and an attempt to lessen Italian territorial aspirations in April and May 1941,⁹⁹ and then he claims that Pavelić thought he could retrieve Dalmatia with the help of

⁹⁵ For more on Meštrović's imagined depictions of this and that, including his conversation with Pavelić, see T. Jonjić, "O pokušaju osnivanja Hrvatskoga komiteta u Švicarskoj. "Diplomat-ska izvješća Senjanina Josipa Milkovića", *Senjski zbornik*, 38 (2012), pp. 262-268. Naturally, other writers before me have pointed out Meštrović's unreliability.

⁹⁶ Many émigré writers pointed out that Eugen Dido Kvaternik was a very untrustworthy witness, such as V. Vrančić, Jozo Dumandžić, M. Sinovčić and others. The latter wrote an entire book about this (*N. D. H. u svjetlu dokumenata*, 2nd ed. Zagreb, 1998). I have also pointed out Kvaternik's unreliability in my own works many times, and this was also done by others who did not have any need for Kvaternik's confabulations to back their own preconceived conclusions.

⁹⁷ There are not, in fact, any memoirs by Slavko Kvaternik, as some uncritical writers suggest, rather there are investigative documents, studies and statements which Kvaternik (probably) dictated or signed before Yugoslav communist interrogators in the hope of saving his life. These materials should therefore be approached with even greater caution than that required by memoirs. The circumstances in which these materials emerged is illuminated, for example, by Kvaternik's servile amnesty petition of 7 June 1947, in which he wrote: "I am a traitor, but not the worst".

⁹⁸ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 63.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

this manoeuvre.¹⁰⁰ Can both be true? If, after 18 May 1941 this designated king became entirely irrelevant and if absolutely no attention was paid to him, how could anything be expected of him in the subsequent period and how could anything be accomplished with his help? Actually, the idea of the king was not Croatian,¹⁰¹ but when Pavelić accepted it as a lesser evil, then a number of different ideas continued to simmer as possibilities, as demonstrated by Kerubin Šegvić's mission and a series of preserved Croatian diplomatic reports.

Bartulin claims that some kind of reception was held "at the Italian embassy in Zagreb" in 1942.¹⁰² Neither Italy nor any other state had a diplomatic mission at the embassy (*Botschaft, ambasciatta*) level in Zagreb, so Bartulin – since he is incapable of distinguishing between the ranks of diplomatic missions – could have accorded some attention to the writers and sources he transcribed. For even transcribing requires a certain critical approach. Similarly untrue is Bartulin's assertion that Croatia had established an "embassy" in Venice,¹⁰³ nor could there ever have been any sort of reception at the Croatian "embassy" in Berlin,¹⁰⁴ because the NDH did not have a mission of that rank anywhere. And not even a lower-level Croatian mission was "set up" in Venice, rather it was simply moved from Rome.

Contrary to Bartulin's claims, the Croatian professor named Ćiro Gamulin was not killed due to something he said to his students on the first anniversary of Italian rule in Split.¹⁰⁵ Had he consulted the basic sources (such as, e.g., the Croatian biographical lexicon – *Hrvatski biografski leksikon*), Bartulin would have known that Gamulin died after beatings on 17 (or 18) April 1942, while he was arrested for commenting on the anniversary of the entry of the Italian army in to Split.¹⁰⁶ Naturally, Bartulin does not distinguish between the Italian army's entry into the city and the Italian seizure of power, so he again requires instruction: the city of Split formally became a part of the Kingdom of Italy on 18 May 1941, but the Italian forces in it did not actually assume power at the time, nor on 17/18 April, but rather several days after entering the city: on 21 April 1941.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁰¹ Bartulin is obviously unaware of the fact that the idea of a personal union and similar monarchist solutions were a frequent phenomenon in Italian politics, and not only in relation to Croatia (or Albania), but also Hungary, Spain, etc. For more, see T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika*, p. 46 ff.

¹⁰² N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 64.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 65, note 85.

¹⁰⁶ *Hrvatski biografski leksikon*, vol. 4, Zagreb, 1998, 570-571, mentions only the first of these two dates!

¹⁰⁷ Cf. the report of Athos Bartolucci of April 1941, *Narodnooslobodilačka borba u Dalmaciji 1941.-1945. Zbornik dokumenata*, book 1 (Split, 1981), doc. no. 159, pp. 414.-417 and the tele-

In the context of this discussion, this means that Bartulin – again – uncritically copied somebody else's fabrications.

He is probably aware that the Sandžak was not a part of the NDH, even though this does not follow quite clearly from his text,¹⁰⁸ for the Italians killed and abused Croats and Muslims in Montenegro as well, so it is unclear as to why he mentions the Sandžak region in the context of Italian violence against Croats and Muslims in the NDH.

It would also be difficult to comprehend Bartulin's contention that the ideas of Stevan Moljević from June 1941 were among the two major causes of the Serbian genocidal massacre of Croats and Muslims (the other being revenge for Ustasha atrocities),¹⁰⁹ if we did not already know that chronology means nothing to Bartulin, and that he does not distinguish between causes and effects.

He therefore simply ignores the Serbian massacres of Croats and Muslims which preceded the establishment of Ustasha power, and thus the Ustasha atrocities and Moljević's plan, even though by all accounts several thousand were killed.¹¹⁰ One may speculate as to whether these data are completely unknown to Bartulin, or if he is attempting to amnesty Serbian crimes. Perhaps this is an attempt to support his intriguing theory that the Greater Serbian ideology was "supranational"?¹¹¹

Or perhaps the Ustasha being the first to perpetrate massacres is necessary to some of Bartulin's other ideas, so he then ignores such facts for just that reason? Perhaps these are the same reasons why he passes over in silence the "Serbs assemble!" campaign, wherein a considerable portion of the Serbian minority opposed even the provisional autonomy of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939-1941, which reoccurred in 1989-1991 in an undeniably similar fashion? Perhaps this is why Bartulin needs to ignore the fact that already as of April 1941 – regardless of any Ustasha crimes – the political representatives of the Serbian minority in Croatia forcefully, politically and militarily, supported Italian aspirations to the Eastern Adriatic seaboard, in Dalmatia (Niko Novaković-Longo and others), and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well (Novica Kraljević and others)? Does Bartulin think that it is *scholarly* to leave out this campaign in an analysis of the outbreak of the extremely savage Croatian-Serbian conflict in the territory of the NDH (including, therefore, the quite

gram from Edo Bulat of 21 April 1941 in the same collection, doc. 358, p. 783. Cf. T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 391-393 and the sources cited therein.

¹⁰⁸ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 65.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65, note 86.

¹¹⁰ A documented overview of these (earlier) mass killings and massacres, both those occurring from 1918 to 1941, and those in the April war of 1941 can be found in: Ivan Gabelica, *Blaženi Alojzije Stepinac i hrvatska država* (Zagreb, 2007), pp. 276-297, 297-312.

¹¹¹ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 50.

brutal retaliations by the Croatian side) and an assessment of its intensity? Or perhaps he thinks that it is *scholarly* to fail to notice that even after Moljević's plans, and after the Serbian genocidal massacres of Croats, both actual and formal alliance between the Chetniks and Partisan movement led by the Yugoslav Communist Party continued for a considerable time?

Even though in this context his scrupulous distinction between a part and whole (which, unfortunately, is nowhere to be seen in his description of the Rome Treaties of May 1941) is interesting, Bartulin also fabricates that in September 1943 most of Dalmatia was in Partisan hands.¹¹² He should once more pick up a ruler and take measurements, and we shall see the results at which he arrives.

The assertion that the Italians interned between 30,000 and 40,000 Croats as a part of their campaign to ethnically cleanse the annexed parts of Dalmatia¹¹³ shows that Bartulin does not know the difference between internment and confinement. If he had simply used a dictionary of foreign words – for it would be too much to expect that he would notice the difference and consult the relevant sources – he would have seen that this was a matter of confinement, which is a politically and legally different term, for internment in this context would have assumed an armed conflict (a state of war) between Croatia and Italy,¹¹⁴ but this was not the case.

Whatever Bartulin may say, it is not true that on 10 September 1943 Pavelić announced the annulment of “both the 1941 Rome agreements and the installation of Aimone as ‘King of Croatia’”,¹¹⁵ for nobody – not even Aimone di Savoia-Aosta himself – was ever installed as the king of the NDH, so there was never any need to annul this non-existent installation.

It is entirely untrue, as Bartulin claims, that Mussolini's new regime (the Italian Social Republic) refused to send an envoy to Zagreb to protest the Ustasha anti-Italian measures.¹¹⁶ Bartulin's inability to understand anything is astonishing! The newly-appointed Italian envoy Tamburini did not come to Zagreb because the Croatian government made this contingent upon Italy's (Mussolini's) explicit acknowledgement of the annulment of the Rome agreements.¹¹⁷

¹¹² Ibid., p. 66.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 65-66.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Vladimir Ibler, *Rječnik međunarodnog javnog prava* (Zagreb, 1972), p. 99.

¹¹⁵ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 66.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 66, note 90.

¹¹⁷ J. Jareb, *Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike. Povodom Mačekove autobiografije* (Buenos Aires, 1960), pp. 108-110; B. Krizman, *Ustaše i Treći Reich*, 1 (Zagreb, 1983), pp. 224-225 ff; T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 497-498. Of course, neither Bartulin nor similar *scholars* notice that at the time Mussolini could not have referred to alleged earlier, pre-war obligations on Pavelić's part and secret pacts with Italy. Nothing like this appeared even later, and they do not exist today, almost seventy years after the end of the war.

When Bartulin claims that “formerly annexed Dalmatia” became part of Croatia on 10 September 1943,¹¹⁸ does this mean he is claiming that Croatia annexed also those Dalmatian areas which became a component of Italy prior to establishment of the NDH (such as, for example, Zadar, Palagruža or the ill-fated, forgotten Lastovo)? Or does he think these areas do not belong to Dalmatia, or – most likely, – he does not think about it at all, because he simply knows none of this, so such matters do not even cross his mind as he uncritically copies the work of others. I am inclined to believe the latter explanation, for if this problem had occurred to Bartulin at all, then he would not have simply stopped at “formerly annexed Dalmatia”, rather he would have offered an answer to the questions posed above, and he would have had to say something about the fate of parts of Gorski Kotar, Kvarner, and even a small part of Istria that Italy annexed in May 1941.

Bartulin’s assertion that Germany was perceived in Croatia as its one true ally is not accurate.¹¹⁹ There were hundreds of Croatian objections to the Germans over their repression or due to the fact that German forces continued to protect the Chetniks after Italy’s fall. There were also combinations containing far-reaching German-Serbian plans to Croatia’s detriment, particularly in eastern and north-eastern Bosnia, which were prevented by Croatian resistance.¹²⁰ There are numerous examples of Croatian displeasure over the tendency of certain German circles to see a “New Europe” emerge under Germany’s explicit domination, with the erasure of national and state identities.¹²¹ Is Bartulin unaware of all this, or does he just want to engage in manipulations? Perhaps this is why he does not mention the Croatian disapproval of German plans for separate Muslim military units? Perhaps this is why he fails to mention that SS officer Wilhelm Beissner was forced to leave Croatia in spring 1942 because of anti-Ustasha plots with the marginal (and also banned in the NDH) Croatian national socialists around Slavko Govedić? Perhaps this is why he does not want to mention that the massacre committed by the Prinz Eugen SS Division against Croats in Dalmatia in the spring of 1944 led to a very hostile response from the Croatian foreign affairs ministry, a response not recorded by the Germans from any of their allies during the 1939-1945 period? For the only thing more drastic than this response would have only been the severance of diplomatic relations and a declaration of war against Germany.¹²² Thus,

¹¹⁸ N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 66.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 67.

¹²⁰ For more see. T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 797-803 and the sources cited therein.

¹²¹ I highlighted some of these examples in: T. Jonjić, *Hrvatski nacionalizam i europske integracije* (Zagreb, 2008), pp. 59-81.

¹²² Milan Blažeković, “Nota Sambugnach. Prilog hrvatskoj diplomatskoj povijesti iz doba rata 1941-1945.”, *Hrvatska revija: Jubilarni zbornik 1951-1975.*, ed. Vinko Nikolić (Munich-Barcelona, 1976), pp. 197-202.

Croatian-German relations were not idyllic, even though the imbalance of power prevented any deepening of their disputes.

And where there similar Croatian objections to, for example, Bulgarian state policy? Was the sincerity of the alliance with, for example, Slovakia ever questioned? Did not the Croatian press designate Slovakia as a nation and state as perhaps the friendliest and closest to Croatia on a number of occasions? But, naturally, Bartulin knows none of this or, if he does know by some chance, he wishes to ignore it. The reasons are plain: while necessity compels him to proclaim the Croatian-German alliance an attempt at ideological identification, expressions of Croatian-Slovak friendship cannot be used for manipulation. This is an obvious reason why Bartulin selectively uses the relevant sources, and why he suppresses the facts!

He is being equally manipulative when he claims that Ustasha ideologues praised Islam for preserving the Croatian national spirit and 'Croatian blood' in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹²³ Any respectable Croatian primary school pupil knows that this and similar ideas had their origin in the founder of modern Croatian nationalism, Ante Starčević (1823-1896), that all Croatian nationalists decades prior to the Ustasha repeated these ideas, and that they have nothing to do with racist teaching (and even less with racism), rather they are part of a national-political platform that was formulated at the onset of the latter half of the nineteenth century, at a time when the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Croatian lands were generally considered "Turks" and "Asians".¹²⁴ Therefore, Ustasha ideologues were only repeating something defined several decades before, precisely because they cited Starčević and the ideology formulated eighty years prior to the declaration of the NDH.

But when it comes to manipulation, Bartulin is tireless.

A classic example of this manipulation is his instrumentalization of the ideas of Filip Lukas in the context of the Croatian anti-Italian press campaign after the fall of Italy. As usual, this manipulation is seasoned with a factual error. For Lukas was not the "the head" of the Croatian cultural and literary organization *Matica hrvatska*,¹²⁵ rather he was its president in the period from 1928 to 1945. This need not be the same thing, for someone without the title of president can also be "the head". Perhaps Bartulin also knows that the chief of an American Indian tribe is also the "head" but not the president; that the pope is the "head" but also not a president, that even a Catholic bishop is the "head" of his diocese, but that nobody calls him a president? This is not simply a mat-

¹²³ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", p. 68.

¹²⁴ This practice continued, unfortunately, deep into the twentieth century, but never among those Croatian political forces which cited Starčević. This is not unimportant to this discussion as well, but the tallying of Bartulin's factual errors is, unfortunately, already taking up too much space.

¹²⁵ N. Bartulin, "The NDH as a 'Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism'", pp. 67-68.

ter of splitting hairs, for by designating Lukas like he did, Bartulin demonstrates his ignorance of what the president of Matica hrvatska could and could not do according that organization's bylaws. However, even more important is that Lukas' ideas, which Bartulin cites and places originally in 1943/44, were actually formulated several decades earlier, before he became president of Matica,¹²⁶ and that he reiterated them on a number of occasions before the establishment of the NDH and afterward. An honest man would have mentioned this; a manipulator remains quiet.

He engages in a similar manipulation with reference to Ante Tresić Pavičić's book *Izgon Mongola iz Hrvatske (Expulsion of the Mongols from Croatia)*. Bartulin indicates two times that this book was published in 1942, whereby he obviously wishes to suggest that it belongs to the body of "Ustasha literature".¹²⁷ However, he does not say – or simply does not know? – that the book was written far prior to the declaration of the NDH and that Tresić Pavičić (who has perhaps only slightly more ties to the Ustasha than the Dalai Lama!) submitted its manuscript to a publisher (Matica hrvatska) on 21 October 1940, i.e. six months before the NDH was proclaimed, at a time when no one knew such a thing would ever happen.¹²⁸ The book itself explicitly says so. The first page of the authors text, i.e. the part immediately after the foreword, contains a note that literally says: „This work was handed to Matica Hrvatska by the author on 21. October 1940.“¹²⁹ Therefore, only two solutions are possible: one, Bartulin has not even read Tresić Pavičić's book, so he knows nothing about that matter, or two: he has read the book, but insists on manipulating with the year of its printing by purposely eliding that information!

I have grown tired of listing all of Bartulin's errors, fabrications and manipulations, and I am certain it is no easier for readers!

And as apparent in cited observations, if I were bereft of Christian mercy, already in my first review I could have cited not only Bartulin's errors registered there, but also those cited here, and concluded that there is no need to pay any attention to an individual who makes roughly sixty factual errors over the course of 19 pages (49-67).¹³⁰ This is the reason why I hoped that Bartulin became aware of my implicit yet obviously well-meaning recommendations, for after such impressive statistics (roughly three factual errors per published page of text!) only a stubborn man would fail to comprehend that he has chosen

¹²⁶ See, for example, F. Lukas, "Geografska osnovica hrvatskoga naroda", pp. 21-91.

¹²⁷ N. Bartulin, "The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia", p. 206, 210.

¹²⁸ Ivo Petrinović, *Politički život i nazori Ante Tresića Pavičića* (Split, 1997), p. 124.

¹²⁹ A. Tresić Pavičić, *Izgon Mongola iz Hrvatske* (Zagreb, 1942), p. 23.

¹³⁰ I shall return to the remaining pages of Bartulin's 2007 article below, as they are – as I have shown in my review – a completely fabricated edifice which grew out of Bartulin's fundamental ignorance of Croatian literature.

the wrong profession. This is why I would not have been surprised if I had never heard of Bartulin again, or that I had been told he had become, say, a salesman, handyman, cactus farmer or origami artist, or maybe even switched to politics (primarily the kind conducted in presidential offices or in so-called non-governmental organizations, since he has performed all of the necessary preliminary work for this in his *scholarly* texts!), and that this was why he did not accept the *RCH* editorial board's invitation to immediately reply to me.

However, my hope was shaken when I saw that Bartulin submitted a text on a similar theme for the same journal.¹³¹ I did not look into this, because I thought that this was a late paper or the chance remains of Bartulin's once impressive intellectual efforts. This is why I did not notice that my polemical rival continued in the same tone, churning out errors and nonsense. Because of the limited space, I will not recount them here. However, I could not entirely resist the temptation due to my own all-to-human flawed nature, which I acknowledge in a humble, Christian spirit.

This is why I call upon Bartulin to eruditely explain two things to us. First, he claims that Boris Zarnik (1883-1944?) was the main expert who drafted the NDH's racial legislation.¹³²

Here I am not thinking of the amateurish mistake of proclaiming legal decrees (low-ranking regulations) for laws (higher-ranking regulations), for – who could expect Bartulin to understand the distinction?! I am not even thinking of Bartulin's typical manipulation when he cites Zarnik's text on the supposed superiority of the Nordic and Dinaric races, published in the journal *Priroda* in 1931,¹³³ while simultaneously failing to mention that Zarnik was actually recycling his text in which he was not speaking of the Croatian, but rather “Yugoslav nation”, i.e. the South Slavs, among whom he did not see any racial differences.¹³⁴

So I am not thinking of these manipulations on Bartulin's part, rather of something else: Zarnik's supposedly crucial role in formulating “the NDH's race laws”, or rather, the decrees (which ones, for there were many!) which belong to the set of racial legislation.

Ustasha apologists would undoubtedly be delighted by this hitherto unknown fact, for it would additionally bolster their not entirely frivolous contention that the so-called racial legislation was enacted under German pressure, so then it would not be illogical that they were midwived by a Slovenian biologist who

¹³¹ This is Bartulin's already mentioned text “The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia”.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 202.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 202, note 64.

¹³⁴ B. Zarnik, “O rasnom sastavu evropskog pučanstva”, *Hrvatsko kolo*, VIII (Zagreb, 1927), pp. 60-62, 65-66, 71, 79-80.

admired Ernst Haeckel as a man who deserved “one of the most honourable ranks in the history of the natural science”,¹³⁵ known for his pre-war support for non-Croatian and anti-Croatian parties, and for his fondness for National Socialism.¹³⁶ However, perhaps all Ustasha apologists are not as uncritical as Bartulin, so they would seek proof. The latter simply cannot be found where Bartulin says it is. Bartulin is therefore skilled in the use of both scissors and glue – to use a bit of wit whose source and context any expert on Croatian history will recognize – so I demand: bring the evidence to the light of day!

In the meantime, I must stress out that Zarnik's academic career in NDH was cut short: he was one of the few professors of the Zagreb Faculty of Medicine which were retired by NDH authorities. *Spomen-knjiga prve obljetnice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 10.4.1941.-10.4.1942.*, which was distributed - according to newspaper articles - late June or early July 1942,¹³⁷ lists Zarnik amongst other retired professors. Official data regarding academic administration and the organization of the university published in later periods of NDH have no mention of Zarnik. According to Jaroslav Šidak, Zarnik was retired on 27. October 1941.¹³⁸ The Education Minister at the time, Dr. Mile Budak, knew that he himself was to be named as an envoy in Berlin, which occurred on November 2, 1941. Since it was well known that German intelligence agencies were suspicious towards Budak (among other, for evasion of anti-Jewish regulations!), it is very unusual that those same agencies would not have protested about the retirement of a man that had a quintessential role in making such regulations, especially bearing in mind that the retirement was in the domain of Budak's Ministry. The Yugoslav communist authorities, however, bore in mind that Zarnik had been retired under Budak's mandate.¹³⁹ I do not think Bartulin meant to depict Budak as such a vivid adversary of Nazi Germany, so I call upon him to prove his claim that Zarnik played a major role in the creation of “race laws” (racial law decrees).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ B. Zarnik, “Ernst Haeckel. Prigodom stogodišnjice rođenja”, *Priroda*, 24 (Zagreb: Hrvatsko prirodoslovno društvo, 1934), pp. 65-70.

¹³⁶ According to the posted list of voters in the (public!) elections for the National Assembly in May 1935, Zarnik voted for the government's (Yugoslav) slate. His Yugoslav convictions and political fickleness is shown not only in his articles in numerous periodicals, but also in the reminiscences of contemporaries. Cf. *Dnevnik Blaža Jurišića*. Edited by Biserka Rako (Zagreb, 1994), p. 147, 217.

¹³⁷ Daily *HN*, 4/1942, no. 421 reported on 9 May 1942, on p. 4, that subscriptions were no longer possible, because the book was already sold out in pre-orders.

¹³⁸ Jaroslav Šidak, «Sveučilište za vrijeme rata i okupacije od 1941-1945», *Spomenica u povodu proslave 300-godišnjice Sveučilišta u Zagrebu*, I. (Zagreb, 1969), p. 176.

¹³⁹ Ivan Mužić, *Masoni u Hrvatskoj 1918-1967. (Dokumenti iz tajnih arhiva UDB-e)* (Split, 1993), p. 196.

¹⁴⁰ Incidentally, the registration log of the NDH Education Ministry under no. 480/1941 of 15 July 1941 notes the request of the retired M. Kus-Nikolajev for reactivation (Croatian State Archives, NDH Education Ministry fund /hereinafter: HDA, MNP NDH/, Urudžbeni zapisnik

Surely it would not be possible for a *scholar* of Bartulin's caliber to copy a piece of information he read somewhere, but forgot where he read it, and thus cannot name his source? Truth be told, at one time the Yugoslav communist authorities suspected Zarnik of being a German sympathizer (his wife was German, and his two daughters were studying in Germany), and they believed that he had participated in the preparation of anti-Jewish regulations and was in conflict with the Catholic clergy.¹⁴¹ Evidence supporting that claim were never published, but the fact remains that soon after the fall of the NDH, articles appeared in Yugoslav communist journals praising his Darwinism and materialistic views.¹⁴² An interesting piece of information is that Zarnik, who was a professor of the Constantinople (later Istanbul) Faculty of Medicine, is still regarded as being exceptionally important for the development of Croatian biology and its „orientation towards the biology of development and evolution“.¹⁴³

Perhaps the fact that Zarnik, who may have outlived the NDH, was by all accounts a Freemason for most of his life sheds some light on his unusual life's path.¹⁴⁴ However, toward the end of his life, it would appear that he left Freemasonry behind and became a devout Catholic.¹⁴⁵

In any case, there can be no doubt that he was among the associates who worked on the fourth and fifth volumes of the Croatian encyclopaedia, *Hrvatska enciklopedija*. The latter was published in 1945, and the Yugoslav authorities had destroyed most of its copies, while the fourth volume was designated as published in 1942, even though was actually released at the end of 1943.

There, in the fourth volume of *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, Zarnik wrote an extensive entry on “Man”.¹⁴⁶ When was it completed (and was it at the time when Zarnik became a “devout Catholic”) is not known. However, it is interesting that in it he discusses at length the human races and the differences between them, and underscored that “to benefit cultural progress, racism

1-216/1941./). This means that even at the time when the “racial legislation” was enacted, he was outside of public life, too.

¹⁴¹ I. Mužić, *Masoni u Hrvatskoj 1918-1967.*, p. 196.

¹⁴² An article in this tone was written about him by his departmental successor, Zdravko Lorković, “Prof. dr. Boris Zarnik”, *Priroda*, 35 (1946). For more, see Josip Balabanić, “Darvinizam u Hrvatskoj između znanosti i ideologije”, *Nova prisutnost*, 7 (2009), no. 3: 373-406.

¹⁴³ *120 godina nastave prirodoslovlja i matematike na Sveučilištu u Zagrebu (21. travnja 1876. – 21. travnja 1996.): Spomenica PMF*, ur. Ž. Kućan, Prirodoslovno-matematički fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu /Faculty of Science of the University of Zagreb/(Zagreb, 1996), pp. 35-36.

¹⁴⁴ Mirko Glojnarčić, *Masonerija u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb, 1941, 74; I. Mužić, *Masoni u Hrvatskoj 1918-1967. (Dokumenti iz tajnih arhiva UDB-e)* (Split, 1993), p. 36, 53, 68. Even though Zarnik, by all indications, died in 1944, according to some sources he died in 1945. Zoran D. Nenezić, “Neimari novih puteva”, *Večernje novosti*, Belgrade, 27 Sept. 2010 (electronic edition) claimed that Zarnik was among those masons who “continued to act and work after the war”.

¹⁴⁵ I. Mužić, *Masonstvo u Hrvata*, 8th supp. Ed (Split, 2005), p. 348.

¹⁴⁶ “Čovjek”, *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. 4 (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 335-366.

aspires to preserve that race deemed the most capable as pure as possible. There are, however, facts which may be interpreted in the opposite sense; that, in fact, the mixing of races impels the development of those spiritual forces which lead to cultural progress".¹⁴⁷ Even more important is his conclusion, according to which "racist efforts have no foundation in the science of races".¹⁴⁸ It is interesting to see this powerful condemnation of racism and racist efforts in the most representative publication of a state administered by a regime which – according to Bartulin – was rooted in and found the meaning of its existence in racist teaching...

Another question from Bartulin's 2009 text pertains to his – rather unoriginal, just as everything about Bartulin is unoriginal – interpretation of no. 11 of the Ustasha Principles: "No-one who is not by descent and blood a member of the Croatian nation can decide on Croatian state and national matters in the Independent State of Croatia. In the same manner, no foreign nation nor state can decide on the fate of the Croatian nation and Croatian state".¹⁴⁹

I am interested as to whether Bartulin, in his intensive, deep and unusually fruitful *scholarly* work, has come upon exactly the same formulations of both Croatian and also foreign writers, which emerged decades earlier, at the height of the national renewals and creation of nation states, without any indication of racialist teaching or racism?

Since Pavelić and the Ustasha constantly referred to Starčević and considered themselves his heirs in the political sense, did he ever ask himself how often Starčević thundered against "foreigners", and that it may have been honest to ask whether number eleven of the Ustasha Principles has its roots in Pavelić's interpretation of Starčević's writings? I am not saying that it has such roots, rather I am saying that such a question *must be posed*. And I can only speculate as to why Bartulin did not pose it, i.e., why he avoids discussing Starčević in this context.

Perhaps Bartulin is simply unfamiliar with him? In his dissertation, he allegedly wrote that Starčević established a party that was even formally called the "Croatian Party of Right". At first glance I found this difficult to believe, for if Bartulin did not know that this was not the party's formal name, then his mentors should have – for how could have they otherwise been mentors to such an intellect?! However, it became apparent that my optimism was misplaced and that Bartulin truly does not know the name of the party headed by Starčević when he made the same assertion in an article published in a Croatian journal.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 355.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ N. Bartulin, "The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia", 197, p. 202-203.

¹⁵⁰ N. Bartulin, "Ideologija nacije i rase: ustaški režim i politika prema Srbima u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941-1945", *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest*, 39 (2007), p. 212.

There as well he claimed the Party of Rights was called the “Croatian Party of Right”. And since he does not know this, it is unsurprising that he thinks there is no place for Starčević in a discussion of Ustasha ideology.

Someone who lacks mastery of elementary concepts can easily be misled by another author, who is almost as reliable as Bartulin. This particular author glibly claimed that Starčević's *Selected Writings (Izabrani spisi)*, which were compiled by Blaž Jurišić, “were printed in 1943, but were only released for sale after the war, because the Ustasha regime could not face the genuine Starčević, with his original affinity for democratic principles and his obsessive hatred of Germans”.¹⁵¹

It would be difficult to prove Starčević's alleged “obsessive hatred”, but the sense of this formulation is clear: if he is not a racist, a Croatian politician and ideologue must at least be “obsessed by hatred”.

However, what interests us here is the supposed (formal or actual) banning of Starčević's writings in the NDH. This was truly an unusual ban, if we can see with our own eyes that, say, a pupil in the Third Men's State Secondary School in Zagreb, “for commendable learning and exemplary conduct” in the 1943/44 school year, received precisely this book as a gift. How could this be, if the book was not released for sale prior to May 1945, a month when Croatia was characterized by the killing of people and the burning of books under the Yugoslav communist regime? Perhaps the school stole a copy from the printer somewhere in 1944, and then gave it to its exemplary pupil?

This “ban” becomes even odder, if we know that even someone who did not manage to find this antique-quality copy of Starčević's *Izabrani spisi* with precisely this dedication, can – if interested in the facts at all – notice that Jurišić's selection of Starčević's works was reviewed in many newspapers and magazines, which would have been difficult to do if the book had not been released for sale.

For example, Jurišić's selection of Starčević's writings was reviewed in the newspaper *Novine* in early August 1943, and it was noted that “certainly the most interesting part of the book [...] is the chapter under the title ‘Sparks’ [...] they show Starčević in a completely, not necessarily new, but well-rounded light, an assessment we could not attain from a book of collected works”.¹⁵² Bartulin would have trouble with this, for these “Sparks” (*Iskrice* in the original) include not only Starčević's numerous thoughts on human dignity, political freedom and harmony between nations, but also Starčević's assertions that each nation is a “mixture of different peoples, different bloods”, and that

¹⁵¹ Ivo Goldstein, *Židovi u Zagrebu 1918-1941* (Zagreb, 2005), p. 523.

¹⁵² “Izabrani spisi Ante Starčevića. U priredbi Dra Blaža Jurišića”, *Novine*, 3 (1943), no. 91, 9. 8. 1943, p. 5.

“nationality [...] is a matter of spirituality”,¹⁵³ so it therefore cannot be a racial/biological category.

This book had been also reviewed by Dragutin Gjurić in the respected monthly published by Matica hrvatska, *Hrvatska revija*, who also stressed that Starčević's thoughts constituted a “lesson, advice, and way for our further work”, particularly underlining the value of the “Sparks”.¹⁵⁴ And a historian, if serious, would not overlook that Jurišić's selection from Starčević's works was also reviewed in the main Croatian daily newspaper, *Hrvatski narod*, which was actually and formally the bulletin of the Croatian Ustasha Movement. And so, precisely on the Feast of St. Anthony (13 June), a day also celebrated in the NDH as the name-day of its leader, Ante Pavelić, this newspaper carried a review signed by certain š. There are catalogues in Croatia, that happen to be some of the most serious and most thorough, which state that this initial concealed the name of historian Jaroslav Šidak, but it would be best not to confuse Bartulin with this.

So this enigmatic reviewer wrote that the book was released “on precisely this day, on St. Anthony's” (1943!), and he added that “the immensity of Starčević's significance and the importance of his political thought will be [...] recognized by the Croatian public in this book, which should be a textbook on Croatian national politics and a signpost for all of those who intend to engage in public affairs in their liberated homeland”.¹⁵⁵ A serious historian would not miss something that bypassed the imagination of an inventive manipulator: that almost the entirety of this special edition of *Hrvatski narod* was dedicated to Starčević, and that it contains texts about much more than Pavelić. And the featured authors are *nothing to sneeze at* either: Ivo Bogdan, Blaž Jurišić, Emil Laszowski, Savić Marković Štedimlija and Milivoj Magdić.

A serious historian would similarly not fail to miss that precisely this book was constantly advertised among the HIBZ editions (e.g. in the magazine *Vienac*), much less that in the professional, historiographic *Časopis za hrvatsku poviest* a change in the book's price was announced.¹⁵⁶ For one may perhaps expect that a historian would at the very least page through the main journal

¹⁵³ *Ante Starčević: Izabrani spisi*. Selected by Blaž Jurišić (Zagreb, 1943), p. 414, 427.

¹⁵⁴ D. Gjurić, “Vječni Starčević. Ante Starčević: Izabrani spisi. Priredio dr Blaž Jurišić. Izdanje hrvatskog izdavačkog bibliografskog zavoda, Zagreb 1943.”, *Hrvatska revija*, 16 (1943), no. 11: 620-621.

¹⁵⁵ š [J. Šidak?], “Izvor pravaške misli. Antologija Starčevićevih političkih spisa”, *HN*, 5 (1943), no. 756, Duhovi [13 June] 1943, p. 9.

¹⁵⁶ *Časopis za hrvatsku poviest*, no. 1-2 (Zagreb, 1943) has an advertisement on its wrappers according to which Starčević's *Izabrani spisi* cost 500 kuna. A price of 800 kuna is advertised in “Viestima iz HIBZ-a” (“News from HIBZ”), printed as a supplement in *Vienac*, 36 (1944), no. 3, May 1944, p. 7., while in “Popis izdanja Hrvatskoga izdavačkoga bibliografskog zavoda” (List of editions of the Croatian Publishing and Bibliographic Institute), included as a supplement in *Vienac* no. 5 (July 1944, p. 8), Jurišić's book is considerably more expensive at a cost of 1,500 kuna.

in the field. And then conclude that none of this would have been possible, if Starčević's *Izabrani spisi* was not released for sale. Right?

And when constructing the reasons for the alleged non-release of this book for sale, it is worthwhile noting that on 5 June 1944 the Headquarters of the Men's Ustasha Youth of Zagreb proposed to the minister of national education that he stipulate a certain number of books that each secondary school graduate should study and demonstrate knowledge of them in the matriculation examination. These were books compiled by "morally and nationally strong Croatian professors", and among "the most vital political books" they specified Starčević's writings as published by HIBZ.¹⁵⁷ Only four days later, the Ministry of National Education sent a letter to the "superintendents of all state gymnasias and teacher-training schools" and the Association of Croatian Secondary School Teachers entitled "Croatian Reading Material for Secondary School Youth". It contains questions on library inventories, and it requests that the Association of Croatian Secondary School Teachers compile a "list of national instructive and literary works for national, political and civic education of secondary school youths", and among the only three titles that would have been mandatory, the letter literally contains this: "Jurišić: Ante Starčević, *Izabrani spisi*, izdanje H. I. B. Z., Zgb 1943."¹⁵⁸

All of this is truly unusual for a book which – alas – according to a typically misleading historiographic manoeuvre, had not been released for sale due to ideological reasons, because of the supposed Ustasha inability to deal with Starčević's genuine thoughts (including those about the equality of all peoples). And who could doubt that Bartulin has a predecessor, teacher and mentor?

But to return to no. 11 of the Ustasha Principles.

I would ask Bartulin, who calls himself a historian, whether he ever heard of the term "rulers of national blood" and whether he is aware that for a century and a half it was used not only in the professional literature, but also in primary school Croatian history textbooks? Is he aware of the dozens of political platforms and declarations in the Croatian lands during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century which use the term "national blood", "ruler of the same blood and language", "down with foreigners", "foreign servants" and so forth? Did Bartulin observe that at the opening of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Science, one of the most important ideologues of Yugoslavism, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, Bishop of Đakovo, spoke about a land "fed by rivers of Croatian blood" but also about "brothers of the same blood and same tribe"?¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ HDA, MNP NDH, box 2, no. 2052/44 of 5 June 1944.

¹⁵⁸ HDA, MNP NDH, box 2, no. U. m. 446/44 of 9 June 1944.

¹⁵⁹ "Jugoslavenska akademija. Strossmayerov govor o akademiji i sveučilištu govoren u saboru dne 29. travnja 1861.", *Hrvatska njiva*, 1/1917, no. 21 (Zagreb, 28 July 1917), pp. 355-357.

Is he aware that the Rightist ideologues (Starčević, Kvaternik and others) already then began waging a verbal war against these claims of “brothers of the same blood and same tribe”? Did it occur to Bartulin that no. 11 of the Ustasha Principles may have been a derivative of Starčević’s view, a Rightist reaction to the obscure idea of “brothers of a single blood and a single tribe” from Triglav to Vardar and to the Black Sea? Did he ever pose the question as to the substantial difference between that point of the Ustasha Principles and Starčević’s slogan that the fate of Croatia had to be decided “only by God and the Croats”, a slogan which, otherwise, was characterized by Nadko Nodilo in 1908 as a mere variation of sayings of Voltaire and Mazzini?¹⁶⁰

And until I have learned about Nodilo’s observation, I admit that I always associated Starčević’s slogan with the Irish “*Sinn Fein*”, wherein it is interesting that Starčević preceded the Irish (or did he actually precede them, since this same thought is shared by all subjugated nations during their struggle for state independence?). Starčević’s slogan has survived in Croatian political life to this day, so it is entirely logical to ask how it came about and how it has been existing and animating spirits for over a century and a half? What is its relationship to other political slogans and mottos? Can it be associated with the Ustasha Principles? Can one overlook the fact that among the ranks of the Ustasha there were claims that the Ustasha Principles could already be discerned in the “Principles of the Kvaternik Croatian Academic Club”, which was established in 1921 by Rightist university students in Zagreb?¹⁶¹

How is it possible not to notice that one of the leading exponents of Ustasha propaganda, Danijel Crljen, in probably the best known – but not only! – interpretation of the Ustasha Principles, used Starčević’s motto precisely as the heading for his commentary on principle number 11?¹⁶² Does it not seem obvious that this heading is not just coincidental and that the author meant for it to serve as a focal point for the analysis and interpretation of his (Crljen’s) text, and the formulation of Pavelić himself? If this is the case, then does this heading show the way, or perhaps it leads readers astray? So regardless of the possibility of dissonant answers – which falls within the realm of interpretation – this question cannot by any means be avoided, for it is a matter of logic.

But did Bartulin pose it?

Did it ever occur to him that this particular Ustasha principle may have had something besides a racial connotation, all the more so since Pavelić’s historicism was generally well known, at times to the point of caricature? If the Ustasha claimed that their movement was nothing new, but rather the contin-

¹⁶⁰ N. Nodilo, “Sloboda volje u književnika”, *Natko Nodilo: izbor iz djela*. Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, vol. 33 (Zagreb, 1969), p. 260.

¹⁶¹ Stanislav Polonio, “Ustaštvo – apoteoza Rakovice”, *Zbornik hrvatskih sveučilištaraca* (Zagreb, 1942), p. 238.

¹⁶² Danijel Crljen, *Načela Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta* (Zagreb, 1942), p. 61.

uation of an earlier Croatian struggle, and not just the struggle of the most recent centuries, but one that had "its germ in the ninth and tenth centuries";¹⁶³ should it not occur to an honest man who wants to be a historian dealing with the Ustasha movement to verify the extent to which that propagandistic platitude is founded?

For example, did Bartulin ever read that Fr. Mihovil Pavlinović (1831-1887), a Catholic priest and ideologue of the Croatian national renewal in Dalmatia, used the following words to explain to the unschooled Croatian populace in 1870 what the Croatian magnates arranged with the envoys of Ferdinand I of Habsburg in Cetinograd on 1 January 1527, four centuries before the Ustasha movement: "No non-Croat in Croatia is to hold power; no law not made by the Croats with their king is to be enforced in Croatia. No language but the Croatian language shall reign in Croatia..."¹⁶⁴

Did he notice similar formulations in literary – and not just literary – works by Dragutin Rakovac, Franjo Rački, August Šenoa, Nadko Nodilo, Ante Radić, Gjuro Arnold, Antun Gustav Matoš...? Let us say that they did not occur to Bartulin, because – as he tells us – he does not know much about Croatian literature. This is why it is impossible to expect Bartulin to take note of a rather common rhyme in Croatian literature, *stranac – lanac* ('foreigner – chain').¹⁶⁵ Henri Murger, using the lips of his Bohemian hero Schaunard, would probably have noticed that this rhyme is no millionaire in the literary sense. However, in the political sense it is another matter altogether. And not only in the case of the Croats. For there are other nations who have been taught by history that foreign rule is the same as slavery.

And did Bartulin at least assess the various, often very different *Ustasha* interpretations of the Ustasha Principles? Did he see that in Valenta's interpretation of this principle, he stressed that the Croats were entirely equated with those foreigners who have united with the Croats "in spirit and in blood", so they align their feelings, loves and interests with that nation, while others in a free Croatia will have all of their rights, but will not be able to decide on its fate?¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ This was noted in a review of M. Bzik's book. The review was written by Vilim Peroš, "Ustaške knjižice i brošure", *Hrvatska revija*, 15 (1942), no. 11: 614.

¹⁶⁴ In the original: "Nikakav Nehrvat u Hrvatskoj da ne ima vlasti; nikakav zakon, što Hrvati sa svojim kraljem ne učine, da se u Hrvatskoj ne vrši. Nikakav jezik do hrvatskoga jezika u Hrvatskoj da ne vlada..." (M. Pavlinović, "Hrvatsko pravo. Na slavi Imotske čitaonice g. 1870." *Mihovil Pavlinović: izbor iz djela*. Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, vol. 33, Zagreb, 1969, 158. Cf. *Pjesme i besjede Mihovila Pavlinovića – God. 1860-72*, Zadar: Tiskara Narodnoga lista, 1873), p. 288.

¹⁶⁵ Thus, for example, Croatian writer A. Šenoa (1838-1861), in his historical sketch on the death of Petar Svačić (1877) admonishes those who "call foreigners to their land, / to execute revenge on their freedom, / they put chain on their freedom" (In the original: "...u svoju zemlju zovu strance, / slobodi svojoj da se svete, / slobodi svojoj kuju lance".)

¹⁶⁶ Ante Valenta, *Tumač Načela Hrvatskog Domobrana. Kako je nastala t. zv. Jugoslavija, ili: Pravi uzroci pogibije Aleksandra u Marseille* (Buenos Aires, 1935), pp. 36-41.

Did he see what Mile Budak, Pavelić's long-time personal friend, party colleague and his closest associate in the Ustasha movement for years, thought about the problem in 1933/34? Did he notice that when Budak spoke of foreigners (who may be personally honest and intelligent, highly cultured and esteemed, but lack an "authentic feeling" for the Croatian people) he was thinking first and foremost of Ljudevit Gaj, Bishop Strossmayer and similar promoters of the Yugoslav ideology? Did he read that Budak did not deny the high human qualities, membership in the Croatian nation and even the Croatian patriotism of these people, but thought that at crucial moments they chose the wrong way for the Croatian nation, and that wrong way was – Yugoslavism?¹⁶⁷

Has he read that Budak took aim at Croatian advocates of Yugoslavism and Panslavism elsewhere as well?¹⁶⁸ In the context of debate on this topic, Budak's thoughts are not insignificant not only due to his exceptionally vital position in the Ustasha organization. They are also important because it is entirely possible that Budak, as the commander of the Ustasha camp in Italy, organized some sort of political education for the Ustasha, and delivered speeches in which he interpreted the Ustasha Principles, while his book was the principal manual for the political education of the Ustasha.¹⁶⁹ In any case, is it not irrefutable, that Budak in his biography, which was published in 1938 as an appendix to his novel *Ognjište* [The Hearth], found only the kindest words for his former employer? He was, Budak said, "the attorney Mr. Julio Oswald, the most ideal and honourable representative of the old guard of former attorneys, gentlemen which were Jews and Croats at the same time".¹⁷⁰

Did Bartulin anywhere mention Moškov's claim that in Ustasha émigré circles, the "question of the Jews" was never posed "as such", that Pavelić did not even deal with racial matters, and that in his speeches sharply distinguished between "Jewish extortionists" who colluded with Belgrade from those Jews who stood forth as Croatian patriots?¹⁷¹ Moškov, of course, never wrote any memoirs – which is often uncritically alleged – rather he wrote, under extremely trying circumstances, an investigative study and, as a prisoner, dictated

¹⁶⁷ Budak wrote how "these Štooses, Webers, Wiesners, Demeters (an ethnic Greek), and even Vrazes, Lisinskis nor Gaj himself did not possess a Croatianness that was big enough, broad enough and strong enough to encompass the entire Balkans, and they did not feel the depth of soul of their own [sic!] nation, which was always content with itself alone, rather seeking instructions and models from others, and by no means people who would fulfil them!" (M. Budak, *Hrvatski narod u borbi za samostalnu i nezavisnu hrvatsku državu*, Youngstown, Ohio, USA, 1934, pp. 13-14).

¹⁶⁸ M. Velebitski [M. Budak], "Naši neprijatelji", *Nezavisna Hrvatska Država. Godišnjak 1934.*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁶⁹ A. Moškov, *Pavelićeva doba*, p. 177, 199.

¹⁷⁰ M. Budak, "Sam o sebi", *Ognjište IV*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb, 1939), p. 145.

¹⁷¹ A. Moškov, *Pavelićeva doba*, p. 206, 236.

extensive statements to the Yugoslav authorities.¹⁷² In them he was merciless (and obviously unobjective) not only with regard to Budak, but also Pavelić. But even Moškov in this light – and under those circumstances, when diverting culpability to Pavelić and Budak could have only helped him – said that both “very sharply reacted” to several anti-Jewish statements made by ordinary Ustashe.¹⁷³

Pavelić's attitude toward racial issues and Rosenberg's drivel is described almost identically by another former associate, and later strident opponent, Branimir Jelić.¹⁷⁴ How did this as well escape the sharp eye of the *scholar* Nevenko Bartulin?

How did he fail to notice that Crljen's interpretation of the Ustasha Principles is actually a variation of Budak's thoughts from 1933/34, although he added a strong anti-Jewish tone to them?¹⁷⁵ To Bartulin, chronology and context mean nothing, so I note: it is now 1942, not 1934, and Hitler is no longer just a potential threat to the Versailles order, rather his troops are on the shores of La Manche, in the Sahara and facing Moscow and Stalingrad!

Did Bartulin find a racist tone in Karamarko's interpretation of the Ustasha Principles?¹⁷⁶ Did he read their interpretation in the 'Calendar of St. Anthony (*Kalendar sv. Ante*, 1943) from the pen of Fr. Andrija Radoslav Glavaš, a Catholic priest, literary critic and high state official?¹⁷⁷ Why did these “Ustasha officials” not notice, much less emphasize, the racist tone in the Ustasha Principles even at a time when – according to Bartulin's – it could have suited them?

And has it ever occurred to Nevenko Bartulin that the Ustasha Principles, including no. 11, were published prior to the war accompanied by photographs of Pavelić and Maček,¹⁷⁸ wherein the photograph of Vladko Maček is placed

¹⁷² The circumstances surrounding the appearance of the alleged “Moškov memoirs” were illuminated by witnesses, Croatian political prisoners, who testified that blood flowed from beneath the door of Moškov's cell (Cf. Željko Rukavina, “Sudbina ‘TOHO-a’/O Tajnoj organizaciji hrvatske omladine/”, *Zatvorenik*, 2 (1991), no. 10-11: 21-25; T. Jonjić, S. Matković, “Novi prilozi za životopis Mile Budaka uoči Drugoga svjetskog rata”, *ČSP*, 40 (2008), no. 2: 426).

¹⁷³ A. Moškov, *Pavelićevo doba*, pp. 206.-207.

¹⁷⁴ B. Jelić, *Političke uspomene i rad Dra Branimira Jelića [priredio dr. Jere Jareb]* (Cleveland, 1982), pp. 31-32, 215-216.

¹⁷⁵ D. Crljen, *Načela Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta*, pp. 61-67.

¹⁷⁶ M. Karamarko, “Političke smjernice ustaštva”, *Ustaška mladež*, 1 (1941), no. 13. Omladinski prilog *Ustaše. Vijesnika hrvatskog ustaškog oslobodilačkog pokreta*, 11 (1941), no. 17, 26 Oct. 1941, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷⁷ A. R. Glavaš, “Duh i značenje Ustaških načela”, in: *Andrija Radoslav Glavaš: Hrvatska književnost i duhovnost*. Selected and edited by B. Donat (Zagreb, 1995), pp. 145-149.

¹⁷⁸ See the facsimile in: M. Jareb, *Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine*, pp. 126-127. Since there were many years of firm notions about the harmony and correspondence between the views of Pavelić and Maček, the photographs of both in the Ustasha

first, and he – Bartulin knows this at least – was also “not by descent and blood a member of the Croatian nation” but rather a Slovene?

At some point it should have occurred to him that in this context it would have been worthwhile to read the text of Pavelić’s pathos-laden speech to Croatian workers on Labour Day 1944: “...Whosoever was born in this country, whosoever has the graves of his ancestors and the cradle of his descendants in this country is duty-bound, and also entitled, to call this country his own. As soon as he calls it his own, it cannot be foreign but only his...”¹⁷⁹

Just to be clear, I am by no means whatsoever claiming that this proves that Pavelić, Budak and other Ustasha leaders may not have nurtured different thoughts privately. A multitude of differently intoned statements can be found in the press after the declaration of the NDH, particularly illustrations with anti-Semitic content. However, even this – like the indisputably tragic fate of the Croatian Jews – merits research, with establishment of the facts and interpretation. This problem cannot be broached using Bartulin’s *scholarly* methodology, i.e., by ignoring facts and data which do not support a preconceived conviction.

But Bartulin proceeds in precisely this fashion, evading the need to place statements, moods and events in their proper context and objectively interpreting them. This is why he never manages to cite the Ustasha sources which, not only before the war (whether in Pavelić’s proclamations or in the foreword to the ‘Croatian University Student Almanac’ – *Almanah hrvatskih sveučilištaraca*),¹⁸⁰ but also after proclamation of the NDH, very clearly assert that the Serbs and Serbian propaganda “christened [the Ustasha] fascists”, while the Ustasha never considered themselves fascists.¹⁸¹ Moreover, such assertions were always rejected.¹⁸² How is it that Bartulin failed to note that the Germans criticized Pavelić and the Ustasha for sending diplomatic representatives to neutral foreign countries who were known for their anti-Nazi stance?¹⁸³ Why is he incapable of observing that Pavelić – for the needs of negotiations on the potential Swiss recognition of the NDH – appointed as his political advisor the

Principles were not coincidental, and those who know something about Croatian political history in the 1930s know that Pavelić and Maček did not part because of their attitude towards the dominant political ideologies of the day, and even less because of the racial questions.

¹⁷⁹ *Hrvatsko društvo osiguranje. Službeni glasnik Središnjice osiguranja radnika*, 4 (1944), no. 5-6 (Zagreb, 1944), pp. 320-321.

¹⁸⁰ B. Krizman, *Ante Pavelić i ustaše*, 299.-300.; *Almanah hrvatskih sveučilištaraca* (Zagreb, 1938), pp. 7-8.

¹⁸¹ Luka Halat, “Ustaški pokret među mladeži u Vukovaru”, *Ustaška mladež*, 1 (1941), no. 9. Omladinski prilog *Ustaše. Vijesnika hrvatskog ustaškog oslobodilačkog pokreta*, 11 (1941), no. 13, 21 Sept. 1941, pp. 5-6.

¹⁸² For more, see. I. Gabelica, *Blaženi Alojzije Stepinac i hrvatska država*, pp. 112-143.

¹⁸³ For several such German complaints, see: T. Jonjić, “O pokušaju osnivanja Hrvatskoga komiteta u Švicarskoj”, p. 224.

well-known Anglophile and Shakespearian expert Vinko Krišković, and the Swiss accepted him as such?¹⁸⁴

Bartulin did not manage to observe any of this!

In this vein, I begin to perspire at the very thought of everything he would think of if he were to seriously page through the periodicals of the NDH period, and came upon, say, these verses: "...Here our people vigorous and strong / Pulverized the wild hordes, / By the blood of Croats / The entire West is saved"¹⁸⁵ Only the Almighty knows how many Hitlers and Rosenbergs would hasten from these verses, how many coincidentally found citations by experts and quasi-experts Bartulin would adorn with these innocent pathetic verses, what kind of *scholarly* tract would emerge from this, and the disgust Bartulin would express over decades of historiographic research which, alas, did not manage to notice something that he instantly saw with his Argus-like vision and unrivalled learning.

As I said, I did not pose these questions earlier because I had long forgotten about Bartulin. But he did not forget me, so – after two years – he decided to reply to my review. If readers compare his reply in this issue, they will easily note that Bartulin actually rewrote his article published in the same journal in 2009.¹⁸⁶ Both contain the same assertions, the same sentences and the same notations. That is something that illustrates Bartulin's historiographic method in a complete way: compilation is his universal cure, and he has concluded that he has reached the phase in which he is allowed to compile his own constructs without sanction. And it is typical of his intellectual honesty that in his reply he avoids debating the subject matter of my response, rather he attempts to divert the river to a new course, i.e., into a discussion of how Croatian intellectuals dealt with the issues of race and racial theory.

It is easy to see that in my review – with the exception of a brief note on Yugoslavism as a racial and racist concept – I did not write a single word about it (!).¹⁸⁷ I did not anywhere write "that anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals had no interest in the question of racial identity and racial anthropology". This and a series of other similar statements by Bartulin in his reply¹⁸⁸ could be described using a very precise and a quite rough appellation. Only that one would be

¹⁸⁴ T. Jonjić, "Pitanje priznanja Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od Švicarske konfederacije", *ČSP*, 31 (1999), no. 2: 265-266.

¹⁸⁵ In the original: "...Ovdje divlje čete smrvi / Rod naš čil i zdrav, / Hrvatskom se ovdje krvi / Spasi Zapad sav."

¹⁸⁶ N. Bartulin, "The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia", *RCH*, 5 (2009), no. 1: 189-219.

¹⁸⁷ T. Jonjić, "From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions", *RCH*, 6 (2010), no. 1: 227-238.

¹⁸⁸ "...Jonjić would have his readers think that anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals had no interest in the question of race..."; "...Jonjić seems to think that only Yugoslavist ideologists referred to 'the allegedly dramatic differences between 'Dinaric' and other Croats'..." etc.

accurate and appropriate. However, for the sake of this journal and its readers, I shall make use of a euphemism, and satisfy myself by pointing out that Bartulin is again – fabricating and manipulating the facts. I did not say a word regarding that matter. I never even wrote that Croatian intellectuals with pronounced Yugoslav orientation were spearheading Darwinist (and thus social Darwinist) views and standpoints.¹⁸⁹

Bartulin feels best when tilting at windmills. This is why, using his own peculiar logic (that same incomparable logic that led to the conclusion on the *quality of human fur*), he confabulates that I wrote something that I did not, so that he can then engage in polemics with this straw man, in the hope that it will somehow back his contentions.

It never once occurs to him that already at the logical level his insinuation that I claim that anti-Yugoslav intellectuals showed no interest in race issues is problematic. For how can something like that be insinuated about someone who has written about Starčević, about Croatian-Serbian relations, about the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about the Ustasha movement, the tragedy of the Jews in the NDH, on fascism and National Socialism in interwar Europe, and so forth?

And someone like the latter could not fail to notice that even Starčević, due to national-political reasons, touched on the issue of race, in the process most often using the archaic term “breed” (“*pasmina*”) instead of “race”. In that era, when the term race had a different meaning than today, “breed” denoted what would today more precisely be called “sort” or “kind” (“*soj*”) (e.g. “the Slavo-Serb breed”).¹⁹⁰

This imprecise terminology was customary for that time, so everything was referred to as a race (“*rasa*”), sometimes – in polemical texts – even confessional identity.¹⁹¹ Other terms were used with an identical lack of precision, so – as Bartulin does not know – even the much more frequent term “tribe”

¹⁸⁹ Usp. Josip Balabanić, *Darvinizam i njegovi odrazi u Hrvatskoj (do 1918). Disertacija obranjena na Prirodoslovno-matematičkom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu* (Zagreb, 1980). It could be interesting to state out that the main oponents of Darwinist sympathizers (those oponents belonged mostly to catholic clergy and catholic intelligentsia) also usually had a very pro-Yugoslav stance.

¹⁹⁰ There is too little space here to cite the writers who showed that Starčević did not mean any nation specifically when he used the term “Slavo-Serb breed”, rather he meant an ethical category, a sort of people who only deserved contempt in his ideological system.

¹⁹¹ At the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, something of a *Kulturkampf* broke out in the Croatian public. In this confrontation between proponents of traditional, conservative values and the representatives of new ideologies (liberalism, anarchism, Marxism, etc.), it was impossible to avoid debates on Social Darwinism, evolutionism and eugenics. These debates proceeded in very heated tones, so that, for example, the Catholic periodical *Hrvatska straža* ironically accused its opponents of considering Catholics an “inferior race” (“*Katolici – inferiorna rasa?*”, *Hrvatska straža za kršćansku prosvjetu. Časopis namijenjen nauci i književnosti*, 3 (Krk, 1905), pp. 57-70, 198-206).

(“*pleme*”) has many and very different meanings in Croatian cultural and legal tradition.¹⁹² The same applies to the terms “*rod*” (clan/lineage),¹⁹³ “*dom*” (home/homeland),¹⁹⁴ and even *narod* (nation/people).¹⁹⁵ However, even today the use of these terms is imprecise. In southern Croatia, even today the term “*raca*” (undoubtedly derived from the Italian “*razza*”, race) indicates a plant or animal breed, but also human blood kinship or lineage: close relatives belong to the same “*raca*”, so a small village may contain five or six “*race*”.

And at places I indicated that Starčević was not the only one to imprecisely and inconsistently use the term “breed”. Many of his followers used the terms “breed”, “race” “nation/people” and “tribe” with the same lack of precision.¹⁹⁶ However, in an entire series of texts I underscored that it was typical of them that in racial and religious matters they were far more tolerant than most other Croatian political forces, particularly those of a Yugoslav bent.¹⁹⁷

Only according to Bartulin's logic does this mean I claimed they were completely uninterested in these issues.

In his joust with this particular windmill, Bartulin actually implies that I had said Croatia is a world for itself, entirely separated from European and global trends. This is of course untrue. Even though I believed and still believe that most Croatian nationalists who assumed influential posts in the Ustasha movement and the NDH did not actually favour either fascism or National Socialism, I never doubted that among the Croats there were those who embraced these ideologies with all of their deviations, including those concerning racist teaching. As I noted in another polemic, anything else would have been impossible, for Croatia is an integral component of Europe, so it would have been impossible for these ideologies not to penetrate it during the interwar years.¹⁹⁸

Already in the first sentences of his reply, Bartulin laments that he did not have sufficient space in a single article to say everything he wanted. This jeremiad touched me, but: it is simple to calculate that, if his *tilty at windmills* had been ten pages longer – in line with his standards – Bartulin would probably have made an additional thirty or so factual errors. This would have delighted all of those who seek humour pieces even in the pages of scholarly journals.

¹⁹² Vladimir Mažuranić, *Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik*, 2nd ed., (Zagreb: Informator, 1975), pp. 935-942; Miho Barada, *Starohrvatska seoska zajednica* (Zagreb, 1957), pp. 43-53.

¹⁹³ V. Mažuranić, *Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik*, p. 1254.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 715-716.

¹⁹⁶ T. Jonjić, “Pogledi Antuna Gustava Matoša na hrvatsko-srpske odnose”, *Pilar*, 7 (2012), no. 13 (1): 34.

¹⁹⁷ T. Jonjić, “Iz povijesti zabluda i nesporazuma. Predgovor trećem izdanju knjige ‘Nekoji nazori i zapovijedi svetih otaca papa glede nepravdnog proganjanja izraelićana’”, V-XX (Zagreb, 2010)

¹⁹⁸ T. Jonjić, “Kako don Živko Kustić želi tumačiti odnos Katoličke crkve i Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, *Politički zatvorenik*, 18 (2008), no. 194: 9-21.

But naturally, this does not stop Bartulin from tastelessly imputing what I know or do not know about authors such as Dinko Tomašić, Ćiro Truhelka, Ivo Pilar or Filip Lukas.

He thereby – in typical Bartulin fashion – makes a double error.

First, and less importantly: it shows his ignorance of the fact that I wrote about all of these authors – except Tomašić – on a number of occasions. I have written many studies about Lukas and, especially, Pilar, and I have prepared for publication (alone or in collaboration with others) many original, previously unpublished texts, memoranda and studies. This should excuse the fact that in this response to Bartulin I am citing my own texts more than what might be considered proper. Otherwise, as opposed to Bartulin, who so gladly cites his own compilations, I do not consider my own texts on these topics or anything in my bibliography in general something that should interest the general reader.

Second, and certainly more important, Bartulin's error in this context shows that his notions of these authors are superficial and one-sided.

The extent of Bartulin's knowledge of Pilar is clearly reflected in the fact that he persistently cites one and the same excerpt from a single – admittedly the most important – work: *Die südslawische Frage/Južnoslavensko pitanje* (The South Slav Question). He does the same with Truhelka, citing only one of his books: *Studije o podrijetlu: Etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Hercegovine* (Studies on Descent: Ethnological Considerations from Bosnia-Herzegovina; Zagreb, 1941) and one article written in 1907. He notes of this article that it was published anonymously, but – naturally – he does not know why, or simply passes over this.

Bartulin approaches these two authors – like, indeed, all of the rest of those he cites – tendentiously, extracting individual thoughts out of context and reducing them to their anthropological observations, entirely ignoring the context in which these texts appeared and the political engagement of their authors. Both Truhelka and Pilar wrote their discussions as active participants in political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the time when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy annexed this territory (1908) and immediately thereafter, as a part of considerations on the possible reorganization of the Monarchy into a tripartite system. Pilar was deeply politically involved at the time, first as one of the founders of the Croatian National Union (Hrvatska narodna zajednica), and then as a writer of many studies on the status of the Croatian nation, while toward the end of the war he was the *spiritus movens* and actual author of one of the most important documents which overturned the thesis on so-called national unity and the aspiration to create a Yugoslav state.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ For more see Jure Krišto, "Uloga Ive Pilara u hrvatskom organiziranju u Bosni i Hercegovini", *Godišnjak Pilar. Prinosi za proučavanje života i djela dra Ive Pilara* (hereinafter: *GP*), 1 (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 81-94.; Zlatko Matijević, "Državno-pravne koncepcije dr. Ive Pilara i vrhbosan-

Both Truhelka and Pilar held similar political positions and had the same objective: to unite the Croatian lands and create an independent Croatian state. Both believed that the unification of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Banat Croatia (Banska Hrvatska) and Dalmatia was a prerequisite for the survival of the Croatian people. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to blunt both Hungarian and especially Serbian aspirations to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a component of this idea, it was necessary to show that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were actually Croats, for otherwise the Catholic Croats would remain a significant minority, and thus unable to achieve that objective. Since political and also social life in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period was organized along confessional lines, and Croatian national awareness only existed among the majority of Catholics and a thin layer of the Muslim intelligentsia, both Pilar and Truhelka had only two arguments they could use to legitimize the demand for the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Croatia. One was the Croatian statehood right, while the other was to prove the common origin of the local Catholics and Muslims.

The first doctrine is historicist, and both felt that it meant little in practical politics. However, the second concept was practically usable, particularly at a time when the development of biology and other natural sciences was leading to a flood of various scientific and quasi-scientific theories, valuable insights but also serious misconceptions (including those from the fields of anthropology, palaeoanthropology, ethnography, etc.). This concept could also have been acceptable to the general populace, particularly if the emphasis on this common descent was accompanied by reminders that the Serbs considered the Muslims "Turks" and "Asians" (so that they almost entirely exterminated them after the creation of the independent Serbian state!), while on the Croatian side (among Starčević's followers) it was stressed that the Muslims were "the Croatian breed, the oldest and purest nobility that Europe has". This is why both Pilar and Truhelka adopted a markedly philo-Muslim stance, and why they used Starčević's classical arguments, even though both – and Pilar especially – were critical of Starčević and his political activism.

This was, therefore, a matter of political pragmatism, rather than a well thought-out system of scholarly or quasi-scholarly standpoints.

Truhelka wrote quite extensively on the necessity of such political pragmatism, also stressing the great importance of the so-called agrarian question in

skog nadbiskupa dr. Josipa Stadlera. *Od Promemorije do Izjave klerikalne grupe bosansko-hercegovačkih katolika* (kolovoz – prosinac 1917. godine), *GP*, 1, pp. 117-131; Z. Matijević, "Političko djelovanje Ive Pilara i pokušaji rješavanja 'Južnoslavenskog pitanja' u Austro-Ugarskoj monarhiji (ožujak-listopad 1918.)", *GP*, 1, pp. 133-170; Zoran Grijak, "Ivo Pilar i Stadlerova promemorija papi Benediktu XV., g. 1915.", *GP*, 1, pp. 95-115; Z. Matijević, "O sadržaju promemorije Ive Pilara caru Karlu I. (IV.) iz kolovoza 1917. godine", *GP*, 2 (2002), pp. 83-102, etc.

the process, in an undated study that emerged around 1908,²⁰⁰ while in his memoirs he wrote briefly about his contribution to this activity, pointing out that he also wrote and published for this purpose a number of unsigned articles and texts released under a pseudonym.²⁰¹ However, when he died in 1942, the obituaries published during the NDH emphasized Truhelka's accomplishments in the fields of archaeology, ethnography, numismatics, etc., while at that time when it could have been *politically correct* to highlight his fragmentary anthropological postulates and his alleged racial theories, nobody wrote a single notable word about this.²⁰² If this had been important to Ustasha propaganda, the situation would have undoubtedly been different. Even in later discussions about Truhelka, nobody noticed nor stressed that which Bartulin wants to present as the focus of Truhelka's work.²⁰³

Naturally, Bartulin overlooks all of this, just as he overlooks the fact that Pilar's and Truhelka's anthropological observations that emerged in the above-described context and for the above-described purpose, were only a single – and surely not among the most important – aspects of their intellectual activities. These omissions are a component of Bartulin's manipulations, which are aimed at construing the leading Croatian intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century as the founders or at least promoters of Croatian allegedly racist concepts.

However, Bartulin cannot avoid making flagrant factual errors in this manipulation. He is, to be sure, right when he writes that in 1929 Pavelić commended Pilar,²⁰⁴ but is wrong when he says that Pavelić praised Pilar's anthropological observations. To this point, Bartulin is obviously unaware that several years later Pavelić's closest associate, Mile Budak, wrote a negative assessment of another work by Pilar.²⁰⁵ Pilar himself died in 1933, at a time when the Ustasha movement was far from the peak of its power, and he also had an obviously detached view of it.²⁰⁶ Even so, when Pavelić and his followers cited him,

²⁰⁰ HDA, Osobni fond Isidora Kršnjavoga [Isidor Kršnjavi personal papers], box 19, unregistered.

²⁰¹ Ćiro Truhelka, *Uspomene jednog pionira* (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 131-132, 136-137.

²⁰² Cf. the texts on Truhelka published in *HN*, 4/1942, no. 533 (19 Sept. 1942) or in no. 535 (22 Sept. 1942). See also the extensive obituary by Viktor Živić in the same daily, no. 541, 29 Sept. 1942, 9 or the one by Agata Truhelka, "† Ćiro Truhelka", *Časopis za hrvatsku poviest*, no. 1-2 (Zagreb, 1943), pp. 149-152.

²⁰³ Cf. articles by several authors in: *Ćiro Truhelka. Zbornik*, ed. Nives Majnarić Pandžić (Zagreb, 1994).

²⁰⁴ N. Bartulin, "The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia", pp. 195-196.

²⁰⁵ M. Budak, *Hrvatski narod u borbi za samostalnu i neovisnu hrvatsku državu* (Youngstown, 1934), pp. 178-180.

²⁰⁶ Cf. T. Jonjić, "Politički pogledi dr. Ive Pilara 1918.-1933.: Uvijek iznova Srbija – radikalni zaokret ili dosljedni nastavak Pilarove političke misli?", *Pilar*, 5 (2010), no. 9 (1): 56, 69-70.

then they did so not because of Pilar's anthropological and sociological considerations, but because they thought his works were useful as an argument against the survival or restoration of a Yugoslav state.

That Pilar as a person and even his work did not particularly fascinate Pavelić is reflected in the fact that it was only in early 1943, after almost two years of life as a state, that an honorary, and relatively modest, pension was instituted for Pilar's widow at the proposal of the internal affairs minister.²⁰⁷ If Bartulin had compared who had received honours and honorary pensions in the first months of the NDH's existence and why, even he would have arrived at certain conclusions.

Meanwhile, the didactic purpose of Pilar's book on the South Slav question during the NDH era is lucidly shown by the fragments thereof published in the Croatian press of the time.²⁰⁸ It is also reflected in the statement of a writer of numerous analyses of this book, the priest and historian Dragutin Kamber.²⁰⁹ Reportedly he and Croatian Prime Minister Nikola Mandić agreed that "it would be good to abridge this book and supplement it with the 'Yugoslav' experiences between 1918 and 1941 and prove that there is no life for the Croats without their state, so it [the book – *author's note*] should be adapted for the Croatian youth."²¹⁰ Equally lucid is the recommendation by the Headquarters of the Men's Ustaša Youth of Zagreb to stipulate Pilar's book, together with Starčević's *Izabrani spisi* and, naturally, Pavelić's *Strahote zabluda* [The Horrors of Folly], as mandatory texts for secondary schools: not on racist or eugenic grounds, but as a warning that an independent nation state is a value worth making sacrifices.²¹¹

Even after the war – and even in Pavelić's circle – these qualities of Pilar's most important work were stressed, rather than those suggested by Bartulin as primary. Thus Marko Sinovčić, who was generally known among post-war émigrés as the 'mouthpiece' for Pavelić himself, stressed that the particular value of *The South Slav Question* lies in the fact that it dissected Serbian imperialism and demonstrated why Croatia and Serbia cannot live in the same state framework.²¹² The same assessment was made by Vjekoslav Vrančić,²¹³ and the same thought

²⁰⁷ For more, see T. Jonjić, "Politički pogledi dr. Ive Pilara 1918.-1933.," p. 70.

²⁰⁸ *Izbor najboljih svjetskih članaka*, no. 2 (Zagreb, August 1944), pp. 12-16.

²⁰⁹ D. Kamber, "Temelj naše orijentacije. Misli uz najaktualniju hrvatsku knjigu, djelo dra Ive Pilara 'Južnoslavensko pitanje'", *Spremnost: Misao i volja ustaške Hrvatske*, 3/1944, no. 131, 27 Aug. 1944; D. Kamber, "Središnje pitanje hrvatske državne problematike. Südländ: Južnoslavensko pitanje", *Hrvatska misao*, no. 7-8/1944, Sarajevo, 1944; D. Kamber, "Kruta istina", *Nova Hrvatska*, 4/1944, no. 190, Zagreb, 18 Aug. 1944.

²¹⁰ D. Kamber, *Slom N. D. H. (Kako sam ga ja proživio)* (Zagreb, 1993), pp. 30-31.

²¹¹ HDA, MNP, box 2, no. 2052/44 of 5 June 1944.

²¹² M. Sinovčić, *N. D. H. u svjetlu dokumenata*, pp. 87-88.

²¹³ V. Vrančić, *Branili smo Državu. Uspomene, osvrti i doživljaji*, 2, Barcelona-Munich, 1985, p. 64.

was expressed by other Croatian émigré political writers: that this book is “epochal” for it “systematically reveals the Greater Serbian ideology and its aggressive intentions against the Croats.”²¹⁴ But not all Ustasha approved of his arguments, and those who had originally belonged to the Catholic movement were particularly repulsed by Pilar’s religious and cultural views.²¹⁵

Nobody said a word about races, eugenics or racism! Everyone – except Bartulin – comprehended the political motivations underlying Pilar’s writings.

Stated briefly, political, historical, geopolitical, sociological, religious/cultural and economic aspects played a much more prominent role in Pilar’s ideological system. This is also clearly indicated by Pilar’s intellectual activities under different circumstances. As the president of the Sociology Association in Zagreb, he dealt with these problems even after the First World War, but always for the purpose of unification of the Croatian lands and their independence in the state/legal sense.²¹⁶

Even Pilar could not avoid eugenic themes, primarily because eugenics were exceptionally popular at that time.

Already at the end of the nineteenth century, the enforcement of measures began in the United States of America to infringe upon the human rights of persons suffering from various mental and psychosomatic ailments. The first measures were introduced in Connecticut, while in 1907 Indiana became the first state to enact a law stipulating the sterilization of criminals, rapists and the mentally ill. Between 1909 and 1930, as many as 33 states in the US enacted regulations on the sterilization of persons which were motivated by eugenic considerations. This may seem horrifying. However, its true dimensions are illustrated by the voting statistics in the state legislatures: such laws were passed by overwhelming majorities. Tens of thousands of people were forcefully sterilized, which, unfortunately and despite the terrifying experiences of the Hitler era, continued to be practiced even after World War II, and not only in the United States, but also in a number of Western European democracies and even in Australia.²¹⁷ The adherents of this manner of “improving the human

²¹⁴ Ivo Hühn, Radovan Latković, “Mile Starčević: dostojan svojega prezimena. Prigodom tridesete godišnjice smrti”, *Hrvatska revija*, 33 (1983), vol. 4 (132): 711.

²¹⁵ For example, Dušan Žanko praised Pilar’s intention of proving the Croatian ethnicity of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: “This healthy thesis going back to Starčević’s time is very solidly treated such that I has never been refuted in Croatia, and it was even advocated by Šišić”. However, this thesis cannot be backed by the speculation about Bogomilism, as done by Südland (Pilar), in his “stupid anti-Roman and anticlerical standpoints” (D. Žanko, *Svjedoci: izabrani eseji, prikazi, sjećanja*, Barcelona-Munich, p. 248)

²¹⁶ More in: T. Jonjić, “Politički pogledi dr. Ive Pilara 1918.-1933.: *Uvijek iznova Srbija – radikalni zaokret ili dosljedni nastavak Pilarove političke misli?*”

²¹⁷ More in Newton Crane, *Marriage Laws and Statutory Experiments in Eugenics in the United States, Reprinted from "The Eugenics Review", April, 1910*, Eugenics Education Society (London,

species" included, for example, George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, John Maynard Keynes, Winston Churchill and many others.²¹⁸ It is not difficult to find examples in Nazi propaganda in which Hitler's regime defended itself from criticism of its racial laws by pointing out that they had predecessors and like-thinkers in the United States and other (democratic) European states.²¹⁹

Anthropological and eugenic topics were so popular in the first half of the twentieth century that the Brazilian academic Tristan de Athayde, while paraphrasing the "father of eugenics" Francis Galton, pointed out that "anthropolatry" had become a "modern religion" and the "Gospel of the twentieth century".²²⁰ It was written about both in and out of Croatia, and particular attention – and an exceptionally critical approach – to these teachings could be found among the Catholic writers and in Catholic periodicals (such as the Jesuit *Život* in Zagreb, or the Makarska-based *Nova revija*).

An uninformed reader may think that this "scientific" theory had been extinguished in May 1945. Unfortunately, it continued in theory and practice in states which call themselves democratic well into the twenty-first century. Even today it is defended by numerous "scientists", although disguised in somewhat more sophisticated terminology than that used by Chamberlain, Galton, Haeckel and the German National Socialists. For example, in Sweden over 60,000 Swedes, among them 90 percent women, were sterilized between 1941 and 1975 based on eugenic reasoning.²²¹

1910); Charles A. L. Reed, *Marriage and Genetics. Laws of Human Breeding and Applied Eugenics*, The Galton Press Publishers, (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1913); *Eugenics Record Office. Bulletin No. 10: Report of the Committee to Study and to Report on the Best Practical Means of Cutting off the Defective Germ-Plasm in the American Population. II. The Legal, Legislative and Administrative Aspects of Sterilization*, ed. by Harry Laughlin, Secretary of the Committee (New York, February 1914); Paul A. Lombardo, "Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars", *Saint Louis Journal of Health, Law & Policy*, Vol. 2 (57), 2008, pp. 57-79; Mary Ziegler, "Reinventing Eugenics: Reproductive Choice and Law Reform After the World War II", *Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender*, Vol. 14 (319), 2008, pp. 319-350; M. Ziegler, "Eugenic Feminism: Mental Hygiene, the Woman's Movement, and the Campaign for Eugenic Legal Reform, 1900-1935", *Harvard Journal of Law and Gender*, 31 (2008), p. 212, etc.

²¹⁸ Thomas C. Leonard, "Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 19, No. 5, University of Illinois at Chicago, Fall 2005, p. 216; Martin Gilbert, "Churchill and Eugenics", <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/support/the-churchill-centre/publications/finest-hour-online/594-churchill-and-eugenics>, accessed on 17 Aug. 2011.

²¹⁹ Cf. Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism*, Oxford University Press, 1994.

²²⁰ T. de Athayde, "Je li eugenika prihvatljiva?", in: *Seksualni problemi* (Zagreb, 1939), p. 53.

²²¹ Gunnar Broberg, Mattias Tydén, "Eugenics in Sweden: Efficient Care", in: *Eugenics and the Welfare State*. Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, eds. (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1996), pp. 109-110. Cited based on T. C. Leonard, "Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era", p. 221.

The racist mood and racist measures in the first decades of the twentieth century also had an impact on Croatian workers in West European countries, and especially in the United States, so that sociologist Dinko Tomašić dealt with this matter.²²² This is why the topic could not be avoided by Pilar, even though it remained at the margins of his interests.²²³ This is why a few of his observations which reflects his interest in the corporatist organization of society and eugenics cannot be interpreted as Pilar's acceptance of racialist theories nor his approval of the totalitarian movements of his time.²²⁴

If he would like him to be considered a scholar, a serious man, while arguing about Pilar's political and sociological views, would have to indicate that Pilar considered the Croats a Slavic nation throughout more than thirty years of his public activity. Actually, he was very thorough while working on matters of Slavic mythology and the pre-Christian beliefs of ancient Croats and Slavs in general, which is more than one can say about most of his contemporaries. And, while considering the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croats, at the same time he considered Serbs as a nation which is most closely related to Croats. But, that view never stopped him from being one of the harshest critics of Serbian politics and one of the most avid adversaries of both the Yugoslav ideology and the Yugoslav state. That shows that his political views had nothing to do with racial, language or religion issues, since Pilar was convinced that national identification of an individual is determined by "internal sense of belonging".²²⁵ Of course, Bartulin does not know anything about it, or he chooses simply to elide it, in order to make further mystifications possible.

In summary, the notions and convictions which Pilar, Truhelka, Lukas, etc. had about races and their qualities (regardless of whether or not these notions and convictions were correct) did not result in that which may be called their Croatian nationalism, rather – just the opposite – they attempted to uphold their national-political positions and convictions and possibly even implement them (or contribute thereto) using historiographic, archaeological, ethnographic, religious-cultural, linguistic and other arguments, including anthropological. Thus, Bartulin, adhering to a standard formula, proclaims effects causes and then continues to tilt at windmills!

Just as he falsely claims that I stated that anti-Yugoslav Croats showed no interest in racial issues, Bartulin also built up a new windmill: he claims that I wrote that the Croats are "exclusively a Western people". In my text it is quite

²²² Cf. Tomašić's articles "Američko tržište rada i ideja o superiornosti ljudske rase" (1935), "Eugenika i rasna teorija" (1937), "Rasno tumačenje društva" (1940), etc.

²²³ I. Pilar, "Spomenica u pogledu organizacije obrane i otpora Hrvatskoga Naroda /H. N./ u sadanjoj njegovoj situaciji", comp. T. Jonjić and Z. Matijević, *Pilar*, 5 (2010), no. 10 (2): 125-147.

²²⁴ T. Jonjić, "Nekoliko napomena uz Pilarovu 'Spomenicu'", *Pilar*, 5 (2010), no. 10 (2): 124.

²²⁵ Dr. Juričić [I. Pilar], *Svjetski rat i Hrvati. Pokus orientacije hrvatskoga naroda još prije svršetka rata*, (Zagreb, 1917), pp. 60-61.

apparent that – while refuting Bartulin's fabrication about the alleged Ustasha system of extolling barbarism – I was speaking of a series of writers who pointed out the Croatian Western tradition.²²⁶ In his duels against windmills, Bartulin is not even capable of seeing that in that same text I cited several Croatian politicians and writers who expressed bitterness over the West's stance toward the Croatian nation.²²⁷ Even Nator's wretched verses about the Croats as the "progeny of wolves and lions" was a glove thrown at the feet of the West, not the East.

But Bartulin is unstoppable in his process of imagining windmills. He fabricates that in my text I claimed that the Croats have nothing to do with the Balkans. A nation which claims a territory that is by no means insignificant in what has been referred to as the Balkans over the past two centuries, cannot have nothing to do with the Balkans. And if Bartulin knew anything about the Rightist ideology, he would then at least know at the anecdotal level that one of Starčević's most important discussions is called 'The Eastern Question' (*Istočno pitanje*) and that it deals precisely with the Balkans and the Balkan nations.²²⁸ Perhaps he also stumbled onto the fact that the writers August Harambašić and Nikola Kokotović, both otherwise born to the Orthodox faith, edited a journal called *Balkan*, and that history remembers them as Rightist leaders. If Bartulin knew something about the Ustasha ideology, then he would have noticed that in 1929 Pavelić wrote the already herein mentioned text "Establishment of the Croatian state, lasting peace in the Balkans", with the title itself indicating that even he did not consider Croatia entirely separate from and different than the Balkans.

The forward march of windmills in Bartulin's mind never ceases.

He also claims that I proclaimed racial anthropology a quasi-scientific discipline.

He obviously has trouble understanding relatively simple texts, so he is incapable of noting that I never wrote a single word about racial anthropology, rather proclaimed quasi-scientific certain assessments by Jovan Cvijić, and then also Dinko Tomašić.²²⁹ These are in fact two different things, are they not? Both of those men, by the way, cannot be seen as synonymous with racial anthropology: Cvijić was first and foremost a geographer, while Tomašić was a sociologist.

I have truly never dealt with racial issues as such, because I believe nations are a political and not biological category, so – to make a football comparison – I draw absolutely no distinction in value or in national-political sense be-

²²⁶ T. Jonjić, "From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions", pp. 229-231.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

²²⁸ Dr. Antun Starčević, *Istočno pitanje (Politička razprava)*. Second edition. Knjižnica *Muslimanske svijesti*, book 1, (Sarajevo, 1936)

²²⁹ T. Jonjić, "From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions", pp. 228-229.

tween Zvonimir Boban, Džemal Mustedanagić, Milan Rapajić and Eduardo da Silva. By the same token, I believe racial issues in the formulation of the ideologies of Croatian nationalism (including Ustasha ideological eclecticism) were and remain of peripheral importance

However, if I had bothered to define my own view of racial anthropology, I would have doubtless assessed that this discipline – not in the sense of studying, e.g., the differences between the skin pigmentation of the Bushmen and Icelanders, but in the sense of teaching about the differing value of human races and racist interpretations of history – is a quasi-scientific theory. For I hold the view that science/scholarship cannot be separated from an ethical foundation, so in this regard I believe that anything amoral or immoral cannot be science, even though such may constitute its abuse. Thus, I consider the theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Francis Galton, Ernst Haeckel and similar thinkers an abuse of science, the consequence of which we have seen in the hundreds of thousands of people in the so-called democratic countries and in Hitler's Third Reich who were sterilized, locked into psychiatric hospitals and concentration camps or simply killed on behalf of human "progress" and "improvement of racial qualities".

I do not prevent Bartulin from believing that these mass crimes were based on scientific foundations, but I am appalled by his arguments. For he believes that this is science simply because at the time it was generally accepted ("in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century there was nothing 'quasi-scientific' about racial anthropology at all").

Thus, Bartulin sees science as what the majority considers scientific. This *scientific* logic is fascinating! For centuries women were burned as witches, and this was deemed scientifically provable. Does Bartulin think that these convictions and sentences had merit because of the generally accepted belief that these women consorted with the devil? For a long time, millions of Europeans did not eat potatoes, because they believed this plant's tubers were inedible. Does Bartulin then accept the belief that potatoes were only useful as a decorative plant as scientific? For quite a few centuries, the world's greatest intellects believed that the world was flat. Does the *scholar* Bartulin therefore deem this opinion was scientific? Or does he simply want to demonstrate the value of his own *scholarly* work to readers?

And in the stance that racial anthropology understood in this fashion is a quasi-scientific discipline, I generally concur with the conclusion accepted by *Hrvatska enciklopedija* in the NDH period as shown above in the text by Zarnik: that "racist efforts have no foundation in the science of races".²³⁰ I will even accept the risk of having Bartulin suddenly accuse me of being Zarnik's adherent, for he accuses me of writing things I did not, so why would he not

²³⁰ "Čovjek", *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. IV (Zagreb, 1942), p. 355.

find some way of confabulating an accusation based on something I did, in fact, write down? I know that it will be of no help either to myself or *Hrvatska enciklopedija* in his forays against windmills that almost exactly the same assessment of racism was present in the Yugoslav encyclopaedistics.²³¹

Nevertheless, in the context of this debate, I believe it noteworthy that an entirely identical position was advocated in the school and university textbooks used in the NDH, which conferred the highest state honours to books which advocated the view that all people are of equal value, regardless of racial, national, religious or any other differences.²³² In this vein, even beginner-level schoolchildren had to learn these verses by rote: "Oh my dear God, / I humbly pray to thee; / teach me how / to love all men..."²³³ However, at the same time this state passed a series of differently intoned legal decrees, and not a small portion of its apparatus participated in the implementation of such discriminatory provisions.

Therefore, the true question is one which Bartulin avoids: why did this happen, what are the causes and what were the consequences?

How was it possible – to use just one example – that Budak, as education minister who made a series of anti-Jewish statements, declined the proposal to publish a state-funded grammar of the Gypsy (Roma) language in 1941, but not because it was contrary to "racial decrees" in force, but by saying that he had more important tasks so that this grammar could wait a year or two?²³⁴ Why did Budak refer to a lack of revenues rather than legal provisions contained in racial legislation, and why did it never occur to him to undertake any action against the individual who proposed the publication of a Gypsy language grammar? Why did it not occur to him that such a proposal did not comply with precisely the one from the "racial decrees" he co-signed himself? Does this say anything about the reasons why he co-signed it, and the circumstances under which he did so?

These are questions worth asking, even if no certain answers to them can be found at this moment.

²³¹ In it, racial theory is described as "a pseudo-scientific social and polit.[ical] 'theory' based on a value differentiation of races (...) and the assertion that biological racial qualities exclusively dictate the cult.[ural] and hist.[orical] mission of individual nations" (*Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda*, 6, "Perfekt-Sindhi", Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1962, pp. 352-353).

²³² Space here does not allow a list of all of these textbooks, but interested and objective readers can easily verify my statement even by a perfunctory overview of primary and secondary school textbooks, and the mandatory textbooks used in the university departments of medicine, philosophy and law.

²³³ In the original: "O moj Bože dragi, / malen ti se molim; / pouči me, kako / da sve ljude volim..." (*Moj dom. Početnica i čitanka za I. godište pučkih škola u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb, 1941, p. 88).

²³⁴ HDA, Osobni fond Mile Budaka [Mile Budak personal papers], bx. 1, vol. 3, no. 147.

In other words, it is entirely clear that Bartulin's constructs stand on flimsy legs.

And his approach to a serious topic is illustrated by the defence he offers when forced to acknowledge that I was correct when I pointed out that the words "We are the progeny of wolves and lions" was not a phrase from Ustasha propaganda, but rather a verse by Vladimir Nazor. Bartulin defends himself by saying that he is not "a historian of Croatian literature and do not claim expertise on the subject of the use of literary metaphors by Croatian poets and writers".

This clumsy response is not fit for a scholar and highlights a minimum of three sad facts.

First, not only is Bartulin not an expert in Croatian literature, he does not even have an rudimentary knowledge of the subject. For as I showed in my review of his article, Nazor's verses are not some exotic detail from the margins of Croatian literature, they are rather included in every school primer, and due to their programmatic character, they were often cited and used as a political slogan and catchphrase.²³⁵ They are not, therefore, solely a literary but also a political fact. In other words, for an intellectual, particularly one in the humanist disciplines, and especially a historian, to be unaware of them is actually an affront.

Second, only Bartulin himself may – after being forced to do so – acknowledge that he is not an expert in Croatian literature (and that he even need not be!), but despite this he still wants to engage in a debate on Croatian culture, and even state in the title to his reply that he is debating Croatian culture in the 1900-1945 period. For only Bartulin can believe that literature is not a part of culture.

And third, and worst of all, this indicates Bartulin's silent acknowledgment that he believes one may write about Croatian political and cultural-political history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without knowledge of the Croatian arts, and Croatian literature in particular. This admission is shocking and by itself demonstrates why Bartulin's texts cannot be classified as scholarship, but rather attempts to write politically correct pamphlets whereby the author intends to achieve some other objectives.

Namely, it is simply impossible to write about topics during the period between 1815 and 1945 without a firm grasp of Croatian art and literature, since the vast majority of Croatian politicians and political ideologues more or less successfully engaged in artistic or literary activity during that era. Such work was an integral component of their social and political activity, and they used it to formulate their own ideological/political views, and also to popularize them.²³⁶ I can count major Croatian political leaders and ideologues who were not also poets and/or prose writers on the fingers of one hand.

²³⁵ T. Jonjić, "From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions".

²³⁶ The same applies to the preceding period, when writers assumed the role of national ideologues or when national ideologues tried their hand at writing. The examples of Marko Marulić,

Literary work was, for example, produced by Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652-1713), Fr. Andrija Dorotić (1761-1837) and Maksimilijan Vrhovac (1752-1827). During the period of the Croatian national awakening, it was actually impossible to draw a clear line between the political and cultural/artistic dimensions of the activity of Croatian public activists, since their literary and political activities constituted an organic whole: the national and literary awakenings were two dimensions of the same movement.²³⁷ The writers included: Janko Drašković (1770-1856), Antun Mihanović (1796-1861), Pavao Štoos (1806-1862), Šime Starčević (1784-1859), Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872), Ante Kuzmanić (1807-1879), Mirko Bogović (1816-1893), Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (1816-1889), Ivan Franjo Jukić (1818-1857), Grga Martić (1822-1905), Ivan Mažuranić (1814-1890), Ljudevit Vukotinović (1813-1893), etc. Literature was also a serious and rather successful preoccupation of Ante Starčević, the founder of the Party of Rights, the *Father of the Homeland*, while the leaders of the Croatian national awakening in Dalmatia, Fr. Mihovil Pavlinović (1831-1887) and Nadko Nodilo (1834-1912), also tried their hand at literature. Safvet beg-Bašagić (1870-1934) entered public life through literature, and literary work was also produced by the leaders of the Croatian national awakening in Istria: Bishop Juraj Dobrila (1812-1882), Matko Laginja (1852-1930), Matko Baštijan (1828-1885), Vjekoslav Spinčić (1848-1933) and others.

At the end of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, an important role in Croatian political life was played by literary giants. Ivan Mažuranić served as *ban* (viceroy), Eugen Kumičić (1850-1904) was a deputy in Croatian Parliament (Sabor) for many years, and for a time he was also chairman of the Pure Party of Rights. The respected prosaist Ksaver Šandor Gjalski (1854-1935) was a deputy in both the Croatian diet and the Hungary assembly, and grand prefect of Zagreb County and also a member of the Provisional People's Representation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Vladimir Nazor (1876-1949) died while serving as a high official of the Yugoslav communist regime, i.e., chairman of the Presidium of the *Sabor* (Parliament) of the People's Republic of Croatia. Croatian political life would have been unthinkable without the Rightist men of letters such as Ante Kovačić

Ivan Gundulić, Petar Zrinski, Fr. Filip Grabovac, Fr. Andrija Kačić Miošić and others speak clearly to this point. Even after the Second World War, Croatian writers assumed the role of defenders of the national interest, advocating them in their works or in the newspapers and magazines they edited. Among the most important phenomena of Croatian political history in 1945-1990 is undoubtedly the appearance of the "circle" generation in literature in the 1950s, the publication of periodicals *Hrvatski književni list* in 1968-1969 (launched and edited by writer Zlatko Tomičić), *Kritika* (edited by writer Vlatko Pavletić), *Hrvatski tjednik* (edited by writers Igor Zidić and Vlado Gotovac), etc.

²³⁷ Milorad Živančević, "Ilirizam", *Povijest hrvatske književnosti*, sv. 4: *Ilirizam – Realizam*, Zagreb, 1975, p. 30 ff; Miroslav Šicel, *Riznica ilirska 1835-1985* (Zagreb-Ljubljana, 1985) 11, pp. 23-25. Cf. Jakša Ravlić, "Hrvatski narodni preporod", *Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti*, (Zagreb, 1965), pp. 74-75.

(1854-1899), August Harambašić (1861-1911) and Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević (1865-1908), and particularly without Antun Gustav Matoš (1873-1914) and the entire constellation of his admirers and literary descendents. Some of them would become ideologues of integral Yugoslavism, such as Vladimir Čerina and, briefly, Tin Ujević, while others – such as Mile Budak – assumed high posts in the Ustasha movement.

The leaders and ideologues of the Croatian Catholic movement were also writers (such as Petar Grgec), while on the opposite side the leading positions were again occupied by writers (such as Milan Marjanović). In something of a Croatian version of the *Kulturkampf* which was waged at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, known as a conflict between the “elderly” and “youth”, an exceptionally important role was played by one of the founders, and main ideologue, of the Croatian People’s Peasant Party, Antun Radić (1868-1919), as well as almost all of the authors mentioned in Bartulin’s own text.

To be sure, they are remembered much more for their aesthetic/philosophical and political views than their literature, but their literary output was an integral component of their ideological systems. Historian, politician and ideologue Milan Šufflay (1879-1931) wrote a number of literary works, even the first Croatian futurist novel. Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić also dabbled in literature (besides a number of sketches, he wrote a novel on the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander in Marseille), wherein he was not considered untalented by literary critics. While he was later best known as the most vocal proponent of the Gothic origin of the Croats, Catholic priest Kerubin Šegvić (1867-1945) thundered against modernism and liberalism in literature and the arts (and based on similar positions, in 1933 he launched and initially edited the journal *Hrvatska smotra*). Literary novice Ivo Pilar (1874-1933) imposed himself as the ideologue of modernist trends with his study entitled *Secesija*. The promoters of modernist tendencies also included painter and writer Iso Kršnjavi (1845-1927), a deputy in the Croatian Parliament and departmental head of religion and education in the government of Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry, and later a fierce Frankist who was retired soon after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Besides expressing their own aesthetic, ethical and national-political views in their works, many of these writers also edited newspapers, magazines and reviews which played crucial role in forming Croatian public and political life. As a numerically small, relatively poor and unfree nation, until the most recent period in the history the Croats did not have separate scholarly journals, rather they published literary, popular and scholarly texts in the same publications.

I shall herein mention only a few of these magazines: Ante Starčević edited and contributed with a not insignificant amount to the pages of *Neven*; in the period leading up to the First World War, Ante Tresić Pavičić edited *Novi viek*, Milivoj Dežman Ivanov launched *Mladost*, and then *Život*, while in 1903 he took over *Vienac* with Gjalski. Between the two World Wars he served as direc-

tor of *Obzor*, the most influential daily newspaper in Croatia. Branko Drechsler Vodnik edited *Nova Hrvatska*, Čerina edited *Val* and *Vihor*, while Branimir Livadić held the top post in *Savremenik* for roughly ten years. Karlo Häusler edited *Sutla*, Milan Marjanović *Zvono*, *Jug* and *Književne novosti*, Petar Grgec edited *Hrvatska prosvjeta*, Ljubomir Maraković edited *Luč*, Zvonimir Vukelić edited *Hrvatska smotra*, Mile Budak and Josip Matasović edited *Mlada Hrvatska*, while between the World Wars Budak also edited the bulletins of the Croatian Party of Rights (*Hrvatska misao*, *Hrvatsko pravo*), Kranjčević was the actual editor of the Sarajevo-based *Nada*, Krešimir Kovačić began editing *Grabancijaš*, Ljubo Wiesner edited *Hrvatska mlada lirika*, and then *Grič*. Miroslav Krleža and August Cesarec launched the Marxist (communist) *Plamen* in 1919. Several years later, Krleža headed *Književna republika*, while in 1934 he launched, together with Milan Bogdanović, *Danas*. On the eve of the Second World War, he launched *Pečat* with a group of adherents.

Most of leading personalities in culture and propaganda during the time of the NDH were also writers and artists. The respected and influential writer Mile Budak, who was undoubtedly the best known leader of the Ustasha movement after Ante Pavelić, launched and edited the weekly newspaper *Hrvatski narod* in 1939, which became a daily during the time of the NDH. For a considerable period its editor was Matija Kovačić, who then became the director general of propaganda. During the interwar years, Kovačić edited the Osijek-based newspaper *Hrvatski list*, and he also tried his hand at literary and theatrical criticism. Writer Jure Pavičić (1906-1946) was the general manager of the Croatian State Printing Press. The editorial board of *Hrvatski narod* included the rather well-respected writer Ivo Lendić, earlier the editor of *Hrvatska straža*, as well as a series of lesser known prose writers. The editorial board of the Croatian encyclopaedia remained in the hands of writer and literary historian Mate Ujević, the former editor of *Luč*, and he also assumed the top post in HIBZ, the most powerful publishing company in the state. Dušan Žanko, the intendant of the Croatian State Theatre, served as editor *Hrvatska smotra* for a time just before the war. Croatian writer Alija Nametak (1906-1987) edited *Novi behar*, *Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice* and *Kalendar Narodne uzdanice* before the war, and after the proclamation of the NDH he was appointed commissioner of the Croatian State Theatre in Sarajevo. That theatre's intendant was writer Ahmed Muradbegović (1898-1972), who also contributed to the Sarajevo newspaper *Hrvatsku misao*. After writer Blaž Jurišić, the post of editor of *Hrvatska revija* during the NDH was assumed by writers Marko Čović, Branimir Livadić and Olinko Delorko, while the German-Croatian paper *Suradnja* was edited by writer Ljubo Wiesner...

In other words, without knowledge of Croatian literature, it is impossible to discuss not only Croatian culture, but also Croatian politics. For one cannot comprehend Rightist thought without Kumičić's glorification of the cult of Zrinski and Frankopan, nor can one begin to grasp the Rightist attitude toward the Muslims without Kovačić's parody *Smrt babe Čengićkinje* (The Death

of Granny Čengić) and the Rightist condemnation of this otherwise highly praised epic poem by Mažuranić, who was about as concerned with the historical truth as Bartulin, and who succeeded brilliantly not only because of his artistic skills, but also because of the traditional anti-Ottoman feeling which, primarily in Yugoslav-oriented circles, generally grew into an anti-Muslim animosity. Someone who is unfamiliar with the articles and feuilletons by Matoš cannot seriously write about Josip Frank, nor can one comprehend the factional splits among the Rightists without knowledge of Tin Ujević, Krešimir Kovačić and Vladimir Čerina on one side, and Budak on the other. The development of the Yugoslav communist movement cannot be analyzed without insight into the so-called conflict on the literary left, and so forth.

That Nevenko Bartulin thinks differently only demonstrates his very flexible definition of the term “intellectual” and the fact that he – with a considerable dose of smug self-assurance – considers himself a scholar. I sincerely pity those who share this opinion. However, as a Christian, I shall conclude on a note of mercy: those previously mentioned verses which I fear, with apparent good reason, Bartulin would recognize as echoing the works of Hitler and Rosenberg were written by Croatian poet Petar Preradović (1818-1872), and published in 1841, exactly one hundred years prior to the proclamation of the NDH.²³⁸ Bartulin, after all, says that he does “not claim expertise” on Croatian literature, so it is only Christian to point this out to him and spare him the trouble of building some new edifice. For his time is valuable, and the plains of La Mancha are vast. And there are so many of those windmills...

BARTULINS KAMPF GEGEN WINDMÜHLEN: MANIPULATION ALS HISTORIOGRAPHISCHE METHODE

Zusammenfassung

In seiner polemischen Antwort auf die in diesem Heft veröffentlichte Replik des Nevenko Bartulin auf seine kurze Notiz die im Jahr 2010 erschien, behauptet der Autor, dass Bartulin und seine Beiträge sehr schwerlich als wissenschaftlich zu bezeichnen sind. Sie sind mehr ein Versuch, eine neue Version der kroatischen Geschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ohne Rücksicht

²³⁸ “...Ovdje divlje čete smrvi / Rod naš čil i zdrav, / Hrvatskom se ovdje krvi / Spasi Zapad sav” (“...Here our people vigorous and strong / Pulverized the wild hordes, / By the blood of Croats / The entire West is saved”) (Petar Preradović, “Na Grobniku”. *Djela Petra Preradovića. Prvo potpuno i kritično izdanje, I. knjiga*. Compiled by Branko Vodnik (Zagreb, 1918), pp. 146-148.)

auf Tatsachen und Quellen, auf politisch korrekte Weise zu formulieren und den abstrakten postmodernen, in Wirklichkeit aber erkennbaren ideologischen Modellen anzupassen, die von den selbsternannten, fast ausschliesslich ausländischen Experten ausgebaut sind, die die politische und kulturelle Geschichte des kroatischen und der Nachbarvölkern nur oberflächlich kennen. Seine Behauptung, Bartulin hat gleich wie seine Vorbilder eine sehr ausgeprägte Neigung die Faktographie zu ignorieren, illustriert der Autor mit einer dokumentierten Liste von mehr als sechzig Fehler die sein polemischer Gegner auf etwa 19 Seiten seines Beitrags gemacht hat. Daraus schliesst er, dass die historiographische Interpretation des Nevenko Bartulin, der durchschnittlich drei faktographische Fehler pro einer Textseite macht, ist selbstverständlich nicht zu ernst zu nehmen.

Dazu kommt, dass Bartulin auch in seiner Replik die Abhandlung über die Kernfragen des Disputs vermeidet: seine Abneigung gegenüber Urkunden und gleichzeitig seine Neigung, die anderen historischen Quellen zu fragmentieren und die selektiv gewählten Bruchstücken ausser dem historischen Kontext zu betrachten, weiterhin die seit langem festgestellten und dokumentierten Tatsachen zu ignorieren und gleichzeitig dem Andersdenkenden die Gedanken und Thesen zu imputieren, die dieser weder gesagt noch geschrieben hat, um gegen diesen ersonnenen Konstruktionen ähnlich wie Don Quijote gegen Windmühlen stürmen zu können. Solche erdachte Vorwürfe zeigen aber, dass ihr Erfinder sehr mangelhafte Kenntnisse über die kroatische kulturelle und politische Geschichte hat. Dadurch kann man erklären, dass Bartulin immer wieder die gleichen Thesen recyclet und die gleichen Fussnoten und Anmerkungen wiederholt. Das ist leicht festzustellen, wenn man seinen Artikel aus dem Jahr 2009, der mit dieser Polemik nichts zu tun hat, mit seiner hiesigen Replik vergleicht.

Obwohl das Verhältniss der kroatischen Intelligenz aus dem 19. und der ersten Hälfte der 20. Jahrhunderts gegenüber Rassenlehre in Autors Notiz über Bartulins Beitrag überhaupt nicht erwähnt war, nimmt der Autor in seiner Antwort die Herausforderung an. Er behauptet, dass die Ideologen des kroatischen Nationalismus dieser Zeit selbstverständlich in Berührung mit diesen Themen gekommen sind, da über sie das ganze Europa debattiert hat. Jedoch hatten die Rassenlehre, Eugenik und Sozialdarwinismus keine wichtige Rolle bei Gestaltung der Ideologie des kroatischen Nationalismus, da alle seine relevante Vorkämpfer nicht nur die kroatische Nation sondern das kroatische Volk selbst als eine politische und nicht als eine rassische oder religiöse Formation betrachteten. Im Gegensatz zu denen machten die jugoslawisch orientierte Ideologen viel mehr Gebrauch von der Rassenlehre, da Jugoslawismus nicht nur ein Rassenkonzept beinhaltet sondern in Wirklichkeit eine rassistische Grundlage hatte.

REACTION • RÉACTION



LETTRE À LA SECRÉTAIRE PERPETUELLE DE L'ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE : EN FINIR AVEC LES MANIPULATIONS POLITIQUES DE L'ATTENTAT DE MARSEILLE DE 1934

Marc GJIDARA
Nada MAJER
Georges - Marie CHENU^{1*}

L'attentat contre le roi de Yougoslavie est dû à un membre de l'Organisation Révolutionnaire Intérieure Macédonienne. Il coûta aussi la vie à un ministre français victime des tirs désordonnés de la police. Les trois membres de l'Oustachi jugés pour ces meurtres étaient loin du lieu de l'attentat. La présentation des faits a été longtemps manipulée à des fins politiques, comme a été faussé le procès qui a suivi. L'avocat du trio croate a été radié de l'Ordre des avocats puis réintégré sitôt le procès terminé. C'est l'occultation de pièces essentielles du dossier qui a permis d'abuser durablement bon nombre d'historiens.

????????????????????????????????

Madame Hélène Carrère d'Encausse
Secrétaire perpétuel de l'Académie française
23, quai Conti
75270 - Paris

Paris, le 11 avril 2012

Madame,

Dans votre ouvrage consacré à l'histoire de l'Académie française, sous le titre « Des siècles d'immortalité », paru aux éditions Fayard, vous évoquez la fin tragique de Louis Barthou. Ainsi vous écrivez en bas de la page 226 et en haut de la page 227 : « Louis Barthou ... sera assassiné seize ans plus tard avec le roi Alexandre de Yougoslavie, triste épisode dans l'éternel conflit des nationalités dans les Balkans, le tueur étant croate ! ». Vous ajoutez également à la page 255 : « Barthou, deux ans plus tard, venait d'être abattu par un terroriste, croate...qui

¹ * Marc Gjidara, Pont – Levoy, France ; Nada Majer, Zagreb, Croatie ; Georges - Marie Chenu, Combs-la-Ville, France

voulait assassiner le roi Alexandre de Yougoslavie - le drame balkanique s'était transféré à Marseille - et avait tué dans un même élan le roi, hôte de la France, et le ministre français des Affaires étrangères qui l'avait accueilli ».

Tout lecteur averti ne peut qu'être surpris par ces affirmations concernant d'une part le régicide et sa véritable appartenance nationale et d'autre part les circonstances de la mort de Louis Barthou, qui ne correspondent ni à la réalité des faits, ni à la vérité historique. La réputation de l'Institution que vous représentez et la notoriété qui est la vôtre, imposent à cet égard une absolue rigueur dans la présentation des événements ainsi rapportés et dans leur commentaire. Tel est l'objet du présent courrier, qui se veut le plus précis possible, pour votre information personnelle, celle des membres de l'Académie ainsi que de vos lecteurs.

L'auteur de l'attentat de Marseille contre le roi de Yougoslavie le 9 octobre 1934 était porteur d'un passeport établi au nom de « Petr Kelemen », délivré le 20 mai 1934 par le consul de Tchécoslovaquie à Zagreb. **C'était un Macédonien membre de l'Organisation Révolutionnaire Intérieure Macédonienne (ORIM)**, ainsi que le prouve le tatouage trouvé sur son cadavre après l'attentat. Le Rapport du Commissaire Pierre Cals, des services de police de Marseille, décrit avec force détails ce tatouage, composé d'une guirlande au milieu de laquelle se trouvait une tête de mort avec deux tibias entrecroisés. Au-dessus et au-dessous de cette tête de mort figuraient deux inscriptions : d'une part, le sigle de l'Organisation « BMPO » (version en caractères cyrilliques de l'acronyme ORIM) et d'autre part, la devise « la liberté ou la mort ». Kelemen s'était fait faire ce tatouage durant un séjour à la prison Kiroutkov de Sofia en 1924.

Il s'agissait en réalité de **Velitchko Gueorguiev Kerin**, fils de Dimitri Velitchko Kerin et de Risa Hristokova Abadijeva, né le 18 octobre 1897 à Kamenitza, en Bulgarie. Avec ses deux sœurs et son frère, il est donc d'origine bulgare-macédonienne compte tenu de la nationalité de ses parents. Le registre municipal de la ville de Sofia le présente comme un sujet bulgare qui serait né le 15 mars 1897 dans les environs de Stip. Après la guerre balkanique de 1912-1913, son village ayant été brûlé par l'armée serbe, il va avec son père habiter à proximité de Pester, puis il s'installe dans la petite ville de Bansko près de Razlog. C'est en 1920 qu'il a contracté un premier mariage à Kamenitza avec Donka Vasila Nejkova, qui lui donna une fille prénommée Latinka. Après le divorce prononcé aux torts de cette dernière, il épouse Trayana Boudinova avec laquelle il a vécu à Sofia jusqu'en 1932, qu'il quitte cette même année pour ne plus y paraître.

Lors de son **affiliation à l'organisation nationaliste macédonienne en 1922**, il est inscrit sous le nom de Vlado Tchernozemski. En 1928, il exécute à Sofia le député communiste Dimo Hadji Dimov. Condamné à mort sous le nom de Vladimir Dimitrov, né dans le village de Petric près de Stip, il bénéficie de l'amnistie générale de la loi du 5 janvier 1932. Pour un autre meurtre, il est condamné à la prison à vie par le tribunal de Sofia en 1931 sous le nom de

Vladimir Tchernozemski, mais bénéficie pour cette peine de la même loi d'amnistie.

L'Organisation Révolutionnaire Intérieure Macédonienne est issue de la lutte contre l'occupant turc et s'est reconvertie dans le combat pour l'indépendance de la Macédoine. Créée en 1893 par plusieurs pères fondateurs dont les instituteurs Damian Groneff, Pere Tocheff et Gotche Deltcheff, l'ORIM après avoir lutté contre l'occupation turque s'est tournée contre l'Etat grec et contre l'Etat yougoslave dominé par la Serbie. Elle a ensuite été dirigée par Ivan dit Vantcha Mihajlov, élu à sa tête en 1924. Celui-ci a concentré les forces de cette puissante organisation secrète contre l'ennemi principal de l'indépendance macédonienne, la dynastie serbe. C'est en 1931 notamment, que le grand reporter que fut Albert Londres est parti en Macédoine enquêter sur ce mystérieux mouvement nationaliste (voir l'article de Jean Christophe Nothias dans « L'Autre journal », N° 5/1991, pp. 144 et s.). Selon certains auteurs, l'organisation comptait 9.000 membres en 1923, et aurait effectué environ 460 incursions en Yougoslavie faisant près de 260 victimes entre 1919 et 1934 (sur ce point : I. Banac, « National Question in Yugoslavia », Cornell University, U.S.A., 1972, pp. 37 à 45 ; également C. Eylan, « La vie et la mort d'Alexandre 1^{er} roi de Yougoslavie », éd. Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1935, p. 69).

La participation de l'ORIM au complot contre la personne du roi Alexandre 1^{er} et le fait que l'auteur de l'attentat soit un Macédonien, s'expliquent par les terribles épreuves infligées au peuple macédonien après l'annexion par la Serbie en 1913. La répression contre les populations non serbes (croates, musulmanes bosniaques, monténégrines et macédoniennes principalement) se prolongea après 1918 et singulièrement sous le règne d'Alexandre 1^{er}. Celui-ci et sa dynastie tenaient leur trône des conjurés qui assassinèrent le roi Alexandre Obrenovic et la reine Draga en 1903 à Belgrade. Par la suite et du jour où Alexandre 1^{er} instaura sa dictature personnelle le 6 janvier 1929, il s'exposa personnellement à des attentats de la part d'éventuels « vengeurs » des peuples opprimés, en dehors des autres dangers qui ont plané en permanence sur tous les souverains balkaniques en général et serbes en particulier depuis plus d'un siècle.

Les persécutions antimacédoniennes ont été dénoncées par des personnalités comme le professeur Miletic de l'Université de Sofia, lui-même d'ascendance croate, dans diverses publications de l'Institut scientifique macédonien de Sofia. Monseigneur Boris archevêque d'Ochrida et Monseigneur Neophyte archevêque de Skopje ont aussi dénoncé publiquement les exactions de l'organisation serbe dénommée Narodna Obrana, absorbée ensuite par la Main Noire qui fut à l'origine de l'attentat de Sarajevo en 1914, relayée elle-même par la Main Blanche également pourvoyeuse de tueurs dont les crimes et les méfaits étaient nombreux à l'époque. Henri Pozzi dans son ouvrage intitulé « La guerre revient » (éd. Paul Berger, Paris, 1933), et Z.G. Pavlovic dans son livre « Bitka na Jadru » (La bataille du Jadar, éd. Makarija, Belgrade, 1924), ainsi que les journaux tels que Republika du 26 novembre 1920 et du 16 mars 1922, Radnicke Novine du 17 novembre 1919, Politika du 5 novembre 1920,

Balkan du 2 septembre 1921 et du 27 septembre 1923, Radnik du 10 juillet 1924, Pravda du 27 juillet 1924, ont décrit la situation en Macédoine, les sévices exercés par les policiers, les paramilitaires, et les missions des « escadrons de la mort » serbes dans le pays. De nombreux autres témoignages existaient à l'époque, sur le degré d'exaspération régnant chez les Macédoniens, tels ceux de Constantin Stanichev, président du Conseil National Macédonien, sur les faits de sadisme policier qui se sont produits à Kalcanik, Souchitza, Dobrev. Des excès identiques se sont aussi produits au Monténégro (voir l'ouvrage de P. Chotch, « L'alliée martyre. Le Monténégro », La Diplomatie Publique, 1920, p. 10, rapportant aussi les constatations du docteur Burnham, chef de la Mission de secours canadienne, p. 11). Il suffit de citer du côté croate et entre autres épisodes sanglants, l'assassinat du professeur Sufflay à Zagreb le 18 février 1931, et l'attentat perpétré en plein parlement à Belgrade le 20 juin 1928 contre cinq députés croates, qui coûta la vie à deux d'entre eux tués sur le coup alors que deux autres survécurent, le leader croate de l'opposition parlementaire, Stjepan Radic, devant ensuite succomber à ses blessures.

La situation intérieure réelle de la Yougoslavie était largement occultée en France à l'époque de l'attentat, en dépit de certaines mises en garde (sur ce point : l'ouvrage de Svetozar Pribitchevitch, « La dictature du roi Alexandre », éd. Pierre Bossuet, Paris, 1933 ; également, Ernest Pezet et Henri Simonet, « La Yougoslavie en péril ? », éd. Bloud et Gay, Paris, 1933). C'est ce qui a permis toutes les manipulations ultérieures à propos de la mort du roi Alexandre de Yougoslavie, s'agissant plus particulièrement de l'identité réelle du régicide et de l'attribution inexacte de la mort de Louis Barthou à ce même meurtrier. C'est à juste titre que dès le lendemain de l'attentat, le journal L'Illustration daté du 8 décembre 1934 (N° 4788, page 506), constatait sous la plume de Ludovic Naudeau écrivant sur « La Yougoslavie telle qu'elle est », que « *les quatre vingt dix neuf centièmes des Français manquent à cet égard des connaissances primaires sans lesquelles il est bien vain de leur part de vouloir essayer de raisonner* ». Il est clair que la France officielle ne comprenait pas la situation réelle d'une Macédoine divisée en trois, et d'une Croatie privée de liberté et opprimée. Cela explique, toujours selon Ludovic Naudeau, que « *conduit par des Croates, ce Macédonien a fait à Marseille le sacrifice de sa vie* » (L'Illustration du 24 Novembre 1934, N° 4786, page 413). Car, contrairement à ce qui s'écrira plus tard, dès 1934 il est notoire que « *... le revolver ait été tenu à Marseille non pas par un Croate, mais par un Macédonien* » (ibidem).

C'est l'un des chefs de la police serbe de l'époque qui a écrit, qu'à la fin du mois d'août 1934, lors d'une rencontre à Rome à l'hôtel Continental, « *Pavelic et Mihajlov convinrent de mettre sur pied plusieurs groupes terroristes en prévision de l'attentat..... Mihajlov proposa que le premier groupe fût conduit par son chauffeur Vlada Gueorguiev Kerin* » (Vladeta Milicevic, « L'assassinat du Roi Alexandre 1^{er} à Marseille », Hohwacht, Bad Godesberg, 1959, page 55). Que les deux organisations aient agi de concert s'explique, d'une part, par le fait que Pavelic avait défendu comme avocat plusieurs membres de l'ORIM devant les

tribunaux yougoslaves, et d'autre part, parce qu'un Pacte officiel liait les deux mouvements nationalistes (Jean Kapel, « Les Oustachis vengeurs du peuple croate », Histoire Magazine, N° 15, avril-mai 1981, p. 37). Les deux organisations révolutionnaires, l'une croate (l'«Oustacha», qui signifie «l'Insurgé») et l'autre macédonienne, avaient défini ensemble leurs objectifs.

Effectivement, **le Pacte Oustacha – ORIM a bel et bien été signé à Sofia le 20 avril 1929**, par le docteur Ante Pavelic et Gustav Percec pour la partie croate, et au nom du Comité National Macédonien par son président le docteur Stanichef, les vice-présidents, Kisselintcheff et N. Iakimoff, les secrétaires I. Vassileff, V. Doumeff, N. Grabovsky, et les membres M. Dimitroff, I. Hadjoff, B. Antonoff, S. Nanef, G. Kondoff et Topukoff. En voici le texte intégral d'après le document original manuscrit rédigé en croate et en macédonien: « *Au cours de la visite fraternelle que le député croate Docteur Ante Pavelic et le représentant de la ville de Zagreb Gustav Percec ont rendue au Comité National des Organisations des émigrés macédoniens en Bulgarie, il a été constaté des deux côtés que le régime impossible auquel sont soumises la Croatie et la Macédoine, leur impose de coordonner leur activité légale pour conquérir des droits nationaux et humains, la liberté politique et l'indépendance pour la Croatie et la Macédoine.*

En conséquence, les deux parties déclarent que pour l'avenir elles vont unir leurs efforts pour atteindre cet idéal des deux peuples frères ».

Aucun agent extérieur à ces deux parties n'a présidé à cette alliance, car ni l'Oustacha ni l'ORIM n'ont eu besoin à cette date de quelque parrainage que ce soit, pour définir les buts de leur lutte commune, totalement étrangère aux inspirations « allemandes ou italiennes » qui leur seront prêtées plus tard, afin de dénaturer leur combat et dénigrer leur cause nationale respective. En revanche, le roi de Yougoslavie avait amorcé dès 1933 un rapprochement poussé avec l'Allemagne, dont il appréciait l'anticommunisme, et pour faire pièce aux visées territoriales italiennes (sur ce point : l'ouvrage précité de C. Eylan, pp. 116 à 129 et B. Krizman, « Vanjska politika jugoslavenske drzave 1918-1941 » - La politique extérieure de l'Etat yougoslave 1918-1941- Zagreb, 1975, pp. 58, 60, 67, 79, 80 ; également, Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939, Tome VII, pp. 628, 650-651).

Par conséquent, **les faits parlent d'eux-mêmes : c'est un Macédonien membre de l'ORIM qui a tué le roi et non pas un membre croate de l'Oustacha**. Les trois Croates membres de l'Oustacha qui seront ensuite arrêtés par la police française, n'étaient pas présents à Marseille le 9 octobre 1934 au moment précis de l'attentat. Mio Kralj, qui était censé « couvrir » Kelemen dans sa fuite, avait quitté la Canebière avant même la fusillade, rentrant à Aix-en-Provence pour gagner ensuite Fontainebleau via Avignon. Finalement il y est interpellé le 10 octobre 1934, parvient à échapper une première fois à la police et se fait appréhender le 15 octobre suivant à Melun. Quant à Zvonimir Pospisil et Ivan Raic, qui étaient censés préparer un attentat à Versailles au cas où celui de Marseille aurait échoué, ils étaient très loin de Marseille au moment

des faits, et furent finalement arrêtés à Thonon-les-Bains dans la nuit du 10 au 11 octobre 1934, alors qu'ils voulaient regagner la Suisse par le train. Ce sont ces trois Croates qui furent jugés au cours d'un procès qui s'est déroulé à Aix-en-Provence dans des conditions hautement discutables. Leur défenseur Maître Georges Desbons, avocat à la Cour d'Appel de Paris, victime d'une machination, fut radié du Barreau et expulsé *manu militari* du tribunal le 19 novembre 1935, pour des propos qui lui ont été faussement attribués. Il a été publiquement et officiellement réintégré un an après dans des conditions qui ne pouvaient que confirmer rétrospectivement le caractère politique d'une cabale judiciaire montée de toutes pièces. Cette péripétie a néanmoins sauvé les trois accusés de la condamnation à mort voulue par Belgrade. Finalement, le dénommé Mio Kralj né le 17 septembre 1908 à Koprivnica mourra en prison à Fontevault en 1941 des suites d'une grave maladie. Zvonimir Pospisil né le 9 juin 1904 à Vukovine (canton de Velika Gorica) décèdera à la maison centrale de Caen en 1940 des suites d'une opération. Enfin Ivan Raic, né le 5 janvier 1903 à Kolendica (canton de Ludbreg) est le seul à être libéré le 12 décembre 1941, et une fois rentré dans son pays il y mourra en 1944 durant la guerre.

Il n'est pas indifférent de noter, à propos de la participation de l'Organisation révolutionnaire macédonienne à l'attentat de Marseille, que le choix de Maître Georges Desbons comme défenseur des trois détenus croates membres de l'Oustacha a également été fait après consultation des dirigeants nationalistes macédoniens, en concertation avec eux et en application du Pacte de Sofia conclu en 1929. C'est le professeur Miletic, président de l'Académie bulgare, qui a suggéré les noms des défenseurs possibles, dont celui de Maître Georges Desbons, lui-même membre de l'Académie macédonienne, qui était lié aux milieux macédoniens et auteur de travaux historiques et littéraires sur la Bulgarie. Celui-ci a accepté d'assurer la défense des trois nationalistes croates, parce qu'il connaissait très bien la situation intérieure de la Yougoslavie à l'époque, et qu'il savait que Louis Barthou n'était pas mort des suites d'une blessure par arme à feu faite par Kelemen.

En effet, contrairement à l'affirmation couramment reprise et nettement orientée selon laquelle Louis Barthou aurait succombé des suites des tirs provenant de l'arme utilisée par Kelemen, celui-ci n'est pas le meurtrier du ministre français des affaires étrangères. Cela a été formellement établi dès l'origine au cours de l'enquête policière, mais pour des raisons de « haute politique », **tout a été fait pour imposer l'idée fausse attribuant la mort de Louis Barthou à un membre croate de l'Oustacha**. La vérité a été sciemment dissimulée et déformée, jusqu'à ce que l'imposture soit passée en force de « fait historique ». Il a fallu attendre certaines révélations intervenues quarante ans plus tard, pour que l'exacte réalité soit rappelée par quelques historiens, sans que la « vérité officielle » ait pourtant été définitivement rétablie dans les écrits de tous ceux qui ont été amenés, pour une raison ou une autre, à évoquer l'attentat de Marseille.

La preuve irréfutable de ce que **le Macédonien Kelemen** (et les trois Croates encore moins) **n'était pas le meurtrier de Louis Barthou** a été apportée

par le **rapport d'expertise daté du 9 octobre 1935**, établi par le docteur G. Béroud directeur du laboratoire de police technique de Marseille et P. Gatimel expert armurier. Voici ce que disent les auteurs de ce rapport : « **La balle trouvée dans la voiture royale du côté gauche où était assis le président Barthou, constitue un projectile blindé de cuivre d'une cartouche de 8 millimètres, modèle 1892. Cette balle est du même calibre que celles tirées par les agents de police. Elle n'a pas été tirée par l'un ou l'autre des pistolets trouvés en la possession de Kelemen** ». Et les experts de conclure : « **La balle enveloppée de cuivre trouvée dans la voiture royale correspond aux balles tirées par les revolvers des agents de police** ».

Le projectile qui a touché Louis Barthou lui a traversé le bras, rompant une artère et brisant l'os. C'est cette balle qui a été découverte dans la voiture royale, une Delage découverte, qui transportait le roi et le ministre, logée entre la carrosserie et le dossier contre lequel était appuyé Louis Barthou. Celui-ci, qui reçut les premiers soins à l'hôpital (à l'Hôtel Dieu très précisément), a donc été touché par une balle tirée par un policier et non par un projectile provenant du pistolet « Mauser » de Kelemen. Des membres du service d'ordre ont en effet tiré dans toutes les directions, y compris sur l'auteur de l'attentat qui gisait déjà au sol. Les policiers yougoslaves qui suivaient le cortège ont eux-mêmes fait feu dans la direction de Kelemen dès les premières détonations, ce qui a aussi conduit les policiers français à riposter en direction des premiers, pris pour des complices et sans savoir à qui ils avaient à faire. C'est cela qui explique **les tirs croisés des policiers, qui ont blessé plusieurs personnes dont Louis Barthou**, les autres victimes étant Madame Dumazert et son fils, ainsi que Mesdames Dupré et Armellin, alors que Mesdames Durbec et Faris également atteintes devaient décéder.

Sur les 10 balles que contenait le chargeur du Mauser utilisé par Kelemen, 5 atteignirent le roi, 4 blessèrent le général Georges qui a voulu s'interposer, la dernière touchant l'agent Galy alors qu'il tentait de maîtriser Kelemen. Quant à la deuxième arme trouvée en sa possession - un Walter 7,65 - elle n'a tiré aucun projectile.

L'auteur de la blessure qui fut fatale à Louis Barthou pouvait être identifié. L'agent de police affolé et maladroit qui en était responsable n'aurait au pire encouru qu'une condamnation pour blessure par imprudence. La thèse officielle délibérément faussée, a été que Barthou aurait été blessé par Kelemen, lui-même inexactement présenté ensuite comme Croate et membre de l'Oustacha.

C'est l'historien Jacques de Launay qui a retrouvé dans les archives la pièce capitale constituée par le rapport d'expertise du 9 octobre 1935, « oublié » pendant quarante ans, démentant formellement l'affirmation selon laquelle le roi Alexandre 1^{er} et le ministre Louis Barthou auraient été victimes de la même arme et du même assassin. Cette « révélation » tardive figure dans son ouvrage sur « Les grandes controverses de l'histoire contemporaine 1914-1945 », Editio-

service, Genève, 1974, page 332. Un autre historien membre de l'Académie française, Alain Decaux, a confirmé pour sa part les termes de ce rapport, précisant que « *les policiers.....se mettent à tirer...Dans tous les sens, de la façon la plus désordonnée du monde... ce tir sans objet va atteindre dans la foule plusieurs personnes* ». Il ajoute à propos de Louis Barthou, dont « *l'artère humérale a été coupée juste au-dessus du coude* », que « *sur place, on lui a bien fait un garrot, mais au poignet !* ». Et il conclut sur ce point : « *La thèse officielle sera que le roi Alexandre et Barthou ont été atteints par le même assassin. C'est faux !* » (d'après son article sur « L'assassinat d'Alexandre 1^{er} de Yougoslavie », *Historia*, n° 432, novembre 1982, pp. 159 et 160). Avant lui un autre auteur, François Broche, a aussi écrit que le rapport établi par Pierre Mondanel, inspecteur général de police criminelle et vice-président d'Interpol, contredisait à la fois la thèse selon laquelle le ministre Barthou aurait été la cible de l'attentat et l'affirmation attribuant sa mort au même auteur (son ouvrage sur « Alexandre 1^{er} et Louis Barthou », collection Les grands crimes politiques, Balland, 1977, pp. 167 et 168).

Un autre témoignage essentiel mérite encore d'être cité, confirmant l'affolement qui régnait dans les rangs du service d'ordre et la maladresse des policiers, celui de Vladeta Milicevic chargé de diriger l'enquête pour le compte du gouvernement yougoslave. Ce personnage-clé, démentant ce qu'il écrivait par complaisance sur ce point dans son ouvrage (précité) publié en 1959 alors qu'il vivait à l'époque en France où il fut fait chevalier dans l'Ordre de la Légion d'honneur, a déclaré une fois rentré en Yougoslavie : « *le policier qui a tiré sur l'auteur de l'attentat était mauvais tireur. Il a atteint le ministre Barthou !* » (rapporté par Ivan Muzic dans son ouvrage « *Masonstvo u Hrvata* » - La Franc-Maçonnerie chez les Croates - Split, 1984, p. 307). Dans cette même déclaration, il s'en prenait à l'enquête diligentée par les autorités françaises de l'époque, dans les termes suivants : « *c'était l'une de ces enquêtes qui avaient pour mission de dissimuler et non pas de révéler, de cacher la responsabilité du gouvernement français et de ses organes policiersCroyez le ou non, je n'ai pu dire la vérité nulle part jusqu'à présent, car ils ne l'auraient pas publiée* » (ibidem, p. 306).

En dépit de toutes les preuves rassemblées et sans tenir compte des éléments factuels, **le gouvernement français a fait inculper les oustachas croates de l'assassinat de Louis Barthou, à la demande de Belgrade** qui avait besoin de cette inculpation. La vérité officielle a donc consisté à prétendre faussement, que Louis Barthou avait été tué par la même arme et par la même personne que le roi lui-même. Cela a permis à la presse de se déchaîner contre les individus emprisonnés, en prélude au procès qui devait suivre et à la future condamnation à la peine capitale qui était attendue. Sur le plan juridique et judiciaire, cela a conduit à les charger plus encore, en les accusant de faits commis par quelqu'un qui avait payé son acte de sa vie, et de faits imputables à d'autres, alors qu'eux-mêmes n'étaient ni présents sur les lieux ni les auteurs directs des faits incriminés, même s'ils participaient à un complot dirigé contre la personne du Roi.

La consigne diplomatique visait à souligner l'amitié entre la France et la Yougoslavie, renforcée par le même deuil, et à dissimuler lors du procès qui s'est déroulé à Aix-en-Provence l'implication de l'Italie. L'assassinat de Louis Barthou par Kelemen est un **mensonge volontaire**, comme est mensongère l'affirmation selon laquelle le régicide était un Croate membre de l'Oustacha. Mais cette présentation des faits était voulue par Belgrade, à des fins de politique intérieure, pour discréditer dans l'immédiat les comploteurs et leurs organisations et disqualifier pour l'avenir leur cause nationale aux yeux de l'opinion publique et plus largement au regard de l'Histoire.

Le gouvernement de la France à l'époque pouvait d'autant moins refuser d'accéder aux demandes de Belgrade, que les autorités yougoslaves auraient pu mettre en cause la négligence policière dans la réussite de l'attentat. Dans son ouvrage précité, François Broche écrit fort justement (page 168) : « *Dès lors, on comprend pourquoi ce brûlant secret d'Etat fut strictement gardé. Le président Barthou tué par des policiers français affolés, tirant dans tous les sens, à la fois sur la Delage et sur la foule... c'était une vérité trop absurde, trop scandaleuse, pour être livrée à l'opinion publique française et internationale* ». Mais aujourd'hui, près de quatre vingts ans après, et alors que la simple vérité historique est connue, peut-on encore continuer à induire en erreur l'opinion publique, manipuler les faits réels, et faire produire aux mensonges officiels tous leurs effets pervers ? L'Histoire de France et celle de votre illustre Institution méritent mieux que la perpétuation des mensonges officiels. S'il est normal et légitime de faire revivre le passé, il serait salutaire de le faire en pleine lumière, en rectifiant enfin certaines allégations qui n'ont pour elles que la force de leur répétition, mais très éloignées de la simple vérité historique.

En restant à votre disposition pour de plus amples informations et toutes précisions utiles que vous souhaiteriez recueillir, nous espérons que les observations et remarques qui précèdent pourront être prises en considération, notamment à l'occasion d'une prochaine réédition de votre ouvrage.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Madame le Secrétaire perpétuel, nos hommages respectueux, ainsi que l'expression de notre très haute considération.

Marc GJIDARA,
Professeur émérite de l'Université Paris-2,
PONT – LEVOY, France

Nada MAJER,
Traductrice, Interprète Chevalier de l'Ordre National du Mérite,
ZAGREB, Croatie

Georges - Marie CHENU,
Premier ambassadeur de France en Croatie,
COMBS-LA-VILLE, France

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Summary

After the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934, at which time French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou also sustained wounds to which he succumbed because he did not receive adequate medical attention at the scene, three members of the secret Ustasha organization were convicted. Their trial was conducted under very questionable circumstances, for the defence attorney was the victim of a political/judicial persecution which was meant to prevent him from highlighting the political aspects of the case (for which he was only exonerated a year later), while the accused were pronounced guilty for the deaths of all of the casualties and sentenced to life in prison, even though none of them were actually at the scene of the assassination. The assassination was carried out by a member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), and the target was the Yugoslav Karađorđević dynasty due to the subjugation and abuse which the Macedonians had suffered at the hands of the Serbian authorities and the royal dictatorship. This Macedonian nationalist was truly guilty of the king's death, but it was soon ascertained that Barthou fell as a victim of indiscriminate police gunfire, for events had spun out of their control. The actual operation was a result of the Agreement concluded in Sofia in 1929 by two revolutionary organizations, one Croatian and the other Macedonian. The manipulations which marked the trial and the misleading presentation of certain facts were influenced by reasons of internal Yugoslav politics and the diplomatic dictates set forth by the French side, which had to be submissively accepted. Numerous authors have backed these official claims, which were only distantly linked to reality and the facts, even though the circumstances under which Barthou died were long known, at least by historians who understood their discipline as an accurate and irrefutable science and for whom history must never be a mere instrument of propaganda.

REVIEWS • REZENSIONEN



Esther GITMAN, *When Courage Prevailed. The Rescue and Survival of Jews in the Independent State of Croatia 1941 – 1945.* (St. Paul, MN, USA: Paragon House, 2011), 271 pp. -- *Kad hrabrost prevlada. Spašavanja i preživljavanje Židova u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945.* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2012), 342 pp.

Gitman is a historian and sociologist of Jewish descent. She was born in Sarajevo, and after the Second World War she moved with her family to Israel, and then to Canada, and finally settled in the United States in 1972. She endured and survived the Holocaust thanks to the help of good people who were not Jews. This latter fact was crucial to her decision to begin systematic scholarly research into the rescue of Jews in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) from 1941 to 1945. The fruits of her many years of research have been published in this book which, in slightly supplemented form, was published in a Croatian edition in 2012 under the title *Kad hrabrost prevlada. Spašavanje i preživljavanje Židova u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945.*

In this book, Gitman very exhaustively presents the activities of many courageous people who, at the risk of their own lives, rescued Jews in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Here readers can find information on hundreds of people who decided to rescue Jews despite admonishments from the authorities and threats of severe penalties, risking their own lives and the lives of their families. Gitman herein particularly underlined the role of the archbishop of Zagreb of the time, Alojzije Stepinac. Investing great effort in researching the relevant archival materials and interviewing survivors or their descendants, she attempted to learn about who all of these people were and all of the ways in which they saved Jews from certain death. She cites examples of entire villages, factories, and pastors and nuns, and even Ustasha officers and soldiers as well as many other individuals who saved the lives of others at the risk of their own. Gitman extols them as very honourable, moral and, above all, courageous people. She also stresses that until now almost nothing had been written about these people and points out that they should have been accorded all due attention and regard long ago. This book is Gitman's attempt to set this great historical injustice right.

The book is sub-divided an introduction and seven chapters, with the last one serving as a conclusion. Gitman begins the introductory chapter with a detailed explanation of the term "rescue", and she continues by recounting all previous historiographic works dedicated to the issue of rescues in the NDH. This is followed by a brief overview of the activities of Jewish communities and individuals in this region between the two World Wars.

The first chapter bears the title "The Unification of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 1918-1941". In this part of the book, Gitman describes the activity of the Jews during the interwar period and also presents their intellectuals, as well as communists. She then sketches out the growing unrest during the 1930s and the onset of the global war, highlighting the status of the Jews in particular. In this chapter, Gitman places emphasis on the fact that during the interwar years, at the insistence of the royal authorities in Yugoslavia, all 115 of the until-then independent communities were unified into the Federation of Jewish Religious Communities. She notes that a "golden age" for the Jews began thereafter, which ended with the arrival of the Ustasha regime of the NDH and the institution of its anti-Semitic agenda.

In the second chapter, “The Ustaše Rule of Terror Against Jews and Their Rescue by Ordinary Citizens”, Gitman writes that the Ustasha authorities imposed anti-Semitic laws and decrees and that the Jews were paralyzed by the partition of Yugoslavia. She then describes the situation at the time using the examples of Zagreb and Sarajevo. She points out the many petitions on behalf of the Jews and the fact that passes were issued for approximately two thousand of them in Zagreb. She cites those individuals who helped rescue them in hospitals. Gitman stresses that ordinary citizens, despite penalties, offered shelter, forged passes, food and warnings to Jews about many planned raids and searches of homes and buildings. She also discusses the transportation of Jews across enemy lines of demarcation and particularly the writing of letters and petitions for their protection. Of the latter aspect, Gitman states that it was a unique example which reflects the very broad involvement in rescues by the population at the time.

Gitman entitled her third chapter “NDH Officials Approve ‘Exceptions’”. Here she notes that educated, qualified and essential Jewish workers were spared, even in “Aryanised” companies, such as those in Bosnia for example. Gitman points to the very important fact that a high number of Jews who were medical doctors by profession were saved such that they were sent to combat endemic syphilis in Bosnia, and that their entire families were protected as well. She cites a total of 650 of such cases. Gitman notes that certain select categories of Jews were also spared, for by making a major contribution to Croatia they became “honorary Aryans”.

The fourth, very crucial chapter bears the title “Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb Confronts Anti-Semitism and Totalitarianism, 1941-1945”. Gitman begins this chapter with the post-war trial of Stepinac, and then examines the diplomatic communications on him, with references to the statements against him issued by the Yugoslav authorities. Thereafter, in defence of Stepinac’s innocence, Gitman provides numerous examples of his proclamations against the brutality of the Nazis and Ustasha authorities against the Jews as well as others. She then presents Stepinac’s correspondence both in Croatia and abroad, and focuses on his stance on the rescue of individuals in mixed marriages and orphans, and his contacts with members of the Jewish community. She notes that Stepinac rescued 58 Jews evicted from a home for the elderly and infirm and moved them to the archdiocesan estate. She puts particular emphasis on his sermon of 7 July 1943, when he said in defence of the Jews: “If God gave this right [to be considered an equal human being] to all mankind, then there is no government on earth that can take it away”. Gitman concludes the chapter with some insight into the development of perceptions of Stepinac after 1945.

The beginning of the fifth chapter, “The Rescue of the Jews by the Italians, 1941-1943”, first outlines the historical context and then the Italian response to the persecution of Jews in the NDH. Here Gitman points out that Italian personnel stationed in Croatia and Slovenia were generally indifferent toward the genocidal plans of the Ustasha, but that eventually there were increasing cases of travel papers and even forged passports being issued from 1942 onward. They often also refused German demands to hand over Jews. Gitman notes that these were very coldly calculated decisions made by Italian officers to save their own honour, which later served them well after the shift in Italian policy in the Second World War. She then highlights this Italian change of course, when members of the Axis became rescuers of the Jews, who suspected their sincerity. She also provides examples of disputes between the Italian military and civilian authorities. In the second half of the chapter, she covers some of the camps and

cases of the rescue of Jews in them. For example, the camps on the island of Rab and in Ferramonti. Gitman notes that from the arrival of the Italians in 1941 to the capitulation of fascism in 1943, approximately 7,500 Jews, mostly from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were saved.

The final, sixth chapter, "Partisan Rescuers Confront Anglo-American Diplomacy" begins with the example of the evacuation of the Jews from Korčula and Rab, also noting the assistance and aid they received during their journey. There were approximately 5,000 Jews in this territory, of whom some joined the Partisan movement, while others left the area and went to Italy. She also discusses the activities of international and domestic humanitarian organizations. The chapter closes with the public pressure on Congress in the United States to resolve the matter of caring for the Jews who escaped Nazi persecution.

Gitman points out the significant role played in the rescue of the Jews from the Holocaust by the cash used to finance their care, while also observing that a not insignificant factor was pure good fortune which was necessary for them to survive their ordeal.

Gitman finishes the book with a sort of concluding chapter, stressing the need for a more objective assessment of events and the actions of individuals and groups in the territory of the NDH during the Second World War and their re-evaluation. She also points to the need for an objective contextualization of events, which is tied to the need to avoid the over-simplification of historical events, which has been very common up to the present. Here it is worthwhile highlighting her assessment of the very moral and humane actions of Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac. In the end, Gitman concludes that thanks to him, and also many other brave people, a total of 9,500 Jews in the territory of the NDH were rescued and survived the Holocaust.

This is a praiseworthy book which is certainly well worth reading, for it provides an exceptionally valuable contribution to illuminating the truth about events during the Second World War in the territory of the former NDH. The book also greatly contributes to the elimination of some of the stereotypes among the international and domestic, both general and scholarly public about the events of that time. The actions of Zagreb Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac should certainly be highlighted as an example which overturns many stereotypes. Finally, a particularly valuable aspect of this book is the dozens of original documents contained in its appendix which faithfully support the author's primary arguments.

Josip KAJINIĆ

Peđa RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, *Odnosi između Jugoslavije i Svete Stolice 1963–1978. Prilog za istoriografiju diplomatsko-verskih nastojanja Vatikana na Balkanu i u Srednjoj Evropi.* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2012), 220 pp.

In this book, journalist and current affairs writer Peđa Radosavljević deals with the international relations between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and today's Serbia and the Holy See, and the socio-political and spiritual heritage of the Catholic Church in these regions. It is for this reason that this book is largely dedicated to the history of the Church and society in Croatia.

The book is divided into an introduction and two principal sections. In the introduction, Radosavljević provides an overview of diplomatic and religious relations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This overview begins with the period of national rulers, and ends with the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia. The first chapter, on 'Structuralist contextualization: the future yielded by the past', begins with an in-depth analysis of relations between the Catholic Church and state structures in the former Yugoslavia and other religious communities, primarily the Serbian Orthodox Church. Here Radosavljević points to the causes of the disagreements and discord between the Church and the state authorities. Even though the assessment of these causes is provided from the Serbian perspective, the conclusions are relatively objective and correct. The introductory section closes with the chapter, 'The fall of the Berlin Wall: submission to triumph', in which Radosavljević presents the course of events which largely influenced the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism, as well as the changes in the status of the Catholic Church both in Socialist Yugoslavia and throughout the Eastern Bloc. Noteworthy here is that Radosavljević rather thoroughly describes the role and mission of the Catholic Church, the Holy See and the Vatican and compares this to the role of the Orthodox churches, pointing out the numerous political and social constants and differences.

The central theme of the first section is described by its title, 'Diplomacy as an alternative to political and historical determinism'. This chapter contains an overview of relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See at the time of their negotiations from 1963 to their conclusion in 1966. At the very beginning, Radosavljević stresses that as opposed to countries with largely Catholic populations, in those communist countries with mainly Orthodox populations, the conflict between the governing regimes and the Catholic church were not only political but also civilizational, and for this reason immutable. The chapter continues with an examination of the first contacts between the Vatican and Yugoslavia during 1963 with the aim of normalizing relations after the complete severance of diplomatic relations in 1952. Also highlighted is the failed mission of the Holy See's diplomatic envoy, Msgr. Silvio Odi, and the Vatican's assistance to Josip Broz Tito. This is followed by a look at the activities of Agostino Casaroli as the Vatican's expert who made a great contribution to tearing down the Iron Curtain. The course of negotiations and the actual signing of the Protocol between Yugoslavia and the Vatican are presented. Radosavljević closes by showing the response of Serbian communists to the signing of the Protocol.

The second section of the book is entitled 'Development of relations between the SFRY and the Holy See after signing of the Protocol'. The initial focus is placed on Mario Cagna, the Holy See's first pronuncio in Yugoslavia after the normalization of relations.

Radosavljević then turns attention to the visit of Mika Špiljak to Pope Paul VI in Rome. This is followed by an assessment of the Vatican's stance on the problem of Kosovo's status within Yugoslavia. After this, Radosavljević shares his opinions of the results which ensued from signing of the Protocol and its impact on the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See. In the next chapter, Radosavljević contextualizes the Catholic Church in this time between spiritual capitulation and secularism, citing its alleged revisionist tendencies. He notes several key problems which stood in the way of the establishment of full diplomatic relations. He then goes over the exchange of diplomatic representatives, the preparation of Tito's first visit to the pope in Rome and his endorsement of "progressive" actions in the Catholic Church. This is followed by a description of Tito's trip to Rome, and Radosavljević evaluates the significance of this visit and underscores the hopes and expectations of both interested sides. Franjo Šeper's role in these diplomatic events is discussed, as well as the change in the Holy See's course in its relations with Yugoslavia. The chapter closes with an assessment of the perspectives of the time on the end of old tendencies in relations between the Catholic Church, i.e., the Holy See, and Yugoslavia.

Radosavljević ends the book with the conclusion that there was a gradual normalization of relations between the Catholic Church, and thereby also the Holy See and the Vatican, and the state authorities in Yugoslavia, even though this normalization had many opponents, both within the ranks of the Church and in state structures. Among the opponents, Radosavljević notes in particular some of the Catholic bishops whom he deemed quite conservative and hostile to any manner of cooperation with the communist authorities. On the other side, he emphasizes the particularly anti-Catholic Serbian communists, who did not want any form of cooperation and normalization of relations with the Catholic Church. Radosavljević notes that Tito himself assumed all aspects of the diplomatic negotiations with the Holy See, citing as the best example of this his official visit to Pope Paul VI in 1971, despite the opposition of most communists in Yugoslavia. Radosavljević stresses that despite the normalization diplomatic relations, there were still tensions between the Church and the authorities in Yugoslavia. It is precisely based on this example that Radosavljević expresses some of his own opinions which may be questioned. For it is precisely here that he puts forth the assertion that the Catholic Church, as in monarchist Yugoslavia before World War II, wanted to be both a religious and political factor. In this regard, he stresses that the Church had Ustasha-oriented priests active in the field. This detail bears emphasis because Radosavljević, although noting certain aspects of the Catholic Church which many of his predecessors in Serbian historiography failed to observe, still nurtures certain stereotypes which took rather deep root in the Serbian public, particularly in the scholarly community. And although there are many instances in which he points out the universal and supranational character of the Catholic Church, when isolating the course of events he not infrequently reverts to the national standpoint, which is more suited to the activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This is why both the Serbian scholarly community and the broader public often find it rather difficult to entirely comprehend supranational discourse. It should also be borne in mind that Radosavljević himself admits that he was limited by the materials of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although this by no means prevented him from rising above their content and using them critically. However, it should certainly be acknowledged that his work is very valuable and important. Finally, it should be stressed that this book largely focuses on the diplomatic and political

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dimension, as suggested by its title. Also, although Radosavljević mentions this at several points, he never completely evaluated the theological aspects of the Catholic Church's mission, which to a crucial degree dictate its actions, making use of – among other things – even political means for the purpose of furthering its religious objectives and pastoral calling. Such political activity contradicts the views advocated in this book to a certain extent, but which imbues the political intentions of Church activities. Thus, politics is a means, but not also an ambition and objective of the Catholic Church. All things considered, it should be noted that Radosavljević's effort is apparent and significant, and his book has historiographic value, primarily for understanding the issues surrounding church-state relations in the former Yugoslavia.

Josip KAJINIĆ

Franko DOTA, *Zaraćeno poraće: Konfliktni i konkurentski narativi o stradanju i iseljavanju Talijana Istre* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2010), 222 pp.

Franko DOTA's book *Zaraćeno poraće: Konfliktni i konkurentski narativi o stradanju i iseljavanju Talijana Istre* (*The War After the War: Conflicting and Competing Narratives on the Suffering and Expulsion of the Italians from Istria*) was published in early 2010 by the publisher Srednja Europa. The book consists of seven chapters; it was first conceived as a journal article – but the high page count led the author to expand it and, at the publisher's suggestion, release it as a book.

The book begins with the acknowledgements (p. V) and the introduction (pp. 1-7), in which DOTA sets forth the primary objective of his discussion: to present the opposing Italian and Croatian (Yugoslav) historiographic, popular history and other texts on the exile of the Italians from Istria and Rijeka at the end of the Second World War and afterward, so that he can answer the question of 'how' and 'why' these texts are contradictory, and what makes them ideologically different. He introduces readers to the problem by juxtaposing two opposing narrative concepts: terms such as "national liberation", "resistance to fascism", "establishment of just borders", and "antifascist victory" on the one hand, and "the homeland mutilated at its eastern border", "the dictate of an unjust peace", "persecution and liquidations of Italians", "death in *foibe*", "forced exile", "destruction of the Italian character of Istria and Rijeka", etc. on the other. In the introduction, DOTA emphasizes that the objective of this work is not to explain how these events came about or to compare interpretations, but rather to compile the material in a manner that will ultimately exhibit the created narratives from the manufactured discourses of both sides and the circumstances under which these narratives were formed. This is first and foremost an overview of Croatian standpoints on the debates which have emerged over the past fifty or so years up to the present which deal with this topic, while the Italian side is encompassed to a more moderate degree, with emphasis on the places where these same processes are covered from diametrically opposite positions. The Slovenian contributions are almost entirely left out, even though DOTA tells his readers that they certainly merit attention, all the more so since a considerably higher number of professional scholarly works have been written in Slovenia than in Croatia.

The chapter on the 'definition of constitutive concepts' (pp.7-24) consists of six sub-sections, in which readers are offered explanations of individual terms, events and processes from the period during and after the war, which are crucial to understanding the themes with which the book deals. Thus, *Julijska krajina* (Julian March) and *Julijska Venecija* (pp. 7-9) are synonyms which constitute the Slovenian and Croatian equivalent but "not also translation" of the Italian historical region of Venezia Giulia. Geographically it encompasses the territory which Italy acquired after the First World War: Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, a part of the Inner Carniola, the Kanal Valley, Istria and, as of 1924, Rijeka, and DOTA reviews the genesis of the term and its promotion in public use. Furthermore, the "Istrian rebellious September" (pp. 9-10) is explained in its basic contours – this was the raising of an antifascist revolt by the leading political activists of the People's Liberation Movement in Istrian territory after Italy's capitulation on 8 September 1943. The interpretations of this event by the Yugoslav communist leadership (a class revolution by peasants and workers) and the Italian government that inherited Mussolini's regime (an act of occupation of Italian territory as a

result of the aggressor Yugoslav Partisan forces) are compared. Under the term “The Trieste question and demarcation” (pp. 10-11) there is an explanation of events from the end of the war in 1945 and the establishment of Zones A and B, through the formation of the Free Territory of Trieste, the London Memorandum up to the Osimo Accords in 1975, while the section on the “Suffering of the Italians” (pp. 11-16) clarifies the way in which individuals of Italian (but also Croatian and Slovenian) nationality died far from direct combat operations. Dota points out two key moments: the first was the already mentioned Partisan revolt after the Italian capitulation in September 1943, while the other is the end of the war and the occupation of the Julian March in May and June 1945 – wherein a high number of people were liquidated in nationally, politically and ideologically motivated reprisals. In the central part of this chapter under the title “*Foibe*” (pp. 17-20), Dota explains the meaning of this term in the collective memory of the Italians. These are karst pits, of which there are several hundred in the territory of Istria and the Trieste hinterland, which were used in the pre-war period to discard various types of waste and then used during and after the war to dispose of the bodies numerous slain individuals, mainly of Italian nationality. Dota presents the contrasting analyses of the number of those killed generated by the non-scholarly, “right-wing” Trieste-based historiography and popular current affairs writing and the Italian historiographic current which advocates the publication of exclusively those historical facts which have passed through a critical scholarly process. Dota also provides the results achieved in this field by Croatian (Yugoslav) historiography. He indicates the significance of the very term “*foiba*” (*infojbirati, infojbiran*), which already after the war became a synonym in the Italian press and public speech for all of those Italians liquidated and sentenced to death, regardless of the site and manner of their death, which is all the more interesting because among those killed there were a certain number of Slovenes and Croats, German soldiers liquidated in 1943-45 and an undetermined number of persons slain in camps and at other killing grounds. The final section in this chapter, on ‘the exile of the Italians’ (pp. 20-24), covers the dynamics of the narrative interpretations of the causes and number of expelled persons, which pertains to the massive departure of Italians from Istria, Rijeka and Zadar for Italy in the period from 1945 to 1955. Dota compares the estimates of Croatian, Slovenian and Italian scholarly historiography, which generally agree on a number of 200,000-250,000 exiles. He makes a special reference to *esuli* (exiled Italians from Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia) popular history works which exaggerate the number of persons in this “exodus” to 350,000-450,000, contrasting them with the figures contained in the relevant Yugoslav sources, which in the 1980s were dominated by ideologized historiographic and popular texts with a tendency to reduce the number to 100,000-150,000.

The next chapter, on ‘legitimation, commemoration and memorial days: the “victory over fascism” and “Remembrance Day”’ (pp. 25-50), has two sub-sections. In the first, ‘Yugoslavia and Croatia: from Party to Nation’ (pp. 25-33), Dota attempts to familiarize readers with the dynamics of development of the Yugoslav historiographic and popular historical narrative on the Second World War. He highlights censorship and self-censorship, not so much of the actual works and texts as in the selection of topics. In this sense, he cites the research of Katarina Spehnbjak and Tihomir Cipek, who asserted that already in the 1950s the regime did not directly intervene in the public space of culture and the arts, and limited its control “only” to the indication of permissible behaviour, i.e., official history and the heritage of the People’s Liberation Struggle could not be directly re-examined until the Communist Party’s complete loss of influence in the mid-1980s. In this sense, the role of members of the People’s Lib-

eration Movement from the territories added to Yugoslavia during and after the war was glorified (including the Italians on the side of the Partisan movement), while the Italian nation was equated with fascism and thus subjected to systematic collective demonization. However, Dota shows that all ideologically-driven myths up to that point began to recede somewhat as a result of the weakening of the apparatus of the repressive state during the 1980s, when – particularly in non-scholarly, popular historiography and in literature – taboos were lifted concerning topics tied to the legacy of the war. Although the “Bleiburg myth” and other topics tied to the crimes perpetrated by the “communist” regime against the Croats assumed a special place in independent Croatia, a re-examination of the Italian question in post-war Istria also emerged. In an overall revision of the social order, the very end of the 1980s and the onset of the 1990s were characterized by the “erasure” of anything that contradicted the creation of the independent Croatian state, so all fields of social activity were incorporated into the creation of “new” myths upon which the newly-created state would rest. With a view to these processes, Dota attempts to depict the need of the “new” history to re-evaluate the history of the Italians of Istria and Rijeka and “demonization” of the communist movement and, in the context of the People’s Liberation Struggle, to underscore and enhance the importance of the Croatian element in the process of annexing the “occupied” territories to the core state.

The second sub-section is called ‘The first and second Italian republic: from 25 April to 10 February’ (pp. 33-50), in which Dota covers the Italian Social Republic, the creation of the first antifascist government during the war in the spring of 1944, the mythologization of the Italian resistance movement (*Resistenza*), and the balance of power on Italy’s political scene in the post-war years and up to the present. Since the preceding sub-section dealt with the influence of politics on both scholarly and non-scholarly historiography and current affairs writing in Yugoslavia, here the same processes on the opposite side are examined. Dota therefore points to the fact that for the dominant post-war coalition in power in Italy (Christian Democrats and communists) and for the sake of resolving the Trieste question via the London Memorandum of 1954, there was no interest in opening “unpleasant” issues with the neighbouring state for several reasons. The first was the promotion of a buffer zone facing the “Iron Curtain” at the border with Yugoslavia, which occurred as a result of the Yugoslav crisis with the USSR from 1948 to 1953, which created some relief for Italy. The second fact was that the loss of Istria and other areas and the suffering of a high number of Italians drastically evoked memories of the wartime defeat, which was at odds with the dominant political mythology of the Italian resistance movement which constituted the fundamental legitimation and bond with the post-war governments. The third reason was that the Italian left, which portrayed Yugoslavia as something of a model for the development of an “authentic and effective” socialist society, had no interest in reviving any dormant post-war disputes. In this vein, Italian historiography in some sense had its hands “tied” in the selection of themes (albeit with no direct political interference in the work of historians), so it largely dealt with “ancillary” problems. The question of displaced and slain Italians from Istria and other regions were sporadically covered by individuals from *esuli* circles in the Trieste region, which until the 1990s remained within the local realm without reverberations at the national level. Closely following these opposing narratives, Dota notes the changes in treatment of official history caused by internal political changes in Italy and the somewhat more radical turns in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Slovenia and Croatia, as successors to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, did not have as strong a

role on the European scene as Tito's Yugoslavia, while in Italy the Christian Democratic and Communist parties began to crumble. This turn of events, as shown in the book, led to a sudden flood of themes related to the "eastern border", "communist crimes", "confrontation with the past" and "*foibe* and exodus" on the Italian side, which sought a revision of post-war history was now elevated to "remembrance" at the state level. Dota furthermore follows events in current affairs writing, non-scholarly and scholarly historiography, and also in the realm of official political speech in Italy.

The next, very short, chapter, 'History to the historians: the Slovenian-Italian Cultural-Historical Commission' (pp. 51-56), deals with the establishment of the Croatian-Italian and Slovenian-Italian cultural-historical commissions at the highest state levels in 1993, which were charged with "conducting comprehensive research and a thorough investigation into all aspects of political and cultural relations in the twentieth century" with the aim of "shedding light on events that transpired in Trieste, Gorizia and Istria after 8 September 1943 and up to the end of the 1940s". Dota explains that this first commission only met once in 1994, while the second continued to cooperate and submitted a report to its governments in 2000. This text is analyzed, and the interpretation of some of its parts is cited in this chapter.

The next unit, 'A review of Croatian historiography' (pp. 57-102), consists of three sub-sections. In the first, 'The Yugoslav taboo and the Trieste myth (1945-1980)' (pp. 57-73), Dota posits that the silence and rationalization of the problem of Italian expulsions and interethnic relations during and after the war in Istria constituted the primary feature of official Yugoslav historiography from the late 1940s until the collapse of that state. Particular emphasis is placed on the reformulation of the ethnic Italian antifascist fighters who remained "loyal" to the domestic regime, as they were spoken of exclusively in superlatives, which in the post-war period was generally assumed as the model for legitimizing the integration of all other national minorities in Yugoslav society and relations. In this discourse, the question of the "*foibe*" and the exile of Italians went virtually unmentioned, even though Dota points out a certain minor number of works that posed considerably different hypotheses. These constructs stood in stark opposition to the situation in Italy, where the problem of exiled Italians in the period after the war and until the end of the 1980s was only discussed and written about in the Trieste region. The topic was particularly popular in émigré and irredentist circles, and almost as a rule it was promoted on the public scene by political organizations with a right-wing orientation, generally transformed from former fascist parties, while in the rest of Italy this problem had almost no impact in the indicated period. Furthermore, Dota also closely examines individual historiographic, para-historiographic, popular history and literary works which appeared on the Yugoslav side, particularly those pertaining to current problems, citing them and drawing conclusions.

The second part of this chapter bears the title 'The quiet lifting of taboos' (pp. 73-85), in which Dota covers the period indicated in the title, and refers to Yugoslav current affairs writing, literature and, to a lesser extent, scholarly historiography by saying that "a timid wind of liberalization in public speech blew through Yugoslav society in the 1980s. Some until-then taboo themes could be mentioned in public slightly more openly. The ideological reins began to gradually loosen, the authorities lost control over certain sectors, historiography among them, even though there were attempts – generally unsuccessful – at direct intervention in the historical analysis of the Second World War which did not comply with social dogma". In this sense, in contrast to the

period prior to this, Dota shows the appearance of the first works on an until-then non-existent topic within the Yugoslav framework tied to matters such as the Italian expulsions and the so-called “*foibe*” during and after the war. They were generated primarily by the circles of Yugoslav intellectuals gathered around the Italian Union, while the opening of “taboo” topics was also spurred on by the Rovinj-based Centre for Historical Research (Centar za povijesna istraživanja/Centro di Ricerche Storiche di Rovigno), as well as journalists, current affairs writers and prose writers. Croatian (Yugoslav) academic historiography did not make any more systematic contribution to this topic until the mid-1990s, rather concepts from the preceding period were “borrowed”, which can be seen in the synthetic history of the city of Rijeka written in 1988 by a group of authors (mainly historians).

The final section in this chapter is entitled ‘Contextualization, historicization and politicization in the national key’ (pp. 85-102), in which three basic interpretive approaches to the problem in the period since the beginning of the 1990s to the present are constructed. The first, ‘an attempt at historical contextualization’, provides an overview of more recent works by historians of the older generation (M. Sobolevski, A. Giron and M. Mikolić), who generally had only just begun to write their studies on until-then taboo topics tied to the Italians in the Second World War and immediately afterward. He denotes the second concept as ‘the first historiographic research’, which constitutes a look into and analysis of the works of second-generation Istrian historians (D. Dukovski, M. Manin) on the “Italian question” and the “exodus”. He concludes that Darko Dukovski went the farthest in research into this topic, as his concepts to a certain extent correspond to the achievements of the leading Italian historians, both in the number of exiles and slain, and in the reasons for their expulsion. The third concept, ‘Incrimination of Yugoslav communism’, includes the works on this topic which have more of an essayist and popular history and less a historiographic character (G. Crnković), in which the approach is “stridently Croatian, at moments also anti-Italian, but always anti-Yugoslav and anticommunist”, so in this regard Dota cites individual details from these texts and comments on them. He concludes that this concept is a reflection of public and cultural activity borne by the “new” Croatian nationalism in the first half of the 1990s, wherein everything Serbian/communist/Yugoslav was portrayed as exclusively “bad” and “detrimental” to the Croatian nation, which – in a discursive interpretation – was transferred to the “Italian problem” in Istria in 1943-1954.

The last chapter, ‘Political uses of history and polemics’ (pp. 103-113), consists of three units. In the first, ‘Historical polemics’ (pp. 103-106), Dota examines the texts by Croatian authors on the problem of the expulsion of Italians from Istria and Rijeka in opposition to one another, but from differing perspectives. On one side, he considers Petar Strčić, who wrote a series of works on this problem, while on the other he considers the historians and other culture experts gathered around the Italian Union in Istria and Rijeka, some of whose work appeared in the scholarly publications of the Centre for Historical Research in Rovinj. Dota concludes that the latter authors, because they wrote almost exclusively in the Italian language, were more often read and cited by experts from Italy than by their Croatian counterparts, which created a certain rift on the historiographic scene on this side of the border. In this sense, Dota stresses that writers of Italian ethnicity in Croatia contributed very little to the formation of Croatian views on this problem, and even less to public political discourse or the culture of commemoration.

In the sub-section on 'Presidential histories' (pp. 106-108), Dota examines the polemic between former Croatian President Stjepan Mesić and his Italian counterpart, Giorgio Napolitano, in February 2007, while in the final section on 'Newspaper histories' (109-113) he compares texts in the Croatian and Italian press over the past few years tied to the "exodus" and "foibe".

The conclusion (pp. 115-118), with some of Dota's final observations, is followed by a section containing concise biographical entries on some of the main proponents of this book (politicians, members of the military, writers, current affairs writers and historians; pp. 119-126), a summary in the Italian language (*Riassunto*; pp. 127-128), the bibliography (pp. 129-142), the indices of personal names (pp. 143-146) and geographic terms (pp. 147-148) and a note on the author (p. 149).

Franko Dota's book is written in a clear style, with only moderate use of "technical" jargon. It contains a wealth of data, especially the biographic entries pertaining to the territories of Istria and Rijeka during the Second World War and post-war years and the problems which accompanied the process of expulsion of (mainly) Italians from this region. In conclusion, it may be said that the work of researchers into Istrian themes from the 1943-1954 period has been greatly simplified, mostly due to the fact that this study contains an overview of the relevant literature and an ideological-discursive interpretation thereof in one place.

Ivan ŽAGAR

Marija MOGOROVIĆ CRLJENKO, *Druga strana braka. Nasilje i ilegitimnost u (izvan) bračnim vezama na području Porečke biskupije u prvoj polovici 17. stoljeća* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2012), 312 pp.

Marije Mogorović Crljenko's book, *Druga strana braka. Nasilje i ilegitimnost u (izvan) bračnim vezama na području Porečke biskupije u prvoj polovici 17. stoljeća* (*The Other Side of Marriage. Violence and Illegitimacy in (Extra)Marital Bonds in the Poreč Dioceses in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century*), emerged as a result of her many years of studying the issues of marriage and the status of women in Istrian society in the first half of the seventeenth century. Mogorović Crljenko herself points out that the inspiration for the book had already emerged during her time as a university student, when she visited the archives of the Poreč Diocese and took notes on the register books (*Liber Conubinatuum, Raptuum, Libertatum et dispensationum matrimonialium*, and *Causae matrimoniales* which she was researching as sources for her doctoral dissertation. This book is something of a reworking of that dissertation, supplemented with new sources, particularly in the chapter on abductions. Already in her preceding book, *Nepoznati svijet istarskih žena* ('The Unknown World of Istrian Women'; Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2006), this same author analyzed "the status of women in Istrian communal societies, primarily their status in marriage with regard to property rights, but also personal relations in marriage and the status of women in society", wherein she studied *secular sources*. With this book, Mogorović Crljenko expands upon her already initiated research to encompass clerical sources, i.e., the cases heard before the Poreč diocesan court in the seventeenth century. In these sources, she studied the experiences of women and men in marital unions. By studying marital disputes, she has attempted to describe the conclusion of marriages and also point out the reasons which led to their termination. By analyzing these sources, she arrived at definitions of marital violence and illegitimacy in extramarital relationships in the territory of the Poreč Diocese in the seventeenth century. An important part of the sources constitute marital disputes due to "proving the existence of marriage or severing a marital bond with a view to divorce from bed and board or dissolution of marriage", and some of these also pertained to various forms of concubinage. The focus of her research is not only on women, but also men, and their mutual relations within wedlock, the family and the very manner in which *canon marital rights functioned*. "This is, in fact, a story about the other side of marriage and the conclusion of marriage, about everything that overturned established norms and made marriage a factor of social (in)stability". She clearly emphasizes that she attempted to describe the "conclusion of marriage as well as its dissolution in situations in which it did not quite comply with the generally accepted norms of society in that period". In the book's foreword (pp. 7-11), Mogorović Crljenko expresses the hope that this book will *serve as an impetus* to other researchers to study similar problems, particularly in the field of research into society, women, marriage and the family in the medieval and early modern periods. She points to the fact "either nothing at all or very little has been written" in Croatian historiography about similar topics, except, possibly, when they touch upon the city of Dubrovnik.

The book is sub-divided into seven main chapters, each of which consists of several sub-sections. Some of these chapters are divided into several smaller units. In this breakdown, Mogorović Crljenko provides an introduction to the issues surrounding marriage, its perception in society and the manner of concluding marriage. She examines the causes for dissolution of marital bonds and the phenomenon of extramarital

relationships and relations within them, wherein she uses a certain chronological determinant to differentiate certain aspects: she divides the history of marriage into the pre-Tridentine and post-Tridentine periods. The book's introductory chapter (pp. 11-38) is divided into three sub-sections: 'Sources and historiography' (pp. 18-23), 'Introductory remarks on the Church's concept of marriage' (pp. 23-32) and 'Litigation' (pp. 32-38). In the introduction, Mogorović Crljenko establishes the book's theme as violence and illegitimacy in (extra)marital bonds, analyzing the problems tied to the conclusion of marriage, relations inside marriage which lead to the dissolution of this bond and the reasons for the establishment of extramarital bonds and relations within them: "the focus of attention will in fact be those factors which destabilized and exhibited deviations from the ideal bond which was deemed to have constituted marriage and engendered social stability". She poses the following questions: what were all of the obstacles to concluding marriage, what were the methods for coercion in its conclusion, what precisely did illegitimacy mean in bonds and can we see deviations in these bonds based on an analysis of sources? She briefly overviews previous knowledge about marriage in Croatian and foreign historiography and the historical sources suited to researching the history of women, marriage and the family. She also briefly explains the use of her sources in the diocesan archives in Poreč: the registers of concubinage, abductions, marital disputes and marriage dispensations in the territory of the Poreč Diocese in the first half of the seventeenth century, wherein the content is compared to the normative instruments contained in the Istrian statutes. She provides a brief overview of the Church's conception of marriage until the Council of Trent (1545-1563), whereafter marriages concluded in a church became mandatory. The Church continued to uphold the respect of consent between spouses as the primary condition for the validity of marriage. Conflicts arose with the secular authorities, which in the thirteenth/fourteenth centuries attempted to increasingly place marriage under their purview, and conflicts also broke out with Protestant conceptions of marriage and sexuality. The Council of Trent finally defined marriage as a sacrament and confirmed its legislative jurisdiction over it, introducing the obligation of public marriage. She describes the way in which marriage disputes were conducted in the Poreč Diocese and how penalties were pronounced in clerical and lay courts (in Istria they only conducted trials for the crime of rape).

The second, most extensive chapter in the book, 'The conclusion of marriage' (pp. 39-180), consists of four sub-sections: "Pre-Tridentine marriage" (pp. 40-75), 'The Council of Trent and the Tametsi Decree' (pp. 75-87), 'Marriage dispensations and permission for marriage' (pp. 87-129) and 'Abductions' (pp. 129-179). The first sub-section is further sub-divided into several smaller units which provide detailed descriptions of the manner and circumstances under which marriage was concluded in the pre-Tridentine era. This chapter explains the meaning of engagement and the *sponsalia de praesenti* or *sponsalia de futuro*, which determined the validity of marriage, the manner in which partners were chosen (freely or by the families), the permissible time within which the ceremonial blessing for marriage could be obtained and the site of the marriage ceremony, which was not always clearly defined. The symbolic act of the marriage ceremony in the sense of joining hands and exchanging kisses was deemed mandatory for marriage (as symbols of consent and fidelity), as opposed to the ring, which was not considered sufficient evidence that marriage had in fact been concluded. Mogorović Crljenko furthermore states: "marriage was, as a rule, regulated by canon law, statutory provisions and local customs", wherein she points out the different

provisions which dealt with the regulation of familial and property relations. She cites the local customs which pertained to the celebration and ritual of taking the bride from her father's to her husband's house. Speaking of the public nature of concluding marriage, she points to the fact that marriage had to be concluded publicly because it would have otherwise been difficult to conduct marriage-related litigation in court (otherwise it would have been necessary to prove the existence of marriage). She describes the process of public marriage, the phenomenon of clandestine marriage and the first registers of births and marriages in the Istrian region. She states that the Istrian region has no preserved descriptions of marriage ceremonies in the medieval period. Mogorović Crljenko describes the lack of respect for concluded engagements (the problem of clandestine marriage) which often led to disputes. This changed in the period after the Council of Trent, which insisted on public marriage ceremonies and sanctions for those who defied their marriage vows. She explains that the conclusion of a new marriage could only be done after the death of one of the spouses. She lists cases which were tolerated and those which were not viewed favourably. The second sub-section, 'The Council of Trent and the Tametsi Decree', explains the new rules set forth by the Council of Trent and the Tametsi Decree where this concerns marriage, the question of clandestine marriages, the selection of partners, divorce from bed and board, the question of celibacy, public marriage and its recognition, sexual relations, maintenance of registers of marriages and similar matters. The principle of consensual marriage was confirmed. The Tametsi Decree brought "three important matters tied to the conclusion of marriage: parental consent, mandatory public announcement and the wedding ceremony". Conflicts with the secular authorities became increasingly common over the matter of clandestine marriages (regulation of complex property relations), although they dropped off in the post-Tridentine era. The third sub-section, 'Marriage dispensations and permissions for marriage', describes the problems surrounding dispensations preserved in the papal registers or on the basis of registers of marital disputes. Mogorović Crljenko says that 50 volumes registering marriage dispensations and permissions have been preserved from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth in the archives of the Poreč Diocese: *Libertatum et dispensationum matrimonialium*, *Libertatum matrimonialium* and *Dispensationum matrimonialium*. For this research she analyzed the two oldest registers of marital dispensations and permissions for marriage in the Diocesan Archives in Poreč which emerged during the tenure of Bishops Giovanni Lippomano of Venice (1598-1608) and Leonardo Tritoni from Udine (1609-1631), which encompassed the period from 1604 to 1620 (44 procedures were conducted). The chapter contains a discussion of the obstacles to the conclusion of marriage (most often pertaining to consanguinity and affinity) and the conditions for obtaining dispensations, wherein Mogorović Crljenko cites an entire series of court cases in the Poreč Diocese, showing the results of research through tables and statistical computations. The final chapter on abductions deals with the abduction of women for the purpose of marriage. Mogorović Crljenko studied processed abductions, a total of 73, from the 1602-1650 period, cited in the four *registers of abductions* in the Diocesan Archives in Poreč. The research pertains to the *problem of violence and illegality in marital and extramarital relations*. The concept of clandestine marriages is described by Mogorović Crljenko in a small part of this sub-section in which she provides details on their causes and consequences. A more detailed examination of abductions in the territory of the Poreč Diocese in the first half of the seventeenth century is provided in the second small unit of this sub-chapter. She gives details on their frequency, and their sanctioning by both the

secular and clerical authorities, as well as the profile of the victims. She presents the results of research through numerous examples and tables of analyzed samples. The investigated motives of these abductions indicates that there were negotiated and violent abductions, often linked to rape, which the statutes punished differently with severe sanctions. Most abductions nonetheless ended with the conclusion of marriage.

The third chapter, 'Marital disputes' (pp. 181-240), is divided into three sub-sections: 'Proving the existence of marriage' (pp. 182-194), 'Dissolution of the marital bond' (pp. 194-235) and 'Witnesses in marital disputes' (pp. 235-240). Mogorović Crljenko cites the marital disputes recorded in the register of marital cases, *Causae matrimoniales* and of concubinage, *Concubinatum*, from the Diocesan Archives in Poreč. A total of 45 were recorded in the period from 1599 to 1649. They are broken down according to the causes for which the marital disputes were conducted. Thus, the first sub-section on proving the existence of marriage explains the processes tied to proving that marriage had, in fact, been concluded. Mogorović Crljenko specifies everything that constituted a duly concluded marriage and the situations in which a woman had to prove its existence. She also stresses that in the territory of the Poreč Diocese during the period under observation, there were only five cases in which a marriage pledge had to be proven with the help of witnesses, or by treatment of a certain woman as a spouse or by consummation of the bond.

The second sub-section on the dissolution of marital bonds actually consists of a number of smaller sub-divisions in which Mogorović Crljenko endeavours to explain the types of dissolved bonds (annulment and divorce), the methods for consolidating and dividing assets upon divorce and the status of children as a result of dissolution of the marital bond. She ascertained that marriages ended with the death of one of the spouses, annulment or divorce from bed and board (*a mensa et thoro*). Divorce indicated a temporary discontinuation of cohabitation until a solution was found for the new situation, wherein the canon court assumed the role of mediator. In the pre-Tridentine era, an increasing number of marriages were annulled, while after 1563 a higher number of divorces emerged, which is also reflected in the Istrian sources. During the period from 1599 to 1649, there were 17 cases, of which 13 were divorces and 4 were annulments. The most common grounds for dissolution of marital bonds in the Poreč Diocese were abuse (domestic violence) and adultery. Support for the wife after divorce was understood, although in these cases the secular courts issued decisions concerning alimony. In Istria, women inherited half of the assets of a deceased husband. Besides property and the return of dowries, dissolution of marriages also had an impact on any children. Mogorović Crljenko explains matters pertaining to custody and the acquisition of legal status for children born out of wedlock. The third sub-section on the role of witnesses in marital disputes explains the crucial role of witnesses and public opinion on a given event in a marital dispute, which could often have a direct impact on the resolution of the case.

The fourth chapter, 'Concubinage' (pp. 241-277), is divided into six sub-sections: 'Reasons for concubinage' (pp. 247-258), 'Registering concubinage' (pp. 258-259), 'Sanctioning concubinage according to secular law' (pp. 260-264), 'Sanctioning concubinage according to canon law' (pp. 264-271), 'Penance' (pp. 271-272) and 'Illegitimate children' (pp. 272-277). Mogorović Crljenko covers the topic of concubinage in a separate chapter because "this is not a matter of a classical marital dispute, but rather a trial conducted due to an infraction (living in concubinage) by a specific couple". Her

source was the register of concubinal marital disputes of the Poreč Diocese for the period from 1599 to 1649, which records 14 cases (31.11% of the total number of marital disputes). Concubinage implied an illegal bond between a man and women that had not been accorded legal recognition for any number of reasons. After the Council of Trent, all bonds not legalized were deemed concubinage and were equated with illicit fornication. Concubinage implied adultery, bigamy and occasional intercourse and cohabitation. In this chapter, Mogorović Crljenko explains everything that was considered concubinage, the differences which emerged within it and the differing attitudes toward in the European countries. She thoroughly explains and analyzes the reasons for concubinage, even though in general the analyzed sources indicate that it often emerged as a result of the servile relationship of a women vis-à-vis the head of a household. Based on the analyzed materials, Mogorović Crljenko provides a detailed overview of all participants in such relationships and how firm these bonds were in the Poreč Diocese. Furthermore, she describes the registration and sanctioning of concubinage which were treated like sexual offences, and as such sanctioned by both the canon and secular courts. She describes the penalties stipulated by various city statutes and the manner in which trials were conducted in the Poreč Dioceses. The punishment was excommunication as a *means of pressure*, followed by public repentance, which varied from parish to parish and diocese to diocese in Istria. The final subsection deals with the matter of children conceived and born out of wedlock, their support and the manner in which their legal status was secured.

The concluding, fifth chapter (pp. 279-288) provides an overview of the most important findings derived from the analysis of marital disputes conducted before the Diocesan Court in the Poreč Diocese in the first half of the seventeenth century. Mogorović Crljenko stresses a number of vital facts: that violence and illegitimacy were apparent in the conducted trials, particularly during illegal conclusion of marriage (coerced marriages: violent abductions, use of conjury and spells, and divorce petitions due to domestic violence); and that illegitimacy in relations was most apparent in cases tied to concubinage. The sources show that from the onset of the seventeenth century, the provisions of the Council of Trent were accepted and enforced, but there was a certain divergence from them. She analyzes and explains the various types of marital disputes and where they most often appear in terms of location and population samplings (dispensations and abductions). Marital disputes, divorce and annulment of concubinage appeared equally at all locations and among all classes of the population who first attempted to legalize their status. The materials indicate the enforcement of canon law (marriage under the jurisdiction of the clerical authorities) and the awareness of the people of the need for the presence of the clergy in these matters. Mogorović Crljenko notes in the end that violence and illegitimacy can be found in all types of marital lawsuits and that such behaviour was nonetheless an exception in the everyday lives of people.

The end of the book contains the standard scholarly apparatus: the sources (pp. 289-292) in which Mogorović Crljenko provides a list of published and unpublished source materials; the bibliography (pp. 293-308); a summary in English (pp. 309); a map of the dioceses in Istria (1535-1788) (p. 310) and a map of the parishes in the Poreč Diocese (early seventeenth century) (p. 311) and a note on the author (p. 312). The text is supplemented with tables that accompany the various topics, showing numerical values and the names derived from an analysis of the source material.

Marija Mogorović Crljenko's *Druga strana braka* shows the manner in which the abundant and unused materials held in various archives in Croatia can be invaluable sources to study the family, individuals inside the institution of marriage and in extramarital bonds, public opinion, legislation, the functioning of the secular and clerical authorities in certain areas and the diverse mentalities of people in specific historical eras.

Mogorović Crljenko has dedicated her efforts to the study of society and everyday life, and particularly the status of women, the family and marital bonds in Istria in the medieval and early modern periods. She has an organized international scholarly conference, the Istrian Historical Biennale (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011), dealing with the history of everyday life in the Adriatic zone. Since 2000 she has been employed at the History Department of the Faculty of Arts and Letters in Pula, today the Department of the Humanities at the Juraj Dobrila University in Pula. From 2008 to 2010, she has collaborated with the international scholarly project, "Across the Religious Divide: Women's Properties in the Wider Mediterranean (ca.1300-1800)". Her specialty is the study of life in marital and extramarital unions, the different ways to conclude marriage, violence and obstacles which appeared in the conclusion of marriages and in married life, the meaning of engagements, wedding rituals, etc. during the Middle Ages and in the early modern era, topics which have only just begun to be researched and written about in Croatian historiography. Therefore, this book constitutes a valuable contribution to study of the history of women in Croatian historiography and it is intended for all of those who study the history of Croatian society and everyday life.

Sandra BEGONJA

Ante NAZOR, *Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-ih (Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat: pregled političkih i vojnih događaja 1990., 1991. – 1995./1998.) / Greater Serbian Aggression against Croatia in the 1990s (The Republic of Croatia and the Homeland War: Overview of Political and Military Developments 1990, 1991-1995/1998)* (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2011) bilingual edition, 399 pp.

In this book, historian Ante Nazor, Ph.D. provides an overview of the major events which preceded the Homeland War, the policies and military preparation of Greater Serbian aggression and the events which preceded the open Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The course of the Homeland War is depicted through a cross-section of the most important events in Serbia's aggression and occupation of territories in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the operations conducted by the Croatian Armed Forces which led to the final liberation of the occupied territories, the end of the war and the reintegration of the Croatian Danubian zone. The book includes numerous ancillary materials, maps, tables and photographs which complement the text and complete the picture of events tied to the Homeland War. The book has been published in a bilingual Croatian-English edition. This bilingual publication may serve as an impetus for readers outside of the Croatian-speaking world to gain an objectively insight into the problems tied to the Homeland War.

The book has a total of 399 pages and is divided into two sections. The first begins with the Croatian national anthem (pp. 6-8) and an introduction (pp. 9-14). It continues with the section "The Republic of Croatia and the Homeland War" (pp. 15-18) consisting of these sections: "The latter half of the 1980s" (pp. 15-26) with the sub-heading "Historical Foundations of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990)" (p. 12); "1990" (p. 27) with the sub-headings "Multiparty elections and the fall of communism in Croatia" (pp. 27-34), "Unconstitutional actions and armed revolt by a part of the Serbs in Croatia" (pp. 35-44) and "Proclamation of the Croatian Constitution (22 December 1990)" (pp. 45-48); "1991" (p. 49) with the sub-headings "The communist JNA threatens to impose a 'state of emergency'; first armed conflicts" (pp. 49-67), "Declaration of the sovereign and independent Republic of Croatia (25 June 1991)" (pp. 68-83.) and "Open aggression by Serbia and Montenegro, i.e., the JNA and Serbian-Montenegrin units in the Republic of Croatia" (84-122); "1992-1995" (p. 123) with the sub-headings "International recognition of Croatia" (pp. 123-127), "UNPA zones" (pp. 128-136), "Beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (pp. 137-148) and "The gradual liberation of occupied sections of the Croatian state" (pp. 149-166); "1995" (167) with the sub-headings "Final liberation of the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia: 'Flash' and 'Storm'" (pp. 167-176) and "End of the war and the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (pp. 177-187). The first part ends with a summary (pp. 188-198).

The first part of the book constitutes a chronological overview of the most important political and military events which led to the creation of the free and independent Republic of Croatia. Nazor lucidly explains all of the complex processes which led to the creation of the Croatian state. Nazor thoroughly backs his assertion that Greater Serbian policies coupled with ideology bore the primary responsibility for the war.

The second part of the book is entitled "Materials" (p. 199) and it consists of these sections: "Franjo Tuđman, President of the Republic of Croatia (1922-1999)" (pp. 201-

212), "Liberation of the occupied areas in Western Slavonia in 1991" (pp. 213-218), "The battle for Vukovar" (pp. 219-230), "Dubrovnik" (pp. 231-238), "Course of the military-police Operation 'Flash'" (pp. 245-258), "Course of the military-police Operation 'Storm'" (pp. 259-264), "Let's save lives" (pp. 265-268), "'Storm' was a legitimate liberation operation by the Croatian Armed Forces, in which Croatian commanders honourably led their units" (pp. 269-302), "Population and surface area of the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia" (pp. 303-306) "The media and certain facts about the Croatian-Bosniak (Muslim) conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (pp. 307-322), "Enemy counterintelligence operations" (pp. 323-324), "From a lecture by Lord David Owen, 27 January 1996" (pp. 325-328), "Foreign volunteers in Croatia's defence" (pp. 329-334), "The course of the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia until admittance to the United Nations" (pp. 335-338), "List of states which accorded diplomatic recognition to Croatia" (pp. 339-341), "The Yugoslav Army destroyed 214 churches" (pp. 342-343), "Thirteen centuries of Croatian culture in ashes" (pp. 344-345), "Thousands of homes destroyed" (pp. 346-347), "The aggressor's main targets were civilians and their homes" (pp. 348-349), "Croats expelled from their homes" (pp. 350-351), "An appeal for peace in Croatia" (pp. 352-353), "The Osijek *fićo*" (pp. 354-355), "Wartime medical corps" (pp. 356-362), "From the testimony by Serbian Krajina Army intelligence officer S. L. at the tribunal in The Hague" (pp. 363-367), "Human losses" (pp. 368-371) and, in the end, "Mass graves" (pp. 372-375). This part of the book clearly supplements the chronology of events and key facts set forth in the first part, and it provides an entirely different picture of the one that can be found in certain Croatian media.

Readers can more easily navigate the abundance of texts with the help of the lists of references and abbreviations, the personal and place name indices, the numerous photographs and the outstanding maps. The lists of references and maps may constitute something of a signpost for all of those who wish to more thoroughly study the Homeland War and the events which preceded the Serbian aggression, particularly since Nator made use of the relevant sources and archival materials of Serbian origin when writing the book. This book is an example of objective writing based on the facts, without the controversial standpoints and personal biases, animosities or distorted images of the Homeland War which can be found on the media scene.

Darjan GODIĆ

**“The Party of the Right in Croatian Political and Cultural Life, 1861-1929”,
Conference held at the “Golden Hall” of the Croatian History Institute,
Opatička 10, Zagreb, 24-25 November 2011**

The scholarly seminar “The Party of the Right in Croatian Political and Cultural Life, 1861-1929” was held in Golden Hall of the Croatian History Institute in Zagreb on 24-25 November 2011 to mark the 150th anniversary of the Party of the Right. A total 19 scholars participated in the proceedings. As the seminar’s title suggests, it was dedicated to the Party of the Right and its political and cultural impact from its establishment until the dictatorship of King Alexander, when the functioning of all political parties, and thus the Party of the Right as well, was banned. The seminar was organized into three panels, broken down chronologically from the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries.

Nine scholars participated in the first panel, and it was opened by Jasna Turkalj, the director of the Croatian History Institute. In her address, she presented an overview of the work of the Croatian territorial diet in 1861, at which the relationship between Croatia and Hungary was deliberated.

Dubravko Jelčić (Croatian Academy of Arts and Science, Zagreb) spoke about the reverberations of Rightist thought on Croatian literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, citing the literary works of well-known Croatian writers August Šenoa, A. G. Matoš, August Cesarec, Miroslav Krleža and others who were influenced by this ideology.

Marjan Diklić (Croatian Academy of Arts and Science, Zagreb) spoke about “The Party of the Right in Dalmatia at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century”, in which he explained the creation and activity of the Party of the Right in Dalmatia. The party was formed in Zadar on 22 August 1894 through the merger of three Rightist groups into a single Party of the Right. It consisted of a 16-member central committee and three subordinate district committees. The Party of the Right in Dalmatia was headed by Fr. Josip Kažimir Ljubić, while its deputy chairman was Nikola Depar and the secretary was Josip Paštrović. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Dalmatian Party of the Right experienced a rift, and the Pure Party of the Right was formed in which the most outspoken member was Fr. Ivo Prodan. This party, as opposed to the Party of the Right led by Ante Trumbić, Frano Supilo and Juraj Biankini, advocated an independent and Croatian state.

Ivo Perić, speaking on “The role of the Rightists in the establishment of municipal administration in Dubrovnik (1890-1899)”, discussed the prominent Rightists of the Dubrovnik area and Rightist activity in that city. He also analyzed their relationship with the Italian and Serbian parties in Dubrovnik.

Robert Bacalja and Katarina Ivon (History Department, University of Zadar), in their contribution on “Croatian-Serbian relations in the Rightist periodical *Crvena Hrvatska*”, emphasized the attitude of the Rightists toward other nations, as well as Frano Supilo’s stance on Serbian policies in Dubrovnik.

Nevio Šetić (Croatian Parliament, Zagreb) dealt with the topic of “The stance of the Istrian Rightists on the rift in the Party of the Right in Civil Croatia”. Šetić concluded that

the Istrian Rightists did not side with either faction in the central party organization, because they felt that the Rightists in Civil Croatia should have a single party.

Mato Artuković (Croatian Institute of History, Slavonski Brod Branch), in his contribution “The speeches of Josip Frank”, examined the activities of Josip Frank, who served as chairman of the Pure Party of the Right, whose members were better known as the Frankists (*frankovci*). In this, he stressed that Croatian and Yugoslav historiography often paint an incorrect picture of Frank, since he advocated a unified, independent and free Croatia with Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the negative assessments of his work were put forth by his political opponents, supporters of the Yugoslav idea. Artuković believes that Josip Frank was faithful to the ideology of Ante Starčević and that he clearly and eloquently expressed this in his speeches.

Jure Krišto (Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb), in his contribution on “Failed Croatian attempts at Christian socialism”, reconstructed the attempts at political organization based on the precepts of Christian socialism. Since these organizational attempts were conducted through the reformed Rightist workers’ organizations and parties, his contribution also served as a reconstruction of Rightist-Catholic relations as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy neared its end.

Zoran Grijak (Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb) spoke about the “Circumstances surrounding the establishment and activity of the Starčević Party of the Right Club in Sarajevo”, wherein he examined the activity of this party from its establishment in 1908 until 1918. He pointed out that in its platform guidelines, the Club opted for the policies of Starčević’s Party of the Right led by Josip Frank.

The second panel commenced with an address by Ljubo Antić on “The Rightist ideology and Yugoslavism”, which dealt with the two factions in the Party of the Right, the Frankists and the Starčevićists and their views of the new state. Since the ideas of the Starčevićists did not function in the new state, they sought their new vision for a party platform within the framework of some of the Yugoslav ideas. In the new state, the Starčevićists conducted an opportunist policy, and they dispersed into other political parties with a Croatian character, mostly the Croatian Union.

Andrej Rahten (Scholarly Research Centre, Slovenian Academy of Arts and Science, Ljubljana), in his contribution “Alpine Croatianism: Slovenian-Rightist themes and ties”, examined the ties between Slovenian Catholic populists and the statehood right platform of the Rightists. Rahten believes that the Slovenian Catholic populists attempted to prove the compatibility of Starčevićist thought with Christian democracy in order to strengthen their party in Cisleithania.

Mislav Gabelica (Ivo Pilar Social Science Institute, Zagreb), in his contribution “Ideological differences between Rightist parties in Civil Croatia on the eve of the First World War”, examined the creation of new factions inside the Party of the Right, and their views of the newly developing situation on the eve of the First World War.

Ante Bralić and Ante Gverić (History Department, University of Zadar), in their contribution “Fr. Ivo Prodan on the fault-line between Italian occupation and the new Yugoslav state (1917-1919)”, recounted the political development of Fr. Ivo Prodan from the May Declaration in 1917 to 1919, when *Hrvatska kruna*, a periodical which he edited, ceased publication. Bralić and Gverić also explained the political situation in northern Dalmatia and the creation of the new state and the withdrawal of Italian troops.

The final participant in this panel was Ivica Miškulin (Croatian Institute of History, Slavonski Brod Branch), with the contribution "Juraj Tomac: peasant leader and Rightist pastor", in which he discussed the influence of Juraj Tomac on the peasantry and his advocacy of disseminating Rightist ideas in small rural settlements.

The third panel commenced on the second day (25 November 2011), with contributions by six participants. The first was delivered by Ivica Zvonar (Croatian Academy of Arts and Science, Zagreb) on topic of "Cooperation between Frane Barac and politicians of Rightist orientation", in which he covered the political life of Msgr. Frane Barac from 1914 to 1929. Zvonar emphasized his influence on respected Rightists such as Matko Laginja, Ante Pavelić, Ivan Lorković, Ivan Peršić and others.

Stjepan Matković (Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb) spoke about the political ideology and work of Ivo Pilar in "Was Ivo Pilar a Rightist?" Explaining Pilar's ideological positions, Matković answered the question by noting that Pilar was not, in fact, a Rightist.

Zdravka Jelaska Marijan (Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb), in "A new state, new paths", spoke about the Rightists in Dalmatia after the First World War and their political preferences and participation in other parties, since certain parties from other parts of the new state began to spread to Dalmatia on the eve of the first elections for the national assembly.

The Rightist factions in Croatia and their main representatives and publications were discussed by Zlatko Matijević (Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb) in "Starčević's Party of the Right and its transformations (1923-1928)". Matijević discussed the main political protagonists of the new Rightist parties, August Košutić, Matej Mintas and Milan Šafar, and their Rightist publications.

Zlatko Hasanbegović (Ivo Pilar Social Science Institute, Zagreb), in his contribution "The cleric of Muslim Starčevićism: the political/national thought of Munir Šahinović Ekremov", analyzes the political activity of Munir Šahinović in general, and particular his activity during the period of the January 6th Dictatorship. He conveyed his political ideas in the Sarajevo-based newspaper *Muslimanska svijest*, where he called for the indivisibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its administrative-political autonomy for the duration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the promotion of a cultural/national and social Renaissance among the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The seminar was closed by Tomislav Jonjić with his contribution "Disputes and rifts in the restored Party of the Right, 1990-1992". Jonjić examined the status of Rightist ideas in the Imotski branch and the Imotski region. Based on his own experience, since Jonjić was the founder of the local Croatian Party of the Right, he provided information on the behaviour of the governing elites in Zagreb and their impact on the party in Imotski.

The seminar "The Party of the Right in Croatian Political and Cultural Life, 1861-1929" continued the tradition of examining Rightist thought and ideology, opening new and thus far unresearched issues in Croatian historiography. The heated and fascinating debate among the participants demonstrated that there is indeed room and broad potential for future research and new findings, and one can only hope that the proceedings will also be published.

Ivana ŠUBIC



INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMITTING MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscripts for consideration should be printed on a letter-quality printer and submitted in three double-spaced copies and on computer diskette. Notes and block quotations should also be double-spaced. Manuscripts are sent to outside readers in anonymous form and should be prepared accordingly. Articles should not exceed 8,000 words, excluding footnotes. Submissions will not be returned. The *Chicago Manual of Style* is to be followed for footnotes. Some examples:

Books

Single Author

Ljubo Boban, *Hrvatska u diplomatskim izvještajima izbjegličke vlade 1941-1943.*, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 1:63.

Two Authors

Zdravko Dizdar, Mihael Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest – Dom i svijet,), p. 27.

More than Three Authors

Jaroslav Šidak, Mirjana Gross, Igor Karaman and Dragovan Šepić, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda g. 1860.-1914.* (Zagreb, 1968), 240.

Pseudonymous Author Identified

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Editor

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1. Bücher:

- Wolfgang Kessler, Buchproduktion und Lektüre in Zivilkroatien und -Slawonien zwischen Aufklärung und "nationaler Wiedergeburt", Frankfurt am Main 1976, S. 25.
- Weiter im Text:
- W. Kessler, Buchproduktion und Lektüre, S. 78.
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Autorin handelt, zitiert man folgenderweise:

- Derselbe (Ders.) oder Dieselbe (Dies.), Politik, Kultur und Gesellschaft in Kroatien und Slawonien in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Historiographie und Grundlagen, München 1981, S. 33.
- In weiterem Text zitiert man wiederum auf die eben beschriebene Weise.

2. Artikel in Büchern und Sammelbänden:

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- Beim Zitieren von Quellen sind folgende Bezeichnungen zu verwenden: Fond, Nachlass, Korrespondenz, Karton (Kt.), Faszikel (Fasz.), Folie (Fol.), Signatur (Sg.), Nummer (Nr.)

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