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About this issue’s cover

In January 1963, New York pacifist-anarchists Judith Malina and Julian Beck, co-founders of the Living Theatre, debuted a remarkable play called *The Brig*. The playwright was a former marine, Kenneth Brown, who had been incarcerated in a military brig for thirty days while stationed in Japan. In the brig, prisoners followed a strict sequence of routines, day in and day out, for the length of their incarceration. The goal was to strip them of their identity and instil unquestioning obedience. Each inmate was given a number and forced to answer to it. Punishment was to study the *Guide for Marines* to the letter while obeying rigid protocols of behaviour within a tightly confined space sectioned off by lines that could not be crossed without permission or an order to do so. Prisoners were screamed at, punched, and subjected to constant humiliation by the guards, who enforced a strict code of silence between inmates. Brown’s play presented a day in this brig, with all its attendant brutality.

The Living Theatre regarded their performance of *The Brig* as a political statement. This is clear from Malina’s director’s notes, published in 1964, in which she interprets the play as a transformative critique of society’s authoritarian structures. ‘Whether that structure calls itself a prison or a school or a factory or a family or a government’, she writes, ‘that structure asks each man what he can do for it, not what it can do for him, and for those who do not do for it, there is the pain of death or imprisonment, or social degradation, or the loss of animal rights’. Outlining her techniques for staging the marine brig’s ‘structure’ of psychological and physical cruelty, she underlined that her ambition was to radicalise people through the play. She also interpreted the play’s message as anarchist. *The Brig’s* brutalised marines and their guard-persecutors were united by the choice, at some juncture, to submit to authority. Each soldier had decided to ‘draw the line at that line’ and this was ‘the symbolic key of his repressed powers’ [Malina’s emphasis] and his suffering. In a free society no such line need ever be drawn by any individual. What inner force could free us to usher in such a society? ‘Love, the saving grace in everything human’, was the Living Theatre’s answer. In *The Brig*, Malina revealed, the Living Theatre ‘called on pity last, on basic human kinship first’ so that their audience may ‘know violence in the clear light of the kinship of our physical empathy’. When humanity grasps the truth of violence, she predicted, we will ‘confront the dimensions of the Structure, find its keystone, learn on what foundations it stands, and locate its doors. Then we will penetrate its locks and open the doors of all the jails.’

Allan Antliff
Gezi Resistance in Istanbul: Something in Between Tahrir, Occupy and a Late Turkish 1968

Süreyyya Evren

It started with a small group of activists trying to defend a public park against government’s plans to build a huge shopping mall. In few days, as police used increasing violence against that tiny cluster of protestors, more and more people came to show their support. On 31 May, the whole country woke up at 3 a.m. to find that a small protest had turned into a huge revolutionary moment. Taksim Square and Gezi Park (in central Istanbul) were ‘captured’ on 1 June and remained government-free zones for two weeks ... It was a bit ethereal for everyone: a stateless mega city-centre! The Taksim Commune! And anarchists were clearly not the only people who enjoyed the temporary autonomous zone. The heterogeneous movement was politicised through a common process. Different political stances converged for the first time. There was clearly a ‘multitude’ on the streets during the uprising and this multitude is still active in different forms. What happened, how did it develop? I believe that the events repay discussion.

There are aspects of Gezi resistance that are truly local and you need to understand the Turkish political and social background to be able to connect fully to the events. On the other hand there are so many similarities, even links with other international uprisings and movements, that the protest seems very familiar. I would like to suggest placing the Gezi resistance in the context of the 2011-2013 uprisings, that is, the new wave of resistance that has emerged in the aftermath of the anti-globalisation movement (whatever we call it). Many aspects of 2011-2013 events resonate with the Zapatistas in 1990s. The encuentros in Chiapas and the writings of Marcos make sense of what is happening in Turkey. For me, this as a new web of radicalism and the main outcome is not overtly ‘political’; rather, it is about the empowerment of people. Gezi has transformed Turkish people.
As to the details: the festival-like atmosphere of Taksim after the police withdrew was very interesting. The square was full of revolutionary groups and parties. But none were able to control the festival, so to speak. In a typical May Day celebration in Turkey, for example the one I witnessed on 1 May 2012, (which was also held in the Taksim Square), there was one main programme, one focus; it was a very good plan and it involved a lot of security. Huge flags, huge placards, all displaying the glory of the revolutionary parties. It was a grandiose show. The 31 May uprising and the June TAZ in Taksim was instead based on ‘affect’ rather than flamboyance. There was room for everyone’s creativity. People made jokes everywhere: on the walls, on upturned police vehicles, on signs; there were performances in every corner of the square, not all by artists but some by activists, even some by passers-by. Some helped to design a park library. People used a police car to make a wish tree, like Yoko Ono’s Wish Trees. There were live concerts in various parts of the square, different types of music. Some groups marched and chanted, others worked on an indie radio station, organised painting workshops for children, or just shouted against the government ... The Gezi Resistance included apolitical youth, precarious employees, workers, activists, anarchists, Marxists, Kemalists, teachers, lawyers, doctors and most importantly many artists. This movement was initiated by a new generation of young activists but their mothers supported them too, conquering bread: giving food, helping youngsters to protect themselves against police brutality. For many it was the first political action they had taken part in. After the government inflicted a series of oppressive actions designed to transform Turkey into an Islamic authoritarian regime, people reacted.

The Gezi Resistance was an internet-based uprising, a Twitter revolution if you like. Facebook, Twitter and other internet environments were de facto places of the resistance. The anarchistic organisational principles of the original activists in Gezi Park subordinated ideology to practical action and attracted thousands of people who have never been involved in a demonstration before and who wanted to help the activists. The internet helped many people from all walks to step out.

Gezi Resistance resulted in clashes with police in several areas of Istanbul. In most cases, protestors didn’t even throw stones. Usually, their ‘crime’ was to return stubbornly having been attacked with pepper, gas and water cannons, to face down the police once more. People regrouped after all kinds of attacks and those chased by police found themselves in narrow streets, without places to hide. Twitter campaigns started asking residents in areas of police pursuit to open their doors and give the protesters access to the internet to upload images of police violence. Keys and pass-words, things we associated with private protection created collective bonds, bonds...
that didn’t exist before. One piece of graffiti, written under heavy police attack, illustrated this perfectly: ‘THAT’S ENOUGH, IF YOU CONTINUE LIKE THIS I’M GOING TO CALL THE POLICE!’

One question preoccupied the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan: How should my citizens live? Erdoğan’s troubling answer was to interfere with the daily lives of citizens – repeatedly in favour of an Islamic way of life. Bans on drinking alcohol were followed by advice not to eat white bread and for women to have at least three children. He came out against abortion. The Minister of Health talked about banning abortion even in cases of rape. The threats encouraged a campaign of civil disobedience by Turkish women. The slogan ‘My Body My Decision’ appeared on women’s bodies, photographed and published online. Women played a huge role in the resistance: on the barricades, behind the barricades, in Gezi Park, banging pots and pans in Istanbul and in other cities, in Twitter campaigns. This was a response to the oppressions experienced in their daily lives. ‘My body my decision’ evolved into ‘my park my decision’ and even: ‘my country my decision’.

Gezi Resistance fits Emma Goldman’s description of a revolution that you can dance to. There was always someone dancing in Taksim and Gezi. It was also the first completely grassroots Turkish social movement. There are no leaders, no parties dominating the movement. No initiators. This distinguished it from all previous revolutionary moments. It was a surprise for everyone involved: we never saw ourselves like this, rioting without a plan, without a programme, without a leader, and trying to create a new life afterwards; testing our limits from a small park. Anarchistic movements have always included numerous encounters and flows of ideas and people. And because there is no one centre, these connections play an important role for all participants in shaping a common politics. There is no single starting-point, no point of origin for the Gezi Resistance. It has no birth certificate, no figuration. It has no end. Always in the middle. Always on the network. And that creates a very fruitful platform for all kinds of creativity.

The ‘Turkish Summer’ began on 27 May 2013 when attempts to bulldoze the Gezi Park were stopped by few activists in the middle of the night. Those environmentalists wanted to stop a shopping mall being put up in the place of this nice, small park in Taksim. In few days the number of protestors grew in parallel with the escalation of police brutality against environmentalists. On 31 May, the police kicked the activists out of the park. That sparked an unforeseen public reaction. People organised through social media platforms. Protests began immediately. Protests attracted tens of thousands of people to the streets. And despite harsh policing, people refused to go back home. Demonstrations continued all
night, in both the Asian and the Anatolian side of Istanbul. The next day, on 1 June 2013, the number of protestors grew and protests were seen in other cities as well. At some point in the afternoon, police left the area to the protestors. People immediately built barricades on main roads. As a result, for the first time in its history, Gezi Park, Taksim Square and Istiklal Avenue became state-free locations governed by the people and the people only. There were of course plainclothes officers but nobody in uniforms. Soon it was possible to get free food and clothes, thanks to donations and more than a thousand volunteers. Infirmaries, a new garden, workshops and a library also appeared. Different political groups occupied different parts of the park; also lots of young students without any political affiliation occupied the space. It was such a shock for the citizens of Istanbul. In the night time, Gezi Park and Taksim Square became festival areas with various concerts and shows.

A direct reference to the flow of the system could again be found in art, in an earlier performance of the Turkish artistic group HaZaVuZu. Their performance Cut the Flow (2007) was a parody of how police forces regulate human flows on Istiklal Avenue in Istanbul, one of the main pedestrian streets in the city. As a group, they were first unnoticed as a part of the human flow on the street, but suddenly they created a ‘human barrage’, a gesture of cutting the flow. Reclaim the Streets, one of the well-known groups of the anti-globalisation movement, has also been known for stopping flows. Interventions to flows do not aim to stop the flow right away, but to show its ideological rhythm. And of course, also to make us feel that we can ‘reclaim’ our control over it. HaZaVuZu’s performance was a pioneering work in this sense, because all Gezi resistance demonstrations were about reclaiming our control over the flow: over the flow of people, ourselves in our cities and our parks, over the flow of money that motivates the state to exchange a park with a shopping mall, and over the flow of information, which is heavily monitored by the government.

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NOTES

2. For a video on My Body My Decision protests see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sXmzLT7XVCQ&feature=player_embedded
Beyond the Anarch – Stirner, Pessoa, Junger

Federico Campagna

When he died on 30 November 1935, at the age of forty-seven, the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa had already been over eighty different people. Writing and living through heteronyms since the age of six, Pessoa led an existence that far exceeded the limits imposed over the life of a normalised self. Pessoa jealously guarded his existential autonomy, to the point of structuring himself around an abundant void, which had much more in common with Stirner’s idea of a ‘creative nothing’ than with the tidy demands of social conformism. As one of his incarnations wrote – the shepherd Alberto Caeiro, to whom we shall return:

If, after I die, somebody wants to write my biography,  
there’s nothing simpler.  
It has just two dates – the day I was born and the day I died.  
Between the two, all the days are mine.  

Yet, we shouldn’t imagine that such an unbridled internal autonomy corresponded to an equally extravagant display of external freedom. Similarly to Italo Svevo – the Italian writer of his same generation, who spent his life quietly working in a paint factory – Pessoa’s visible life unfolded over the grey tones of a career as a translator for an import-export firm. As it will be argued in the rest of this essay, Pessoa developed a practice of deep – yet invisible – existential anarchism, which is as distant from traditional anarchism, as it is close to a Stirnerian, Jungerian vision of the anarch.

When asked to explain his understanding of the figure of anarch, as opposed to that of the anarchist, the German writer Ernst Junger replied:

The anarchist is a man with plans, for example to kill the tsar or something to that effect, while this is less so with the anarch. The anarch is more established
within himself, and the condition of the anarch is in reality the condition which
every man carries within himself. [...] An anarch can for example work calmly
in an office, but when he leaves in the evening, he plays quite another role.
And aware of his own superiority, he is able to take a complaisant view of the
political system currently in power. Stirner said that the anarch is a man who [...] 
perceives what can be of use to him and to the world at large, but he does not
involve himself in ideologies. With this in view, I’d like to call the condition of
the anarch quite natural. First there is man, then comes his environment.³

Commenting on the reactive character of anarchism, the young Pessoa also
remarked: “The anarchist is a product of civilization. Very much as smoke is the
product of fire”.⁴

It is clear how the vision of the anarch can lean both towards a proudly
detached existential nobility, as well as towards an Ayn Rand-esque complicity with
the existing economic and political status quo. Pessoa faced this issue in the dryly
satirical short story “The Anarchist Banker”, published in May 1922 on the first issue
of the Portuguese journal Contemporanea. In this story, resembling the structure
of a Platonic dialogue, a wealthy banker defends his lifelong commitment to the
anarchist cause, portraying his career as the natural outcome of a clever practice of
radical individual freedom:

‘I had established that, in the true anarchism, each person had to create
freedom and to combat social fictions by his own efforts. [...] What does
combating social fictions means in practical terms? It means war, it is war. [...] 
How do you conquer the enemy in war? By one of two ways: by killing him,
that is, by destroying him; or by imprisoning him, that is, by subjugating him,
by rendering him powerless. I couldn’t destroy all social fictions; that could
only be carried out by a social revolution. [...] I would have to subjugate them,
I would have to overcome them by subjugation, by rendering them powerless.
[...] The most important [social fiction], at least in our day and age, is money.
How could I subjugate money, or to be more precise, the power and tyranny
of money? There was only one way forward, I would have to acquire money,
I would have to acquire enough of it not to feel its influence, and the more I
acquired the freer I would be from that influence. When I saw this clearly, with
all the force of my anarchist convictions and all the logic of a clear-thinking
man, only then did I enter the present phase – the commercial and banking
phase – of my anarchism.”⁵
Pessoa’s banker resembles the protagonist of Junger’s short novel *Aladdin’s Problem*. Having escaped from Communist Russia to West Germany, Junger’s protagonist begins an astonishing career as funeral director, quickly rising to the role of CEO of a visionary multinational funeral firm. Like Pessoa’s banker, Junger’s character passes through the jaws of a capitalist society with the sharp ruthlessness of a pure egoist. However, unlike Ayn Rand’s heroic characters, neither Pessoa’s nor Junger’s creations believe for one moment in the intrinsic value of their success or of their wealth. For the anarch, submitting to the outer demands of society – to that point of utter submission which is the achievement of social success – is only a way to vanish, to further withdraw from society. Yet, as we shall observe later, both these characters lacked what constitutes the core quality of the true anarch.

In Junger and in Pessoa, the anarch has a social dimension and this runs deeper than the bonds of nationality and of society; but both remained highly sceptical of the emancipatory possibilities of any revolutionary strategy.

My egoism is the surface of my commitment. My spirit constantly lives in the study and the care of Truth, and in the concern of leaving, once I will have dismissed the clothes that bind me to this world, an opus which will be useful to the progress and the good of Humanity.7

The group that makes a revolution has the same mentality and the same character of the group that is beaten and substituted by that revolution. Thus, we can define a revolution as ‘a violent way to leave everything as it was before’.8

As with Max Stirner, the desire for universal emancipation withdraws from mass struggle, towards the actions of the individual. Differently from Stirner, however, both Pessoa and Junger see the small group of individuals who might take up such task, more as an enlightened elite – almost a vanguard – than as a pure ‘union of egoists’.

According to Pessoa:

> How to reform society? It is simple: with a non-collective movement, that is with a purely individual impulse. [...] All social reforms have always originated from one man of genius. From this man of genius, they pass to a small minority, form this small minority to a larger minority, and finally to the whole of society.9

While for Junger:
There is still someone who has not ceased to seek a breach in the armour of today’s Leviathans – and this is something which requires a caution and a bravery which are as yet unseen. These elites will give battle for a new freedom.\(^\text{10}\)

The true problem is that the majority does not want freedom, on the contrary they are scared of it. One must be free in order to desire to become it, because freedom is existence – most of all, it is a conscious accord with existence, it is the desire – which one perceives as his destiny – to realize it.\(^\text{11}\)

But this internal freedom, this autonomy which is at the heart of Junger’s work, and even more so of Pessoa’s life, should not be considered as a given. Creating one’s existential autonomy is in itself the task of a lifetime, and it can be hindered by external circumstances, as well as by the weaknesses of the human condition. Pessoa went dangerously close to a complete existential catastrophe a few times throughout his life, which was plagued by recurrent cases of grave depression. During one of them, he employed the universe of his heteronyms as a barrier against the suicidal whirlpool which had recently swallowed his friend, the Portuguese poet Mario de Sa-Carneiro. By writing ‘The Education of the Stoic’ under the heteronym of the Baron of Teive, Pessoa used a semi-autobiographical character – whom he would later define as a ‘mere mutilation’ of his personality – to issue a suicide note and finally to commit suicide on his behalf.

The Baron of Teive is perhaps the most dangerous of Pessoa’s heteronyms. Through the words of his only surviving manuscript, the Baron described an existential paralysis which still sounds as timely today, as when it was written in the late 1920s.

I belong to a generation – assuming that this generation includes others beside me – that lost its faith in the gods of the old religion as well as in the gods of modern unreligions. I reject Jehovah as I reject Humanity. For me, Christ and progress are both myths from the same world. I don’t believe in the Virgin Mary, and I don’t believe in electricity.\(^\text{12}\)

What made me furious at myself was the disproportionate weight of the social factor in my decision. I was never able to overcome the influence of heredity and my upbringing. I could pooh-pooh the sterile concepts of nobility and social rank, but I never succeeded in forgetting them. They’re like an inborn cowardice, which I loathe and struggle against but which binds my mind and my will with inscrutable ties.\(^\text{13}\)

While the Baron of Teive had lost his faith both in religion and in ‘unreligion’, the negative freedom which he achieved had not yet developed into the positive freedom
which can finally lead to true existential autonomy. It almost seems to be hearing the Baron’s analyst speaking, when we read Stirner’s distinction between freedom and ownness:

“What a difference between freedom and ownness! [...] Ownness is my whole being and existence, it is I myself. I am free of what I am rid of, owner of what I have in my power or what I control. [...] To be free is something that I cannot truly will, because I cannot make it, cannot create it: I can only wish it and – aspire toward it, for it remains an ideal, a spook.”

Stirner’s notion of ownness is the culmination of a progress which, from radical atheism – that is, a disbelief, or a ‘forgetting’ all ideologies and ‘spooks’ – through self-discipline, leads all the way to unleashing the potential of the Ego – which in its correct translation should be rather called ‘the Unique’ – as the ‘creative nothing’.

Although it is not particularly emphasised by Stirner – who confined it mostly to the issue of dealing with one’s own desires – the problem of self-discipline as the exertion of one’s will remains at the heart of the passage from existential paralysis to ownness.

In his early writing, the young Pessoa remained highly sceptical of the possibility of freely exerting one’s will:

“We can only be responsible and free if we are responsible for that brain being as it is. That is to say to be responsible for our state, to be free we must have created our own [self] ourselves. But to create oneself is nonsense. [...] Free-Will is the mode of existence of an Infinite Being (if such there be). It may, with incoherence or absurdity attributed to God. To man, only absurd and unthinkingly.”

Yet, in his lifetime, Pessoa seemed to have found a way to finally reach the state of an ‘Infinite Being’ able to create itself. By giving life to his army of heteronyms, while at the same time remarking that ‘Pessoa, properly speaking, doesn’t exist’, the Portuguese poet established within himself a space in which creation – and thus free will – could finally be possible.

Once again, it is as if Max Stirner was commenting on Pessoa – and at the same time, bitterly, on the failings of his heteronym the Baron of Teive – when he wrote:

“I am not nothing in the sense of emptiness, but I am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything.”
I am owner of my might, and I am so when I know myself as unique. In the unique one the owner himself returns into his creative nothing, of which he is born. Every higher essence above me, be it God, be it man, weakens the feeling of my uniqueness, and pales only before the sun of this consciousness. If I concern myself for myself, the unique one, then my concern rests on its transitory, mortal creator, who consumes himself, and I may say: all things are nothing to me.17

It would be tempting to conclude here this discussion of existential anarchism in the works of Pessoa, Junger and Stirner, but the genius of the Portuguese poet and of the writer from Heidelberg wouldn’t allow us to do so.

If Stirner verged towards nihilism, with his claim that ‘all things are nothing to me’, both Junger and Pessoa successfully managed to move ‘beyond the line’ of nihilism – to paraphrase the title of Junger’s book of 1949.18

Once again, it was through one of his heteronyms that Pessoa reached a perspective which allowed him to rediscover and to re-appropriate ‘all things’. During one ‘unrepeatable night’, Pessoa gave life to the young shepherd Alberto Caeiro, who is perhaps the exact specular image of the Baron of Teive. In Pessoa’s production, as well as in his life, Caeiro remains almost as a conceptual limit: he is a non-autobiographical character, who acts as the spiritual guide of many of Pessoa’s other heteronyms. It might not be a coincidence that Alberto Caeiro died young of tuberculosis, the same disease which killed Pessoa’s father when the poet was just five years old.

Pessoa repeatedly said that Alberto Caeiro wasn’t just a wise young man with a pagan character: he was the very embodiment of Paganism itself. Differently from Pessoa and from all of the other heteronyms, Caeiro seemed to have found a solution to the existential anxiety and paralysis which plagued the early modern generation, as well as our post-postmodern one. As if providing an answer to Wallace Stevens’ dilemma on the possibility of seeing things as they ‘merely are’,19 Caeiro wrote:

Only Nature is divine, and she is not divine ...

If I sometimes speak of her as a person
It’s because I can only speak of her by using the language of men,
Which imposes names on things
And gives them personality.

But things have no name or personality:
They just are, and the sky is vast, the earth wide,
And our heart the size of a closed fist
Blessed am I for all I don’t know.
That’s all I truly am ...
I enjoy it all as one who lies here in the sun.20

Caeiro pushes the existential autonomy of the anarch one step further outside of society and of social conformism, towards a state of unmediated contact with Nature’s essential core – which closely resembles Stirner’s definition of the Ego/Unique, in its transcendence of any possible definition.

Such a tension equally shines through Ernst Junger’s writing, especially in his later work. In a text largely dedicated to investigating the timeless essence/uniqueness of any individual human being, and particularly in a section focusing on Hesiod’s account of the ‘Golden Age’ which preceded historical time, Junger remarked:

Holderlin defines [the Golden Age] as a world ‘without cities’, which mainly signifies: without the State. [...] We should hint here to the question if man, in his becoming a State-maker, zoon politikon, hasn’t taken a line which is secondary to authentic human formation, and whether, since then, completeness, genius and happiness haven’t become possible only as isolated episodes, and no longer as a permanent condition.21

Although Junger’s position seems at times to verge towards mysticism, the German author took care of clarifying the nature of his message. According to Junger, if we seek an example of the perfect completion of the existential autonomy of the anarch, we shouldn’t look towards the mystic, but towards the poet:

There is only one freedom, which can put all this under checkmate: the freedom of the poet. It is for this reason that there isn’t any space for it in Plato’s State.22

For its part, Alberto Caeiro is even more firm in rejecting any accusation of mysticism:

Today I read nearly two pages
In the book of a mystic poet,
And I laughed as if I’d cried a lot.

Mystic Poets are sick philosophers,
and philosophers are lunatics.23

Or, at least, to accept mysticism only on his own terms:
If you want me to have a mysticism, then fine, I have one.
I’m a mystic, but only with my body.
My soul is simple and doesn’t think.

My mysticism is not wanting to know.
It’s living and not thinking about it.

I don’t know what Nature is: I sing it.24

Much more so than Junger, Caeiro managed to combine a refusal of nihilism, with the highest form of materialism:

As for me, I write the prose of my verses
And am satisfied,
Because I know I understand Nature on the outside,
And I don’t understand it on the inside,
Because Nature has no inside.
If it did, it wouldn’t be Nature.25

If Junger belongs to the ‘Age of Bronze’ – in which, according to the German writer, myths and miracles replaced the loss of an immediate connection with Nature – Caeiro fully embodies the spirit of the Golden Age, as described by Hesiod. Perhaps, it is only in the spirit of the Golden Age, that the suicidal existential impasse of the Baron of Teive can be resolved through Stirnerian means, while at the same time pushing Stirner’s vision beyond the line of nihilism.

If, earlier, we compared Stirner to the Baron of Teive’s analyst, we might now add that Junger and Pessoa could be seen as two of the closest, most understanding friends of this analyst. However, like any analyst, even Stirner needs to have his own, and that is a job that only the poet Alberto Caeiro can take upon himself. After all, if Socrates was deemed the wisest of men, since he admitted not to know, then Caeiro should be seen as the wisest of poets:

I have no ambitions nor desires.
To be a poet is not my ambition,
It is my way of being alone.26

To him belongs the autonomy and the ownness of the anarch, beyond the anarch.

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NOTES

1. *Al mio maestro, Stefano Baia Curioni*.
13. Fernando Pessoa as the Baron of Teive, in Richard Zenith (ed.), *The Education of the Stoic - the only manuscript of the Baron of Teive*, Exact change, Cambridge, 2005, p. 10.


Revisiting social and deep ecology in the light of global warming

Roy Krøvel

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is largely theoretical. It asks what type of perspective is needed in order for left libertarians and anarchists to develop a deeper understanding of global warming. This way of framing the question builds on a set of premises which I will spell out. First, global warming is real. Second, the reality of global warming exists independently of our discourse about it. Third, global warming will have real and dangerous consequences for humans and human society. Fourth, we do not have full knowledge about global warming and climate change, and we must reach a deeper understanding. Fifth, the urgency of global warming demands that we act before we know everything we want to know about it. Sixth, human societies have an inherently creative capacity to find solutions to the challenges posed by global warming. Ethical thinking about global warming cannot, therefore, be reduced to the realm of human consciousness, language and discourse; global warming forces us to rethink our relationship with nature and our possible paths to understanding nature and reality in a theoretically serious manner (in the Hegelian sense of the word ‘serious’) – that is, in terms of the unity between theory and praxis.

Keywords: Ecology, global warming, anarchist praxis

INTRODUCTION

Because of its relative ‘newness’, global warming is different from most other phenomena that we normally relate to ‘globalisation’. For instance, in reading the ‘classics’ of left libertarianism and social ecology, the near absence of analyses of global warming and climate change is striking. The work of Murray Bookchin
is an exception: he began to deal with the topic in the 1960s (Bookchin, 1987, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Marshall, 1994). Nonetheless, anarchist perspectives on nature have had a considerable influence on the development of the environmental movements over the last decades and they are still felt in environmental movements today. It is therefore pertinent to reconsider the historical background and particular experiences that produced those influences. This is particularly important in the light of the conflict between deep and social ecology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At one point this conflict was seen by many as threatening to ‘split the whole environmental movement’ (Carter, 1995, p. 328).

Thinking about the challenge posed by global warming has the potential to be a very fruitful exercise. It forces us to re-examine critically the ways in which we think about the big questions on a global scale while, at the same time, making us focus on the deep and narrow, on how we hermeneutically and collectively make sense of, and understand, the nature of which we are a part. It also presents a challenge to left libertarians and anarchists to rethink and develop theoretical perspectives in the light of new information about, and knowledge of, phenomena. It is not enough for anarchists and left libertarians to limit themselves merely to subsuming global warming and climate change within existing theoretical perspectives.

I will not attempt here to capture the full meaning of phenomena as multifaceted as ‘anarchist’ or ‘left libertarian’ (Evren, 2011; Franks, 2011). However, if terms such as ‘anarchism’ or ‘left libertarianism’ are to be useful tools for analysis, a minimal understanding of what characterises them in relation to, and in contrast to, other terms or ‘isms’, is necessary. In that spirit I briefly outline below some of the key elements necessary (but not sufficient) for ‘offering a vision of a potential new society’ (McKay, Elkin, Neal, and Boraas, 2010).

1. Decentralised forms of organisation. This has a number of components. Murray Bookchin, for example, builds on E. E. Schumacher to make an argument about scale. However, smallness should not be seen as a sufficient condition for non-violence and non-repression (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999, p. 59). According to Malatesta, ‘the new society should be organised with the direct participation of all concerned, from the periphery to the centre …’ (Malatesta quoted in McKay, et al., 2010). Decentralised forms of organisation go hand in hand with an emphasis on, and valuing of, spontaneity and creativity (Bookchin, 1975; McKay, et al., 2010).

2. Praxis and experience over theory. ‘Experience through freedom is the only means to arrive at the truth and the best solutions; and there is no freedom if there is not the freedom to be wrong’ (Malatesta quoted in McKay, et al., 2010). However, prioritising praxis and experience over theory has sometimes led left libertarians to disregard theoretical reflection on structure at different levels in theoretical...
analysis (Pritchard, 2010). From a critical realist perspective, structures ‘may consist of internally related objects so that their generative mechanisms or powers emerge from this combination and cannot be reduced to its individual components’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 14). Deepening our understanding of natural and social structures matters to those concerned with human emancipation.

In this paper I will argue that Murray Bookchin and social ecology offers the best starting point to think about global warming from a non-anthropocentric left libertarian perspective. Brian Morris accurately explains Bookchin’s underlying philosophy: ‘... Murray Bookchin sensed that the social and the natural must be grasped in a new unity and that the time had come to integrate an ecological, natural philosophy (social ecology) with social philosophy based on freedom and mutual aid (anarchism or libertarian socialism)’ (Morris, 2009). To avoid ecological disaster we must, _inter alia_, reach a ‘new sensibility toward the biosphere’. I will, however, argue that the polemic with deep ecology in the late 1980s was a missed opportunity for left libertarian ecology to deepen the understanding of the natural environment, and I therefore propose to proceed by revisiting the debate between Arne Næss and Bookchin.

**BOOKCHIN’S CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY**

In a keynote speech at the National Green gathering at Amherst, Massachusetts in 1987, Murray Bookchin challenged the political perspective of deep ecology as ‘guilty of a deeply flawed and potentially dangerous ecological perspective’ (Chase, 1991, p. 8). This rather harsh criticism led to a long and often nasty debate between proponents of deep and social ecology. The term ‘deep ecology’ was first coined by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (A. Næss, 1973) to describe a ‘deeper’ form of environmental engagement suitable for a new type of environmental movement. Re-reading the deep ecology manifesto today, one notes that the many similarities with social ecology overshadow the differences by far. By the 1980s, however, the term ‘deep ecology’ had, in the US, increasingly come to be identified with an eclectic body of ideas, including ideas from militant wilderness activists such as Ed Abbey, Christopher Manes and Dave Foreman. It was presumably against some of these American militant wilderness activists that Bookchin intended to direct his fiercest criticism. According to Bookchin, deep ecology was now potentially and explicitly anti-social and anti-human (Chase, 1991, p. 10). He characterised some of the deep ecologists as ‘barely disguised racists, survivalists, macho Daniel Boones, and outright social reactionaries’ (Chase, 1991, p. 11). Dave Foreman was ‘guilty of’ a form of ‘crude eco-brutalism’ which made Bookchin compare the deep ecology movement to Hitler and the third Reich (Bookchin, 1987).
According to Bookchin, we need instead ‘a resolute attempt to fully anchor ecological dislocations in social dislocations; to challenge the vested corporate and political interests we should properly call capitalism; to analyse, explore, and attack hierarchy as a reality ...’ (Bookchin, 1991a, p. 61). For Bookchin, social hierarchies should be seen as the root cause of environmental degradation.

In the debate Bookchin provoked in the environmental movement in Norway, I sided with Bookchin. There were several reasons. The first was because he directed a necessary critique against reactionary policy proposals made by a few North American ecologists often associated with the deep ecology movement. Dave Foreman, for instance, claimed at the height of the 1983-85 famine, that ‘the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid – the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to let the people there just starve’ (cited in Bookchin, 1991c, p. 124). Others welcomed the AIDS epidemic as ‘a necessary solution’ to population control (cited in Bookchin, 1991b, p. 123). Ed Abbey described the United States as a product of Northern European civilisation and warned against allowing ‘our’ country to be ‘Latinised’ (cited in Bookchin, 1991b, p. 123). My second reason was that I felt that the resolution of many of the mainly local issues of the 1980s and 1990s depended on the adoption of a social ecologist perspective on social hierarchies, domination and capitalist exploitation. I did not see how ‘deep’ ecology could help find ‘deeper’ or better answers to those problems. I now believe, in fact, that at the time deep ecology in the US had already degenerated into a fragmented and often reactionary body of thinking, far removed from the vision presented by Naess and others only a few years earlier.

The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas further convinced me of the necessity of searching for social roots to environmental degradation (Krøvel, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). In Chiapas, the establishment of a nature reserve in Montes Azules by the Mexican government, based on a romantic and false vision of a special relationship between one indigenous group, ‘the Lacandon’, and the rainforest, excluding other indigenous groups deemed ‘less worthy’, provoked a war which rendered it virtually impossible to find sustainable solutions to the environmental degradation (de Vos, 2002, 2003). Without social justice, there was no hope of resolving very real and serious ecological problems of the Lacandon. There were strong similarities between the Zapatista message and social ecology: non-hierarchical forms of organisation, anti-capitalism, participation, dialogue and consensus must be key in the struggle for human emancipation and environmental justice.

Yet Naess also raised some concerns about Bookchin’s critique and, in particular, the issue of mono-causality: is there one cause of the problem? Bookchin did not believe that environmental degradation had only one cause, of course, but he repeat-
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edly singled out social hierarchies as the root cause. As Næss argued, in the real world, in open systems, there will always be many generative mechanisms causing the phenomena we are trying to observe and understand (Bhaskar, 2008; Ugarriza, et al., 2009). It was difficult, moreover, to know that something is a root cause. How can we know that environmental degradation will end if we remove social hierarchies? Understanding Næss’s concerns and the approach to knowledge that informs them, offers a different perspective on Bookchin’s critique and opens up a space for a synthesis of social and deep ecology.

NÆSS AND DEEP ECOLOGY

Murray Bookchin was not alone in worrying about the supposed spiritual ‘Eco-la-la’ of deep ecology (Bookchin, 1997, p. 47). Other critics raised a number of similar concerns. It is, however, necessary to distinguish clearly between Næss and much of what has come to be known as ‘deep ecology’ in North America, as for instance Joel Kovel does in The Enemy of Nature (Kovel, 2007). Here, Kovel quotes Næss’s view that ‘it is still clear that some of the most valuable workers for ecological goals come from the socialist camp’ (Kovel, 2007, p. 190). Very few people influenced by deep ecology in North America, Kovel adds, ‘bother to reed Næss’ (Kovel, 2007). Most critical analysts of deep ecology spend little time researching in detail the historical development of the deep ecology promoted by Næss and how it might differ from the versions rightfully criticised by Bookchin, Foster and others. In what follows I will therefore briefly discuss some of the key concerns raised by critics of deep ecology.

Some of Næss’s earliest work of could create suspicions of anti-rationalism if read only casually. The influence of Henry Bergson was, for instance, visible in Næss’s master’s thesis (Norsk biografisk leksikon, 2011; A. Næss, 1933). Bergson had argued that immediate experience and intuition are more significant than rationalism and science for understanding reality. Næss’s doctoral thesis, however, was primarily influenced by the logical positivism of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle who, in the 1920s and 1930s, combined empiricism with a version of rationalism (see, for example, Næss’s PhD thesis: A Næss, 1936). Later work, such as Interpretation and Preciseness (A. D. E. Næss, 1953) and Logikk og metodelære: En innføring [Introduction to logics and methodology] (A. Næss, 1966) further militate against anti-rationalist readings of Næss’s work.

Another criticism of deep ecology is related to the employment of the term ‘holism’. According to Foster, Clark and York, the ecological holism often found
in deep ecology can be traced back to the South African, Jan Christian Smuts (Foster, Clark, and York, 2010). They rightfully expose Smuts’s ideas on nature and society as among the philosophical underpinnings of the South African racist apartheid regime, and demonstrate the ‘enormous’ influence of his ecological holism throughout academia (Foster, et al., p. 323). Alfred Adler, for instance, promoted Smuts’s ecological holism and psychological connections in Vienna at the time that Næss studied in the city (early 1930s). ‘Deep ecology carried forward many of the essentialistic, vitalistic, and organismic traditions of the idealist side of the ecological debate’, say Foster et al. (Foster, et al., 2010, p. 338). Næss and deep ecology is thus implicitly linked to essentialistic idealism and racist apartheid politics.

The critique of Smuts and his legacy in the ecological movement is important and valuable. The brief treatment of Næss and deep ecology in this context, however, leaves out important aspects of the history. It is indeed possible that Næss, then in his early 20s, was exposed to ecological holism in Vienna, but of course not all those who attended lectures by Adler or others belonging to the Vienna circle became essentialistic idealists or racists. This was certainly not the case with Næss. Reducing the understanding of holism, and in particular the influence of holism on the deep ecology promoted by Næss, to Smuts and a handful of South African ecologists, would be unfair. Indeed, Scott Randall, Nina Witoszek and others have traced the roots of Norwegian ecophilosophy to Niels Treschow (1751-1833), the first Norwegian academic philosopher, and to a range of nineteenth-century Norwegian writers and poets (Randall, 2007; Witoszek, 1998). According to Randall, Treschow ‘developed original ideas of holism incorporated with individualism while reflecting upon the natural environment and striving for a type of self-realisation’ (Randall, 2007, p. 25). While one of Smuts’s followers, the grassland ecologist John Phillips, argued, for instance, that indigenous peoples ‘should not be granted any autonomy or freedom because it would violate the relations of races within the community’ (quoted in Foster, et al., 2010, p. 323), Næss was already resolute about the need for local autonomy and decentralisation in 1972, when he made his original call for a ‘deep ecology’ (A. Næss, 1999b). He pointed out that the existence of ‘exploitation and suppression’ was a reality and that it called for ‘extreme caution toward any overall plans for the future, except those consistent with wide and widening classless diversity’ (A. Næss, 1999b, p. 4).

A similar problem arises with Foster et al’s treatment of scepticism in the ecological movement, which they link mainly to idealism and extreme constructivism. This might be the case for some deep ecologists internationally, but it would certainly be a misleading description of the Nordic tradition (Bhaskar, Høyer, and Næss, 2012). Of course Næss, in contrast, was not driven by extreme
constructionism or postmodernism, but he was nevertheless deeply sceptical about strong knowledge-claims and the ability of humans to administer nature in its full complexity. Instead, he favoured more sensitivity towards ‘our state of ignorance’ (A. Næss, 1999b, pp. 4, 5).

Another discussion arose from within Nordic deep ecology itself, between Næss and younger activists and scholars influenced by Marxism. Sigmund Kvaløy, a former student of Næss, for example, highlights the need to focus on human society before nature: ‘... although it is important to have strong feelings about nature, we have to concentrate on the human society and the human being, otherwise everything we cherish will be destroyed. We have so little time’ (Reed and Rothenberg, 1993, p. 148). The disagreement should not be seen as a conflict between opposites but, rather, the slightly different ordering of priorities. In contrast to what is sometimes believed about Næss’s neglect of human society, he was, on numerous occasions, engaged in cooperation and dialogue with local communities – for instance in order to develop sustainable solutions to the tension between the demands of sheep farming and protection of a diminishing population of wolves. Some also argue that Næss adopted a different view about the role of environmental action to some of the younger generation of deep ecologists, including Kvaløy. For Kvaløy ecophobia is total engagement. Action is the teacher, not a university seminar (Orton, 2005). Kvaløy, nevertheless, echoes Næss’s activist approach to social change and he reinforced the view that the activist does not need a ‘picture of the future society because there are a range of possibilities’ (Orton, 2005). Moreover, Næss was no stranger to activism. In the 1960s he played a leading role in enacting an absurd and funny essay by Jens Bjørneboe, Norway’s leading left libertarian nineteenth-century novelist (‘How Arne Næss and I conquered NATO’, Bjørneboe, 1996). In 1970 he quit his post as professor at Oslo University to become an activist, engaging himself in environmental actions and civil disobedience in, for instance, Mardøla and Alta. In particular, the environmental actions in Alta resulted in a stronger focus on the exploitation and suppression of the Sami (indigenous people).

Activism notwithstanding, Næss and many other ecophilosophs continued to advocate ‘non-violence’ and to emphasise social harmony. Kvaløy, in contrast, argued that the conflict model of social change should guide environmentalist activism: ‘I’m all for polarisation. That’s the only way we get deeper discussions’ (quoted in Orton, 2005). Næss did not agree and maintained that maximising contact with your opponent is a central norm of the Gandhian approach. Kvaløy presented a rather different interpretation. According to Kvaløy, Gandhi teaches that ‘[m]an’s most important source of insight and wisdom is located in social conflict where central human values are at stake’ (Orton, 2005). Again, the gap
between them is, perhaps, not as wide as it looks. Underlining ‘social harmony’ did
not mean avoiding conflict and change and should, rather, also be understood in the
light of Kropotkin’s critique of vulgar social Darwinism. In interviews and lectures
Næss repeatedly referred to Kropotkin and the concept of mutual aid (see for
example Eidslott, 1999). In Mutual Aid (Kropotkin, 1987) Kropotkin argued that
organic and social life were not ‘characterised by laissez-faire competition, conflict,
and survival of the fittest, but rather by mutuality and symbiosis’ (Morris, 2005). It
is true that in Communication and Argument Næss recommended showing respect
for the opponent to make discussions as fruitful and pleasant as possible, and argued
for a set of rules, including avoiding tendentious irrelevance, quoting, ambiguity, use
of straw men, statements of fact and tone of presentation (A. Næss, 1981). However,
being able to represent the opponent’s view fairly is not only an ideal reached out of
consideration and respect; it requires willingness and the ability to understand the
opposing arguments. It will thus potentially help to deepen your own understanding
of the issue and to develop your own argument further. As Orton puts it, his
concern to respect the opponent sometimes created the impression that there were
no enemies, only opponents: from a left wing perspective this approach appeared
‘simplistic-minded’ (Orton, 2005).

Brian Morris’s thought-provoking left libertarian critique, developed in Ecology
and Anarchism: Essays and Reviews on Contemporary Thought (Morris, 1996),
criticised Næss’s Ecology, Community and Lifestyle for not directly addressing
social issues, poverty, economic exploitation and state oppression (A. Næss and
Rothenberg, 1989). According to Morris, Næss’s only answer to the ecological crisis
was the advocacy of an ‘ecological consciousness’ and the development of ‘fairly
strong central political institutions’ (A. Næss and Rothenberg, 1989, p. 157). This
led Morris to categorise Næss and deep ecology under the heading ‘reactionary deep
ecology’ (Morris, 1996, p. 135). Yet in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle Næss disapproves of ‘socialist slogans’ (for instance ‘maximise production’, ‘centralisation’ and
‘high consumption’) and dedicates a chapter to the censure of ‘bureaucracy’ (A.
of the deep ecology movement seem to move more in the direction of nonviolent
anarchism than towards communism’ (A. Næss and Rothenberg, 1989, p. 156).
Næss elsewhere explained that he and others in his circle in the 1960s were ‘heavily
influenced by Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution’ (quoted in Clark,
2010, p. 26). He had become more critical of anarchism after observing that many
traditional communities that approximated to Kropotkin’s communitarian ideal ‘no
longer took good care of their environments’ (Clark, 2010, p. 26).

While the term ‘reactionary’ does not accurately describes Næss, Morris was
right to point out that the main problem with the deep ecology promoted by him is the reluctance to engage seriously with a critique of capitalism. Næss’s resistance to the growing Marxist influence within Nordic deep ecology in the 1970s and the critique of capitalism it encouraged must, of course, be understood in its particular historical context. Marxism in Norway at the time was dominated by two strands: one loyally followed Moscow, the other – and at the time intellectually more influential – looked to China, Cambodia and Albania for inspiration. Both were united in seemingly limitless admiration for authoritarianism and indifference to freedom and even life: neither had much to offer in terms of respect for nature. Still, the failure to engage systematically and vigorously with capitalism as the dominating mechanisms behind poverty, exploitation and environmental degradation limited, and continues to reduce, the potential of deep ecology to explain and guide attempts to find solutions to environmental problems.

For all its limitations, Næss’s approach continues to offer some important insights for understanding global warming. First is that the ethics of deep ecology are not based on the presumption that we know and understand the impact of human activity on nature, but on the insight that we do not. It calls for caution because we have no way of knowing all the long-term consequences of the complex processes we set in motion by our actions. Complexity in nature must be protected because complexity is necessary for nature to preserve itself, reproduce and develop. Nature’s ability to repair damage depends on natural diversity and complexity. To demand caution based on the insight that we do not know the long-term consequences of human activity is a better starting point for developing ethics suited to dealing with global warming than certainty about the possible consequences of human activity.

Further, as the ecofeminist Karen Warren argues, Næss’s concern was not with the correct ‘total’ view, but with the personal and political ‘importance of having, and negotiating from, ecologically acceptable … total views’ (Warren, 1999, p. 264). Warren notes that the critical goal of deep ecology is not sameness, but the ‘solidarity achieved by agreement to the values and beliefs expressed through the … platform’ (Warren, 1999, p. 264). This argument should be read in the light of the critiques advanced by women of colour and women from the global South about the universalising tendencies of the women’s movement. Ecosophical pluralism makes sense both ethically and epistemologically.

The inclusive and respectful scepticism promoted by Næss in the later stage of his career can strengthen and supplement materialist environmentalisms. His focus on diversity might also make it easier for some Marxist environmentalists to understand minority perspectives, for instance indigenous people’s perspectives that are sometimes at variance with ‘leftist’ Latin American presidents. Foster et al. hold up
leftist Latin-American presidents Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales as exemplars for a ‘rational, scientific regulation of the human metabolism with nature’ (Foster, et al., 2010, p. 396). While some of the actions undertaken by these presidents are worthy enough, they also provide a useful reminder about the limitations to an approach based on ‘rational scientific planning’ and competition for political power within the state. Some of these problems have become increasingly clear since the publication of *The Ecological Rift*. These left-leaning presidents have been employing authoritarianism with increasing frequency as they struggle to maintain power confronted by various types of organised opposition. Most worrying, perhaps, are the armed and deadly confrontations with indigenous groups struggling for control over local territories faced with the threat of expanding exploitation of natural resources by national or multinational companies.

Næss’s insistence on pluralism in the face of ‘our state of ignorance’, and caution towards overall plans, provide an important perspective for a libertarian environmentalist movement which seeks to understand and fully allow for the integration of minority and indigenous peoples’ perspectives. This should not be taken to mean that Næss was some kind of anarchist, as that would be stretching the argument too far – he pragmatically saw the social democratic state as a necessary safeguard against exploitation by multinational corporations. He also called for stronger international institutions, something most left libertarians would resist (Morris, 1997).

I will return to the issue of diversity and the ethical implications of uncertainty later, but first I need to clarify why a theory of the nature of global warming is a necessary prerequisite for a dialogue on ‘climate change justice’.

**WHAT POSSIBLE ACCESS DO WE HAVE TO THE ONTOLOGY OF GLOBAL WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE?**

Global warming is different from most other issues related to ‘globalisation’ which can to some extent be observed locally as they develop globally. We see people migrating, we observe capital being moved, information being produced and being used in a global market. (To get at the forces driving globalisation, however, we must engage in some critical reflection. They are not out there waiting to be observed.) Global warming and climate change, however, are different. They are (still) based on theoretical insights that should force us to act long before they can be fully experienced in such a way that we can no longer doubt their existence. Global collective action cannot wait for local experience to take place.

The urgency of global warming, then, presents us with a new type of challenge, one which can only be solved by global collective action borne out of the construc-
tion of a global consciousness about the reality of global warming. But as the
theoretical insights about global warming gradually grew in the 1990s in such a way
in that it could no longer be ignored, a parallel process unfortunately took place.
The term ‘global warming’ was gradually substituted by the term ‘climate change’,
after significant lobbying from business interests and right-wing groups, and to the
delight of the Bush administration, as Lakoff and others have demonstrated (Lakoff,
2010). Substituting ‘global warming’ with ‘climate change’ was a dangerous setback.
I will try to explain why briefly, as the explanation is relevant and necessary for the
analysis of the merits of social ecology, and I will use Bhaskar and critical realism as
an ‘underlabourer’ of science.1 This choice of critical realism is not coincidental. I
will argue that deep ecology has made significant progress over the last two decades,
inter alia, as a result of the cooperation with critical realists. For an understanding
of how science can be a valuable social activity in order to comprehend and act on
the challenge of global warming, a distinction between the realms of real, actual and
empirical is necessary.

It is a common misunderstanding that our knowledge of ‘global climate
change’ is the result of the accumulation of local experiences and locally produced
knowledge of local ‘climate change’; that we move from having insights into local
experiences of climate change to gradually processing those insights into knowledge
on a global scale. Unfortunately, we cannot gain insight into the realm of ‘the actual’
through observation and experience alone. To believe that would be naïve empiri-
cicism (Bhaskar, 2008).2

Instead, it is useful to employ the three domains of the world outlined by
Bhaskar: the real, the actual, and the empirical. The real is the realm of generative
mechanisms that create the flux of events that make up the actual. In order to
understand this perspective, it is useful to think of Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler
and Isaac Newton and the emerging understanding of the solar system and eventual
development of a theory of gravitation. To use the emerging understanding of gravi-
tation as an example will make it possible to connect with Arne Næss and his search
for a deeper non-foundational understanding of natural phenomena. He studied
Einstein’s theory of relativity in order to grasp the new (at the time) and potentially
revolutionary ideas emerging from the field of studying the very large things in the
universe (as, for instance, Einstein) and quantum mechanics (as, for instance, Niels
Bohr). More recent deep ecologists have increasingly combined Næss’s ontology of
nature with a critical realist understanding of how science can be a valuable social
activity. This example, therefore, also serves to illustrate key aspects of current
versions of deep ecology (or ‘ecophilosophy’, as some now prefer to call it).

Tycho Brahe, the Danish astrologist and astronomer, observed planets and
stars, carefully describing their trajectories and possible connections with other stars that seemed to form patterns. He used his experience and imagination to interpret relationships between observed movements and patterns, and his own life world. Nonetheless, he could not move from the realm of the empirical to the realm of the actual. His experience seemed to tell him that the earth was the centre of the system, and that the sun was orbiting around it. His one-time assistant, Johannes Kepler, however, understood that this model was wrong and used Brahe’s observations to produce a new model, now with the earth orbiting the sun. A new model did not in itself move science to the realm of the actual. Isaac Newton helped to produce a deeper understanding when he predicted that an invisible force, gravity, must be introduced to explain the observed movements. Still, from a critical realist perspective, everything we say about reality is fallible (but not equally fallible). Albert Einstein later demonstrated that Newton’s theory was far from a complete explanation and continued to search for the unifying theory that might explain both the very big (that which the theory of relativity deals with), and the very small (the field of quantum mechanics). We still do not understand what gravity is. According to Næss, that we do not know should lead us to accept the possibility that our assumptions and theories about the world are wrong.

The point here, of course, is that not even a very large number of observations and other forms of accumulated experience will by itself guarantee a deeper insight into the generative mechanisms which can guide us towards the realm of the actual. To achieve that, theoretical reflection on the many possible causes of observed and experienced phenomena is needed. Our best option, in my opinion, is again critical realism. According to Bhaskar, explanations (theories) are accomplished by a model of explanation comprising a four-phase process: ‘resolution of a complex event into its components (causal analysis)’; ‘redescription of component causes’; ‘retrodiction to possible (antecedent) causes of components via independently validated normic statements’; and ‘elimination of alternative possible causes of components’ (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 72).

Applying the critical realist model of theoretical reflection to the phenomenon of ‘global warming’, we realise that it is a very complex issue, of course, but also that we have at our disposal a number of theories on the most prominent generative mechanisms at play. Understanding the basics of ‘global warming’ certainly requires a substantial number of (fallible) ‘natural laws’ or ‘causal laws’ predicting a number of causes for global warming and climate change, for instance, but not limited to, those related to the infl ow of energy from the sun, reflection from clouds, ice, sea and vegetation, the greenhouse effect, and so on. Understanding ‘climate change’, however, is immensely more complicated. Any local observation, in order
to be interpreted correctly, must be understood in relation both to possible changes in climate at all neighbouring localities and globally. A theory of global warming is therefore a prerequisite for any critical reflection on locally observed climate change. We are much more likely to produce a robust understanding of generative mechanisms behind ‘global warming’ than of the much more complex web of causal mechanisms behind locally observed ‘climate change’.

The theory of ‘global warming’ predicts a phenomenon caused by a number of generative mechanisms, and which empirical evidence has later generally found to be reasonably robust. ‘Climate change’, in contrast, describes nothing meaningful except for the commonsensical notion that the climate is changing. The climate might be warming at one locality, cooling at another and staying more or less unchanged at a third. The generative mechanisms behind such a complex state of affairs are not likely to be fully understood before meaningful collective action must be taken to avoid the most drastic consequences of global warming. We have moved from relatively robust knowledge of one phenomenon (‘global warming’), which could serve as the basis for collective action, to an abyss of uncertainty about the meaning of another (‘climate change’). No wonder the Bush administration was pleased.

This detour has served to bring me closer to the goal of explaining why global warming poses some serious challenges for social ecology. Let me sum up some of the arguments so far. First, because of its novelty (a historical perspective) we have little previous experience to draw on in order to understand and respond to global warming caused by human activity. Second, because the climate is global by nature, any meaningful response would have to be global in scope whereas, as I have already argued, left libertarians have so far engaged mainly with decentralised, local or regional political organisation. Third, because of the long delay (predicted by theory) between activities now and corresponding future effects on global warming, we cannot rely (solely) on individual or collective experience to formulate responses to the challenges posed by global warming. Fourth, because of the anthropocentrism of much recent anarchist and left libertarian thinking, existing perspectives are not well suited to the analysis of a nature that also exists beyond – and independently of – our endeavours to describe and understand it. The only path to a deeper understanding of the reality of global warming involves theoretical reflection on the generative mechanisms behind it.

THE LIMITATIONS OF ‘EXPERIENCE’

I do not mean to reduce the term ‘experience’ to mean only what we experience individually in our daily lives (Goulet, 1998; Griffiths and Whitford, 1988) or that
only theories that can be falsified by our individual experiences will be accepted. We must interpret ‘experience’ widely enough to encompass collective experiences with, for instance, science which functions to convince us of the usefulness — or even ‘truth’ — of proposed theories. Theories can be accepted in such a way that they function as foundations for collective action which, after all, is what is needed to mitigate the consequences of global warming, even though we do not individually understand or are able to test those consequences.

To understand what I mean, think of Einstein and the (second) theory of relativity. Einstein was in his twenties and worked at a patent office, conducting purely theoretical experiments on his own, when he published his first papers on relativity in 1905. Later papers elaborated on the first theory of relativity, and predicted that light had mass and would be bent as it travelled past an object asserting a gravitational force on it. Needless to say, many were sceptical, and Einstein only rose to general fame after his theory was tested and the effect he predicted was observed in May 1919 (Kumar, 2009, pp. 126, 127). Only a very few scientists actually observed and studied light bending, of course, but as the results were made public the evidence was acknowledged, and the theory became generally accepted ‘knowledge’ in much the same way as did Newton’s predicted force (gravity). We do not necessarily need to understand the details of theories, causal explanations or natural laws in order to accept them, or to experience them ourselves, to accept them as ‘true’.

However, it is important for me to underline that I do not consider the capacity to produce insights that transcend existing knowledge and commonsensical interpretation of experience the exclusive realm of experts and scientists. On the contrary, I believe in the universal inherent human potential to develop the capacity for reflexivity and transformative action of this kind.

However, in comparison to the theory of relativity, theories on global warming and climate change face additional challenges before they can be generally accepted as ‘true’ based on experience. First, because of the complexity involved in understanding climate change, any observation at one locality may be linked to a number of possible generative mechanisms — in contrast to the bending of light caused by gravity. Second, while the theory that predicted light bending could be tested within a few years of its formulation, global warming or global climate change is different. Some of the proposed natural laws predict that it will take fifty to one hundred years from the observation of pollution for the consequences for climate to (possibly) be observed. Existing theories forecast a long time lag and that we will not be able to observe the predicted results until long after collective action should have been taken in order to mitigate the consequences of global warming.
REVISITING BOOKCHIN’S CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY

The mutual interest in understanding and taking nature seriously should have formed a basis for fruitful dialogue between Næss and social ecology. The style of Bookchin’s critique, however, angered many environmentalists and helps explain why the subsequent ‘debate’ looked more like a shouting match than a dialogue. More seriously, the substantive content of Bookchin’s critique failed to confront his opponents’ strongest arguments. Bookchin unfortunately ignored Næss’s published writings (Clark, 2010, p. 37). This lack of engagement with the deep ecology proposed by Næss and others continues to impede a mutually beneficial learning experience.

In fact, as we have seen, Næss was far from insensitive to social aspects of environmental issues and social justice. In an exchange of letters with Paul Feyerabend, he claimed to be ‘more of an anarchist’ than Feyerabend, although he himself preferred the term ‘possibilism’ to ‘anarchism’ (A. Næss, 1999a, p. 71). There is nothing in Næss’s original vision of deep ecology which proscribes serious engagement with the real and important social issues raised by Bookchin, as later developments in deep ecology have demonstrated. A more pertinent criticism of Næss’s original deep ecology would have focused on the limited critique of capitalism as a ‘ecological cancer: a form of barbarism’ (Bookchin, 2007, p. 56) which would have brought Bookchin in line with some of Næss’s former students (Setreng, 1973; Skønberg and Setereng, 1985). Additionally, Bookchin’s vision of a universe developing ‘whose most dynamic and creative attribute is its ceaseless capacity for self-organisation into increasingly complex forms’ echoes positions already advanced by Næss and Kvaloy (Bookchin, 1994, p. 66). There was ample room for a rich and mutually beneficial dialogue between deep and social ecology, an opportunity that Bookchin’s critique missed. While there was a later détente between North American deep and social ecologists (for instance in the form of a public debate between Foreman and Bookchin, and subsequently a co-authored book), Bookchin avoided engaging with the more important and more difficult questions raised by Næss’s reply to Bookchin’s critique. Taking these questions and issues more seriously could have opened social ecology up to some of the perspectives later developed by deep ecologists. By failing to read Næss properly, and reducing him to a leader of a band of ‘fuzzy-headed’ followers, Bookchin help cement a view that continues to plague much leftist engagement with deep ecology and the environmental movement.

A number of crucial issues were left unanswered by Bookchin after Næss’s reply. First, is it not anthropocentric to claim that social structures can be taken as the
root cause of environmental destruction? Laferrière and Stoett argue otherwise and classify Bookchin as a non-anthropocentric thinker (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999). Bookchin himself was ‘shocked’ to read the ‘unfounded assertion that I believe in anthropocentrism’ (Bookchin, 1991c, p. 122). Nonetheless, according to Adams it is justifiable to use the term anthropocentric to describe Bookchin’s thinking (Adams, 2011, p. 122). I agree with Adams, but my argument is rather different to his and turns on the questions that Bookchin leaves unanswered: how do we know that humans started harming the environment only after societies became stratified with social hierarchies? What type of sources and knowledge do we have in order to draw such a conclusion? Bookchin cited ‘considerable anthropological evidence’ for his understanding (Bookchin, 1990; 1991a, p. 57; 1991b). But what we know from archaeology, and from anthropological studies of a few non-hierarchical indigenous groups, is hardly sufficient to draw absolute conclusions about root causes. Even more importantly, as Næss pointed out, there are no strong grounds for believing that environmental destruction will disappear if and when we abolish social hierarchies. The question he asked was about how to develop a new sensibility toward the biosphere. If capitalism, social hierarchies and other social mechanisms have resulted in a damaged or a broken sensibility that leads us to understand nature exclusively in relation to its potential utility for humans, this process must be undone. The undoing of the destruction caused by capitalism to our sensitivity must be envisaged as an organic process in which real experience with nature plays a key part. According to Morris, Bookchin also advocated spiritual renewal to develop humanity’s potential for rationality, foresight and creativity, and the fostering of an ecological sensibility. This is in fact also a fairly accurate summary of the proposal put forward by Næss and is far from the ‘naïve form of biological reductionism’ expressed by deep ecologists, according to Bookchin (Bookchin, 2007, p. 28). Indeed, most of the proposals advocated by Næss were compatible with the organic and processual way of thinking that Bookchin had proposed.

Many deep ecologists have continued the probe for more knowledge and a better understanding of the multiplicity of causes related to human society and natural degradation. The Nordic version of deep ecology, through the work of Sigmund Kvaløy, Petter Næss, Arne Johan Vetlesen, Karl Georg Høyer and others, continued to develop deep ecology in various directions, cooperating with, and seeking inspiration from, critical realists such as Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Sayer and Margaret Archer (Bhaskar, 2010, Bhaskar, Næss and Høyer, 2011; Reed and Rothenberg, 1993). More recent versions of deep ecology, now more often called ‘ecophilosophy’, have advanced to improve the analysis of causal effects related to emerging structures. Others have deepened the critique of capitalism. Combining
these advances with a continued emphasis on the inherent value of diversity, ecophilosophy has evolved into a promising perspective for left libertarian non-anthropocentric thinking on global warming, and brings this tradition closer to the long left libertarian tradition of metaphysics of nature implicit in the writings of many early anarchists beginning with Bakunin, Reclus, and Kropotkin among others. In particular, ecophilosophy proposes an ontology of nature and human society which refuses to reduce statements about the world to statements about our knowledge of the world (epistemological fallacy) – a valuable antidote to extreme forms of hermeneutics.

The version of Nordic deep ecology presented here is a simplification. There are, of course, also other forms of ecology, sometimes inspired by Næss and Kvaløy. From the late 1960s and 1970s onwards, the counterculture produced forms of ecology inspired by anthroposophy and theosophy. Many in this tradition would, interestingly enough, trace this tradition back to some of the nineteenth century Norwegian anarchists such as Ivar Mortensson (Langen, 1951). This, though, lies outside the scope of this article.

SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND GLOBAL WARMING

Others have already called for a new synthesis of deep and social ecology (Marshall, 1994). According to Marshall, this should be a ‘libertarian ecology’ (Marshall, 1994). Nevertheless, ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ are not central issues in the analyses of either Bookchin or Marshall. ‘Global warming’ is not listed in the index of Nature’s Web, An Exploration of Ecological Thinking, published as recently as 1994 (Marshall, 1994). Similarly, ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ are not major issues in Social Ecology after Bookchin (Light, 1998). Marshall is more nuanced and thoughtful in his analysis of deep ecology than is Bookchin, proposing a ‘libertarian ecology’ built on deep and social ecology (Marshall, 1994). In line with both Bookchin and Næss, Marshall sees human destruction as a social phenomenon, but he avoids defining social hierarchies as the root cause of environmental degradation.

So how are social ecologists today employing and developing social ecology as a philosophy, to respond to global warming and climate change? As I understand it, the Institute for Social Ecology ground their argument on global warming in science, particularly the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which, as we know, is based on theories predicting generative mechanisms and models constructed to help us understand the dynamics between them (Tokar, 2008). The Institute for Social Ecology, however, seems to gravitate towards understanding and explaining global warming based on local experience: ‘What gets lost in all these
long-term projections, however, are the ways that chaotic global warming is already affecting people around the world today’ (Tokar, 2008). Tokar rightly notes that the consequences of global warming will probably hurt the poor the most. There is certainly an aspect of social justice to global warming issues: ‘Most of the world’s poor people live in the tropics and subtropics. They are already living in a world of increasingly uncertain rainfall, persistent droughts, coastal flooding, loss of wetlands and fisheries, and increasingly scarce fresh water supplies’ (Tokar, 2008). This might turn out to be a very insightful hypothesis for the future consequences of global warming but it is not a precise encapsulation of current knowledge on global warming and climate change, and such claims of climate change already observable in certain localities have met powerful resistance from many scientists, including Mike Hulme (Hulme, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). I disagree with Hulme when he tries to explain ‘why we disagree about climate change’ by referring to a set of Biblical myths defining the ways we see and understand it. He is right, however, to note that scare headlines and unfounded dramatic claims tend to be counter-productive. Claims like ‘already living in’, ‘uncertain rainfall’, ‘droughts’, ‘flooding’, ‘scarce fresh water supplies’ and so on will not produce the desired response unless they are supported by strong empirical and theoretical evidence.

This might seem like a minor disagreement in relation to the seriousness of the problem at stake, but it is worth considering further. The theory of global warming does not predict a uniformly warmer world. It will probably get warmer in some places and cooler in others. In addition, the climate will also fluctuate over time at each individual locality. Variation is the norm. Even though the long-term tendency at one locality might be warming, it will also probably experience periods of cooling. To increase the complexity, several other generative mechanisms will also be influencing the climate at any given locality which means that claims linking periods of warming at one locality to human activity can always be met with counter-arguments relating the same phenomenon to other generative mechanisms. Furthermore, if we ground our argument on global warming in observed periods of warming we must always expect a backlash. Periods of warming will be followed by naturally occurring fluctuations, including periods of cooling. These periods of naturally occurring cooling will provide arguments for climate deniers to counter attack. In fact, if the theory on global warming is right, variations will be naturally occurring, and the number of observed instances of warming will only be slightly higher than the number of observed instances of cooling. Only carefully planned measurements at a large number of localities over an extended period of time will be able to detect, beyond reasonable doubt, that global warming has been observed and experienced. This line of argument could be repeated for other phenomena.
related to global warming – drought, flooding, hurricanes and so on. By grounding the argument in supposedly already observable instances of local changes to the climate, the Institute for Social Ecology risks falling into the carefully constructed trap of the Bush administration. I believe that this is one of the most important reasons why it has proved so difficult to organise effective global action against anthropogenic global warming.

Another problem for social as well as deep ecology is related to the global nature of global warming. Meaningful action must be local but still global in scope. However, social and deep ecology have both engaged largely with local, communal or regional levels of organisation and most other left libertarian or anarchist thinkers have engaged with decentralised forms of decision making where all those supposedly affected by an issue would have equal right to participate in the decision-making process. In small communes, for instance, the members would normally also engage in numerous face-to-face forms of interaction. Those potentially affected by the consequences of global warming, however, encompass all humankind. The experience of organising and engaging in face-to-face forms of interaction on a daily basis forms identities, helps construct imagined communities, and facilitates collective action based on creativity and spontaneity. The way we organise social life contributes to producing experiences that will affect how we value nature and human life. The challenge of global warming demands that this creative spontaneity is translated into global organised action.

CONCLUSION

I will now leave behind the conflict between deep and social ecology to indicate possible ways to develop a synthesis between the two. I will not pretend to have ready-made answers to the challenge posed by global warming, and will only point towards a possible path for future development. First, I agree with Marshall that a synthesis of deep and social ecology is needed (Marshall, 1996). It has become increasingly urgent since the publication of Marshall’s *Nature’s Web,* especially in the light of the emerging knowledge we now have on the challenge posed by global warming. Such a synthesis could combine the need for theorising structures, including social hierarchies, and generative mechanisms with ecophilosophical reflexivity on nature and human potential for developing a new sensitivity towards nature, building on recent developments in deep ecology and critical realism (Bhaskar, et al., 2011). A starting point could be Vetlesen’s reflection on ethics, and how a new sensitivity towards nature needs to be developed and nurtured through real experiences with nature – and also how the potential to be fully sensitive to
nature is being circumscribed in modern capitalist societies (Bhaskar, et al., 2011; Vetlesen, 2008, 2009, 2010).

According to Hulme, we should ask what ‘climate change’ can do for us (Hulme, 2009, p. 326). First, global warming forces us to think globally; all living things are connected and depend on each other. Humans and human society cannot be considered in isolation from the global environment of which we are a part. Second, our limited insight into global warming and climate change is emerging, albeit slowly. What we know or believe to know from experience is not likely to be enough to prescribe effective policy proposals. We need to know more, to maintain ontological curiosity and to resist subsuming analysis of new phenomena within the framework of existing theories or ideologies.

I further propose Wright’s definition of realism as a potentially fruitful perspective for our engagement with nature and reality: ‘A way of describing the process of “knowing” that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence “realism”), while also acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence “critical”)’ (Wright quoted in Lynch, 2007, p. 6). Ecophilosophy proposes an alternative ontology of nature and reality which can help us along this spiralling path of dialogue and thus help us think systematically from a global perspective. A key element in this alternative ontology is the intrinsic value of all things and the value of biological diversity. It is crucial for nature to be able to respond to the uncertain but likely rapid and dramatic future changes to the climate caused by global warming. It provides a bridge from deep ecology for anti-authoritarians and left libertarians who resist capitalist domination because of, inter alia, its inherent tendency to destroy other forms of social organisation and to create social equivalents to biological monocultures notoriously vulnerable to rapid changes.

Returning to my argument in the introduction, then, I still believe that any lasting solution to anthropogenic global warming must build on decentralised forms of organisation which stimulate spontaneity and creativity, and facilitate active participation in order to build a society that is the ‘expression of the creative potentiality of humanity’ (Bookchin, 2002). However, praxis and experience are not enough to reach a useful understanding of the challenge posed by global warming. Theoretical insight is the only possible path to an understanding of, and response to, global warming in time to organise global collective action to mitigate the problem. Therefore, left libertarians must resist the temptation to reduce the framing of the problem to ‘already’ experienced changes to the local climate. Ecophilosophy of the critical realism variety, combined with anti-authoritarian left libertarianism, presents us with a non-founda-
nationalist understanding of science, one which will make it possible for science to be a valuable contributor in the production of knowledge on global warming.

Much of what I have said about global warming resembles the definition of ‘post-normal science’ (Schneider and Mastrandrea, 2010, p. 17). According to Schneider and Mastrandrea, ‘climate change’ can be seen as a ‘post-normal science’ because some groups want or need to know ‘the answer well before normal science has resolved the deep inherent uncertainties surrounding the problem at hand’ and ‘there will be no clear consensus’, but also a ‘clear need to consider policy decisions before this uncertainty is resolved’ (Schneider and Mastrandrea, 2010, p. 17). From an ecophilosophical point of view this line of argument cannot be accepted because it implicitly suggests a ‘normal science’ that can be expected to resolve uncertainty about the future before policy decisions need to be considered. The ecophilosophical tradition has always been sceptical about the belief that science and experts can produce all the necessary information needed in order to make decisions without uncertainty, arguing instead that generalists are normally better suited to the making of sound judgements in real world situations. The complete individual is not a specialist; s/he is a generalist and an amateur, according to (Næss, 2005). From this perspective, global warming is not ‘post-normal’ but, rather, normal. Most generalists and amateurs would recognise situations of interaction with nature where decisions must be made without certainty about the future: the fisherman would like to know what the weather will look like the next morning before setting sail; peasants have always tried to interpret signs in nature before making decisions about when to sow. Instead of mystifying science by employing expressions like ‘post-normal’, global warming instead asks us to reconsider the role of science. Science cannot be expected to produce certainty, but it can help to guide us to make more or less sound ethical judgements based on the uncertain predictions we have at the time when we need to make ‘policy decisions’. This understanding of the role of science would accept that we have no guarantee that the future will resemble the past, while also accepting that some statements on global warming are less fallible than others.

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NOTES

1. I’m not convinced that critical realism should be seen as an ‘underlabourer’ of science, meaning that following critical realism will ensure better or correct results. However, for the purpose of this essay, I will not discuss this further, as I accept Bhaskar’s distinction between the realms of the empirical, actual and real, as minimal requirements.

2. Empiricism conceives the world as a series of atomistic events, and causal laws a constant conjunction of events, but from a critical realist perspective, causal laws are not constant conjunctions of events.

3. I use ‘experience’ here (even though I am aware of the problems of such a use) to capture a particular element of the process whereby proposed theories get accepted as ‘true’, not because we (the vast majority of us) understand or accept the natural or social laws proposed to explain the generative mechanisms and how they work on the phenomena observed, but because we feel or believe that they have proved themselves to ‘work’ in daily life. Newton’s prediction of a gravitational force demonstrates the problems with such a definition of ‘experience’. Many would say that the predicted force (gravity) must be there since they experience it every day. Still, it was the same type of experience-based argument that ensured that the Ptolemaic worldview persisted from ancient Greece until the time of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo.

4. ‘Possibilism’ for Næss is ‘the assumption that the future is in principle completely open, offering unimaginable surprises’ (A. Næss and Haukeland, 2002, p. 4). This assumption is closely related to Pyrrhonic scepticism that holds that no certain knowledge is possible.

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Bridging Utopia and Pragmatism to Achieve Direct Economic Democracy¹

John Asimakopoulos

ABSTRACT

Owing to a poverty of vision anarchists are failing to bridge the gap between utopian economic models of society and reality – theory and praxis. The result is a de facto acceptance of the basest systems as ‘pragmatic’. Direct economic democracy, also known as libertarian socialism, is attainable but only in ways that connect to the experiences of daily life. By modifying existing institutions of production it is pragmatically possible to achieve societies resembling distant utopias. One of my proposals is that the top corporations have half their boards of directors filled by lottery from the demos modelled on the jury system, the other half by workers of the company. Here, citizens and workers would set corporate policy which affects society at large. My second proposal is to establish a standard national wage, leading to increased economic efficiency and development. These changes are possible only through critical pedagogy and radical direct action but the possibilities have been demonstrated by US labour and civil rights history.

Keywords: Political Economy, Critical Theory, Political Philosophy, Inequality

INTRODUCTION

The birth of market fetishisation was recorded and discussed by classical theorists including Durkheim, Marx and Weber. This commodification of society was not complete simply because those with capital dominated society’s institutions. Rather, market fetishisation of nineteenth-century capitalism extended to the bourgeoisie as a class. In contrast, tomes of labour history, including classic works of the aforementioned theorists, make clear that the average worker wanted as little to do with the forces of the free market as possible. There was a high level of class consciousness...
amongst workers, though it was not always articulated. As a result, the domination of culture by capital was resisted. The victory of market ideology was complete in the twenty-first century, having become the common point of reference for understanding social issues. While radical coalminers shot back at capitalists during the 1900s Coal Wars, working Americans now shout pro-capitalist slogans on the way to the food lines or Tea Party rallies.

Unfortunately, much blame for this reversal can be apportioned to the bankruptcy of left ideologies. On the pragmatic side, too many groups on the left spend time developing public policies that could barely be considered even reformist. For example, one of the most respectable left economic think tanks, the Economic Policy Institute, provides great analyses of economic data but its prescriptions for reform rarely extend beyond recommendations for tweaking the tax codes or reviewing levels of stimulus spending. On the theoretical side, the few remaining left critical theorists still often prefer to expend their energies in sectarian debates instead of developing workable models for change. Similarly, utopian theorists pour over things that are alien to the average person. Who in the general population has even heard of ‘Really Really Free Markets’? The final problem is the left’s ideological rigidity, often exhibiting a naïveté about socioeconomic systems and how they change. Some left groups even think epochal transformation happens like the big bang: instantaneously through a ‘great strike’ or ‘revolutionary moment’! Did feudalism appear in this way from antiquity? Did capitalism appear in its fully developed form in a fortnight? No. Any historian will tell you all this is a result of historical processes, often historically contingent. There is room for a different way of thinking about transformation. The changes we should be considering are the intelligent moves that will unfold historically in the direction of social equality, in this case direct economic democracy.

There are qualitatively different types of reform, those that keep the system intact e.g., anything coming out of congress or the White House and those that transform it as proposed here. This brings us to the core issue of what we mean by ‘anarchy’ and ‘radical change’. Anarchy, to me, ultimately means egalitarianism coupled with social responsibility in contrast to right-wing libertarianism. And the pace of change is not central to the consideration of its radicalism. According to Dahrendorf (1959) societal change can be both revolutionary (sudden) and evolutionary (gradual) measured by the extent to which personnel in positions of domination are changed. He imagines a continuum ranging from total change of personnel to no change. In turn, what he calls radical change can range on a continuum from sudden to evolutionary. Thus ‘revolutionary change’ could refer to and is used interchangeably in the literature to describe both sudden and radical change – although it can be evolutionary and might be equally radical in its effects.
As mentioned, theoreticians often confuse radical and sudden change to be one and the same when they are not. Radical change is positively correlated with the intensity of class conflict. According to Dahrendorf, ‘intensity refers to the energy expenditure and degree of involvement of conflicting parties. A particular conflict may be said to be of high intensity if the cost of victory or defeat is high for the parties concerned’ (1959: 212). Sudden change is positively correlated with the level of violence. According to Dahrendorf:

The violence of conflict relates rather to its manifestations than to its causes; it is a matter of the weapons that are chosen by conflict groups to express their hostilities. Again, a continuum can be constructed ranging from peaceful discussions to militant struggles such as strikes and civil wars ... The scale of degree of violence, including discussion and debate, contest and competition, struggle and war, displays its own patterns and regularities. Violent class struggles, or class wars, are but one point on this scale. (Dahrendorf 1959: 212)

Although sudden and radical change can occur together, as with high levels of violence and intensity, these concepts can be disentangled.

As well as helping to shed light on the nature of radical transformation, Dahrendorf’s analysis also illustrates the space that exists for critical pedagogy in struggle. The intensity of conflict shows precisely where these pedagogies become indispensable as a means to build class consciousness (Freire 2000, McLaren 2006). The work of Antonio Gramsci (1971) on the importance of developing a counter hegemony and the role of organic intellectuals is also relevant here.²

As a starting point, my claim is that we cannot expect ordinary people to instantaneously adopt a fundamentally different socioeconomic system that is alien to them. Rather, as Gramsci argued, we need to develop alternative models of society while demonstrating why and how these would be preferable to the status quo, thus eroding its legitimacy. In addition, he argued that people would need time working within these new models, to appreciate their feasibility and gradually become accustomed to the new structures. Only then would they be willing to act toward transformational change.

Gramsci’s point was that if a counter hegemony grows large enough, it is able to incorporate and replace the historic bloc into which it was born.³ Gramscians use the terms ‘war of position’ and ‘war of movement’ to explain how this is possible. In a war of position a counter hegemonic movement attempts, through persuasion or propaganda, to increase the number of people who share its view on the hegemonic order. In a war of movement, once the counter hegemonic tendencies have grown

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large enough, it becomes possible to overthrow, violently or democratically, the current hegemony and establish itself as a new historic bloc.

It is in the context of Dahrendorf’s and Gramsci’s work that the proposal to fill the boards of directors of major corporations with randomly selected citizens and workers of the enterprise is made. In Dahrendorf’s terms, totally replacing personnel in these positions of domination (corporate boards) would be a sudden, therefore, revolutionary change, more or less violent, leading to a radical end, although it may not seem as such, while avoiding the total destruction of existing institutional arrangements and the chaos that that would create in everyday life. Such a change inside corporate boardrooms would contribute to a wider process of evolutionary radical revolution.

Critics might ask: how radical is the change and is it any different from reformism? To be sure, the proposal looks different to theoretical anarchism found in academic literature. But this is an ideal type, as separate from reality as the theoretical ideal-type capitalism of classical economics. My proposals are a form of what R.K. Merton termed theories of the middle range, which will bring us as close as possible to a functional state of egalitarianism as a definition of anarchy. Those espousing ideal theoretical models will be disappointed.

A PRAGMATIC PATH TO DIRECT ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

Outright expropriation of productive property is synonymous with political revolution assuring the state’s violent reaction. There is however a pragmatic alternative that would be difficult to achieve yet attainable and as revolutionary in its consequences: demanding that half the board of directors of all major corporations are filled through statistically random selection e.g., by lottery from the demos, and half from the employees of the firm. In general, lottery schemes are not new. Ancient Greeks used lottery systems to fill certain public offices. In modern times various theorists have proposed random selection of decision makers on grounds of fairness and egalitarianism (Burnheim 2006, Carson and Martin 1999). Here I extend the concept to ‘workplace democracy’.

The lottery challenges the principle of representative democracy, engrained in liberal systems, though it retains a representative aspect. Specifically, representative democracy is founded on the principle of a smaller number of elected people representing a larger group in decision making. In contrast, under direct democracy people decide and vote directly for themselves. In representative democracy, candidates promise the electorate that they will vote a certain way on issues and, if elected, are expected to represent that constituency, although in reality they may not and...
vote as they wish. Here the elected representatives claim to ‘speak for’ others. In terms of anarchism, even the most ardent proponents of direct democracy, from Bakunin and Proudhon to most modern writers, ultimately develop representative decision-making models. Delegates, elected directly from a smaller body, represent it at aggregate levels e.g., regional and federal. This happens for the simple reason that it is logistically impossible to get, for example, 300 million Americans to vote directly on all issues affecting the community on a daily basis.

In the lottery system, representation is opened up to all through random sampling. The language comes from statistics and surveys. A sample is a statistically representative selection from a larger population (Schaefer 2009). When selection is performed randomly, e.g. via some form of lottery, the result is a random sample meaning every member of the entire population has the same chance of being selected (Schaefer 2009). This also means there will be identical proportions of all groups between the random sample and the population (see any statistics text). For example, say we have a population of three-hundred million voters that includes X per cent blacks, Y per cent fascists, Z per cent anarchists, etc. If we randomly select say 1200 individuals (a typical sample size for surveys of this type) from that population, believe it or not we will mathematically end up with 1200 individuals that are representative of the larger population and in the same proportions namely X per cent blacks, Y per cent fascists, Z per cent anarchists, etc.

How would the sample reach its decisions? The proposal here is similar to the models of deliberative or discursive democracy based on the writings of Jürgen Habermas (1997). Accordingly, it is suggested that public deliberations be held for deciding various issues. A choice is made by the demos when an issue is fully deliberated and consensus reached. Therefore, legislation derives legitimacy from the deliberative process. Fishkin (1991) has discussed decision-making by way of a deliberative opinion poll. A representative sample would be generated from the community to discuss an issue. The group would then be polled and their recommendations forwarded to the decision makers or adopted outright.

Under the proposed model, Fishkin’s representative sample forming a deliberative opinion poll would in fact be the randomly-selected decision makers, namely those replacing the corporate members on the boards of directors. Randomly selected citizens and company employees would discuss and deliberate matters at hand. More importantly, they would also have the power to adopt outcomes of deliberation by virtue of being the decision makers themselves. Therefore the model would incorporate various elements of direct democracy both structurally and procedurally in the economic sphere.

No randomly selected person for the board speaks for anyone other than
themselves. For example, an anarchist will vote in accordance with their own ideology which captures some of the ideas of other anarchists in the population. Mathematically this means the ideas of that group will be reflected proportionately in the voting group. It also means that large social groups who do not effectively have their interests represented in the current system (i.e. the working class) will have the largest number of individuals selected as representatives directly from their ranks given the proportionality of random selection from the demos. It also means you will have everyone else represented on the boards who is part of the demos e.g., capitalists, homophobes, and religious zealots. Is this desirable? To me, and probably most people, yes. In a democratic system, especially a system of direct democracy, everyone has a right to speech and representation no matter how reprehensible their beliefs. Once a system starts excluding anyone it is no longer egalitarian but on the path toward totalitarianism.

If the purpose of representative democracy is to reflect as closely as possible the will of the voting demos, it is possible to define representativeness in statistical terms. The difference between this proposal and the existing systems of representation is the idea that the board of directors (as representatives) do not claim to ‘speak for’ others – randomness and proportionality being the key. Statistically, it is impossible to obtain such a representative sample in parliamentary voting systems, even though in the popular usage of the word the elected officials are considered to be representative of the electorate. Who represents anarchists in the US senate? No one, yet there are anarchists in the demos. Who represents the poor in government? Clearly many politicians claim to ‘speak for’ the poor yet the poor’s interests are almost never reflected in policy or laws, etc. In my model, we would have a group of civilians reflecting the make-up of society. The equal chance of selection by random sampling, upon which fairness is based, will result by mathematical definition in a sample that reflects/represents the pool where it came from/of whatever is in the population. In this case everyone (including religious and ethnic groups, LGBT, fascists, anarchists, etc) will be represented proportionately in the sample by the mechanics of random selection.

Consequently, a statistically random sample treats the entire population fairly. If all citizens are equals and the goal is to give everyone an equal chance to express their views then random selection is defensible. Decision makers selected this way will be as reflective of the divergence and diversity in the demos as scientifically possible and absolutely far more so than those generated by elections or appointment as under any existing system. Naturally, the democratisation of corporate boards will require direct action as the elite would never consent voluntarily to changes that challenge their power; it only consented to the introduction of labour
rights after a series of bloody confrontations and agitation spanning generations, e.g. union organisation or the eight hour workday (Asimakopoulos 2011). As Rudolf Rocker (1938) suggested, any substantive changes to the operation of capitalism have to be forced upon the state:

> Political rights do not originate in parliaments, they are ... forced upon parliaments from without ... The peoples owe all the political rights and privileges ... not to the good will of their governments, but to their own strength. Governments have employed every means that lay in their power to prevent the attainment of these rights or to render them illusory. Great mass movements among the people and whole revolutions have been necessary to wrest these rights from the ruling classes, who would never have consented to them voluntarily ... Only after the workers had by direct action confronted parliament with accomplished facts, did the government see itself obliged to take the new situation into account and give legal sanction ... (Rocker, 1938: 111-112)

Unfortunately, due to space limitations this paper focuses on the value of the proposals rather than the extensive literature on the types and effectiveness of direct action or the methods of developing adequate support from the population for such action. However, examples of such direct action can be found in many historical accounts of labour struggles and include: sabotage, occupations, destruction of business and elite property, mass demonstrations and violent resistance against police intervention (Adamic 2008, Brecher 1997). Americans should not forget their own history which clearly documents violent resistance as a key factor behind most if not all substantive labour victories, see for example the long history of agitation behind the eight hour workday (Asimakopoulos 2011). In fact, violence against state security forces is routinely practiced to this day in many industrial democracies e.g., Spain, Greece, Ireland, etc. (see various national news broadcasts 2008-11 on anti-austerity clashes). In Greece, my homeland, the media routinely show protesters including anarchists attacking security forces in demonstrations rather than the other way around. In more extreme cases people even engaged armed rebellion as did blacks in many US cities during the ghetto revolts of the 1960s (Asimakopoulos 2011).

However, it is assumed that the working class has no allies in this conflict. That workers should not rely on anyone but themselves for their emancipation is a cornerstone of libertarian socialists from Bakunin, ironically a Russian aristocrat, to Gramsci, an organic intellectual, onward. The argument being any group other than the workers, intellectuals included if we recall Bakunin’s warnings, will ulti-
mately attempt to promote their own self-interest at the expense of everyone else’s. The bourgeoisie have betrayed alliances with the working class at first opportunity in almost every revolution. It is the people who should take the leading role in the fight, demonstrating why critical pedagogy as developed by Freire (2000), McLaren (2006), and others is the long-term engine of egalitarian change.

If workers’ groups become successful and overcome the state’s resistance, why not simply demand outright expropriation of productive property, a political revolution in other words? If workers had such power and the historical time was ripe, then a revolution against the state to establish workers’ control would be the appropriate goal. Unfortunately, this is not feasible in the foreseeable future for a number of reasons ranging from media concentration to lack of class consciousness — which, I argue, ultimately come back to the lack of critical pedagogy and working models of counter hegemony. There is simply not enough support from the working class population exemplified by American’s consistently voting against their class interests. The question then becomes: do we wait until we develop sufficient support for that ideal revolution in the bye and bye or do we do something attainable in the here and now? Demanding executive control over businesses is not the same as expropriating them. Although the elite and state would battle against these changes they would be invested far less than they would in an all-or-nothing fight to the end if confronted by outright wealth expropriation.

*This is what’s radical: Public governance of productive property*

The working-class can demand that each major corporate board of directors be comprised exclusively of randomly selected citizens and workers of the firm while leaving stock ownership private, a scheme hopefully replicated in all industrial democracies. This is synonymous with ending elite control of private productive property and establishing private ownership with public governance which is a historically radical change.

Here it is helpful to sketch out the powers of corporate boards vis. shareholders and how that relationship would be altered. Currently, in the US and UK corporate boards are charged with maximising profits for their shareholders, every other interest being secondary. Second, shareholders have voting rights over various issues depending on legal jurisdiction and company constitutions. These rights include voting for the board of directors which in reality is commonly cited as having little if any impact on the board’s decisions. These relationships would change as follows. First, as were historically the original corporate charters, corporations will be offered legal recognition in exchange for social contribution first, profits being secondary.
Second, shareholders have no voting rights; they are a ‘silent partner’ in investment terms. Why? Corporations affect society and private equity represents its own interests therefore determining non-democratically how the community will be impacted when unilaterally determining corporate behaviour. Community worker boards will be democratically representative of society given their selection method. Shareholders get to participate in corporate governance on equal footing with every other citizen given the statistical chances of proportional representation of their class on the community board seats – and worker seats if they choose to engage in actual work. However, during this intermediate period of structural social change shareholders continue to receive profits as return for their capital investment.

The new boards would still nominate all the top executives e.g., CEOs, CFOs, Presidents, etc. The officers could also be nominated by workers and ballot write-ins. Once nominated, they would have to receive confirmation by a simple majority vote of the employees. Furthermore, these officers could be removed at any time and for any reason either by the board or by a recall vote of the employees that would override any board decision. In fact, any majority vote by the workers would override the board. This would apply primarily to operational control of the enterprise. Strategic control/decision-making must be weighed against community interests not just the narrow interests of company employees. This is why the entire board of directors makes strategic decisions which include the interests of both the community and workers given the make-up of the new boards. However, these board members should be recallable by the workers of the enterprise any time for any reason by initiatives or a simple majority vote. Of course, all this leaves many details to be considered. This is deliberate. It is up to the worker-citizens to decide those details, not someone else academics included, giving the new system flexibility. However, one thing is certain, no worker-citizen would vote for a CEO to earn tens of millions even as the company is run into the ground only to ‘parachute’ out with even more millions.

Having captured the governance of wealth which capturing corporate boards represents, the next major revolutionary step might be to expropriate wealth outright in a working system of communal ownership. Given experience with self-direction and using control of the boards to implement what today would be considered socialist policies, e.g. job security, reasonable workloads, increased leisure time, living wages and so on, the working class would be in a position of becoming self-assured, confident, and willing to further act on its class interests – conditions historically necessary for any successful revolutionary group, beyond participation in corporate governance. In addition, all this would allow time for further developing and fine-tuning a Gramscian counter-hegemonic model of society (Gramsci 1971).
Bridging Utopia and Pragmatism to Achieve Direct Economic Democracy

What is suggested here, would lay the foundation for a true libertarian socialist epoch via a combination of direct action and democracy to achieve the ending of corporate rule over the media, politics, and the production process. Also, worker and community governance of corporations could evolve into a groundbreaking real-life experimental school for the practice of self-direction and organisation (Gramsci 1971, Guérin 1970, Proudhon 1980 [1863], Ward 1982). This would demonstrate to workers that they themselves are capable of self-directed production without corporate elite owners (Azzellini and Ness 2011, Brecher 1997, Chomsky and Pateman 2005). At some point the majority, realising that corporate ownership actually rests in the hands of the top 1 per cent may ask the simple question ‘why?’ and act on the lack of convincing answer forcefully (unlike the Occupy movement of 2011 that fizzled out, resulting in no concrete gains). Ending private productive property would be in the interest of society at large. For example, the top 1 per cent of US households received 34.8 per cent of the stock market gains of 1989-98, while the richest 10 per cent received 72.5 per cent, and the bottom 80 per cent received only 13.6 per cent (Mishel et al., series). Looking at table one it becomes clearer just how concentrated ownership of productive property is in the United States. Running company boards, supported by transformative education programmes through critical pedagogy and self-direction, would provide a strong impetus for self-rule. But until all that happens, worker-citizen staffed corporate boards would represent industrial democracy.

Table 1. Wealth distribution in 2001 for the bottom 90% top 10% and 1% of households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of:</th>
<th>Bottom 90 per cent</th>
<th>Top 10 per cent</th>
<th>Top 1 per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Net Worth</td>
<td>15.5*</td>
<td>84.4**</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of All Stocks</td>
<td>15.5*</td>
<td>89.3**</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension Accounts</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Equity</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Domhoff http://whorulesamerica.net/power/wealth.html)

*Bottom 80%
**Top 20%
Furthermore, the proposal builds upon existing structural labour victories found in some industrial nations such as works councils – a concept embraced by anarcho-syndicalists. The importance of works councils relative to past examples of workers’ control (Azzellini and Ness 2011) is that the former, rather than attacking the state in a premature effort to overthrow it, forced it after much working class agitation to cede these economic rights just as it would after renewed action to capture corporate boards. In short, there is a functional precedence allowing us reasonably to argue these changes are more feasible than outright political revolution at this time. True, works councils in of themselves are not the solution to effecting structural transformations because they do not have the power of outright corporate governance nor are they the focus of this paper. Yet, they exemplify how radical demands that once seemed impossible can be achieved even within the capitalist framework short of full blown revolution leading us who knows where ...

Germany and France offer good examples of how works councils operate and the type of workers’ rights they have institutionalised (Rogers and Streeck 1994). These rights would be inconceivable in the US but nevertheless possible on the way to expropriating corporate governance. An important difference between national works councils is whether they are given codetermination in addition to rights of consultation and information. When only consultation and information rights are provided, the councils still have a high degree of power within the production process that greatly empowers workers:

Works councils laws invariably obligate employers to disclose to the council information about major new investment plans, acquisition and product market strategies, planned reorganisation of production, use of technology, and so on. And council laws typically require employers to consult with the council on workplace and personnel issues, such as work reorganization, new technology acquisition, reductions or accretions to the work force, transfers of work, overtime, and health and safety. (Rogers and Streeck 1994: 100)

However, when works councils are given codetermination they become even more powerful labour institutions because codetermination requires that employers obtain approval for certain decisions from the councils. Should the council refuse to approve a managerial decision, it can mount legal action and challenge the employer. Therefore, the laws provide resolution mechanisms such as arbitration, grievance committees, and special labour courts. Germany is an excellent example of a country with works councils enjoying codetermination rights:
German works councils enjoy information rights on financial matters ... In addition, however, they have codetermination rights on such matters as principles of remuneration, introduction of new payment methods, fixing of job and bonus rates and performance-related pay, allocation of working hours, regulation of overtime and short-time working, leave arrangements, vacation plans, suggestion schemes, and the introduction and use of technical devices to monitor employees’ performance. They also enjoy prescribed codetermination rights on individual staff movements, including hiring, evaluation, redeployment, and dismissal, and the right to a ‘reconciliation of interests’ between the council and the employer on a wide range of other matters bearing on the operation of the firm. (Rogers and Streeck 1994: 101)

When talking about ‘reconciliation of interests’ it is important to note this means workers have power over what is produced, as well as any closures and relocations in parts or all of the company plant. Consequently, codetermination indicates extensive workers’ power in its active institutional form. Even in the absence of codetermination, works councils in and of themselves are indicative of higher levels of institutionalised workers’ power, given their right to access company information. This is the case with France’s works councils where they are given rights to information and consultation, but not codetermination.

The societal control of corporate boards represents the next evolutionary step from works councils toward libertarian socialist societal organisation with an intermediary compromise to the abolition of private productive property. It is the implementation of institutionalised control of all the top corporations by the community and workers that makes this a radical change. For example, in practical terms, would such boards funnel tremendous sums of money to anti-labour political parties and officials as they now do under elite governance thanks to recent Supreme Court rulings? Would such boards hire anti-labour or union-busting consultants? Furthermore, such a fundamental change in class power relations will alter corporate behaviour to reflect the public good and eliminate production externalities and corporate free-rider problems. Communities could prohibit the use of corporate wealth and ownership to influence the political process or the news media. The managerial class of capitalist private property could be instructed to operate under new parameters of production, using sustainable technology, offering all employees substantive benefits, living wages, and reasonable workloads. This would also eliminate the most common excuse that corporations offer for not being socially responsible: ‘we will not be competitive if we employ these practices, because our competitors do not’. If the workers who are also the citizens have the
final say on all boards, it is reasonable to argue that a consensus of demands will arise with high corporate responsibility, which will level the cost playing field for companies. This form of evolutionary revolution is very radical in that the authority of private productive property over society would be seriously limited if not eliminated altogether. Yet, this would provide fundamental changes that do not require the immediate destruction of key social institutions and the accustomed mode of daily life.

**NEW EVOLUTIONARY RELATIONS OF CONSUMPTION**

New productive relations would also require new corresponding relations in consumption that will be proposed and possible upon capturing the governance of corporate boards. Namely, a socioeconomic system must address not only how to produce, whether it be under self-management or not, but also how to distribute products and services, whether it is based on a wage system or not. There is virtual agreement among left scholars regarding the shortcomings of a wage/market-based distribution system. However, one of the main problems, whenever self-management has actually been practiced, has been to figure out how one pays in and receives from the community resources – distribution in other words (Guérin 1970).

Practical solutions have included counting hours worked as payment into the system for ‘community credits’ with which to ‘purchase’ supplies at the community ‘store’. This was the practical solution to problems with more idealistic libertarian socialist formulas of exchange mechanisms that would try to create a working state of the slogan ‘to each according to need, from each according to ability’. Unfortunately, such a simple idea turned out to be very difficult to put in practice. How can community governance be combined with an economic system that is egalitarian and fair? Namely, how do we count?

All too often, many left intellectuals are not economists and tend to associate words like price and wage with all that is wrong with society. However, the problem is not the concept of price or wage. Rather, the problem is how they are defined and what determines them. More to the point, prices and wages serve the basic functions of rationing/distribution and guiding the economy as to what needs to be produced. The real problem is that wage levels are set by class power relations that determine in turn which skill sets (labour) are valued by markets. This type of ‘value’ is therefore fictitious. Consequently, wages are a form of rationing based on class power instead of an objective measure of time worked or social contribution. For example, studies have confirmed CEO compensation cannot be objectively justified by market economics but by class power relations (Bebchuk and Fried 2006, Burton and
Weller 2005). Thus, the CEO has higher wages even though the value of his labour does not justify them. Rather, his wage is a return, a ‘rent’, a reward for his class power. Thus, the skilled wage premiums for the CEO are fictitious. For example, a typical CEO in the 1960s made 42 times more than the average worker compared to 531 times more in 2005 (WhoRulesAmerica.net). Clearly, CEO productivity did not increase by 500 per cent.

As for capitalist return for risk and innovation, that too is bogus because the rate of ‘return’ is also socially determined based on class power. Arguing that markets determine a fair rate of return for risk is premised on the value judgment that markets should be making this determination in the first place. Since markets represent capital, clearly capital in essence is determining its own value. Otherwise, why is an innovative activist who takes risks with his own money and time to form a charitable foundation not rewarded with billions for that risk and innovation even when the organisation is successful? The Steve Jobs of the world are simply not worth billions for anything they have done.

In the new model prices and wages are retained for their rationing and guiding functions but the basis upon which these are set would no longer be based on class power. Instead, if we accept that all people are equal then all socially necessary labour is also equal. If society should not be stratified, then neither should labour be so. This makes socially necessary labour a homogeneous concept or ‘product’ measured by standard units of time at a given social average of intensity and ability. Just like a gallon of milk is the same regardless of who produced it, one hour’s worth of street cleaning is equal to one hour worked by a medical doctor. Why? Because all socially necessary labour is, well, labour. What Marx saw as complex or compound labour was instead knowledge. It is a society’s pool of accumulated knowledge which builds on past discoveries that can be compound or complex. Labour is the medium through which knowledge is applied to the physical world in order to alter it. As such, all socially necessary labour, mental and physical, is equal (irrespective of who or what performs the work) to be measured by standard units of time, e.g. one hour’s worth of work.

Marx was wrong about the nature of complex or compound labour and for associating any type of value with labour rather than with knowledge for the same reasons he attributed Aristotle’s inability to deduce the next intellectual step toward a labour theory of value. Namely, according to Marx, Aristotle could not see the common link between commodities being human labour (free or slave) as creating ‘value’ because of his epoch’s zeitgeist which was based on devalued slave labour. Here, Marx is referring to Aristotle’s argument that there is no equivalency between a house and a bed:
Aristotle therefore himself tells us what prevented any further analysis: the lack of a concept of value. What is the homogeneous element, i.e. the common substance, which the house represents from the point of view of the bed, in the value expression for the bed? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. But why not? Towards the bed, the house represents something equal, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both bed and the house. And that is – human labour.

However, Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that, in the form of commodity-values, all labour is expressed as equal human labour and therefore as labour of equal quality, by inspection from the form of value, because Greek society was founded on the labour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour-powers. The secret of their expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all kinds of labour because and in so far as they are human labour in general, could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion. This however becomes possible only in a society where the commodity-form is the universal form of the product of labour, hence the dominant social relation is the relation between men as possessors of commodities. Aristotle’s genius is displayed precisely by his discovery of a relation of equality in the value-expression of commodities. Only the historical limitation inherent in the society in which he lived prevented him from finding out what ‘in reality’ this relation of equality consisted of. (Marx 1977:151-52)

Ironically, Marx could not disentangle knowledge, value, and labour because he too was limited by his corresponding zeitgeist of hierarchical relations, in this case social not just economic, where status inequality was also a ‘natural basis’ for stratification. This prevented him from concluding, as he describes in this passage, that all labour is homogeneous assuming we are all equals. This led him to see labour as ‘stratified’ from the simple to the complex with corresponding wage premiums e.g., the artisan versus unskilled worker. For example, how could his, a professor’s, or medical doctor’s labour be equated to that of the janitor’s? This is the same malady of ego which to this day afflicts even radical scholars of the left who see ‘educated’ labour as being worth more than ... But, if we are all equal, then we are all equally necessary or unnecessary. Can the medical doctor build her house, educate her children, sweep the streets, dispose of garbage, and produce her own clothing? Can a lawyer or college professor build their own automobile, computer, or furniture? This simple truth also ‘could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality’ evolved to include not only producers but citizens more broadly, e.g. where LGBT’s, janitors,
atheists, blacks, immigrants, etc. are seen as having equal social status with heterosexuals, lawyers, whites, etc. and have ‘acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion’.

Therefore in an equal society there is only one form of labour being neither complex nor compound any more than a gallon of milk can be more complex or compound relative to another gallon of milk. According to McCarthy, for Marx '[t]he source of equivalence of goods rests in equivalence of persons ... Marx indicates that the concept of value and the concept of human equality are elided into one concept: value' (1992: 113). Furthermore, although there is such a thing as use value, real value is something different. Value is not what someone is willing to pay for something nor the labour time required for producing it as Marx argued. Rather value has its foundation in knowledge. Everything derives value from the knowledge required to create it while labour is the tool, the medium, for giving form to knowledge in the physical world. The house and bed both originate in the knowledge of how to make them which is derived from society’s knowledge base. In addition ‘cost’ is understood by Marx and contemporary economists as the expenditure of resources for producing or reproducing something. Labour’s only cost is what it takes for it to survive and reproduce itself. Consequently, labour has no value in of itself. Similarly, Marx was wrong in thinking machines represent stored (compound) labour. Instead, they represent accumulated knowledge. Since labour has no value, neither do machines – beyond the material cost of creating and replacing them. The only value to be found is the knowledge that made it possible for humans to create mechanical copies of their productive abilities. Now machines can provide most of the labour required to run society. If these machines are owned by everyone then no one is compelled to engage in forced labour setting them free to engage in other creative activities. But, since it is the pool of accumulated societal knowledge (which is part of the commons or society’s total wealth) that made the creation of these machines possible then they are also part of the commons to which we all have right to.

All this sets up the argument for the next major policy recommendation. Because there is no true value generated by labour, its cost being what it takes to survive and reproduce; knowledge which is socially generated being the true creator of value; and given the absolute equality of citizens, it is logical that there should be only one common wage for a standard work period. The minimum wage for labour is the cost to maintain and reproduce it. Beyond that, labour cost per unit is whatever compensation is socially agreed upon regardless of whose labour it is. The maximum hourly labour compensation, in turn, is determined by what a society can bear based on its material development and available resources. In short, the overall productive capacity determines the ‘wage level’ for a unit of labour which means it also
determines the average standard of living. This could be represented by a society’s National Income as measured by national accounts. Consequently, so long as one contributes up to the required socially necessary time for keeping society running, e.g., 3 hours per day, then they would be compensated equally as everyone else. In essence this is how you divide resources equitably once the means of production have been returned to the commons. Of course, there could always be allowances and adjustments in the system to reflect divergent needs based on disabilities, old age, etc. These are details to be worked out by the citizens themselves.

More importantly, since we would be given a standard national wage in compensation for our labour to obtain goods and services we desire, this system also maintains a guiding function of prices which command economies lack ultimately leading to misallocations, shortages, and collapse. This means individual choice still determines what and how much a society will produce in contrast to central planning. But, unlike the capitalist consequences of unequal wages, in this system people’s needs would be met before luxuries are produced given the equality of compensation. In short, it maintains free consumer choice and flexibility of capitalism but with the equality of left isms. This is the democratisation of consumption, production, and the societal allocation of resources.

The National Wage

Income inequality in the United States is staggering. In 2006, the top 1 per cent of the population received 21.4 per cent of all income, the top 10 per cent accounted for 47.2 per cent, whereas the bottom 50 per cent received only 14.6 per cent (Kennickell 2009-13). If we agree that labour is homogeneous and therefore all income should be equal what would be the standard annual compensation and for how many hours of work? The following example is only for illustration purposes of how this would work in a large society like the United States even though there are certain problems. Specifically, the financial analysis does not consider the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency which permits the United States to extract significant income from the rest of the world. Given such caveats, from the 2007 national accounts of the United States personal income was $11,912.3 billion (US Bureau of Economic Analysis). If we divide $11,912.3 billion by the adult population of 235 million from the 2010 census the average income per capita would be $50,691. Since all adults would be required to work and be compensated equally, $50,691 would become in effect the National Wage (NW). Of course, it is up to the community to make allowances for the disabled, the retirement age, etc. which is a separate conversation. If one makes billions a year, as some hedge-fund managers do,
this compensation is equivalent to nothing. For the unemployed, underemployed, minimum wage earners, and working poor it is a dream come true. It is also probably more than many middle-class workers earn currently. Why? This NW would be tax free making it the equivalent of a $65,898 pre-tax income based on a 30 per cent tax bracket. The average rent or mortgage for a clean non-trailer type dwelling is at least $1,000 per month. Since housing is a guaranteed right in this system there are no rents or mortgages boosting the value of the NW up to at least $77,898. This also does not reflect the savings from guaranteed free national healthcare, free education at all levels, no taxes of any kind e.g., property, sales, etc., no tolls or other such fees, free basic services e.g., utilities, etc. When everything is said and done the average living standard would be equivalent to that of someone earning over $100,000 per year in 2010. Let’s compare these figures to what people earn today. In 2007 median family income, meaning there could be more than one person working in that family, was $64,427 for Whites; $40,143 for Blacks, and $40,566 for Hispanics minus income taxes and housing expenditures (Mishel et al., series). A family with two working adults in the new system would be earning a family income equivalent to $131,796 pre-tax (in 2007 dollars). Therefore, although it is not a lifestyle of a billionaire or millionaire the majority would be materially better off under this system of equal compensation.

Fairness being the goal, the NW should also be adjusted to reflect a region’s cost of living since living expenditures are lower in Cheyenne, Wyoming relative to New York City. This is a common criticism of minimum wage, social security, and similar social programmes. Namely, a flat nominal amount does not reflect the relative purchasing power for people living in different regions. Returning to the NW of $50,691, when adjusted for Cheyenne it would be $27,321 keeping in mind that there would be no payments for basic necessities such as housing (http://www.bestplaces.net/col/). Eventually, ‘prices’ may become homogeneous removing the need for indexing.

Things become more interesting when we consider the length of the workweek to earn the NW. Currently Americans work an average of forty hours per week to earn less than under the new system as shown above. However, when the workers are the owners there is no need for surplus labour to generate profits for private owners. Thus automation is embraced given guaranteed employment at the NW with the effect of reducing the amount of socially necessary work. If the American economy can function with a forty hour workweek – the longest among industrialised nations (Mishel et al., series), it is reasonable to assume that the workweek in the new system could drop immediately to twenty or fewer hours. With automation and new innovations to reduce necessary labour being embraced we could have that
utopian ideal often discussed by Marxists and anarchists of a three-hour workday for perhaps a three or four day workweek!

It gets even better. Nothing was said of corporate profits, most of which are not distributed as income. These profits are in essence based on goods and services being sold for more than the cost to produce them. First, society can decide how much more to charge for things above cost in order to finance social programmes including education, healthcare, housing, infrastructure, mass transportation, social security, and so on. Second, the community can decide to charge below or at cost for items that are important such as food staples while placing heavier premium pricing on luxuries and socially harmful products such as cigarettes and alcohol. Alternatively, society could eliminate what economists call externalities and ‘free rider’ problems. Consequently this system increases allocative efficiency of resources. For example, instead of building yachts, super cars, and mansions we would be building hospitals, schools, and housing for all. Instead of allocating resources for butlers, marketing executives, and financiers we would be employing educators, builders, and medical professionals.

What about wealth distribution?

Wealth distribution in the United States is the most unequal in the industrialised world. In 2007 the richest 1 per cent owned 33.8 per cent of all wealth compared to only 2.5 per cent for the bottom 50 per cent of the population (Kennickell 2009-13). The dominant ideology of the United States is that anyone can succeed if they just work hard enough and are intelligent. Clearly, these distribution figures blow away this myth as it is hard to imagine that half of the population can be so unintelligent and lazy to own collectively so little. Likewise, it is incomprehensible to think 1 per cent can work so much more and be so intelligent relative to the bottom 99 per cent to own close to half of everything. How can 400 individuals be worth $1.57 trillion in 2009 when hundreds of millions have nothing (Forbes.com)?

That the rich get richer at the expense of workers can also be demonstrated by the distribution of productivity gains. The rich are the ones that truly own corporations as demonstrated by stock ownership. For example, in 2004 the top 1 per cent of households owned 36.7 per cent of all stock compared to 9.4 per cent for the bottom 80 per cent of households (Wolf 2007). In turn, productivity has been increasing over the past few decades while workers received stagnant or declining shares. From 1992 to 2007 productivity increased by 25.4 per cent but median compensation grew only 0.8 per cent while remaining at zero from 2002-2007 (Mishel et al., series). Clearly a rising tide has not lifted all boats. Because
the working class has been totally defeated through de-unionisation, free trade agreements, and so on, all economic gains accumulate to the owners of capital. Consequently productivity gains with flat incomes can only be rationalised based on class power just like the compensation of CEOs.

It would be a waste of paper to engage in any further arguments and rationalisations as to this injustice especially since others have devoted entire forests worth of paper to demonstrate this plain truth: the wealth of the rich is based exclusively on class power and ownership of productive resources which translates into advantages and privileges in all spheres of life.

Consequently, there is no such thing as equal opportunity which is the final legitimising safe-stop myth in the United States against meaningful direct action and ultimately revolution. Class war is an ongoing fact rather than something to be avoided as so frequently warned against by the system’s representatives e.g., politicians, capitalists, and judges. The problem is, the plutocrats have won a spectacular victory over everyone else and they try to keep this from the public conscious, in case there is resistance from the populace. This is why the media are collectively owned by the elite, to control the free flow of information and ideologies that lay bare the legitimising myths in support of counter ideologies.

If opportunity was equal, then resource ownership would also have to be equal in addition to the availability and quality of education, health care, and housing. Does this mean we would all be equal in poverty as has been oft en said about the former Soviet Union? Absolutely not. For example the total net worth of all Americans combined in 2007 was $64,987.9 billion (Kennickell 2009-13). Divided equally among 235 million adults we would each have an instant net worth of $274,885! This while earning the equivalent of a $65,898 pre-tax income per year. As with income, wealth distribution should also be indexed relative to the cost of living in different parts of the country. Therefore, the national average of $274,885 translates into a share of $148,154 in Cheyenne, Wyoming (http://www.bestplaces.net/col/). Either way, the logic is that purchasing power needs to be factored in when setting the NW and wealth shares to obtain real versus nominal equity.

The Ability to Evolve

Many systems can evolve, the question is at what cost and for whom. Few would disagree with capitalism’s ability to morph into ever new forms. However, its ability to adapt to change is distorted since it is based on the price mechanism combined with unequal wage incomes that are often artificially determined as through regionally / globally segmented labour markets and class power (Asimakopoulos 2009).
In addition, although capitalism does evolve, we need to consider at what cost to society at large. For example, Polanyi (2001 [1944]) demonstrated the devastating effects of sudden radical change. Although he was writing about the disastrous effects of changing societal organisation toward capitalism, the work still provides insight as to the social cost of capitalism’s ‘evolution’.

Today, we are continuing to witness capitalism’s transformation into a neoliberal global system. However the social costs are still high for most of the planet’s population. Globally, segmented labour markets and contingent labour carry equally high costs for individuals in terms of stress and alienation and society in terms of inadequate aggregate demand caused by insufficient purchasing power. Thus, although capitalism is capable of evolution and survival, it does so at the expense of the great majority of society. Therefore, the superior system would be one that can be flexible without the socially devastating consequences needed to support it.

A socialist libertarian society would have a more flexible economic system without the devastation of capitalist change. Politically, self-governance assures decision-making that reflects people’s direct needs and beliefs without being filtered through unresponsive professional politicians and ossified political institutions controlled by elite interests. The elimination of special interests by self-governance also assures that the economic system adapts according to social needs. Instead, today we have a skewing of the economy to benefit corporations (Zepezauer 2004). In addition, there is greater acceptance of economic change when people know that their living standards would not be adversely affected. For example, in a socialist libertarian society, workers of a buggy-whip factory would be more accepting of their plant closing due to obsolescence if they knew their livelihoods would be socially secured and alternative work (social contribution) provided.

If people are not afraid of technological change negatively impacting them there will be greater acceptance of full productive automation that our existing technology makes possible. Under capitalist production automation is resisted by workers that rightfully fear it will eliminate their jobs but, ironically capitalists too. The elite are woefully reluctant to fully automate society for two reasons. First, there would be immediate resistance by the masses of the newly permanently unemployed. Second, deep down, they understand that a capitalist system is fundamentally a wage system without which aggregate demand, therefore sales, collapse. This is the realisation of Marx’s argument that existing relations of production, which are property relations, at some point turn into fetters for the productive forces. Now capitalist relations are fetters to fully implementing existing technology toward automation and rationalisation. A communal system of ownership blows the gates that are currently holding back society’s productive forces. Of course, the elite could erect a utopian automated
society for themselves walled-off from the surplus population leaving them to fend for themselves as animals. However that is not capitalism nor do capitalists have the creative capacity to imagine such new dystopias.

This brings us to the issue of unnecessary labour of which there are two types. First, there is labour that could be performed through automation. This is inefficient from an economic perspective and it occupies people’s time when they could be freed to engage in other productive activities or leisure. Second, capitalism employs armies of unproductive labour in unnecessary industries. Sales and marketing are the clearest examples including the financial industry (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Cassidy 2010).

As mentioned earlier, capitalism cannot change based on true need nor does it increase a society’s total utility because of unequal income distribution. An efficient economy must produce those goods and services that yield the greatest total satisfaction (utility maximisation). However, when income is concentrated, the economy produces unnecessary luxuries for the wealthy that do not provide as great a utility as say affordable housing to a homeless family. Basically, unequal incomes result in allocative inefficiencies. When incomes are equally distributed then the economy is signalled to produce what is of most importance to all thus increasing total utility. Now resources are immediately allocated as needs develop with luxuries being satisfied last.

Finally, capitalism’s driving motivation is oppression and the desire to escape it through market success (the dominant ideology). Unfortunately, this is a statistical improbability for the majority of the population. Socialist libertarianism’s driving force is creative pursuit since freedom from want and wage slavery would be guaranteed for all.

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NOTES

1. I am grateful to Dr. Ruth Kinna editor of Anarchist Studies for her comments and suggestions.

2. Organic intellectuals are: ‘the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental social class ... distinguished less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong. The implications of this ... bear on all aspects of Gramsci’s thought. Philosophically they connect with the proposition that “all men are philosophers” and with Gramsci’s whole discussion of the dissemination of philosophical ideas and of ideology within a given culture. They relate to Gramsci’s ideas on Education in their stress on the democratic character of the intellectual function, but also on the class character of the formation of intellectuals through school’ (Gramsci 1971: 1). This corresponds to the ideas of critical pedagogy by Paulo Freire (2000) and later McLaren (2006) and others.

3. According to Gramsci for a social class to move from a position of subordination or defending its own economic-corporate interests to that of hegemony – a dominant class, it must develop its own intellectual and moral leadership including cultural production that would challenge that of the current hegemonic group. It would do so by challenging the legitimising ideology of the dominant group. In its challenge to the status quo it would initially make alliances with other social groups developing into what he calls a new historic block. Much of his ideas are based on a theory to praxis model explaining the value of organic intellectuals and educational systems in educating for action (see Gramsci 1971).

4. To clarify, all university economics courses begin with the ‘ideal type’ (Weber) description and tenants of a given economic system be it capitalism or anything else. As such, it is also clearly explained in standard textbooks that in the real world there are approximations to such ideal types but the actual ideal is never reached. This is true not only of capitalism but anarchism as well.

5. ‘Theories of the middle range: theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social organisation, and social change. Middle-range theory is principally used to guide empirical inquiry. It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from particular classes of social behaviour, organisation and change to account for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalised at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, but they are close enough
to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing’ (Merton 1968:39).

6. In statistics the term *population* refers to what is being studied and could be made up of objects or individuals, e.g. voters, institutions or newspaper articles.

7. For a more detailed analysis of these topics see Asimakopoulos (2011).

8. Any worker of the enterprise can do this. Remember we are now talking about appointing executives like a CEO, not to be confused with executive board seats half of which are filled from the workers ranks by lottery.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Postanarchism and its Critics: 
A Conversation with Saul Newman

Duane Rousselle

DISPLACING THE OUTPOST OF POSTANARCHISM

Slavoj Žižek discovered a certain logical movement in the acceptance of a new theory:

[F]irst, [the new theory] is dismissed as nonsense; then, someone claims that the new theory, although not without its merits, ultimately just puts into new words things already said elsewhere; finally, the new theory is recognized in its novelty.2

Is this not the path that critics of postanarchism have adopted over the years? First, postanarchism was dismissed as obscurantism, nonsensical, academicism, jargon-laden, and so on; next, Jesse Cohn and Shawn Wilbur, among others, claimed that postanarchism was not without its merits but ultimately just put into new words what was already said by the classical anarchists themselves;3 finally, postanarchism was tolerated and both sides have accepted their losses. The final stage has not been a divorce of postanarchism from classical anarchism in order to usher in a new edifice but precisely the reverse: there has been a consolidation or marriage of the two theories. In other words, it is now obvious that postanarchism has passed through two of these major phases in the development of its theory over the last three decades. First, postanarchism was criticised as an attack on the representative ontologies of classical anarchism. Second, postanarchism was defined as a re-reading of the traditional anarchists to reveal their quintessential post-structuralist nuances – always avant la lettre. It seems to me that (a) anarchism was always already postanarchism, and (b) postanarchism has itself always been a form of anarchism.

Viewed in this way, we may say that postanarchism functioned as a ‘vanishing mediator’ between an old and a new version of anarchism. Vanishing mediators occur between two periods of stasis. But postanarchism does continue to be used as
a descriptor for a particular type of anarchist project insofar as that project cannot be satisfied by recourse to tradition. In this case, I am more inclined to describe postanarchism as a ‘displaced mediator’ that can be revived at a moment’s notice to reconfigure the normal anarchist discourse. After postanarchism we latch back onto the displaced mediator and explore its potential in the emerging stasis of postanarchist scholarship. The new terrain is defined by a reconciliation with what currently counts as postanarchism, particularly in the anglophone academic scene. After postanarchism, the marriage, and along with it both sides of the debate, are displaced, to make room for something new.

The coming displacement can be summed up in the joke about the philosophy professor who recently got married. The professor was confronted by one of his graduate students: ‘Professor! I need to tell you something immediately!’ The professor paused, looked at his wife for a moment, and then responded: ‘Wait a moment, before we go any further I want to make sure that what you are going to tell me is worth my time’. He continued, ‘Will your message refer to a moment of truth?’ The student replied without waiting a moment: ‘No, not exactly’. The professor posed another question: ‘Will your message refer to something good?’ The student replied: ‘Not at all’. The professor asked a final question: ‘Can your message be put to productive use?’ The student answered without waiting a moment, ‘Not immediately; perhaps it will even be destructive’. The professor stopped a moment to think. Dissatisfied by the student’s responses and by his own inability to frame what the student might then want to say to him, he grabbed his wife by the arm and marched off into the university to prepare his next peer reviewed article. As the professor walked off he yelled out to the student, ‘I do not want to hear any of it!’ This explains why professors rarely understand the potential of a revolutionary philosophy. It also explains why the professor did not know that his student was secretly having sex with his wife.

Cunning students of traditional philosophy have been quick to point out: ‘So, what comes after postanarchist philosophy?’ The answer, which of course they already know, comes: ‘It is post-postanarchist philosophy!’ This has been the most naive way to attack postanarchism. But we ought to take it more seriously than they do; the laughter we express over post-postanarchism might very well be an expression of our inability to come to terms with the possibility that postanarchism might not be enough. Post-postanarchism is a joke because it disembodies us – traditionalists and postanarchists alike. It exposes us to the possibility that there might still be something else out there. The problem of postanarchism today is not one of exclusive disjunction – of either traditional anarchism or postanarchism – but precisely their conjunction or marriage: anarchism and postanarchism. In this conjunction
we have failed to recognise the next operation: the discovery of the superset that
displaces the conjunction against an emergent set. In other words, in the marriage
of anarchism and postanarchism, we have failed to see that the emerging students of
political philosophy have been having sex with our wives.

So what comes after postanarchism? It is now clear to me that speculative
realism is grappling with many of the same problems that postanarchism finds
itself quickly approaching. For the sake of introducing this problem early, I shall
borrow the phraseology of the object oriented ontologist Levi Bryant: what we are
dealing with in the eventual displacement of the current marriage is the problem
of the hegemony of epistemology. To put matters even more simply, I will state
immediately that this is the problem that postanarchists face in the third decade of
scholarship.

Admittedly, a great deal of what I have discovered about postanarchism’s ‘next
move’ emerged from an early and premature attempt to formulate a response to crit-
icisms of postanarchism. What I discovered was that the criticisms of postanarchism
paralleled the informal fallacy outlined by Freud in his *Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious*. A neighbour borrows a kettle and returns it damaged. The neighbour
constructs three defences: first, that he returned the kettle undamaged; second, that
it was already damaged when he borrowed it, and; third, that he never borrowed the
kettle in the first place. These criticisms reflected the very same concerns brought
to bear against postanarchism: critics were mostly criticising in postanarchism what
postanarchism was criticising in classical anarchism, namely the political strategy of
reductionism and/or essentialism. The critics were reacting against postanarchism’s
reduction of the classical tradition. The critics argued the following: first, postanar-
chism represented an attempt to abandon classical or traditional anarchism; second,
postanarchism represented an attempt to rescue classical or traditional anarchism
from its own demise, and; third, anarchism was always already postanarchist.

For two decades postanarchism has adopted an epistemological point of depar-
ture for its critique of the representative ontologies of classical anarchism. This
critique focused on the classical anarchist conceptualisation of power as a unitary
phenomenon that operated unidirectionally to repress an otherwise creative and
benign human essence. Andrew Koch may have inaugurated this trend in the
early 1990s when he wrote his widely influential paper ‘Post-structuralism and
the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism’. Koch’s paper certainly laid some of the
important groundwork for postanarchism’s continual subsumption of ontology
beneath the *a priori* of an epistemological orientation. His work continues to be
cited as an early and important venture into postanarchist political philosophy. The
problem is that Koch could not conceive of an anti-essentialist and autonomous
ontological system, one not subject to regulation or representation by the human mind. Consequently, he was forced to assert a subjectivist claims-making ego as the foundation of a poststructuralist anarchist politics.

It seemed to me that Saul Newman was indebted to this heritage insofar as he also posited the ego (extrapolated from the writings of Max Stirner) and the subject (extrapolated from Jacques Lacan’s oeuvre) as the paradoxical ‘outside’ to power and representation. Todd May fell into a similar trap in his book *The Political Philosophy of Post-structuralist Anarchism* when he wrote that ‘[m]etaphysics […] partakes of the normativity inhabiting the epistemology that provides its foundations’.\(^5\) Newman’s approach did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of a metaphysics, at least to the extent that he began with the subject of the Lacanian tradition (wherein the subject is believed to be radically barred from *das Ding*). On the other hand, it seemed to me that May completely foreclosed the possibility of any escape from the reign of the epistemological. There laid the impasse of yesterday’s postanarchism. This impasse at the heart of the project of postanarchism has forced Koch, Newman, May, and many others, to come to similar conclusions about the place of ontology in postanarchist scholarship. The postanarchists have all formulated a response strikingly similar to Koch’s argument that any representative ontology ought to be dismantled and dethroned in favour of ‘a conceptualization of knowledge that is contingent on a plurality of internally consistent episteme’.\(^6\) This is precisely the problem that we are up against: by dismissing all ontologies as suspiciously representational and as incessantly harbouring a dangerous form of essentialism, postanarchists have overlooked the privilege that they have placed on the human subject, language, and discourse.

Ontology must now be distinguished from representation. We must shift the terms of the debate and interrogate the hegemony that epistemology has been afforded within postanarchist philosophy. At least two possibilities are now permitted. On the one hand, we could intervene into the reigning mode of philosophy, namely epistemology, by latching onto concepts from meta-ethical philosophy. Meta-ethics allows one to separate the ontological from the epistemological easily and to answer very particular questions about each in order to formulate an overarching meta-ethical position. What meta-ethics does through an analytical gesture we might do through a critical gesture. Postanarchism is particularly adept at this task because of its resounding ability to reframe itself as an ethical political philosophy (against the so-called ‘strategic’ political philosophy of classical Marxism). On the other hand, the best way to defeat the privilege of epistemological anarchism is to shift the terms of the debate – this is also something that postanarchists have already shown they are well able to achieve. Instead of asking the question ‘how do
representative ontological systems harbour concealed epistemological orientations toward the political?’, one might ask: ‘do epistemological orientations toward the political always harbour representative and subject-centred ontological systems?’

The fallacy of strategic political philosophy in the Marxist tradition is, as Todd May quite correctly points out, that it remains committed to a concept of power that is unitary in its analysis, unidirectionally in its influence, and utterly repressive in its effect. Similarly, Levi Bryant’s ontology allows one to argue that there is a fallacy that occurs ‘whenever one type of entity is treated as the ground or explains all other entities’. Whereas May’s poststructuralist anarchism moved away from the fallacy of the unitary analysis of power (whereby subjects were thought to be constituted by the influence of a single site of power), it nonetheless remained committed to a ‘tactical’ political philosophy that was monarchical in the final analysis. It remained monarchical to the extent that the human world, the world of epistemology, was treated as the yardstick of democracy, and no room was afforded for the things of the world to influence politics. Bryant’s argument is quite instructive: ‘[w]hat we thus get is not a democracy of objects or actants where all objects are on equal ontological footing [...] but instead a monarchy of the human in relation to all other beings’. The real fallacy is thus not against strategic political philosophy but philosophy itself and the way it has played out over so many centuries. ‘The epistememic fallacy’, writes Bryant, ‘consists in the thesis that proper ontological questions can be fully transposed into epistemological questions’.

We can now distinguish three stages in the life of postanarchism. First, we can deduce what Süreyyya Evren has described as its ‘introductory period’. The introductory period of postanarchism is defined by its inability to side-step the ontological problem in the literature of classical anarchism. During this period, postanarchism needed to distinguish itself from classical anarchism while nonetheless remaining committed to its ethical project. The second period overcomes the problem of the separation of postanarchism from classical anarchism by re-reading the classical tradition as essentially postanarchistic; in other cases, previously marginalised thinkers are brought back into the canon (such as Gustav Landauer and Max Stirner). Some of the critiques of postanarchism are included into this period insofar as postanarchism, for most of the critics, was always already anarchism. Whereas the first and second phases included only explicitly anarchist literature under their rubric of worthwhile investigation, in the third period this no longer holds true. To be certain, the second period permitted the incorporation of poststructuralist literature into postanarchist discussions, but always with a certain amount of reservation. The third period, the one that is to come – the one that is already here if only we would heed its call – will not take such care with attempts at identification.
or canonisation. An after to postanarchism is no joke, it is already here, like a seed beneath the snow, waiting to be discovered.

Perhaps it is time to investigate this After to postanarchism. In this regard, I have interviewed Saul Newman about the future of postanarchism and the role it must play after the critical backlash it has received from other anarchists. The transcript has minimal alterations; only the material that appears within square brackets has been added by me.

POSTANARCHISM AND ITS CRITICS: A CONVERSATION WITH SAUL NEWMAN

Duane: It seems to me that for more than two decades postanarchism has adopted an epistemological point of departure for its critique of the representative ontologies of classical anarchism. Andrew Koch may have inaugurated this trend in the early 1990s when he wrote his widely influential paper ‘Post-structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism’.

However, similar lines of argument can be found in the work of most of the major postanarchists. Consequently, Benjamin Franks has discovered that Koch was forced to assert a subjectivist claims-making ego as the foundation of his poststructuralist anarchist politics. Todd May has fallen into a similar ‘trap’ in his pivotal work The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism when he wrote that ‘[m]etaphysics [...] partakes of the normativity inhabiting the epistemology that provides its foundations’.

My question relates to the possibility of a non-representative ontology – in your (Stirnerian-Lacanian informed) postanarchism, is it possible, or desirable, to assert a non-epistemological and yet also non-representative postanarchism?

Saul: What I find interesting about [Max] Stirner – and what critics of postanarchism like Franks fail to understand – is that the ego is a nothingness, a void, perhaps something like the real in Lacan. Stirner refers to it as the ‘creative nothingness’ which is always in a process of flux and becoming. So it could not be anything further from a fixed or essential identity, and this is why the whole critique of the supposed ‘subjectivism’ of postanarchism – by which I suppose Franks means something like the relativism of the supreme individual – is misplaced. There is no ego as a solid, concrete subject which is at the centre of the universe – just an open field of possibilities, more of a rhizome perhaps.

When Stirner declares ‘I set my affair on nothing’, this is an invitation to think in non-foundationalist, or more accurately, post-foundationalist terms. The difference is that, while we cannot simply abolish foundations, we can think of ways in which the ontological field might be contingent, open, porous and unstable. Stirner
Duane: As a point of connection, Widukind de Ridder, in chapter four of your new edited collection on Max Stirner, argued that ‘much against Stirner’s own intentions, “egoism” became a philosophy of the self’,¹⁴ Stirner’s Ego – not to be confused with the imaginary Ego of post-Freudian thought – takes on an autonomous reality that resists any and all claims to represent or domesticate it by ‘spooks’.¹⁵ For example, on the opening page of the book you insist that the Ego is ‘the only reality’.¹⁶ But I detect a slippage back into epistemology, back into language and discourse. Throughout the book, ‘difference’ is the concept most used in describing the Ego – it even has prime place in the index. In point of fact, you know this, Stirner never used the word ‘difference’ (or anything resembling it) in his own work. It seems to me that the proximate concept is ‘the Unique’ or ‘ownness’ which resists all conceptual representation from somewhere outside of and ‘beyond the limits of language’ (to paraphrase Stirner). Does this concept (‘difference’) not carry certain Derridean baggage with it (écriture), does it not imply an indebtedness to a certain ‘poststructuralist idealism’? Similarly, Stirner’s work has often been derided for its (Hegelian) idealism. My questions are therefore: (1) would you classify Stirner as a materialist? and, (2) do you think there are problems with the post-structuralist appropriation of Stirner’s work? You’ve hinted as much in your book From Bakunin to Lacan¹⁷ when you claimed that Derrida did not go far enough with his discovery of a ‘radical outside to power’ because he was at the limit of poststructuralist argumentation.

Saul: Yes, you’re right about difference. It’s more accurate to refer to singularity in relation to Stirner. Difference presupposes a stable identity of difference, whereas the ‘unique’ is that which destabilises all identities; it is something much more fluid and in flux. Singularity is that which is neither same nor different, neither universal nor particular.

I would see Stirner as a materialist, albeit an unusual one. It is ironic that Marx and Engels dismissed Stirner as an idealist for his supposed neglect of material economic relations and his claim that political apparatuses such as the state – which had their base in economic and social relations – wielded over us a power that was.

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Stirner’s point, however, was not to deny the material conditions of power, but to unmask the idealisation, self-sacrifice and voluntary servitude that make them possible. Moreover, Stirner’s philosophy of egoism is an attempt to demolish all idealisations and to bring everything back down to earth, so to speak. The ego or ‘unique one’, as I have said, is not some sort of new transcendental subject but a rhizomatic field of flux and becoming, a swirl of singularities, a void which consumes any positive identifications. This is a certain kind of materialism, akin perhaps to the notion of ‘aleatory materialism’ found in the later writings of Althusser. This parallel is something Widukind picks up on.

There is precious little appropriation of Stirner in poststructuralist thought, apart from Derrida’s *Spectres of Marx*, and a brief nod to Stirner in Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche. This general neglect of Stirner amongst philosophers and thinkers who would certainly have some familiarity with his work, has always struck me as curious. As you know I have sought to address this missed encounter, and to show how Stirner in a way foreshadows so much of poststructuralist thinking. This is not an attempt to assimilate Stirner into the poststructuralist fold. Indeed, where I find Stirner’s thought to be powerful is in the way that it at the same time goes beyond the limits of poststructuralism, developing a kind of positive figure of the outside, the unique one, wherein all stable identities are dissolved. While poststructuralism makes the limits of our world visible to us – the limits of power, discourse, language, subjectification – Stirner shows us that we can live beyond those limits. Stirner’s thinking really is – as Deleuze once said of Foucault – ‘thought from the outside’.

**Duane:** In *From Bakunin to Lacan* (2001) you maintained that the problem of essentialism is the political problem of our time. In *Unstable Universalities* (2007) and *The Politics of Postanarchism* (2011) you sketched out what a non-essentialist and anti-authoritarian politics might begin to look like. Here, we seem to be firmly in the domain of meta-ethics rather than politics *per se*. For example, you’ve claimed that if postanarchism is to have any political efficacy it must have a clearly worked out ethical framework. In the development of this meta-ethical framework have you discovered a difference between the ethics of classical anarchism (especially *à la* Kropotkin, which appears to me as nothing less than the *point-de-capiton* of traditional anarchist meta-ethics) and the ethics of postanarchism? Or is there some ethical kernel of which both classical and postanarchism share? Finally, do you believe, as some have claimed of your arguments, that classical and post-anarchism are delimited strictly by answers to the question of essentialism, whereby classical anarchism is (somewhat reductively) essentialist?
Saul: I wouldn’t put it quite like this. I have not tried to develop a clearly defined meta-ethical framework for postanarchism, and to some extent, such a rigid framework would be in tension with the deconstructive, ‘anarchic’ impulse of postanarchism. What I have proposed, instead, is that the dimension of the political must be thought in relation to the ethical, just as politics must be thought in relation to anti-politics and utopia. But I do not see ethics in terms of some sort of moral code or transcendental law. Rather, I see ethics along similar lines to Levinas, as the an-archic element which punctures, destabilises and disrupts existing identities, displacing their self-enclosed sovereignty, and opening them up to the Other beyond their limits. This does not mean that the political is to be submitted to the tribunal of Ethics. But neither do I think that we can keep these two domains separate, as Carl Schmitt sought to do. If we do so, we end up in a sort of closed, violent, nihilistic political space in which the struggle between friend and enemy becomes the only concern. So, rather giving ethics a positive content, it is about its relation to the political domain that I see as important.

The problem with classical anarchism is once again to do with its foundationalism, with the way that its ethics is grounded in biology, in some sort of rational social essence which is scientifically verifiable. This does not mean, however, that postanarchism cannot share with classical anarchism a common ethical horizon: principles of freedom, equality and solidarity – no matter how differently articulated in different conditions and historical periods – continue to guide and inform contemporary emancipatory politics.

Duane: In 2005, Theory & Event published (what turned out to be) a scathing critique of the Lacanian left and its theory of constituent lack, written by Andrew Robinson. Robinson aimed his critique at Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto Laclau (who endorsed your first book on postanarchism), Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupancic, Yannis Stavrakakis, Alain Badiou, and, of course, you, among others. The strength of his article was its ability to unearth one of the most obvious themes that occur in the writings of today’s most influential Lacanian radical philosophers. How would you respond to Robinson’s charge that the Lacanian left’s critique of essentialism via the concept of ‘constitutive lack’ only allows for essentialism to re-emerge in the political? For instance, Robinson accused you of slipping essentialism in through the back door in your description of the Lacanian real as well as in your description of the Stirnerian ‘creative nothing’: you described each as an ‘emptiness at the heart of any place’. Do you believe that it is incorrect to reduce, as Robinson does, the notion of lack to the Lacanian real and to das Ding – are the two, the real and lack, inextricably connected? In other words, do you think that Robinson is correct to situate...
lack within the coordinates of the ontological and is this necessarily also the coordinates of desire (the Lacanian lack-of-being)?

Saul: Robinson is clearly affirming a Deleuzian ontology that prefers plenitude and abundance to lack. This way of seeing things is nothing new. In fact there was even an edited book that came out a little while ago called Radical Democracy: Politics Between Abundance and Lack,27 which explored the contours of this debate in continental philosophy. From my perspective – and this is once again where Stirner is useful in thinking through these questions – this division between abundance and lack, plenitude and void, is perhaps not as important or fundamental as it is made out to be. The idea of the void – which would be equivalent to the real in Lacan (Badiou as well has some notion of the void out of which the event emerges) – is simply a way of thinking about the outside, the limits of discourse, symbolisation, existence. The void as outside can be found for instance in Stirner’s notion of the ‘un-man’ as that which cannot be assimilated into the ideology of humanism. The ‘unique one’ or Ego itself, as I have said before, is not a positive identity, but a ‘creative nothingness’, out of which new becomings emerge. I don’t think we can see this as essentialist, or if it is, it is a funny sort of essentialism which is without positive properties or stable identities. Is this really so different, for instance, from Deleuze’s ‘plane of immanence’ which is immanent only to itself, which defies any division or stable identification, and which consists only of anarchic and heterogeneous forces, drives, connections, multiplicities? Come to think of it, this is very similar on one level to the Freudian unconscious. My point is that these ontological terms – abundance and lack, plenitude and void – whose apparent antinomy so much is made out of, are just different ways of thinking the outside, which, for me, is absolutely crucial for theorising radical politics.

Duane: In 2002, Todd May published his review of your book From Bakunin to Lacan book in Theory & Event.28 He intimated that your approach, in your early book at least, tends to divide people rather than bring them together. In other words, he thought that your approach, your strong critique of essentialism borrowed from Lacan and Stirner, precluded the ability to develop a cogent theory of collective action necessary for political efficacy. Do you think this is accurate? If so, do you think you overcame this problem in your later work?

Saul: I always found this a slightly odd criticism, especially coming from a post-structuralist who also rejects essentialism.29 May’s point is that the notion of indeterminacy that he finds in Derrida and Lacan, particularly, is a weak basis for
collective action. It is less to do with Stirner, who also attracts criticism from others for his supposed individualism and his refusal of collective politics – something that I consider to be a misreading of Stirner. Anyway, for me, Derrida and Lacan represent important ways of thinking about the instability and contingency of all identities – and not the affirmation of difference – which as far as I am concerned is the central insight of poststructuralism. The question is whether this indeterminacy and contingency makes collective political action impossible. I have tried to show that this is the very ontological condition of politics. That is, political projects are always confronted with the challenges of construction, of how to bring together different identities, positions and so on, and how to build something new out of these singularities. Politics itself is an indeterminate enterprise – it is like a rhizome which can go in all sorts of unpredictable and undesirable directions. It is always a risk, as Deleuze and Guattari themselves pointed out.

What I have sought to do in my more recent work is engage more explicitly with questions of ethics and subjectivity – that is to explore singular/collective political formations on a micro-political level, at the level of everyday relations and interactions, behaviours and subjective positions. This is where the thought of the later Foucault, as well as the anarchists Gustav Landauer and Etienne de La Boetie, have been influential. Again, here, psychoanalysis has a role to play, as we need to understand with greater clarity the subjective relation to freedom and domination, and how it is possible for the subject to desire both.

Duane: The question of desire has been at the heart of the insurrectionary anarchism project (from Alfredo Bonanno, to Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed). I think that one has to be careful to avoid the temptation of lapsing into this form of anarchism, where the motto could just as well be something like: stop theorising, unleash your desires, and just toss bricks. However, I have always been moved by the form of insurrectionary anarchism advocated by Stirner. Breaking out of what Etienne de La Boetie has called ‘voluntary servitude’ – as you put it, ‘the desire for one’s own domination’ – may imply, you seem to suggest, a commitment to insurrection rather than revolution. Distinguishing between these two commitments (insurrection and revolution), you’ve cited one of the most powerful paragraphs in Stirner’s book: ‘[revolution] consists in the overturning of conditions, […] and is accordingly a political or social act; [insurrection] has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, […] the revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged’. In many ways, Stirner was traversing the fantasy of traditional revolutionary politics, perhaps he
was even motioning toward what Lacan, Žižek, and Richard Day (in each their own way) have referred to as ‘a politics of the act’. But, here, do we risk the possibility of losing the revolutionary project entirely? Some commentators have described postanarchism, disparagingly, as ‘post-revolution’. Is this even a problem? Does postanarchism imply that we have no longer to commit ourselves to the risk of politics? (Instead, we have only to work on ourselves, the statist relationships that occur in my personal encounters with my affinity group and friendship networks, and so on).

Saul: This question of desire is of course crucial to radical politics, and the notion of the insurrection – as expressed particularly in that passage from Stirner you refer to – is an enactment of desire. But the interesting thing here is that the emphasis is not so much on the desire for certain ends, such as different social arrangements, the abolition of the state and capitalism and so on. That all works on the strategic register of revolution. Rather, desire is mobilised in the insurrection at a micro-political level, at the level of one’s ethical relation with oneself and others, and seeks a transformation of behaviours and subjectivities – it is a work of the self on the self, primarily. Stirner’s argument here is that any sort of macro-political change – the revolutionary transformation of society – is already immanent in this micro-level insurrection, so that if we free ourselves from the subjectivities that have been imposed upon us, if we choose – and it is a matter of choice, of the will – to live and act in a consciously libertarian way (he would call it egoistic, but it means the same thing) then the rest will follow. What is surprising is that some anarchists reject this insurrection of the self as being somehow politically superficial, as a question of ‘lifestyle’ anarchism, as opposed to ‘social’ anarchism, to use [Murray] Bookchin’s terminology. But surely what Stirner is getting at here is the notion of prefiguration, which has always been central to the ethics of anarchism – that is, the idea of acting in the here and now, acting to transform everyday relations, acting as if you are already liberated, and the liberation will follow from this. The other thing to consider is that Stirner does not say that the insurrection should replace or be the exclusion of the revolution – he simply differentiates between the two processes. So perhaps we should see the insurrection as the necessary supplement to any macro-level social transformation, something without which the revolution will simply invent new forms of power and domination.

However, the insurrection does force us to question the idea of Revolution with the capital ‘R’, the Revolution as the all-defining, all-encompassing Act, wherein all will be redeemed, whereby the whole of Humanity will be liberated. Social transformation cannot be conceived in this way – it must be an ongoing process, an ongoing
contestation with limits and power, a continual process of invention and experimentation. To see it as one universal Act leads us down often dangerous paths.

This is why, even though the insurrection is about active desire or what I call (following Foucault) voluntary inservitude, it cannot be likened to the way that Žižek at least (leaving aside Day and Lacan here) understands the ‘politics of the act’. For him, this translates into a certain vanguardism, and sovereign decisions taken with all their ruthless consequences; hence his fascination with the figure of the great revolutionary leader – Lenin, Mao, and the Jacobins. The insurrection, and the act of voluntary inservitude, as far as I am concerned, has nothing to do with this sort of authoritarian revolutionary politics.

Duane: Perhaps we can use this as an opportunity to try to distinguish your work from such people as Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, and Simon Critchley. I have often found myself defending Žižek and Badiou’s politics within the anarchist milieu – often times their work is reduced to a caricature or, worse, described as authoritarian, and then any further discussion is immediately forbidden. Against this impulse you have entered into their philosophy, drawing out the elements that may be relevant to postanarchism. You have even suggested that Alain Badiou’s work comes very close to a sort of postanarchism (Benjamin Noys has also picked up on this in his Anarchist Studies articles “Through a Glass Darkly: Alain Badiou’s Critique of Anarchism”). While Žižek and Badiou have often been dismissed for having nothing to say to anarchists, Critchley has, on the other hand, been described as a neo-anarchist. How would you situate your own work in relation to these three Lacanian philosophers? Do you see an anarchist moment in any of their work that is worth pursuing? For example, do you think Žižek’s Leninism is a provocation to those who have abandoned the ‘dirty work’ of revolution?

Saul: This is a complicated question, and my answer will hardly do it justice. As you suggest below, I try to avoid drawing up lines of rigid division between different approaches, something I find profoundly un-illuminating. Instead, what I try to do is unravel a particular thinker, tease out strands of their thought that are productive and useful, and perhaps even read him against him – or herself. So what is interesting to me is how various Continental thinkers today – when we really pick them apart – seem to veer quite close to a sort of anarchism, while at the same time either remaining entirely silent about this tradition, or explicitly disavowing it, as if their proximity to anarchism becomes uncomfortable to them.

This is the case, for instance, with someone like Badiou who, despite his acclamations of Mao, Lenin and the Jacobins – which seems almost a sort of fetish
– at the same time tacitly acknowledges that this model of politics, based around vanguards, party discipline and the figure of the leader, is no longer really conceivable today. Instead, does he not call for a politics that is no longer based on the party-form? There is on the one hand, a nostalgia and revolutionary romanticism, and on the other hand, a realisation that these forms and symbols no longer really resonate today. With Žižek, one finds much more posturing and provocation, with the fetishisation of the vanguard and leader, and yet, once again, there is a sort of acknowledgement that these cannot exist today as anything other than a fetish – even Žižek does not advocate a direct return to Leninism in its historical form; Lenin is merely a symbol or signifier for a revolutionary act that radically and retroactively changes an existing situation.

I find [Jacques] Rancière’s conception of politics, by contrast, much more persuasive and interesting. Even though he says that politics is ‘rare’, it is nevertheless the politics of the ordinary – that is, of ordinary people in everyday situations (which thereby become extraordinary) enacting the equality and liberty that is denied to them, acting as though they are already free, putting into practice in a self-organised, autonomous way, the world they are wanting to build. What is crucial here is the way that the position of mastery and authority, whether in knowledge or politics, is continually interrogated, exposed, and unseated. This is an anarchistic politics without a doubt, and indeed, Rancière refers to democracy with the paradoxical term ‘anarchic government’, as the governing of those without any authority, title, qualification to govern. Todd May draws these links out extremely well. But where I think Rancière has some important critical implications for anarchism is, firstly, his refusal of the idea that freedom is somehow immanent within or grows organically out of the social body – rather it is always the work of politics, and involves active and ongoing experimentation. Secondly, there is the tension between the orders of politics and the police (la police); a political rupture becomes part of a new social (police) order, with its own set of limits, exclusions, power arrangements and so on. There is no final state of liberation. Indeed, in Rancière there is really a distancing from the idea of the grandeur of Revolution – and in this sense, Rancière is quite close to my own position.

As for Critchley, he is one who most explicitly invokes anarchism, and he certainly deserves some credit here for taking anarchism seriously today. But at the same time, I find his treatment of the anarchist tradition slightly superficial and inadequate. However, I sense in his work a desire for a deeper engagement with anarchism, so perhaps this will come in time.

It was not my intention to engage in polemics here; nor was it to gauge how closely these thinkers resemble anarchism – that’s not terribly interesting. But what
is significant is that one finds in much continental theory today a certain recognition of the limits of the revolutionary forms and categories of the past, and a desire for alternatives. And this is where I think anarchism is beginning to emerge from the shadows.

Duane: I note with interest the recent interview conducted by Todd May, Benjamin Noys, and yourself, with Jacques Rancière for Anarchist Studies. I sense that more anarchists today, inspired by the turn to postanarchism, are finding Rancière’s theories on the saturated police order (and les sans-part as the void or excess of the distribution of the sensible) as a satisfying framework for thinking postanarchism in a time or discourse of ‘post-politics’. Might we expect further engagements with Rancière’s concepts in your future work? Do you think any such engagement might once again open up Benjamin Franks and Sasha K’s critique that postanarchism gives up on revolution and opts for small-scale self-satisfaction? Jodi Dean, for example, has made a compelling claim that Rancière’s politics operates within the narcissistic imaginary register insofar as ‘one gets satisfaction by appearing in one’s disagreement […]’ (italics added) and therefore does not take the risk of politics. How can we be sure that les sans-part are not themselves carrying out the (ethical, local) work of the state in their very attempt to do otherwise?

Saul: Rancière’s conception of politics as taking place in the gap or disjuncture between the ‘part of no part’ and the police order, and as the self-activation of equality and liberty, has indeed proved stimulating for my own thinking, and the connections with anarchism are quite clear. I can’t say what my future engagement with Rancière’s work will be, but I’m sure that his thinking, like that of a number of others, will be an important point of reference for further investigations into the nature of the political. At the same time, I like to use such ideas in slightly heterodox ways and do something different with them, read them in different ways – through an anarchist lens, for instance – to reveal something new.

But let me respond to this perennial critique of postanarchism, that it gives up on revolution; and here it is quite interesting to see how similar the two critiques you cite below (Franks and Sasha K; and Dean) are, even though they come from different perspectives. No doubt, the understanding of revolution is different: for the anarchists, it is about the destruction of state power; whereas for the latter – and here Dean is representative of a certain neo-Leninist position – it is about the seizure and instrumentalisation of state power. But in both cases, the revolution is the great transformative Event – the figure in which so many fantasies and desires are invested. I think we have to ask ourselves honestly what the revolution actually
means today, and whether it doesn’t simply operate as a fantasy itself, as a point of identification. Allow me to quote a brief passage from Sasha K:

As anarchists, the revolution is our constant point of reference, no matter what we are doing or what problem we are concerned with. But the revolution is not a myth simply to be used as a point of reference. Precisely because it is a concrete event, it must be built daily through more modest attempts which do not have all the liberating characteristics of the social revolution in the true sense. These more modest attempts are insurrections. In them the uprising of the most exploited and excluded of society and the most politically sensitized minority opens the way to the possible involvement of increasingly wider strata of exploited on a flux of rebellion which could lead to revolution.

Elsewhere in the piece, Sasha stresses the importance of autonomous self-organisation and self-management, something with which I would entirely concur. But what I am unclear about is the distinction being drawn here between insurrection and revolution – at what point does one turn into the other? Is autonomous self-management the goal of revolution, or is it simply a means to an end, or a minor stage on the way to revolution? If so, then what exactly is revolution, what does it look like? Where is the symbolic place of power today that the revolution seeks to topple? I’m not sure power is still centralised in the sovereign state – certainly this is a node of power, but only one in a much more complex and diffuse network. So, the question is, can we still think in terms of the great event, the great uprising, in a singular, totalising sense?

If, indeed, revolution really refers to the spreading and pluralisation of autonomous spaces and practices of self-management and self-organisation (what Bakunin referred to as the organisation of our powers ‘outside and against the state’) then it is hard to see where the disagreement lies. Perhaps it is to do with my contention that we will never be entirely free from power, that the revolution will not necessarily lead to a final and complete liberation. But here I agree with Foucault, that power and limits are inherent in any social arrangement, and that therefore freedom must be seen as an ongoing work of agonistic contestation with these limits, and an ethical work on ourselves. The inevitability of power and limits does not mean, however, that things cannot be improved, even radically so, so as to reduce the potential for domination, violence and exploitation – but we must always be careful about the possibility of new forms of domination emerging.

I detect in the objection about anything less than the ‘Revolution’ – no matter how ill-defined this is – being merely a kind narcissistic self-satisfaction, echoes
of [Murray] Bookchin’s complaint about ‘lifestyle’ anarchism. It is surprising the extent to which such crude dogmatism, coupled with revolutionary purism, lingers amongst some anarchists today.

There is something perhaps more interesting and suggestive in Dean’s criticism of Rancière, but at the same time, it comes out of a nostalgia for the revolutionary vanguardism of the past, a way of thinking about politics that is completely inadequate today. However, the claim about the politics of appearance, of visibility, and the narcissism attached to it – while being a slightly unfair and simplistic interpretation of Rancière (Rancière is not advocating anything like an identity politics; on the contrary, it is about ‘disidentification’)50 – at the same time leads me to think that the most interesting gesture of radical politics today is not one of appearance and visibility, but rather of invisibility and imperceptibility. It is no longer fundamentally about staging a confrontation – through protest marches, for instance – although we should not discount the symbolic value of these – but rather about the proliferation of multiple and anonymous networks, of sabotaging or subverting regular circuits of communication and surveillance, embodying counter-conducts in our everyday behaviour, and inventing autonomous and heretical forms of community.

Duane: I would like to finish by asking you about the very concept ‘postanarchism’. Why did you choose this concept? Do you think ‘postanarchism’ has a particular shelf life? Or, do you believe, as I do, that postanarchism opens up a certain space, or (to borrow a Freudian expression) ‘another scene’, for thinking anarchism in relation to itself and its other/s?

Saul: Postanarchism has no periodisation. It is not a specific phase within anarchist thought, nor is it a distinct political theory. I have said many times that it does not signify in any sense the obsolescence of anarchism – quite the contrary. Rather, as you say, it opens up a space of problematisation, inquiry and deconstruction within anarchism – and indeed within radical political thought more broadly – allowing a rethinking of key categories, concepts, identities and strategies, through the constitutive tension between the political and the anti-political. It is something like the unconscious of anarchism, to use your Freudian metaphor. My contention has always been that anarchism has something important to teach radical political thought today – that indeed it might be seen as both the underside, and the ethicopolitical horizon of radical politics. Moreover, anarchism has something important to teach itself. So postanarchism should be seen as an ongoing project of revitalising anarchist theory and communicating its relevance to today’s emancipatory struggles and movements.
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NOTES

1. This title is a play on Sandra Jeppesen’s chapter (‘Relocating the Outpost of Postanarchism’) in Duane Rousselle and Süreyyya Evren eds. (2011) *Postanarchism: A Reader*. Pluto Press, pp. 151-159.


11. I posed this question to Newman after informing him of the return to ontology in post-continental thought (especially in Speculative Realism, Object Oriented Philosophy, and so on). He admitted to having very limited knowledge on the topic at this point. I had intended to question him on the meaning of the ontological turn for postanarchism. See, for example, the forthcoming issue of *Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies*, ‘Ontological Anarche’ – 2013.2.

12. Franks argued, for example, that ‘Stirner and Newman, against the dangerous hierarchicaal and oppressive account of morality offered by the universalists, propose in its place a form of subjectivism. The individual is freed from the constraints of universal laws to create their own morality. […] The belief that the individual (or individual consciousness) is the fundamental basis for the construction of, and justification for, moral values has a number of fatal flaws for an anarchist or any proponent of meaningful social action’. ‘Postanarchism and Meta-Ethics’: 144).


16. Newman wrote: ‘Stirner tears up the paving stones of our world, revealing the abyss of nothingness that lies beneath. […] All that is left standing after this frenzy of the destruction is the Ego – the only reality – smiling at us enigmatically […]’ Newman, *Max Stirner*, p. 1.


19. See Widukind de Ridder. ‘Max Stirner: The End of Philosophy’ in Newman Max Stirner, pp. 158-59. ‘Althusser’s later writings make a divide between an ‘almost completely unknown materialist tradition in the history of philosophy’ and the way it had been ‘perverted into an idealism of freedom’. Max Stirner, according to Althusser, is part of the unknown tradition. Althusser’s redefinition of philosophy as having no object is firmly opposed to idealism. Instead of a rather narrow definition of idealism, Althusser broadens the concept until it encompasses all forms of teleological thinking. [...] The importance of Newman’s interpretation [of Stirner] lies in dissociating Stirner from the history of philosophy, by focusing on his critique of essentialism without at the same time placing him within the existentalist tradition’. There is thus a tension here between a reading of Stirner through the limitations of poststructuralism and the linguistic turn (whereby the Ego becomes a play of differences), and a reading of Stirner that reads the Ego as roughly equivalent, not to lack as a function of desire, but rather to Das Ding, the object which objects to the subject as a first order real – perhaps there is an emerging ontological reading of Stirner’s work that does away with the subject in its entirety? Widukind de Ridder’s work on Stirner seems to me most up to the task demanded of us by the new ontological turn in philosophy.


29. Todd May he prefers to call his work ‘poststructuralist anarchism’. His most cited book, in this regard, is The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism.

30. Op.Cit., fn. 29. Todd May wrote: ‘I am not convinced that by utilizing a deconstructive approach to language and politics there is room for the kind of collective action that seems necessary for political success. Indeterminacy is, to my mind, a weak

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basis for political thought and organizing. It tends to drive people apart rather than bringing them together. I understand that Newman is concerned, as he is right to be, that the bringing together too often runs the risk of embracing once again essentialising concepts and authoritarian forms of power. It seems to me, however, that an adequate political approach cannot avoid this risk’ (page number unknown).

31. One of the oft-cited passages from Gustav Landauer’s work reads: ‘The state is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of behavior; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another […] We are the State and we shall continue to be the State until we have created the institutions that form a real community’. Cf., Gabriel Kuhn., Ed., Trans. (2010) Gustav Landauer: Revolution and Other Writings. AK Press.


36. I intend no harsh judgment on the black bloc tactic; while I no longer participate in black bloc tactics, I fully endorse these tactics. I have, myself, participated in many black blocs throughout the years and have found in them the key to my own development as an anarchist. However, I believe that we need to be aware of the limits of black bloc tactics and be critical of the strange relationship between the black bloc


38. For example, Richard Day wrote that there are problems with, what Lacan has called, an ‘ethics of desire, an endless repetition of a self-defeating act that only perpetuates the conditions that give rise to its own motive force. Fortunately, the same identities that have hit the limits of the politics of demand have begun to move beyond them, towards a politics of the act driven by an ethics of the real. This alternative ethico-political couple relies upon, and results from, getting over the hope that the state and corporate forms, as structures of domination, exploitation and division, are somehow capable of producing effects of emancipation [i.e., traversing the fantasy]’. Richard Day. (2005) Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements. Pluto Press, p. 15.


40. Saul Newman appears to be making a reference to what meta-ethicists call consequentialism.


45. See, for example, Badiou’s candid remarks about ‘politics without party’ in ‘Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou’ (with Peter Hallward) in (2002) *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, Verso Books. On page 96, Badiou argued that “‘Politics without party’ means that politics does not spring from or originate in the party. It does not stem from that synthesis of theory and practice that represented, for Lenin, the Party. Politics springs from real situations, from what we can say and do in these situations. And so in reality there are political sequences, political processes, but these are not totalized by a party that would be simultaneously the representation of certain social forces and the source of politics itself.”


48. Jodi Dean’s paper appeared as ‘Politics without Politics’ in *Parallax* Vol. 15, No. 3. Her concluding words are powerful: ‘Rancière’s account of staging of disagreement, rather than figuring the politics as such […] exemplifies the sublimation of politics in democratic drive. As drive, democracy organizes enjoyment via a multiplicity of stagings, of making oneself visible in one’s lack. […] Contemporary protests in the United States, whether as marches, vigils, Facebook pages, or internet petitions aim at visibility, awareness, being seen. They don’t aim at taking power. Our politics is one of endless attempts to make ourselves seen. It’s as if instead of looking at our opponents and working out ways to defeat them, we get off on imagining them looking at us’.


REVIEW ARTICLE

A soundtrack to revolution?

Gil Scott-Heron, The Last Holiday: A Memoir

Denise Sullivan, Keep On Pushing: Black Power Music from Blues to Hip-hop

Pat Thomas, Listen, Whitey! The Sights and Sounds of Black Power 1965-1975

These studies highlight the centrality of music to African-American social memory and struggle. Indeed, from the first blues and jazz through to hip-hop, this most elementary form of collective expression became highly politicised in a context of enduring state repression, social exclusion and political disenfranchisement. In one way or another, these works also reflect the commercialisation, institutionalisation and domestication of street voices by hostile political and corporate forces. A case in hand is Curtis Mayfield’s Keep On Pushing, the informal anthem of the Civil Rights Movement that was brashly appropriated by Obama at the 2004 Democratic National Convention.

The same song provides Denise Sullivan with the title of her ambitious study of black protest music. Despite the sub-title, by tackling folk, rock and punk, Sullivan bites off more than can be feasibly analysed in under 250 pages; for instance, there is no discussion of the overlap between punk and anarchism, so crucial for a generation of (albeit predominantly white) activists on both sides of the Atlantic. Equally, the treatment of hip-hop is rather thin. Ultimately, the core of this book assesses the 1960s counter-culture and the focus goes beyond African-American music; for instance, there is a fair amount of material on Bob Dylan and Native American Buffy Sainte-Marie, both of whom figure far more prominently than contemporary ‘raptivists’ Public Enemy, who have now notched up over twenty-five years of
social criticism. Certainly, in the sense that Dylan was a hero for many of the Black Panthers, his inclusion is not unreasonable; however, this points to another set of problems: the absence of an overarching interpretive framework and, more specifically, the lack of analysis of the relationship between white and black protest music. This is a shame, for Sullivan has conducted some excellent research, including many valuable interviews; but ultimately the devil here is in the excessive detail, as the book stumbles into anecdotes and a disparate narrative: in a desire to be inclusive, a few pages are devoted to political music outside the US. This is vexing when political rappers The Coup, whose albums include ‘Kill my Landlord’ and New Orleanian Christian Scott, an outspoken critic of policing and post-Katrina policies and whose efforts to drag jazz into the twenty-first century certainly make him a radical, go unmentioned.

A further example of Sullivan’s problematic approach is when she touches on the institutionalisation of revolutionary voices by the music industry without fully exploring the processes at play. For instance, she correctly notes the ‘insurgent’ content of early NWA and their intimate ties with the Los Angeles dispossessed; yet the process whereby their initially fierce anti-police message was muted, and the accent placed on their rhetoric of homophobic, sexist and male violence so characteristic of ‘gangsta rap’, goes unmentioned. The end product was the manufacturing of a ghetto version of the American dream, a marketing ploy that conveniently did much to disarm socially contestatory rap, while, curiously, becoming immensely popular with suburban white youth, much to the benefit of record companies.

Although also casting his net wide enough to include a range of genres, Pat Thomas’s *Listen, Whitey!* is a far more coherent work. The focus here is African-American protest music from the crest of the wave of protest that saw the radicalisation of a section of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and its rejection of the Civil Rights Movement until its nadir, a decade later, with the switch of the Black Panther Party to electoral politics. For Thomas, a curator, music historian and producer, *Listen, Whitey!* was a labour of love which he nurtured over a six year period that saw him relocate to Oakland, the BPP’s birthplace, where he interviewed and befriended several key protagonists. The result is a rich and detailed study of the politicised music of the era: as well as exploring the work of giants like Jimi Hendrix, John Coltrane and Archie Shepp, Thomas has also unearthed many rare and forgotten recordings of poetry, speeches and songs, a selection of which are to be heard on the CD companion to this attractively packaged coffee table-style publication.

Given the author’s sympathy for the BPP and, since this is a book essentially about the intersections between music and politics, Thomas is largely uncritical
of this notoriously hierarchical, macho organisation, albeit one that was, at times, capable of promoting impressive direct action and self-help community initiatives. Thomas does, however, point to the restrictive nature of BPP’s organisational culture when he discusses attempts by Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas, to promote ‘organic’ musicians in order to spread the party’s message. One example was Elaine Brown, an activist, pianist and, for a brief time, BPP leader. Before stepping down in protest at the sexism within the organisation, Brown was commissioned by Douglas to record two albums, one of which included ‘The Meeting’, the BPP anthem. Douglas also provided much of the inspiration for The Lumpen, an R&B vocal outfit consisting of BPP members, which, during 1970-1971, was the party’s ‘official’ band or, as it claimed with its typical vanguardist bravado, the ‘people’s band’. Unsurprisingly, Stalinist-inspired, ‘Third Period’ style musical projects did not flourish among their target audience: then, like today, the African-American music that was truly revolutionary, both in lyrical and in sonic terms, was generated by artists who enjoyed genuine artistic independence. Indeed, The Lumpen, with their matching outfits and vocal harmonies, were somewhat conservative for their day, far removed from the cutting edge of black music, as is clear from Thomas’s discussion of their contemporaries, proto-rap performers such as The Last Poets, The Watts Poets and Gil Scott-Heron, whose lyrical power and innovative style are eloquent testimony to the febrile creativity occurring in the revolutionary maelstrom of urban black America. Indeed, The Last Poets’s ‘Niggers are scared of revolution’ was, arguably, an infinitely more realistic appraisal of the insurrectionary strengths and weaknesses of the black urban working class than the party-directed paeans of The Lumpen. To be sure, the next big African-American musical revolution – rap – borrowed far more from BPP direct action philosophy than from the music of The Lumpen.

This brings me to Gil Scott-Heron’s beautifully written, poignant memoir, *The Last Holiday*. Dubbed the ‘Godfather of Rap’ and ‘the People’s Poet’, Scott-Heron led an intense life: having published two novels by the age of twenty-one, he established himself as one of the most important and prolific musicians of his generation, releasing fifteen studio albums, often defying musical categorisations, prior to his tragic and untimely death in 2011, aged just sixty-two. Across four decades, he was a leading social and political commentator, his intensely rich lyrics and poetry constituting a trenchant commentary on the experience of the dispossessed (‘Blue Collar’), the black experience (‘Angel Dust’), the spectacle (‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised’) and political life in the US (‘H20gate Blues’) and further afield (‘Johannesburg’). Yet very often his lyrics paid testimony to human frailty (‘Ain’t No Such Thing As a Superman’), something he grappled with all too often in others
and in himself, along with the impact of his troubled upbringing (‘On Coming from a Broken Home’).

Scott-Heron’s cruelly curtailed genius and fragility is writ large in The Last Holiday, a truncated, uneven work that was completed for posthumous publication by his editor and friend, Jamie Byng. There is much focus on Scott-Heron’s early life: we see the impact of his grandmother, who, in the 1950s, baulked at giving up her place to whites in queues; and his own inevitable initiation into radicalism – at school in the early 1960s he led a brave struggle against segregation. He also comes across as engagingly humble and modest: ‘I’ve always looked at myself as a piano player from Tennessee; I play some piano and write some songs’. But his much-publicised troubles of the last two decades of his life are largely absent: how his personal conflicts culminated in drug addiction, isolating him from family and, importantly, friends, both real and potential; how his growing addiction made him more erratic, particularly as a live performer, ultimately leading to his incarceration and his contraction of HIV. He remained a critical, dissident voice until the end, but he was detached and, increasingly, alone. He would never become the public intellectual his prodigious intellect and talent suggested he would be.

As Scott-Heron noted: ‘when you stop reaching, you die’. These words weigh heavily as one reads The Last Holiday, the title of which reflects Scott-Heron’s active participation in the campaign to establish Martin Luther King Day. By this time, he himself had ceased to reach for the same heights: the young man who expected change to come in the streets, and who predicted ‘the revolution will be live’, was now agitating merely for the commemoration of earlier struggles for a set of goals far less ambitious than those for which he had initially fought and dreamed.

Chris Ealham, Saint Louis University (Madrid Campus)


This book places itself in the current of transnational studies, that is, studies whose scope crosses national boundaries. It is self-described as ‘a political and social history of the French anarchists’ exile years in London between the late 1880s and early 1890s, tracing their legacy until the First World War and placing them in a broader historical context of exilic and transnational activism’.

This first of the book’s six chapters sets the scene by providing a standard overview of anarchism and socialism in France and Great Britain in the 1880s. The core of the book is constituted by the next two chapters, the ones which the book’s title refers to more directly. Here Bantman provides a social history – mainly based on French police sources but also on correspondence and autobiographies – of the community of four to five hundred French-speaking anarchists that lived in London. She surveys their provenance, sex, marital status and job; she describes their neighbourhoods, clubs, daily life and level of integration, or lack thereof; and she draws a profile of their periodicals and most prominent militants, whom she unproblematically refers to as ‘the elite’. The following two chapters look at the same community from the other side of the barricade. In two self-contained essays Bantman describes, respectively, how anarchists were perceived by public opinion and dealt with by the British authorities, and how British immigration and asylum policy changed in time, in no small measure as a result of the anarchists’ presence and activity – real or imagined. The final chapter examines the rise of syndicalism in France and Britain in the pre-war years and the bi-directional osmosis of direct action tactics along the Franco-British axis.

As Bantman states, her book ‘concentrates on prominent individuals, personal networks, and ideological transfers’. A paradigmatic figure on all three accounts is Émile Pouget. He was one of the protagonists in the rise of syndicalism in France, and his views were deeply influenced by British trade-unionism, which he directly experienced through his London exile. He thus epitomises the role of mediators, another key theme in the book. Bantman’s focus on cultural and militant trans-
national transfers allows her to show that the traditional dichotomy between revolutionary France and reformist Britain is untenable. Beyond the Franco-British axis, the title’s reference to globalisation, which invites a comparison with contemporary alter-globalisation movements, remains marginal in the book, being confined to the introduction and conclusion. Comparatively little space is also devoted to discussing the competing tactical and theoretical options within the anarchist movement. The controversy on organisation – probably the most fundamental, ubiquitous and sophisticated anarchist debate ever – is relegated to the section on ‘the daily lives of exiles’ and demoted to a sort of squabble partly spurred by the boredom of exile life.

The book’s master narrative is anarchism’s coming of age from the individualism, illegalism and blind terrorist violence of the 1890s to the organisation, gradualism and educationist endeavours of the 1900s. The source of the process is identified in the ‘classic libertarian organisational dilemma’ between the anarchist rejection of organisation and the need for organisation for effective action. Syndicalism, Bantman argues, provided an answer to the question, ‘albeit by-toning down its libertarian contents’. The positing of this ‘inherent contradiction’ is somewhat reminiscent of the contrast between effectiveness and ‘anarchism’ that traditionally underpins irrationalist interpretations of anarchism. However, the contradiction might have been dispelled by a clearer acknowledgment that competing currents coexisted, respectively – and coherently – equating formal organisation with authoritarianism and effectiveness. Such an acknowledgement would have also dispensed the author from labelling any pro-union stances from the 1880s on as ‘proto-syndicalist’. In other words, there was anarchist life outside the terrorism-syndicalism binomial.

The book is well-written. Among other merits, Bantman shows an aptitude for choosing telling quotes that enliven the reading. The layout is pleasant: the text is accompanied by nicely printed and appropriate illustrations and chapters are conveniently subdivided in short subsections. Running to just over two hundred pages, this an accessible book at the same time that it adheres to high scholarly standards.

Davide Turcato

Anarchist Studies 21.2
Martin Baxmeyer, *Das ewige Spanien der Anarchie. Die anarchistische Literatur des Bürgerkriegs (1936-1939) und ihr Spanienbild [The Eternal Spain of Anarchy. Anarchist Literature from the Civil War (1936-1939) and its Representation of Spain]*


‘If the words “national socialism” had not acquired their current dreadful meaning’, wrote Helmut Rüdiger to Rudolf Rocker in July 1936, ‘I would say that the CNT represents a national socialist movement; its connection with the international anarchosyndicalist movement is purely formal’. The complaint by Rüdiger and many other foreign anarchists at their Spanish comrades’ nationalism is corroborated by Martin Baxmeyer’s study in the domain of literary production.

The anarchist literature of the civil war was not the realisation of the cultural utopia in the sense of a new type of free and collective praxis which updated and helped to disseminate anarchist ideologemes. [...] Libertarian civil war literature distanced itself significantly, both formally and in terms of content, from its ideological ‘roots’. Instead, it was closer to pro-Francoist civil war literature, updating nationalist, colonialist and even racist theorems and creating its own Spanish myth. (p. 30)

Over the next 500 pages, Baxmeyer provides evidence for his thesis, first discussing the anarchists’ ideas about literature, then elaborating on the conditions of the production and reception of anarchist civil war literature, and finally analysing the image of Spain presented in such literature. He devotes a single chapter to the question of how a movement’s literary self-representation was able to be transformed so profoundly in such a short period of time. As for possible explanations of the anarchists’ nationalistic representation of Spain, he suggests the propagandistic delegitimation of the enemy; the pressures towards conformity within the republican zone; self-legitimation and the desire for distance from other political factions; the philo-nationalist tradition within the anarchist movement; and the demand for a ‘literatura de combate’ (pp. 478-519).

Readers who are unfamiliar with literary theory or who do not read Spanish will find Baxmeyer’s book difficult in places, but will be compensated by the study’s interesting conclusions and by a very original chapter entitled ‘Anarchism – an attempt at definition’ (pp. 60-89). This is a very good book and one can only hope that it is read widely. Baxmeyer will not always make friends and will not always be
met with understanding, as he discovered at the ESSHC conference in Glasgow. For not only his conclusions but also his question ‘what political consequences could the nationalistic representations of Spain in anarchist civil war literature have for the Spanish anarchist movement’ (p. 524) could easily be interpreted by some dogmatic anarchists as a case of fouling one’s own nest.

*Dieter Nelles, Ruhr University Bochum (Translation from the German by David Berry)*

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**Mark Boyle, *The Moneyless Manifesto***


Mark Boyle has experimented with living outside ‘the monetary economy’ for several years. His first book, *The Moneyless Man*, details his experiences, while *The Moneyless Manifesto* aims to provide a philosophical and practical basis for others wishing to follow his example. Boyle describes himself as a ‘reluctant author’ (p. xxv), inviting readers to shake off the ‘chaff of propaganda [...] and keep whatever grains of truth you find’ (p. xxx). His desire not to patronise is welcome, and his humorous and personable writing style is effective, but his efforts to proselytise are less successful.

The opening four chapters are theoretical, engaging, and even a little anarchist-leaning, with quotes from Chomsky and favourable mentions of Graeber’s *Debt*. However, Boyle’s position is expressed euphemistically – ‘monetary economy’ instead of capitalism, ‘gift economy’ instead of socialism or communalism, ‘transitional strategies’ instead of resistance or revolution – and it seems the book’s agenda is being deliberately obscured behind these ‘fluffy’ terms. This ‘soft sell’ was probably a deliberate choice to appeal to a large audience, but it undermines the weight of Boyle’s arguments.

In short, this is an individualist guide to ‘dropping-out’ (euphemism: ‘living a life of glorious simplicity, freedom and adventure’ [p. 61]), with scant lip-service paid to wider society and collective action. The underlying mind-set of the author is summed up when discussing life ‘off-grid’, which he explains thus: ‘In the event of an apocalyptic scenario that caused all industrialised systems to magically evaporate in an instant (one can dream, can’t one?), I would say the extent to which you were off-grid would be equal to the amount of years you could survive afterwards’ (p. 212). This survivalism sits along with pseudo-Mother-Earth-spiritualism, and primitivism (advocating a drastically reduced human population of hunter-gatherers,
eschewing modern medicine in favour of poultices and herbs etc.), so the book should appeal to fans of Zerzan and Bey – though Boyle’s book is more practically useful than those authors’ output.

The Moneyless Manifesto has been made available to read for free online, is published under Creative Commons licence, and proceeds from hard copies go to Permanent Publications to fund sustainable projects. In other words, Boyle puts his lack of money where his mouth is. This is a refreshing change from some other current ‘radical’ books published through mainstream (profit-motivated) means when other avenues are increasingly available.

Jim Donaghey, Loughborough University

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Gary Chartier, *Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society*


Gary Chartier’s *Anarchy and Legal Order* offers nothing less than a tremendous contribution to contemporary libertarian and anarchist thought. The state, Chartier argues, is not an institution that merely needs a good tune-up like a poorly running car; instead, given its track record of hostility toward ‘peaceful voluntary cooperation’, its very legitimacy needs to be re-thought and ultimately rejected. Chartier’s argument is made plausible and persuasive by his detailed account of how a just legal regime can exist and function within a stateless society. My short critique of *Anarchy and Legal Order* is limited to a central element of Chartier’s proposed just legal regime, his non-aggression maxim (NAM). Chartier maintains that one central element of a just legal regime is that it would uphold the NAM and that, ‘it [the state] is an enemy of the NAM and so of just social order’ (p. 156).

Chartier writes that, ‘the nonaggression maxim (NAM) is the injunction that moral agents should avoid harming the bodies and interfering with the just possessory interests of others’ (p. 45). The NAM, or something akin to it, has found support among the vast majority of classical liberals, libertarian and anarchist thinkers. Chartier is on solid ground with his endorsement of NAM. The trouble with NAM is not its intuitive appeal but instead with specifying what counts as harming the bodies of others or even more challenging specifying what counts as a just possessory interest.
In respect to a just possessory interest over physical objects (excluding the bodies of sentient agents), Chartier outlines a set of baseline possessory rules that allow the first agent to take effective possession over a physical object to become its effective owner and use, exclude others from using, and transfer the object, as they see fit – within the bounds of respecting the just possessory claims and bodies of others (pp. 64-5).

Chartier maintains that these baseline rules of effective possession are justified, in large part, by what he deems the Principle of Fairness. This is a requirement of practical reason that demands we avoid discriminating arbitrarily among those impacted by our actions (pp. 23-7). A paradigmatic case, Chartier cites, where the principle of fairness is violated involves discrimination based upon ethnicity or race (p. 28).

One substantial difficulty with the baseline possessory rules that allow the first possessor of an object to become its just possessor, and in effect its private owner, is that despite Chartier’s claim to the contrary this rule might run afoul of his Principle of Fairness. The reason for this is that temporal order is a good candidate for a morally arbitrary feature. Why should the first be given such privilege when it comes to taking just possession over the world? Clearly not because of anything, in the normal course of events, that the first has done to be first, as such a status is often a matter of luck. It is dubious that rational agents would agree to terms in which agents were conferred with just possession simply by virtue of being first possessor, given that those who do not happen to be first could be left out in the cold, literally. Only those who knew they would be first would likely agree to such a baseline possessory rule, placing doubt on the consistency of such an idea with the principle of fairness that Chartier proposes. Not only do those who take effective possession of a physical object become its just possessor but they may also transfer their justly held possession how they wish and exercise exclusive control over what happens to the physical object. Such terms threaten to create enduring and rampant conditions of social and economic inequality.

One way in which Chartier tempers the above charge is he stresses that it must be a claim of ‘effective possession’ to count as bringing about a just possessory claim. The possession, that is, must be effective and not merely claimed. This prompts Chartier to claim that, ‘a possessory rule will not count as just, will not be consistent with the Principle of Fairness, if (for instance) it denies homesteaders access to land that is unused; and so abandoned’ (p. 85). Chartier, however, never offers a clear or developed picture of what it takes to ‘effectively use’ some physical object and thereby become its just owner. This challenge is by no means insur-
mountable but its address would bolster even further Chartier’s compelling and rich vision of anarchy forged by a just legal regime.

Eric Roark, Millican University


*Nine-Tenths of the Law* starts off with a thorough exploration of the American Indian history of land rights and tracks the various tactics by which the invading colonialists stole land and claimed title. Dobbz then charts acts of resistance over the past 200 years in the USA. Moving into more recent times, she analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the Urban Homesteading movement and assesses the impact of various housing justice groups, noting that Occupy, whilst important, has brought into the spotlight campaigns which in some cases have been in existence for decades. Adverse possession is covered in some depth, with one inspiring case being the example of Steve DeCaprio who has got very close to claiming title to a derelict property in the San Francisco Bay Area. Dobbz then considers housing co-operatives and community land trusts as ways of taking title of property communally and closes with some powerful arguments for a future squatting movement, as part of a more general struggle for housing justice.

There are many fascinating stories. Unfortunately, I only have space to mention just two in brief. Firstly, the Anti-Rent War in Hudson River Valley, New York in the mid-1800s saw bailiffs regularly repelled and in one case forced to buy a round of drinks for everyone. The level of lawlessness (and tendency to wear disguises) seems quite reminiscent of the Guildford Guy Riots, which occurred at a similar time in England. Secondly, I was saddened to read about the state-sponsored assassination of Yoland Ward in 1980. She was a young black activist researching a racist government policy called ‘spatial deconstruction’ which was designed to break up inner-city communities by scattering families across the suburbs.

In the battle for housing justice, squatting is certainly one important method amongst many others. As a direct action tactic it attacks the notion of private property which is a central tenet of capitalism. Recent moves towards criminalisation in the Netherlands and the UK (where squatting is now illegal in residential
properties, and what exactly this means is currently being defined in the courts) show that it is still seen as a threat. And so it should be. As Aneurin Bevan said: ‘Either poverty must use democracy to destroy the power of property or property in fear of poverty will destroy democracy’.

In his back cover review, Alan W. Moore states: ‘if you’re thinking of squatting – or just want to know more about legal theory of property and home ownership – this book is for you’ and I would agree, but (and there’s always a but) I would offer some constructive criticisms as well.

The scale of the book means that it cannot always do individual movements justice. One example would be squatting in Seattle, which is skated over. Another example would be the references to Europe in the introduction, which leave a little to be desired. A direct link is drawn between the battle of the Vondelstraat in Amsterdam in 1980 and the eviction of Ungdomshuset in Copenhagen (2006-2007). Saying ‘Copenhagen saw some of the most destructive and virulent squat-defence riots since the ones in Amsterdam’ (p. 5) made me raise my eyebrows. There are a lot more squat struggles out there than those two, but at the same time, only so much history can be squeezed into one book.

I enjoyed reading Nine-Tenths of the Law and I’m sure I will refer to it again. I agree with Hannah when she says that ‘bewilderingly, few other squatters I have met are interested in this kind of documentation’ (p. 238). In the introduction she comments: ‘I hoped by researching squatters in U.S. history to establish a cultural precedent and by pinpointing the legal conditions and issues surrounding squatting (and other forms of property resistance), I might help’ (p. 10). It is fantastic that she has put so much time and effort into making this book and I really hope it does inspire more people to start squatting in the USA (and everywhere else too).

E.T.C. Dee

Kevin Eady, Uncontrollable


Fictionalised memoirs with anarchist themes are not a new phenomenon. With Uncontrollable, Eady has joined Stuart Christie, author of the recent Pistoleros! trilogy, in attempting to promote a renaissance of the genre. Like Christie, Eady has chosen Spain as the setting for his protagonist, Buenaventura ‘Coco’ García. ‘Coco’
is an uncontrollable; he is an anarchist militant of the CNT who rejects that organisation’s collaboration with the Republican government during the Civil War. Born in Barcelona at the beginning of the ‘Tragic Week’ of 1909, ‘Coco’ moves to Casas Viejas, but is absent when the uprising of 1933 results in a massacre of twenty-two of that ill-fated pueblo’s inhabitants. Exile follows before he returns to Spain and prison, from where he is liberated at the outset of the Civil War by the anarchist militia, the Iron Column, which he joins in their fight against fascism and for libertarian revolution.

Uncontrollable uses the rise and fall of the CNT as the jump-off point for a fast-paced, subterranean history of the twentieth century, incorporating the horrors of totalitarianism and the hippified protest of Dutch provos. Perhaps inevitably, its scope makes it a disjointed, albeit entertaining, affair.

Daniel Evans, University of Leeds

Vittorio Frigerio (ed.), Nouvelles anarchistes: la création littéraire dans la presse militante, 1890-1946


This is a marvellous collection of stories published in the French anarchist press from 1890 until 1946. Vittorio Frigerio has done an excellent job of recovery and given us not only a fascinating collection of stories but also his introduction is a very impressive work of literary scholarship. It is not perfect but the overall merit of the work outweighs its few flaws.

Frigerio gleans fifty-two stories from fourteen different ‘anarchist’ journals. Twelve stories spanning the final decade of the nineteenth century are from Le Libertaire, while L’Anarchie has nine ranging in date from 1905-1926. Thirty-five are from before the First World War, four from the war years, eight from the twenties, four from the thirties, and just one from the final year of 1946. The arrangement of the book is by themes rather than by authors or publications. The themes are ‘The Imaginary of Violence’, ‘The Dream’, ‘Parables and Allegories’, ‘Love and Women’, ‘Parody and Humor’, ‘Slices from Life’ and finally – also my personal favourite – ‘Christmas Tales’. Prominent names such as Émile Armand, Albert Libertad, Mutatuli, Émile Pouget, Han Ryner and Léon Frapié (the winner of the 1904 Goncourt Prize for his novel La Maternelle) are among the forty-two authors in the anthology. Though Libertad has the most entries with five, most
of the rest are represented by a single story. (The great Léo Malet is mentioned as continuing the tradition; however, he is too recent to be included.) Understandably the majority of the authors are French, though the anthology includes authors born in Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. The latter was Benjamin De Casarea who worked on a number of important New York City newspapers and co-founded the Mexican daily El Diario.

The stories themselves are an interesting fictional reflection of the concerns and visions of French anarchists in their press. As with any anthology one can question the criteria, arrangement, the selections and omissions, etc. If these are anything other than mild queries (and mine are intended as such), then such questions are churlish. Frigerio did a great deal of work in collecting what he does give us, especially some in hard to find journals (notably the four stories from the First World War). I came to these questions in writing the review, not reading the volume, which captivated me.

Ultimately, the highlight of this anthology is the introductory essay by Frigerio. A professor of French at Dalhousie University in Canada, he does a very good job of discussing the literary significance of each theme. Frigerio immediately addresses the question of the connection in France between anarchism, literature and writers during the period before the First World War. Examining the same question for Spain at roughly the same period, Clara E. Lida published her 1970 essay ‘Literatura anarquista y anarquista literario’. Lida made the distinction between literature with an anarchist purpose and littérateurs who dabbled in anarchism as ultimately a passing fad, easily discarded. Frigerio makes a similar distinction, and consequently his selected authors are overwhelmingly from the first group: they are writing for a libertarian culture and, ultimately, an anarchist revolution. He does recognise the siren calls that pulled – perhaps too easily – the littérateurs away from the black flag: ‘The call of the Church, of the country in danger, or more prosaically, that of a literary fame – best served by a few items provided to a select audience rather than the dubious appreciation of a proletarian readership – gradually thinned the ranks of anarchist intellectuals’ (p. 9).

Though in a few cases the information on his authors is sparse to non-existent, Frigerio also provides a useful biographical section at the end. I would have liked a similar set of entries for the journals as well, but admittedly this is being greedy. Let me place my other ‘demands’ here as well, the areas where I have some disciplinary concerns with the work. As an historian I would like more historical context in the introduction, especially given the waning fortunes of the movement over the period of the anthology. There is no discussion of readership or audience, circulation, etc. How did the Anglophone authors come to be published in the militant French
press? Do the themes vary over time, is one more popular in a specific historical period? Why?

I place these disciplinary queries here at the end because I truly hope the review’s beginning has convinced the reader of the immense value of the book. If not perfect, Frigerio’s collection is still superb, and recovers an important body of anarchist work that is often forgotten because it is by definition false, fiction. But as an economist friend recently observed upon retiring and going back to school to get an advanced degree in literature, there is often more human truth in fiction than in all the truth of the social sciences. I look forward to more such anthologies, more work of recovery, and thus a more rounded and consequently better understanding of both the diversity and impact of anarchism.

Andrew H. Lee, New York University Library

Note


Antoni A. Kamiński, Michail Bakunin Zycie i mysł [Mikhail Bakunin. Life and thought]


In Poland in 2012 and 2013 two volumes were published of the planned three-volume biography entitled Mikhail Bakunin. Life and thought. The author is Polish philosopher from the University of Economics in Wroclaw, Dr. Antoni A. Kamiński (b. 1947). The work is academic in nature. It is the first Polish academic biography of Bakunin and will probably be the longest biography of him ever published. It is impressive in its remarkable clarity and detail, and the volumes that extend to 736 and 542 pages include a separate life calendar and illustrations.

The author has used sources in several different languages. Among the archival collections, he used both the most important Polish archives and lesser-known local archive collections in Kórnik in western Poland. The foreign archives included draft manuscripts from the Russian State Library. In addition, academic studies, articles,
and memoirs in several languages were used. The bibliography for the two volumes covers 150 pages!

One of the chief academic merits of the work is its discussion of the historiography of Bakunin, to which almost sixty pages are devoted. The author recalls that most biographies have been written by supporters of anarchism. He has determined that documents devoted to Bakunin may be found in about forty archives in different countries (and some of the legacy has disappeared completely). This is not by chance – after all, Bakunin lived in over a dozen countries and was in prison in several, and he wrote in four languages and has been translated into over a dozen. For the non-Polish reader, or even those not from Eastern Europe, one innovation may be the information about Bakunin’s Polish and Russian scientific and political works. Works written from political positions dominate. It was a Pole by birth – Antonina Kwiatkowska – who in 1878 initiated the first biography, never finished due to financial reasons. It should be noted that it was in Poland in 1965 – the first country in the Soviet bloc after the Second World War – that the works of Bakunin were published, as was the study Bakunin and the Contradictions of Freedom by Hanna Temkinowa. Further, a short biography of Bakunin was published in interwar Poland in Yiddish (and another was translated into that language). The author also presents the evolution of Soviet and Russian historiography in the approach to Bakunin, from initial overwhelming interest, which lasted until about 1926, through playing down its historic role, to full rejection in Stalin’s time, a short-term return of interest in the Khrushchev period (from about 1959; the most important Russian-language biographer was Natalia Pirumova) to the re-annihilation in the Brezhnev era and recurrence in interest since the 1990s.

The author has opined that the vastness of his argument is intended to include rectification of various distortions in the literature on Bakunin. Traditional, sound methodology and precision in determining the facts are opposed to ‘postmodern arbitrariness and easy imagination’.

The pre-anarchist life of Bakunin is less known, and has often been underestimated and referred to only as ‘philosophical flirtation’. Bakunin’s influence on the ideological revival in the Russia of the 1820s and 1830s has been underappreciated. In addition to the political factor, this deficit is also due to the small number of Bakunin’s writings before 1848.

The author aims to reconstruct Bakunin’s philosophy, including the tracing of his ‘complicated ideological path’, full of volte-faces and changes, the evolution from religious belief to atheism, and from conservatism to anarchism. His changing political views and philosophical orientation were never accompanied by any form
of denial over the idea of freedom. Dr. Kaminski’s universal themes point to the consistent rejection of the state in all its forms, ‘the pathos of rebellion’ and of course the idea of the liberation of the individual and society. For Bakunin, freedom was equally a philosophical issue, a political slogan and a moral imperative. The author stresses that Bakunin did not consider himself a theorist – he lacked the time and patience – but was an exemplary revolutionary not only because of his ideas, but also by temperament. He stresses that Bakunin both frequented the salons and spoke among the workers. He described the Russian revolutionary as the ‘Sisyphus of revolution’ because ‘there was something of the romantic knight errant about him ... But he never felt the taste of victory’.

The biography is chronological in nature, and each of the volumes corresponds to a specific period of Bakunin’s life. The author considers the first fundamental breakthrough as the year 1848 – the ‘end of philosophical immaturity’. Volume I is titled *From the religion of love to the philosophy of action* (1814-1848) and consists of the following: *Growing up* (1814-1825), *Moscow* (1836-1840), *Germany* (1840-1842), *A Farewell to Philosophy* (1843-1844), and *The Birth of a Revolutionary* (1844-1848). Volume 2 is entitled *Europe’s Arsonist* (1848-1864), and contains the *Springtime of Nations* (1848-1849), *Prisoner in Three States* (1849-1857) *Siberian Exile* (1857-1861), *London* (1862-1863), and *the Polish January Uprising* (1863-1864). The planned Volume III will bear the significant title *Anarchism* (1864-1976).

The reader will certainly find the many details from almost every year of Bakunin’s adult life, such as determining who he met. The author shows the contexts and effects of the various acquaintances of the Russian revolutionary.

Novel, even for Polish readers, is the increased importance of Bakunin’s approach to the Polish question, one of Europe’s most important for revolutionaries in the nineteenth century, which was also Bakunin’s view, especially after 1846. Bakunin himself described Poland as ‘our Ireland’, seeing a symmetry in the question of independence for both countries. Bakunin was the first Russian to openly advocate Polish independence (in fact he argued about the matter with Proudhon). He was ready to fight in the Polish rising of 1863 (which played an important role in the creation of the First International), which aroused genuine enthusiasm among his Polish friends. He also sent a letter to Russian officers fighting against the Polish uprising, and planned to create an anti-tsarist legion of Russian prisoners of war. Bakunin wanted to convince the Poles of the revolutionary nature of Russians. He put forward the idea of the existence of two Russias – the revolutionary and the reactionary, and in that sense he was one of the pioneers in breaking the stereotype of Russia’s reactionary nature. Bakunin’s views during this period
were influenced by contacts with several Poles. He met Poland’s most important poets, Adam Mickiewicz and Juliusz Słowacki, and composer Fryderyk Chopin. The author has drawn attention to the importance of the philosopher and economist August Cieszkowski, eulogist of the philosophy of action. Above all, an important role was played by the progressive historian Joachim Lelewel, famous throughout Europe, who reinforced Bakunin’s commitment to democratic, Slavic and federal ideas. However, relations with the Poles were not idyllic. Poles rejected pan-Slavist concepts (Bakunin himself abandoned them after 1863), fearing their use by Russia (though Bakunin did not see Russia as having a special role in the Slavic alliance), whereas Bakunin feared the strength of Polish Catholicism and ... idleness. In Poland, the name Bakunin was looked upon positively by many left-wing intellectuals, including the forerunner of mainstream democratic socialism Bolesław Limanowski, and a poem in honour of Bakunin was written by the communist-leaning poet Władysław Broniewski. One of the Polish Federation of Anarchist Organisations in the interwar period was named after the Russian revolutionary. Few people today remember that Bakunin advocated independence for the Ukraine (although that name was not yet in use), which is interesting in the context of the power of anarchism in the Ukrainian territories in the first quarter of the twentieth century (in his Dresden period, at some point Bakunin even became a mediator between Poles and Ukrainians).

The author shows the ambivalence of Bakunin’s relationship with Marx – the Russian’s initial fascination with the German theoretician. The book emphasises the permanence of the presence of Hegelian topics. The author outlines the beginnings of Bakunin’s creation of a network of international contacts, which became a stimulus for the beginning of anarchism’s isolation. The author recognises the years 1848-1863 as a transitional stage, key in the evolution of democratic revolutionism towards anarchism, whose background was relevant not only to Bakunin, but to disappointment with the West and the growth of anti-statism and pan-Slavic sympathies.

It is worth mentioning that Bakunin thought about adopting United States citizenship in 1861. The facts cited by Kamiński may also be the inspiration for a might-have-been history, for example, what would have happened if in Bakunin’s 1840 duel with Mikhail Katkov, planned in Berlin, had come to fruition.

Rafał Chwedoruk & Mateusz Batelt, University of Warsaw
Richard Mann Roberts introduces Carlo Pisacane and one of his most significant pieces of writing, *La Rivoluzione*, for the first time to English-speaking readers.

Pisacane (1818-1857), a remarkable figure in the history of Italian unification, is mostly remembered for the dramatic ending of his insurrectionary attempt in Southern Italy in 1857, when he and dozens of his companions were killed by the Bourbon army and the inhabitants they wished to liberate.

As underlined in Roberts’ introduction, translation of writings by the protagonists of the Italian *Risorgimento* has mostly focused on those key figures (Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi and King Victor II) who have also been used as foundation myths for the legitimisation of the new nation-state. Other protagonists such as the federalist Carlo Cattaneo or the social revolutionary Pisacane, who did not properly fit with the rhetoric and narrative of the new state, have been marginalised. Thus, the lack of translated works has made it difficult for readers of the Anglophone world to appreciate the originality and relevance of Pisacane’s thought. Roberts’ translation is a welcome attempt to redress this situation.

*La Rivoluzione* was part of a collection of essays published posthumously between 1858 and 1860 (*Saggi storici-politici-militari sull’Italia*). In these writings Pisacane analysed the causes behind the failure of previous revolutionary attempts and elaborated his views on the nature of the forthcoming revolution. The distinctiveness of Pisacane’s political thought lies especially in his inclusion of libertarian and socialist principles within the struggle for national liberation – principles that sprang from a classist interpretation of Italian history. Indeed, Luigi Fabbri considered Pisacane the sharpest precursor of ‘social revolution’ and the first theoretician of ‘anarcho-socialism’. Influenced by Proudhon and the Italian philosophers Vico, Cuoco and Filangeri, Pisacane argued that the struggle for national unification should aim not merely for institutional change, but for the achievement of political and economic equality through the overthrow and abolition of the class system, property rights and the government: ‘the causes of all society’s evils and dreadful obstacles to human happiness’. According to Pisacane, after the revolution the class system must be abolished and each individual should have ownership of the fruit of his or her own labour. The nation should be organised as a free association of communes, free associations of individuals.
Pisacane’s belief that ‘common people are only convinced by action, not words’ and his insistence on the predominance of action over propaganda and education is another key point developed in *La Rivoluzione*, one which makes Pisacane a forerunner of the ‘propaganda of the deed’ adopted by anarchists few years later.

The translation of *La Rivoluzione* is preceded by a long introduction that provides a summary of Pisacane’s life and thought and places him in historical context. However, this section could have been structured in a more coherent and systematic way; at times it appears rather fragmented and the inclusion of a large section from *La Rivoluzione* makes the text rather cumbersome. Moreover, the introduction would have benefited from much more careful and thorough editing to eliminate the numerous typographical errors, inaccuracies and misspellings. References and footnotes lack consistency and accuracy; on too many occasions works quoted in the text are not referenced. This is a considerable weakness, especially if the book were to be used in the teaching of Modern Italian history at university level. Another considerable flaw is the lack of a bibliography and index. Nevertheless, Roberts deserves praise for having introduced one of the most original figures of the Italian *Risorgimento* to English-speaking readers and scholars.

*Pietro Di Paola, University of Lincoln*

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In 1947 Colin Ward, aged twenty-three and having returned to London after five years as a military conscript, was invited to join the editorial group of the anarchist newspaper, *Freedom*. For the next fourteen years he and the other editors, never more than some half-a-dozen, brought the paper out weekly, writing the bulk of its contents themselves. It is scarcely surprising that, to break from this punishing regimen, he began to urge the case for a monthly, more reflective *Freedom*; and finally his fellow editors responded by giving him his head with *Anarchy* from March 1961, while they continued to bring out *Freedom* for the other three weeks of each month.

Ward had actually wanted his magazine to be called *Autonomy*, but this his traditionalist comrades were not prepared to allow – he had already been described as a ‘revisionist’ and they considered that he was backing away from the talismanic
word 'anarchist' – although his subtitle of *A Journal of Anarchist Ideas* was initially, and now largely redundantly, retained, until ditched from no. 28 by Rufus Segar, the designer of the covers, the subject of the book under review.

118 issues of *Anarchy* were published, the last appearing in December 1970. The content was always distinctive, blending such traditional anarchist preoccupations as progressive education and crime and punishment with Ward’s own interests and enthusiasms: housing and squatting, workers’ control, adventure playgrounds and the like. But the real originality lay in anarchism being seen not as a total system to be implemented sometime in the future – after an anarchist revolution – but as present all around us, in everyday human arrangements, in the here-and-now.

Ward was given complete freedom – or autonomy – by Freedom Press to produce each number entirely by himself, laying it out on his kitchen table. A frequent though not uncritical contributor, Nicolas Walter, was to comment: ‘Colin almost didn’t do anything. He didn’t muck it about, didn’t really bother to read the proofs. Just shoved them all in. Just let it happen.’ (p. 258) Although Ward’s ideal was to produce special issues on single themes, most numbers were not. If a promised article failed to materialise, he would be obliged to write it himself, leading to a profusion of pseudonyms.

Daniel Poyner understands the political and intellectual significance of *Anarchy*, indeed going as far as to reprint from *New Society*, very usefully, ‘Utopian Sociology’, the remarkable appreciation of 1987 by the Marxist historian, Raphael Samuel, reviewing *A Decade of Anarchy*, Ward’s selection of contributions by others than himself to his journal. (I have drawn attention in ‘Colin Ward and the New Left’, *Anarchist Studies*, 19, 2 (2011), pp. 52-3, to the friendship and mutual admiration of Ward and Samuel.) Yet Poyner’s concern is with neither the contents of *Anarchy* nor Wardian anarchism but the magazine’s cover designs. This sumptuous volume lovingly reproduces all of them in colour and in full size, not only each front cover but also the back, since the design frequently spread over the two.

Poyner says one hundred of the covers were the work of Ward’s anarchist friend, Rufus Segar. Anarchic, humorous, often wacky (Segar is) and always eye-catching – until no. 59 black alone or black and red were printed on yellow paper – a contemporary subscriber such as myself awaited each *Anarchy* as much for Segar’s cover as for Ward’s contents. Segar had similar autonomy to Ward’s, as he explains in a long and absorbing interview which Poyner has transcribed for this book. He would never read the contents before they were printed – for Ward would still be throwing them together until the last moment. But ten days before publication he would receive a note of the issue’s theme or otherwise the titles of all the articles. He would then have a week to mull over a design. Each month, on a Tuesday afternoon,
he would work on the cover for twenty-four hours, taking a respite from his full-time job (with the Economist and its Economist Intelligence Unit from 1964). On Wednesday afternoon (or Thursday) he delivered the artwork to the block-maker, Gee and Watson. On Friday he and Ward would receive proofs; and later the same day Freedom Press's Express Printers would get the blocks.

The first Ward would know of the month's cover design was on the Friday. But when there was a special issue on Wilhelm Reich, Segar foolishly sent the proof to the lead contributor, Robert Ollendorff, Reich's brother-in-law, expecting him to appreciate it, but who objected to the irreverence and insisted on the suppression of the design. This, possibly Segar's most brilliant cover, was not published until it was used in 1982 to illustrate Ward's New Society review of the correspondence between Reich and A.S. Neill. Poyner reproduces it now for the first time full-size in Autonomy. It depicts a nude couple, a vast balloon from the man's mouth containing the original German titles of Reich's works and the woman remarking 'Orgasm schmorgasm. How about a good lay?'

Robin Kinross's Hyphen Press publishes books exclusively on design and, particularly, typography. His engagement with anarchism has previously only been with the work of the lifelong anarchist furniture-maker and design theorist, Norman Potter, whose impressive Models & Constructs: Margin Notes to a Design Culture (1990) he selflessly assembled for the author. He has now done both Ward and Segar proud with Autonomy, himself compiling an indispensable ten-page index to all the articles in Anarchy. My only reservation is that, very regretfully, the yellows of Autonomy's reproductions are duller, muddier than the bright and garish yellow of my own pristine set of Anarchy.

David Goodway

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Andy Price, Recovering Bookchin: Social Ecology and the Crises of Our Time

Full disclosure: this reviewer sees Murray Bookchin as one of the greatest minds of the past century, and at the same time recognises that he could – at least in the last fifteen years of his life – be condescending, curt, even arrogant towards those who disagreed with him. Andy Price seems to be of much the same opinion. This volume manages to cover in some depth, and with laudable fairness, the controversies and
the philosophies in only about 250 pages. It fills an important gap in the literature about Bookchin and social ecology, and should be required reading for anyone who cares about the future of anarchism. Murray Bookchin, more than any other thinker, pointed us toward that future.

Few radicals on either side of the Atlantic would have questioned Bookchin’s pre-eminence among living philosophers of anarchism and ecology before 1987. In that year, at a Green gathering in Amherst, Massachusetts, Bookchin delivered a keynote address on the disparities between social ecology and deep ecology – which touched off a battle (‘debate’ is too feeble a word) between those two ideologies that has still today not run its course. Price sets out the arguments on both sides with clarity, though the reader will not doubt which side he is on. Some eight years later, with the publication of *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm*, Bookchin provoked a new controversy over what he saw as a tendency in fin de siècle anarchism towards what he called ’ad hoc adventurism, personal bravura, an aversion to theory oddly akin to the anti-rational biases of postmodernism, celebrations of theoretical incoherence ... ’ Perhaps the choice of the red-flag word *lifestyle* was a poor one – or perhaps, as Price suggests, Bookchin was simply exhausted by eight years of *ad hominem* attacks (not to mention his ill health) and wanted to retaliate in kind. It can’t be denied that Bookchin’s hostile and sardonic attacks on his opponents alienated many who had once admired him – John Clark, L. Susan Brown and many others.

The debate with the deep ecologists was not so much about their view that humans are a ‘cancer’ on the planet, an evolutionary aberration – dangerous though that may be – but more about their frequent racist and heartless remarks (AIDS as a solution to the overpopulation problem, for example). It must be said that Bookchin focused more on these bloopers than on deep ecology theory, which after all is just as nuanced and profound as his own. Price perhaps errs in not giving that philosophy due credit. Still, that is not his purpose; ‘recovering Bookchin’ is his aim. Bookchin did respond to the essential claim of deep ecology, pointing out that equating the ‘self’ with the entire ecosphere is a ‘deadening abstraction’ that tells us nothing about how the human species came to be so ecologically destructive. His analysis of history is a good start towards explaining that wrong turn, though it’s just a start.

A substantial part of the book is a critical look at the flaws in Bookchin’s theories – and there are flaws, as in any comprehensive philosophy. Price concludes that none of these flaws is fatal, but adds that further work needs to be done to develop social ecology and what Bookchin, towards the end of his life, called ‘communalism’. It is to be hoped that Price himself will contribute to that project.
The bottom line: the controversies with the deep ecologists and the so-called ‘lifestyle anarchists’ have obscured the real value of Bookchin’s lifework. Price’s study is a major step towards bringing it back into the light and moving it forward.

Thomas Martin, Sinclair Community College

Film: *Bastards of Utopia*, directed by Maple Razsa and Pacho Velez

Waterville, ME: EnMasse Films, 2010, 56 min.

*Bastards of Utopia* is the story of three young Croatian anarchists (Fistra, Dado and Jelena) struggling to change the world amid the aftershocks of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia. Based on a decade of field work by Harvard-trained anthropologist Maple Razsa and co-director Pacho Velez, the film accurately documents an important period in the history of the Croatian anarchist movement, carefully places warm personal stories in relation to global anti-capitalist struggles, and astutely explores important universal questions. Classified as a documentary educational resource, the film is well suited for courses in subjects ranging from gender, anti-globalisation and social movements to ethnography and anthropology.

Anarchists are usually depicted as aggressive, masked militants who mindlessly cause trouble and destroy property. In contrast, *Bastards of Utopia* provides a more rounded insight into anarchists’ everyday lives and activism, thus providing a balance between the personal and the political, the intimate and the public, the local and the global, the documentary and the critical. The film is organised around a number of central episodes. A smooth story-line provides an excellent background for presenting the best features of the film: small, often brilliant snippets of conversation, actions and everyday activities such as getting arrested at anti-globalist riots and cleaning the kitchen.

Immediately after meeting the protagonists, it is obvious that their relationships with the film-makers are ones of close friendship and solidarity. In the first episode, protagonists and film-makers embark on a journey to Thessaloniki in order to participate in anti-capitalist protests. The film critically analyses their motivations and it soon becomes clear that the protagonists are much more passionate about building social alternatives than about rioting. In the second episode they squatted an abandoned building and established an anarchist free shop. (Those familiar with the
history of local anarchist movements will also notice that this is one of the earliest documented attempts of squatting in Croatia.) Learning the hard lesson that anarchist politics is always personal and that anarchist personality is always political, the film-makers leave Croatia for a couple of months – and return several years later.

In the meantime, the protagonists have developed in different ways. From her squat in London, Jelena places the movement in the global context and concludes that, after the strong tidal wave of protests in the 1990s, the anti-capitalist movement has entered a quiet period. She decides to develop ‘other tactics that are not so spectacular, but are good enough for the moment’. Fistra has remained in Zagreb and joined the precariat. He still practises milder forms of activism such as playing punk music and participating in the Zagreb Anarchist Bookfair, but ‘cannot cause too much trouble anymore’ because of uncertainty over his low-paid job in a factory.

Dado still pushes the old ways. In the last scene, he buys old records from Yugoslav times at the flea market. Bargaining for the best price, the record-seller asserts that Dado only pretends not to have money because ‘he is being recorded by the television’. Dado furiously denies this, yet one cannot avoid the feeling that there is some truth in the record-seller’s words: everyone can critique the society, but only the few can appear in popular films. This is the final scene in the film, and the final step in the domestication of the young anarchists: instead of changing society, they ended up in one or another of its many niches.

As an active member of the Zagreb anarchist scene during the 1990s, I had a difficult time writing this review. Bastards of Utopia successfully transported me into the past. However, my personal feelings about Croatian reality from that period are quite different from the one presented, so I could not help but wonder: was it really so dark back in the day? Has communism really affected us so much? Bastards of Utopia takes the assumptions and perspectives of its protagonists as granted, and offers very little contextualisation. However, it does not claim the right to truth. Instead, it makes us question our own assumptions and perspectives, and reminds us that truth and meaning are always negotiated. In this way, the simple narrative based on the protagonists’ worldviews has become a powerful tool for critical inquiry.

Bastards of Utopia is an important film for Croatia, because it documents a crucial period in its history and explores the sources of wounds that have yet to heal. Deeply rooted in the local context, it draws strong links with global issues and provides another angle for exploring fundamental questions. What is the personal cost of challenging hegemonic social practices? Is it possible to avoid the domestication of one’s ideals and remain a full member of society? Bastards of Utopia is a
sound ethnographic document, a creative vehicle for the critique of contemporary society, and a useful guideline for asking questions about the future. Therefore, I am especially glad that its authors have moved into the neighbourhood and decided to continue their valuable work in the field.

*Petar Jandrić, The Polytechnic of Zagreb*

Duane Rousselle, *After Post-Anarchism*


This is the first title in an imprint of the US post-leftist distributor Little Black Cart for ‘more academic, theory-heavy titles’. *After Post-Anarchism* is certainly the latter (though it deserves more than an academic readership), and if future titles measure up to its quality then there is much to expect from Repartee. This is without doubt some of the best current work in original anarchist theory. This book is small in measurements and not long in word count, but it is very dense and on a high level of abstraction, going well beyond substantive political theory to discuss meta-ethics, post-metaphysics and, well, philosophy.

The ‘after’ moment in the book’s title is not only a clever provocation, but refers to the further development of the post-anarchist discussion. Early post-anarchists may have relied on post-structuralist critiques of ontological essentialism to situate their discourse in relation to a ‘traditional’ anarchist discourse. Since then, however, much of the anarchist ‘canon’ has been re-read as not necessarily essentialist and at times prefiguring post-structuralism. Now, Rousselle seeks to bring this process to fruition by recovering the anarchic negativity which has explicitly or implicitly driven anarchist discussions of ethics, universalism and the subject.

This negativity is probed in the final part of the book through a dialogue between Rousselle’s ‘nihilist anarchism’ (p. 215) and the philosophy of Georges Bataille. To take this negativity to its limit – as with the academic meta-ethical nihilism that Rousselle reviews – is indeed to reject not only epistemological foundationalism and thus universalism (the ‘process’ of ethics), but also the subject as its ontological ‘place’ – and thus meta-ethical models reliant on its more or less stable constitution. Rousselle makes a fairly well-argued case that this negative moment can be found latent even in Kropotkin’s statement of anarchist ethics. He locates it in the meta-ethical backbone of Kropotkin’s substantive ethics, an antagonism to both...
prevailing social-religious mores and to ascendant social Darwinism which is logically antecedent to universalism and scientism.

All this is expounded with informing use of some concepts from Lacan to describe anarchism’s negativity as its nihilistic ‘extimacy’. Happily, Rousselle strikes an excellent balance between readability and the deployment of specialist concepts, offering quite enough context for readers who are not as familiar with post-structuralism. This is highly recommended reading for anyone interested in current philosophy and/or anarchism.

On page 163 Rousselle takes exception to my statement that postanarchism is largely an academic discourse with little currency in the anarchist movement, accusing me of the undefended assumption that anarchist writing should necessarily address itself to activists. My statement was empirical, not evaluative, and I do not hold the latter assumption. Nor do I construct the straw man of ‘activism’, nor do I need to ‘wriggle out’ (p. 164) of being considered a post-anarchist myself: I am sympathetic to it as a philosopher.

But I do think that it remains an important task for philosophy to enact a clever negativity and wrest revolutionary pathways out of its encounter with conceptual constructs and material realities. In this context, a more concerted attempt to theorise trajectories of overshoot and industrial collapse, by post-anarchists and politically engaged post-structuralists more generally, would be a welcome step forward.

Uri Gordon, Loughborough University

Jeff Shantz, Green Syndicalism: An Alternative Red/Green Vision

In this thought provoking book’s stated aim of revisiting the intersections between the radical ecology movement and the labour movement there is much to recommend: that the radical ecology movement needs to revisit the role of the working class in any future project of social transformation; that much radical ecology has thrown the baby of the working class out with the bathwater of failed socialism; and the notion that the working class, so used to living within their own economic and social limits, might be the social class best placed to lead a collective attempt to live within our planetary limits. Difficult to disagree with the first two; and the third is enticing.
And for Shantz, it is through the practice of syndicalism, as understood in its French and Spanish forms, that radical ecologists can re-envision their notions of the working class and bring this group into play in building a workable project of social and ecological transformation.

To test his central claim, Shantz gives us one major case study here: the work of Earth First! (EF!) activist Judi Bari in the so called ‘timber wars’ of Northern California in the late 1980s. In opposing the deforestation of the Redwoods, Bari established the Industrial Workers of the World/Earth First Local 1 group that explicitly reached out to (and drew on the activist experience of) the loggers themselves. At the time, this was a radical departure for a prominent member of EF!, a group which up until that point had equated the loggers with the logging companies, and who had seen both as enemies in the fight to preserve the Redwoods. But Bari suggested that both ecologists and workers would be better served working together, and that ‘the destinies of the forest and of the forest workers were inextricably linked’ (p. 62).

IWW/EF1 soon gained momentum, organising many different actions and swelling in membership. Moreover, its impact on the hegemony of the logging corporations in the forests was undeniable: the alliance that the group suggested was a ‘chilling proposition’ (p. 68) not only for the logging companies but also for local and national law enforcement agencies.

Indeed, this case study is Shantz’s greatest strength. As an examination of both the need for and the potential strength of a collaboration of ecology and labour, it is illuminating. However, the centrality of this case study also highlights all too clearly the weaker elements of this work. Principally, these are two. The first is that this case study comes late in the play: we only get to it in chapter three (and it only lasts for one chapter; much more could have been said here about its success or failure). And before we get there, Shantz attempts to show in Chapters one and two why his case study is necessary: that is, he surveys the literature of radical ecology to argue that, as a whole, it provides no meaningful way to practically enact its project of transformation because of its rejection of class, of the work-based action of the labour movement. But this survey is cursory at best, and its findings as a result are unfair: not all radical ecology followed the EF! line and some were openly critical of that kind of approach (the likes of Bahro, Biehl and Bookchin are all too summarily dismissed here as being cut from the same cloth as EF!).

The second problem is whether or not this main case study, and some of his lesser examples of green syndicalism – in particular, the General Toronto Workers Assembly (pp. 155-58) – allow for his central claim to be substantiated. That is to say, Shantz uses Bari and the Toronto assembly as examples of the continuing
vibrancy of the work-based, syndicalist approach, and how they have aided a green movement that would otherwise remain forever at the level of theory.

However, the mechanics in both examples could just as easily be read in reverse – that is, that in fact the old model of syndicalism only became something more because it embraced the concerns of ecology. Indeed, in both examples, Shantz details how the groups became much more than a group dealing with workplace issues and became more community focused. This, therefore, is not necessarily a restating of the importance of syndicalism, but actually the transcending of it into something much wider.

Still, these problems are not terminal to Shantz’s well-written and highly readable book. Indeed, he contributes well here to the ongoing discussion of the relationship of red to green.

Andy Price, Sheffield Hallam University

Davide Turcato, Making Sense of Anarchism: Errico Malatesta’s Experiments with Revolution, 1889-1900


Despite a recent surge of interest in the history of anarchism, scholars still face several obstacles when attempting to conduct research on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anarchists. These include both historiographical misrepresentations and significant research hurdles: anarchist security-culture transcends geographic and linguistic borders and makes anarchists especially slippery subjects of study. However, despite these issues, progress in anarchist studies is being made by researchers such as Davide Turcato. Turcato’s most recent publication, Making Sense of Anarchism: Errico Malatesta’s Experiments with Revolution 1889-1900, represents a major methodological step toward grappling with this ‘classical’ period of anarchist history. In his dense but readable 250-page volume, Turcato provides a persuasive re-reading of anarchist ideas and actions that highlights the often misunderstood continuity of the anarchist tradition, the often ignored rationality and evolution of anarchist theory and the nearly invisible transnational character of anarchist networks. Turcato’s book is thus something of a clarion call to historians of anarchism, providing both great insight into Malatesta’s life and evolving political thought and delivering a resounding evisceration of the
old stereotypes of anarchists perpetuated by authors such as James Joll and Eric Hobsbawm.

To address the troubled historiography of anarchism Turcato employs what he calls ‘methodological charity’, an approach that begins with the assumption that the anarchists’ actions were guided by reason and then seeks to interpret behaviour patterns as meaningfully as possible. For Turcato, this means that ‘anarchist rationality, instead of being an empirical assertion to be demonstrated, becomes not only a methodological principle of interpretation, but also a heuristic principle, to be used in attempting to pierce through the deceptive appearance of anarchist action’ (p. 12). This ‘charitable approach’ to history proves to be extremely useful when analysing events associated with Errico Malatesta, such as the 1891 May Day riots in Rome, the 1892 Jerez uprising in Spain, and the 1894 insurrection in Carrara. By starting off with the assumption of rationality, Turcato is able to reveal hidden motives and connections often overlooked by historians who have all too often relied on emotive and irrational explanations for anarchist behaviour. Turcato also compares Malatesta’s anarchist theory with non-anarchist ideas from the social sciences, such as the work of Karl Popper, Robert Nozick, F.A. Hayek, Mancur Olson and Karl Marx in order to display the robust flexibility and coherence of anarchist thought, thereby dispelling the illusion of anarchist simplicity that has misguided generations of historians.

Turcato argues that historians have failed to accurately understand the history of anarchism because they employed a methodological nationalism that obscured the transnational character of the anarchist networks. When Malatesta and his companions are analysed from a transnational-network perspective, distant locations become ‘part of the same large Anarchist map’, revealing a geographic continuity often denied or overlooked in ‘national’ anarchist histories (p. 47). Unlike formal organisations, networks are particularly elusive subjects because their nodal structure has ‘no fixed configuration, no articulation of centre versus periphery or top versus bottom and information had no fixed direction’ (p. 47). This kind of complexity allowed militant anarchist organisations to survive, despite international persecution. However, until recent works such as Turcato’s, this security culture also made the anarchists exceedingly difficult to study and thereby warped the historiography of anarchism.

Thus, Turcato’s impeccable research and generous interpretations not only add new levels of detail and complexity to our knowledge of Errico Malatesta’s revolutionary life but his methodological approach allows for historically enriching contextualisation and intellectually exciting analysis. This has the additional benefit of demonstrating the strength of anarchist theory in comparison with major
strands of both progressive and conservative political thought. As such, Davide Turcato’s groundbreaking book deserves to be read not only by scholars interested in anarchists and anarchism but, also, by the twenty-first century’s digitally networked activists who find themselves moving across national borders, contributing to and learning from the battles of fellow rebels from different countries, and struggling as Malatesta and his fellow anarchists once did, in the direction of human freedom and solidarity.

Andrew Hoyt, University of Minnesota
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