Engaging Foucault

Volume 1

edited by
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Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
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Contents

Introduction   vii

Foucault’s Understanding of Critique and Modernity

Sanna Tirkkonen
SUBJECT AND “ANOTHER KIND” OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY    12

Goran Gaber
THE TWO ENLIGHTENMENTS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT    24

Lazar Atanasković
FOUCAULT: ON THE TRAJECTORY OF THE QUESTION: WAS IST DER MENSCl? 33

Jiyoung Ryu
“How Thought Can Reside Elsewhere Than Here”: Spatiality of Thought in The Order of Things 47

Balázs Berkovits
FOUCAULT, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE    58

Foucault’s Concept Of Power

Jernej Kaluža
THE ANARCHY OF THE CONCEPT OF POWER    71

Duško Petrović
POWER AS THE POWER OF/OVER LIFE    82

Marco Checchi
ENGAGING WITH FOUCAULT’S MICROPHYSICS OF POWER THROUGH THE PRIMACY OF RESISTANCE    96

Katarina Peović Vuković
RELIGIOUSLY DEVOTED TO POWER: FOUCAULT AND TECHNOLOGY    112

Kushtrim Ahmeti
MICHEL FOUCAULT-IN-BETWEEN ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND GENEALOGY OF POWER    121

Political Challenges Derived From Foucauldian Methods

Izidor Barši and Aleš Mendiživec
FOUCAULT’S INVESTMENT: A NEW POLITICAL PRACTICE    128

Alpar Losoncz and Vladimir Gvozden
FOUCAULDIAN METHODS OF IAN HACKING    141
Florian Geisler and Alex Struwe
THE DIALECTICAL CHALLENGE OF BIOPOLITICS: ON THE EPistemological BREACH BETWEEN FOuCAULT AND MARXISM | 155

Dario Altobelli
UTOPIA AND THE ARCHIVE. SOME REFLECTIONS ON ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE UTOPIAN THOUGHT | 168

Conor Heaney
THE ACADEMIC, ETHICS AND POWER | 185

Requestioning The Ethical Subjectivity

Kerem Eksen
FOUCAULT’S “SPIRITUALITY” AND THE CRITIQUE OF MODERN MORALITY | 202

Alenka Ambrož
FOUCAULT’S ETHICS: ENGAGING ANTIQUITY | 208

Fabian Voegeli
TECHNIQUES OF THE SELF IN VIEW OF POTENTIALITY | 215

Introducing Experience Into Philosophical Practices

Amadeusz Just
IS THERE ANY OTHER SIDE OF DISCOURSE? CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE IN FOuCAULt’S EARLY WRITINGS | 230

Vincent Garton and Eugene Yamauchi
EVENT AND DISCURSIVITY: ON FOuCAULt’S CONCEPTION OF SINGULARITY | 242

Janos Robert Kun
THE CRUMBLED BODY OF UNREASON | 257

Sigrid Hackenberg
PARAFOuCAULt PARAFLCTIONS | 263
Introduction

This volume comes as an published outcome of the Engaging Foucault international conference which was organized by the Group for Social Engagement Studies (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory) in December 2014. The main aim of the conference was to open space for a general discussion of the actuality of Foucault’s work. During the conference we had many opportunities to see just how much legacy of the French philosopher still remains rich and vibrant. But perhaps more importantly, the presentations that we heard – and now have an opportunity to read–also proved that contemporary interpretation of Foucault try to (re)emphasize practical applicability and political implications of his philosophical insights. These new tendencies in interpretation prove to be all the more important if we have in mind the conventional rendition of Foucauldian thought as being “nihilistic” and devoided of any social hope.

In that sense, the authors of this volume tried to offer many ways in which we could (re)think “Foucauldian engagement.” Following his somewhat overlooked cues, they tried to combine theory “that has political meaning, utility and effectiveness” with the “involvement with the struggles taking place with the area in question”. 1 Throughout the volume, in different connotations, we repeatedly hear the question of what we as theoreticians do, or should do. Do we play the role of prophetic intellectuals who think instead of others, prescribe objectives and means, and tell people what they should believe and ought to do? Or can we join in Foucault’s dream of an intellectual “who incessantly displaces herself, doesn’t know exactly where she is heading nor what she’ll think tomorrow because she is too attentive to the present”?2 This question is related to how we do things as well. Do we collaborate with practitioners, in order to modify the institutions and practices we theorize about, which also allows for the possibility of the thought itself being reshaped in this process?3

In other words, the contributions in this volume suggest that (Foucauldian) social engagement should be about production of communities, however transient and mobile they are, and not about the production of foes. If we follow Foucault this is imperative not because of inherent belief in the goodness of the world or human nature. “What is good is something that comes through innovation. The good does not exist, like that, in an a-temporal sky, with people who would be like the Astrologers of the Good, whose job is to determine what is the favorable nature of the stars. The good is defined by us, it is practiced, it is invented. And this is a collective work.”4

First chapter of the volume entitled Foucault’s Understanding of Critique and Modernity will try to provide insight both into Foucault’s notion of critique and his relation towards modern philosophy. In the first contribution of the chapter, Sanna Tirkkonen points out that the political aspects of Foucault’s work is best seen in his theoretical objective to study precisely those practices that do not only constitute the objects of knowledge, but also create new forms of subjectivation. According to her interpretation, in Foucault’s work critique emerges as a particular kind of reflective activity in which we question both

1. Foucault, Questions on Geography, in Power/Knowledge, 64.
2. Foucault, Questions on Geography, in Power/Knowledge, 64.
3. What is called punishing, 384
ourselves and the world around us. Tirkkonen therefore concludes that Foucauldian critique can best be summarized as an art of voluntary, reflected insubordination.

Although somewhat differently framed, Goran Graber’s paper comes to a similar conclusion. Starting with problematical status that Enlightenment has in Foucault’s work – primarily in regards to Kant’s views on this subject – Graber emphasizes the importance of distinction theoretical/practical in modern philosophy which would go beyond the never-fulfilled promise of the objectivity of scientific discourse and the everlasting dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness of our practical activity.

In the third paper of this chapter, Lazar Atancković reflects on the relation between early Foucault’s works and Kant’s anthropology. He points out that Foucault’s analysis of this aspect of Kant’s thought shows both “empirico-transcendental-confusion” (regarding the anthropological question Was ist der Mensch?) and fundamentally different structure that could resolve this confusion.

In his contribution, Jiyung Riu also focuses on Foucault’s reflection on Kant’s anthropology. The author claims that what Foucault sees as important in Kant’s text is the idea of that finitude is more constitutive for our knowledge than its limitations. This is why Riu finds that for Foucault the central theme of knowledge is the notion of finitude which in turn brings us to the question of „spacialty of thought“.

In the last contribution of the chapter, Balascz Berkovitz tries to show some of the advantages that social critique would have if it was based on Foucault’s genealogical method. In order to show how we could criticize the construction of the “abnormal individual”, Berkovitz introduces a distinction between two features in Foucault’s nominalist method.

Second chapter, Foucault’s concept of Power consists of five papers which focus on Foucault’s complex understanding of power. The chapter starts with the contribution of Jernej Kaluža. His main theoretical question is how we can explain hierarchical nature of power if we have in mind that Foucault regards it as “net-like” structure. Using Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s notion of care for oneself, Kaluza tries to show that not all power relations are the same.

Duško Peterović in his paper argues that Foucault’s understanding of power as a relation is derived from his notion of biopower, not vice-versa. Petrović also argues that biopower is just one historical form of power.

Marco Checci in his contribution focuses his attention on affirmative aspects of resistance within Foucault’s power/resistance relation. According to Checci, resistance needs to be assumed as confronting power relations not only through concrete practices, but also through its multiple possibilities.

On the other hand, Katarina Pejović-Vuković contemplates the ways in which main Foucault’s conceptions should be (re)interpreted in light of change from centralized to decan- talized technology which occurred after Foucault’s death.

In his paper, Kuštrim Ahmeti analyzes the productive role of Foucauldian methods of archeology and genealogy, and also tries to show how poltization of all aspects of life unmask and challenge hidden power relations.
Main aim of the third chapter, titled *Political Challenges Derived From Foucauldian Methods* is to offer (re)consideration of Foucauldian methods of direct political practice and strategy for action. The chapter opens with Izidor Barsi’s and Aleš Mendiževčev’s paper in which he argues that Foucault understanding of power cannot be properly understood if its political investment is left unexplained.

In their contribution, Alpar Losoncz and Vladimir Gvozden focus on Foucault’s influence on Ianc Hacking. They try to investigate interconnection between Foucauldian horizon in which “people are being created” and economic relations in capitalism. Losoncz and Gvozden argue that there are reasons that explain the fact that the capitalist markets are intrinsically policized: Foucault’s genealogical account sheds light on the intertwining of policy and market. Foucault is to be exposed to critique when (implicitly) accepts the liberal self-understanding of the modern economy as the spontaneous results of the interest-based interaction of economic agencies. Following this critique, the authors pay attention to Hacking’s assertion that there is a link between the expanding experiences of indeterminatedness and the need of control by statistics and in turn put emphasis on the relevance of this connection in regards to the process of “creating people” in capitalism.

Alex Struwe and Florian Geisler on the other hand debate the importance of Marxian thought for contemporary understanding of Foucault. Based on their reading of Althusser, they argue that a dialectical engagement of Foucault’s notion of biopolitics can overcome “chasm” between epistemologies of materialism and discourse analyses.

Dario Altobeli in his contribution focuses his attention on the constitutive role of utopian thought in Foucault and argues how this reading is crucial for overcoming discursive boundaries and opening the critical potential of his thought.

In the last contribution in this chapter, Conor Heaney analyzes the position of intellectuals in the neoliberal society, and points out some important practices of self-transformation that could be carried out within academic institutions. Namely, through a connective reading of Foucault’s work on governmentality and his later work on the “care of the self”, Heaney tries to isolate writing and friendship as two potential micro-practices of resistance in academic practice. Both practices, he claims, contain a double movement comprising the subject’s refusal of objectification in the neoliberal regime of truth, and a transformative and experimental transfiguration of the self through those practices.

The fourth chapter, *(Re)quisitioning The Ethical Subjectivity* consists of three papers which deal with Foucault’s relation towards ethics and technics of subjectivization. Authors consider these notions in a wide time frame stemming from antiquity to contemporary problems. In the first contribution, the main thesis of Karim Eksen is that Foucault’s work can be used as viable alternative insight into modern ethical problems. Eksen argues that Foucault’s work has very useful conceptual tools through which “code-based morality” can be analyzed primarily as a central “dispositif” that regulates the modalities in which the self relates to the world, to others and to itself.

Alenka Ambrož analyses Foucault’s understanding Greek and Roman technics of self. She stresses the importance of change in perspective that Foucault makes; namely, subject’s relationship towards the truth in antique is not based on pure scientific knowledge, but rather on moral subjectivization. The access to truth is no longer perceived as an indifferent scientific procedure that could be separated from spirituality and practices of self-
transformation. She argues that this change of perspective could have emancipatory effects, since the techniques of the self are represented as tools in the struggle against identities imposed to us by power relations.

Fabian Voegli in his paper analyzes the temporal configurations of ancient techniques of the self as laid out in Michel Foucault’s lecture Hermeneutics of the Subject and on the other hand neoliberal entrepreneurial ones in light of Giorgio Agamben’s conception of potentiality and its relation to actuality. He finds that the emancipatory potential of self-techniques must take into account “genuine messianic temporality”, which cannot be explicitly found in Foucault or Agamaben account of technics of the self.

The last chapter named Introducing Experience Into Philosophical Practices consists of four contributions which emphasize the importance of experience in Foucault philosophy. In the first paper, Amadeus Just is interested in Foucault concept of “prediscursive” experience found in his early writings. He argues that this kind of experience enables us to reject all interpretations of Foucault’s thought, which draw a picture of discourses overwhelming and penetrating society.

In their contribution to the volume, Vincent Garton and Eugene Yamushi in a original and dialogical manner debate the notion of singularity from both Foucauldian and Kripkean position.

Janos Robert Kun in his paper focuses Foucault’s understanding of human body. Kun argues that for Foucault the body is on the one hand the surface upon which normative rules and the consequences of punishment are inscribed, and on the other, the body could be seen as a container of an ever-changing nosographic encyclopedia. In his analyses he is primarily interested to explore where and how the human body becomes one with the political entity of man,

Sigrid Hackenberg in her contribution “parafoucault/ parafictions usues Foucalut’s notion of parasitic discourse in which “fictions” is a means of activating an aleatory practice in philosophy.

Adirana Zaharijevć
Igor Cvejić
Mark Losoncz
Foucault’s Understanding of Critique and Modernity
Subject and “Another Kind” of Critical Philosophy

Introduction

In the Howison Lecture at Berkeley 1980 Foucault explains the political dimension of his research concerning technologies of the self. Foucault defines technologies of the self as those operations by which individuals have an effect on their own way of being and thinking, on their body and conduct (Foucault 2001b). These technologies can be carried out by the individual or with the help and benevolence of others, and their objective is to transform the individual whether the aim was to find happiness, wisdom, peace of mind, purity or perfection (Foucault 2001b: 1604). Foucault writes in the footnote of the lecture:

“I mean an analysis that relates to what we are willing to accept in our world, to accept, to refuse, and to change, both in ourselves and in our circumstances. In sum, it is a question searching for another kind of critical philosophy. Not a philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves.”

(Foucault 1993: 224)

In this article I will ask what is this “another kind” of critical philosophy and take a closer look at the aspects this short passage entails. One of Foucault’s objectives is to study practices that do not only constitute the objects of knowledge but also new forms of subjectivation. These include self-conceptions that serve established hierarchies and systems of behavioural expectations. In this continuous process desubjugation is, however, possible through critical activity. The quote above suggests that this reflective activity is a question of transforming both ourselves and the world around us. Investigation of technologies of the self is perhaps more topical today than ever as we are continuously encouraged to adopt patterns of thought which motivate us to be more effective, competitive and flexible for the sake of our own happiness in order to adapt to existing norms and economically driven discourses. My approach is strictly philosophical as I will show how the study of techniques is tied to the critical project theoretically.

The passage above opens up various possible, large fields of investigation which I will only briefly grasp. Instead of trying to cover everything that is different from Foucault’s thought or attempting to identify all possible aspects of these lines of thought, I will read the pas-
sage through texts which support my point of view. The most important sources of this article are Foucault’s “What is Critique?” and Judith Butler’s commentary “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”. My first point is that in the passage above Foucault explains the political significance of his ethics and investigation of technologies of the self. I will tie ethics of the self to the political sphere through the concepts of ‘government’ and ‘conduct’. Secondly, Foucault speaks of seeking the limits and conditions of knowledge, which undoubtedly refers to Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. The notion of not seeking to determine these conditions has, however, a Nietzschean twist: we should not accept the limits of possible knowledge without calling them into question. And thirdly, in the passage Foucault refers to self-transformation. Just prior to this passage Foucault adverts explicitly to Martin Heidegger’s concept of tekhnē, or even to his “obsession with tekhnē”, which to Heidegger is the only way to understand objects. Foucault wants to turn the question around and ask, what the techniques are that form our comprehensions of the subject. Techniques refer to very concrete actions and practices that require knowledge of their application (Foucault 1993: 224). In “What is Critique?” critique is characterized as a subject’s right to question the relationship between truth and power. In the Lectures on the Will to Know Foucault refuses, however, the sceptic notion that there would be no truth. In the end of the article I will ask where does the subject anchor her own truth in the constantly moving relations of power and knowledge?

Critique and Judgment

In the essay “What is Critique?” critique is defined in the context of analysing governmentalization (Foucault 1997b: 28). The concept covers everyday practices of individuals in intensified subjugation processes. They are always linked to the production of truth. Foucault defines “governmentality” (gouvernementalité) as the point in which techniques of the self and techniques of domination intersect (Foucault 2001b: 1604). In his late thought Foucault investigates the variety of associations between the arts of governing others, letting oneself to be governed, and the arts of governing the self through daily conduct. The word “governing” is at times used interchangeably or at least associated with the word “conduct”, which is introduced in the lecture series Security, Territory, Population (Foucault 2007: 193; Foucault 2001c: 1539; Foucault 1997b: 29). “Conduct” covers the meanings of the activity of conducting, the ways in which a person conducts oneself, lets oneself to be conducted, is conducted, and the actual behavior as the effect of conducting (Foucault 2007: 193). This actually renews Foucault’s depiction of power relations by adding the word “conduct” in the definition. Power relations are then defined as “strategic games between liberties—in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be controlled or try to control the conduct of the others”¹ (Foucault 2001c: 1547).

¹."[Il] faut distinguer les relations de pouvoir comme jeux stratégiques entre des libertés—jeux stratégiques qui font que les uns essaient de déterminer la conduite des autres, à quoi les répondent en essayant de ne pas laisser déterminer leur conduite ou en essayant de déterminer en retour la conduite des autres” (Foucault 2001b: 1547).
“Governing” and “conduct” are both tied to certain type of critical reflection. In “What is Critique?” the arts of governing are always accompanied by arts of “not being governed quite so much” (Foucault 1997b: 29). They can for example take the form of questioning the truth of influential texts, they can be legal and ask where are the limits of the rights to govern, or they can question the truths of an authority (Foucault 1997b: 30-31). As governing and conduct take place in the movement of a whole set of relations between knowledge, power and the subject, this movable space is also where critique emerges. Foucault defines critique as “a movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth” (Foucault 1997b: 32). Before addressing questions concerning formation of the subject I will take a look at the movement that is involved.

Describing the subject’s movement of not wanting to be governed Foucault introduces the notion of Aufklärung, or Enlightenment, which encompasses encouragement to know and appeal to rise above the state of minority. Aufklärung marks a specific relation to present moment and its reflection. If previously the present moment was seen as separate from past by a dramatic event, a heralding sign of future events, or a point of transition into a new world, Aufklärung is none of these, but described as a task or as “a way out” (Foucault 1997c: 304-305). Foucault equates Aufklärung with his own definition of critique (Foucault 1997b: 34). It must be noted that Foucault speaks of critical attitude, not of Critique in the strict Kantian sense which would refer to the investigation of the conditions of knowledge in order to set up the limits we could not exceed.

Foucault notes that the modern conception of the subject is characterized by a split between freedom and constraint, and to him this problem has a Kantian origin. He even states that we are all Neo-Kantians. Judith Butler points out in her essay on Foucault’s “What is Critique?” that Foucault makes critique distinct from judgment and calls for a practice that suspends judgment (Butler, internet). Foucault’s relation to Kant is ambiguous, but in my view this notion posits Foucault’s definition of critique in the wider context of political philosophy. The distinction between critique and judgment draws a contrast especially to Hannah Arendt’s political thought. Foucault’s refusal to operate with the Kantian concept of judgment provides also an angle to take a look at the concept of aesthetic. Butler does not actually mention Arendt’s political philosophy at all, but Arendt is the one who reflects on the interrelations between political sphere and freedom, and who—just like Foucault—discusses with Kant alongside Thucydides, Socrates and Plato. Compared to Foucault the conclusions are, however, very different. To formulate her political philosophy Arendt turns to Kant’s notion of judgment in the Third Critique. Schematically, if Kant’s First Critique investigated the conditions of knowledge and the Second Critique the domain of freedom, the Third Critique combines these by the notion of judgment. Arendt writes:

“The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement [...] such judgment must liberate itself from the “subjective private conditions”.

(Arendt 1993: 220)
In this way Arendt makes a distinction between privately held opinions, which lack “all validity in the public realm” and political activity. Arendt stresses the public quality of taste judgments, and the notion of aesthetic is tied to aesthetic judgment explicitly in a Kantian manner. She thinks that on one hand judgments are open to discussion, because beauty is presupposed to generate pleasure which is shared by others, but on the other hand agreement is expected. Arendt writes that taste judges the world in appearance, and this “world” is not merely an individual’s experience of it, but indeed shared with others. Moreover, Arendt believes that taste is disinterested: moral interests concerning the self are not of a primary concern here (Arendt 1993: 222). Foucault, by contrast, does not make such distinction between private and public. The aesthetic realm refers to whole existence in its tiniest detail, the whole way of being and constitution of the self. Compared to Foucault, Arendt’s concept of appearance is innocent: when we perceive and discuss about the shared world she assumes it happens without interests. Needless to say, Foucault does not expect consensual agreement or presuppose neutral or objective deliberation. This does not mean, however, that Foucault would make all shared, future-oriented goals impossible as Richard Rorty has claimed (Rorty 1992: 329-331). People can surely come together for a cause or for example resist domination by making strong bonds in the form of friendship (Foucault 1997a: 136). All in all, critique is not a concept for seeking and finally reaching agreement in communication; it is rather a way out of a pre-established social and political situation, and that which is known to us. Moreover, it holds a personal commitment and in that sense “private” character, because it has to do with our day-to-day existence.

Critique as Virtue and Tekhnē

Judith Butler points out that Foucault replaces the idea of resistance by the notion of virtue (Butler, internet). He defines critique as virtue, but also as an art (tekhnē) (Foucault 1997b: 25; 32). Foucault explicitly declares that revolution has been in the way of recognizing the mechanisms of power and spreading this critical attitude. Butler writes that critique is an art to Foucault which means that it is not a single act. Art and critique are not determined in advance, and they are not merely subjective (Butler, internet).

Aristotle actually makes a distinction between arts and virtue: tekhnē is an art or a skill of any kind, whereas virtues are divided into intellectual and moral ones, and the latter has to do with the good character (EN: 1103a15). Foucault and Butler do not really care about the distinction, but what is important here is that both, art and tekhnē, are acquired through constant practice. Aristotle writes: “[T]he virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well” (EN: 1130a). Foucault does emphasize that critique is reflected, and even more precisely it is “an art of voluntary, reflected insubordination” (Foucault 1997b: 32). This means that critique is well-thought disobedience. In the essay “What is Enlightenment?” the critical attitude has converted from virtue and art into ēthos, a deep-rooted habit, which comprises the way of being in its entirety (Foucault 1997c: 309). Care of the self is then both ethical and political conduct that forms the way of being of the individual. Political role of the care of the self lies in the practice of freedom—intertwinement of (self)control and creation—which limits the excessive use of power (Foucault 2001c: 1535).
As critique is the voluntary act of deciding not to be governed in certain ways, Foucault accompanies his methodology with strategy: we must have an adequate picture of what only replicates the same procedure we are trying to question and what actually transforms it (Foucault 1997b: 58). Archaeology refers to the investigation of instances of discourses that articulate ways of thought, and genealogy separates out the possibilities of no longer thinking and being as we have before (Foucault 1997c: 315). Then the dimension of strategy in “What is Critique?” is tied to an active process which Foucault calls eventualization. We can show that an issue or practice we are dealing with and wish to call into question stands on an unstable foundation. By doing so we can point out that it is merely an event whose disappearance is just as possible as its existence (Foucault 1997b: 59). Foucault’s research questions are thus twofold: on one hand the task is to find out how singularities are formed according to the conditions of acceptability in a certain field of interactions and overlapping strategies of knowledge and power. But on the other hand we should find out what makes these, perhaps permanent-looking, fixations fragile and temporary (Foucault 1997b: 60). If Kant rejects the possibilities of exceeding the limits, we must ask what makes contingent and singular those things that now are seen as universal and necessary. This is what Foucault calls “a limit attitude” (Foucault 1997c: 314).

In a similar vein Foucault reflects the relationship between the attitude of Aufklärung and Critique as the investigation of the conditions of knowledge. Their co-existence raises, however, a problem: if critique consists in knowing the limits of our knowledge, how can this simultaneously existing attitude encourage us to look and act beyond them? Foucault states that there is a gap between these two even if he points out that he is not trying to demonstrate the opposition between Kant’s critical project and Aufklärung. Even if a distinction is made between them, they are not opposites. Foucault sees that in Kant’s Critiques obedience and autonomy are combined just as much as they are in Kant’s essay on Enlightenment. Nevertheless, this is just as well problematic. Kant suggests that by exercising critical reflection and knowing one’s own limits one also understands to obey: one posits oneself autonomously under the command to obey regardless of the authorities (Kant 1997: 17; Foucault 1997b: 35). Foucault sees, however, that in the end Kant’s attempt is to desubjugate the subject. Critique asks to which extent one can know, and also Aufklärung is embedded in the question of knowledge. According to Foucault, Kant promotes the task and obligation to know knowledge (Foucault 1997b: 36). Critique is possible when knowledge has got an adequate understanding of itself (Foucault 1997b: 61).

The conclusion that we should know knowledge raises further another suspicion that all this use of reason would take the form of rationalization which is related to excessive use of power (Foucault 1997b: 38). Foucault sees that historically speaking the French have too much confidence in revolution and resistance which has reduced critical thinking in terms of rationalization and techniques that are used to govern individual lives. According to him German critical theory, and even the phenomenologists who Foucault so fiercely criticizes throughout his career, have taken these questions more seriously. They have been aware of Aufklärung and the problems it provokes. Hence, at this point Foucault refers, very briefly, to Edmund Husserl’s thought in a completely new light—to describe the necessary critique of the relationship between knowledge and techniques, or tekhnē and rationalization (Foucault 1997b: 39).
The question that Foucault raises here is actually an old one. It is a question of change we can already recognize in the *Order of Things*. The question is: how can change take place, and more precisely, how can something emerge from something that is altogether different? For a phenomenologist the question is about meaning: how can meaning rise out of nonsense? Here the question is how excessive use of power can be born out of the use of reason (Foucault 1997b: 41). Timothy O’Leary suggests that there is always something that forms an outside in Foucault’s though: madness for instance is set opposite to reason, and thus it is excluded (O’Leary 2009: 81). O’Leary writes that in the 1970s to Foucault the outside of thought takes place in the ruptures of resistance, and the sources of force are found in the body. In the 1980s, however, this strangeness of the outside is found folded within the subject. O’Leary thinks that by looking at this folding we find the potential for change. If there is such a thing as the outside, it cannot be, however, anything permanent or universal in its existence (O’Leary 2009, 85). In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault stresses further that we must move beyond this inside-outside distinction and see other alternatives than choosing simply between them (Foucault 1997c: 315).

Besides acknowledging the problematic relationship between reason and tekhnē, there is also another connection to Husserl in Foucault’s genealogical project. In the last lecture series *The Courage of Truth* Foucault constructs a genealogy of critical expressions and a genealogy of the undefined, open tasks which are found for instance in the thought of the Cynics. Revolutions are usually seen as one-time events, but critical work is an infinite task. A philosopher’s éthos consists in the task of ongoing critique. It is actually Husserl who is better known as “the philosopher of infinite tasks”, and he also finds this attitude in antiquity. Husserl describes in “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man” (1935), known as the Vienna lecture, the philosophical attitude which emerged among the Greeks:

> “With the appearance of Greek philosophy, however, and with its first definite formulation in a consistent idealizing of the new sense of infinity, there occurs, from this point of view, a progressive transformation that ultimately draws into its orbit all ideas proper to finitude and with them the entire spiritual culture of mankind. [...] Scientific culture in accord with ideas of infinity means, then, a revolutionizing of all culture, a revolution that affects man’s whole manner of being as a creator of culture. It means also a revolutionizing of historicity, which is now the history of finite humanity’s disappearance, to the extent that it grows into a humanity with infinite tasks.”

(Husserl, internet)

Husserl’s revolutions are not singularities, but tied to continuous, infinite tasks. The English translation misses the following point, but Foucault writes that the Cynic way of being is not only a virtual attitude or a state of mind, but undefined or endless work on oneself (*travail indéfini sur soi-même*) which is actual and tangible, fully tied to material reality (Foucault 2009: 238). With the Cynic, Foucault’s emphasis is on the continuous work on the self that includes a public aim of making visible those norms which are so self-evident that they are

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2. "You can see that the typical poverty of the Cynic life is not the virtual poverty of an attitude [...] It is a real poverty of dispossession, an indefinite poverty endlessly at work (*travail indéfini*) on oneself." (Foucault 2011: 258). "Vous voyez, la pauvreté caractéristique de la vie cynique n’est pas une pauvreté virtuelle... C’est une pauvreté effective de dépouillement, une pauvreté indéfinie en travail indéfini sur soi-même" (Foucault 2009 : 238).
otherwise difficult to see. I will now return back to the passage in the fourth note of the Howison lectures to see how tekhnē and reflection, or the task to engage with philosophical thought, are further connected.

**Tekhnē: from Heidegger’s Objects to the Genealogy of Subjects**

Foucault states that instead of thinking about how objects are formed to our experience, we should concentrate on the question of the formation of the subjects. A subject forms a relation to itself through specific techniques. At this point Foucault refers explicitly to Heidegger. In “The Question Concerning Technology” (1977) Heidegger reflects on the ancient conception of causality, because he wants to redefine the concept of tekhnē by reviving the ancient formulation of the term. He calls into question the instrumental definition of tekhnē and thus our modern understanding of technology. The modern understanding of technology is embedded—using Foucauldian language—in a particular field of *historical a priori* which Heidegger calls *Enframing* (*Ge-stell*). He refers to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and identifies four causes in the formation of objects:

1) *Material cause* grasps the material of the object.

2) *Formal cause* describes the shape into which the material enters.

3) *Effective cause* is usually understood as the standard for causality as something that causes the effects, but Heidegger defines it as *bringing forth* or being responsible of making something to appear.

4) *Telos* is ordinarily understood as the aim, but in Heidegger’s view it rather captures the bounds that complete the object.

(Heidegger 2007: 2-3.)

In Foucault’s *Use of Pleasure* we then find these four very similar-looking areas which constitute the ethical field, the field of the subject’s relation to itself:

1) Determination of the ethical substance refers to the part of the self which is the most important *material* of the ethical conduct.

2) The mode of subjectivation is the *form* in which one recognizes the relationship to the rule and feels obliged to implement it in practice.

3) Ethical work refers to all conduct one actually carries out, or *brings forth*.

4) *Telos* is to Foucault the aim of the ethical work. Actions are not, however, moral in their singularity but only in circumstantial integration regarding to virtue and the whole pattern of conduct. Foucault writes here that moral action does not only aim at accomplishment, but also beyond it. In this sense we find the idea of bounds that Heidegger stresses.

(Foucault 1985: 26–28)
Foucault does not formulate here a general structure of the subject: the subject is not a substance (Foucault 2001c: 1537). “Subject” refers to forming a relationship to the self. This relationship is different if one constitutes oneself as an ethical, political or for example a healthy subject, a criminal, a citizen, or someone insane (Foucault 2001c: 1538). This formation is carried out by a whole range of techniques that the subject has not invented alone. Applying these techniques in particular situations require specific arts, arts of existence. In classical antiquity “arts” (tekhnai) include crafts or skills such as raising a horse or practicing medicine (O’Leary 2002: 52). Hence, instead of mere individuality they consist in knowledge of the community and its know-how, but also the possibility of their application and spontaneity.

According to Heidegger, understanding tekhnē as a skill of a craftsman is not yet sufficient. The concept captures besides fine arts and crafts, also the arts of the mind: it brings things into existence as poiēsis. To Aristotle, tekhnē is a rational quality and a capability concerned with making (poiēsis). It is made distinct from things that come into existence out of necessity, such as phenomena taking place in nature. Moreover, tekhnē brings forth things that could also be differently (EN: 1140a). Heidegger points out that there is a tight relationship between knowledge and art, or epistēmē and tekhnē. They are both modes of revealing, and in this sense tekhnē is a mode of un concealing (alētheuein). Art as tekhnē is associated with Heidegger’s conception of truth as revealing: when one truth is established, something else gets or remains hidden (Heidegger 2007: 5–6). Hence, tekhnē is not only about making things or using equipment or certain material to achieve a certain end. In the Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger reflects on power, describes a field of different forces, and writes that knowing as tekhnē is primordial and continuous way of looking beyond that which happens to be apparent. This looking beyond, or overcoming, transforms the field of the things that happen to be apparent and its justification – just as well as its limits. Heidegger writes that it takes place through different paths and in different fields, and it reminds of Foucault’s notion of event, which is characterized by dispersion between different discourses and institutions. Tekhnē as an art brings that which appears in a halt and, most importantly, brings it forth so that we are able to grasp it (Heidegger 2000: 153).

What I find important in this passage is the connection between art or technique and knowledge, and especially the idea of looking beyond a limit, capturing a form of being and bringing it forth. This is the task of Foucault’s genealogy too: in late Foucault we can always find the undefined and endless task in the form of methodology in which questions of power, knowledge and ethics are inseparable. He makes a parallel between Aufklärung and the truth-power-subject axis of his own research. We should investigate under which conditions we can apply the continuous task to know knowledge (Aufklärung) to any point of history instead of understanding it as a historical era (Foucault 1997a: 47). In the essay “What is Enlightenment?” the éthos of genealogy is proposed as “the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of limits that we may go beyond and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (Foucault 1997b: 316). Philosophical life must be about a constant test of the critical reflection by con crete practices (Foucault 1997b: 319). After Kant Aufklärung has been the question of knowledge, but Foucault insists that it must also be a question of power: one must ask, which misconceptions knowledge has of itself because it is connected to power (Foucault 1997a: 49). In “What is Critique?” the question of the subject is not formulated as the Cartesian “I think therefore
I am”, but “what, therefore I am”. Nietzsche writes in *Beyond Good and Evil* that there is nothing self-evident about the “I”, or what it means to think or to be (BGE: §16). Foucault states that power affects to our understanding of knowledge and that one should examine the effects of power on us (Foucault 1997a: 46). Knowledge is not innocent, but an outcome of struggle. The aim is then not to ask, what is true or false, but to investigate the relationships between knowledge and power, to find the conditions of acceptability and show where they historically, concretely and singularly emerge (Foucault 1997a: 54–55).

In the *Lectures on the Will to Know* Foucault refuses, however, the sceptic notion that there would be no truth. Even if knowledge would be an outcome of struggle, we must make it distinct from the concept of truth. How should we understand truth here? If Arendt sees that the world of appearances is innocent and open to deliberation, to Foucault the truth of power lies in appearance, and we need to take a look at these appearances. Foucault replaces the sceptic slogan by stating that “the truth is not true (vrai) (Foucault 2011: 208). The statement becomes understandable when the word vrai is opened up: it signifies not only ‘true’, but also ‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘right’, ‘truthful’, ‘genuine’ and ‘sincere’. The truth is not “real” in the sense of being opposite to appearance, and it does not hold the moral qualities of sincerity or authenticity. This formulates the principle of fiction.

In “What is Critique” the notion of fiction suddenly appears when Foucault states that this historical-philosophical practice fabricates its own history as fiction. He does not define what fiction means here, but in an interview from 1980 he opens this up. Foucault quite famously states that he has written nothing but fictions (Foucault 2001a: 863). He says that instead of trying to impress professional historians and following predefined understanding of historical facts, by his books he invites us all to experience what we are today. This experience establishes new relations to the issues discussed in the text, because one sees how they were understood in the past and how they are perceived in our modern thought. Experience can then be something that transforms us (Foucault 2001a: 863). “Experience” as such cannot be true or false, and that is why Foucault equates it with fiction. Experience is something that happens and is fabricated in the self by the self in that particular moment. It does not exist before it takes place, and it cannot be recaptured afterwards. This forms a difficult relationship between experience and truth: truth can change experience in a significant way, but experience does not in any way depend on truth, and experience is capable of changing it (Foucault 2001a: 864). The documents Foucault uses for his research are real, but they are intentionally presented in a way which transforms our relationship with the world. Intentionality does not mean, however, that a certain experience would be something only Foucault himself recognizes. Experience should be something shared in order to be transformative. That is why experiences Foucault wants to generate deal with collective practices we can all recognize (Foucault 2001a: 864-865). Experience is then something that an individual has, and it cannot be completely shared, but the type of experience Foucault is seeking has to do with encountering the experiences of others (Foucault 2001a: 866).

Also Judith Butler asks in her essay, why Foucault suddenly refers to fiction without defining the term. She explains that in the Nietzschean frame all origins of value are fictional, but that the description of these fictions mirrors the process of making values, which in turn becomes value-production that enacts the same process it narrates (Butler, internet.) In addition this passage with the notion of fiction can be read together with the 1971
The principle of fiction in the Nietzsche essay means simply that the truth is an effect that is created (Foucault 2011: 190). The French speak of “making an experience” (faire une expérience) instead of having one (O’Leary 2009: 88). Foucault’s books are experiments (expérience) that create experiences (expérience) rather than demonstrate the state of affairs (Foucault 2001a: 866). Even if we are talking about creations, this does not mean that the effects would escape into the immaterial world or to the imaginary, quite the contrary. Even Plato declares that in order to define the Sophists’ art of illusions, one must admit that the apparent and the ostensible take part in being—they exist (Soph: 260c–d), and the effects of power exist to our experience in their concreteness. In this sense the fictitious is not in things or in people, but in the verisimilitude of what lies between them, in the encounters (Foucault 1998: 153). The task is not just to show the invisible, but to make the relations of power visible in the very concrete practices, even if they might be very difficult to pinpoint. Instead of trying to unmask what lies beneath the “real”, one must go beyond what is given as appearance or as a “mere appearance” and ask how did it become conceived in that manner in the first place (Foucault 2011: 198).

Butler writes that the point is not only to identify these breaking points but to track down how they emerged. We should seek discontinuities between the field of things that are considered “intelligible” and make visible the logic for which their intelligibility grounded. (Butler, internet.) She remarks that desubjugation takes place when the limits of rationalization are exposed. Dynamics between knowledge and power is transformable and the relationship between them is fragile. Where and to which truths does the subject then anchor herself in order to practice critique? Butler responds that the critical attitude is a practice of virtue of courage, when the subject meets the shaky limit of the epistemological field. And without yet knowing really where to anchor one’s knowledge or the claim of its value, one takes the risk by a critical act anyway. The subject can take distance from the authority and look at it from a new perspective. Butler calls this “a virtue in the minimal sense” (Butler, internet). Critique is a risk because the act shakes also the principles according to which oneself is formed. By taking the risk one risks the very foundation on which one self is established. The subject does not suddenly start to form itself independently and boundless after becoming a critical subject. In critical activity self-formation takes place in disobedience to the same principles that also have formed it—the self forms itself in disobedience in ontologically insecure place which posits the questions of the subject and its way of being (Butler, internet). Compared to Arendt’s notion of judgment, in this way Foucault’s critical practice is much riskier than making a judgment which is tied to communication.

Conclusions

Why is Foucault formulating “another kind” of critical philosophy? I started by making critique distinct from aesthetic judgment that is associated with taste, which is presupposed to be something shared and discussed until agreement is found. Critical work is not, however, “another kind” because Foucault would detach his thought completely from Kant. Critique is at least to some extent equated to Kant’s Aufklärung which encourages us to know knowledge. Here Foucault’ critique is “another kind”, because Foucault twists philosophical questions concerning the conditions of knowledge into a Nietzschean mode—they
become political questions of power. Conditions of knowledge are not investigated in order to accept the limits of our thought and action, but in order to ask how they were established. Our continuous, undefined task is then to shake the pre-established limits. Finally, the Heideggerian question concerning technology is turned from the investigation of objects into the question of the subject. Formulating another kind of critical philosophy leads us to fundamental philosophical questions of knowledge and truth together with the question of change. Transformation takes place in the limits of our experience which involves a risk of shattering the very conditions of our own way of being. The task Foucault hands us over is undefined. Transforming the world around us, however, requires that we are willing to let ourselves to be vulnerable. Foucault’s understanding of critique leaves us the possibility to do so.

Bibliography


Introduction

It seems that not much has changed since Michel Foucault, a little more than thirty years ago, proposed an interpretation of Kant’s text *Was ist Aufklärung?* Even more: if we were to follow this interpretation, not much has changed even since Immanuel Kant, exactly two hundred and thirty years ago, in December of 1784, provided his answer to this question in the *Berlinische Monatschrift*.

For instance, when reading this conference’s presentation one might say that its principal aim – “to open up space for a general discussion of the actuality of Foucault’s work”, is in a way guided by a problematization of our own present, of our own actuality:

“Taking as our point of departure Foucault’s statement that the role of the intellectual is not merely to criticize ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or furnish him/herself with the most appropriate ideology, we want to incite a debate on the possibilities of “constituting new politics of truth”, advocated by Foucault. Thus, central to this conference would be the investigation into the possibilities for (re-)articulating public engagement today [...]”

Thus, much like the philosophical movement of the Enlightenment as well as – according to Foucault – an important part of modern western philosophy as such, this conference continues to put before us the following questions: “What is happening today? What is happening now? What is this ‘now’ in which we all live in and which is the site, the point, (from which) I am writing?” (Foucault 2010: 11). In other words, one might suggest that it aims not only to engage Foucault but also to confront “modernity as a question” (Foucault 2010: 14).

However, this affinity is not limited to what one might term the object of problematization. If we were to follow Foucault, one of the specificities of the Aufklärung consists in the fact that it has set for itself a certain number of operations that it must effectuate within its own

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1. The full title of Kant’s contribution published in the *Berlinische Monatschrift* was *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* For an English translation of this text see Kant 1999: 13-22.
2. See the *Engaging Foucault* conference (IEFC) presentation available at http://instifdt.bg.ac.rs/fuko/ (viewed March 15th 2015). The emphasis is ours.
present (Foucault 2010: 14). Likewise, this conference has its eyes set on concrete practical goals that resonate within its own actuality, namely, the prospect of changing “political, economic, social and institutional regimes of production of truths” (IEFC, internet).

Given these similarities and in order to move beyond their simple acknowledgment, this contribution will propose a reading of a certain number of texts, a combination of two lectures and one text to be more precise\(^3\), where Michel Foucault interprets the significance of the Enlightenment as an event in the history of western philosophy and presents us with his views on the manner in which a properly modern philosophical ethos should approach this type of goals that have just been mentioned.

The way it will try to do this, is not so much by focusing on their undoubtedly rich content, but by trying to highlight a distinction that seems to operate within them to the point where it appears to be, at the same time, the condition and the outcome of Foucault’s interpretation: the distinction – which does not amount to a separation, it needs to be stressed right from the beginning – between what one might term the theoretical and the practical. This reading will therefore not consist in a reconstruction of the texts in question, but rather in a selective reading of certain passages where this distinction appears to be particularly pertinent in the light of the problems proposed by this conference.

Perhaps, it is only when the role of this distinction is fully understood as well as its consequences assumed – not only within Foucault’s work, but also in our comprehension of modernity as such – that we can start to move away from the never-fulfilled promise of the objectivity of scientific discourse and the everlasting dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness of our practical activity, which appears to be one of the characteristics of our present situation.

I.

In the first of these texts, a lecture in fact, that Foucault delivered before the Société française de Philosophie in 1978, the distinction between the theoretical and the practical appears in the following manner.

When proposing his definition of critique, or to be more precise, of the critical attitude – for we are dealing here, as so often with Foucault, with a historical phenomenon and not a transcendent property of the human being – he characterizes critique as “the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth” (Foucault 1997: 32).

Here it should be noted, firstly, that this critique, for Foucault, does not consist in a denunciation of the fact of a truth being seized, forged, transformed, or unjustly appropriated by an instance of power, but in highlighting the power effects that every truth-claim, as such, produces when it claims for itself the status of truth. Secondly, that the critical attitude does not approach the exercise of power as something resting upon, or dependent upon, a

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\(^3\) For an informative account concerning the history, convergences and differences between different variants of Foucault’s treatment of the Enlightenment, see Gros 2006.
certain masking, dissimulation or disfiguration of truth, but rather in a way that renders explicit the manner in which exercises of power are bound up and are accompanied by certain forms of truth producing discourses.

Thus, it seems that what we are dealing here is exactly the kind of distinction that was mentioned above, between science and practice, or knowledge and power if you will, that on the one hand *emphasizes* their distinctiveness while on the other hand *insists on* their inseparability.

Furthermore, this characteristic of the critical attitude – which, it must not be forgotten, historically emerged in the 15th and the 16th century from a *practical* and not a *theoretical* problem, namely, of “how not to be governed *like that*” (Foucault 1997: 28) – this practical stance therefore, Foucault asserts, is not very far away from the way in which Immanuel Kant defined the *Aufklärung*, linking it to “a certain minority condition in which humanity was maintained [...] in an authoritative way” (Foucault 1997: 33) – precisely because of an inappropriate linkage between the exercise of reason and submission to power. In order to illustrate this point let us turn to Kant himself:

“Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. [...] If I have a book that understands for me, a spiritual advisor who has a conscience for me, a doctor who decides upon a regimen for me, and so forth, I need not trouble myself at all”.

(Kant 1999: 17)

However, one might object that this genealogical affinity between the critical attitude and Kant’s understanding of the *Aufklärung* does not imply that our modernity has articulated the relationship between the theoretical and the practical in the same way that the critical attitude has done several centuries before. This objection appears even more justified if we consider Foucault’s statement that in the 19th and in the 20th century, it was not Kant’s understanding of the *Aufklärung* that played a pivotal role, but rather his delineation of the *critical enterprise* – the latter being significantly distinct from its historical predecessor by apparently focusing exclusively on the question of knowledge, and emphasizing not so much the distinction between knowledge and power, but rather the responsibility of knowing (the limits of possible) knowledge4.

Nevertheless and despite Foucault’s rather questionable interpretation of the significance of Kant’s critical enterprise – which most probably cannot be reduced to a problematization of the limits of knowledge as such, but shows at least a great interest in the specificities of the functioning of different kinds of knowledge, either pure or practical, as well as to the inevitable connections linking the two – the fact remains, that subsequent intellectual currents, either in Germany or in France, were to a significant extent preoccupied not only with the question of knowledge in and by itself, but also with its incessant linkage with power, domination, authority, politics, etc.

4. For this point see Foucault 1997: 58.
There is no doubt, that these currents articulate the connection between the two elements in a variety of ways that cannot all be subsumed under the so-called critical-attitude model. However, it seems that the historical sources of various models of the critical attitude cannot not so easily be attributed to the so-called “gap” that Foucault (1997: 48) saw between Kant’s description of the Aufklärung and his definition of the critical enterprise and should be thoroughly reexamined.

But to return to Foucault (1997: 59), it is clear that his own conception of this relation, which he clarifies when presenting his research program, clearly resonates with the one he identified in the critical attitude:

“What we are trying to find out is what are the links, what are the connections that can be identified between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge, what is the interplay of relay and support developed between them, such that a given element of knowledge takes on the effects of power in a given system where it is allocated to a true, probable, uncertain, or false element, such that a procedure of coercion acquires the very form and justifications of a rational, calculated, technically efficient element, etc.”

Foucault (1997: 59)

Thus, we have here the first example of a certain kind of distinction between knowledge and power, that from a historical perspective might be seen as constituting the condition of possibility of Foucault’s own thought as well as one of the aims to which his intellectual enterprise is directed.

II.

Let us now turn to the second lecture, this time at the Collège de France in January 1983, when Foucault’s course was entitled The government of Self and Others.

5. For instance, while presenting his view on the genealogical roots of the critical attitude, Foucault (1997: 26-32) rightly proposes that it stemmed from a specific interplay of three interlocking domains that gravitated around the problem of governmentality: (1) the putting into question of the reliability of Scriptures and the development of procedures and techniques in order to restore their function as the legitimate guide for human action; (2) the parallel development and theorization of natural law as an universally binding normative system; and (3) the removal of the principle of authority from the standards assuring the certainty of knowledge. However, when posing the critical attitude as the main characteristic of the Enlightenment as an event and proposing that the latter should not be confused with Humanism understood as a certain set of themes, his analysis appears to be slightly more questionable (Foucault 1984: 43-45). On the one hand, it seems to evacuate the Enlightenment of all its humanistic ideals that surely played an important part in its historical constitution, while on the other hand it apparently neglects the role that Humanism – precisely as a set of ideas – played in the internal dynamic of the abovementioned fields that ultimately gave rise to the critical attitude (for the role that Humanism, as an intellectual current, played within these domains see, for example, Jehasse 2004; Grafton 1994; Gibert 2010). To put it in a nutshell, there is no doubt that in the 15th and in the 16th century there existed a certain type of Humanism that claimed for itself the label of “critique” – the question therefore remains, what was its consequent historical development and did it perhaps evolve into a distinct “critical attitude”, different to that which Foucault identifies based on his reading of the works of Immanuel Kant.
On this occasion the abovementioned distinction appears in a particularly interesting manner, when Foucault deals with the condition of minority from which the movement of the Aufklärung is supposed to free mankind.

In order to leave this minority condition and begin our enlightened path it might be helpful, according to Foucault’s interpretation of Kant, if we untangle “two unjustified and illegitimate couples: first, the couple formed by obedience and the absence of reasoning; second, the couple formed by, or at least the confusion between two things that should be distinguished, the private and the public” (Foucault 2010: 34).

As for the first couplet, it rests on the presupposition – common to both those who govern and those who are governed – “that there can only be obedience where there is absence of reasoning” (Foucault 2010: 34) and seems to be resolved in a particular political constellation that would function according to the maxim “Argue as much as you will and about whatever you will, but obey” (Kant 1999: 18).

However, since things are easier said than done, the question remains, what does argue mean, how are we to understand the injunction to obey, when and where are we to argue and when, where and whom are we to obey. Thus, it seems that in order to resolve these questions and in order to fully understand the meaning of Kant’s proposal, we need to turn to the second illegitimate couplet mentioned above.

Firstly, what needs to be stressed regarding the supposed entanglement of the private and the public is the fact that we are not dealing here, primarily, with two distinct domains of “activity” – and that therefore the problem does not consist so much in what would be an unsatisfying condition of one or even both of the abovementioned planes of human existence. What the terms private and public refer to, according to Foucault’s (2010: 35) interpretation of Kant, is in fact a certain distinction with regards to different types of “use of our own faculties” of reason.

Secondly, what is interesting in Kant’s distinction is the fact that the meaning of these terms, if we compare them to the way they are employed today, seems to be almost transposed. Thus, private reasoning does not refer to something that would and should be contained within the domestic sphere of human activity, nor does it characterize this thought process as something inherently subjective. Almost on the contrary, “the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted” (Kant 1999: 18). Consequently, this type of use of our reason corresponds to situations where our roles as human beings are fixed within a certain societal machinery, that is to say, as Foucault puts it, “when we are components of a society or government whose principles and objectives are those of the collective good” (Foucault 2010: 35) – since in these kinds of situations, “we do not function as a universal subject but as an individual” (Ibid.). Therefore, it is insofar we use our reason as mere individuals, whose activities are directed toward predetermined public ends, that we should find it “impermissible to argue” and understand that in these instances “one must obey” (Kant 1999: 18).

On the other hand, the public use of our reason is occasioned precisely when we place ourselves outside of our particular political activities, precise administrative functions or concrete economic practices, when “as a scholar” we use our reason “before the entire public of the world of readers” (Ibid., 18) – or, to put it in Foucault’s terms (2010: 36), when “as
rational beings we address all other rational beings”. It is only thus, from a position of a universal subject, that one can “certainly argue without thereby harming the affairs assigned to him” (Kant 1999: 18) in his role as an individual member of society.

Now, if we were to apply this distinction to our current situation, we would find ourselves facing a contradiction that is – so it seems – one of the sources of our present academic uneasiness. When illustrating the distinction between the private and the public use of our reason, Kant (Kant 1999: 18–19) takes on the examples of an officer, a citizen, and a clergyman, in order to show how in their respective societal roles – an officer toward his superiors; a citizen as a taxpayer toward the State; and the clergyman with relation to his congregation – they are undoubtedly under the obligation to obey their orders, pay their taxes and preach in accordance with the creed of the religious denomination they serve. However, all three are and should be free to express, as scholars, their thoughts and (unfavorable) judgments with regards to these same societal arrangements they are a part of. If an officer, a citizen and a clergyman seem to be able to benefit from an alternative scholarly position from which they can freely exercise their reason in a public manner, one might legitimately raise the question of the peculiar case of professional, or perhaps even better, civil scholars themselves: are they – as scholars – under the obligation to obey or under the duty to argue?

Given the fact that they are to be considered a part of the societal machinery, employed by the state in order to fulfill the educational mission that has been assigned to them, one might rightly suppose that they are to exercise their reason in a private manner. However, the role that has been assigned to them, or at least one of the goals that they have assigned to themselves, is a so-called “critical” one: to question the goals, the procedures as well as the functioning, if not even the existence, of this same machinery they are a part of; a type of thought therefore that is clearly not a private one and appears to resonate more clearly with what has been termed above as the public use of reason.

Obviously, this is not a problem that would pass unnoticed in the academic sphere and there have been numerous attempts to resolve its apparent inherent contradiction6. As for this contribution, suffice it to say that by pointing out this problem we can perhaps see to what extent the functioning of our modern societies – societies that historically emerged with the ambition of reflectively acting upon themselves – is in fact conditioned by this imbrication of elements, that can and should be distinguished, yet hardly separated.

III.

Finally, let’s look at how these elements appear in a text that was originally published in English and where Foucault is perhaps most explicit with regards to the properly modern philosophical ethos and the tasks it faces.

6. One example that immediately comes to mind is that of Max Weber’s principle of axiological neutrality. For an internal commentary of Weber’s concept of Wertfreiheit see for example Hennis 1994; for an overview of various kinds of conceptualizations in different fields of social sciences see Callegaro and Girard 2011.
Foucault defines this ethos in both a negative and in a positive way. Negatively, this modern ethos, historically rooted in the *Aufklärung*, can be seen in a refusal of a certain “blackmail” of the Enlightenment (Foucault 1984: 42). More precisely, it refuses “everything that might presents itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism [...] or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality” (Foucault 1984: 43). We could say, that neither for nor against the *Aufklärung*, the modern philosophical ethos is in a way an ethos “for itself”, since it aims, by the way of historical analyses, at an even better insight of itself as historically dependent on the *Aufklärung*.

As for the positive characterization, Foucault notes, firstly, that this philosophical ethos is a “limit-attitude” (Foucault 1984: 45) – an attitude that moves to the limits not in order to guard them, but with the ambition to see how to move beyond them. For instance, the abovementioned historical inquiries are not to be aimed at a better understanding of the universals that were formed in the *Aufklärung* and that continue to condition our modern existence, but at showing their contingent historical appearance: in our case, this would mean that after we fully accept the fact that the functioning of our philosophical discourse is determined by a certain type of distinction between the theoretical and the practical, rooted in the *Aufklärung*, we are not to guard this distinction as if it were an universal, but rather try to get further insight into its historically contingent constitution. “On the other hand” – and it is important to note that this is the term Foucault uses – “on the other hand” therefore, this philosophical ethos, in order to move beyond its pure discursiveness, should assume a concrete experimental posture that consist in “putting itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable and to determine the precise form this change should take” (Foucault 1984: 46).

To sum it all up – and this is where the operative role of the distinction between the theoretical and the practical in Foucault’s thought can, so it seems, be clearly seen –Foucault characterizes the “philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (Foucault 1984: 47). Or in even more clear terms, the modern philosophical ethos is a matter of a “theoretical and practical experience” (Foucault 1984: 47).

**Conclusion**

Let us conclude in a way that is somehow orthogonal to the developments above, in the sense that we are no longer trying to present a reading of the way that the distinction between the theoretical and the practical plays a certain role in the thought of Michel Foucault, but rather trying to understand its role with regards to our own current situation and trying to translate it in terms of the goals that this conference, according to our understanding, wishes to address.

One of the consequences that follow from what has been said above is that a “critical” intellectual discourse today would need, in the first place, to fully recognize its dependence on the *Aufklärung* as well *Aufklärung’s* roots in the emergence of a certain kind of critical
attitude that stemmed from a practical and not a theoretical problematization. Consequently, this would mean that the Aufklärung and Kant in particular are not to be seen as revolutionizing a certain set of ideas and presenting them in a light that continues to illuminate our existence today, but rather as finalizing a movement from the distinction between reason and practice that apparently began around the 16th century, to the distinction between reason and practice within reason itself.

Secondly, since this distinction has acquired the status of a universal, the primary task of those intellectuals who perceive criticism as representing a constituent part of their professional vocation would not be the elaboration of an alternative universal system. Instead, their efforts should be directed towards investigating the historically singular social constellation that gave birth to the universality of the distinction between theory and practice.

Finally, a critical philosophical stance today would need to undertake a practical endeavor with regards to this distinction between the theoretical and the practical while at the same time fully acknowledging its own practical character – meaning that it would no longer satisfy itself with examining the historicity of this distinction but should move beyond this gesture towards one that would effectively show its relativity.

However, this would mean that any further elaboration of the last point would fall beyond the scope of this presentation...

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Foucault: on The Trajectory of The Question: Was Ist Der Mensch?

Trajectory of one question

In the conclusion of the text which Michel Foucault wrote to accompany his translation of Kant’s *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* (translation which Foucault made to serve as his complementary doctoral thesis), he remarked:

“The trajectory of the question Was ist der Mensch? in the field of philosophy reaches its end in the response which both challenges and disarms it: der Übermensch.”

(Foucault 2007: 124)

Quite an interesting reply, which does not leave the reader completely in the clear. At the end of the text, the purpose of which is to introduce the reader to one possible path of reading Kant’s anthropology, Foucault courageously decides to provide us with an answer to the question Was ist der Mensch? But he does so against all our good habits of answering, habits that are almost two millennia old. He does not give us a direct formula with an equal sign, a straightforward definition of menschliche Wesen, without repeating the very notion that should be defined – he is answering the question with only one word which breaks our hopes of him providing us with his precious attitude towards the true essence of man.

Had he posited something as zoon politikon, animal rationale, ens creatum etc. after the equal sign, it would have been a bit more comfortable for some – but this would also have enabled others to conclude that, alas, Foucault was just another one who is trying to find a shortcut through the already given and ad infinitum repeated solutions – in the end, our interest in the remainder of his thought would have been utterly questionable. But, Foucault also could have been somewhat more contemporary, and thus to posit something as: being that works and produces, being which speaks, or perhaps a living being with a specific biological organisation – he could also have posited all the three definitions – and this would have appealed to some as quite acceptable, at least to those who are still harbouring some sort of spontaneous affinity to philosophical anthropology. What could stand against such obviousness, if not barren scepticism?

However, it is obvious that Foucault’s decision was to leave us confused, without a definition, but with a vague Nietzschean construct: der Übermensch – exchanging the same with
the other even where it is most reasonable to expect the same in a different way, now exposed and clear – he serves us with other, different, and irreducible. How is it possible to understand a notion such as man, through the over-man? Don’t we need some definition of man, in the first place, to allow us to speak about something like der Übermensch? It seems that the very sign of equality is made questionable, but only insofar as man and over-man are not the same.

However, it might be possible that Foucault here is not placing the other at the place where the same should be posited – maybe here we could find some sort of exposition of essence? What if Aristotelian canon is not violated, and that mentioning of Mensch in the Übermensch, could be very well justified. Then the things seem to be clear – and this Übermensch we could understand as follows: Man’s essence is in the fact that he is a being that is going over itself, that he is a being that overcomes itself, and through this process he is becoming something that he is not yet. We could say that this is the solution that Diogo Sardinha is giving us, as one of rare interpreters who deals with this early and, to say the truth, forgotten text of young Foucault. Sardinha remarks that we could find the following determination of the object of pragmatic anthropology in Kant: Anthropology deals not with this what man is, but with this what he could make of himself (Kant: 2006: 3, 192; Sardinha 2012: 48) – and of course, it is the same thing that Foucault was able to notice in his text. (Foucault 2007: 44). This question – hence, what man could make of himself – Sardinha differentiates as pragmatical question from the metaphysical one (Sardinha 2012: 51).

Whichever way, while Foucault seems to care for the structure which is present in Kant and formed from the critique, anthropology, and transcendental philosophy and he considers specific relationship between transcendental and empirical – we will arrive at this point later – Sardinha nearly introduces a primacy of the pragmatical question regarding Foucault’s interpretation of Kant, and through this primacy he also explicates Nietzschean answer – which is here still problematic for us – at the end of the Foucault’s text. Namely, if the man is being which could create from itself something other, and moreover he is doing so, then, at the same time, he is being “ultimately indefinable because it is marked by the constant need to become other than what it is” (Sardinha 2012: 47) and consequently we will never be in a position to definitively establish what man is (Sardinha 2012: 46-47). Therefore, it seems that the obstacle in providing a classical definition at the end of Foucault’s text, is resolved, and that, in fact, it is all about Foucault’s pointing towards a human - all too human – impossibility for a final definition of man. Thus, we might be able, following Sardinha, to remark that from the infinite possibility for change that is immanent to human being, we are arriving at the finitude of that being. Because this being’s immanent possibility of infinite change is finally denied in the possibility of certain knowledge about itself – man is therefore theoretically and practically finite, but pragmatically he shows himself as being of infinite dynamis – that way Kant comes in the proximity of Nietzsche’s thought, of course only insofar as we are ready to interpret Nietzsche’s overman as a concept of essential human nature, as characteristic of man to be constantly surpassing himself.

It is obvious that the assertion that man is being which is constantly making of itself something other than it currently is, is no less a definition, which we could put in the company of other mentioned definitions (animal rationale etc.). Are we not then faced with the direct
answer to the detested metaphysical question *what is man*? The fact that the man, because of his specificity, is an indefinable being, is making this determination in no way less standard definition of human essence – and it could be possible that Foucault’s intention at the end of the text was not just pointing at the indefinability of man (about this difficulty was spoken long before Foucault or Sardinha in Scheller’s philosophical anthropology, and it was Heidegger then who criticised it (Heidegger 1991: 210)) and especially not pointing towards its immanent power to go over himself.

Although the repetition of Kantian question, in Nietzschean reply, will be sufficient to satisfy our need for balance on both sides of sign for equality, it, as we already mentioned, might be that it is not the only solution that is left for us. What if it is the case that Foucault’s intention was not to strike any sort of balance, what if he planned to show us a possible imbalance? What if he intentionally posited the *other* in place of the *same* – it may be that the relationship between man and over-man is not the true focus of Foucault’s thought here? We are then faced with one indication towards a non-relation, which is established between *definition* and *definiendum*, with impossibility of a proper answer. There is a point at which speech about man becomes mute, or starts to speak about some completely different object – when everybody is still convinced that there is speech about man.

**Two philosophies**

It is easy to find a way to make Foucault’s answer more graspable, which would fit our expectations of *exposition, determination, definition*; this might not lead us very far, and thus we should try the other way, and consider the manner of Foucault’s questioning, we should ask ourselves: Why is Foucault considering such a question – *Was ist der Mensch*? France during the fifties, and especially the sixties, was unquestionably a very lively place for philosophical thought. There, we could find real blossoming of different philosophical approaches, which were influential in France: phenomenology and its derivatives (with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), Marxism which itself outlined a heterogeneous field, Hegelian thought under the Hyppolite’s and Kojève’s influence, but also of specifically French epistemology and history of science through Bachelard and Canguilhem – to mention only a few. However, the most fascinating here is not the multitude of philosophical schools, approaches, methodologies etc. nor is it by any means negligible the liveliness of that time’s philosophical discourse – what is most specific is a link which was established between theory on the one side, and concrete political-social goings-on in the fifties, and sixties. Philosophy there was not only the thing of curious philosophy students and their professors – on the contrary, it was the shaping force of attitudes and plans of action of one whole generation. Anyway, we should leave that story to the testimonies of those who remember it, and also to the curiosity of others who are trying to reconstruct it – the simple fact that is important for our story could be summed up this way: the good part of above mentioned “rival” philosophies, in fact moved in the same direction, towards action, straight to the *agency of subject* which strives to its ultimate liberation, towards understanding of some *current historical situation*, and taking adequate steps in accordance with it – either way, man was *activated*, his subjectivity, however defined, was equally mobilised. Yet, from the other side, there was something else inscribing itself in this specific configuration – we mentioned Canguilhem’s thought. This thought, at the first sight
completely apolitical, and enclosed in the cabinet of a philosopher engaged with the history of science, was achieving its effects (Fausion 1998: 465-466), which were crucial in forming a new field inside these “strange years” – to cite the phrase which Foucault used for the fifties and sixties (Fausion 1998: 465).

It is of note that structuralism was excluded from the listing of the philosophical currents at the beginning of last paragraph, however, this is not at all because of some intention on our side to make it less representative, rather, it is because of a specific position that was acquired by that thought of insecure boundaries, from its very beginning. Of course, here is not the place for further historical explications, and accordingly, it will be enough to mark the following: spectre of structuralism could be shown in the destabilisation of the very ground of the dispute about the ways of proper agency, positioning, and action. Illustrative example is offered to us by Paul Veyne, when he speaks about young student of history with convictions somewhere at the crossroads of Phenomenology and Marxism (therefore some sort of Sartrean Marxism) whose most fundamental attitudes were shaken through the reading of just a one short text by Claude Levi-Strauss “which analysed system of body images in one Amazonian tribe, in this text it was shown, supported by pictures, how some sort of a structural combinatoric was enough to explain diversity of one part of reality.” (Veyne 2014: 137.) Afterwards he continues:

“This was a spark of light: hence, it was not that all could come down to society or consciousness; there was also a third lout, tertium quid. Structuralism, in its own time, will enable us to escape a centuries long confrontation of subject and object, but not to be poured to sociologism accordingly.”

(Veyne 2014: 137)

Now, the picture is a bit more complete, on the one side there was a philosophy of subject, it’s consciousness, and society in which he is determined and active, and on the other side there is a thought in which man is not even a problem, which even when it studies man, and when it names itself anthropology, it is doing so only through the web of structures, basic oppositions, repeatable relations, practically traversing a man, forgetting it as it could be found in the philosophies of subjectivity. Maybe we could here sense something of Levi-Strauss’s triumphant merriment when he mentions in Tristes Tropiques how he found a salvation from the academic philosophy in his turning towards anthropology (Levi-Strauss 1961: 56, 63)). It is clear that structural anthropology and the thought of Levi-Strauss have not become less philosophical, maybe it is better to say that this sort of a liberty from philosophy, which was not strange to Foucault, could be ascribed to the merit of this alchemical tertium quid, which Veyne mentions, and which philosophy, colonised by finite reductions to subject, society, history or anything else, made almost forever inaccessible to those who were trying to write their thought on the margins of Canguilhem’s epistemology, and Levi Strauss’ structural analyses.

Foucault was also alert to mark this sort of difference inside French philosophy:

“It is the one that separates a philosophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject, and a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality, and of the concept. On one side, a filiation which is that of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; and then another, which is that of Jean Cavailles, Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyre, and Canguilhem.”
It is therefore clear that this thought, later named structuralism, to which Foucault was largely indebted, could be situated in extension of this second line inside Foucault’s division, and also it is clear that any attempt at positioning Foucault should consider those crossings made in the field drawn by this thought. However, something that is not at all clear is the fact that Foucault is considering a question very atypical for such a tradition, to ask *What is a man?* It seems that this is more appropriate for the philosophy of subject, of experience and meaning, much more than to this of knowledge, rationality and concept – unless, if question is posited to point out something completely unexpected, and then to mutate the question, in order not to be an anthropological question, nor the question of philosophy of consciousness – this question for Foucault is on the one side epistemological in the wake of Canguilhem, and on the other side determined by the legacy of structuralism. What does this precisely mean? In short, when Foucault is mentioning this question, he is not aim at a straight answer, instead he is positing one additional question: How is it even possible to ask something like this? When and how was it possible to ask about what is this man, what is the sort of configuration that is previously required to establish itself (and because of this we are speaking about epistemological and structuralistic approach), to enable one new object of curiosity, posited in it: the Man.

Thus, answer to the question like this could not be exhausted in asking ourselves about what *sort of being a man is*, not even by pointing towards its indefinability, or at the direction of his infinitely modifiable nature – even the answer that claims that it is hard to speak about man, because he is already *not there* when we are asking about him, is reducing itself to the explanation of human nature as historical and always on the move, without any solidity and certainty. These are not possible answers for Foucault, these are still answers of the philosophy of subject, experience and meaning – they depart from inside, and Foucault had in mind a completely different undertaking: question should be posed about man from the outside, trough the drawing of epistemological configuration, it should be posed about everything that *is not a man*, about everything that is posited around and above it and what makes it possible, the question what *kind of being is man* leads us nowhere. However, is it not that such an approach is disarming the question itself – isn’t that view from outside what in the same time challenges and disarms the question, showing the limits of the very thing that is questioned in it: how far is this configuration which enables man stretching itself, and is it possible to see the place where these boundaries are dissolved, and with them also the man, to use popular phrase of Foucault, “would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1989: 422). Question, which therefore is left without predictable answer - because it is not able to find a man as a man, and is instead always encountering its finitude, its doubles, its problem of origin, cogito etc. - finds a most unpredictable one in the word: *der Übermensch* – word placed at the very border at which man is exhausting itself. Assumption is therefore: man is just a consequence of one determined set of relations, one determined disposition inside the modern episteme, it should be outlined, and then its limits must emerge, and only then it is certain that on its borders we could already anticipate something different, something that is going over the man, and what is not dependent upon this epistemological figure, this is place which is filled with the prophetic anticipation *der Übermensch*.

Hence, this answer here is not to be used as some sort of secret path towards the essence of man, nor to guide us to the fact that we are never to be able to gain definitive knowledge
about man, it is there to point towards radical difference, irreducibility, and towards the possibility of thought on the other side of the boundaries that are securing a man as a sovereign reflexive subject. Foucault’s question and answer are therefore split between the question *Was ist der Mensch?* and answer *der Übermensch*, there is insurmountable gap, void, opened space between man and its boundaries on the one side, and possibilities of one different knowledge which will be at difficulties in comprehending a man, equally as it is hard for modern age to comprehend the objects of knowledge which Foucault named *classicistic*.

**Why Kant?**

Now that the manner of Foucault’s questioning is somewhat clearer to us, when it is clear that he is in fact stealing the question from his opponents, only to pose it in a way which disarms it, we must ask ourselves about the following: *Why does Foucault here, anyway, need Kant?* It could be considered as manifest, that Foucault, at the beginning of the sixties is not employing Kant in order to borrow a solution. No matter how much, at first sight, we could ascribe to Foucault a phenomenologico-heideggerian sentiment of forgetfulness, his referring to Kant’s forgotten lesson (Foucault 2007: 118) (as well as some places in the *Order of things* (Foucault 1989: 371, 373)), it is not a result of an inclination towards a clarification of *ursprung*, that could provide us with clarity needed for a confrontation with a vague contemporaneity. Foucault does not refer to Kant, as Husserl is recalling about Descartes or Galileo, nor as Heidegger is referring to Greeks – on the contrary, what he is trying to tell us, could roughly be stated as follows: We are certainly not thinking the same thing as Kant, and already inside the boundaries of the modern epoch, at the threshold of which Kant’s thought is situated (therefore Kant is at the threshold and not the origin or source, and this is something that we should not disregard), we could see that the thought that followed after Kant, and more or less acknowledge Kant as some sort of its foundation, is not thinking the same thing as Kant – central problematisations of that thought are more or less dependant on the derivatives of terminology inherited from Kant, yet forming a completely different structure, in which the question *Was ist der Mensch?* is posited differently than in Kant’s philosophy.

Anthropology now emerges as a privileged place, on which it could be shown how Kant’s thought – as thought that represents the boundary of classicism and representation, where “representation lost it’s power to determine….the interplay of it’s own synthesis and analysis” (Foucault 1989: 371) on the one side, and on the other the magnificent repository of 19th and 20th century inspiration – is offering us a completely different relation between the elements of a structure which gave rise to an obvious question: *Was ist der Mensch?*

From this position, which is facing the *era of man* with its own *beginning*, one more challenging question is imposed on us: Where to situate Kant in Foucault’s map drawn in his *Introduction to Anthropology* (although it seems that the text is dedicated to Kant, it appears that there is not an unambiguous solution for the difficulties arising from the attempt to think Kant’s position inside that text) and somewhat later in the vast, almost half a millennia wide map of the *Order of things*? Is Kant located within the *era of classicism*, or is he a modern thinker? What does it mean that he is on the threshold? We will try
here with the following answer: Foucault’s famous *threshold of modernity* (Foucault 1989: 48, 263, 273, 326, 331, 346, 347), reserved *inter alia* for Kant’s thought, does not mean anything else than that Kant is a philosopher which is thinking the possibilities of *modern thought* at the boundaries of classicistic *dispositif*. Therefore, the answer is: neither the *classicism nor modernity* – and this is the very thing that makes Kant such an interesting figure to Foucault – what Cuvier, Bopp, and Ricardo each are for *life, language and labour for biology, philology and political economy*, respectively, as discourses shaped around mentioned objects, Kant is for philosophy, in his thought we could mark the *boundaries of representation*, and therefore we should not think that the following of Foucault’s words are in contradiction with it:

“Only those who cannot read will be surprised that I have learned such a things more clearly from Cuvier, Bopp, and Ricardo than from Kant or Hegel.”

(Foucault 1989: 335)

We should not overlook that in the same book, Foucault remarked, also:

“Kant avoids representation itself and what is given within it, in order to address himself to that on the basis of which all representations, whatever its form, may be posited. It is therefore not representations themselves that, in accordance with their own laws, could be deployed and, in one and the same movement, decomposed (by analysis) and recomposed (by synthesis): only judgements derived from experience or empirical observations can be based upon the contents of representation. Any other connection, if it is to be universal, must have its foundation beyond all experience, in he a priori that renders it possible. Not that it is a question of another world, but of the conditions in accordance with which any representation of the world in general can exist.”

(Foucault 1989: 262-263)

Hence, Kant’s question is a question unimaginable for classicist thought dependant on the representation, Kant is questioning about conditions of possibility of representation, that way, the very representation is decentralised.

Therefore, it was not just a matter of Kant’s personal decision to think about *boundaries of our knowledge*, about *conditions of it’s possibility – bringing into play the transcendental theme* – Kant was in a position to do so only through the questioning about conditions of possibility of our *representations*, where from then it is only possible to understand Kant’s thought as a thought of finitude in a specifically modern sense. What is important to underline here, is that for Foucault, finitude is not a consequence of Kant’s philosophy, but rather it is some sort of a motif which is a starting point for the first time with Kant – since the classicism, as Deleuze remarks, was a thought of different orders of infinity (Deleuze 1988: 97), modern episteme is marked with an analytic of finitude. Marking of that crossing for Foucault is a crucial place – it was mentioned here how Foucault is looking at Kant’s thought as a thought on a threshold, nevertheless, here it will be very suitable to mention one of the many places in which Foucault is speaking about the moment when this threshold was already crossed:

“The threshold between Classicism and modernity (though the terms themselves have no importance – let us say between our prehistory and what is still contem-
porary) had been definitively crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, they rediscovered their ancient, enigmatic density; though not in order to restore the curve of the world which had harboured them during the Renaissance, nor in order to mingle with things in a circular system of signs. Once detached from representation, language has existed, right up to our own day, only in a dispersed way, for philologists, words are like so many objects formed and deposited by history....”

(Foucault 1989: 331)

At that moment, when language stopped to be some sort of a representation of representation, when this grid through which things were arriving to the words were broken, classicism was over with – like the pearls from the broken necklace, living beings, needs and words were scattered, but not to stay simply dispersed, no, they started to gravitate around finite centres:

“needs have organized their production for themselves....living beings have turned in towards the essential functions of life....words have become weighed down with their own material history, in short...identities of representation have ceased to express the order of beings completely and openly....”

(Foucault 1989: 331)

Nevertheless, while the living beings, and needs, spontaneously formed their centres of gravitation, through the production and living functions placing themselves around labour and life, with language things went a bit more different. Foucault is mentioning the later in order to state the cause why the philosophical reflection stayed away from language for a relatively long time, leaving the terrain for the philosophy of labour or life (Foucault 1989: 332) – already with the first philosophical attempts of thinking the modern language, with Nietzsche, the whole web represented as modern episteme is made questionable – so to speak, at that moment when Nietzsche the philologist, became Nietzsche the philosopher, at that precise moment when question of philology as a science which is engaged in tracing of discontinuous history of dispersed language, were surpassed in the Nietzschean question: who speaks, and when Mallarme tried to reply to this question, stating: language, the word itself (Foucault 1989: 333) – minimum which was required for perceiving the modern episteme was set, line which leads from Nietzsche’s question and Mallarme’s answer, to the Foucault’s analysis of discursive practices, is established.

Let us return to our initial question: Why Kant? For the first time, discourse appears with Kant as shattered, and it happens in his Anthropology – material for writing of an anthropology, empirical material, is gathered in an oral communication,¹ it should not be forgotten, and this simple, but nevertheless very important fact is underlined by Foucault

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¹. It is important to note that this study of spoken language, of habits, and manners should not take place in the same sort of scientific distancing of pure observer from observed, quite the contrary, observer finds himself entangled in the complicated web in which he himself participates, as citizen of the world. There is interesting text by Peter Melville entitled Kant's dinner party, where in arranged middle-class communal meal, to which Kant in Anthropology dedicated section entitled “On the Highest Ethicophysical Good”, author is trying to show all the complicities of the underlying metaphysics of the life of emerging 18th century middle classes. (Melville 2002: 103-108)
It is peculiar how Kant remarks: “Large city such as Konigsberg...has the advantage of commerce both with the interior of the country and with the neighbouring and distant lands of different languages and customs, can well be taken as an appropriate place for broadening one’s knowledge of human beings as well as of the world....” (Kant 2006: 4) Anthropology is therefore empirical, the medium for study of it is language, but it is not completely independent from a critique, quite the contrary – in any direction it chooses to go, anthropology constantly collides with critique, but while the critique is occupied with a synthetic activity which only makes experience possible, anthropology always encounters already accomplished synthesis – therefore, it results in a repetition of the “a priori of the critique, in the originary, therefore in a truly temporal dimension (Foucault 2007: 93), and also with, as Beatrice Han calls it decentering of the transcendental theme, in the originary (Han 2002: 28-32). So, contrary to the critique which examine a priori activity of the subject, anthropology is operating on the basis of passive syntheses, which are every time encountered as already finished, activity of knowing subject is therefore for anthropology inaccessible in its origin, the laborious efforts of critique in the sphere of a priori are therefore denied for anthropology. Anthropology is constantly encountering the products of syntheses as something already-happened, as something always-already-here. Therefore, transcendental, just at one very brief moment in Kant’s philosophy, finds itself inscribed in the empirical – establishing that way sphere of originary experience.

An interesting and important example for this relation is the position of a “Spoken I” which is seen by Foucault as central place for Kant’s Anthropology – basically, “spoken I” refers back directly towards Critique, on the one hand by pointing in the direction of the impossibility of the empirical to stay grounded in itself, because ‘spoken I’ is always presuming synthesis of one ‘pure I’, and on the other hand, helps movement of Kant’s thought beyond the critique, because “spoken I” which could be an object, or rather a medium of anthropological inquiry, by its very status of object differentiates from the I as considered in the Critique; this is what Foucault says about it:

“The Critique, for its part, comes to a decision: the I can never be the object, only the form of the synthesis. Now, in the 1798. text, when the I is considered in it’s fundamental synthetic function, it also assumes the simple status of an object. It appears, abruptly assuming a fixed form that from then on remains constant in the field of experience. The impact of the spoken I marks the passage from sentiment to thought - from Fühlen to Denken. Without being the agent or simply the conscious awareness of this passage, it is the empirical and manifest form in which the synthetic activity of the I appears as a figure already synthesized – a structure that is at once first and second: it is not given to man from the itself at beginning, as a kind of a priori of existence; but when it does appear, inscribing itself within the multiplicity of a chronicle of sensations, it presents itself as already having been there, like the irreducible content of a thought which can operate only once that figure of experience is constituted: it is this I that the subject will become aware of its past and carry out the synthesis of its identity.”

(Foucault 2007: 66-67)

Hence, here we are directed towards a movement from the a priori as typical for the critique, to the field of already operated syntheses characteristic for anthropology, the transcendental finds itself inscribed into the experience through the never completely graspable becoming of passive syntheses. It is interesting, that the very language as a
medium of *anthropology* is, in fact, an enabler of further movement of Kant’s thought - from the *Critique* dominated by it’s Latinity, to the *Anthropology* which loses itself in the analyses of spoken language, (Foucault 2007: 98). Thus, in newly formed field of *originary*, man for the first time appears as an *object of all the knowledge* and as condition of that knowledge at the same time – man in the *Critique* is *not already at that privileged and ambiguous position* – interests of *Critical Kant* are directed towards *conditions of possibility of our knowledge*, they could not be reduced to the man, and, of course, man is not the last place where they are directed – only Kant’s *Anthropology* opens up the space of *originary* in which man is thought as specific *empirico-transcendental* doublet. However, what Foucault stresses as a most important at this place is a transitive character of this originary field, it is not a final destination of Kant’s thought, but rather a necessary moment in a greater structure made up by the elements of *a priori, originary and fundamental* – this structure, and boundaries which are placed to the *anthropology*, is a place of exceptional importance for Foucault. Here is what he could say about this *transitional* place of *Anthropology*:

“This anthropologico-critical repetition is grounded neither in itself nor in the critique: it is based on a fundamental thinking; with regard to which the anthropology – which has neither the substance of the repeated, nor the depth of that which grounds repetition; and which therefore amounts only to the transitional but necessary moment of repetition – cannot but erase itself, and disappear, paradoxically, as having been essential.”

(Foucault 2007: 104)

Hence, anthropology is, of course, at a *privileged* place, place of originary which directs thought of *critique* towards *empirical*, but only to get it back from there, towards fundamental *transcendental structures* which are making the empirical only possible, and this is a level of the fundamental. What is especially interesting is that *Anthropology* appears in Kant’s thought only to disappear, it is something that *has been essential*, where we cannot remain – its task exhausts itself in opening to then inaccessible field of experience, but only to disappear afterwards, at the level where this experience manifests itself as only possible and founded on the basis of the prior transcendental structures. The different ways through which *a priori* repeats itself in the *originary*, the ways in which *Anthropology* is repeating a *Critique* (because this is the only possible way for such an approach to exist), and the way in which this *anthropological level* is making a space for a *fundamental thought*, are not always completely clear in Foucault’s text, but, alas, it is not our task here – what is of utmost importance for us is that Foucault observes in Kant’s thought specific structure where *transcendental-empirical* duality of man has been made possible in one moment, only to disappear. This possibility made its mark, according to Foucault, on history of modern philosophy (Foucault 2007: 107), but what happened to this intermediary character of *anthropology* then:

“The intermediary character of the originary and, with it, of anthropological analysis, situated between the a priori and the fundamental; is what allows it to function as an impure and unthought hybrid within the internal economy of philosophy: it will be accorded both the privileges of the a priori and the meaning

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2. Since, there is no space to analyse such a structure in a detail, we will refer reader to the study of Beatrice Han *Foucault’s critical project* (cited here, and listed in a bibliography).
of the fundamental; the preliminary character of critical thought and the revised form of transcendental philosophy, it makes no distinction between the problematic of the necessary and that of existence; it confuses the analysis of conditions, with the interrogation of finitude.”

(Foucault 2007: 106)

Here, we could finally say why for the Foucault of sixties, Kant is such an important figure: because he does not just represent a beginning of a trajectory on which a question about man as transcendental-empirical double starts, but at the same time a possibility of a different structure of thought is shown, in which anthropological question, is important but only as a phase and motif, and not just that, but that if we are to stick to the anthropology, to the thought which thinks man as the first object, and the last condition of all knowledge, we are to disarm philosophy. Philosophy and critique are not to be subordinated to the anthropology, rather, anthropology is just one level of philosophical reflection, which must find its own ground in a critique, and on the other side, which opens up a possibility of non-anthropological approach to the questioning of man? For Foucault, it means an archaeological approach to it. Such an approach is definitively marked in Anthropology and developed in the Order of things – where man appears just as one fold in the configuration of episteme of modernity, as fold created with newly appeared empiricities of labour, life and language, as fold which will be comprehended by the modern thought as a firm substance called man.

Instead of conclusion: stratification and escape

At the beginning of the text, we asked ourselves about Foucault’s unusual answer, only to realise that there is an obvious misbalance between the question and the answer, and then arrive at the place where the very question is founded – in order to make clear the engagement of such a question at the place where it was first posed, and finally, we reached the conclusion that the answer, the famous: der Übermensch – could by no means be reduced to any explication of man. This question, following Foucault, is from the very beginning marked with a specific misbalance. This question is always deprived of its substance, it receives it, so to speak, outside of itself – with modernity man is, as we know, formed from the outside, by the empiricities of labour, life and language – which manifest themselves at the place of transcendental. That is another repetition of operation inside the field that Foucault named an originary, which he also marked as transitory in Kant, but also as a field in which all the modern thought would perpetuate one and the same rela-

3. Heidegger was pointing towards a limitations of anthropology (if it is philosophical) in a bit different sense: “...philosophical anthropology becomes regional ontology of man, and, like this, it stands at the same level with other ontologies with which it participates in a division of the complete domain of Being. Comprehended that way, philosophical anthropology could not be a centre of philosophy, and especially not because of some internal structure of it's problematic.” (Heidegger 1991: 211) However, proximity of Foucault's attitude towards anthropology with Heidegger's is still an open question, Federico Luisetti for example remarks that: “Foucault's “anthropological quadrilateral” follows literally Heidegger’s description of the “Kantian ground-laying” and anthropological turn of Western metaphysics, almost paraphrasing Heidegger’s arguments on finitude, the “breaking-open of the foundation” and the transcendental analytic of subjectivity.” (Luisetti 2012: 122)
tion, captivated inside the *anthropological quadrilateral*, which should be destroyed in order to finally free the thought from *anthropological sleep* (Foucault 1989: 372). *Anthropological* question is therefore without a definitive answer, not because of inherent characteristic of man as an indefinable being, but because *man* is constituted from the *outside*. Here is the place of the answer: *der Übermensch*, which draws its hopes from the awareness that man is a product of one contingent and changeable structure – or already in the *Order of Things* from the alertness about man as being ingrained in the *labour, life and language*, which formed the shapes of one – not the first, and not the last – epistemological configuration.

However, it is important to mention that Foucault is making his maps not just out of curiosity and passion for drawing in wide and elegant moves, though not for the lack of it, he is primarily doing so in order to *mark* inside those vast maps also a *lines of escape*, which are possible inside the current *dispositif*. Foucault actually asks: how is it possible to change contemporary *episteme*, how is it *changing itself*, which are the points where it breaks? Later, we mentioned as a useful example and important place *language*, as new *empiricity* on the one hand, and on the other the only member of the great *trinity* which was unable to find its own centre of gravitation. Here, already with Nietzsche who notices it, and with Mallarme who is offering the first answers, modernity shows itself as fragile.

Hence, Kant is on the border between *classicism and modernity*, he is in some sense on both sides, and on neither – maybe in the wake of what we proposed, it is possible to say that he is on the *threshold*, but that there is no moment in which he passes the threshold completely.5 So, we have a *threshold*, but already with Nietzsche and Mallarme, we are faced with the *limits* of modernity, because in the intersection of Nietzsche’s question and Mallarme’s reply, man is caught as one who is spoken in a *language*, rather than a subject *who speaks*. In that way, *transcendental-empirical structure* is decentred, and its fragility is shown through the pointing towards its anchoring in the *outside*, and is making absurd any further attempt at grounding on the basis of subjectivity. Foucault’s project in the sixties could then be situated as a further work on the limit marked by Nietzsche, as placing itself at the very end of possibility of question of man, possibility which ends its trajectory in the answer *der Übermensch* – Foucault revitalizes Nietzsche’s foreshadowing in his own manner, by drawing a picture of configuration of which man is just a fold in hollow of which philosophy fallen asleep, (Foucault 1989: 372), its negative, and that with which it is identical – this is in fact the ultimate goal of Foucault’s engagement with something that he named *modern episteme*. There, he is trying to achieve a description which is at the same time a strategy for thinking outside of boundaries which are shown in such a description. No single epistemological configuration which is analysed in the *Order of things* has a privilege to stratify inside itself as *modernity* – at the threshold of which we could see Kant’s though

4. And this is starting point from which Etienne Balibar could speak about quasi-transcendental, since, as he reminds ourselves for Foucault transcentdental is always mixed with empirical impurity (Balibar 2012: 99)

5. Beatrice Han, praising the importance of Foucault's *Introduction in Kant's Anthropology*, interestingly remarks: “Commentary permits us to establish that it is not the “Kantian Critique” in it's totality that marks “the threshold of our modernity,” but that the line of division passes within Kant's work itself, separating the original version of the transcendental theme from it's later versions...the Commentary shows that it is only from the *Anthropology* onward that the dual structure that defines man becomes clearly visible.” (Han 2012: 35)
separating modernity and classicism, offering a completely different structure, completely different order of transcendental and empirical, than it would have been the case throughout the nineteenth and big part of twentieth century, when distinctive thought would be built on the anthropological dimension of originarity - as transcendental in empirical. And, not just this, besides this specificity of Kant’s stratum at the threshold of modernity at which we indicated, already in the nineteenth century there is Nietzsche, also Mallarme, therefore one more line of escape. In twentieth century there are specific disciplines of psychoanalysis and ethnology, which, as Etienne Balibar remarked in his discussion with Gunter Gebauer, were “in a unique position within the human sciences. It was a kind of interiority-exteriority position: they were the disciplines, which while being a part of the humanities, allowed a critical view of the constitution and the objectives of these disciplines. (Balibar 2012: 91) – and therefore we could add that they accelerated decentralisation of man. If we are to consider those two disciplines as a simple derivative in the field of human sciences, we would then overlook their role, which exhausts itself over every anthropology and humanism. Ultimately, there is also Foucault’s thought, inspired by all those cracks inside the modern thought, which amounts to nothing else than recognising its boundaries at the other end of modernity, depleting them, and finally leaving the place for something that could come.

So, why is this dynamical stratification presented inside the modern episteme? Does it mean that there was no such thing earlier, or is this because modernity is always at its boundaries? The question remains open, but after everything, it is possible that it’s very reason is to be found in Foucault’s occupation with a possibility of freedom inside a dispositif, which could be practiced only after cracks are established on its structure, which make change possible. Because of this, Kant’s question Was ist der Mensch? is not here to acquire a simple answer, it is here in order to point towards possibility of a different positioning of a man inside the same philosophy which is placed at the threshold of modernity. Answer der Übermensch, is not here in order to repeat the same and to show the eventual proximity between Nietzsche and Kant, because they are philosophizing about similar things, but rather to show how Nietzschean reply is opening up a possibility of thinking which is by no means dependant on a man, towards a thought which transcends a modern episteme. Thus, with Kant, we could see a possibility of a different structure, in which the same question is positioned on a different place with a different purpose, at the very beginning of a trajectory of a question Was ist der Mensch? But, its end in the answer der Übermensch is not at all identical with its beginning, it foreshadows a structure composed of different elements, where problem is no longer: are we able to keep transcendental and empirical separated, are we able to differentiate between what is foundational and what is founded? This will be a fundamental confusion of modernity, but what is with a thought which might surpass its boundaries?

6. Kant’s thought itself does not offer us a way out of modern episteme, and simple returning to Kant could hardly provide us with something similar, but at that very moment when through the analysis of modern episteme it comes clear that there, at the very threshold of modernity, is possible to situate a fundamentally different structure, which anyway operates with the very same elements as modernity, anthropological sleep is on the path of it’s destruction. Therefore, here could be peculiar to mention Han’s remark that Foucault’s interpretation of Kant, is not here to contribute to studies of Kant, but that it is rather strategic. (Han 2012: 33)

7. It is interesting how Foucault in the Order of thing in reference to Levi-Strauss’s project is using term ethnology, rather than anthropology.
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In Foucault’s Critical Project, Béatrice Han draws attention to how the critical question that Kant first raised for the field of modern philosophy occupies a central place in Foucault’s works. According to Han, the fundamental problem for Foucault is how to properly articulate our conditions of experience. At a late stage in his career, he states that his concern has always been articulating “the relation between the subject, truth, and the constitution of experience” (2002: 2). Denying that Kant actually solves the problem at a fundamental level through his critical projects, Foucault seeks to address it by taking up his own series of different methodologies, such as archaeology, genealogy, and the study of the constitution of an ethical subject (Han 2002). Indeed, Foucault’s Critical Project aims to see the evolvement of his methods as the process by which he, at one stage after another, seeks to find ever-new approaches to better bring to light how conditions of knowledge work in relation to the truths produced in the process of the constitution of modern subjectivity.

This paper begins with the issue thus recognized by Han: Foucault views Kant as both significant and problematic. In The Order of Things, one of Foucault’s most significant works in which he articulates his methodology explicitly, he clearly presents anthropology as the quintessential model of modern thought, which definitely displaces the episteme of Classical thought and according which we still think, even though “willy-nilly” (Foucault 1970: 250). His reason for using such an expression has to do with the problematic situation of anthropological thinking, whereby no clear boundary is set between the subject and the object of knowledge. Foucault already notes the problem in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, which was written as his secondary thesis (Han 2002). As a secret foundation supporting the purported division between the transcendental and the empirical, anthropology also makes it challenging to arrive at a clear idea of such a division. While one would want to articulate the conditions of knowledge, one already notes that such conditions are already imbricated with the empirical situations within which the subject, in his finitude, is embedded; however, the empirical contents would not have become knowledge in the first place had they not somehow been shaped by transcendental conditions. While it is impossible to differentiate between them, the empirical and the transcendental remain indispensable to one another. The fact that Foucault both posits such a mode of thought (for convenience, I will refer to it as the situation of “finitude” throughout this paper) as one of the definite epistemes in The Order of Things and decries the figure of “man” until the very last sentence of the book attests to his preoccupation with the prob-
lem. According to Han, it also shows how we can regard Foucault’s project as a whole as addressing his own “philosophical ambition” (Han 2002: 5).

This paper, however, takes a different direction in regard to studying how Foucault approaches the problem of finitude. Before asking whether or how Foucault contributes to solving this epistemological dilemma, the paper first aims to observe why or how he values the situation of finitude as a historical phenomenon. Accepting Han’s suggestion that what Foucault views as Kant’s genius is his positing of finitude as the positive foundation of knowledge, rather than as a limitation of it, this paper brings into focus and narrows down the seemingly indispensable points regarding how Foucault explains finitude, rather than focusing on whether or how Foucault escapes such a situation (Han 2003: 128). There are three reasons for my approach. The first is that a close examination of the way in which Foucault illustrates the function of modern thought reveals that, for him, what is significant is not what we can know but how we come to doubt anything. The confusion of the epistemic boundary between the transcendental and the empirical translates into inquisitiveness about the possibility of the existence of such a state in the first place. In other words, doubt arises not despite but due to the absence of the subjectivity that is safely walled off from the rest of the world. Therefore, pursuing the question not by adhering to the line of epistemological inquiry that has already been delineated but by following the way in which Foucault presents the historical contours of the rise of doubt would be productive, in the long run, in enabling us to recontextualize the function of doubt for epistemological inquiries.

The second reason pertains to whether we would not reproduce the problem of the “original” in dealing with the question, which is a central philosophical problem for Foucault in Han’s analysis of it (Han 2003: 128). According to Han, because the epistemological terrain is already contaminated with the movement of Geist—the working of the “unthought” that escapes our rational, reflective attempt to describe the state of thinking—any effort to present such a scene from a stable, conscious vantage point is bound to fail. The inevitability is supported by Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological approaches (Han 2003: 129, 134). However, the problem is that Han often already reads Foucault in line with the critiqued phenomenological attempt, as Gary Gutting notes in his review of Foucault’s Critical Project. He suggests that this is not unrelated to the way in which Han sees “traditional metaphysics” working in The Order of Things or sometimes reads Foucault’s notion of subjectivity as “autonomous”—the kind argued for in Sartrean existentialism (Gutting 2003). Gutting points out that Han might perhaps be too focused on Foucault as a theorist, at the expense of attention to the side of Foucault that gives the readers the experience of seeing the historical realities they are embedded in in a new light. Reading Gutting, one sees how, even while Han notes a philosophical significance in Foucault, she indeed has a tendency to be caught up in the terms of such a problematic, which she sets up herself, thus making it somewhat difficult for a reader to be open to Foucault’s methodology as something unprecedented. However, it is still true that, for Foucault, clarifying his own methodology both for himself and for his readers was an important pursuit throughout his career. Moreover, rather than being unconcerned with “how to understand and jus-

1. The final sentence of The Order of Things ends as follows: “[...] one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1970: 387). Man is the figure of anthropological thinking, showing how the subject itself is at stake in knowing and how, in knowing, the subject itself appears as an object of knowing.
tify [his] approach philosophically,” he very much defined his own approach in philosophical terms, starting with his use of the term “anthropology” throughout *The Order of Things* and as can be seen in his discussions of various philosophers throughout his career—certainly at least beyond a level that Gutting might consider “casual employment” (Gutting 2003).2

If, as Gutting states, Foucault’s texts work by pointing to the “small spark of subjectivity” embedded in our “everyday human life,” Han would argue that there should be a reason for it to work in such a way, which validates the theoretical pursuit to articulate such a reason (Gutting 2003). Moreover, while it is true that rules that condition our knowledge can very well remain unconscious without us trying to articulate them (the point Gutting uses to note the pointlessness of seeing a philosophical dilemma coming from the impossibility of accessing the unconscious), it is also true that, as Gutting himself notes, such unconscious rules are sometimes brought to the conscious level, which is precisely what happens in the emergence of modern thought. The question then arises about how to regard this unconsciousness turned consciousness, however difficult a task it may seem. The question is not necessarily, as Gutting suggests it, to let history be history; rather, it is whether any attempt to describe our experience in a generalized language would inevitably end up with a theory that necessitates the subject/object binary. In this regard, this paper takes a cue from Foucault’s own argument that modern thought never works by suggesting a theory but always already by acting (1970: 328). In his attempt to describe how thought functions, does Foucault offer us a way in which to build concepts that do not actually reproduce the problematic binary? Analyzing his passages in *The Order of Things*, I argue that this indeed looks to be the case. I argue that the specific spatiality that Foucault argues opens up in our experience of finitude can best be mapped via a relative conceptual pair: “here” versus “elsewhere.”

I argue that examining how Foucault presents thought as a positive historical dynamic would open a path for reevaluating the way in which he identifies us as Neo-Kantians (Han 2002: 3). This is the third reason for my argument. In keeping with the line of thought suggested in this paper, it would be possible for us to focus on Foucault’s historical thesis, not in terms of how he overcomes Kant via “throwing off the last anthropological constraints” (Han 2002: 5) but in terms of how the history of modern thought is itself a series of returns to the Kantian question. In stating what appears to be a strictly epistemological problem, Foucault derives a positive rule about the emergence of such a problem in a move that historically validates the phenomenon. Thus, when he states, “the empirical contents of knowledge necessarily release, of themselves, the conditions that have made them possible” (1970: 322), he is not only discussing what seems to be a perennial problem but is also positing a historical “necessity.” My examinations aim to reveal the way Foucault had definite ideas on how certain historical necessities were working in moving the dynamic of thought forward, although at this stage, I am aware that this alone would not suffice as explanations on what will be presented in the following.

The paper will thus present Foucault’s ideas on modern thought in a few divided stages. First, in describing the basic situation of finitude, it suggests that Foucault conceptualizes the terrain of such an experience as the space of the body. Second, it suggests that the

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2. I think Gutting’s point can be taken to the extent that we understand it as “Foucault never takes any of these thinkers as absolute on their own terms.”
bodily space thus identified always opens up as a relative distance between a “here”—the locus of thought—and an “elsewhere”—where the thought, in its singularity, seems to have originated. The emergence of such a distance triggers the rise of the doubt regarding how such a space can actually exist or how it is possible for ‘me’ to accommodate such a space. I then examine the way in which the process of subject-object transformation and the idea of agency are imbedded in such relative spatiality. Finally, I suggest how this spatialization aids us in appreciating Foucault’s suggestion that we are all Neo-Kantians.

Originally, the finitude theme comes from a passage in *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which Kant discusses how an experience of looking up at the starry sky led to his intuition about the immortal realm of morality, in stark contrast to the attending realization of his own finitude as a being. A sense of mutual connection between himself and the rest of the universe is established, with Kant noting his “importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came, the matter which is for a little time provided with vital force” (Caygill 1995: 200–201). In *The Order of Things*, which comprises a historical presentation of epistemes, the framework of finitude assumes central significance as having brought forward a specifically modern form of knowledge. Even in the guise of the problematic anthropology, the situation of modern thought, where man comes to knowledge precisely through the impossibility of ever dissociating himself from that which he wants to know, definitely displaces the classical mode of thought. In Classical thought, what is primary is coming to terms with different representations that characterize anything. If it was a case in biology and a flower was being analyzed, such representations would include the shape of its stem, the number of its petals, and the anatomy of its seeds. The representations of different flowers thus recognized would consist of a higher level of representation. The very function of thought is to secure the consistency of the link between what one sees in nature and the tabula of representations that orders nature. Thus, any hierarchy in the properties of nature can be articulated solely in terms of the relations among the representations on the tabula. On the other hand, in modern thought, what is prioritized is the observation of the various functions that maintain a flower’s life, which is essentially not different from the life of the observer. A perspective is born whereby, rather than distinct entities, the plant and the observer are all part of the larger mechanism by means of which diverse functions, such as breathing, reproduction, and circulation, occur in and through such entities. What should now be thought of as hierarchical is not a series of different visible characteristics that should be representable but, rather, resides among the diverse mechanisms and functions occurring in the world at large, which are especially concentrated in the bodies of certain organisms. The entire priorities of observation change.

Both in his actual discussion of the examples of modern thought in Chapter Eight and in his exploration of such a mode of thought among the central thinkers of the time in the following chapter, Foucault repeatedly attempts to express what he is seeking to describe. How would it be possible to generalize the working of thought, which, in its different instantiations, seems to preclude a clear delineation of what is being observed, because it always embeds the thinking subject in the midst of the larger processes? On many occasions, Foucault’s own language seems riddled with the very sense of confusion to which one is subjected when attempting to think through finitude. However, it still remains the case that Foucault denotes the givenness of the state itself as facticity. Furthermore, it is clear in his language that he essentially sees the state itself as bodily. That is, the experi-
ence of finitude—whatever it is ‘about’—is foremost felt in and through the body. In his language, because there is no boundary between ‘me’ and the rest of the universe in such a state, one’s body itself turns into the space of experience:

“But to man’s experience a body has been given, a body which is his body — a fragment of ambiguous space, whose peculiar and irreducible spatiality is nevertheless articulated upon the space of things; to this same experience, desire is given as a primordial appetite on the basis of which all things assume value, and relative value; to this same experience, a language is given in the thread of which all the discourses of all times, all successions and all simultaneities may be given. This is to say that each of these positive forms in which man can learn that he is finite is given to him only against the background of its own finitude.”

(Foucault 1970: 314)

With the body, a curious concept of space opens up. In other words, via the tangible experience that occurs through my body, I come to know a larger space that is related to this particular space of experience, although it is impossible for me to precisely tell them apart. However much confusion such an experience entails, Foucault makes it certain that he grasps this spatiality as pertaining to the experience of finitude in general, using the phrase “to this same experience” in repetition.

Is there any indication of the precise relationship between this particular “fragment” of a space and the larger “space of things” based upon which this “ambiguous” yet “particular and irreducible” bodily space is “articulated?” This question equates to inquiring how to understand the spatial terms that Foucault uses when referring to the figure of man or the event of modern thought. In his expressions, thought straddles a definite extension in each of its emergences:

“Man is a mode of being which accommodates that dimension [...] which extends from a part of himself not reflected in a cogito to the act of thought by which he apprehends that part; and which, in the inverse direction, extends from that pure apprehension to the empirical clutter.”

(Foucault 1970: 322–323)

This is how Foucault rewrites the fundamental moment in Kantian reflection, in which Kant, as the critical subject, emerges precisely when he perceives the continuity between the universe and his own “animal existence,” which is a mere “speck” of it (Kant 1979, CPrR 5: 162).

What looks at least certain is that, regardless of the question of whether there is a larger space and a smaller space that should somehow be clearly related in definite terms, the question arising from accommodating such a space in Foucault’s articulation of it transmits a definite sense of there ‘being’ such a space in the first place:

“How can man be that life whose web, pulsations, and buried energy constantly exceed the experience that he is immediately given of them? How can he be that labour whose laws and demands are imposed upon him like some alien system? How can he be the subject of a language that for thousands of years has been formed without him, a language whose organization escapes him, whose meaning
sleeps an almost invincible sleep in the words he momentarily activates by means of discourse, and within which he is obliged, from the very outset, to lodge his speech and thought, as though they were doing no more than animate, for a brief period, one segment of that web of innumerable possibilities?"

(Foucault 1970: 323)

This is a series of questions, but these questions ironically communicate the unbelievable certainty that ‘I’ am accommodating a space that erases the bodily boundary between the rest of the world and me. That is, it is precisely because it is so certain that there is such an ambiguous spatiality that there arises the question about the possibility of ever positioning an ‘I’ in seamless continuation with the ‘non-I.’ This is the moment that causes Foucault to transpose what is originally a properly epistemological question for Kant into a question of being; at the same time, this is also the moment in which the epistemological value of modern thought reveals its power. The seemingly plain question, ‘How can A be B?’ is one that is not even possible to arise in the Classical episteme. In representation, A always ends up being A, because the process of thinking and that of signification exactly overlap. Here, the surprising realization that it can indeed be the case that A does not have to be just A, and that A can actually blend into B, lets the questions emerge. Finitude no longer appears as an epistemological dead end; it actually promotes thinking in new ways.

What would be the implications of the above analysis? In The Order of Things, Foucault repeatedly argues that finitude should be considered at the level of being rather than as a problem of epistemology per se. However, from what we have seen in some key passages, it appears that communicating the whole sense of grasping the being of such a space, with all its amazement and disbelief, seems central to the argument — perhaps even more than the mere positing of the argument. This should explain why Descartes’ cogito appears to be so important for Foucault in his discussion of modern thought, which is taken to task after he posits modern thought with Kant. As is still apparent in Foucault’s reading of the Meditations six years later, Descartes is valuable for him because Descartes regarded meditation as a process by means of which the meditating subject can and even should be palpably “affected” by the effect of his own thoughts, which is a state that Foucault clearly identifies with the state of finitude in The Order of Things (1998: 406). With regard to Descartes, Foucault argues that “the thought of the ill-thought, of the non-true, of the chimera, of the purely imaginary […] emerged as the possible locus and the primary, irrefutable proof of all these experiences,” thereby illustrating the impossibility of their “not being thoughts” (1970: 324).

Thus, I contend that Foucault’s own “modern cogito,” a concept that he obviously derives from Descartes in a move that modifies it in a certain way, merits our attention to see how, if ever, Foucault conceptualizes modern thought on his own terms. If Foucault brings finitude and the cogito together, I suggest that such a move shows that he is attempting to arrive at as definite a conceptualization of modern thought for himself as possible. However, before we move to the passage in which he specifically builds upon Descartes, let me visit a related passage in which he describes modern thought in other terms. I want to see whether this passage, which can be said to be characteristic of many difficult passages that have plagued many readers of The Order of Things, can guide our reading of the modern cogito passage. As a passage that contains the often, as many have it, mysti-
cal-sounding description of thought, it would give us both an idea of what Foucault is attempting to grapple with himself and a text to come back to and interpret once we have visited modern cogito as the concept that would anchor our further readings.

Accessible as neither absolutely private nor completely objective, thought appears as a series of transformations that draw both what only appears to be the subject and the object of thought to the heart of the dynamic of thought. Thought, as it were, reveals both the subject and the object as already different:

“What is essential is that thought, both for itself and in the density of its workings, should be both knowledge and a modification of what it knows, reflection and a transformation of the mode of being of that on which it reflects. Whatever it touches it immediately causes to move: it cannot discover the unthought, or at least move towards it, without immediately bringing the unthought nearer to itself—or even, perhaps, without pushing it further away, and in any case without causing man’s own being to undergo a change by that very fact, since it is deployed in the distance between them.”

(Foucault 1970: 327)

What is he suggesting here? To put it in a context that is more congenial to our own understanding, let me attempt to arrive at this passage again through some detours. First, Foucault proposes Kant’s finitude as the quintessential moment of modern thought. In this space, one literally experiences being a part of the universe as matter that comes from there and to which it will return. Second, Foucault suggests that this peculiar bodily space should be conceptualized on the level of being. The possibility of such a conceptualization is itself the reason why modern thought is so radically different from Classical thought, where the modern thought already questions it as it emerges. Now, he argues that this special space is one of transformation. In the midst of the experience in which I feel a profound oneness with everything around me, a mutation happens; it is felt not only by me, who undergoes it, but probably also by whatever I am interacting with, whether I am sensing the particularly comforting warmth of an evening, experiencing a friend’s embrace, or in the throes of hammering on a desk I am building.

We have already conceptualized thought as bodily and as being; therefore, the transformation under discussion should naturally be ontological and ‘real.’ We do not know if Foucault has any idea about the actual mechanism of the transformation process he discusses. However, it remains the case that he is definitely suggesting that what is really acting or doing something in the midst of the confused state of the finitude is neither a subject nor an object but something that happens in between. The absence of a subject or an object is insignificant here compared to the more important point that some ‘happening’ is described as occurring in relation to both, although there is really no ‘them’ proper. As Foucault puts it, knowing cannot happen without the “modification” of what one wants to know nor without the “being” of the subject of knowledge undergoing “change.” Obviously, his problem is that it should be presented without resorting to any stable concept of subject, object, or anything capturable through the net of representation, when the process itself is the material of his historical thesis. This situation is all the more difficult because modern thought should be clearly differentiated from Classical thought, which works through representation. This should explain why many of Foucault’s phrases that he uses in his attempt to bring to light modern thought sound like a quasi-mystical account of
an “imperative” that “haunts” thought “from within” whether “it be given currency in the form of ethics, politics, humanism, a duty to assume responsibility for the fate of the West, or the mere consciousness of performing, in history, a bureaucratic function” (Foucault 1970: 327). As though on its own, thought is shown to go out into the world and perform all sorts of activities; it “offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites” and “cannot help but liberate and enslave” (Foucault 1970: 328). These series of reflections should also explain why Foucault emphasizes that one of the most essential characteristics of modern thought is that it is no longer theoretical; theory works through replication, while thought “had already ‘left’ itself in its own being as early as the nineteenth century,” precluding any possibility of it being copied. This must be why modern thought, “in its very dawning,” is a “perilous act”; “Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud, and Bataille have understood this on behalf of all those who tried to ignore it; but it is also certain that Hegel, Marx, and Freud knew it” (Foucault 1970: 328).

It is indeed a strange idea of agency that is difficult to communicate. Strictly speaking, then, by describing thought as doing one thing after another, Foucault is inevitably misrepresenting it, couching it in the position of the subject of a sentence. The question, then, remains regarding whether it would be possible for anyone to conceptualize the way in which thought functions in such a quasi-autonomous sense. I have been arguing that, in Foucault’s presentation of modern thought, there is an underlying yet concrete conceptualization of the experience of thought as that of occupying a specifically felt bodily space. Therefore, the question remains regarding whether such a conceptualization can be further modified based on Foucault’s discussions so that spatiality itself can become a mapping that denotes the mechanism of the curious agency of transformation.

Central to Foucault’s presentation of the modern cogito is how the space of thought can and cannot be occupied, as it were, simultaneously. There is, in modern cogito, the palpable sense that I am occupying a specific locus in relation to the rest of the universe. This sense is actually what is common between Descartes’ original cogito and Foucault’s modern cogito; it is what Descartes uses as the basis of the full “Cogito, sum.” However, for Foucault, the movement from the certainty of occupying a spatiality to the certainty that such a space absolutely exists cannot be validated. Instead, precisely because it cannot replicate, in absolute terms, the distance thus experienced, modern cogito begins to move itself in a desire to occupy such a strange space again:

“[...] Descartes was concerned to reveal thought as the most general form of all those thoughts we term error or illusion, thereby rendering them harmless, so that he would be free, once that step had been taken, to return to them, to explain them, and then to provide a method of guarding against them. In the modern cogito, on the other hand, we are concerned to grant the highest value, the greatest dimension, to the distance that both separates and links thought-conscious-of-itself and whatever, within thought, is rooted in non-thought. The modern cogito (and this is why it is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken afresh) must traverse, duplicate, and reactivate in an explicit form the articulation of thought on everything within it, around it, and beneath it which is not thought, yet which is nevertheless not foreign to thought, in the sense of an irreducible, and insuperable exteriority. In this form, cogito will not therefore be the sudden and illuminating discovery that all thought is thought, but the constantly renewed interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere.
than here, and yet so very close to itself; how can it be in the forms of non-thinking."

(Foucault 1970: 324)

Foucault makes it clear that modern thought does not freeze the being of thought into a representation: it is “not [...] the [...] discovery that all thought is thought,” as if whatever is thought should be represented as an indefinite A. The reason there arises a desire for thought to seek to “articulate” itself in relation to everything around it again is precisely because it is at a loss regarding how to have an idea of itself as an absolute spatiality. Here, Foucault is suggesting that Descartes, after having experienced such a spatiality, proceeded to turn the distance between the locus of thought and where the thought should have arrived from into an absolute distance, an ideal one, so that he can safely possesses it, precisely because he is scared to go back to such a space again. Modern cogito lets such a confusion to immediately turn itself into a desire to accommodate such a space again. The doubt arising on the occasion is not transposed into a question couched in the language of representation, asking whether what had just appeared is A, not A, or B – a movement of thought in the case of Descartes’ cogito. The disbelief in occupying a space in which A blends into not A directly translates into a desire to occupy such a space again, seeking in fact to reoccupy the knowledge of A = not A.

This is to say that modern thought, by its nature, is always in progress. It is literally moving or moving on. For me, who is involved in observing the sky and feeling as if I am a child of the sky, it seems that something within me is inquisitively seeking, in all directions, a way in which to repeat such a curious instance of occupying a space. A desire is working, as though of its own volition, to “traverse, duplicate, and reactivate” the “articulation of thought” on the “irreducible exteriority” that is “within it, around it, and beneath it.” The very continuity of its own movement seems to tow me toward the direction in its advance, ever seeking to transform the “elsewhere,” which is always so tantalizingly “close to itself,” into yet another “here” that is involved in its own “ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken afresh.” The question again is how to transpose this event into a concept that does not, as in Descartes’ reasoning, make thought into an absolute extension that exists regardless of my own occupation of it. We can say here that, at the level of Foucault’s underlying conceptualization, there is properly no space of thought that ‘I’ do not actually occupy.

So far, it appears as if the mapping of the space of thought seems to be the best approach we have, because we cannot resort to grammar to represent thought in the best way we can. We can think of it as a distance that is always perceived as a definite extension between an elsewhere and a here but yet is never the kind that can be represented via the language of an absolute locus. As a relative distance, it can only be mapped by the curious pair of here and elsewhere; each member of the pair can only exist by being referred to by the other, but this does not mean that neither of them exists. Therefore, I suggest that we use the conceptual pair ‘here—elsewhere’ to denote the mutual, relative constitution of the here and the elsewhere that always opens up in our experience of thought—at least the way it happens according to the way in which Foucault presents modern thought. The usefulness of this pair further lies in the fact that together, they show how thought is always an advance with a definite (search for) directionality. If it were simply a relative distance, the two poles of such a distance would endlessly oscillate, referring to one another.
However, because it is a ceaseless effort to transform an elsewhere into a here, it becomes a purposeful ‘moving toward,’ rather than a simple ‘moving.’ That thought is always actively searching for the next locus for it to occupy is palpable in the passage above. This certainly does not have to do with the question of the direction in which thought should progress in an absolute sense, such as the north or the south. At the least, a sense of ‘moving toward’ is indispensable to characterize modern thought, which, for Foucault, historically differentiates it from classical thought: “more fundamentally, modern thought is advancing towards that region where man’s Other must become the Same as himself” (Foucault 1970: 328).

The conceptual pair would not only be useful in decoding The Order of Things. It would also help us to rethink the significance of thought in Foucault’s historical concerns. It does seem that the relative space thus configured is a definite dimension that Foucault forces us to take into account in our consideration of the contemporary. It involves a dimension that cannot be conceptualized with a static formula, such as A = A or A = not A. It always involves a movement in progress that cannot be factored into the one-dimensional tabula of representation. If such a mode of thought brings the dimension of post-Classical thought into existence, how could it be possible to conceptualize what brings Classical and possibly other modes of thought into existence? Can historical change be understood dimensionally, if ever? Do different dimensions interact, if there are such things? One can at least begin to wonder what happens when Descartes, in his apparently illogical turn of thought, posits the cogito as absolute. As Kiarina Kordela argues, just because a thought is illogical does not mean that it does not produce any effect; capitalism is produced with such wrong turns of rationalities (1999: 792; see also Kordela 2007). In addition, we can reconsider the significance of anthropology for Foucault, because it never appears to be a stable concept in itself either. According to Foucault, modern thought does not work through ethics because it never works theoretically. Therefore, it seems inevitable that “the ceaselessly repeated injunction to return to the break established by Kant,” which Foucault argues is present in our time, comes through anthropological thinking itself, which is a mode of thought that advances precisely for a desire to return (to the relative spatiality which it is certain it has just occupied) (Han 2002: 3). It does seem that Foucault, in his historical turn, gives weight to our practice of thinking in its various guises.

Bibliography


I will try to outline how Foucault’s critique works when it comes to categories employed by
the psychiatric and psychological sciences. We know that in his theoretical formulations
relating to critique, Foucault always emphasizes that he does not have recourse to any
external norm, neither political, nor epistemological, on which he could establish his cri-
tique. This is so because Foucault does not offer a social theory, nor a type of critical the-
ory, which would be situated on a different level compared to his empirical investigations.

Foucault’s critics often labeled his genealogies as “relativist”, “postmodern” or “social
constructionist” (Fraser 1990, Walzer 1986, Habermas 1990). Now, Foucault is certainly
a nominalist in his method and a critical thinker in his politics, two features that equally
qualify the self-understanding of social constructionist approaches as well. Furthermore,
social constructionist approaches also seemingly repudiate external norms on which to
establish their critique (but, as I will argue, they are not very successful in doing so). How-
ever, Foucault is not a constructionist, and even less a social constructionist, as this
notion is generally understood. Therefore, his critique is also different from the one
adopted by the tenants of this type of approach.

In critical social science and also in foucauldian genealogy a very special attention is
attached to the analysis of such sciences as psychiatry, psychology or special education,
for they can play an important role in the subjugation, regulation and transformation of
subjects. How do social constructionist approaches proceed when they analyze psychia-
tric, psychological, criminological categories and categorized subjects? And how does fou-
cauldian genealogy? They are both not interested in how one becomes a psychiatric
patient, deviant or mentally handicapped due to supposedly preexisting disadvantages,
impairments, or illnesses, but rather, they ask: how these definitions or categorizations
come about? They do not take for granted the existence of categories defined by psychia-
try, nor the procedures of categorization, but ask how categorizations occur.

I would like to present a conceptual outline of social constructionism, its epistemology
and its failure to propose a viable critique of categories of deviance/abnormality – due to
unconsciously applied epistemological norms and what some theoreticians call “ontologi-
cal gerrymandering”. Then, I will argue that Foucault’s genealogical critique avoid these
pitfalls, for it does not claim “epistemological sovereignty”, which he criticizes in his writ-
ings and interviews concerning intellectuals and criticism in general (Foucault 1971, Fou-
And still, his genealogies are capable of preserving critical force, due to what I will characterize as the “genealogical circle”.

**Ontological gerrymandering**

Constructionist analyses (a tradition dating back to labeling theories of the 50’s and 60’s), contrary to objectivist and functionalist approaches, which concentrate on social pathologies considered as objective, were inclined to deal with institutions of social control. Instead of so-called “real deviance” preexisting societal reaction, they were interested in institutions or individuals who perceived and defined some conducts as deviant. Thus, in their view, deviance and the perception of deviant groups are created by reactions to certain conducts, but independently of their characteristics; also, any type of conduct could be labeled. Therefore, they refrained from formulating anything with regard to the objective reality of deviance. But if there is no objective reality of deviance or of non-deviance, then how can the deviant label be criticized? What could be the basis of the critique? There are several, although implicit or unconscious strategies to solve this problem, which have been unearthed by (non-objectivist) critiques of the constructionist discourse.

In a famous article, entitled “Ontological Gerrymandering”, Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch revealed an inherent ambiguity in what they call “social problems explanations” (which roughly designate social constructionist approaches concerning phenomena relative to criminality, “deviant” subcultures, moral panics and their media representations etc.). These researchers, say Woolgar and Pawluch, “elaborate the imperative to study definitions of social problems rather than the imputed conditions themselves. To do so, they employ the assumption that in many cases definitions of social problems vary while conditions do not”. (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985: 216). Therefore, these researchers, by presupposing some “stable conditions”, seem to reintroduce tacitly the reality of deviant behavior, but before its labeling as such, as a kind of preexisting reality, which could be distinguished from its definition. Woolgar and Pawluch name this procedure “ontological gerrymandering”. This is expressed by the formula that they borrow from a constructionist researcher: “The same “objective” condition may be defined as a problem in one time period, not in another” (Gusfield 1981: 8, cited by Woolgar and Pawluch 1985: 216). This is a kind of ontological manipulation (though, of course, not identified as such by Gusfield), which renders uncertain the status of definitions, by referring to a so-called “more real reality”. For researchers generally implied that the label being a putative characteristic, it does not have a basis in reality, therefore it cannot be justified. If the definition is considered as “putative”, the word suggests that it is not true, not founded in reality. But it is at this point that the problem actually arises: what is that reality that we are supposed to refer to? For this so-called reality has been already bracketed by the initial methodological considerations.

Also, this supposedly more real reality is never examined by the researchers. This means that in social constructionist approaches the definitions of the sociologists do not fall under the category of labeling, for they pretend to express “what there is”, even though,
what really exists, the sociologist could not investigate, because, in his theoretical credo, he had already excluded the investigation of the “objective reality”.

Other social constructionists adopt a different strategy, denying at all the existence of underlying objective phenomena as such under the constructed definition. They “rely on the theoretical principle that all societal reactions might be unwarranted. They describe the labeling process as it applies to particular substantive arenas of social action. In their selection of substantive arenas they display a remarkable affinity for “socially ambiguous subject matters” (Rains 1975: 6). For example:

“Witches have become interesting again not because of their renewed claim to existence in certain circles, but precisely because their claim to existence has been so thoroughly discredited. They stand now as the pure case of un-warranted imputation, the kind of ideal case in which no actual deviance is involved.”

(Rains 1975: 6)

Clearly, in their case, we could easily assert that “the deviant act is nonexistent” Other examples are mental illness or juvenile delinquency because they “are so nebulously defined” [...] that it is very difficult to establish “the grounds for deciding whether a person is “really” mentally ill” (Rains, 1975: 7). In fact, in the two strategies mentioned, critique can be inserted by virtue of the separation of the conditions and their definitions. For these definitions seem to be only the consequence of the historical and social changes in the context of the defining subjects, and not due in any way to the defined objects.

When talk about social construction appears in a debate between different scientific disciplines, the problematic will be a little more complicated. This is the case for example when critical sociology reveals that “mild mental handicaps” are constructed by unwarranted psychological practices, such as IQ testing and subsequent irrelevant categorization. Constructionist sociologists view these handicaps as mostly or exclusively transposing social disadvantages in the realm of school, for psychology and special education serves the middle-class interests of the status quo, by helping to maintain ideologically defined normalcy. In this presentation psychology becomes the agent of the dominant social classes. However, psychologists can easily retort that they are the ones who actually know what is going on in a school, while sociologists are the ones who adopt a remote and ideological perspective; they can also refer to their manuals, professional training and scientific legitimacy in order to deny their embeddedness in simple and direct power relations. Henceforth, the debate will be about which science has privileged access to reality, in this case, the reality of school, and thereby, which is the one that can determine the actually existing entities (also by recategorizing the rival discipline’s categories) and so the real nature of “mild mental handicaps”. This problematic is all the more interesting that the symptomatology of “mild mental handicaps” is supposed to be situated on the frontier of nature and society; therefore, the stake for critical sociology is to separate the natural and the social components. This means that in this kind of critical discourse the opposites of “real” and “constructed” will eventually be formulated as the opposites of “natural” and “social” (with all the unfolding contradictions of this kind of translation, see Latour 1993 and 2005).
Therefore, the pretension to criticize and the corresponding scientific and intellectual procedure are contradictory with the original intention of social constructionism, namely, that

A) one should not deal with the labeled conduct, and

B) that one should consider every label as constructed.

Because if the definitions are at one and the same time putative and unverifiable, than we encounter a contradictory theoretical statement. For, then, one should refer to some kind of a preexisting reality, the ontological status of which has been taken for granted.

In critical sociological approaches relative to the psychological disciplines, critique will be based on presumed doubtful manipulations, categorizations influenced by power interests, procedures, which seem to imply some kind of social causation. This kind of sociological approach with regard to the psychological sciences is attractive because it makes it easier to take a normative stance, also by the adoption of a realist truth criterion (presuming that there is an ever existing reality structured in a specific way, which has to be unveiled by science – however this is only possible if scientific practices are not diverted by social influences.) In this view, all effects originating from the social context induce scientific practices in error, and conversely, “valid results” do not need to be explained causally.

Needless to say that this standpoint ignores the “strong program” of the sociology of science (Bloor 1976) as well as the results of “science studies” and generally of anthropological approaches to scientific practices, which do not differentiate between “natural” and “social” components in an a priori way (Latour 1993). These latter do not take social causes as reducing the scientificity of a given categorization either. Conversely, in critical sociological approaches of the psychological sciences the “natural” component survives as a metaphysical presupposition, for they give up its real study as something that falls outside social science.

This means that constructionist arguments can fulfil neither the relativist, nor the critical program: each time they fall back on realism and an exterior epistemological norm. Furthermore, the so-called “reality”, as the basis of this type of realism, is defined, that is, constructed, by the sociologist (without examining it). However, the sociologist’s own definitions are not meant to be treated as constructions, for he takes it for granted that what he does is superior (in an epistemological sense) to the object of his analyses (in this case the psychological sciences). But this means that they tacitly and illegitimately introduce an epistemological critique, which contradicts the initial methodological postulates: ontological gerrymandering is a practice to ascertain one’s epistemological sovereignty, in this case over the psychological sciences.

This argument against social constructionism resembles a great deal Habermas’ accusation against Foucault. Habermas termed Foucault’s genealogies as crypto-normative (Habermas 1990), because Foucault seems to provide an empirical description of power relations, while also reintroducing a transcendental concept of power: for Foucault, according to Habermas, power is everywhere, and one cannot be liberated from power relations, because, for him, talking in terms of repression and liberation does not make
sense in the first place. However, according to Habermas, Foucault analyses empirical power relations with the aim of criticizing them, which is contradictory, for he had already excluded the possibility to rely on whatever normative basis for the sake of the critique of power. Clearly, Habermas (but also Foucault’s other critiques like Nancy Fraser, Michael Walzer etc.) links the possibility of critique to a concept of power, which works with the notions of repression and liberation. He is convinced that these always should at least be implicit in all critical approaches. Therefore, Habermas repudiates the idea of “productive power”, which, in his sense, inherently prevents critique, while making it necessary to tacitly and covertly reintroduce critique without a real and viable critical basis. This is what amounts to crypto-normativism. However, whereas the critique of Woolgar and Pawluch and others against social constructionist discourse is valid, it is not the case with the Habermassian critique targeted against Foucault. Furthermore, Foucault’s genealogies can provide a viable and critical alternative to social construction talk. Let us now examine, why that is so.

Woolgar and Pawluch, at the end of their article (not unlike Habermas) also ask whether it is possible to describe phenomena independently from their ontological status. And, if there is no objective element, would critique be still possible? So the question is, and now independently of Woolgar and Pawluch, if critique can be done without having recourse to an explicit and exterior norm, without having to take a dubious epistemological stance?

**Hacking’s critique of social construction**

Before examining Foucault’s genealogy in this respect, we should turn to one of Ian Hacking’s formulations in his *The Social Construction of What?* (1999), in order to highlight a somewhat different problem with social constructionism. According to Hacking, discourse on social construction is ambiguous, because it is often not clear, whether researchers talk about the construction of the object or the construction of the concept of the object. For example, according to Hacking, talking about the construction of “child abuse” does not mean denying the existence of abused children (Hacking 1999: 9). It only means concentrating on the importance of category making. This distinction often disappears with social construction theorists.

This inherent ambiguity of social construction talk, says Hacking, is due to the fact that the aim of this approach is to demonstrate that the objects in question were created in a historical process, which highlights their non-inevitable nature. So, it would have been possible that the objects did not come to existence. But from this, social constructionists often conclude that the objects do not actually exist, or that they only exist in those peoples’ minds who construct the categories. However, as we saw, more often social constructionists understand that what are constructed are not the objects, but only the categories: these are the ones which are established by our practices (Hacking 1999: 47). Second, it is not contradictory to assert at the same time that the object is fabricated, that is, has come to existence at a certain particular moment, has a history and that at this very moment it really exists: the process of construction does not imply at all that the object does not actually exist. Third, and most importantly, it is not all about concepts. It is also about the becoming of those objects designated by the concepts. The psychological
sciences have an ontological role, the way they influence, produce reality: that is, not only theoretical entities, but also real ones.

Therefore, critical sociologists generally neglect what psychological and other human sciences create, their influence on the real individuals in question. They fail to consider the productivity of the psychological sciences – when the question is not only the making of theoretical entities, but equally that of real ones. They treat these sciences according to their ability of reflecting human reality in an objective way, which can be measured by their capability of getting rid of “social effects”, by disentangling themselves from relations of power. In turn, this more or less objective image could supposedly be separated without contradiction from the reality the sciences examine, which means that there is no mutual influence between the two.

Now, I believe that Foucault does not commit the fault of ontological gerrymandering; neither could his stance be qualified as “crypto-normative”. Also, he does not confuse the construction of the object with the construction of its concept. Let’s take the example of the genealogy of forensic psychiatry, which could highlight how foucauldian genealogy is different from social constructionist critiques to which it is often and mistakenly assimilated.

The two moments of Foucault’s genealogies

In what sense does prison constitute delinquency? How are abnormal individuals constructed? And how is it possible to criticize these processes? In order to answer these questions, I will introduce a distinction between two moments in Foucault’s nominalist method, which in turn correspond to two moments of critique. Finally, I will argue that for him no external normative position will be needed for the foundation of critique, which remains embedded in genealogies.

Foucault’s main question in *Discipline and Punish* is how the unshakeable evidence of prison came about as seemingly the most efficient and the most humane mode of punishment. Prison creates the field of objectivities in which punishment can be conceived and practiced as therapy, while the sentence preceding the confinement appears as stemming from a scientific discourse (Foucault 1977). This discourse is constituted by means of gathering knowledge about individuals, by constructing and analyzing their personality, biography, character traits as well as their past and present behavior. Now, this is the first moment of genealogy: demonstrating that nothing in history was predetermined, that no teleological view is possible and that everything came about by certain contingent events and scientific constructions. This is the nominalism which accounts for the coming about of scientific objects in history. But, it does not follow that those objects would not exist in reality, or that they should be less real than others, on the contrary. Nor does it imply that those scientific practices constituting their objects would be erroneous is an epistemological sense. For there is a second moment in foucauldian genealogy, which establishes that those objects are real, and precisely because they have been constructed.
That prison can fabricate criminals is due to the fact that psychiatry appeared in the field of justice and punishment. It is true that some genealogical moments seem to be lacking from the analysis of *Discipline and Punish*, furthermore, the interpretation of the *Panopticon* itself raises some questions as well (Berkovits 2009). However, the Collège de France lectures entitled *Abnormal* held in the same period as the book was written (1974-1975) offer a much more detailed analysis attenuating this picture, while they diagnose the intrusion of psychiatry into practices of legal punishment. This diagnosis at the same time functions as the immanent critique of psychiatry and normalization. This critique emerges in the genealogy of the psychological and psychiatric sciences and their functioning, for in modernity those are precisely these sciences, in quest of some human essence, which are the most significant carriers and support of those evidences. Many times they are linked to dispositives of power, disciplinary institutions, and they have recourse to knowledge about humans for their better and more effective subjugation, while scientifically legitimating these practices.

“It is, after all, one of the most immediate and fundamental presuppositions of all judicial, political, and critical discourse that there is an essential affiliation between stating the truth and the practice of justice. Where the institution appointed to govern justice and the institutions qualified to express the truth encounter each other, or more concisely, where the court and the expert encounter each other, where judicial institutions and medical knowledge, or scientific knowledge in general, intersect, statements are formulated having the status of true discourses with considerable judicial effects.”

(Foucault 2003: 11)

For sure, the appearance of psychiatry was by no means predetermined by exterior conditions, but was linked to a clearly definable event, which is the appearance (in its psychiatric definition) in the 19th century, of “homicidal monomania” (Foucault 2003: 119), characterizing a type of “moral monster”, and the crime committed by him (as it is documented in the Collège de France lectures, entitled *Abnormal*). In this case, the perpetrator of the crime, according to the psychiatric expert assessments, is not insane; however, his act seems to be unmotivated: the law cannot do anything with him, for it cannot understand his reasons.

“The criminal subject’s reason is the condition of the application of the law. The law cannot be applied if the subject is not rational: That is what Article 64 says. But exercise of the right to punish says: I can punish only if I understand why he committed the act, how he committed the act, that is to say, if I can enter into the analyzable intelligibility of the act in question. Hence the radically uncomfortable position of psychiatry as soon as it is dealing with a motiveless act committed by a subject endowed with reason; or again, every time that it deals with an act whose analytic principle of intelligibility cannot be found, but which is the act of a subject whom one cannot demonstrate to be in a state of dementia. We inevitably find ourselves in a situation in which the exercise of punitive power can no longer justify itself, since we find no intrinsic intelligibility of the act through which the exercise of punitive power connects up with the crime. [...] Consequently it can no longer judge; it is obliged to come to a halt and put questions to psychiatry.”

(Foucault 2003: 116-117)
Therefore, the criminal will be recoded on a different normative register, namely that of psychiatry, and correlative, the legal procedure will be changed as well. This means that the legal norms will be employed by the mediation of extra-legal norms, which are, in this case, the psychiatric norms, and which, in turn, create the figure of the abnormal. These norms obey to a different type of rationality, but can be integrated into the legal machinery, creating thereby the relationship between criminality and mental illness, and discovering the abnormal in all spheres of society - whereas, before, these two were radically different: the mentally ill, by definition, was not responsible for his acts. From now on, the sentence will be based on the personality of the criminal, beyond his act. It turns to the criminal, who is not perceived as someone breaching the law, as a perpetrator of a crime, but as an “abnormal” individual, that is, in a moral-psychological sense (the pathological nature of whom is attested by his “inclination” or even “instinct” to infringe the norms). The objective of the sentence will not be limited to punishment, but will equally comprise correction – and for sure, penal institutions will have an important role in the use of therapeutic procedures.

Techniques of transformation can function (which does not imply that they are surely successful) because of the institutional treatment (the sentence and the modes of punishment being based on the category of an abnormal sub-type) and also because individuals employ these norms to themselves, by which they form their own subjectivities. By the fact of her subjugation to norms, the subject creates new, unprecedented forms of behavior, including forms of resistance, and in turn, institutions will have to elaborate new forms and procedures in order to counter them.

Therefore, psychiatry and the institutions where it is practiced construct not only the concept of mental illness and abnormality, with which a type of social deviance can be perceived, but equally the reality of the mentally ill or the abnormal individuals, who should not be unveiled as non-existent, be reduced to some supposedly “more real” entities or phenomena, in order to be able to criticize the sciences that deal with them. Foucault accepts that psychiatric sciences can be scientific (because, for him, “scientific” is not a value-laden concept, while what counts as scientific is historically changing): he does not intend to criticize them by unveiling their so-called “unscientificity”: he does not have a normative epistemology.

“[…]I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false”

(Foucault 1980: 118).

This is the reason why Foucault repudiates to conduct an “investigation concerning the legitimacy of the historical modes of knowing”. Instead, he opts for a method which is through and through historical, highlighting the “event”. “[…] therefore, what we intend to know is not what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive” (Foucault 1990: 47). The shift relative to normative epistemology is clear: one should examine which elements of knowledge are liable to convey
power effects, and also, how these elements take on the status of knowledge, for there is no such thing as original truth.

Therefore, the scientific object of the psychological/psychiatric sciences is either constructed or does not exist. This is the reason why one cannot distinguish between the exterior and the interior, the social and the natural, the social and the scientific, and cannot radically separate the concept and the object from one another. A new type of critique has to bear this in mind, which, in this way, cannot be formulated as a meta-discourse over and above the psychological sciences. It can only consider how the mentally ill, the handicapped or the abnormal are formed by institutional practices and categorizations, and how they could be directed to alternative modes of existence.

Foucault, who had a great deal to say about psychiatry, and was its fervent critique, did not intend to investigate the nature of “real mental illness”, “handicap” or “deviance” which would have been falsified by psychiatric practices. Nor did he claim that the figure of the “abnormal” is a fiction. According to him, the investigation of the nature of science cannot be separated from the examination of the entities that scientific classification deals with. The functioning of the science cannot be separated from its objects on which it works – this is the sense of the interior relationship between power and knowledge. Therefore, the question for Foucault is how mentally ill, handicapped, criminal, etc. populations come about as real entities, and how they are constantly transformed, due to scientific classification and other scientific practices. The epistemological type of critique could not deal with that problematic, for it only examined constructions in the order of knowledge, which it rigidly separated from the purportedly erroneously categorized “real” objects (but the examination of which it did not undertake).

Genealogical circle

So the task of genealogy as critique is not only to take note of the becoming of the categories and the subjects comprised by them. It also has to strive to undo or undermine the subjectivation undertaken and conveyed by the psychological/psychiatric sciences.

“I practice a sort of a fiction. In a way, I know perfectly well that what I say is not true. [...] I know perfectly well that what I did from a historical point of view is partial, exaggerated. I might have overlooked certain elements that would contradict me. However, my book had an effect on how people perceive madness. Therefore, my book and the thesis I develop in it bear a certain truth in our actual reality. I try to provoke interference between our reality and what we know about our history. If I succeed, this interference will bring about real effects in our present history. My hope is that my books shall become true after being written and not before.”

(Foucault 2001c [1980]: 805)

What does Foucault mean when he says that those are the truth effects of his books which are important? It should be noted that he not only talks about “fiction”, but different degrees of truth that his texts qualified as “fictions” are liable to obtain: Foucault seems
to assert that his books are less true before they are read and interpreted. Also, the
described and interpreted phenomena in the texts are less true before the writing of the
books. So writing is also a way of creating reality, especially if the book encounters a pub-
lic on which it can have a real influence by de-subjectivating effects. The works are less
true before they are read, for they have not yet exercised their effects on the readers: they
have not yet countered the impact of the psychological sciences. In this way, Foucault
establishes the validity of genealogical critique in a pragmatic way, by asserting that it is
directly linked to the experience of reality it is capable of transforming in a performative
manner.

It has to be noted that even if Foucault conceives of his works as particularly understood
fictions, making a difference in reality, he cannot deny the same qualification from the
psychological/psychiatric sciences, which are equally capable of rendering themselves
true; also, unlike social constructionist approaches, he cannot criticize them because of
their “fictitious” nature. This means that even if psychological sciences do not satisfy the
truth criteria they seem to profess, this cannot be sufficient for the refutation of their truth
claims, for genealogy works in an identical way. This demonstrates some of the parallels
between the functioning of genealogy and that of the psychological sciences. Foucault,
having refused the traditional truth criteria and because it is the production of truth that
he examines and criticizes, cannot use truth as the foundation of a theory or a science;
this is one more reason why he does not have recourse to epistemological critique. But if
this is so, he cannot invalidate the claim to truth of the psychological sciences either, for
genealogy does just the same: it equally strives to construct reality.

Therefore, accusations directed against Foucault, namely that his analyses, by instituting
a global relativism, are self-refuting, are completely empty. These accusations are empty,
for genealogy does not claim for itself a superior epistemological status over the psycho-
logical sciences. Genealogy fights against the psychological/psychiatric sciences, but it
does not vindicate a preferential treatment for itself: it does not constitute itself as being
truer than the psychological sciences (contrary to constructionist discourse). What is at
stake is not epistemology; at the same time critique always remains strategic, local and
political. Genealogical diagnosis has to be true in the sense of being plausible, for in that
case it is capable of inducing effects in reality. It has to be a credible fiction, while it
refuses to exert power effects, which originate from the prestige conveyed by an estab-
lished science. This characteristic, in turn, distinguishes genealogy in an absolute manner
from the way psychological/psychiatric sciences proceed. So the objective of foucauldian
critique is not to demystify power or to account for the objective reality against so-called
“false” conceptualizations; rather, it should be able to act on the creative potentialities
inherent in relations of power-knowledge, in order to be able to transform reality itself.

The activity of the psychiatric sciences consists in striving to fix and naturalize their
objects. It is not only in their hagiographic history written for and by themselves that they
claim the constancy of their objects (which they would eventually succeed in discovering);
they also intend to create their objects as fixed and constant, and which would behave
according to their scientific interpretation. The functioning of the psychological sciences in
disciplinary institutions produces (more or less successfully) their subject-objects which
they assert having discovered. Once again, the figure of the monstrous delinquent should
be cited, who is “discovered” by forensic psychiatry and proposed to juridical practice in
need of legitimating criminal sentences. Therefore, the problem is that the contingency unearthed by genealogy has already and continuously been hidden by the reality-producing practices of the psychological sciences.

Foucauldian genealogy is the perspective of the non-universal: there is no need of a separate normative critical theory, genealogy already comprising critique. There is no stable normativity, historical transcendence, eternal human nature or subject on which a universal theory could be established. Therefore, the criteria of validity of Foucault’s genealogy as a method (which are needed to be taken seriously, even if Foucault talks about it as an “antiscience”, see Foucault 2001a: 165), have to conform to this stance as well, and also with regard to the possibility of critique. Furthermore, if genealogy is capable of exercising truth effects, this would also reinforce its status as a valid approach. Because the major stake of genealogy is the demonstration of the contingent nature of psychological/psychiatric sciences’ objects, the conditions of validity of the genealogical interpretation are grounded in the viability of the diagnostic concerning the psychological/psychiatric sciences as well as in its potentiality to change reality according to its description. The effects produced by the analysis reinforce the validity of the genealogy seeking contingency everywhere; this is what we can call the “genealogical circle”. It is evident that reality is not independent from our activity of knowing, knowledge not being a simple relationship of representation/distortion – an image, which is also conveyed by constructionist approaches, committing the fault of ontological gerrymandering. So in order that genealogy be, or rather, become true, psychological sciences have to be performatively defeated or weakened, but no epistemological critique can succeed in the fight against them.

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Foucault’s Concept Of Power
Introduction: question on power

In this text, I am going to focus on a very specific epistemological difficulty, which is crucial for the understanding of Foucault’s concept of power. In one of his lectures on power, after explaining that power is not repression, that it is not in someone’s hands and that it forms a “net-like” structure, Foucault stressed: “ [...] But I do not believe that one should conclude from that power is the best distributed thing in the world, although in some sense that is indeed so” (Foucault, 1994: 215).

It seems like this statement is a riddle: something is true and false at the same time. How to draw the difference in power on the basis of such a conception? If nobody possesses power, if it does not have a location, if power is everywhere - how can we explain the hierarchy and inequality of power? Are we, when we try to do so, already captured by the false understanding of power (as a possession of people “in power”)? On the other hand, if we persist on Foucault’s notion of the omnipresence of power, how to avoid certain inflation of meaning of the concept of power itself: power suddenly signifies every possible sort of social relation to the extreme limit, where it suddenly loses every power of signification. This is what happens with the statement, often ascribed to Foucault, although he himself proclaimed it for meaningless, that we all have power in our bodies. For example, his argumentation from the preface in Deleuze and Guatarri’s Anti-Oedipus, where he stated that the major enemy is “fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior” (Foucault, 2004: xiv-xv) should not be understood simply in a relativistic and general way. It is misleading to say that we are simply all fascist, that we are equal in our fascism. On the contrary, the phrase “we” is in this context used strategically to signify the impossibility of such a general and vague definition of fascism: every one of us (including me) should forget his or her prejudices about what fascism is. Fascism can never be perceived as a complete outside; every one of us should concentrate on his or her own specific inner fascisms, which cannot be reduced to a common definition. Foucault therefore rejected such generalizations in defining the power, he did not claim that there is the same amount of power everywhere, that we are simply all equal in a degree of our inner fascism, but he did not propose a direct and general reason why such a conclusion is false. Therefore, my aim is to explain why Foucault’s theory seems indefinite at this point and what are the reasons for this surface impression of confusion.
In this context, a response of Foucault on a question of a female student at the end of the lecture *The Mesh of Power* is very interesting. She asked him about the power, which he – Michel (it is not a coincidence that she called him by his first name), is performing/executing with his knowledge. Of course, this question was a little bit provocative, but nevertheless, in the context of Foucault’s theory of power, where power is characterized not as something external, but as something that “we are constantly performing and fighting for”, this question seems sensible, even essential. We should thus not conceive it as a mere general provocation (which could be addressed to any intellectual), but strictly in the context of Foucault’s thought. One part of Foucault’s answer to this question was: “because you are a student, you are on a certain position of power, and me, as a professor, I am also on a certain position of power; I am on a position of power because I am a man and not a women, and you are also on a position of power, because you are a women. Of course, not on the same position of power, but we all are on positions of power” (Foucault, 2012: internet).

On the first glance, this answer seems a little bit trivial and non-precise, but we can observe a serious epistemological problem, which caused the fact that he could not answer to this question in any other general way. So, if we take his theory of power seriously: where and how can we define the limitations of power, how to define power’s quantity and its quality? This is the main question that frames our text.

First of all, we should not neglect seemingly unimportant fact that Foucault is in his answer to a student constantly using the phrase “position” (of power), what is not in adequacy with his conceptualization of power and is probably used only as a not very well-chosen common expression. From his answer, we could generalize: power could be found on any position or, vice versa, there is no position which could be outside power. However, it would be misleading if we on this basis concluded the same amount of power is everywhere. As Deleuze stated in his book on Foucault: “in brief, power is not homogeneous but can be defined only by the particular points through which it passes” (Deleuze, 1988: 25). Power is therefore not homogeneous and it is not localized, even if it is everywhere. The amount of power on a certain location could not simply be measured because power passes through particular points and is thus not a stable property found on a certain location. We have to be careful when we speak about the “locality” of power, because (following Deleuze) we have to understand it in a very specific topological sense: “Foucault’s functionalism throws up a new topology which no longer locates the origin of power in a privileged place, and can no longer accept a limited localization... Here we can see that ‘local’ has two very different meanings: power is local because it is never global, but it is not local or localized because it is diffuse” (Ibid: 26). We can see that Deleuze connected Foucault’s concept of power with his own basic concepts: virtual and becoming. Power could not be treated as something universal, as something what is extracted from its real manifestations. Power is virtual: “It is virtual insofar as it is actualized, in the course of being actualized, it is inseparable from the movement of its actualization” (Deleuze, 1991: 42-43). Insofar as it is virtual, it is also different in its every actual manifestation. It is constantly in becoming from the virtual to the actual. If we take its becoming seriously, not only as moving but also as change, modification, we could not simply locate it in a certain defined space and time (Deleuze, 1988: 37). When it is grasped simply as a certain outside thing or its property, it is at the same time also missed, similarly as in Bergson’s philosophy we cannot reduce movement to a series of static positions which are grasped by
the photographic view of things. In this sense power is nothing, if it is not performed, executed, exercised, thus constantly in movement of actualization and materialization. Power, as in Zeno’s case of an arrow in flight, cannot be localized: it passes in every moment through every point - it is to be found in every relation from one point to another.

The relation between practice and theory

Our main question is not important only in the context of understanding Foucault’s theory. It is also the question, on the basis of which we can think about some problems in the conceptualization of the emancipation practices of today. But how can we establish such a direct connection between Foucault’s theory of power and some practical problems that we have with a concrete power, its functioning and its effects? Of course, our aim should not be a simple application of theory to practice because of its special usefulness or because of some magical link between the present moment and Foucault thought. We will not solve any practical problems with Foucault’s theory. On the contrary, as we tried to explicate, Foucault’s theory of power itself demands a certain turn towards concrete manifestations of power. Actually, the main problem, which reproduces the false oppositions, is the separation between theory and practice. This separation cannot be found in Foucault’s work. On the contrary, as Foucault stated in a conversation with Deleuze, entitled *Intellectuals and Power*: “theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice” (Foucault, Deleuze, 1977: 208).

We must take this identity between theory and practice very seriously and pay attention to the difference with the relationship between theory and practice in the Marxist tradition. Foucault does not primarily think that theory could produce tools for struggle, for agitation or an ideological basis for political activity. More important is a certain reverse effect: practical struggle, which has already taken place inside every theory. In this sense, we have to understand that Foucault’s conceptualization of power itself is, as any other conceptualization, closely connected with the concrete power mechanisms; it could produce or reproduce them, it could also be in a striking contrast to them. For example, juridical theory of power as sovereignty is for Foucault closely connected and adapted to the monarchical power as also to the bourgeoisie - they both had at the end of the Middle Ages a certain benefit of implicit rejection of the idea of different coexisting powers of the feudal society:

“[…] basically, in the West, the great systems established since the Middle Ages had been developed through the increase in monarchical power, at the expense of power, or better, of feudal powers. Now, in this battle between powers and monarchical power, right [le droit] was always the instrument of monarchical power against the institutions, customs, prescriptions [réglements] and forms of bond and belonging characteristic of feudal society. […] In other words, the growth of the State in Europe was partially assured by, or in any case was used as an instrument in, the development of juridical thought. Monarchical power, the power of the State was essentially represented as right [le droit]. […] And yet, as it happened, while the bourgeoisie was largely profiting from the development of royal power and the diminution and regression of feudal power, it also had, on the other hand, every interest in developing a system of rights that would permit it to
give form to economic exchanges that assured its own social development. The
result being that the vocabulary and form of rights was the system of representa-
tion of power common to the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. The bourgeoisie and
the monarchy succeeded little by little at establishing, from the end of the Middle
Ages up to the 18th century, a form of power representing itself as language, a
form of power which gave itself – as discourse - the vocabulary of rights. And,
when the bourgeoisie had finally disposed of monarchical power, it did so pre-
cisely by using this juridical discourse – which had more or less been that of the
monarchy – which they turned against the monarchy itself.”

(Foucault, 2012: internet)

As we can see from Foucault’s argumentation, the truth about power, as any other truth, is
always a product of concrete struggles, eliminations and war strategies. So we have to
turn the perspective regarding the concepts of power upside down in certain sense: there-
fore, we should not be interested in what power is and how can we apply this truth to prac-
tice, but why and how are certain forms of concrete power in accordance with certain
images of power? What are the inner reasons of power, which are the inner-micro strug-
gles, which have produced a certain representation of power and why exactly this image?
Therefore, how and why is a certain image or representation of power itself also a mecha-
nism, a weapon of confusion in the hands of power, a weapon, which somehow hides a
concrete power, its purpose and its potential powerlessness. This could be a way of read-
ing of one of the crucial lessons of Foucault’s equating between power and knowledge
from the Order of discourse: power is in a certain sense powerless if it shows its functioning
completely. Therefore, if it is seen as power, it is completely separated from knowledge. To
explain all this in one sentence: there is a certain necessity in the fact that our ideas about
power are misleading, there is certain correctness in our incorrectness of the representa-
tion of power.

In this context we could also see why we should not treat Foucault’s concept of power sim-
ply as a positive philosophical definition. Foucault does not try to find an alternative, unhis-
torical and general concept of power, which would express the essence of power and
which could embrace all the different concrete forms of power. For example, when it looks
like that he talks about power in general, he is usually talking about a methodological
direction, how concrete forms of power should be treated in order not to be misled into
certain representation of power, which is a product of established power mechanisms. He
was constantly rejecting different general images of power, which are necessarily reduc-
tions, and themselves certain mechanisms of a certain concrete power. His most common
diction is not “power is this, power is that”, but “power is not this, power is not that...”

Problems emerge when we take together all this negations from different contexts and try
to think of them as of some defined borders, which are simply enframing the positivity of
Foucault’s concept of power. Such an understanding could be misleading. His conceptual-
ization of power should namely be understood as a struggle with different images of
power, therefore more as a (theoretical) practice of dealing with power then as a theory of
power, which could be directly used in political practice. From every one of these rejec-
tions of different images of power, we should not conclude that exactly the opposite is
true. As we said, the claim that power is not in a possession, does not presuppose, that
power is equally distributed and that we are living in harmony. So, we should be careful
and research all the different layers of Foucault’s practice of treating power. In this context we have to observe the discontinuities in Foucault’s work, different starting-points and different conclusions.

We can find many different layers, different argumentations, which were produced in confrontation with the conceptualizations of power in many different theories, for example in psychoanalysis, Marxism, law theory of power, Frankfurt school, etc. Some of these argumentations are coinciding with other argumentations; some other should be treated separately. They were also produced in different eras of Foucault’s work. Certain precision is needed in this context and also caution that we do not transform all the diversity in those argumentations (which should be treated as singular struggles with singular images of power) to a new “megalomanic” concept of power. We will just enumerate some of those levels briefly, especially those which are connected with our question, without explaining the broader context of each statement:

(1) Power is not based only on the repression, its primal form is not prohibition (critic of psychoanalysis, “Frankfurt school”, law theory), which partly coincides with the claim (2) that power does not have a privileged central position (critic of theory of power as sovereign), that it forms a net-like structure, that it is distributed. (3) Power is not a possession of certain people who are “in power”, it is a relation between any two points (This is a respond to a popular claim, that we could distinguished between those who are ruling and those who are being ruled) (4) Furthermore, power should not be reduced to economy, its origin should not be understood as an economic profit. (5) Power should not be reduced to the ideology as a “false consciousness”. (6) There is no social position which would be immune to power relations. (7) Resistance should not be treated as external to power, but as its inner part. (8) We should not think power inside binary opposition between war and peace, violence and contract (this claim is connected with Foucault’s interpretation of Nietzsche) (9) Power should be seen as a productive force, as a force able to produce new pleasures, as a “power over oneself”.

Beside all those argumentations concerning power there is one, which we did not mention, because it is placed on different level then all others: it is present implicitly in every other argumentation, although we still cannot perceive it simply as Foucault positive and universal definition of power, but more as an opening statement of a field on which different forms of power could be treated. We have in mind the connection between power and knowledge: knowledge is not external to power and vice versa, power is not external to knowledge. Where knowledge relations are, we also have power relations, but they are not simply the same relations. Power relations cannot be seen from the interior of the knowledge relations in which we are located. Foucault, in the Order of Discourse, stated:

“Certainly, when viewed from the level of a proposition, on the inside of a discourse, the division between true and false is neither arbitrary nor modifiable nor institutional nor violent. But when we view things on a different scale, when we ask the question of what this will to truth which has crossed so many centuries of our history; what is, in its very general form, the type of division which governs our will to know [notre volonté de savoir], then what we see taking shape is perhaps something like a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system.”
Any knowledge could be, seen from the outside perspective, perceived as power. Nevertheless, this is just a general truth, which cannot define specific power relations in concrete situations. This is a difficult task, because, as Deleuze stated: “Power relations are [...] not known.” Power relations become powerless, if they are perceived and seen as power relations and not as knowledge relations: power relations, which determine a certain thought, are always the outside of this thought. That is why the thought must try to reach the outside, its specific outside, it must think its own concrete cause, power relations which have established it. As it was explicated by Paule A. Bové, interpretations of Foucault must try to reach power relations which are in the background of this same interpretation and not perceive the relation between power and knowledge as something external. It is symptomatic that the role of the intellectual and the relations between power and practice of discourses are one of the least understood parts of Foucault’s work. (Bové 1988: xiii)

There is certain discrepancy between knowledge (the inside) and power (the outside). This relation certainly cannot be described with the logic of signifier and signified: “The statement is not at all defined by what it designates or signifies. It seems to us that what we must understand is this: a statement is the curve joining individual points: [...] But the individual points themselves, with their relations between forces, did not already constitute a statement: they were the outside of the statement, [...]” (Deleuze, 1988: 79). There is therefore a certain necessary discrepancy between the discursive and non-discursive. The same must be true also in the context of the discourse of power.

First of all we can see that the usual image of power (as centralized, as a law, as a negation, repression and order) aims in a certain sense exactly the opposite way as Foucault’s methodological directions about how power should be treated: as something dispersed, omnipresent, productive, chaotic and non-teleological. In this context, I find a certain nearness between Foucault’s notion of power and a quote of Pier Paolo Passolini: “Nothing is more anarchic than power. Power does what it wants and what it wants is totally arbitrary or dictated by its economic reasons which escape common logic” (Passolini: internet).

Therefore we should not oppose anarchy as something external to a centralized, reasonable power, power which orders and which is in order. On the opposite, we have to comprehend the inner anarchy of power itself; its chaotic, dispersed and violent character. This anarchic appearance is a direct epistemological consequence of the inability of the knowledge to perceive power from the inside. This, I think, may best be seen in Foucault’s interpretation of Nietzsche: history is the non-oriented and non-homogeneous process, composed of many different specific struggles for power; every truth is only a temporary supremacy, a result of certain power relations. Every sense, every peace, every law and every form of dominant rationality are just expressions of the certain triumph of a certain form of power. “It is instability of power-relations which defines a strategic or non-stratified environment. [...] It is true that, in Foucault, everything is practical; but the practice of power remains irreducible to any practice of knowledge [savoir]” (Deleuze, 1988, 74).

This Foucault’s general idea of power cannot be thought on the same level as other representations of power. Foucault does not try to explain what power is on itself, what is its essence, because with this, he would be trapped within the way of thinking, he is usually
criticizing. He is talking more about methodological tools, more about a practice of treating power, practices of struggling with power inside of a discourse. He tries to establish weapons for a confrontation with power, weapons against the misleading representations of power. Foucault himself admitted that we are in a process of changing of the paradigm of power and that he is not proposing some other completed definition. A certain ambiguity in Foucault’s notion of power is necessary and in adequacy with his theoretical practice. We have to persist exactly on our problematic question of the non-position of power, of the omnipresence of power. This question itself should, in a certain sense be perceived as a concrete battlefield for power. As said before, we are not trying to apply Foucault’s theory to political practice of the contemporary political struggles for and against power. On the contrary, practice itself is a criterion which divides between real and false problems in theory.

The concept of power in contemporary emancipatory struggles

In order to reach the level of the concrete problematic, we have to first admit, that every struggle for (or against) power itself has, implicitly or explicitly, its own understanding of power, which is crucial for its direction and tactics. The recent history of struggle with power is also a history of struggle with the concept of power; therefore, there exists a certain parallelism between the problems with the concept of power and the problems of resistance to power, which is self-evident. Confusion on the level of concepts is somehow transformed in an uncertainty on the level of practice.

In the last 20 years, after the decline of the socialistic regimes in the Eastern Europe, the prevailing tactic of the emancipatory struggle was searching for some kind of a magic, privileged point that would be external to power relations of the capitalist society. The main supposition was that emancipatory movement should not try to reach the position of power from which it could change the world, because the problem lies exactly in the existence of this position, which reproduces the power relations. Emancipation could thus not be done through the political institutions. The idea is that there exist certain points that are out of reach of power, where we have to persist and that such a positioning is enough: there is no necessary need for any relation towards power. It is believed that from those autonomous and isolated position new forms of “contra-power” could emerge. This way of thinking, which was definitely also inspired by many analysis that exposed to view the ability of capitalism to infiltrate in every sphere of society and culminated maybe the most explicitly in the famous work of John Holloway with the title Change the World Without Taking Power. He points down that “/w/hat has failed is the notion that revolution means capturing power in order to abolish power. What is now on the agenda is much more demanding notion of a direct attack on power relations. The only way in which revolution can now be imagined is not as the conquest of power but as the dissolution of power” (Holloway: internet).

But if we look on the idea of absolute autonomy and absolute immunity to power, (its best non-discursive materializations are “squatting”, autonomous zones, alternative economic circulations, etc.) we can observe two general problems: first of all – those places are not immune to inner power relationships, inner hierarchies, ideologies, dogmas and suppres-
sions. Even more, more isolated than such a community is, more easily it is for a certain power-knowledge to control it totally. This was one of the most disillusioned comprehen-
sions of the revolutionary 60’s: hierarchy, servitude and exploitation can emerge from the
inside, not necessarily from the outside. Power is here in this context understood as some-
thing external, with which we should fight and that is the reason why “our” own power-
knowledge relation is overlooked. The other problem that arises if relations with the exter-
nal world are disconnected is that there is also no possibility to influence and possibly change this external world. As Foucault stated: where is power, there is also resistance. If we
say this in reverse: resistance must be somehow close to power, it must be its inner part. There is no resistance outside of power. The other problem of the autonomous model of the resistance is that it in many contexts simply proved to be powerless to make any sig-
ificant changes on its outside.

In the last few years, many critics have explicated the inability and a certain self-castration of such a positioning outside of power. A new paradigm is occurring, which tries to estab-
lish radical political structures, usually formed as anti-capitalistic political parties (as for example the Greek Syriza), which are trying to directly reach the privileged positions of power, that is mostly the positions in national or European parliaments. But the problem, which was already noticed, is that those positions only seem as privileged positions of exclusive power, but there is actually a very limited possibility for change.

From Foucault’s perspective, it is interesting that both those two strategies (searching for a position outside power and searching for “the most powerful” position), even if they are oppositions, are based on the same suppositions: power has a position, it could be found somewhere and somewhere not. This supposition should be understood as a specific historic idea, which has a meaning only in a specific discourse about power, only inside a spec-
cific dispositive of understanding of power, which Foucault is criticising. Exactly those two limits are excluded from his conceptualization: there is no position of power as also there is no position, which would be immune to power. The other problem, which I see in those two strategies, one of them trying to avoid power and the other trying to take power as a possession, is that in both cases we lose the direct confrontation between two powers on the same field, a productive struggle in Nietzschean sense.

It is symptomatic, that neoliberal capitalism with its dispersed power produces a dis-
course, which is obsessed with locating power, with searching for its proper position: “the problem are managers, financial elites, corporations, immorality of those ‘in power’, etc.?” How to draw a line, which could divide those who are ruling and those who are ruled, the 1% and the 99%? Or should we claim that the main adversary is system as whole? But is it really so homogeneous? But maybe we must acknowledge that we are not lacking only a solution, but also concretely stated problems.

**Power as a relation with oneself**

Let’s return to Foucault and ask what his thought can offer to us in this context? Power is, as we already said, not a possession and it does not have a position. It is a relation between two points. Because of that, it seems that it is nowhere and everywhere at the
same time. But this is a false problem, derived from unhistorical and abstract understanding. Statement “Power is a relation” means that it is a becoming, that it is happening between entities. It is an activity, a performance. Power is exercising. But in order to preserve any meaning of the concept of power and not to fall into the thesis of its homogeneity, we have to preserve the difference in power, but this should not be a difference about positions or possession, but the difference between different relations of power. This difference could not be one essential difference between suppressed and free, or between hierarchic and equal power relations. We do not agree with some anarchistic interpretations, which seem in accordance with Foucault, which are trying to draw the difference between power as a pyramid and power as a network. The problem lies exactly in a non-critical adaptation of representation of power as central power:

“[W]e have to build networks instead of pyramids. All authoritarian institutions are organized as pyramids: the state, the private or public corporation, the army, the police, the church, the university, the hospital: they are all pyramidal structures with a small group of decision-makers at the top and a broad base of people whose decisions are made for them at the bottom. Anarchism does not demand the changing of the labels on the layers, it doesn’t want different people on top, it wants us to clamber out from underneath.”

(Ward, 1973: 22)

Flatness of the network of power does not exclude inequality, because the connectedness itself could become the measure for power: some points have more connections than the others, some are excluded, isolated, etc.

When searching for the answer to this question of difference in power, we can find only one satisfactory way of thinking in the frame of Foucault’s thought. The question about the link between the later Foucault’s work (after the first volume of History of Sexuality) and his previous work is very acute for his interprets and also in the context of the question of power something crucial can be found there. It looks as Foucault on this point of his work found himself in a kind of a “vicious circle” of power: if power and knowledge are necessarily connected, than it seems that we cannot oppose power, that we are powerless in practice as well as in theory, when confronted with power. Foucault himself expressed this weakness, which he felt about his thought: “That’s just like you, always with the same incapacity to cross the line, to pass over to the other side ... it is always the same choice, for the side of power, for what power says or of what it causes to be said” (Foucault, 1979: 80).

In Madness and Civilization or Discipline and Punish, for example, Foucault analyses power in a context of a certain duality: we have the discourse about madness and about punishment and about those, who are subjected to it, who are treated in accordance with the effects of this discourse. Of course does the influence between discursive and non-discursive go also from the other side around: practices (of punishment, of healing madness) have an influence on the discourse. Nevertheless, the repressing and the producing functions of power are partly separated: only one entity in the relation of power is able to produce discourse, to form institution, and the other entity is subjected to this production. This may be best seen out of the Foucault-Derrida dispute about History of madness; Rationality is divided from madness and in the moment, when we have two entities, we have one, which produces the truth of the other, and the other, which is the quiet, non-
working object of this discourse (Derrida, 2001: 36-77). Of course, those two positions should not be treated simply as positions of the rulers and of those who are ruled: those, who are producing the discourse, are also “ruled” by it in a certain sense. The main problem lies elsewhere: it seems, that in the moment, when the madman opens his mouth and expresses his own truth, he also betray madness, transgresses to the outside, on the side of power, where the discourse about madness is produced.

Following Deleuze’s interpretation, we found the idea of “the care for oneself” in this context very interesting. We should not understand it as an exclusively individual approach towards oneself, but exactly as the more general idea of a power relation, where the productive and the repressive functions of power are completely united. “But what comes about as a result is a relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect of self on self. [...] This is what the Greeks did: they folded force, even though it still remained force. They made it relate back to itself” (Deleuze, 1988: 101).

The power is here still a relation, but it is somehow related, addressed only to itself: presupposition for “the care for oneself” is the idea that entity which is producing the discourse is the same as the entity at which effects of power of this discourse are directed. In a certain sense is this structural, spatial effect of “the care for oneself” exactly the effect, which could describe the difference in power: we have to differentiate between those relations of power, where we have two entities and those where the repressive and productive, discursive and non-discursive functions of power are completely united. Power is in this case “produced inside” and “directed to” the same entity. Power is not the outside of thought anymore: “The unthought is therefore not external to thought but lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside. /.../ The inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea” (Ibid: 97).

We don’t think that this topological, spatial effect could be reached only in certain practices, in practices which seem from the perspective of today as individualistic practices: practices of writing, aesthetic and ascetic practices, practices of production of pleasure, etc. This is just a hypothesis, but maybe, the general positive aim would be to transform all power relations in such a way, that different entities would be able to produce their own truths, obligations and rules. Maybe it is a problem, that we understand Foucault’s “struggle for subjectivity” in a too subjective a way, as a personal struggle. “The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis” (Ibid: 106). This is, in a very specific sense, a universal struggle, universal is in its singular manifestations. It cannot be forced from the outside, it must emerge in its specific form the inside of every entity.

For example, the aim of the Greek phenomenon of “parrhesia” (fearless speech), described by Foucault in one of his lectures, is exactly this. The entity, which is in a subjected position, a slave for example, must address the ruler, must enter into the discourse of power, even if this is dangerous, polemic or controversial, even (and especially if) the ruler doesn’t want to hear the truth of this speech (Foucault, 2001). The slave must be courageous and say the truth, no matter what the ruler might think about it. His revolt must be close to power, but not exactly the same as power: courageous speech is not flattering to the ruler. An infinitely small difference must be preserved. This could be per-
ceived as a confrontation with power, which we were looking for, a confrontation which is not an attempt of taking the power from someone’s hands, not even an attempt of running away from the power. It is an attempt to change the certain power from the inside, an attempt to change the relations between the two points (ruler, slave) into a certain self-addressing of the power. This is a powerful entering into the discourse of power, its transformation from the inside.

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Introduction

Over the last thirty years much has been said about Foucault’s concept of power. Many authors embraced his model considering it very useful for understanding the functioning of political power in modern societies. The model proved to be very helpful in describing “the life of power” on a micro level, the, so called, microphysics of power such as power relations in the school, family, factory, prison, or in everyday life. It revealed that power relations in modern society are penetrating and controlling all aspects of existence and are, in the end, situated on the level of reproduction of biological life, of a living being. Moreover, Foucault’s model very well captured the fluidity and productive nature of modern societies. It proved to be groundbreaking in understanding how discipline and control function in seemingly open and liberal democratic societies, and as such form theoretical and practical basis for articulation of new emancipatory political movements. The practical, political and theoretical usage of Foucault’s writing was not always in accordance with his own words on the matter.

The paper argues that although Foucault’s concept of power is defined as a relation between forces, or in Deleuze’s words as a physics of abstract action with particular features, its productive, relational and integrative aspects can only be understood if the basis of the concept of power is reduced to the concept of biopower. In other words, the main thesis of the paper is that Foucault’s concept of power is derived from the concept of biopower from which the general concept of power is drawn, not other way around, where biopower is just one historical form of power.

Few remarks on biopower

In recent years writings on biopolitics and biopower certainly had a rich and fruitfull afterlife. Much has been said on the mater from different perspectives, and not always exclusively based upon Foucault notion of biopolitics and biopower. After all, Foucault’s theory of biopolitics and biopower inaugurated in the first volume of History of Sexuality remained “largely a promise, an unfinished work that he never explicitly renounces but
which always eluded him” (Fassin 2009:45). As Lazzarato pointed out, when elaborating contemporary development of biopower in the form of biopower, the power that is working on the level of life, as the power over life. Its main concern is to administrate, regulate and foster life itself to grow in strength and richness while simultaneously remaining submissive and employable. Although Foucault’s text stresses the life and power over life as main concerns, his concept of life remains enigmatic in a way. When Foucault defines biopower as the power over life he speaks of two modes of biopower: discipline (power over individual body) and regulation as the bio-politics of population (power over population) (Foucault 1978:139). He never refers to analytics of power over life, but only over body and population. The notion of life disappears again as a sort of anomaly in his whole research program. This is evident in the fact that after this text Foucault moves his focus on studying governmentality, modes of subjectivation, self and ethics. It is even more puzzling when we know that in that part of the History of Sexuality he puts life on the side of the resistance which is very important issue for him, because without resistance the whole theory of power would be in danger of becoming too repressive. On one occasion he talks about primacy of resistance: “So resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the other forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance. So I think that resistance is the main word, the keyword, in this dynamic (Foucault 1997:167)”. He puts the ever-growing forces of resistance, emerging in the nineteenth century alongside the biopower, on the side of life and man as a living being: “Moreover, against this power that was still new in the nineteenth century, the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being” (Foucault 1978:144). Forces of resistance are supported by the very thing that is invested. That thing is life itself, a sort of power of life.

Drawing from the text we may conclude that Foucault insists on primacy of the forces of life that are not solely possessed by the disciplinary and regulatory power which he analyzed in detail. This sudden appearance of primacy of life and then its enigmatic disappearance in the later stages of Foucault’s analysis is very interesting. Some authors, for instance Mitchell Dean, suggest that Foucault abandoned the concept of biopower which, according to Dean, had the central role for Foucault until 1978. In his view, until 1978, the two forms of power, the power that focuses on the individual and its body, and the power that regulates multiplicities and population, have been expressing the single power over life. This is clearly stated by Foucault himself. After 1978, the notion is absent from his texts. This led Dean to conclusion that Foucault effectively abandoned the concept replacing biopower with the new central concept – governmentality (Dean 2013:42). In my opinion, this was not the case because in addressing this question it is crucial to bear in mind the formal aspect of power.
That leaves us with the possible conclusion that biopower is not abandoned concept but central one. It unites genealogical stage of his work split between techniques of domination and techniques of the self.

Moreover, it is possible that biopower is conspicuous by virtue of its absence, or to put it differently, it is present by absence, by negative relation or suspension of its use and analysis. The possible centrality of the concept of biopower in the genealogical stage of Foucault’s work puts in question the concept of power itself.

**Power and resistance**

The following text will attempt to prove the centrality of the concept of biopower and the notion of life itself for Foucault’s concept of power in general as expounded in the last stage of his work.

In my view, centrality of the notion of life means that life itself is the concept that, like a glue, holds together the last phase of Foucault’s work. In other words, if we want to see his work as connected complex we must presume that life is its central feature.

As I said before, the power over life and life as such were never of any analytical concern for Foucault, only body, population and self. Life is just mentioned as the primary target of techniques of power but never analyzed.

In other words, this means that the notion of life, if we take Foucault’s work in continuity, is at same time inside and outside Foucault analysis, he is taking the notion of life in, while pulling it out.

On the other hand, if we analyze the meaning of given evidence, it seems that life, as an entity, is simultaneously under the dominance of power, and in resistance to it while at the same time being on the side of resistance.

We find similar logic in the section when Foucault delivers his concept of power. He speaks of resistance as “the other side of the power”, “the irreducible opposite” (Foucault 1978:95-96). Talking about resistance, he states that there is nothing outside power relations, and that resistance is something that is just irreducible to prevailing power relations like a bone in the throat. The *life and resistance* or *life as resistance* are inside (under) power relations as the other side of power, being at the same time inside and outside, but nevertheless situated by the relations of power, firmly attached to power. This insight in the nature of resistance is very important because drawing from Foucault’s text it is clear that power is first of all some kind of dominance still retaining negative relation.

1. Talking about the shift from discipline to governmentality, Foucault singles out three techniques which do not replace one another but form the triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. Governmentality is the form of power, “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 1991:102). It seems that for Foucault governmentality is not a completely new and central concept but at least, at this stage, further development of the power on the level of population.
Power is always power over something. But power at the same time contains productive dimension, the productive force, as the power of.

Now, it is useful to ask, how can we understand relation between production and negation? What is the source of ongoing productivity of power in the historical context? Why negative relation does not end up in destruction and nihilism but instead has a productive dimension? Moreover, what is the nature of resistance? It seems that the notion of resistance is not without ambiguities as well. Foucault stated that the resistance comes first and that power relations change in accordance to resistance, but at the same time resistance is not outside power relations. In his words resistances are: “...the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite. Hence they too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior. Are there no great radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds” (Foucault 1978:96). Some of the critics pointed out Foucault’s work as lacking in theory of political resistance or political theory in general, “nothing like Foucauldian politics...ever emerges (Best and Kellner 1991:55).” From his writings it is not clear what would resistance actually be because he does not provide detailed positive content for it. Also, it is not known whether these points of resistance can be united in any way, and if they can, what are the means for integration or unification into, let us say, hegemonic bloc? Is some kind of connection between points of resistance ever possible? To form the hegemonic bloc the points of resistance certainly must communicate. Foucault did not provide any theory of intersubjectivity, and he never refers to solidarity or collective action (Best and Kellner 1991). On the other hand, as it is known from Hannah Arendt work, the key feature of political power is collective action or possibility for collective action. Political power or power in general is possibility to act in accordance, to act together, collective praxis based upon sharing words, action and solidarity among citizens (Arendt 1970). Foucault’s work does not refer to such features of collective life making. His theory is highly a-political. Because he is avoiding intersubjectivity and solidarity, his view of power relations is reductive and based on the notion of authority in different ways. In that respect, all forms of technologies of power retain relations of domination, just in different forms. It is all about some sort of governing. Even the last shift from the technologies of domination to the technologies of the self did not erase domination. Also, for Foucault the practice of freedom means, among other things, acquiring ability to govern oneself, mastering one’s body and desires. The model of that relation is domination-submission, command-obedience (Foucault 1990:70).

When we observe this model on the level of the self we can conclude that this relation is the basic characteristic of human will, or willing. No one other than Friedrich Nietzsche explained this dialectics of command-obedience as the basic relation in the act of willing. As we know some of the basic Nietzsche’s concepts had a crucial influence on Foucault’s work and thinking.
What Nietzsche had discovered is that the act of willing is different than ordinary wanting or wishing. The main feature of human capacity to will is the commandment. The man who wills is always split between various impulses inside his “soul”. To will is to command this various impulses by overcoming some kind of resistance in the act of commandment or willing. One who wills is always split, one is at same time the commander and the one who obeys the command. But the trick is that man usually identifies himself with the commanding part feeling strength and triumph.

The I, the ego is the commanding part, the victor that overcomes the lower part of the self. For Nietzsche the I is then an illusion, something that is not pre-given but an effect of the act of willing, something that comes to us after the act, through inner feeling of strength and power. We tend to replace the effect for the cause believing that the I is the cause for acting because the feeling of strength is coming to us before the act itself. This feeling of strength is for us then the force that acts, force of acting (Nietzsche 2002:18-19). We act because of the difference between forces that come to us as the consequence of the triumph which we feel as strength, abundance, delight. For Nietzsche, this abundance is abundance of life itself. But the life itself is just a special case of will to power, the life as most known case of being is just will for accumulation of power (Nietzsche 1968:368). All survival tends to maximize the feeling of power, it strives for the surplus of power and can be understood as the fluctuation of differential relations between “quantum of forces” (Deleuze 1983:50).

This brief excerpt from Nietzsche’s writing on power shows us the basic features of his theory that influenced Foucault’s thinking and writing on power. As we can see, he connects his notion of power to will and willing. The act of will is structured as the relation of command-obedience. In the act itself we are drawing the surplus of pleasure through the inner feeling of strength. We can see how this inner feeling of strength that comes after the act is the cause of acting.

If we analyze Nietzsche’s theory more carefully we can conclude that his theory of power is in fact highly individualistic because it draws its basic assumptions from introspection. It is close to the concept of strength as a quality of a person. Secondly, in his elaboration of the phenomenon of power he is always referring to the concept of authority, not to the power of collective performance. At last, when he deconstructs the cause and effect relation, he criticizes the style of thought that privileges human activity of production. For him such style of thought is inherently authoritative and anthropocentric. Through this critique Nietzsche is in fact destroying Western metaphysical thinking that relies on relation between cause and effect, considering it just the mirror of a more basic relation of willing which is inherently coercive. Nietzsche revealed hidden nihilism in the Western thought especially modern thinking preoccupied with science and technology. He is also critical of modern philosophy that identifies human capacity to will with being. Human capacity to will is inherently project oriented to the things that do not exist at the moment, and to the future as the primary time frame. It has the ability to eradicate the present, potentially destroying everything on its path. Its strong negativity reveals inherent Nothingness underneath, “man will rather will nothingness than not to will”. Nietzsche’s “solution” to this opaque dialectics of willing is to put surplus, delight, abundance of being before this negativity and to extend time frame to eternity by posing the eternal recurrence as the central thought of his philosophy. It is on these grounds that he is building ontology of
forces and puts life at its center. Power and action come through difference of forces and pure richness of life overcomes negative relations of ressantiman. But life as most common form of existence, for him, is just an assumption. In his elaboration of power, Foucault takes Nietzsche’s basic assumptions and deploys their analytical potential on society and concrete historical data. In this process he inherits some of the highlighted theoretical weaknesses.

Analytics of power

In the next chapter I will analyze Foucault’s concept of power. I will try to show that power defined as a relation between forces, or in Deleuze’s words, as a physics of abstract action with particular features, suffers from some theoretical difficulties. As I have already pointed out, Foucault’s theory does not take into account intersubjectivity, solidarity or political integration thorough collective political action. This puts in danger relational and integrative aspects of his theory. Also, in my opinion, even the productive dimension of his theory of power can be put in question when one asks what agency can provide ongoing productivity of power. Why relation between forces does not collapse in their mutual destruction and nihilism?

Some of these disadvantages can be traced back to Foucault’s text where again productive, relational and integrative aspects of his concept of power can be put in question. These aspects can only be “defended” if the basis of the concept of power is reduced to the concept of biopower. In other words, the main thesis of the article is that Foucault’s concept of power is derived from the concept of biopower, not other way around, that biopower is not just one historical form of power but central concept from which the general concept of power is drawn.

At first, it would be recommendable to ask ourselves, what this thesis actually means and how can we understand it. What lines of argumentation can we use to back it up?

Foucault insisted that power must be understood as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate, as overall effect of the mobile force relations which are unstable and in constant motion. It is the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses the forces. To put it simply, every relation between forces is power relation (Foucault 1978:92-102).

This dynamic model rests upon the fact that power is a relation not a form. It is a model in which force is already a relation existing in the relation with other forces.

Because force relations are mobile, power is practiced, not possessed and the effects of these force relations are materialized in the micro-physics of power.

Another important insight is that power is not essentially repressive as some kind of superstructure imposing on other types of relations, but that it is immanent to them, having a direct productive role. Unlike the common view of power emphasizing only the repressive aspect of power relations, throughout Foucault’s work on power there is this
dichotomy between productive and repressive aspect of power, and between power and resistance. Foucault insists on productive role of power and on primacy of resistance.

In the beginning of this paper I mentioned the integrative aspect of Foucault's model of power.

On several occasions Foucault speaks about integrative aspects of multiple and fluid force relations. In his words, force relations are “forming a chain or a system”. They form a general line of force and major dominations which comprise the hegemonic effect of force relations (Foucault 1978:94).

Gilles Deleuze asserts that power relations are stabilized and stratified by the integrative aspect of power, where integration is an operation which consists of tracing “a line of general force (Deleuze 1988:75)”.

Summarizing everything that has been said, it is hard to find any stable element or any temporary position that would mark the application of power. Foucault speaks of points or knots as positions that mark the presence of power.

In his words: “power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile force relations” (Foucault 1978:94). It is omnipresent “produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” (Foucault 1978:93). As Deleuze suggested, it seems that these points are marking “the application of forces, the action or reaction of the force in relation to others” (Deleuze 1988:73).

As I said before, this model is fraught with some serious theoretical difficulties. The following analysis will trace these difficulties in Foucault’s text.

The first difficulty is the problem of the mentioned relational character of power or, more precisely, the problem of impossibility of establishing relations in this model. Why?

Foucault's text is very ambivalent on this matter. On one hand, Foucault thinks of power as over-all effect of the relation of the forces. On the other hand, power is exercised from innumerable points. It is produced from one moment to the next at every single point.

Foucault’s text is ambivalent due to the fact that it is not clear whether points are effect or cause of power. It is not clear whether power is an over-all effect of mobile force relations or is produced “from” points, “at the” points, or in the relation from one point to another? In my opinion, this ambivalence can be interpreted in two ways.

Firstly, if we imagine power as an effect of these mobile force relations, points should mark the presence of these effects as particular places where power is produced. It means that power is in some way focused in these points as a consequence of unknown movements of force relations. The constant clash of forces establishes relations of power marked by particular points. However, if the power is already an effect of mobile force relations it seems that overall activity of these points is vague and potentially without relational aspect. In other words, if they are already effects of the relations, how could they further be engaged as points in new relations that actually should be relations of power? It is not clear in what way they could be connected, because, in this model, they are pro-
duced as singular, solitary points emanating power into, let us say, non-defined space. This puts in question the integrative aspect of power in general, because we could ask what general line of force could integrate these solitary points? If power is an effect of force relations and if points mark the application of these force relations, what kind of relations can form or trace the general line of forces? What is the nature of this operation? It seems that this operation must be of different order than the relation of forces. I will return to this problem further in the text.

If we keep the ambivalence of Foucault’s text alive, if we imagine that power is produced at points, or from points or in every relation from one point to another, and simultaneously as an effect of force relations, then we have two layers of power. The first one we can see as clash of forces, and the second as relation between points. This means that power is not immanent to other relations. This is so because in this case we have the clash of forces and superstructure consisting of relations between points.

If we analyze this superstructure and interpret Foucault’s words in a way that power is produced from points and at the points, this means that these points must be determinable elements that we can put into relations, thinking of them as some sort of the cause of power. In that case power is not over-all effect of mobile force relations but something emerging in the relations between defined points. Considering relational nature of power, these points must be connected in some way. In this case we have some kind of pre-established form or temporary structure that may be open-ended. Of course, this fact is in opposition to Foucault’s basic notion of power as generated through dynamism of mobile force relations.

This also means that the productivity of mobile force relations is brought into question because to be productive means the creation of new entities and relations beyond the ones already being established. In other words, it means that something is emerging or becoming. Subsequently, productive model is quite different from the model with elements, relations and any defined structure.

Analyzing Foucault’s text we can see that there is a problem with certain ambivalence. Throughout the text Foucault is in fact speaking of two different layers that cannot be connected in any way. His model of power is struggling between unformed and unknown play of forces on the one side, and some kind of formal structure expressed as network, points and relation between points on the other. Nevertheless, he insists that power should be primary seen as the play of mobile force relations. For Foucault, power certainly exists as the dynamism of mobile force relations.

Now, if we follow Foucault’s thought that power is productive, that it is an effect of mobile force relations, the problem of integration becomes crucial. The model that relies on relation between points forming chain (system, network) of power cannot be connected with the power seen as the clash of forces. Any sort of formalized system put above model of power seen as the clash of forces would jeopardize its productive nature. These two models are very different in nature.

This is the reason to think that Deleuze points both in the right and wrong direction at the same time when he insists that we can make connections on a different level than on the one where relations of forces are situated. He states: “Conversely, relations between
forces will remain transitive, unstable, faint, almost virtual, at all events unknown, unless they are carried out by formed or stratified relations which make up forms of knowledge (Deleuze 1988:74).

He uses term actualization to designate integrative aspect of power. In his words: “...actualization integrates only by also creating a system of formal differentiation (Deleuze 1988:77).”

For him it is the abstract curve and statement that join the individual points at the last instance. Statements are like curves that, through regularities and systems of formal differentiation, create general lines of force (Deleuze 1988:78). But this is not all.

At this moment in discussion we are touching the problematic relation between knowledge and power in Foucault’s work. In the last phase of his work Foucault insists on primacy of power over knowledge. For Foucault, system of formal differentiation is, in fact, knowledge or rather different forms of knowledge. But as I pointed out, power seen as the unformed clash of forces and knowledge, as the system of formal differentiation cannot be connected. Knowledge cannot integrate this model of power. To put it differently, if we go in this direction we must presume that power does not really exist as distinct entity before actualization in knowledge. Because if knowledge integrates power then we cannot speak of power as distinct entity and we cannot insist on difference in nature between power and knowledge, between diagram and archive, or between unformed play of forces and systems of formal differentiation as Foucault does.

Moreover, we cannot insist on primacy of power either.

To quote Deleuze: “But if there is primacy (of power) it is because the two heterogeneous forms of knowledge are constituted by integration and enter into an indirect relation...under condition pertaining only to the forces. In this way the indirect relation between the two forms of knowledge does not imply any common form, or even correspondence, but only the informal element of forces in which both are steeped (Deleuze 1988:82)”.

The above sentence touches the key argument for the initial thesis about integrative aspect of power. As we can see, at the last instance, two forms of knowledge are pertaining only to informal element of forces in which both forms of knowledge are steeped. Here Deleuze speaks metaphorically about integrative aspect of forces. I think that the metaphor of two forms of knowledge immersed in informal element of forces points in the right direction. This indicates that power is “already” integrated in itself on a different level, and is seen as a relatively independent entity that has the primacy over knowledge. This also means that power has its form, it is not formless but form is somehow hidden or neglected.

To summarize everything that has been said so far, my analysis has shown that it is impossible to find integrative aspects of power only by following argumentative lines drawn from Foucault’s model. If we imagine power as an effect of relation of forces materialized at points, it is impossible to integrate these points in the over-all effect of force relations, and, consequently, it is impossible to integrate two forms of knowledge as well. They could be connected only if we imagine some constant and pre-established flux, flow,
process, presence or tension in which both are steeped. We could ask what might be nature of this flow, why the flow is the only solution and how it can be constructed? We can find the answer to these questions through the primary logic of the previous discussion. The key problem of Foucault’s model is impossibility to integrate numerable, individual points in the general line of force. As it has been said before, curve and statement, are the primary tools for integration. In my opinion, only the curve and not the statement (as the part of the system of formal differentiation or knowledge), can fulfill this role. Because seen from the formal perspective, only the curve can integrate individual points in some general feature. Few sentences above I asked what kind of operation could form the general line of force uniting individual points? It is quantification and summation. The curve is mathematical tool uniting individual point through quantification and summation. Also, the curve represents functions or describes processes, and it is used as the basis for the integral calculus that is used in calculating all kind of flows. In my view, mathematical operation of quantification is the only thinkable mean for integration in this model of power. Moreover, if we presume that quantification is the general form of Foucault’s concept of power then relational and productive feature of power can be easily explained. In that respect relation between forces is differential relation between quantum of forces. In his reading of Nietzsche’s concept of power, Deleuze already pointed in that direction. Also, productive aspect of power can be understood as the process of ongoing accumulation of power. To accumulate means summing things up. Again, this aspect is mentioned by Nietzsche when he speaks about life as the special case of will to power. For him, life as most known case of being is just will for accumulation of power. Therefore, essence of all life processes is that everything needs to be summed up and accumulated.

Now going towards the end of argumentation, it is useful to ask why Foucault is mentioning life as the object of power, and how can I explain the initial thesis that life and bio-power is central feature of his concept of power in general? How can we explain presumed productivity and growth in dialectical tension with negative relation of dominance as power over something, in this case power over life? In other words, what is the nature of this dichotomy power over/of life? For Nietzsche, life as the most common type of being is just an assumption. In contrast, Foucault focuses his analysis on historical context and society. So it is reasonable to ask, where in this historical context and society can we find life at the center of relations of domination which are at the same time productive?

I think the modern labor under the capitalistic relations of production is the primary site where we can find this dialectical tension resolved.

Quantification and related accumulation is general form of this model of power, and as we know, quantification and accumulation is general form of capital.

Marx was the first one who found the connection between capital, surplus of value and the exploitation of the labor force. From his writings, we know that the labor force was and is quantified, and that labor force is seen as an expendable commodity on the market, and that surplus of capital is in correlation with surplus of labor or expenditure of labor force. Of course, this is the classical model of fluctuation of the labor power on the market and the extraction of the profit. In the past, economic analysis of labor has gone much further taking into account variety of phenomena connected with labor. Foucault himself is using the theories of human capital to explain changes in the production of labor. For
instance, he states that theory of human capital divides labor between human capital as ability to earn and income, or, between human capital and “earning stream”. Also Foucault sees human capital as something that can be changed and invested in the overall economic growth etc. (Foucault 2008: 215-233) Nevertheless, in my opinion all these theories do not break the basic relation of quantification and accumulation. In other words, the function of human capital is to produce extra-quantitative value. Also, Marx pointed out that labor force only exists as natural capacity of living person and that economic activity is in fact giant process of exchanging matter with the nature. The further development of capitalistic economic system did not produce new type of relation between man and nature. The life process is the product of the exchange of matter between man and nature. So, everything that is produced must be spent and destroyed to support process of life.

So we can conclude that surplus of capital is in fact in correlation with the surplus of life. This surplus of life is in constant tension and can be represented as the spikes that must be summed up and captured by the capital, disciplinary mechanisms and regulated by biopolitical techniques and knowledge in order to be transformed into the flow. The primary aim all of these techniques is maximization of force relations and creation of constant flow of forces. Discipline is achievement of this maximization on individual level, biopolitical techniques is achievement of this maximization on the level of population, and techniques of the self are maximization on the level of consciousness and subjectivity. In such view governing apparatus must deal with chaotic and immanently antagonistic field of force relations, or it must observe all aspects and forms of existence as unformed expendable matter. In other words, all aspects and forms of existence have the capacity and potentiality to support life and life processes. Mentioned consciousness and subjectivity are not the exception. In that respect the alienating “outside” view on the body and the population as a chaotic field of forces is met with “inner” experience of the feeling of strength and force. Put differently, in the context of liberal societies, the alienating “outside” view is complementary with the inner experience of the self and subjectivity as a chaotic, unlimited source of forces that always need to be controlled and governed by the techniques of self. That situation generates an enormous pressure and imperative to work on the self by means of the techniques of self. Moreover, power primary seen as strength and force of life is the consequence of liberal social environment where powerful bureaucratic domination and unlimited individual freedom with weak intersubjective connections exists simultaneously. These two poles mentioned before, the technologies of the domination and the self, are the two basic poles of the modern society and modern social drama. Contemporary societies are split between two alternative ways of living, the sovereign bureaucratic control that is controlling individual freedom and the potential anarchy of individual goals, and the autonomous sovereign subject controlled by bureaucratic mechanisms. In this model the autonomous sovereign subject can seek freedom from the grip of technologies of domination by practicing freedom through self-mastery and creating new forms of life. The later stage of Foucault’s work, with its distinct shift from the technologies of the domination to the technologies of the self, is an example of this tension. The main problem of this model with two alternative ways of living is the lack of intersubjectivity, solidarity and collective action. This is the reason why self-mastery and the creation of new ways of living can generate an enormous pressure and an imperative to work on the self by means of techniques of the self. Contemporary society is an example of how the practice of self-mastery can result in new forms of domination, such as governing the
self as human capital, in psychotherapeutic culture, or in the consumerist aestheticization of existence. Foucault never addresses these questions and problems.

The main thesis of this article is that in such social environment the force of life is that which mediates between the mentioned two poles of modern society. In contemporary societies pure life remains an uncontested ethical and political value. Foucault’s work reflects the tension between these two poles and his concept of biopower is the one that connects them.

By stating that biopower is the central concept in Foucault’s work we are able to resolve another dialectical tension between power of and over. If we go to back to Marx’s analysis we can find something crucial. It revealed that the pure form of capital, commodity form and quantification “produces” pure life as the fact of existence, or life as the flux or flow, not the way round. In Foucault’s work this part of biopower is named the productive power of life. However, if the analysis is correct, then that power of life is product of exploitation of labor force and related techniques, or in Foucault’s taxonomy power over life. The repressive and productive aspects of power are present in Foucault’s writing on power, and, as we can see, they can be understood and connected if we present them through dialectical tension of/over. The life is mediating “thing” in this process. It means that Foucault’s model of power is in fact highly limited and drawn from the concept of power as power of/over life or biopower. So, Foucault’s power is biopower.

At the end I will summarize the basic conclusions from the presented discussion.

If we follow Foucault in defining power as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate, as overall effect of the mobile force relations which are unstable and in constant motion, as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses the forces; if we follow power as a relation not a form, such that force is already a relation existing in the relation with other forces, immanent to other relations having a direct productive role, we must notice some theoretical problems and weaknesses. Foucault’s model of power is highly a-political because it is not referring to solidarity, collective action or intersubjectivity. In other words, if we follow Arendt’s definition of power as possibility to act together or to act in accordance, Foucault’s model of power is closer to the notion of force (or strength), or, more precisely, bioforce. Also, it remains authoritative because power is always power over something, in other words, power as government over bodies, souls, processes, self etc. Because of that model of power remains trapped in relations dominated by negativity and coercion. Paraphrasing Deleuze’s and Foucault’s statement about resistance, we can add that in Foucault’s model of power Negation comes first. So, any form of resistance is trapped in a vicious circle of negativity. This means that his model does not transcend some aspects of Hegel’s and Marx’s modernistic theoretical background. Moreover, his theory of resistance based on transgressive potential of body and the forces of life inherits some basic theoretical difficulties of modern vitalism and naturalism. Also, as I tried to present, his model of power has a hidden Marxist premise. On several occasions when he speaks of power and biopower Foucault is mentioning Marx and capitalism but quickly

2. Deleuze’s theory is providing the solution for that problem by referring to the Outside and Thought, stating that resistance is coming from the Outside. In my opinion, we cannot find this model in Foucault’s theory of power.
abandoning the subject and moving to another direction. But as I tried to show, the mentioned negation is embodied in the quantification as the form of capital and exploitation of labor force. Only from that perspective we can understand the rise of biopower because only through labor force, the various forms of existence are reduced and transformed to biological potentiality or the force of life that sets in motion the whole process. Therefore in the end, from the point of view of quantification and biopower (bioforce) all aspects and forms of existence have the capacity and potentiality to support life and life processes and are seen as unformed expendable matter, chaotic field of forces, reduced to force of life.

Nevertheless, if we transfer his a-political model of power and detailed descriptions of techniques of the power to contemporary societal environment it provides us with the good description of all sorts of modern post-political phenomenon: the phenomenon of atomization and related massification, radical individualization, reign of bureaucratic control mechanisms and the forms of subjectivity connected to it. Generally speaking, Foucault’s theory of power and his writing in general is a fascinating description of the development of a-political, alienating social environment of modern societies and was and still is justifiably used as the basis for the critical thinking and writing.

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Engaging with Foucault’s Microphysics of Power through The Primacy Of Resistance

Foucault’s concept of power relations evokes a nebulous constellation of floating conceptual elements: resistances, forces, multiplicities, points, holds, adversaries, struggles, strategies, dominations. The problem, which is often bypassed in the literature that uses this concept, lies in the construction of a conceptual line that could firmly keep these elements together. The impossibility of referring to a single locus in Foucault’s work obliges the researcher to creatively combine a variety of different texts, lectures, interviews or whatsoever. This is the kind of engagement that Foucault’s legacy necessarily requires and that is brilliantly reflected in the spirit of this collection and of the relative conference. The possible trajectories that can emerge out of this experience of engagement with Foucault’s work are differentiated according to their specific problem. The primacy of resistance constitutes the problem that drives the present recombination of Foucault’s concept of power relations.

The concept of resistance has often been relegated to a secondary role within Foucault’s model of power (see for instance Poulantzas 1978, Philip 1983, McNay 1994, Žižek 2009<XREF>). However, Deleuze has instead highlighted how resistance is instead prior to power relations and therefore key in the whole dynamic (Deleuze 2006). Deleuze locates this primacy of resistance in continuity with Mario Tronti’s interpretation of Marxism structured upon the primacy of labour and workers’ struggles over capital (Tronti 1980). This line continues throughout the Autonomist tradition and, in particular in the work of Antonio Negri and in his trilogy with Michael Hardt (Hardt and Negri 2000<XREF>, 2004, 2009<XREF>). Nevertheless, the primacy of resistance seems to appear through scattered fragments rather than through a solid conceptual line. The goal is to draw a trajectory through these different elements. Within this wider project, this article focuses on the elements in Foucault’s work that can contribute to the trajectory of the primacy of resistance. This requires a preliminary redefinition of Foucault’s microphysics of power through a perspective that focuses on the government of probabilities. It compares the relatively-instable stability of power relations with absolute openness of relations of confrontation, as presented in The Subject and Power (Foucault 2000). This often neglected differentiation shows the specific functions that resistance and its possibility exert within
Resistance and the microphysics of power

It is worth making clear at the outset that power relations are not to be held as a relation between power and resistance. “Power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them” (Foucault 1995: 27). Those who do not have power are nevertheless constitutive of the power relations (“it is transmitted by them and through them”) rather than being the passive object of power. This is one of the crucial elements of Foucault’s originality: there is no passive pole in power relations. There is an inequality, a dissymmetry, an imbalance, but both sides actively contribute to the mechanism of the power relation: “power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must [...] be analyzed as something that circulates. [...]” (Foucault 2004: 29). Power relations consist of this fluid and circulating effect that connects a multiplicity of elements, points or forces, rather than a struggle between power and non-power (Foucault 1996). Which of these elements, points or forces refer then to resistance? None, insofar they function as relays of a power relation. If a power relation is defined as what circulates through a series of relays (no matter whether they are positioned at the top or at the bottom of the hierarchy that constitutes and is constituted by the power relation), resistance can occur either as an obstruction or a subtraction to this circulation. But insofar the circulation runs smoothly, the power relation at stake does not display any resistance.

We need to look at the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault 1978) in order to find a place and a definition of resistance. Although, the regularity of power relations display a certain absence of resistance, there is still “the distant roar of the battle” (Foucault 1995: 308) that reassures us that stability can be disrupted at any time. This distant roar is the evidence of an agitated and imbalanced substratum. Conflicts, struggles, confrontations ceaselessly redefine and modify power relations and their strategies. Here it is where resistance necessarily starts outlining its contours within the picture. “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault 1978: 95) is the most well-known Foucault’s formulation of resistance. Refraining from reading it as a dead and sterile litany, it is worth exploring the potential trajectories that explode out of it. What the quotation is affirming is the mere presence of resistance everywhere we find a power relation. The presence of power relations immediately implies the presence of resistance. It expresses their necessary co-presence, although the modality of this co-presence is not further specified.

The way in which resistance manifests itself in the encounter with power relations is through a multiplicity of points: “[The] existence [of power relations] depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance. [...] These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network” (Foucault 1978: 95); “the points, knots or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities”; “more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance”; “the swarm of points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities” (Foucault 1978: 96). Points are the analytical mani-
festations of resistance. What is a point? It is the microphysical equivalent of the relays through which power relations circulate: a sort of elementary unit. Points of resistance are specifically the broken or malfunctioning relays for power relations. They are those relays where the circulation of power relations is somehow either obstructed or where it is attempted but with no success at all. To be sure, in relation to individuals, institutions or whatsoever global entity, points represent the explosion of these nominal units or integrated forms into their constitutive elements, which can be appreciated from Foucault’s microphysical view of power relations. This microphysical gaze restitutes the complexity of the power network, the map of distribution of these points taken in power relations and those not taken, points of resistance. The latter determine the creation of regions where power relations cannot circulate: “more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society- that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds” (Foucault 1978: 96). In the map of the complex strategical situation of a given society, these irreducible regions are the effect of the interaction between power relations and points of resistance. These are the zones that power relations are not able to cover. The idea of irreducibility restitutes the sense of a failed attempt or, anyway the evidence of the fundamental and constitutive impotency of power relations. And this seems one of the primary attributes that Foucault gives to these points of resistance: “[Resistances] are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite” (Foucault 1978: 96). Although it might misleading seem to locate resistances within power relations, irreducibility necessarily implies a distance that is at once the effect of the excess proper of multiplicities. At best, points of the power relation and points of resistance might seem to touch each other, but they do not fully overlap. Insofar it is irreducible, a point of resistance is not a fully working relay for the power relation. To be sure, this irreducibility manifests itself as the temporary effect of a contingent distribution of points in the network. Irreducible points of resistance can be appreciated through an “instantaneous photography” (Foucault 1996) of the network of power in a given society at a given time. Therefore, their irreducibility can be revoked at any time, as far as a certain modification of the power relations manage to include those specific points in the set of functioning relays through which power relations are transmitted. Likewise, irreducibility does not lean upon some natural feature or intrinsic property. Foucault firmly rejects this naturalistic account of points of resistance: “[Resistance] n’est pas antérieure au pouvoir qu’elle contre. Elle lui est coextensive et absolument contemporaine.” (Foucault 1994b). The distribution of points of resistance and points through which power relations circulate does not occur in two distinct temporalities but in a unique process of mutual determination. Therefore, there does not seem to be an intrinsic characteristic that differentiates between points of resistance and points of power relations.

Resistance and the possibility of resistance

The conceptual line of the primacy of resistance within Foucault’s work can be retrieved in two distinct but intertwined axes: an ontological one, which discusses the problem of exteriority and immanence; and one which relates to possibilities and the structuration or gov-
ernment of probabilities. The former is consistently deployed by Deleuze and has been presented elsewhere in relation to Nietzsche’s distinction between active and reactive forces (Checchi 2014). Nevertheless, the discussion of this line requires a robust departure from Foucault’s text. As such, this is well beyond the scope of this paper. The focus is therefore on the analysis of the metaphysics of power through the perspective of the possible and its government.

There are several dispersed elements in Foucault’s texts that, although unelaborated and underdeveloped, offer a consistent hold for drawing this line. This conceptual line spins around a certain doubling of the concept of resistance or its expansion. What operates in the power network as the odd-term of power relations is not simply resistance, but resistance and its possibility. The virtual threat of a potential resistance has a real effect on power relations. As such, resistance is considered not only in its concrete practices, but also in the absence of its actual exercise. Even the possibility of resistance disturbs or imposes a modification upon existing power relations. Therefore it does have its own expression in the mapping of the power network. The importance of the possibility of resistance is decisive as it postulates its presence even when power relations operate smoothly and without a concrete attrition. Even where there is no resistance, there is its possibility. As such, it is definitely more correct and exhaustive to refer to a different presentation of Foucault’s relational model: “dès lors qu’il y a un rapport de pouvoir, il y a une possibilité de résistance” (Foucault 1994b) – where there is a relation of power, there is a possibility of resistance. This constitutes an insightful refinement of the more well-known quotation. Instead of power and its various possible senses, there is a clear reference to power relations. As for resistance, this does not just enlarge the picture but adds a layer of complexity both to the actual dynamic and to its relevant analysis. The possibility of resistance obliges power relation to an indefinite range of risks, traps and sabotages that, although not present, constitute a real threat that power relations cannot avoid to face. As such, power relations respond or attempt to respond to this indefinite multiplicity of possible resistances or possible points of resistance.

Therefore the strategic deployment of power relations occurs in function of possible resistances and aims to neutralize them by preventing their emergence. Likewise, these points of possibility constitute already a potential network to be mobilized into a strategy. This strategic arrangement is somehow inscribed in Foucault’s project. There is a dimension of possible intentionality that aims to transform the possibility of resistances into a concrete struggle. And this intentional formation of an opposing strategy corresponds to a call for political action — In the conclusion of the first volume of his History of Sexuality, Foucault addresses the problem of this power over life that emerges in the nineteenth century with its holds on sexuality and life: “It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim-through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality-to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance” (Foucault 1978: 157). The translation is quite misleading and does not transmit the modality of this call for action in the original: “si [...] on veut faire valoir contre les prises du pouvoir, les corps, les plaisirs, les savoirs, dans leur multiplicité et leur possibilité de résistance” (Foucault 1976: 208). Against the holds of this specific power over life, it is necessary to “faire valoir” bodies, pleasures and knowledges (that are partly captured as relays in these power relations) in their multiplicity, i.e. in the multiplicity of points that actually constitute them. And these multiplicities are, by defini-
tion, not completely exhausted by power relations and contain therefore possibilities of resistance. What we need to “faire valoir” are exactly those possibilities of resistance that multiplicities display insofar they are not completely captured by power relations. “Faire valoir” can be translated as to deploy, to put into play, to mobilise, but also, especially in this context, to actualize. This case evokes a transformation, a passage from a virtual status of possibility to an actual and concrete exercise of resistance. This “faire valoir” restitutes first this sense of intentional actualization. Given its specific purpose – the emancipation from the power relation at stake (in the original Foucault uses the verb “affranchir”, originally referred to the practice of freeing slaves), this actualization is immediately followed by the strategic coding of the points of resistance that emerge. This strategic deployment seems to consist of the actualization of singular possibilities and their grouping into a strategy of struggle that intentionally confronts the power relation. This resonates with the general task of the genealogist or of the philosopher who analyses power relations. The genealogist, the philosopher or the historian of the present ultimately present the mapping of the power network highlighting those points or regions where power relations are more intolerable and the possibilities of resistance emerge more clearly. Yet the ultimate object is not a cold understanding of this complex strategic situation, but an engaged knowledge that could immediately operate in contemporary struggles (Foucault 2004) both as refusal, but, more cogently, as affirmative creation. And the underlying task that drives this approach is enclosed in a key principle of Foucault’s project: “I want to show the reality of possible struggles” (Foucault 1996). Possible struggles (“luttes”) are those projections of possible points of resistance against actual power relations. The reality of these possible struggles manifests itself on the one hand in the anticipation of the power relation that deploys itself in function of the multiplicity of points of resistance and of possible resistance. On the other hand, this reality represents a strategic promise: out of these possibilities, a real struggle can always emerge. The apparent stability of power relation is always confronted by a real danger that lies in the possibility of this reality.

Political metamorphoses: resistance and the attraction of relatively-instable stability

What is a struggle? And in which way is this struggle related to resistance and its possibility? Apparently, the struggle expresses somehow the tension between these points of (possible) resistance and the relevant power relationships. Nevertheless, power relations are held to be fairly stable and able to determine certain conducts or impose certain tasks with high regularity. As such, (concrete or actual) resistances definitely disturb the smooth functioning of these relations, but they do not determine a level of attrition or tension that can be classified as a struggle. Possible resistances might as well project a proper struggle in the future. But struggles are, by definition, open to any outcome, their result is fundamentally uncertain. This openness makes the dichotomy power relation against resistance irrelevant, as both strategies might possibly result as the winning strategy.

1. This creative aspect of resistance is particularly emphasised within the Autonomist tradition (see for instance (Negri 2005, Cleaver 1992, Toscano 2009, Checchi 2014) or in the idea of creating new worlds (Rancière 1999, Papadopoulos 2010). However, the link between resistance and creation appears clearly also in Foucault’s later works (2009, 2005) on counter-conducts and arts of living (Taylor 2003, McGushin 2010).
Therefore, the occurrence of the struggle signals a metamorphosis of both resistance and power relations into something other. What is this other form or modality? This moment of differentiating power relations from other kinds of relations is crucial to refine the model and highlights how this ultimately operates upon the structuration of probabilities. It is from this picture that this Foucauldian conceptual line of the primacy of resistance can clearly emerge.

In *Subject and power*, Foucault offers a catalogue of the different forms or modalities determined by the metamorphoses of power relations and (possible) resistances: relations of violence, physical relations of constraint, strategies of struggle (relations of confrontation), dominations² (Foucault 2000). Struggle thus represents only one of the possible relations that are other than power relations. The type of relations at stake can be labeled political, as each of them covers an aspect of the spectrum of the political, understood generically as the realm of (ant)agonistic relations (a conception of the political germane to that of Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe (2005). Nevertheless, these different and mutually exclusive relations constitute a continuum insofar each relation can turn either into the relation that precedes or follows it. What differentiates each segment is the specific modality in which antagonism is modulated (either as physical constrain, agonistic provocation or struggle) and the relevant features or elements that emerge in virtue of that specific modality or configuration.

First, from *Subject and power* we can add a further definition of power relations, which complements the conceptual lines presented so far by presenting the model from a slightly different perspective. The image of the circulation between points or relays can be considered as a possible alternative visualization of the model of power relations presented here: “what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual, future or present actions” (Foucault 2000: 340). There is a strong correlation or perhaps even a correspondence between points and actions. Their centrality in the model is due again to the microphysical approach adopted, where individuals (the “others” in the quotation above) are more a compound of these micro-elements or an effect of their interactions rather than a source of agency for those actions. Furthermore, there is again the temporal doubling that has been discussed in relation to resistance and its possibility. The actions that operate, interact or are taken into account within power relations are not only those which are concretely active (actual or present) at a given moment, but also (and perhaps even more cogently) those which are possible or future. There is a very tiny shift in the translation that partly obfuscates the inclusiveness of this aspect. Instead of “an action upon an action”, Foucault originally writes “[u]ne action sur l’action” (Foucault 1994a). Therefore, not upon an action, but upon “l’action”, upon action as such, action in general. This generalization is the perfect coupling of a concrete action and the indefinite multiplicity of possible actions that might or might not emerge in the context of a given power relation. But, indeed, “l’action” seems somehow to privilege this dimension of the possible. The multiplicity that the possible enclosed within action in general is the ultimate threat of the dreamed stability of power

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² Dominations are actually presented as phenomena that somehow determined by the intertwinement and reciprocal appeal of power relations and relations of confrontation. As such, they do not really constitute a different kind of political relation. Rather, phenomena of dominations design a more complex scenario of interaction between two actual kinds of political relations.
relations. Stability is crucially dependent upon the structuration of this multiplicity. A perfectly stable and repetitive mechanism ultimately neutralizes these multiple possibilities by determining always the same outcome. Therefore, the stability of power relation is measured upon the extent in which these possibilities are neutralised. As such, the way in which power relations produce their constitutive stability is through the “management of possibilities”:

[The exercise of power] operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.

(Foucault 2000: 341)

In the quotation, the term “power” functions as the pole within power relations that through its actions aims to determine the future action of the other pole. This future action is the key element of this dynamic. The multiple possible actions that can be actualized in this future action constitute the terrain of power relations, in terms of their deployment, intentionality and development. First of all, if an action is required in order to induce a certain desired action by the other pole (i.e. the deployment of emergence of a relationship of power), it is because there is no guarantee that the desired action will be performed independently of the intervention of the first pole. The desired action is reckoned, by those who want it to be performed, as not likely to occur. It has scarce probabilities to be actualized. This is why an action is required. In order to achieve a given outcome in which another subject performs a specific action that otherwise it would not perform, an action is necessary. What kind of action? Incitements, inductions, seductions, prohibitions, etc. Once the power relation is onset, the end of the exercise of power (its intentionality) is that the desired action will actually occur. The development of the power relations consists mainly of the set of actions required in order to make sure (or as sure as possible) that the desired action will be regularly and consistently performed. The depiction of this model highlights how crucial the management of the field of possibilities is for power relations. Furthermore, its centrality emerges even more cogently in the effort of distinguishing power relations from other forms or modalities of antagonism (violence, struggle, domination). The extent of the field of possibilities functions as the very criterion for distinguishing power relations from relations of violence, confrontation or domination and to determine their respective relations with resistance, its possibilities or the forms that it might as well take.

At one end of this scale of antagonism, there are relationships of violence and physical relationships of constraint. The former are distinguished from power relations in virtue of their target. Relationships of violence consists of an action exerted not upon the possible or concrete actions of the other, but directly upon the body of the other: “A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities” (Foucault 2000: 340). The difference between the target of power relations (actions) and of relationships of violence (bodies or things) determines a specific operational modality, which is unidirectional, from one pole to the other but not the other way around. There is no circulation as in the case of power relation, but a contin-
uous and reiterated transmission with a singular sense of direction, terminating in a pole that has no other possibility than suffering (or being affected by) this action: “Its opposite pole can only be passivity” (Foucault 2000: 340). The passive pole of a relationship of violence is therefore characterized by the incapability of action due to the blockage of all its possibilities (or possible actions or responses). Without the possibility of acting, the passive pole remains incapable of affecting the relation, which in turn is completely determined by the action of the other. The relationship of violence reproduces itself as long as the one who exerts violence pleases.

What happens though when this capacity of action is restored? There is the possibility of resistance. In the range of possible actions that are available to the subject, a set of them consists of concrete or possible points of resistance. Only when both poles of the relations are active, then their combinatorial interaction can generate a multiplicity of possible scenarios or interplays of actions. Relationships of violence produce a univocal scenario, which is entirely determined by the action of only one pole. The result depends only on one action and its intention coincides with the actual effect. But as soon as a possibility of resistance emerges, this relation of certitude between action and effect is immediately renegotiated. The man in chains is the liminal figure that occupies the point of transformation between power relations and relations of violence: “slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape” (Foucault 2000: 342). When the enchainment leaves no room for mobility or escape, the type of action performed generates a “physical relation of constraint”, which is ultimately a relation of violence upon a body deprived of its capacity of action. But as soon as this enchainment, for whatever reason, loosens up a bit and some mobility becomes possible, the inert body turns immediately into a subject capable of action. It is the sudden emergence of a minimum chance of escape that signals the passage from a physical relation of constraint to a power relation. The emergence of a power relation coincides with the emergence of a possibility of resistance. The future exploitability of the capacity of action of another is not decisive for the establishment of a power relation. The paradox of the man in chains is that even an accidental emergence of a chance of escape suffices to determine the turn from a relationship of constraint to a power relations. The primacy of resistance lies in the fact that power relations seem to emerge more in response to resistance and its possibilities rather than in virtue of the outcomes and effects that one pole wants to achieve. So what is primarily at stake in power relations, their primary and constitutive concern is the government of this capacity of resistance, the government of a capacity whose political relevance is not primarily due to its action in general and the beneficial effects that can be achieved by manipulating it. The primary focus is on this capacity insofar it includes the possibility of resistance, source of instability and incertitude. The possibility of resistance is what generates a field of possibilities and necessitates the establishment of a power relation that structures that field.

The primacy of resistance manifests itself in this opening of possibilities that determines the instability that is constitutive of power relations. Now, this instability is modulated on a scale of probability. When the man in chains passes from a physical relation of constraint to a power relation in virtue of the emergence of a possibility of escape, the relation in which he finds himself approximates the top of this scale of probability: the possibility of

3. Deleuze (1983, 2006) expresses the tension at work in power relations as proper of the capacity to affect and to be affected, combining Spinoza with Nietzsche’s qualitative distinction of forces.
resistance has a very scarce probability of being actualised. The relative field of possibility is therefore minimum. The points of possible resistance that swarms around the power relation define a scarce probability of actualization that is unable to disturb or affect the relationship of power. In this scenario, the action performed by the pole which exerts the power relation approximates the certitude of obtaining a desired outcome. The approximation of certitude constitutes the upper limit of power relations. Beyond that limit, power relation transforms into physical relations of constraint, relationships of violence or, by extent, to any relation which produces an outcome completely determined by a one-sided action. Now it is necessary to identify the lower limit on this scale of probability. There is a second point of transformation in which power relations turn into a kind of relation whose circulation is continuously disrupted and the desired outcomes are more unlikely to be actualized. Relationships of power are constitutively instable, but they do display a certain stability. This is evident in the longevity of institutions, which code a multiplicity of power relations that, despite their relative opening to transformation, can be considered overall stable. Their continuous reproduction expresses the scarcely-instable stability of power relations. Nevertheless, when this stability fades off, power relations are disrupted. There is a level of instability that power relations cannot tolerate. When the regularity that the government of the field of possibility falls beyond a certain level, power relations transform into what Foucault call relations of confrontation or strategies of struggle “in which the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused” (Foucault 2000: 346). In the passage, the actions performed by the poles of the relation are clearly distinguished. They are no longer superimposed in the sense, that one action is no longer upon the action of the other, but frontally against it. They do not become confused because the circulation is completely disrupted and the poles of the relation do not function any longer as relays, but confront each other as adversaries: “Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of possible reversal”. We have seen above that the possibility of resistance immediately expresses a form of tension which confronts power relations. Here that tension intensifies up to the point in which it becomes more properly a struggle. The concept of struggle collocates itself at the precise moment in which power relations turn into relations of confrontations. Struggle, as a specific modality of action, occurs only after the points of resistance and their possibilities that swarm around power relations are coded into an actual strategy. The struggle starts when the relays turns into an adversary. These relations of confrontation therefore display a specific dynamic. The interaction of adversaries takes the form of a “the free play of antagonistic reactions”, where “one must be content with reacting to [the actions of the other] after the event” (Foucault 2000: 347). Actions can no longer be anticipated and induced as in power relations. If the action of the other cannot be manipulated in advance, there is a wide set of possible action that has a similar chance to be actualized. As such, anticipation would be hazardous. Any action is no longer the reaction to an action and its relative field of possibilities, but only a reaction to the concrete move of the adversary. What would the course of action be then? It is the finality of the struggle that determines the evolution of the relation: “[a relationship of confrontation] is not a struggle to death”. If the objective were the mere destruction of the other (as in relationships of violence), the relation would be a mere matter of strength: the weak would immediately succumb with the struggle vanishing on its ashes. The struggle is instead open, undecided. So the poles of the relation share a substantial equality where their differential is insignificant. Yet, a struggle to death between two equal adversaries is more likely to become a quiet equilibrium: “a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides”. A mixture of Buridan’s ass
that starves to death and Beckett’s endless wait: each pole waits for the action of the other to plan its reaction – indefinite postponement and blockage of action. Nevertheless, the achievement of this static equilibrium is prevented by the attraction exerted by power relations over both the struggling poles: “[f]or a relationship of confrontation [...] the fixing of a power relationship becomes a target- at one and the same time its fulfilment and its suspension”. The final objective of every relation of confrontation is the establishment of a power relation, where the action of the other is again governable. The defeated adversary needs to be transformed into a relay for a new power relation, while the coded resistances need to be re-dispersed and reduced to a sterile swarming or a “distant roar of the battle” (Foucault 1995: 308). Therefore, the actions that animate all the sides involved in relations of confrontation are moved paradoxically by the intention to exit such a relation. A relation of confrontation determines a necessary but unpleasant situation for all the parties at play. The participation to a relation of confrontation is merely instrumental in order to achieve a new and more stable configuration of the forces at stake in the network. As such, the way in which relations of confrontation deploy and develop displays somehow a tendency to its self-overcoming. The relation evolves up to the moment in which it finally turns into something other than itself. Its target is therefore at once its fulfilment and also its suspension. Its full evolution decrees its termination. Once the struggle reaches the moment in which the frontal confrontation achieves a new scarcely-instable stability and the adversary turns into a relay, the struggle stops and a new power relation emerges. The struggle aspires to its own termination: “every strategy of confrontation dreams of becoming a relationship of power” (Foucault 2000: 347). There is a clear aspirational tendency towards power relations. The latter seem to exert a certain attraction on the other relations. The fixing of a power relation is the final objective that makes the struggle worth to be fought. What wants to be achieved and what actually exerts an attraction is the establishment of stable mechanisms through which “one can direct, in a fairly constant manner and with reasonable certainty, the conduct of others”, where the actions of the other can be manipulated and induced “in a calculated manner”.

There are two main points that emerge out of the differentiation of the spectrum of political relations. Firstly, power relations constitute somehow a pole of attraction for the other relations of the spectrum. The primacy of power relations over relationships of violence, physical relations of constraint and relations of confrontations or strategies of struggle is built upon the specific course of action that each relation displays. The political spectrum presents different combinations of certainty, stability and probabilities. Any differentiation corresponds to the modality in which these elements are reciprocally negotiated and determined. At the two extremes of this spectrum, we find the limits of power relations, the thresholds that mark the passage from one kind to the other. On the one hand, we have relationships of violence and physical relations of constraint, where action is upon a body capacity of action is suspended or annihilated: maximum certainty of the effect as this depends entirely upon the first action and there is no reaction from the other pole; maximum stability of the relation, as the suspension of the capacity of action blocks off all the possibilities of resistance as well; maximum probability of successful reproduction of the relation, as there is no field of possibilities to govern. At the other extreme of the spectrum, there are relations of confrontation. They cover a range of situations in which certainty, stability and probabilities are variable. There is very scarce or no certainty at all as the struggle determines a predicament of unpredictability; strong instability as there is a continuous possibility of reversal; the radical openness of the field of probabilities makes
it ultimately ungovernable and actions take the form of reactions after the event in the free interplay of antagonistic forces. Every political relation that is in between these two limits can be considered a power relation: quite regular, fairly certain, scarcely-instable stability, quite solid government of the field of possibilities.

Yet, what is evident from this picture is the continuous appeal to the capacity of action of the other and the stability of its government. The way in which power relations are differentiated from the other relations of the spectrum has therefore an intrinsic reference to what determines the level of stability (and accordingly the levels of certainty and probability): resistance and its possibility. This leads to the second point that can be extracted from this hypothetical Foucauldian narrative of the political spectrum. Oddly enough, it is resistance and its possibility to determine not just the internal differentiation of the various political relations, but also its hierarchization. The primacy of power relation is entirely dependent on the specific modality in which the capacity of action of the other is governed. The success or failure of this enterprise is not primarily measured upon the positive effects that the relation produces, but depends on the management of the capacity of action insofar it displays a capacity for resistance. The primacy of power relations rests upon the varying degrees of actualisation of resistance and its possibility. Resistance becomes therefore the key-element of the dynamic as it affects and influences the evolution of political relations in general. The attraction that power relations exert over the other kinds of relation in the spectrum is ultimately conditioned by resistance. A relation of confrontation wants to be overcome because resistance produces a level of antagonism that is unbearable for all the sides involved. A relationship of violence is likely to be transformed, because the incapacity of resistance of the other is at the same the decree of impossibility of its usage and of the futility of the relation, as no beneficial effect is produced through the relation. The whole spectrum of the political and the fluctuation between the multiple kinds of relations that it comprises are ultimately shaped upon resistance: this determines its primacy not only over power relations but, by extension, over any kind of political relationship. The primacy of resistance lies in the processes and the dynamics that resistance and its possibility activate, forcing power relations but also political relations in general to a reactive modification. Resistance is ultimately what assures the dynamicity of the political, what compels political relation to a ceaseless transformation, what maintains the flow of becoming against the dystopian dream of its ultimate crystallisation.

The primacy of resistance with and beyond Foucault

In the works analysed so far, the primacy of resistance emerges quite cryptically through the development and the prolongation of the conceptual lines actually drawn by Foucault. Nevertheless, there is a text in which this previously hidden message makes its brief apparition. Foucault concisely hints to the primacy of resistance in an interview released in Toronto in 1982 and then published under the title *Sex, power and the politics of identity*:

If there was no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because it would simply be a matter of obedience. You have to use power relations to refer to the situation where you’re not doing what you want. So resistance comes first, and resistance remains supe-
The first sentence of the quotation should have become a sort of refrain by now. The rest of the quotation instead constitutes the core of the primacy of resistance. The “process” refers to the interactions within the power network, the map of the distribution of points and their relations. Points and forces are assumed to constitute the irreducible element, the substance of the power network, although the relation between points and forces remains quite underdeveloped. In the dynamic interplay of these forces, resistance affirms its primacy through a persistent superiority. It is not limited to the emergence of power relations, but also the development of power relations confirms the primacy of resistance. Resistance comes first because it constitutes the condition of existence for power relations. The “so” that introduces the primacy of resistance refers back to the beginning of the quotation in which power relations owe their existence to resistance. As it has been discussed above, the peculiarity of power relations is that they constitutively necessitate resistance. Nevertheless, the primacy of resistance is not exhausted with the emergence of the power relation. The evolution of the process still displays its superiority over the other forces. The idea of superior forces evokes Nietzsche’s famous dichotomies on forces and their will to power (superior vs. inferior, active vs. reactive – see (Deleuze 1983, Toymentsev 2010). Nevertheless, the quotation on its own draws already a conceptual line that leads to the superiority of resistance without the need to take these dichotomies into account.

The persistent superiority of resistance lies in the modality in which the interaction of power relations and resistance unfolds. “Power relations are obliged to change with resistance” (Foucault 1997). The confrontation of forces constitutes a dynamic process that generates a continuous modification of the power relation. Nevertheless, these changes are held to be imposed by resistance. The way in which forces exert resistance provokes a modification of power relation. This modification cannot be a mere redefinition of the disymmetry between power and resistance, a hint of reversal. The change obliged by resistance regards the forces that exert power. Any resistance provokes a reaction of power that adjusts itself in order to leave intact or reinforce the dissymmetry that constitutes the power relation. Its action is not an autonomous affirmation, but an imposed necessity. For the sake of their own reproduction, power relations need to be articulated in reaction to the autonomous affirmation of their counterpart. This is perfectly in line with the conceptual edifice elaborated so far. Power relations are constitutively instable, but this instability needs to be continuously managed. There is always a range of actions that might increase this instability. These actions are always possible. What can be modified though is their probability. Power relations attempt to make resistances highly improbable. “Revolts are irreducible because no power is capable of making them absolutely impossible” (Foucault 1981). The revolt can be defined as the moment in which resistances are coded into a strategy that confronts the relevant power relation, obliging the latter to enter a relation of confrontation. Power relations work on the probability of revolt as its possibility is irreducible by definition. Nevertheless, it is crucial to bear in mind that power relations display a certain regularity and their stability is correlated by the rarity of revolts. As such, the moment of the revolt becomes a mysterious and enigmatic event: “In the end, there is no explanation for the man who revolts. His action is necessarily a tearing that breaks the
thread of history and its long chains of reasons so that a man can genuinely give preference to the risk of death over the certitude of having to obey” (Foucault 1981). What gives the enigmatic character to this event? Its actualisation despite the highly unfavourable odds. Power relations ideally create the conditions for their smooth reproduction. They induce a certain course of action upon the other. Obedience guarantees the circulation of the relation and the secure regularity of beneficial outcomes for both parties. The action is induced in exchange for the repetition of a scenario that is acceptable enough for the one who performs the induced action. The final outcome does express a dissymmetry in which the latter is somehow disadvantaged, but the cons are compensated and outbalanced by the regularity of the acceptable benefits. By submitting to a power relation, by functioning as the good relay, there is a small but guaranteed reward. Obedience gives you the certainty of obtaining some beneficial effects. Revolt instead implies the renunciation to this certainty and the opening up of a risky situation. As it activates a relation of confrontation, the outcome is completely open to any scenario. This implies the risk of death or enslavement for instance. At the same time though, the struggle opens up the possibility of an actual reversal of the contested power relation and the creation of a new configuration. Such a result constitutes an effect that is way more beneficial for the previously submitted pole in the relation. There are less chances of obtaining a beneficial effect, but this is compensated by the better reward that the new configuration might imply. Revolt is risky, but if successful, it promises to be way more rewarding than the regular but scarce benefits that the power relation under attack could have offered.

Obviously, revolts constitute the limit of resistance, the moment in which the swarming of resistances and the possibility of resistance turns through its coding into a defined strategy of struggle. This binary opposition between the two series obedience-security of scarce rewards and revolt-high risk-possible high rewards persists somehow even when resistance does not trespass into a proper revolt. This mechanism is at work even when the power network does not really display points of resistance but only its possibility. Basically, what happens during the circulation of power relations is a similar choice between the two series. When one acts upon the action of the other, the latter has always the abstract possibility of choosing whether to obey or not. The action induced by the first pole occurs only if the other actually performs it. The other maintains the possibility to refuse it. It is like if the second relay has always the choice of allowing or blocking the circulation. Therefore, the complexity of the possible responses can be condensed into two modalities: obedience or resistance. “The plebs is what responds to power through a movement of escape (degager)” (Foucault 1980). Here plebs stands clearly as another term for resistance, a specific modality of response to the request of circulation of power relations. This movement of escape is the attempt of revoking the participation to the power relation. It is the attempt to stop functioning as a relay. But when the circulation is disturbed or interrupted, a certain modification is needed to restore it or to define a new one. There is no need for intervention when the circulation is smooth. If power relations constantly produce the desired result, their mechanism does not require any intervention. It is therefore the plebs or resistance “what motivates all the new development of the network of power” (Foucault 1980). This constitutes the primacy of resistance. New possibilities of resistance impose a change or a modification of power relations. The latter need to respond to these new

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4. In the notion of escape, resistance highlights its creative aspect over its oppositional stance (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008)
points and invent new mechanisms. These transformations are therefore provoked by resistance and the proliferation of its possibilities. As such resistance derives its primacy over power relation because it is what ultimately activates and modulates history and becoming.

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Religiously Devoted To Power: Foucault and Technology

Foucault and Technology

Question commonly addressed in reference to philosophers would be “what can we learn from this or that philosopher?”, in this case “what can we learn from Foucault today?” However, one could also re-phrase this question and ask “what Foucault can learn from us?”, or, in other words, is there anything in today’s social/political/economic reality that would have a deep influence on basic Foucauldian notions on subject, ideology and ethics? If there is one thing that could be described as fundamental paradigmatic shift that took place after the year 1984, the year of Foucault’s death, that would be a shift related to a changes in media technologies. It is a change from centralized media technologies (television, radio, newspaper) to decentralized or “distributed” technologies – digital media and the Internet, allowed primarily through digitalization and TCP/IP protocol. Major difference in practical sense is that the Internet presents at the same time communicational technology (like telephone or telegraph) and mass-media technology (like television). In such context it is reasonable to ask whether this change in the power relations – a shift from centralized Panopticon-type broadcasting, to disseminated communications where every subject becomes a disseminator, means, at the same time, empowering of the people. Or does this new form of technologies form, in Foucauldian terms, the “technologies of the Self”, the “arts of existence”, “intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.” (Foucault 1990: 17).

Firstly it is important to define what the term technology means for Foucault. The fact is that Foucault does not use the term technology in contemporary sense. What does the contemporary usage of the word mean? The current understanding of technology arose in modern era, it dates to second half of 19th century, days of industrial revolution, and it refers to “application of science to production, in the form of engineering and the design of industrial systems” (Morphie/Potts 2003: 4). In that sense, technology refers to overall system of industrial machines and processes. Instead of such understanding of the technology, present in Martin Heidegger’s work, for example, Foucault is using the term in pre-industrial meaning relating the term to the meaning it had in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Foucault extendedly uses the term technology in his description and classification of the “technologies of the Self” (TotS), ways “in which people organise their
It is obvious that such usage can hardly be related to technology at all, and hardly to the shift in technologies (centralised/decentralised technologies) that took place after Foucault’s death. Nevertheless, while his literal reference to technologies must clearly be abandoned, this paper will try to prove that distributive technologies have lot in common with Foucault’s basic definitions of subject, power and ethic, and that new media technologies fits perfectly to his notions of the technologies of the self. At the same time, it will be elaborated, how those new TotS shows limitations of of the original term, and Foucault’s work in global. Since issues addressed here are widely distributed in his work, the paper will focus on three texts important for this conjunction of Foucauldian basic teachings and newly established order of things. The first is already mentioned faculty seminar “Technologies of the Self”, from fall of 1982, second is an essay “What is Enlightenment?” published in year 1984 where Foucault reflects on the Kant’s text that carries the same title, and third is an interview “Sex, power, and the politics of Identity” that Foucault gave in June 1982. The most simple notion and understanding of addressed phenomena can be derived from his interview and lecture. Foucault’s ethics, by reading those texts, could be formulated as a negation of centralized power, questioning of all universal ideas as a a product of history. I'll shortly summarize his lecture “The technologies of the Self” where he depicts humanistic sciences as responsible for new type of the “hegemony of the self”.

The technologies of the Self

Foucault starts his investigation of the TotS by posing a question: “How have certain kinds of interdictions required the price of certain kinds of knowledge about oneself? What must one know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce anything?” (Foucault 1988: 17). I am adding here the obvious association: how one is willing to renounce his/her sexuality? We already detected Foucault’s interest in period between pagan and early Christian time, in 4th century. For him, this period is of crucial importance because during this specific period something profoundly changed. While in pagan practice the aim of TotS was “to take care of oneself”, early Christian practice establishes first disclosure of
the self, dramatic and verbalized, followed by renunciation of self. Hypothesis, Foucault proposes at the end of this lecture relates his definition of TotS with disciplinary societies and period of 18th century. From the 18th to the present, concludes Foucault, second technology, technology of verbalization, becomes more important. Such uses of that technique without the other, renouncing oneself, constitutes a decisive break. In this new paradigm “human sciences” become new agents of using verbalization without renunciation of the self, and the aim of this new practices is “to constitute, positively, a new self” (Foucault 1988: 49). Those knowledges and notions on and about oneself, and those interdictions represent the limits and obligations that one internalizes during his/her life.

The notion of technologies of the Self closely relates to Foucault’s understanding of power. For Foucault power is specific technique that person internalizes during his/her life, and such technique present an interdiction and limit to freedom of inventing oneself, limitations of unconstrained living. We will see how this definition of power determines understanding of emancipatory politics and subsumes subversion of power to personal level, free individual that himself/herself can and must establish personal ethic that can than be elevated to whole social field and emancipatory practice. But before we step to limitations of such understanding of power, let us bring into a question Foucauldian definition of emancipatory fight.

If those interdictions and knowledges create power relations by bringing human sciences into historical scene as new agents and tools of power, which define new forms of internalization of subjective limitations, is there any way to step out from modern structure of power? In other words, what would be a positive, emancipatory notion of subject, and how it can be created? It is a question closely related to Foucauldian notion of ethic, a theme that became important for his work only after the year 1980. In those years Foucault gave lots of interviews, and during one of them he gave an answer to this question of positive constitution of oneself and described a form of a personal ethics of free subject. This definition, nevertheless, has to be taken as a form of simplification, having in mind genre, media and format in which it took place. Still, there is a political agenda present in this interview that makes it important. In short, in an interview “Sex, power, and the politics of identity” (Foucault 1994: 163-174) he describes what would be an emancipatory politics of the Self. We can summarize his major thoughts from this interview.

Firstly, Foucault concludes that sexuality is something that we ourselves create, since it is our own creation, much more than the discovery of a secret side of our desire (Foucault 1994: 163). That creation, claims Foucault, have to escape any essentialism (he finds a program of “inventing our own culture” also problematic, because of essentialism, claiming that sexual minorities have to invent a culture, not ghettoized in their culture). That is a point of view he wants to accent also in the matter of S&M practices, that he finds very important for social power relations. S&M is not “uncovering” of secret tendencies “deep in our unconscious” but “a creation of new possibilities of pleasure, which people had no idea about previously” (Foucault 1994: 165). The similar politics of invention Foucault relates to drugs. Foucault claims that instead a revelation, a practice of uncovering our own identity (Foucault 1994: 166) we have to invent our identity. He answers “...the relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones of identity, rather, they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To be the same is really boring” (Foucault 1994: 166).
Further, he defines his relationship to power. For Foucault the power is not only a negative force. We are always already in the situation. “We cannot jump outside the situation” (Foucault 1994: 167) as he formulates. So for Foucault resistance forms the power, not the other way around: “if there was no resistance, there would be no power relations” (Foucault 1994: 167). In short, resistance comes first. If there is resistance that forms power, and there is creation of identity through new established practices (sexual practices, drugs) that emancipation comes in a form of self-inventing and creative construction of identity, since only this can be subversive. For Foucault ethics is a kind of *ethics of self invention*. The primal enemy of such ethics is an “identity as an ethical universal rule” (Foucault 1994: 166).

Apart from his historical studies of ancient sexual ethics, this statement is typical for his interviews, and the period in which Foucault focus to practical elaborations of emancipatory politics. In those years Foucault also dismissed linguistic and psychoanalysis and advocated what seems to be, as Copjec noted, “structures that march in the streets (Copjec 1994: 4). Foucault claims: “I believe that it is not to the great model of signs and language that reference should be made, but to war and battle. The history which bears and determines us is war like, not language like. Relations of power, not relations of sense” (quoted from Copjec, 1994: 4).

Problem is that in his late work such notion of the ethical subject is conceived as something totally devoid of content and thus as structurally unknowable, unthinkable, finally, of course, as nonhistoricizable (Copjec 1994: 3). Copjec concludes that such political acting is understood as acting of “egoistic and autonomous individuals who know, and who have reason to know better than anyone else, just what it is they want” (Copjec 1994: 2). In quoted interview Foucault backs up this claims. When asked “what kind of political institutions do we need to begin to establish, in order not just to defend ourselves but also to create new social forms that are really going to be alternative” (Foucault 1994: 171), Foucault answers “I have no precise idea”, but he supports “institutional models have been experimented with without a program” (Foucault 1994: 171-172). He noticed that in France there has been a lot of criticism recently about the fact that there are no programs in the various political movements”, but he thinks that “being without a program can be very useful and very original and creative” (Foucault 1994: 172). So instead of political platform, Foucault advocates experience, artistic invention of subject without any constraints and theoretical background, such as structuralism or psychoanalysis.

The aim of this paper is to focus on problems of the nature of political emancipation Foucault seems to advocate, but also to relate Foucauldian non-program with contemporary politics, embodied in the structure of the Internet. For that reason, the importance of here quoted paragraphs from late Foucault’s interviews lies in the similarity between Foucault description of the emancipatory politics of the self and description of the production of the self on the Internet. For the purpose of such endeavor it is important to highlight similarities between Foucault and descriptions of the new media technologies, in order to show how Foucauldian notion of politics is co-opted.

There could be no better or more eloquent description of new media technologies, than Manuel Castells’s description. It is not only because Castells is one of the major scientists in the field of sociology of new media, but also because in his more recent work where Castells describes Web 2.0 technologies, he also describes those platforms as platforms
of power, expressing his unlimited optimism toward emancipatory potentials of such decentralised form of power. Such is the highly optimist definition of what Castells describe under the term the “communication power”, provided in his study from 2009. In his study Communication Power, Manuel Castells promotes the idea of autonomous subject on the Internet, providing an examples of the Internet media services such as YouTube, Facebook, or MySpace, as platforms that allow free acting. For Castells, freedom presents not an economical or political freedom of acting, forming of the society according to specific rules, but the value of power is exactly in its “expression of power” (Castells 2009: 30). In other words, Web 2.0 services can be seen as technologies of self-inventing, since they allow “the production of the message” that “is self-generated, the definition of the potential receiver(s) is self-directed, and the retrieval of specific messages or content from the World Wide Web and electronic communication networks is self-selected” (Castells 2009: 55).

However, such description is highly problematic if we take into account the question of freedom related to social networks. Subjects using those platforms forms what can be defined as “audience commodity” (Smythe, 1981) or producer/prosumer commodity (Fuchs 2009). It is not a democratisation of human communication, but total commodification of human creativity- Prosumers present “exploited class of knowledge workers” that are creating content for corporations like Google, News Corp. (which owns MySpace), Yahoo! (which owns Flickr), etc. (Fuchs 2009: 95). From today’s perspective it can be argued that although there is an emergence of new distributed technologies of the self, liberalization of production of identities, the hegemonic power still carries on. False liberation of subjects on the Internet is proliferation of self-invention, plurality, and identity politics advocated by Foucault. Is it not Foucault’s ethics implemented on the Internet?

What is Enlightenment? Or - “limitation liberates”

To fully comprehend Foucault’s ethic, notion of power and constitution of a subject, let us turn to another question – Foucault’s ambiguous relation to Enlightenment. Proposed thesis is that Foucauldian ethics, marked by his description of procedures of self-invention, is of crucial importance for today’s politics. Foucault’s work in global can be approached from this perspective, and we can find it also in the lecture “The Technologies of the Self”. His work in whole was marked by his standpoint on Enlightenment and progress. In this particular question, it becomes clear that Foucault sees the progress in idealist Hegelian sense, as progress of ideas. On the other hand, he does not take into account concrete technologies, production forces in Marxian sense.

Lecture “The technologies of the Self” starts with imaginary dialog with Max Weber. For Foucault Weber himself stands up for the norms and principals of the Enlightenment and modernity¹. Max Weber, German sociologist, philosopher and political economist of the

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¹Max Weber, asked: “If one wants to behave rationally and regulate one’s action according to true principles, what part of one’s self should one renounce? What is the ascetic price of reason? To what kind of asceticism should one submit?” Foucault states that he wants to pose the opposite question: “How have certain kinds of interdictions required the price of certain kinds of knowledge about oneself? What must one know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce anything?” (Foucault 1984: 32).
late nineteenth century, advocated rationalization and secularization through the project that he described as a project of, what he called, *disenchantment of the world*. The world that was enchanted, for the purpose of rationalization and progress, must be disenchanted, claims Weber. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* – he proposes ascetic protestantism as a tool for emergence of market capitalism and rational nation-states. The history of modern society can be described as a progress of this Weberian instrumental (technical) rationality. On the other hand, Foucault is suspicious of rationalization and progress. He is ambiguous toward a project of Enlightenment and progress in whole, since it is often accompanied with exclusion of minorities.

For Foucault, in a narrow sense modernity refers to technological changes that started with second half of the nineteenth century and the industrial revolution. But he often refers to modernity in broader sense, to eighteen century and Enlightenment, where there is an emergence of an absolute trust in self confidence of the subject. Such confidence, nevertheless, often ended with exclusion and subordination of deprived groups.

Similar skepticism we find in essay on Kant – where Foucault asks: who belongs to this mankind (Menschheit) Kant is referring to? The question follows, as a form of positive counter-idea: How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations? In other words can we imagine a world without technologies of the Self in the form of technologies of power, and think of the really universal mankind (Menschheit), collective of truly universal ideals? So why is notion of Enlightenment crucial for Foucault? Foucault tries to establish a rational skepticism towards definitions of the subject established by Enlightenment. “We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment.” writes Foucault (Foucault 1984: 313). Such “criticism consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits” (Foucault 1984: 315). That means that the aim of such criticism is to provide positive analyses of “what is given to us as universal necessary obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault 1984: 315) In other words, for Foucault project of Enlightenment is no longer possible, without new definition of free beings. That subject should be undetermined and unconstrained by specific definitions.

An essay “What is Enlightenment?” is Foucault’s reflection on the Kant’s text that carries the same title. It is an essay in which he tries to define, how things went wrong, and what are the consequences.² Kant in his argument on what is Enlightenment provided rather controversial explanation. Kant firstly begins with pragmatic and expected statement, with the slogan of the Enlightenment: *Sapere aude! Dare to know!* (Dolar 1991: 47). Expectedly, Enlightenment is for Kant “an ‘exit’, a ‘way out... from the status of ‘immaturity’” (Foucault, 1984: 34), since the mature person is the person who does not need a guidance of some authority (clergyman, doctor, or teacher), but is daring to challenge knowledge. However, a few paragraphs later, Kant adds, in what appears to be the most flagrant self-contradiction: “Reason as much as you want and on what you want, but obey!” (Kant 1784/1996: 18). So the truth of *Sapere aude* is ultimately “Use your own reason freely - provided that you obey!” Nevertheless, “Kant resolves the contradiction by placing the freedom of reasoning and obedience in two different spheres, the public and the private”

²I will lean here on Mladen Dolar's interpretation of Kant's and Foucault's texts titled “The legacy of the Enlightenment: Foucault and Lacan”.

117
(Dolar 1991: 47). His point is not, “Think what you wish in private, as long as you obey in public”, but exactly the opposite: the use of reason belongs in the public sphere - the whole success of the Enlightenment depends on there being no limits to the public use of reason - while obedience is a private affair”. It is a formula of “as an army officer, for example, I have to obey orders ... but I can make a public appeal” (Dolar 1991: 47-48). Division public/private, is also reflecting a division of power as private and knowledge as public. It is also a reason why Althusser describes ideological state apparatus as private use of the reason. That is why this private use of the reason is a place where ideology hides for Althusser (Dolar 1991).

In other words, while Foucault finds this paradox “The law is valid, but not true” as limited, for Kant (as for Hegel and Lacan), it constitutes a foundation for free subject. “The subject of the Enlightenment, for Kant, is a split subject and can only remain free as long as it accepts this split”, “split is indeed the place of freedom, not something to be overcome” (Dolar 1991: 48). It is not appropriate to criticize the universal claims of Enlightenment by pointing out that they dissimulate a split. On the contrary, one has to except a split as constitutive for any universality.

Kant not only admits a division reason/power, but he actually takes it as the very matrix of the Enlightenment: for to admit the split as constitutive is the best way to deal with the unreason of power. The fundamental Kantian/Lacanian formula of liberation is “limitation liberates” (Dolar 1991: 50). Lacan and Kant here call for different reading of the relationship between universal and particular. Kantian/Lacanian formula is than following: It is not that we can liberate our society by including all particularities in the concept of the universal, but the concept of universal has to be emptied from any content, and put into a position of an empty signifier that has to be master signifier not despite its emptiness, but exactly because of its emptiness.

We must try to establish a paradoxical place for freedom, since pure name, an empty signifier, purely formal peak of power, excluded, non-social place of Lacanian S1, holds society together (Dolar 1991: 50). That does not mean, that we have to put up with an irrational law. Quite the contrary: the admission in advance of its unfoundedness actually entails a kind of degradation of the law (Dolar 1991: 50-51), it deprives the law of its internal authority it clears a place for “real” authority to be established: the authority of reason and truth. That is why power appears in the Kantian system as something particular and private, opposed to universality. Reason can be universal only as long as it admits an exception; its universality indeed calls for an exception.

Conclusion

To conclude, for Foucault definition of Enlightenment is constituted in an ambiguity. Enlightenment invented the subject (individuum, and freedom) but also invented a new formula of hegemony. Foucault is not for the outcasting the heritage of the Enlightenment, negation of rationality, but he calls for questioning of every historical situation in which universality show to be a particularity (like it is a matter with homosexuality). His formula is - every universality that is undermined by certain particularity should be ques-
tioned. For Lacan and Kant on the other hand, there is different formula of the relation between universal and particular. It is not universal that has to include every particular subject, position or point of view, but there should exist a knowledge that every universality is particular. So in a way it could be concluded that the problem with Foucault is not that he does not believe in the institutions, that he does not believe in a project of Enlightenment, but almost the other way around, the problem is that he believes in them too religiously. He believes that there is a formula of universality which is not constituted on the conflict and antagonism, and that such universality in the position to include every particularity.

For Foucault Enlightenment presents anew possibility of an ethics based on self-construction. On the other hand, today’s media technologies reveal a paradox of distributive diagram that reflects the inner impossibility of an autonomous subject to constitute itself without Symbolic order, law that works from behind. Distributive horizontal diagram of the Internet and distributive selves must not be seen as a project of liberation or universal inclusiveness, since it proved to be, first of all, an ideal symbolic-economic machine. On the contrary the very project of Enlightenment, as well as its last iteration - the Internet, should be approached through a perspective of the formula “limitation liberates”. In other words, huge debate on the politics of identity, multiculturalism, political correctness on the Internet, should be focused on the liberation on the uses of public reason in a form of a critique of political economy. Is it not that the Internet is loosing its counter-power because of the present consensus between users and hegemonic institutions on how liberation is an liberation of private uses of reason, or identity politics? While every question can be posed, the question of profit orientation, is still restricted. There cannot be argument on the unlimited access to knowledge, informations and archives, except from the point of view of traditional copyright. At the same time, such point of view is limiting all possibilities of the Internet as public sphere.

We cannot conclude that there is no more obedience, that decentralised power does not present power, since institutions did survive in new forms. Facebook, Google, Amazon, and other Internet companies, present new type of institutions in the era of, what Gilles Deleuze described as “societies of control”. What strikes as a fundamental difference between human sciences responsible for hegemony of the technologies of the Self, and emerged institutions of societies of control, is a fact that former exercise their power in a form of disinterest in public use of reason, as long as the fundament, the reproduction of the economy of the late capitalism remains untouched.3

To conclude, new distributed diagram, based in digital dematerialization of media object, and protocol structure of the Internet, lightens the problem presented in Foucault’s theory of subject, power and ethics. For Foucault, subject challenges a rupture, a trauma, and such rupture is an outcome of specific technologies that are not situated in the subject

3. There are many examples of such openness of politics of identity, and the restrictions of capital. One best example of such openness, universality is the usage of the Facebook during the Arab spring. In early days of revolution one of the most important groups was censored. Censorship was not motivated by Facebook taking side in the conflict. Group was censored because administrators were using pseudonyms. It is Facebook conditions of use that does not allow anonymity but not because of ideological or moral stands, but because of company’s business model based on commodification of user’s information. The lesson of Arab spring could be summarized as follows: create your public image (for whatever reason you like), as long as you obey to the law of the profit.
before entering the social sphere. Technologies of the Self, although are internalized, are formed outside the subject, in a form of a knowledge produced by certain institutions as constitutive agents of the self. On the other hand, a different notion of subject, power and ethic is present in Kant/Lacan axis. I here tried to show how their resemblance on the matter of limitations present “missing link” in Foucault. New media technologies only lighten the fact that capitalism is the name of the truly universal machine, where all questions can be proposed except the fundamental question of reproduction of the way of production. Finally, we can ask ourselves whether the Foucaultian notions of subject, power, and ethics should be engaged with the critique of political economy of late capitalism?

Bibliography


Michel Foucault-In-Between Archeology of Knowledge and Genealogy of Power

Michel Foucault is the emblematic figure of French post-structuralism and postmodernism, characterized by originality and a unique style, whose opinion is distributed among the discursive/extra discursive theoretising, the macro/micro perspective and the dialectic of domination/resistance.

While rejecting modern views valorizes the eccentric efficiency of individual, local and discontinuitive criticism, in comparison with the propulsive effect of global and totalitarian theories, both in the theoretical level as well as in the political, although acknowledges that theories such as Marxism and psychoanalysis created lighter tools for local research, however he believed that they are reductionist and imposing in practice, and should be replaced with a plurality of forms of knowledge and microanalysis (Foucault 1980:81).

Through the criticism that this author makes towards modernity and humanism, while increasingly relying on the anti-illuminist approach, claiming that “modern forms of power and knowledge have served to create new forms of domination”, turns into one of the main sources of the postmodern, since, humanism in Western civilization is limiting the desire for power and excludes the possibility of taking power, and the revolt against humanity is a revolt against all forms of servitude which includes all social and cultural spheres.

Nietzsche’s impact on him is more than evident, in particular his request for the transcendence of Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy, which together with Freud’s psychoanalysis considers typical modernist approach which in essence are reductionist, thus initiating in him ideas for topics with post-humanist and post-metaphysical character.

Nietzsche also taught Foucault, how to write a genealogical history of unconventional topics such as folly and sexuality, which are configured within rational frameworks, within the modern knowledge discourse and with it are made adequate for guidance and control (Butler 2007: 17).

So, by following his example and the genealogy of morals, ascetism, justice and punishment, Foucault will write the stories of marginalized discourses and qualified as non-subject to formalism; disqualified and delegitimised from positive science and Marxism (Foucault 1980: 81; 83).
Foucault in his works, also develops two other findings of Nietzsche:

1. that the will to achieve truth and knowledge are inseparable from the will to power and

2. his criticism towards liberal humanism and the humanities.

In his attitudes, one can notice similarities with two representatives of the Frankfurt School: Horkheimer and Adorno, when he believes that rationality is power of obligation, but unlike them, Foucault was concentrated in the dominance of individuals through social institutions, discourses and practices, while differs with Weber’s, Marx’s and Habermas’s attitudes who try to discover the modern emancipatory and respectable aspects (Best & Kellner 1996: 57).

Foucault starts from the position that there is not only one kind of apriori forms, as Kant and some structuralist thought, but that there are several different types of apriorities, which in its own way necessarily constitute general knowledge of a particular period of time.

In fact, before him, very rarely was it put forward, the question which in fact is Kantian, in a serious and systematic manner: how is it possible the full knowledge of an era or of a whole period of time! (Butler 2007: 63).

The relationship between power and knowledge: archeology and genealogy

Foucault uses the concept of archeology to distinguish his approach to history, first in relation to hermeneutics which requires a really deep truth at the base of discourse or clarification of subjective meaning schemes as well as the difference of modern models such as those causal as well as superficial-deep models.

The work “Archeology of knowledge” represents retaliation to the criticism of Jean Piaget, who said Foucault while relying on his intuition, replaced all scientific methodology with speculative improvisations. And this response is based on facts, analyzing his methodology, in a very thorough manner, but also making turns from his previous thoughts and by bypassing the episteme, as key categories in his polemic against theories anthropologic and humanistic knowledge, thus also notifies us of his third round of works “The history of sexuality” and “Discipline and punish”.

“For a time, archeology as a discipline that deals with memorials that cannot speak, with traces of immovable, with no context items and things that remain from the past - tend towards history and gain meaning by putting the historical discourse. It can be said, if you can play with words, that history in our time has a tendency towards archeology- towards the internal description of monuments.”

(Foucault 2010: 13)

Archaeology under Foucault also differs from the fields of history of ideas which usually believes in the coherence of the discourse that is analyzing, is confusing and not well
structured, is idealistic and humanistic, characterized by tracking the continuative evolution, traditional thinking and conscious creation of the subject.

Thus archeology tries to reveal the conditions for the possibilities of knowledge, deterministic rules for the formation of discursive rationality which operates below the goal level or the thematic content (Best & Kellner 1996: 76).

Archaeology under Foucault is not the search for inventions:

“It is tasteless to that moment, in which someone for the first time would be safe for any truth; she does not insist in the renewal of light in such solemn absences. But this does not mean that it addresses medium thinking appearances, which at a given moment everyone has been able to repeat.”

(Foucault 2010: 184)

So unlike structuralism, rules recommended by Foucault are not immutable and universal, or placed in the structure of the mind but are given for discursive areas and have a variable historical character.

“There should be a distinction between linguistic analytics (or irreversibility), logical identity (or equibalance) and the homogeneity index. Archaeology mainly deals with this homogeneity. It can make visible appearance of a new discursive practice through verbal formulations which remain analogously linguistic or logically equivalent”

(Foucault 2010: 186)

Also, archeology does not pretend to define thoughts, appearances, photos, subjects, obsessions hidden or shown in discourses, but discourses alone, discourses as a practice subjected to the rules (Foucault 2010: 178).

For, archaeological description addresses those discursive practices that should be brought about with the facts of the order, unless we want to prove in a naïve or wild manner respectively according to the logic of merit. At the level at which it is set, the opposing concept of originality-banality is not permanent: it is not establishing a hierarchical value between a started formulation and the sentence which for years or centuries later is repeated with more or less true; it makes no radical difference. (Foucault 2010: 184)

Foucault believes that archeology can, even that is it’s main task of that, to create “tree of deriving discourse “such as natural history“. At the very roots, the main declarant, it would put those which relate to the definition of structures that can be observed, while in the field of possible objects, those which determine the forms of description and perceptual codes that can be used, those that enable the presentation of generalizing specificities and also fulfill an area for building concepts, and finally, those which, although educate a strategic choice, leave room for the greatest number of options later (Foucault 2010: 188).

He himself agrees that it is a dangerous word which evokes signs that are out of time, which today have become silent and cold. In fact it is about the description of discourse, but not the books, in relation to their writer, and neither discourse theories, with their
structured coherence, but the discourses of those mysterious groups which over time appear to us as medicine, political economy or biology.

And that his aim was to show how these units create fields, although not independent, regulated, but are anonymous and without subjects, although incessant change and hit the many individual achievements.

Similar to archeology, Foucault distinguishes the genealogy as a new form (of historical thought) historical works, whereas the genealogist to him is the new historian.

So Foucault’s initial role was the archaeological analysis of internal logics of discourses as inadequate, because they did not pay proper importance to social practices and institutions, which were actually built. While in later works, such as “Discipline and Punishment” and “The history of sexuality”, “archeology” is replaced by “genealogy”, which through a historical analysis aimed at uncovering the ways that individuals are created into subjects and objects of knowledge. (Fern 2002: 145)

Foucault himself, considered himself as an intellectual genealogist, aiming always at review the facts and submissions; as well as the shock to the usual forms of action and thought: to delete the conventional data, to review the rules and institutions and starting from this recreation of the problem-to participate in the creation of a new political will.

The start of the Foucault’s transition from archeology to genealogy is observed in 1970, and it was intended at a more adequate theorization of the material institutions and forms of power, and although it signals a new shift, it is not a break in his works, but above all an expansion of the circle of analysis, a more convenient thematization about social practices and relations with power that will be present in his opinion all the time.

However, along this passage, he places special emphasis on material conditions of the discourse by defining it through institutions, political events, economic practices and processes and by analyzing the relationship between discursive and non-discursive spheres (Foucault 2010: 49).

In his essay “Discourse on Language”, he talks about using a new genealogical analysis of forming an effective discourse, or in borders or outside its control, and that his archeological research must now be implemented in connection with the will to knowledge and the effects of power that creates it. (Best & Kellner, 1996: 68)

Thus, through the genealogy, according to Foucault, our everyday life’s truth is being problematized: our bodies (sexuality), our social institutions (prisons, schools, hospitals, families) and scientific norms (normality, insanity, health and disease) which are actually objects created in changing historical relationships of power.

Genealogy also reveals the extent by which we are a consequence of power, because the truth which makes laws, which creates discourses to send strength and expand itself from the effects of force, are the product of relations of power, so much so that we are doomed, determined certain ways of life and desirability.
The genealogical understanding of ourselves, our social institutions and our practices, reveals how the mechanisms of power effectively incorporated into the social totality, and shows how the individual can create new effects of power.

According to Foucault, modern power is distinguished from all other forms because it is disciplining and ordering which aims to normalizing and creating manageable bodies and useful. “The exercise of discipline implies the existence of a clause where the game viewing have binding force, of a device that allows viewing techniques simultaneously be carrying effects of power and where, in turn, the pressure means will make clearly visible the objects on which it is being exercised” (Foucault 2010: 176).

Among the representatives of this modern authentic form of normalizing/disciplining power, Foucault counts social scientists, social workers, psychiatrists, doctors, teachers and ordinary citizens who adopt the categories and values of regime power.

“A whole army of technicians come and occupy the seat left vacant by former executioner, this un-distanced anatomist of pain, caregivers, observers, doctors, pastors, psychiatrists, psychologists, educators, simply by their virtuous presence around the convicts, sing praises to justice which it badly needs; their swarm is proof that the last objective of their punitive activity is not his body and pain”

(Foucault 2010: 14).

This according to Foucault, influenced our society to turn into a weird society of confessors: “The story has stuck to its roots away; in law, medicine, pedagogy and education, family relations, in the bonds of love, the daily chores and most solemn rites; crimes are confessed, diseases and plagues are also confessed; the story pushes us with zeal and greater accuracy to say what is more difficult to say; private and public confessions, educators, parents, doctor, friend and friend, and to the lover also; impossible stories of others made onto himself, between pleasure and pain, although then made also into books “

(Foucault 2011: 88).

So, this means that genealogy not only detects the omnipresence of power(which is always there, not because it includes everything but because it comes from everywhere), but also its productivity, because it is not only repressive and does not just say no, since by inciting fun and forms of knowledge, it creates discourses. In fact, according Foucault, we should understand it as a network of connections, which are responsible for the creation of the subject as a product and representatives of power. This means that power is not owned by the entity, similar to knowledge, since power creates an impact on levels of desires, and also on the level of knowledge. Far from it, to prevent knowledge, power creates it. (Fern 2002: 145). This is the central theme of Foucault’s philosophy - “The idea of power and its relationship to knowledge”, which we find almost in all his works.

He does not use the word force only in terms of physical and military force, but to him, “she is manifested in ways that the society is regulated”.

Genealogy politicizes all aspects of general culture and life, thereby aiming to achieve a single goal: theoreetization of the birth of modern practices which are essentially normalizing and disciplining.
His basic idea is that discourses of madness, medicine, punishment and sexuality have independent histories and cannot be converted into macro-phenomena, such as the modern state and the economy, which in fact are tyrannical and globalizing discourses.

For this reason, Foucault concludes that the genealogies are “anti-science”, because they primarily challenge the effects of the centralizing powers which are associated with institutions and the functioning of organized scientific discourse (Foucault 1980: 84).

So, as it can be noted, the commonality of these two methodologies is that from the beginning tend to look at the field of society in micrological terms thus allowing us to discover a discursive and dispersive discontinuity instead of continuity and the identical, so as to capture the historical events in their real content.

Both methodologies, try to solve the big cuffs of the historical continuity and the teleological definitions and to historicize what is thought to be unchangeable. (Best & Kellner 1996: 69)

Based on this, archeology and genealogy are joined in shape of theory/practice, where theory is directly practical based on its character. “Archaeology would be an appropriate analysis methodology of local discursivities, whereas genealogy would be a tactic while the subjected knowledges would be introduced in the game based on the descriptions of these local discursivities” (Foucault 1980: 85).

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Political Challenges Derived From Foucauldian Methods
Nothing is “as usual” when it comes to Michel Foucault - and this applies all the more for his way of doing theoretical, intellectual work. His peculiarity is too often ascribed only to his persona, to his (in some sense) personal details: psychic problems in his youth, homosexuality, sexual adventures etc., as if they were by themselves some sort of immediately meaningful statements. Foucault himself had a problem with this mode of thought and in his famous discussion with Noah Chomsky he resolutely resisted this kind of approach from the moderator of this discussion:

“Elders: [...] You have already refused to speak about your own creativity and freedom, haven’t you? Well, I’m wondering what are the psychological reasons for this... / Foucault: Well, you can wonder about it, but I can’t help that”; and further: “Elders: When there is a problem for you to answer, what are your reasons for making a problem out of a personal question? / Foucault: No, I’m not making a problem out of a personal question, I make of a personal question an absence of a problem”

(Davidson 1997: 124)

It is no surprise that Foucault resisted the question of his own geniality, creativity and with this also standards of intellectual superiority. The reason is of course not his own modesty, but rather his theory: he is the inventor - in Canguilhemian sense - of the concept of “discursive formation”, governed by “discursive rules” (or “rules of formation”) which he constructed on the background of a critique of a self-assured or transcendental subject. On the one hand Foucault criticized the Cartesian self-assured thinking substance of “I think” which in its coincidence with itself\(^1\) presupposes “a supporting discourse that provides it with an object” so that “sovereignty” of the thinking substance disappears (Foucault 1999: 147-148); and on the other his critique of transcendental subject (which is the background of his entire book *Archaeology of knowledge*) who functions as an assurance of historical progression (towards its origin) and excludes “irruption of events” (Foucault 1972: 6) with its principle of continuity (whether this means the “hidden origin” or “already-said”).\(^2\)

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1. This identity with itself also means the identity of “I speak” and “I think”, which for Foucault is no longer pertinent when we consider the phenomenon of language: “The breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded, the bringing to light of a perhaps irremediable incompatibility of the self in its identity / .../” (Foucault 1999: 149). With it Foucault opens up space for thinking about “exteriority”.

2. This principle of continuity (whether this means the “hidden origin” or “already-said”) is the background of his entire book *Archaeology of knowledge*.
So with rejecting to accommodate to or participate in a psychological discourse he is being plainly consistent with his own theory, because it renders him (and everyone else) as a (Cartesian) creative thinker impossible: “creativity is possible in putting in play of a system of rules; it is not a mixture of order and freedom” (Davidson 1997: 123). So the vehement rejection from Foucault, which can appear rude or impolite, is not his own personal peculiarity as psychological particularity (regardless if it means modesty or rudeness) but rather his theoretical position, or if we borrow from Louis Althusser: “parti pris” in his own discursive formation, which refuses to be integrated - the notion of the “subject” being the function of this integration - in a discourse that itself criticizes and explains in its own way. Thus Foucault, fully aware of this, almost imperceptibly performs a trick on Chomsky who is instead being explained and in this manner integrated in to Foucault’s discourse in this strategic game of discursive practices: “The linguistics with which you [Chomsky] have been familiar, and which you have succeeded in transforming, excluded the importance of the creative subject, of the creative speaking subject; while the history of science such as it existed when people of my generation were starting to work, on the contrary, exalted individual creativity [...] and put aside these collective rules” (Davidson 1997: 125), which means that: “Here and there [Foucault’s fields of theoretical investigation and Chomsky’s] the problem of creativity cannot be resolved in the same way, or rather, it can’t be formulated in the same terms, given the state of disciplines inside which it is put” (Davidson 1997: 117).

So it is not so much of a problem for Foucault that there is no need for personal questions or problems of personal questions, but that they are above all strategic discursive attacks of relocating him into position of the theoretical field, where this types of questions are meaningful, where they have their sense. Having in mind that Foucault’s theory of discourse was constructed by way of criticizing the self-assured or transcendental notion of the subject, his only available tactic to this attack is a blunt counter-attack: “I make of a personal question an absence of a problem” (Davidson 1997: 124), which only means making the limit between discourses explicit and above all subsistent - the difference must be maintained. But nonetheless this difference is not itself simple: after Elders poses the question of Foucault’s own creativity, Foucault immediately replies: “I don’t believe that the problem of personal experience is so very important [...] in a question like this” (Davidson 1997: 119). So the question almost poses itself: what questions make a problem of personal experience important? We have until now obtained two negative determinations: 1) personal questions are not relevant when there is a question of theoretical production of a Cartesian subject of creation, which can be reduced to psychological particularities deriving from innate universality3, and 2) personal questions are not relevant when there is a question of theoretical production of a transcendental subject with its universal categories of the process of knowing (connaissance).

Perhaps if we pose the problem the other way around we might find out more about the question in play. Both theories of the subject have one thing in common: empty schematism. As Hegel once criticized Kant’s a priori categories as a random list, based on

2. Because of this circular structure of the subject (self-assured or transcendental) bringing forth the language in the first case and the statement (as an event) in the second means for Foucault constituting conditions of possibility for any kind of exteriority.
3. Chomsky uses phrases such as “innate language”, “instinctive knowledge” and also “schematism”, with which an individual as such “begins”.
classical teachings of logic at that time, without any conceptual necessity, the same can be said for Chomsky’s creative (Cartesian) subject\(^4\): not only that his notion of human nature, anchored in innate abilities (language) of every individual, must remain empty of content (without being determined as such - as emptiness or lack, as is the case with Lacanian psychoanalysis for example), the differentiation in the human nature itself becomes totally obscure and without any kind of necessity: normal creativity, scientific creativity, “low level” creativity\(^5\) etc. So if these notions of subjects are grounded in empty metaphysical notions (on the one side Cartesian God, who assures the thinking subject and his ideas - which is in Chomsky’s case “innate language” - and on the other Kant’s “list” of transcendental categories), we might propose that “personal questions” have their importance not as a foundation as such, nor a simple and unimportant “derivation” of a theoretical work but as a complex intertwining of one with the other.

Deleuze once described Foucault in following terms: “you weren’t aware of him as a person exactly. Even in trivial situations, say when he came into a room, it was more like a changed atmosphere, a sort of event, an electric or magnetic field or something. That didn’t in the least rule out warmth or make you feel uncomfortable, but it wasn’t like a person. It was a set of intensities. It sometimes annoyed him to be like that, or to have that effect. But at the same time all his work fed upon it” (Deleuze 1995: 115). And elsewhere he adds: “Dangerous, yes, because there’s a violence in Foucault. An intense violence, mastered, controlled, and turned into courage. He was trembling with violence on some demonstrations. He saw what was intolerable in things” (Deleuze 1995: 103); and further: “Paul Veyne paints a portrait of Foucault as a warrior. Foucault always evokes the dust or murmur of battle, and he saw thought itself as a sort of war machine. Because once one steps outside what’s been thought before, once one ventures outside what’s familiar and reassuring, once one has to invent new concepts for unknown lands, then methods and moral systems break down and thinking becomes, as Foucault puts it, a “perilous act, “a violence whose first victim is oneself” (Deleuze 1995: 103).

This personal investment of Foucault which cannot but appear dangerous, evoking the murmur of battle, armed with new concepts for unknown lands, has nothing to do with him as a person: not as a psychological particularity nor a philosophical subjectivity. Foucault’s investment is in his and with his own theory and concepts, where (and with which) he performs his “perilous act” as Deleuze points out. But what kind of theoretician was he? Foucault himself described himself as an archaeologist, genealogist, historian, sometimes even as a philosopher. But none of these self-characterizations were used as a simple determination of his own work. For example, he called himself a “historian of the present”, which is of course “contradictio in adjecto”: historian by its own definition disregards the present and looks back to the past. Or another example: foucauldian practice as an “ontology of the present” - why the “surplus” of present, why this pleonasm? Ontology in a way always regards what is always present, so this “surplus” word “present” can only mean polemics with ontology as something that misses the present, something which

\(^4\) It must be said, that everything that is said here about Chomsky applies only to the content of the mentioned interview and is therefore in no way representative of Chomsky’s entire œuvre. Chomsky actually serves here only as Foucault’s point of delimitation and thus in a way a “straw man”.

\(^5\) This coincides with Chomsky’s view on the process of knowledge: with learning we proceed “from scattered and degenerate idea to highly organized knowledge” (Foucault, 1999: 109), which means the progression from simple to complex
with its own specific “presentness” loses the “present”. So how does Foucault with his own proper historical method - at this point regardless if we call it archaeology or genealogy - touches the present, to the Hegelian dialectics the ever eluding actual moment of the “now”?

If there is someone that challenged the classical academic mode of theoretical production within it, then this must surely be Foucault. And not just because of his critique of common or rather universal intellectuals and his construction of the so called specific intellectual - which is useful, but somewhat too useful notion\(^6\) - but rather because of his own investment with his theoretical oeuvre. Why call his work an investment? Mainly because of the effects of his own theoretical practice which provoked highly symptomatic counter-investments: from angry reactions of psychologists regarding *Madness and civilization* as described by Georges Canguilhem\(^7\), to annoyed Marxist reactions (and on the other hand reactions from the liberals) regarding Foucault’s theory of power etc.

It would be too easy to call this stupidity or even a reactionary in vulgar political sense of the term. Perhaps we could better describe them if we take the term “reactionary” seriously: this reactions were provoked, they were (and probably still are) the effects proper to Foucault’s theoretical practice which produced something which in that specific historical conjuncture demanded a reaction from certain disciplines, a reaction which is reactionary in a way that it spontaneously produces a defense, a defensive reaction (proof of this spontaneous nature can be seen in appropriation of Foucault’s conceptual innovations into classical political philosophy for example). This “demand” in a way interpellated these disciplines because of the “conflictual nature” of Foucault’s theoretical practice, as Louis Althusser once described Marx’s and Freud’s theoretical practices. And this interpellated defensive counter-investment as effects of Foucault’s theoretical conflictual practice are the proof of Foucault’s seizing of the present, this is how his historical work touches the present moment.

There are all too often present tendencies of treating Foucault in a certain historicist way: like post-foucauldian studies (note the “post”), the putting of Foucault in the contemporary framework of neoliberalism and so on. This means putting or applying the past to the present, which means that “the present” is judging what is dead and alive in Foucault. This is contrary to Foucault’s orientation, which goes from the present to the past, and as we have seen with the Foucault-effects, back to the present. This does not mean that certain aspects of Foucault’s theory need not to be rethought, that we ought to become “Foucauldian dogmatics”, we would rather claim that through analysis of Foucault’s conceptual field we should first find out what exactly in Foucault never was “present” and what still is. We should not judge influential thinkers with discussing what is dead and what alive in them, we should rather ask the dead about us, the (present) living, we should make them pose questions about “now” (like Foucault did with Nietzsche after all).

And regardless of his mostly academic way of writing his major historical works, they are throughout politically engaged in contemporary struggles and exhibit some kind of a theo-

\(^6\) In the sense of its negative definition in the demarcation of the universal intellectual and its empty positive definition, namely: in what way exactly is it specific? What is condition of possibility of being specific?

\(^7\) See Davidson 1997: 23-27.
retical attitude. With this we come back to a personal investment, to that “murmur of battle” intensity, as described by Deleuze. The characterization of Foucault as a historian of the present with dangerous intensity inscribes him to the present, to the “now” through “our” reactionary reactions. Foucault himself offers us a positive determination (and not only the negative work of critique, described above) from thus starting disposition in an interview called Questions on geography: “To me it doesn’t seem a good method to take a particular science to work on just because it’s interesting or important or because its history might appear to have some exemplary value. If one wanted to do a correct, clean, conceptually aseptic kind of history, then that would be a good method. But if one is interested in doing historical work that has political meaning, utility and effectiveness, then this is possible only if one has some kind of involvement with the struggle taking place in the area of question” (Foucault 1980: 64). And a few lines later he adds: “My historical work was undertaken only as a function of these conflicts. The problem and the stake there was the possibility of a discourse which would be both true and strategically effective, the possibility of a historical truth which could have a political effect” (Foucault 1980: 64).

What is important here is not only the fact that Foucault felt the necessity to do theoretical work because of his practical experience, this is not enough, because if we take this fact by itself it could lead to a vulgar reduction of “ad hominem” (for example reduction to his homosexuality) and this is for Foucault precisely something that needs to be made “the absence of a problem”; far more important is that his own historical work is not “aseptic”, that it figures as a political investment as a function of those conflicts which he noticed on a certain level. This is the condition of possibility of the described “conflictual nature” of his work. This intertwining of theory and practice means that his theory is a practice, a theoretical practice intervening in conflicts of fields in question.

Foucault-as-intensity (Deleuze) is by itself nothing special, in a (Deleuzian) way we all are intensities, but Foucault’s outstanding specificity is in his manner of making his own theoretical work a “conscious” moment in this aspect. Rather than posing metaphysical grounds as basic principles for development of his theory (the notion of the subject might never escape from this problem) and rather than historicizing his own position and not be concerned with his own involvement and relevancy, Foucault started from the “now”, from the actual and went back in the past, and this procedure, this theoretical work he believed that it was capable of changing the actual “now”: not a circular structure (of the subject) but rather declenched loop as an intervention in the present from the past, so to speak. His theoretical practice is thus grounded not so much on a practice of a historian, but rather in “principles” of geography, meaning that he is taking into consideration foremost spatial terms that seem “to have the air of anti-history”: “The spatializing description of discursive realities gives on to the analysis of related effects of power” (Foucault 1980: 70-71). This is not relevant only for Foucault’s object of analysis but also for himself: not to do the “aseptic kind of history”, but to produce theory as a function of conflicts in which he found and then situated himself, to change the relation of forces in fields in question, to change the actual power relations - “historical truth which could have a political effect”.

“Function of (actual) conflicts”: this does not mean that he grounds his own theory in an universal principle that would be jeopardized and needs to be defended or fought over,
nor does it mean total arbitrariness in quasi-Machiavellian war-like manner “victory no matter what”, but rather that in the last instance it all depends on his own position - whose lonely hour, and this is essential, never comes, as Althusser once put it. “[O]ne can’t, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions [human nature, justice, realization of essence of human beings] to describe or justify a fight which should - and shall in principle - overthrow the very fundamentals of our society” (Davidson 1997: 140).

One cannot rely on universal consciousness (of the proletariat in class struggle for example), but only on one’s own position to which others can ascribe and form a new kind of unity. This is why a nietzschean position, which Foucault in a way to vehemently defends and advocates, does not mean “victory no matter what” principle, but rather that arguments from one position cannot become entirely the arguments of the other position to form a unified whole⁸ and that an action that has this for its goal (and its means moral justification on universal grounds) might even relapse into its opposite (immorality of its consequences).

And if political engagement in that way inscribed itself in Foucault’s theory, the theory also inscribed itself in practice, to be more exact, in his conception of political engagement, political practice. Foucault’s revolution in political philosophy regarding his theory of power also challenged the notion of revolution: if power is local and dispersed, is then also the same with revolution and revolutionary strategy? Is it even sensible to speak of a revolution as in transformation of the totality? For Foucault the general Marxist notion of revolution is in a way naïve: instead of talking about “class consciousness” Foucault advances the problem of “desirability of a revolution”⁹. If politics means revolution¹⁰, then: “we may be living the end of politics. If it is true that politics is a field which was opened with the existence of a revolution and if the question of a revolution cannot be posed with this terms [of political petitfoggery - fr. politique politicienne - or/and Marxist problem of organization of society], then politics risks it own disappearance” (Foucault 2001: 267). But we must leave on the side the conceptualization of Foucault’s notion of political engagement as such, and focus on what “political” for Foucault even means, we need to in a Foucauldian way further examine Foucault’s theoretical resistance, the Foucauldian attitude and its political effects that we have tried to outline, to lay out the possibility of conceptualization of such political practice.

Foucault never gave a clear or complete prescription of his own political practice, rather only particular prescripts, which can be seen as either too general or too fragmentary. He used words such as “resistance” and “freedom” at certain instances, but what is of our interest is that they always found their place, not in the center of his great works, but on their margins and the margins of his complete oeuvre: in the introductions, conclusions and summaries; in his shorter texts, and especially in the interviews he was known to give.

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⁸. This is also the great lesson of Marx, who in his first book of Capital talks about on the one hand on the bourgeois formal laws of exchange of equivalents (which can only appears as universal and neutral) and on the other about “Labor day” with descriptions of misery of the proletariat. If the first represents the logical reasoning of the book starting from the commodity as such, the second is even methodologically different and cuts into the first line of thought as something completely different that cannot be explained logically deriving from the concept of commodity - there are two totally different lines of thought in play and this is why bourgeois and proletariat cannot ever conceptually unify.

⁹. See Foucault 2001: 266.

¹⁰. Instead of revolution Foucault is talking about resistance which does not necessarily exclude revolution in a softer sense of the word, meaning change of functioning on a larger scale.
in an abundant manner. Beside this marginal placement, he never positively defined any of these terms, never explicitly indulged in answering the question “What is ... resistance, freedom?” We can argue that this type of question is not a Foucauldian one, since he never really addresses in this way even his main concept, namely that of power, and instead asks “How does it work?” or “By what means it is exercised?” and “What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power on others?” (Foucault 1982: 786). This kind of questioning does not lead to a search for metaphysical foundations of power, which is of no interest to Foucault, but it provides the analysis with its object that are “power relations and not power itself” (Foucault 1982: 788). But the same does not go for the notions mentioned above. Foucault nowhere tackles the question “How does freedom work?,” or, “How can freedom be practiced?” This silence, if we may call it so, with respect to a positive political project has brought much misunderstanding regarding his work, and also critique from all sides, accusing him of being a pessimist and a nihilist, a relativist or a historicist, or a postmodernist and a neoliberal. It is not so much a question whether they a right or wrong, but rather what is the source of all this conundrum. We would like to argue that just as Foucault as a person was not willing to be integrated into psychological discourse, so is his work resisting assimilation into the prevailing theoretical and academic discourse.

Where does this silence stem from? Is there a relation between the two silences, this one and the one about his personal life? This time we are going in the other direction: not searching for consistency of his actions with his theory in order to examine the theory, but searching for the consistency of his theory with his practice in order to examine the practice. Not the silence of Foucault as a person when confronted with a common personal question, but the silence of Foucault as an oeuvre, when confronted with a classical problem of political theory. As we shall see these two silences coincide in the last instance. The problem we are facing this way round is the seeming dichotomy of practice and theory as our starting position. Let us be quick on this point: speaking and acting as well as thinking are heterogeneous activities for Foucault, but just as his notions of knowledge and power, they are intertwined, they presuppose, but do not necessarily determine each other. This answer already gives way to the answer to the second problem that we haven’t mentioned yet. Namely, how are we to measure Foucault’s theory up against his practice if we are given only the former? How to measure work up against life if we don’t know it and are given only the work? To draw on the previous answer, or to be specific, on the way we answered, that is, with Foucault, we can only confront this and all other problems we stumble upon our way with and within Foucault, meaning that we can only proceed immemorially from his work, since our goal is not an evaluation of his work, but a research of it.

Let us return to the debate with Chomsky, or rather a little earlier when Fons Elders made a preparatory interview with Foucault for the debate that was about to follow. After they talked about his work on madness, sexuality, about structuralism and other things, Elders brought up a question about Foucault’s defiance when it comes to personal questions, to

11. The shift of analysis from “power itself” to “power relations” is crucial, as we shall see later on.
12. We are not claiming it is resistant as such, since “Foucault studies” are becoming more and more popular in the academia, and we are definitely not trying to affirm a scale of value between the two options – complete recognition or complete disavowal – any of which being “better.” We are merely trying to point out the fact that Foucault remains fully, if not becoming even more present in spite of all better or worse attempts of critique, reconciliation and assimilation.
which Foucault answered: “Well listen, you are saying that I refuse to speak about my personal life, but I don’t see what I’ve been talking about for the past half an hour if not my personal life” (Elders 1971). He thus claims to have been, while speaking of his work, speaking about his personal life all along. This is of course not the personal life that Elders was aiming at. The difference can be described as a difference between two objects pertaining to different discourses, but signified by the same word. Elders’ discourse, as we have already said, is the discourse of psychology and of confession, where personal means sharing our “dirty little secrets” and our deepest and most hidden feelings, which are then retroactively supposed to explain “us” and our work. Whereas in Foucault’s discourse “life” has nothing to do with our most inner experiences, longings and desires, it is nothing secretive which would be the hidden motor under all of our actions waiting to be brought to the light of day in a confessional manner. If we have ruled out Foucault as a person with all the biographical details, which is the least of what we are obliged to do in order “to do justice to Foucault,” than what we are left with in order to examine his practice is the life that he has made for himself by the means of thought and writing. The object of our research is thus “a philosophical life” (Foucault 1997: 132). And the decision for this kind of research is not an arbitrary one, on the contrary, it is the only possible one in the light of our search for the political in Foucault, which is not to be found in a form of a theory or a doctrine, but only in a general attitude – the critical attitude.

We are going to tackle this attitude, by which Foucault is trying to put forward a description of a practice he would like it to be his own, with the help of the two of his texts, specifically a talk he gave in front of the French Society of Philosophy on 27th of May 1978 that was given the title What is Critique? when published, and his better known text What is Enlightenment? written in the year of his death. Both of them take for their main starting point the problem of the Aufklärung as it was posed by Kant, and then rework and re-actualize it within his own terms in order to explicate what might be the critical attitude in the first case or the attitude of modernity in the second.

In What is Critique? Foucault locates the critical attitude, which is defined as “the art of not being governed quite so much” (Foucault 1997: 29) and entails “a certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society, to culture and also a relationship to others,” (Foucault 1997: 24) in the modern Western world from the 15th to the 16th centuries. He provides three historical anchoring points,13 all of which basically proceed by questioning “truth on its effects of power” and “power on its discourses of truth” (Foucault 1997: 32). This questioning is closely related to how Kant defines the Enlightenment in his text What is the Aufklärung?, since the philosopher challenges his own actuality in terms of different kinds of authority that keep humanity in a subordinate position, locates the source of this subordination and calls for an exit from it. But from this point on Foucault parts with Kant, or at least goes in the opposite direction. If Kant’s way then lead into an inquiry of the limits of one’s knowledge, which once known are supposed to provide one with a condition of his autonomy, thus confining practice to these limits and the battle cry of the Aufklärung to the ratio of the Critiques, Foucault reverses the hierarchy between the two endeavors by putting the call for courage and exit from the “minority condition” that is proposed by

13. Challenging ecclesiastical rule by examining the Scriptures; questioning the limits of the right to govern in the form of establishing and defending natural law; and not accepting as true what an authority says it is true (Foucault 1997: 29-30).
the Aufklärung as the guideline for any critical analyses and use of rationalization. This means that the Aufklärung is no more confined within the critical project and it is no longer confined to the domain of knowledge, but that critique now becomes the means by which the Aufklärung can proceed in its “undefined work of freedom”.

By this reversal the domain of power is necessarily brought into question, even put in the foreground, since there is no exit from a subordinate position, which would not be an actual exit from certain historically specific conditions of subordination, in other words, relations of power. Knowledge thus cannot be thought without its relations to power anymore, and more specifically, rationalization cannot be taken anymore without its great role in the proliferation and dissemination of certain effects of power from the Age of Enlightenment onwards (Foucault 1997: 38-42). But what does this exit mean, how could we realize it, if what we think, say and do is always already within power relations, that is, if we ourselves are constituted through mechanisms of power and knowledge? To answer this, we could be very general and simply say that Foucault’s concept of power is a positive one, meaning that power is not a priori bad nor good. But this kind of answer would, besides its untelling generality, implicitly grant power the status of a neutral fact and an ontological firmness, obscuring a much more complex setting. First of all, the problem is not that of “power in itself,” but of power relations that imply a distribution of positions with constant tension between them. Two other implications are that power is not something that could be possessed (mechanisms of power can be possessed – an important distinction) and, inversely, that resistance is not something outside of power, but has in its hands the same means of struggle (power relations) as does its adversary. But if there is no outside of power, how can we distinguish between resistance and what should be resisted? What is the criteria by which we can orient ourselves in our struggles?

In The Archeology of knowledge, when speaking of the archive, Foucault emphasizes that “it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak,” while “in its presence it is unavoidable” (Foucault 1972: 130). Since we cannot really know our own limits, but we find ourselves already in the midst of battle invested by power relations and as such invested in specific struggles, this fact by itself provides us with the will to actively engage in them, which means that the engagement is primary to any analytical knowledge of them. The terms knowledge and power thus “only have a methodological function,” they are “only an analytical grid” for “pinpointing the analytical front, the type of element that must be pertinent for the analysis” (Foucault 1997: 51-2). This methodological function seems to us to be twofold: on the one hand, these terms open up a break in our actuality, the possibility of critique, and function as tools for articulating this critique within the struggles we are engaged in; on the other hand, they are analytical tools for the analysis of historically specific forms of power relations. The primacy of our investment into actual struggles and the fact of impossibility of knowing our own limits, make the historical detour a necessary one, since we are better able to discern the workings of power relations somewhat distant from us – those specific forms that do not determine us as much, that are more or less discontinuous with the present moment. Let us look at the types of analysis Foucault proposes.

14. “The archive is a generic term for the limit of what can be known about a particular moment or period in history” (Buchanan 2010: 26).
In both texts, *What is Critique?* and *What is Enlightenment?*, there are two types of analysis proposed, which are of no surprise, since they are main and well known Foucault’s theoretical procedures. The first one is the *archaeological* level, the task of which is to “bring out the conditions of acceptability of a system [be it the mental health system, the penal system, delinquency, sexuality, etc.],” but also “identifying what made it difficult to accept: its arbitrary nature in terms of knowledge, its violence in terms of power” (Foucault 1997: 54). This type of analysis “will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events” (Foucault 1997: 125), recovering them as “pure singularities”. The second procedure is *genealogy* and it “attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not a product, but rather the effect” (Foucault 1997: 57). It has to bring to light the contingent nature of what realizes itself in historical processes: “it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is possible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think” (Foucault 1997: 126).

But it seems to us that there is a general difference between the two texts, to which we would like to focus our attention now. This difference is not so much in what they say or what would be their respective themes, since they both investigate this “historico-critical attitude,” “the critical attitude,” or in the case of the latter text “the attitude of modernity.” The difference would rather be in the way they investigate the same theme. *What is Critique?* examines the critical attitude through empirical examples of specific historical practices, continues with Kant and the reception of the Aufklärung in different European schools of critical thought, then presents Foucault’s own theoretical procedures as aspects of the critical attitude and finishes with the reversal of Kant’s project and a call for a “decision-making will not to be governed” (Foucault, 1997: 61). *What is Enlightenment?* begins with a thorough examination of Kant’s text, continues with characterization of the *attitude of modernity* with the help of Baudelaire, moves to a description of “a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era” (Foucault, 1997: 119), then presents the conditions of possibility of such a work of critique, and concludes with a brief summary.

The subtle difference that can be felt is that the first text presents and calls for the critical attitude through empirical examples, Kant and Foucault’s own theoretical practice, whereas the second tries to examine and describe this historico-critical attitude “in itself”, if we may say. Foucault’s theoretical procedures here figure only in the background or only in certain smaller parts of the description of the critical attitude. It seems to us that there is also a change of focus present, a change from mostly describing these procedures of knowledge proper to Foucault to highlighting their potentially transformative effects: “The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression” (Foucault 1997: 124). The difference we are trying to demonstrate is also obvious in the fact that there are in *What is Critique?* besides archaeology and genealogy introduced also two other Foucault’s theoretical procedures, namely *eventualization* and *strategics*, which are not mentioned in *What is Enlightenment?* The relations between all four of the procedures do not seem to be completely clear (a fact that should not be taken as conceptual sloppiness),
but in general we think it is safe to say that eventualization is a term on another level than
the other three (possibly a higher one, encompassing the other three), whereas strategics
is on the same level as are archaeology and genealogy, meaning that these are “three
necessarily contemporaneous dimensions in the same analysis” (Foucault 1997: 59).
Both of these procedures are not very known, Foucault rarely mentions them and they are
not part of his main concepts (it is a question, if we can even call them concepts). Both of
them also carry a charge of critical, political or practical engagement or investment. We
are not going to continue with a broader discussion of what each of these two terms des-
ignates, we would only like to maintain this thesis. Eventualization is a procedure where
“one takes groups of elements where, in a totally empirical and temporary way, connec-
tions between mechanisms of coercion and contents of knowledge can be identified”
(Foucault 1997: 49-50): “To show that things “weren’t as necessary as all that”; (…) A
breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences,
and practices rest: this is the first theoretico-political function of “eventalization” (Fou-
cault 2001a: 226, our emphasis).

As can be seen by this example, Foucault himself finds the notion of eventualization politi-
cally charged. We do not know if there is such an explicit example for the notion of strate-
gics in the oeuvre of Foucault, but there is a conceptual affinity of the two notions right on
the point of the potentialities of resistance founded on the fact of contingency and fragility
that they are meant to articulate. Namely, Foucault establishes the procedure of strate-
gics on the lack of any principle of closure in the critical analysis (archaeology and geneal-
ogy), since “support for this network of intelligible relationships [between subjects, types
of behavior, decisions and choices] is in the logic inherent to the context of interactions
with its always variable margins of non-certainty,” and that is why “we have perpetual
mobility, essential fragility or rather the complex interplay between what replicates the
same process and what transforms it” (Foucault 1997: 57-8). When talking of resistance
in his History of Sexuality Foucault places it in the strategic field: “Instead there is a plural-
ity of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary,
improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent;
still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can
only exist in the strategic field of power relations” (Foucault 1987: 95). Strategics would
therefore be the analysis of the strategic field, of all possible points of resistance, deci-
sions and transformations. It is definitely possible to show for any historical formation at
which points and in what ways resistances actually occurred, but would it be possible, as
the analysis of the strategic field could imply, to show exactly what else could those
restricted by a certain formation have done differently or how should they have exercised
their freedom within the limits imposed on them in order to change them? We could try,
but it would a wild speculation, a product of our imagination unworthy of Foucault’s minu-
tiose analysis of historical documents – everything there is are the concrete actions and
resistances that did take place and are available to us through some form of documenta-
tion. If the implication of analysis of possible but unrealized past resistances does not
hold for the strategic field, then we can turn again to the way Foucault discusses the three
procedures. Where as the task of archaeology is to bring to the surface the singularity of
historical events and the task of genealogy to bring out their contingency, it is not clear
what else could be added by strategics, since “perpetual mobility and essential fragility”
are already implied by singularity and contingency and their respective forms of analyses.
What it possibly could add is the answer(s) to “what replicates the same process and what
transforms it,” possibly with an analysis of historical examples of transformations. But if we look at Foucault’s oeuvre, where a great work of archaeological analysis can be found (The Order of things), just as a great work of a genealogical analysis can be found (Discipline and Punish), there is no great work of a strategic analysis there. How come?

How would one great volume of strategic analysis look like? If we abstract from it all the precise historical analytical work, it would look like one long list of successful and unsuccessful resistances, in other words, it would easily be taken as a manual of examples of what to do and what not to do in order to resist: it would offer positive prescriptions for political action. But the problem would on the one hand be that all these examples would have been taken from singular and contingent historical formations, and on the other, that also our own limits are singular and contingent, which is why a direct application of these actions would mean a disregard for the complex nature of our present moment, for the premise of our inability of knowing our own limits and very likely a political failure (failure by the criteria of our intentions for applying certain actions). Here hides the reason why Foucault was so hesitant in prescribing political action: prescriptions as statements, that is as discursive elements, have immediate discursive effects on practices, but these effects are as singular as the prescriptions themselves are, which means that they may be directly opposed to the political practice that these statements are tied to, and can use them as sentences or slogans – means for the legitimation of their political practice.

This does not mean that strategic analysis is actually absent in Foucault’s work and that he threw this type of analysis into the text What is Critique? just by some coincidence. Not at all. We would argue that strategics is definitely present in his work, scattered all over it, but that it at the same time breaches the field of knowledge and as an analysis enters into the strategic field which Foucault himself was a part of. Archaeology and genealogy of course have their own discursive effects that cannot be predicted, but they figure much smoother as neutral and scientific methods or theories with no pretense for political engagement, whereas strategics is a procedure that has to evade knowledge in regard to the historically specific mechanisms of power that are at work in our present moment. Archaeology and genealogy are not as easily taken for political practices, they are not as easily appropriated by any political practice for its own purposes and they do not a priori shut their door to a wide range of political beliefs, but can gradually reveal their political motivations and practice to the reader, possibly encouraging him for such a precise and complex analysis of his own or even imbuing in him the “critical attitude of modernity”.

This ambivalence between a scientific historical analysis and a political project is what is marked by the differences between the texts What is Critique? and What is Enlightenment? In the former the possibility of transformations is formalized as one of the forms of an analysis, whereas the latter notably moves its focus and much more explicitly emphasizes the transformational aims of practicing these analyses as such. Difference, transformation and change are now explicitly on the side of the one who embarks on the journey of critique, the one who takes up the practice of a permanent reactivation of the attitude of modernity within his own, to him not completely known, strategic field.
Bibliography


It is evident that Michel Foucault has been widely quoted. His words are a decorative either/or provocative part of the discourse, especially in social sciences and the humanities, but the real question is how his thought survives or engages in the discussions on important contemporary issues. To quote does not necessary mean to relive one’s thought: let us remember the fate of the Christians, who had spent centuries in creating the public citation culture until it was completely emptied, wasted and finally retreated into the private sphere. Therefore let alone the ongoing process of citation and ask ourselves what does it really mean to use the Foucauldian methods? What might be considered as a proper or at least interesting engaging of Michel Foucault? As the title of our work contains the word Foucauldian it appears to be necessary to face it with existing Foucault’s reading of this kind of vague and comprehensive terms. We could remember a seemingly appropriate and important example from his texts that answers the question what Foucault meant by being Nietzschean. The well-known answer is:

“I am tired of people studying [Nietzsche] only to produce the same kind of commentaries that are written on Hegel and Mallarmé. For myself, I prefer to utilize the writers I like. The only valid tribute to a thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche that is of absolutely no importance.”

(Foucault 1980: 53-54)

It appears that the application of Foucault thought is everywhere, but we must bear in mind that his thought from the beginning resists the idea of applying, We would even say that his thought is inapplicable in the immediate sense. As Lisa Downing notes, it is really not easy to ‘do’ a Foucauldian reading of a cultural product in the way that one can ‘do’ a psychoanalytic, Marxist or phenomenological reading (Downing 2008: 53). Thus it seems that Foucault’s work always requires a certain level of critical reception and rewriting.

Therefore if we ask ourselves how to engage with Michel Foucault, it would be fair to answer that we can do that only critically. However, it is not easy to read critically, and especially it is not easy to turn a critical reading in the adequate method of analyses. Analyses often entail ready-made methodology, but that methodology is also a kind of trap which makes us to transform in an aesthetical manner the complex social dynamics into a
statical object of knowledge. What makes methodology completed and applicable? It is a difficult question, but when it comes on Foucault, we can think about scholars that accepted his ideas critically and tried to check their scope in the analysis of certain terms that are produced by modern (or post-modern) society or by the scientific knowledge or by the regime of ongoing official statements and decisions.

Having all this aspects in mind, we are dare to say that Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking, who was the first Anglophone lecturer at the Department of philosophy and history of scientific concepts at the Collège d’France (2000-2006), shows how to “do” Foucault. He presents a curious mixture of Michel Foucault’s ideas and insight and the some interesting parts of analytical philosophy and mashes it up into something really challenging. Hacking’s career covers a long list of different but related issues: from his early research on the emergence of probability as a style of reasoning, to his contemporary projects on mental illness and “the looping effects” of human kinds, Hacking writes extensively on the something he calls historical ontology in the tradition of Foucault’s genealogy. Hacking’s histories of statistics, child abuse, mad travellers and multiple personality, intersect with Foucault’s work by focusing of clinical praxis, critical history, and analyses of power/knowledge relationships. However, Hacking states that his engaging of Foucault means to use it – in a similar vain Foucault said on Nietzsche: “I do not want to examine his work, but to use it to combine history and philosophy in a way that may or may not owe a good deal to him” (Hacking 2002: 5). Or, as we can read in another text “Between Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman: between discourse in the abstract and face-to-face interaction”: “In the past I have incorporated or adapted many of the kinds of analysis that Foucault developed (but not his remarkable style of writing)” (Hacking 2004: 278). In one recent interview, Hacking also says:

“Yes, we found problems with Foucault’s citations. I have always been pretty lenient about this, because I think that the main thrust of his analysis is correct. I give examples of his errors, and explain my willingness to be generous about them, in a little squib I wrote much later, ‘Night Thoughts on Philology’, reprinted in my Historical Ontology [2004c]. At the time I was trying to write a book explaining Foucault to an English-language readership which, in 1976, had not yet taken to his work. I became increasingly dissatisfied with what I was writing. Finally I decided I had to stop. So one day I took the entire manuscript, at least 200 pages of self-typed material, and fed it into the large dustbin in the Stanford quad outside the philosophy department. A number of grad. students watched in glee – one joked that each student present should salvage a chapter and uses it for his PhD thesis. Føllesdal recalls that I also tore up some small part of the book earlier, in his presence, right after one of our classes had met. Doubtless at that moment I was moved by dissatisfaction with Foucault, but I destroyed the whole typescript because I was dissatisfied with myself. I came to the conclusion that Foucault is the man to read about Foucault. There are now a hundred books about Foucault, and I still think Foucault is the only one to read”

(FOUCAULT 2013: 13)

The connection between what Hacking first envisaged in the 1970s and Foucault’s work is no accident. In fact, he deliberately translates Foucault’s methodology into analytic terms. The book Historical Ontology reveal that the Hacking’s rejection of his earlier language-oriented analysis parallels Foucault’s increasing distance from his early work and
FOUCAULDIAN METHODS OF IAN HACKING

its *Archaeology of Knowledge*. This shift could be viewed as a shift from epistemology—a shift impelled by their dissatisfaction with idealist remnants in their thought—to ontology (for Foucault, from “critical” to “genealogical” investigations). Hacking identifies the problem, or at least his version of it, as “verbalism”: the doctrine says that language is the primary object of our philosophical investigations. It has been usually coupled to a weak transcendentalism: it is not just language, but conditions on the significant use thereof that the philosopher investigates (see Hyder 2003 for a short but penetrating review of Hacking’s *Historical Ontology*).

The main entries of Hacking’s intellectual dictionary are: making up people, historical ontology, dynamic nominalism and the looping effect. Let us shortly examine these terms.

What is historical ontology? It the preface to his book *Historical Ontology* Hacking quotes Michel Foucault’s essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1984b) that contains two references on “the historical ontology of ourselves”. For Foucault, there are three aspects of the historical ontology: it can be a study that is concerned with (1) “truth through which we constitute ourselves as objects of knowledge”; (2) power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others”; (3) “ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents” (Hacking 2002: 2). He calls these axes on which we constitute ourselves the axes of knowledge, power and ethics. Hacking is also interested in possible ways to be a person. We all know that Foucault did not lay to the term historical ontology much public emphasis. There are much famous terms (discursive formation, episteme, genealogy…). As hacking notes, Foucault used “historical ontology” only during one particular visit to Berkeley in the early 1980s Hacking (2002: 3).

But Hacking develops this term by using other Foucault’s notions. Historical ontology thinks that “we constitute ourselves at a place and time, using materials that have a distinctive and historically formed organization” (Hacking 2002: 3). What Hacking investigated through the prism of historical ontology? There might be numerous problems that this kind of ontology investigates, but let us mention only few that informed Hacking’s books. *The Emergence of Probability* answers the question how what we now call probability emerged (Hacking 1975b). In a similar vain, *The Taming of Chance* demonstrates how chance, once the ultimate other, the unknowable, was tamed and became the increasingly favored means for predicting and controlling the behavior of people and things (Hacking 1990). *The Social Construction of What?* explain how child abuse was made and molded into a focus for action, a vehicle for judgment, a lament for generation lost innocence, a scapegoat for the end of the nuclear family, and a ground for repeated interventions, the policing of families (Hacking 1999) Similarly, Hacking’s books *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (1995a) and *Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illness* (1998), in which he talks about relationships of ongoing discursive formations and the production of certain types of subjectivity that need to be hospitalized or medically treated in order to direct people to act on the basis of the scientific descriptions of themselves. In short, for over twenty years Hacking has tried to study what he calls “making up people” (Hacking 2004: 279). This enterprise was about interaction between classifications of people and the people classified (especially funny in the case of the book *Mad Travellers*, which describes something Hacking calls “transient mental illness”). But also about the ways in which those who are
classified, and who are altered by being classified, also change in ways that causes systems of classification be modified in turn (Hacking 2004: 279).

Hacking says that he has never loved the word ontology, but it came to him as I kind of self-aware irony. What to do with beings that become things, classifications, ideas, minds of people, people, and institutions? He poses a question: “can they not be lumped under the generic heading of ontology?” (Hacking 2002: 5) So he is interested in cogent implication of knowledge, power and ethics. Ontos is the Greek word for being. In German tradition, ontology is closely connected with theology and metaphysics, and Christian Wolff gave ontology a modern direction as the “science of being in general”, whereas metaphysics is the science of that which transcends nature. However, in traditional ontology, the borders between metaphysics and ontology blur when the letter begins to investigate the timeless essence of Being. In fact, they have in common the following presupposition: their ultimate objective of investigation is eternal unconditioned truth, the realm of the absolute.

Historical ontology connects historian and philosopher. Thus, Hacking takes into account that Foucault’s teacher Georges Canguilhem was the first to state that Michel Foucault “archaeological” method dug up the “historical apriori” of a time and place (Hacking 2002: 5). The historical apriori conditions the possibilities of knowledge within a discursive formation, conditions whose dominion is as inexorable, as Kant’s synthetic apriori (Hacking 2002: 5). Hacking’s historical ontology “is concerned with objects or their effects which do not exist in any recognizable form until they are objects of scientific study” (Hacking 2002: 11). Hacking would say in his typical manner: “I am dead serious about the ‘creation’ of phenomena, phenomena of cosmic significance that come into being in the course of human history” (Hacking 2002: 16). Among the thoughts that underlie historical ontology is also Foucault’s sentence from the Archaeology of Knowledge: “one cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to say something new; it is not enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention, or to be aware, for new objects suddenly light up and emerge out of the ground” (Foucault 1971: 44f). Take one famous example: trauma. The question from the perspective of historical ontology follows: “Trauma used to mean a physical lesion or wound. When did it come to means a psychic wound?” (Hacking 2002: 19). The anonymous power of the very concept of trauma works in our lives, that is important for Hacking (2002: 19): “Trauma offers not only a new sense of who others are, and why some may be that way, but it also produces a new sense of self, of who one is and why one is as one is” (Hacking 2002: 20).

Hacking develops Foucault’s ideas; especially through something he calls the looping effect. Foucault understands discourse in the abstract. He is interested in the “pure description of discursive events” (Foucault 1971: 29). Hacking is also interested in “an understanding of how the forms of discourse become part of the lives of ordinary people, or even how they become institutionalized and made part of the structure of institutions at work” (Hacking 2004: 278). The main notion that Hacking develops is the notion of loop (1995b; 2004: 297–298). For him the looping effect of classifying human beings is a cycle of changes composed of two basic stages:

“There is an effect on people who are classified. There is classification K of people, which is made as part of our scientific knowledge. Associated with K are what are conjectures to be laws or regularities about people who are K. At least some
people thus classified change their behavior in consequence of being so classified. (2) It may be necessary to change the criteria of the knowledge about people who are K, because in virtue of classification, they no longer fit the old criteria. Or at any rate, one may have to modify the regularities about such people, not because one was wrong in the first place, but because the people have change somewhat. This, in turn, may affect the people classified, and looping may continue”

(Hacking 2004: 297-298)

Hacking adds that this is one of the important differences between human and natural sciences. In the latter objects do not change because they are classified, although we may change them in the light of classifications. Hacking is sure that there is no single underlying structure according to which looping occurs. This means that specific historical approach is necessary for analyzing different notions that makes us people. Hacking’s historical ontology breaks with the presupposition that the focus of ontology is a realm of a-temporal absolute essences.

At the same time, he discharges Foucault of the accusation of “postmodern” relativism, the ominous “anything goes”. Against the repeated charge of relativism he mobilizes the historically emerged sphere of possibilities, the fine-tuned “systems of possibility”. Namely, Foucault’s entering into the sequences of history based on the strong patterns of discontinuity is standardly understood as the concession to the relativism in postmodern era. This is naturally not the problem only Foucault confronts with: even Hacking as the philosopher of polemical nominalism must cope with it; moreover, he cannot avoid recurrently going back to this problem. One of the most powerful examples of this operation pertains to Paracelsus who is analyzed several times by Hacking. Yet, for us it is of essential importance that the relation to Paracelsus is especially articulated in the given chapter on Foucault (Hacking 2004: 97) Hacking denotes the problem of incommensurability broadly analyzed in the philosophy of science: it is evident that by dealing with the issue of the discontinuity in history the problem of incommensurability between different epochs comes into being. In accordance with Hacking it is wrong to identify the theory as the bearer of the incommensurability. In reality, the discourses, and “systems of possibility” are incommensurable.

As a result, this conclusion appears to be a red thread in Hacking’s argumentation and let not forget that this moment always and inevitable leads us to Foucault. Therefore, historical ontology thematizes the “ways in which the possibilities for choice, and for being” come to surface: it paints the “space of possibilities for character formation” of individuals. Therefore, Foucault does not teach us on the “corpus of certain theses” but on the systems of historical possibility-regimes: the process of the making up of people establishes the regimes of possibility for individuals. Thus we gain the following insight: “Paracelsus’s system of possibility is quite different from ours. What he had up for grabs as true-or-false does not enter into our grid of possibilities, and vice-versa. This is not due to different articulated theories or systems of conscious belief, but because the underlying depth knowledge is incommensurable... What we have to learn is not what they took for true, but what they took for true-or-false. (For example, that mercury salve might be good for syphilis because mercury is signed by the planet Mercury, which signs the marketplace

1. An other candidate for the account of nominalism could be the term “organized nominalism” (Jameson 1991: 217-259)
where syphilis is contracted” (Hacking 2004: 97). This is not a cheap relativism but the historically mediated and determined system of contingencies, and regime of possibilities. Historical nominalism gains the final meaning by this intervention, it confines to the study of systems of possibilities. It depends on clear epistemological and ontological demands. The point is to pose the questions such as: how these possibilities affect the capacities of our speaking, voicing our interests in different areas and in different epochs confronting with divergent, discontinuity-based possibility-regimes.

There is obviously indeterminability in this reasoning on the above mentioned “true-or-false” perspective, but this argumentation does not mean that the dynamic of history is fragmentized into the myriad of discrete events. In contrary, the historically constituted systems of possibilities have determinacy-function: it conditions the applicants for the truthness or falseness in the given epoch. Contingency is not to be characterized as sub-determinatedness: by emphasizing it we only protest against the predeterminedness: this assertion of Hacking leaves no possibility for the eventual misunderstanding. And the counter-history à la Foucault is not without the constitutive limitation: it would be extremely improper leaves out of account that Foucault is consistently engaged in the writing of the philosophy of limit, that the crucial notion of the limit represents the horizon of his thinking. Moreover, we could speculate that Foucault write the “philosophy of the limits as such“ (Hallward 2000: 93), and he wants to show the genealogy and archeology of constitutive limits (and the transgressions). Hacking`s intellectual trajectory helps us to dismiss the often manifested charge against Foucault in regard to his alleged historicism in his studies of historical knowledge: it is to be recalled that Foucault very explicitly asserts that every serious orientation in philosophy and social sciences struggles against the historicism, that the anti-historicism is deeply inscribed into his course (Foucault 1997: 154).

Consequently, by this line of reasoning Hacking makes possible to see Foucault’s endeavor more clearly: in spite of genealogical investigations it would be wrong to impute to Foucault the charge of relativism. The established regimes of possibilities during the history constrain, or determine the framework for the contenders for the truth or falsity. Foucault’s intention is to confront the “subject” with these systems of possibilities: this point is adequately captured by Hacking. This is not the subject that is disappeared in the playing of the meanings and signs; she is not presented as the definitively disappeared entity, but highlighted processually in the context of incessant confrontation with her conditions of appearance and manifestations.

Hacking investigates the fundamental features of being in terms of historical processes that the human being engages in the form of “politics”. What does this mean? The Canadian philosopher refrains from every robust, declarative political manifestation: yet his orientation appears to be clear. For example, in advocating the construction analyses of social and cultural phenomena he says that for the proponents of the “talk of construction”, “politics” and “power” are more important than the elaboration of the metaphysics. By treating the scientificty the constructionist deals obsessively with the authority, power and control. “Constructionism” evidently proves to be a subverting form of thinking: Hacking several times repeats the term of “unmasking” (with or without quotation marks) that refers to the using of the given modus of knowledge in the practicing of the power (even we could read on the unmasking of the order). By his detached style he does not side
declaratively with a certain orientation in the configuration of the lefts and right-wings within the domain of the political specter (Hacking 1999: 95). Yet highly indicative is his treatment of objectivity. Is the “objectivity” an indispensable and eternal tool of the emancipation of the victims or the weeks as some persistent fighters for freedom assume? Or is objectivity a consolidated form of repression in the given order as some feminists suggest? We are inclined to say that “constructionism”, the “tale of constructionism” could be characterized as the counter-orientation or as the counter-conduct in Foucault’s sense. For example, Foucault frequently explicates the meaning of the ascetism in Christianity: this term is usually depicted as the inherent feature of Christianity. Nevertheless, Foucault defamiliarizes the ascetism by connecting it to an subversive core of Christianity and naming this “self-forming activity” as a “tactique”, “supplement-excess” that contains an inaccessible “gist” for the external power (Foucault 2004b: 205, 211). Ascetism as the underground-based opportunity of Christianity is to be understood precisely as counter-orientation in relation to the institutional power of Christianity. We should link this meaning of counter-orientation to the “resistance” and “ politicization”, in fact, to the politics in the processual sense. Politics exists only as the re-politicization: this is the sense of the famous assertion that the resistance is prior to the power. Hacking’s narration on constructionism could be interpreted exactly as the processual/non-finalized orientation that undermines the authority of order and the established regimes of knowledge-power. In short, the tale of constructionism is to be described as the always emerged, non-closed operation-intervention into the structures of authority.

Though, it seems there is a problem! Does Hacking claim to offer insight into the true structure of the world and the human by analyzing cultural phenomena not just in terms of their formal or sociological characteristics but for evidence of the way in which they reveal the universal structure of being itself?

That is why Hacking describes Foucault’s and his own philosophy as ‘extreme nominalism’. His main focus is Foucault’s rejection of humanistic subject and he sees himself as a “dynamic nominalist” interested in how our practices of naming interact with the things we name. He also can be called “dialectical realist, preoccupied by the interactions between what there is (and what comes into being) and our conceptions of it” (Hacking 2002: 2). Dynamic nominalism is a nominalism in action, directed at new or changing classifications of people (Hacking 2004: 279). A kind of person came into being at the same time that the name (or a special sense of that name) became current (279-280). In some cases our classifications and the classified emerge hand-in-hand, each egging the other on. The point is that naming has real effect on people, and changes in people have real effects on subsequent classifications. That’s why this naming is dynamic and dialectical.

The abuse of child is a real evil, but what is about the notion of child abuse? The notion has its own history. It appeared in certain time and a certain place in the discussion of persons with authority: it was in 1961. in Denver among pediatricians, and it was originally used to describe beaten babies but soon the name got wider connotations. The notion became part of the legislation, incorporated in practices, and changed wide spectrum of professional activities that includes social workers, police, teachers, parents and different kids of hustlers: “I studied development of child abuse precisely because atti-
tudes to child abuse, definitions of it, laws about it, practices of child abuse and practices invented to curb it were evolving before our very eyes” (Hacking 2004: 280).

The point is made here again in terms both analytic and continental. If intentional action is, in Anscombe’s language, action under a description, then the emergence of new categories in the human sciences (psychic trauma, the phases of child development, hysteria, and multiple personality disorder) changes the space of possible action. Following Sartre, one can say that changes in these categories do indeed change the ways of being that are open to individuals. Hacking always says that one starts to understand how a kind functions only when he thoroughly studies it. The game here is “to lose ourselves, as befits philosophy, in total complexity, and then escape from it by craft and skills and, among other things, philosophical reflection” (Hacking 2002: 17).

The crux of the encounter between Foucault and Hacking should be located in the field of statistics. It sounds very strange, but the account of statistics resumes the fundamental aspects regarding both thinkers. It is possible here to follow Hacking through the Foucauldian glasses and vice versa. As we know, Foucault in his courses of seventies was devoted to the “political arithmetic” (this term is usually connected to William Petty who “captured” and governed Ireland by the imposition of statistical “compass” and numerical representation; see Perelman 2000), and the genesis of political economy, in fact, to “the genesis of political knowledge” (Foucault). Within this framework he particularly emphasizes the importance of the category of population: he combines the articulation of the liberal horizon of modern economy, political rationality and the biopolitics. Taking into account Foucault’s engagement in the confrontation with the population as the “new collectivity”, or, “principles of ordering”, we can acquire the perspective toward the statistics and calculation. We know very well that in spite of recognizing the epochal status of population as the main “operator of transformation for the transition” in the light of emerging political economy, Foucault’s non-extensive and insufficient account could be critically addressed (see Dean 2015). Yet, the stipulative perspective is opened and it is clear that the population is the “final end of government”, that the analysis of the forms of control is strongly connected to the regularities and heterogeneities of the “new collective entity”.

Foucault treatment of the aggregative and quantitative effects of the establishment of population offers opportunities for the narrative on the economic horizon of the category. Foucault is specifically interested in the judicial and criminal statistics: but the epochal meaning and importance of statistics, the modern knowledge constituted by statistics is at stake as well. Statistics is characterized as the “knowledge of the state”, “the instrument of the organization of the police” (regarding the police there is even an interaction, a “loop”: policy and statistics mutually determine each other; the existence of police needs the statistics and at the same time the functioning of the police is the indispensable con-

2. Interestingly, Hacking dismisses Petty, (I. Hacking, 1975, 102.). What is at stake here from the perspective of the novelty of Petty’s discourse: the relationship between the political arithmetic and “political anatomy”, and the using of the science that is not as “analytically precise as useful”, (McCormick 2009: 187)
3. Consider an another type of critique regarding Foucault’s treatment of population: “…the population crisis of the 16th and 17th centuries, not the end of famine in Europe in the 18th (as Foucault has argued) that turned reproduction and population growth into state matters, as well as primary objects of intellectual discourse” (Federici 2004: 86)
4. It is not by chance that Foucault’s thinking on calculabilities is commonly addressed as the referential point for the critical interpretation of accounting (Hoskin; Macve 2000).
dition for the statistics; Foucault even outlines the statistic conditions the space of maneuvering of state; the opportunities of state could be known only by statistics); as the “state’s knowledge of the state”, actually, of itself and of other states, or as the “knowledge of things instead of knowledge on the laws”. All these features cling to the articulation of the tendency of the “economization of society”, “total space of market” broadly described in _Naissance de la biopolitique_: the taming of heterogeneities by statistics, the quantitative framing of life, the reality as the domain of calculable properties, the imposition of the calculation as imperative, the establishment of accounting machines, the new knowledge-power axis are the manifest marks of the political-economy of modernity. The indicators, the sea of data, the stream of numbers, and the “technological assemblage” in the context of statistics are not neutral: they prove to be the elements and dimensions of the biopolitical-statistical mapping of reality. Biopolitics and statistics are inextricable. Biopolitics takes charge of population in order to govern the existing groups of people. Thus, there are threads that link population, statistical axiomatic, and biopolitics: the eternal non-neutrality of statistics opens the door before the affirmation of biopolitics that frames the groups of people as entity to be measured, ordered, in fact to be governed.

Hacking comes up, _mutatis mutandis_ (the Canadian philosopher is much more indirect concerning the power,\(^5\) and his interest leads him toward the first decades of 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century regarding the statistical classification), with the analogical tendencies: let see that he appears to be a thinker who comprehensively follows Foucault’s “immature science” that deals with the issue of probability and statistics (statistical language, “statistical truth”, statistical discourse in their own right). Hacking narrates on the “subversive ramifications of the knowledge”, “the numerical manipulations of the body politic”, “counting bureaucracy”: he tells us that the “data”, “average and dispersions” bring about the “idea of normal people” endorsing the new “social engineering”, social technology that modifies the “undesirable classes”. The statistics forms and structures the regime of possibilities, it is not innocent: “it is illegal to die, nowadays, of any cause except those prescribed in a long list drawn up by World Health Organization” (Hacking 1982: 280).

For this reason, we should relate Hacking’s investigations to the kernel of Foucault’s orientation. The key term, namely, _the making up people_ is to be interpreted from the perspective of “biopolitical-statistical” framing of reality. Hacking leaves us in no doubt regarding the construction-aspects of statistics-driven reality: hence the accent on the “statistical interference” in his argumentation. To quote a relevant sentence: “the influence of statistics upon the ways in which people are understood, governed, see themselves” (Hacking 2002: 99). When Hacking explains the process of classifying the people “in industrial bureaucracies” in order to shed light on the “interventions in the lives of individual human being”, we find the traces of Foucault’s trajectory. We would call this _intervention-framework as the performative power of statistics_. In line with the performativity theory certain discursive formation determines what happens, distributes the possibilities within the given domain.

Hacking repeatedly points out the importance of classification supposing that this procedure intensely affect the people classified. It is not necessary to turn to detailed reconstruction of the position of classification in Foucault’s books and articles: it would be

\(^{5}\) Consider that Hacking says it is wrong to relate to Foucault through the articulation of power-effects; in fact, the effects of knowledge (savoir) prove to be substantial (see Hacking and Kirsch 2003).
enough to refer to the wide-ranging accounts in *The Order of Things* or in *The Archeology of Knowledge*. Besides, let us not forget that the work of George Canguilhem on classifications (normality/deviation as the central binarity) proves to be the prelude for Foucault. Let us see, for example, how is smallpox articulated by the implementation of the statistical classification and how is the distribution of the possibilities takes place between the normal and deviant morbidity, success and failures (Foucault 2004b: 62). In the process of the classification of such disease as smallpox are condensed all processes of importance for the statistics as interference: making disease accessible through the processes of collectivizing and individualizing on the basis of the quantification and rational identification represents a pattern for the rethinking of statistics. Hacking’s applies Foucault’s vocabulary regarding the statistical framing of the “class of people” that are always individualized and collectivized: he thematizes in this manner the problem of social classes that are not *intrinsically* inscribed into modern society but are to be made up. He attempts to explain that the statistical “bureaucracy” has designed the cartography of class structure: our eyes are reprogrammed to see the classes, occupations and the power configurations by this design. Or, the ominous “poverty line”, and “threshold of poverty” is constituted through the police oriented on the family. Statistics needs measurements, numbers, counting of the people, for example, for the taxes, and enumerating. The emphasis is not put on the linear, pure quantification: what is so significant here is the transformation of the qualitative dimensions into the quantitative proportions, namely, the overdetermination of the quality by the quantification. What is relevant: our categories are products or by-products of this act of enumeration. That is, the act of enumeration requires the categorization, the classification of the people. This is the course of the historical nominalist who believes that the counting “creating the people the ways to be” and how they fit (seeming spontaneously) into the structure of categories. And this is the trace of the dynamic, and “revolutionary” nominalist who is so impressed by the describing of the historical processes “whereby new categories and distribution of objects come into being”. (the “distribution” bears the mark of Foucault’s account as well: the different meanings are mentioned, such as “distribution” of forces, things, cases etc., that is, there are complex spheres of distributions).

The “looping effect” is *expressis verbis* absent in Foucault, but it is not too difficult to find the analogical tendencies in his works. The classified people are not the passive agencies that mechanically absorb the direction from the statistical classification; they are “moving target” that is, they are determined to move, to be dynamic, that is, they interact with the classification that addresses them. The inherent self-referentiality, the belief oriented toward herself, may change the knowledge on the people: Hacking even says that “the classified people can take matters into their own hand” anticipating the opportunity of self-determination (Hacking 1999: 58). “The classified” people are not epiphenomenal-behavioral entities, their subjectivity is constitutive feature of classification. (In line with this we could envisage the processes of declassification, the counter-classification.) This excess of the “looping”, this remainder of the self-referentiality against the totality of classification is not strange for Foucault. Does not contain his engagement on subject, subjectification, practical subjectivization exactly this excess of self-referentiality? Can we understand his late turning to the hermeneutics of subject without this excess? Can we cope with the intricacies between the constituting and constituted subjectivities in Foucault without these looping effects?
Coming to the end of our paper, we intend to make a step further. Hacking tells us on the long list of “engines”, or driving forces by which the making up people takes place: 1. counting, 2. quantifying, 3. creating norms, 4. correlating, 5. medicalising, 6. biologizing. 7. geneticizing. This list suited to the “economization of society”: in fact we keep in mind Foucault’s innovative (and debated) account of neoliberalism that necessarily involves all these “engines“. The biopoliticized making up people is the set of processes, classifications for the market in capitalism producing the normative logic and imposing the incentives: in other words, this is the design of people, implementation of subjective *modus operandi* for this historical mode of market. Not eternal market, the market as invariant, but historically mediated one captured by capitalism. In this light appears the figure of subject who is “govermentalizable”: the “productive subject” in “classical” period and the “competitive” subject in the neoliberalism.

Is this reading of Foucault set up against Foucault himself, leastwise in a certain sense? Yes, we must acknowledge his oscillations that threat his own critical intentions and leave us in doubt (consider a critique regarding capitalism, Lazzarato 2015).

Let us pay again attention to the bipolar relation between market and population. There is a context loaded with the meaning of the commodification, or we would say with the *intelligibility of modern life mediated by commodity*. Foucault points out the intertwinement between police and commerce, police and urban development, he brings to the fore the appearance of the “market town”: this interaction is in reality integrated into the articulation of the “entry of human existence into the abstract world of commodity” (Foucault 2004a: 346). We read even such formulation as “the primacy of commodity” and in addition there is a strong link between the police and the mentioned primacy. The police are not only urban, but explicitly market-based (*marchande*): it is the *institution* of the expanding market, thus, the capitalist market is *immanently policized*. The police⁶ is focused and organized around the market: this assertion is confirmed by historical researches that recount the scrupulous, all-inclusive regulation of the market by the police (Harcourt 2011: 22). In this sense it is highly misleading when Foucault refers to the “spontaneous synthesis of the individual selfishness” elevating the market to the entirety of the “globe” (Foucault 2004a: 305): this description ignores the “constructive”, interventionist aspect of the “destructive” creation of market, or the commodity-structures in capitalism.

“Making up people” does not allow this type of *pregiven* spontaneity. By contrast with Foucault’s assertion, it presumes the people who count, take a part in the marketizing, imagine the market in every situation, interiorize the market-conform sense of guilt and responsibility, and, paradoxically, will be ready to be a self-entrepreneur and to participate in her own making up. The “spontaneous synthesis” is the matter of normalization, processes of optimalization, making of population productive, monitoring of differences and the interfaces between the normalcy and deviancy; nevertheless, we are grateful to Foucault and his analysis about the indirect acting of the power on the individual to underscore these processes. That the looping or the “interactive classification” always comprises the self-relation indicate leads us to Foucault; the practicizing of the governmental power includes self-knowledge and self-regulation. But, this implies that we should

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⁶. It is to be mentioned that Foucault’s term of police is different from Rancière’s articulation: the first points out the link between the police and power, the latter puts the police in relation to the partition of the sensible (Rancière 2009: 219).
start out not from the pregiven natural agency of markets, but from the analysis of the historical conditions on which emerges this agency.

We could hypothesize that in this place Foucault falls prey to presupposed liberal conception of the economy, that imagines the unplanned genesis of the market in accordance with the transcendental nature (see Lošonc 2014). Hacking could help us once again: the category of the market are determined by the denaturalized categorization, and classification. For example, the *phenomenon* is strictly opposed to *datum*. The concrete price in the market exists in the chain of the market-mediated data set, but only under the phenomenon of the denaturalized price (Hacking 1983; Schabas 2005: 154). Furthermore, we could recall an important insight of the Canadian philosopher: by the strengthening of the indeterminism in our concepts of world and people, the control will be always higher (Hacking 1990: XIII). The “objective knowledge” of statistics is viewed as the repository of the deterministic relations: but in point of fact affirming the chance it undermines the pattern of determination. This strong divergence between indeterminism and the growing need of control fits into the depiction of our subject: the capitalist market is the set of locus of indeterminism, yet it is conditioned by intensified control, monitoring, re-evaluation, and the coercing of recognizing. The market-based indeterminism is in coexistence with the comprehensive control: this elucidates, for instance the paradox of the conditioned choice in the context of capitalist market.

Hacking strongly emphasizes the institutions as they appear in Foucault`s thought: they enumerate, practice surveillance, control, verify, order, fabricate and direct the possibilities which gives them power. They implement the “sweet despotism of reason”. In the context of institutions we can narrate the sequences of the mechanism of loop that is to be understood as the sweet. And this step is an added help to all of us who want to unlock the bolts of this thinking: therefore we could employ the vocabulary and terms that express the institutional infrastructure of the making up people.

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7. Foucault`s relationship to liberalism is too complex to be accounted here, but consider: Bidet 2006.


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The profound gap between materialism and poststructuralist theory is by now fully established within social sciences. While the former is linked to some sort of epistemologically anachronistic claim of understanding the totality of the social world in its real condition, the latter is based on the impossibility of such an endeavor and therefore shifts the analytical focus from explaining the world to deconstructing its contingent appearance. Although the fact that this gap exists figures as a widely used commonplace in social theory today, its precise roots are somewhat hard to explain and we only ever find evidence of its extensive effects. The breach between a macrolevel analysis of the social whole and a microlevel analysis of the effects of power even has attained the status of an ontological given within social theory, it appears to have no history at all.

On the other hand, we can track constant efforts to bridge this gap. Since Michel Foucault’s path breaking studies turned social theory inside out and displaced the epistemological claims of Marxism for a whole generation of thinkers, there have been repeated approaches to recover a Marxist framework by combining it with Foucauldian insights. Besides, one seems to be intuitively drawn towards such an ‘alliance between Marx and Foucault’: Since Marx has something to do with class, and since Foucault has something to do with gender and sexuality, and since relations of both class as well as gender and sexuality clearly relate to each other somehow, it figures to ‘think them together’, as it is very often put. Furthermore, problems of epistemology urge us to such creative combinations: Since it has always been very hard to distinguish between symbolic and material sides to social phenomena — and as it seems to be getting harder every day — specific fields of interest may require an ‘extended toolbox’ in order to describe problems adequately.

According to the fundamental problem that the division between a Marxist and poststructuralist paradigm poses, synthetical approaches using such extended epistemologies bear several difficulties. Generally, they tend to be quite eclectic. Though this supposed eclecticism of combining elements from both Marx and Foucault is very common, it often lacks detailed explanations of the precise relation between the different elements. In a way, this vagueness is constitutive, as a closer look at the ontological and epistemological claims would cause serious problems if not real incompatibilities. But since such approaches do not merely combine the distinct works of two individual scholars — on the
contrary, these two names stand for whole schools of thought — the eclectic character necessarily correlates to a certain degree of superficiality. To that effect, it does not even need a significant amount of effort or number of quotes to think and write in a basic Marxist-Foucauldian mindset. Much to the contrary, it seems to be even harder not to be drawn into this framework. It seems as if the 20th century thought can be labeled as a ‘Marxist world’, we can dub the 21st century a Marxist-Foucauldian one. No serious form of thought can either completely neglect the forces of wage-labor, alienation and value form or ignore the dynamics of power and discourse.

However, these injections of Marxist and Foucauldian forms of thinking into the general social regimes of knowledge seem to get stuck at that level. Form the materialist perspective, the argument has been made time and time again that the quasi-acceptance of the Marxist critique of free market capitalism into the general conscience of society in the guise of modern social democracy has not been pointing us towards an end to the at times violent contradictions of capitalist societies but rather stabilized the bourgeois arrangement as a whole. In precisely this sense, the Marxist world has not been a revolutionary world. Therefore we need to pay special attention to the ways in which societies can in fact absorb critical thought and turn it into an integral part of the system. So, if we want to adequately answer “the difficult question of how to fight the system without contributing to its enhanced functioning” (Žižek 2012: 10), we need to talk about the current status of our Marxist-Foucauldian world: Is the perceived need for a productive combination of these two schools of thought itself indeed a subversive or liberatory moment in social science or a sign of decline, retreat, accommodation, integration, entropy and defeat of the critical momentum?

In the following we want to argue that the impulse of an alliance between Marx and Foucault does in no way foster the supposedly reconciliation between two divergent frameworks, it rather essentializes the epistemological breach by systematically suppressing its real character. On this account, we find substantial evidence that the necessary step is to formulate the problem in its contradictory nature, in a dialectical manner. Instead of reproducing the dilemma between enforcing or synthesizing its antipodes, we must grasp the hidden unity behind the two sides and figure out the objective reasons for their divergence. As a first precondition, we suggest to revisit the historical breaking point of critical thought, which led from Louis Althusser’s last attempt to formulate an integral concept of society as a structured totality according to a materialist-world setting to Michel Foucault’s approach of strictly anti-totalitarian thought situated in a world of discourse. We then want to show that this breach is neither an accidental one. Rather, it follows a general movement of bourgeois society and therefore it can be accessed from the framework of Historical Materialism. Adorno was right when he stressed the strange inversion of history at the beginning of his Negative Dialectics: When he put his work under the motto “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed” (Adorno 1973: 3), he did not merely state a strange hiccup in history. Adorno gives us a hint that Marx’ own idea to explain the anatomy of the historically earlier in terms of the subsequent configurations — i.e. explaining the anatomy of the ape with the key taken from the anatomy of the human (Marx 1973, 105) — comes to a halt in the 20th century and rolls back in the other direction. Maybe this will serve as enough of an initial justification for our undertaking: to explain the science of discourse analysis and the phe-
nomenon of neoliberal biopolitics as an enigma that can be unraveled with the key that lies in its predecessor, Historical Materialism and liberal capitalism.¹

From Historical Materialism to Radical Historicism

To confront the epoch-making achievements of Foucault with its own historical character essentially means to treat him as a symptom. According to that, the most striking aspect of Foucault’s work can be seen precisely as the epistemological break that was put into effect against a paradigm of structural Marxism. In a nutshell, the defining element of that break is the abandoning of any concept of structural determination. Hence, Foucault’s elaboration of a theory of discourse is simultaneously a reformulation of a theory of power in general, which changes the coordinates dramatically. The traditionally Marxist problematization of power approached the effects of power by its very origin, it thus involved a minimal theory of totality to think of society as a coherent context of causal interrelations. Such an approach always tends towards becoming a reductionist view of linear determination in one or the other way. Obversely, this point marked the major critique against Marxism that finally was incorporated by Foucault, who openly attacked the Marxist paradigm for being a mere positivism (Foucault 2002: 112). The analytical focus that Foucault elaborated shifted from the origin of power to its actual effects and therefore subverted the dangers of a reification of power such as in Marxist orthodoxy. As Foucault coquetted in respect to a certain fetishization of power, “to begin the analysis with a ‘how’ is to suggest that power as such does not exist” (Foucault 1982: 786). Exactly that turn characterized Foucault as the one who “rendered visible’ certain aspects of our experience in profoundly new ways for a whole generation of thinkers” (Rabinow/Rose 2003: viii).

In this way, it seemed as if Foucault was the first one to pose the problem of the Marxist epistemology’s fallback into mere determinism. Despite that, the Marxist tradition was in itself a debate on exactly that problematic tendency. Even more, it was essentially founded in reaction to a determinist reduction of a theory of the social totality. It was Marx’ ground-breaking reformulation of the Hegelian notion of the society’s totality into a materialist dialectics that constituted the tradition of Historical Materialism. Accordingly, it was the genuine problem of Marxism to deal with the in itself dialectical relationship of an idea of totality and its very historicity. Marx’ centered his analysis of society on the notion of social practice, which allowed him to grasp its totality as a movement in itself. This was the key to prevent the concept of totality to degenerate into a mere reification of its object. Consequently, Marx was unable to explicate the theoretical implications of his model, since he could only give a case example with his Critique of the Political Economy and not an elaborated theory. Left with this theoretical blind spot, the history of Marxist thought can be seen as a struggle for an adequate understanding of society between the two antipodes of a re-

¹ One more remark on terminology: For this essay, we will use ‘Marxism’ and ‘Materialism’ as synonyms, just as we will treat “Foucauldianism” and “discourse analysis” as one and the same. We are aware, that such conflations are always problematic, but they serve the given purpose of facilitating communication between two radically different schools of thought by imagining a dialogue between their most prominent representatives. We are thus far convinced that the argument holds up in spite of the ambiguities that arise out of these conflations, and not just because of them.
fication of the social whole and an emphasis on its historical specifics. It came with the epistemological shift towards an ontological contingency that this dialectical tension was resolved into the abandoning of any form of determining coherence of a social structure. Certainly, Foucault was not the only advocate of this theoretical development, but he was most definitely the most influential.

Ultimately, the specificity of the epistemological break and its wide range of implications for social theory today can be understood on the basis of the concrete historical situation that paved the ground for Foucault’s revolutionary course. It is therefore the story of the intellectual rupture between Althusser, as the last proponent of an orthodox Marxism, and Foucault in postwar France. The roots of that break can be traced back to the climate of intellectual disorientation at that time. The French Left was torn between a radicalization of a critique of bourgeois capitalist society on the one hand, and the growing dogmatism of the Communist Party that scared away many of the young intellectuals. But this confusion itself refers to a crisis of Marxist theory in general, of which Althusser speaks of as a dead end of Marxist theory (Althusser 1969: 22 f.). It was Stalinism that finally identified a Marxist orthodoxy with an economic reductionism and thereby discredited the whole notion of Marxism. On the other hand, “the critique of Stalinist ‘dogmatism’ was generally ‘lived’ by Communist intellectuals as a ‘liberation’. This ‘liberation’ gave birth to a profound ideological reaction, ‘liberal’ and ‘ethical’ in tendency” (Althusser 1969: 10). Althusser’s objection identified the radicalization of left intellectuals as an ideological tendency which he tried to circumvent in his own philosophical and political interventions.

Althusser’s theoretical opponent thus was both the economic reductionism of Marxist dogmatism and the ideological delusion that he accused the leftist movement of. Since Althusser treated these aspects as the two sides of the same medal, his theoretical program stands in virtual opposition to both tendencies. It was thus a resumption of a Marxist methodology as utilized by Marx himself in his Critique of the Political Economy and against a reductionist, humanistic or generally ideological misconception. He wrote:

“We were politically and philosophically convinced that we had reached the only firm ground in the world, but as we could not demonstrate its existence or firmness philosophically, no one else could see any firm ground beneath our feet – only conviction. [...] we failed to offer an objective and public proof of the apodicticity of our convictions” (Althusser 1969: 28).

The possibility to shift from mere conviction to objectivity lies in the emphasis of the scientific aspects of Marx’ work. The scientific methodology served as the demarcation between the ideological function of a theory — that is the social function of a reproduction of the social relationships (Althusser 1994: 113 ff.) — and the scientific function of providing knowledge. Accordingly, an ideological concept “really does designate a set of existing relations, [but] unlike a scientific concept, it does not provide us with a means of knowing them” (Althusser 1969: 223). As Althusser elaborated in his later work, the means of knowing the existing reality instead of merely describing it depend on an insight of the structured totality, in the sense that we need to face the ideological structure of society in its totality in order to step out of it. Thus, the theory of ideology in general marks the scientific approach towards ideology in its structural totality (Althusser 1994: 130).
Essentially, Althusser’s theoretical elaborations tie in with the tradition of Marxism precisely in the sense that they employ the infamous “point of view of totality” (Lukács 1971: 27) but reformulating it in a truly Marxist sense. This is also why Althusser can be seen as Lukács’ “later great anti-Hegelian antipode” (Žižek 2000: 152) in his attempt to get to the core of the theoretical and scientific outcome of Marx’ theoretical revolution (Althusser/Balibar 2009: 201) that is dialectics as the approach towards the totality of society by the means of its inherent and contradictory movement. In contrast to that, Lukács’ return to a Hegelian concept of totality repeated its idealistic fallacy of an abstraction from the actual existing social relationships. This idealistic fallacy is a reductionist one precisely because it traces back the totality to an inherent principle, which in turn is realized throughout every element of the totality. Accordingly, in economic reductionism, it is a base-superstructure-model that is employed as a totality, in which the superstructure is directly determined by the base in a relation of linear causality. Against this misleading simplification, Althusser positioned a theoretical reconfiguration of the base-superstructure-totality as an overdetermined entity. The overdetermined contradiction at the base makes it impossible to simply trace the superstructural phenomena back to its determining essence, but it simultaneously holds up a causal relationship of determination in the last instance (Althusser 1969: 111). In order to grasp this relationship that connects the contradictory elements of the superstructure to its inner coherency, Althusser employs the conception of structural causality (Althusser/Balibar 2009: 205). As a result, the notion of totality becomes a structured whole that is determined by its constitutive class antagonism in the last instance. Accordingly, the task of Marxism is the “elaboration of the theory of the particular essence of the specific elements of the superstructure” (Althusser 1969: 114), which Althusser fulfilled in his theory of ideology in general and which is the key to an understanding of ideology as a concept of virtual totality that allows to grasp its entity not as a substantial intercorrelation but as a functional reference to the reproduction of the social relations.

Paradoxically, this strong emphasis on theory increasingly fostered an uneasiness as it began to appear as a mere theoreticism. Althusser’s project to give Marxist theory a philosophically stable ground appeared to be itself an ideological articulation that claims the status of objective truth. The tendency of rejection was even intensified when Althusser progressively criticized the student’s revolt in 1968 as a false Leftism. Although Althusser wanted to save a Marxist epistemology and methodology from its rigidification in mere dogmatism, he seemed to enact just the same type of dogmatic fundament. As for example Jacques Derrida noted about Althusser:

“I thought that what he was saying was not wrong – not necessarily, not always – but that it was necessary to further question the axiomatic of discourse. […] That’s why Althusser’s and the Althusserians’ discourse seemed a bit stifling to me: I sensed a new scientism in it, even the refinement or the disguising of (and this term would have made them scream) a new ‘positivism’ that repressed the possibility of questions” (Derrida 2002: 162)

As a result, Althusser — once seen as the “master who promised to deliver a philosophy capable of changing the world rather than merely interpreting it” (Montag 2013: 3) — ended up as the incarnation of a deep disappointment with Marxist theory. It became obvious that a Marxist approach would somehow necessarily lead into dogmatism and that its supposed leading figures’ only interest was to “preserve philosophy […] as the exclusive business of academically trained specialists by upholding a division of labour that safe-
guards its place” (Rancière 2010: 11). The conflict with Althusser and his claim for objectivity was thus central, because by denouncing Althusser as an illegitimate authority, it seemed to bring the very political character of knowledge as such to the fore.

Jacques Rancière, who criticized Althusser for acting as “theory’s police force” (Rancière 2010: 41), articulated this shift by pointing out that “a new element had been introduced to the game, one that could not be absorbed into the opposition between intellectuals (teachers and students) with conflicting political opinions and practices: knowledge itself” (Rancière 2010: 39). It was Michel Foucault who seemed to best exemplify this analytical shift within his relocation from the origin of power to its actual effects. In Foucault’s framework, it was not only possible to problematize axiomatic truth and its fallback into dogmatism, but to avoid it as well. In a nutshell, Foucault’s way of thinking promised to solve the dialectical problem of totality by universalizing the contingent character of every positive formation of power. Accordingly, Foucault’s path breaking notion of discourse describes a concept of virtual totality that actively denies any determination and thereby allows to think a virtual structure against the background of an ontological contingency. Exactly that simple ontological premise, that a discursive structure (as totality) is essentially undetermined, marks the radical historicism that Foucault represented for a whole generation of thinkers.

To begin with, one of Foucault’s most significant early claims was concerned with a fundamental shift in the very appearance and function of power. In his famous study *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1995), he argues that power has not to be addressed as a certain capacity anymore, something that can be possessed, but as a productive relation between knowledge and its objects. These power-knowledge relations not only directly affect subjects but, in fact, produce them. So, the actual appearance of power (in institutions, techniques etc.) marks “a set of material elements and techniques that […] supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” (Foucault 1995: 28). The knowledge that brings those subjects into existence is powerful in the way that it becomes their truth.

Accordingly, power is decentralized as it shifts away from any authoritative entity and is inscribed in the system of knowledge itself, it hence is omnipresent and inescapably existent in its systematicity as such. He addresses this new form of power, in which the subject is constitutively involved in the very functioning of power, as disciplinary, as “a type of power, a modality for its exercise, […] a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology” (Foucault 1995: 215). Corresponding to this fundamental transformation, Foucault elaborates an analysis that focuses on the actual functioning of power on the microlevel. His *archaeology* aims at the discursive structure and “describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive” (Foucault 1972: 131). Those various discourses express the systemic formation of elements that are related to each other by practices and rules to which an analysis of the discourse can point to, to the immanent rules of its formation. This precisely grasps the productive nature of power that is not simple coercion but the “multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (Foucault 1990: 92). One of the most striking advantages of this analytical perspective is the supposed emancipatory potential for corresponding micropolitics, the direct intervention or alteration of the discursive structure in its very operation, precisely because “where there is power there is resistance” (Foucault 1990: 95).
It is this conception in which Foucault acknowledges the structural formation of knowledge, language, consciousness etc. but privileges the discourse as the historical constellation that enables those structural contexts (Foucault 1972: 201 ff.). This is exactly one of the reasons why Foucault’s notion of discourse became so popular, because, as a concept, it seemed to be fundamentally able to reflect on the historicity of its own appearance and it thereby provided “compelling alternatives to the discredited Marxist paradigm of ideology critique” (Vighi/Feldner 2007: 18). The concept of discourse therefore inherits the epistemological shift towards a revised form of totality that actively neglects any form of structural determination. It is thus the anti-structural correlate of the notion of ideology, which is to be rejected because it “always stands in virtual opposition to something else that is supposed to count as truth” (Foucault 2002: 119) and thereby indirectly affirms a supposedly ahistoric construct.

Paradoxically, Foucault seems to point to a totalization of power that itself has disappeared by volatilizing into the structure as such. But he argues at the same time that the structure is not a total existence, instead it is a complex relation between formations, apparatuses that organize their elements according to a strategy and therefore express power (Foucault 1980: 194 ff.). This enables him to give up a structuralist perspective in favor of a microperspective that allows him to focus on the concrete, strategic formations in order to criticize them, to address their historical character, and ultimately to change them. Although it seemed very clear for Foucault that “disciplinary control [...] is unquestionably linked to the rise of capitalism” (Rabinow 1984: 17 f.), Foucault denies that there is a deeper necessity or coherence than the “reality of the discourse” (Foucault 1971: 20) which is essentially contingency. The ultimate claim that Foucault is defending against all odds is the negation of any structural causality.

Finally, we face two very similar constructs of ideas. The paradigm of Foucault discourse analysis resembles Althusser’s structural Marxism in several respects: They share an analytical scope and utilize similar ways of operation, for instance when it comes to modes of interpellation or subjectification. Additionally, when we think of the commonalities between discourse and structure, these analytical instruments almost seem to be synonyms. However, the defining difference is to be located at their most fundamental premise, that is the distinction between an ontology of structural determination on the one hand and structural contingency on the other. As we can see, this is not just a conceptual difference stemming from a mere evolvement of theory. Quite the contrary, this marks a clear contradiction that has to be addressed as such. From that point, it becomes clear that Foucault’s epistemological break consist in a decidedly anti-Marxist act.

Contingency as a Symptom

Taking this inherent contradiction between those competing frameworks seriously would leave us with very high threshold for any notion of possible alliances between Marxist and Foucauldian epistemologies. Nevertheless, the political problems that actually speak to both sides are not going to just fade away. Quite the contrary, as actual challenges to a social theory, they will continue to insist on the dilemma between determination and contingency, once again putting us into the position of either taking sides or naively seeking
reconciliation. Therefore, we want to suggest that instead of creating yet another kind of synthesis between those two theories, we should face their contradictory and yet dialectical character by trying to apply one to the other. Since, as we wanted to show, Foucault provides in itself a implicit reading of Materialism — as mere determinism, essentialism and so forth — the task would be to create a Marxist reading of Foucauldian discourse analysis, i.e. explain the phenomenon of the rupture between materialism and discourse analysis in materialist terms, and see if Historical Materialism is ready to explain even its own significant other.

As we developed, the Althusserian type of a symptomatic reading of Foucault provides us with the means to explain the objective character of Foucault’s own achievements with respect to the theoretical conjuncture of his own impact. It sets out the precise silent and sublime, yet instructive “productive contradictions” (Habermas 1986: 107) within Foucault’s work. But not in order to prove him wrong, but to develop the necessary character of these contradiction in the best sense of a materialist critique. These contradictions will be most visible in his What is Critique? and his Birth of Biopolitics, two moments when he was arguably at the farthest distance from Marx, mediated by an undecided and vague phase in his History of Sexuality, where he develops his critique of the repressive hypothesis in close correspondence to Marxism.

In his short lecture about the question What is Critique?, Foucault develops his suspicion that critique in the sense of critique of power and of government might be a functional, necessary part of government in itself. Thus it serves “as both partner and adversary to the arts of governing” (Foucault 2007: 45), as of itself a brilliant critique of the ideology of the bourgeois mind, which creates incentives both for radical democratic individualism and the necessary subjection under reason in general, which is always bigger than the limited individual rationality and is incorporated in the state. However, Foucault decides to interpret the differences between the German and French discourses in such a way, that he deems necessary a notion of historical-philosophical praxis which differs radically from the approaches of the western Marxism of the Frankfurt School, a new praxis “which has nothing to do with the philosophy of history or the history of philosophy” (Foucault 2007: 55). This new approach is precisely based on the radical contingency of the individual, where “one has to make one’s own history, as if through fiction” (Foucault 2007: 56). Of course, contingency cannot be positively realized as a real utopia, it follows historical developments and necessities. But insofar as the gaining of consciousness about the true character of these necessities is now seen as yet another technique of creating the surface of the subject so it can be cast into power in the first place, the contradiction between history and philosophy merely cancels itself out instead of developing, leaving nothing but the history as a simple fact. This is why to “de-subjectify the philosophical question by way of historical contents” (Foucault 2007: 56) means exactly to employ a radical historicism at the expense of any non-factual potentiality or logic. In this way Foucault’s discussion of the general topic of the dialectics of enlightenment (why does the movement towards individual use of rationality also produce collectivizing irrationality) gets highly problematic. It is his contradictory conflation of rationality and critique as both partner and adversary of governmentality at the same time and in the same instance, which is productive in the sense that it does open up the character of the subject as an effect. This comes at the prize of making it impossible to undertake inquiries about the formal character of the mode of production, which is suspected to produce this effect in the first place. Accordingly, this is also
why Foucault’s critics in the past have failed a lot: It was precisely the environment of an existential and humanistic Marxism which largely neglected economic and formal characters of capitalism in favor of a cultural-revolutionary attitude, in which structuralism could gain ground. The multiple criticisms which accused Foucault of being an active agent of the bourgeois class are therefore decidedly wrong. It was the weakness of materialist theory that sparked theoretical alternatives, not theoretical alternatives that toppled Marxism here.

We find the very same figure of thinking throughout the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*. It figures prominently in the critique of the repressive hypothesis. Here Foucault aims at the decoding of the complex of a “society that denounced the powers it exercises and promised to free itself from the very laws that made it function” (Foucault 1990: 8). Again, this statement lets us hope for an instructive critique of the special character of the form of bourgeois society, which exercises material forces that make it function at one place, and puts the critique of the same powers at another place where it is indeed free to denounce it in an ideological, false way which does not harm the working principle that stands at the first place. But this is just not what Foucault has in mind. His aim is not a critique of a double movement of a specific mode of production — a mode which brings about the need for the creation of a subject at the price of confining it to certain, false area but at the same time is creating the possibility to break the boundaries of this confinement. On the contrary, Foucault identifies these two movements as essentially the same. Ultimately, this is why he insists on the inadequacy of the repressive hypothesis: If generating the sexual subject and the creation of sexuality is immediately the same as the repression of that subject — if both movements are just sides to the same logic of governmentality — Foucault must acknowledge the repression of the subject as the very precondition for its formation.

An illustrative example of this contradiction is provided with the figure of the peasant Jouy. Foucault depicts Jouy as a victim of some kind of the “discursive explosion” (Foucault 1990: 17) on sexuality around him. As a person who used to have some sort of (as of his time not particularly unusual) sexual contacts with girls of his village, suddenly ‘sexuality’ happened and Jouy is read as a sex offender: The explosion of a social discourse on sexuality made it both possible and necessary to pathologize his sexual behavior as abnormal. Clearly, it is impossible to simply deduce this discursive explosion from the previously existing feudal arrangement of power. On the other hand, it is completely clear that the explosion could not have any particular effect if it was not at the same time intimately tied to the very same existing power structures. The social scandal around Jouy, the police lockup, the forced medical examinations could not have happened without the existing repressive orders of power. In a nutshell, discourse is nothing without material force — and of course not material force in a mere simplistic sense of linear causality, but as a sort of the specific arrangement of participation in different areas of social reproduction. On the other hand, material forces are nothing without symbolic representation. In order to lock somebody up, one must know the who and the why. Here we have a pattern of contradiction, of dilemma: Two things that are literally nothing without each other, but are nevertheless different things, impossible to reduce. Unfortunately, instead of developing this problem, Foucault dissolves it by simply claiming that discourse is a material reality in itself, denouncing the

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problem that the concrete situation of power always involves more than just discourse, that is the social as a whole, as a material totality.

There are similar things to be found in Foucault's theory on biopolitics, more specifically in his central argument about the paradigm shift between the idea of sovereign government on the one hand and the governmentality of discipline and control on the other (Foucault 2010: 319). Foucault says that since roundabout the 18th century there is a paradigm shift from theories on the state which start with the assumption of the necessary existence of a state — i.e. theories of sovereignty — and theories of liberalism that start with the question of whether and why it is necessary to have a state in the first place. Obviously, and Foucault does indeed see that, liberal theory does not really pose the question in an honest sense. Rather, they are designed to legitimize state rule by pretending to question state rule, regardless of whether or not they secretly reflect or know about their status.

But Foucault doesn’t see that it is not so much a shift in paradigm, but indeed much more of a dialectical unfolding, a continuity. It’s not the case that sovereign power is getting any less important. If anything, both sides, sovereignty and discipline/control, are getting more important as falling rates of profit intensify the degeneration of both production and consumption, exploitation and participation. Whether it is actually possible to resolve the conundrum of biopolitics by dialectical critique in one single thread will have to remain open for debate, but we think that any approach which cuts the connections first and then ties them back together will necessarily fail to recognize its inherent intermediation.

The Dialectical Challenge

What Foucault ultimately provides us with seems to be an implicit insight on the dialectical interdependency of material forces and discourse on the one hand, and a surprisingly vehement prioritization of the latter on the other hand. To provide us with a powerful example of how Foucault’s anti-dialectic point of view gets entangled in this not always delicate but at times pretty straightforward dependency, let us remind ourselves of the impressive images that were flooding social media during the London riots in 2011: High definition material of looting and pillaging, filmed by omnipresent security cameras — cameras which completely failed to provide the intimidation as soon as the police were driven out of the borough. Cameras which were degraded to powerless jokes, remnants of a futile attempt to discipline people which collapsed as soon as the actual, sovereign and material power of the police batons were gone.

In order to bring some light into this complex, we decided to revisit the general tendency of leftist academic inquiries between Marx and Foucault. In tracing this tendency back to its origins, at which there lies an unwarranted dissociation from a perspective on totality and ideology, we found some significant evidence for underlying necessity of basic questions of Historical Materialism, and further exemplified this necessity in three cases. Regarding emancipation, we found decidedly dialectical figures between rationality and emancipatory thinking. In respect to the formation of the subject, we too found a contradictory pattern of social imperatives. Regarding state and police, we saw the inadequacy of the figure of a paradigm shift for describing the birth of Biopolitics. Therefore we assume that this pattern
of productive contradictions or dialectical figures play a central and necessary role throughout Foucault’s thinking.

In this light, it seems like the configuration of neoliberalism in its most developed current form of biopolitics indeed does not pose a new challenge that necessarily calls for an alliance of Marx and Foucault. Much rather, we do face the same constellation in respect to its dialectical character. All of the productive contradictions that can be observed through a close reading of Foucault point us precisely back to the basic questions of Historical Materialism as the most sophisticated attempt to think the totality of the social in its specific historical constellation. To grasp this entity is essentially what we call the dialectical challenge that we are confronted with and to which Foucault’s discourse analysis only corresponds in an insufficient way. By means of his radical historicism, he was arguably right in criticizing Marxist epistemology for tending towards a totalization of its philosophical system, but he was throwing the baby out with the bathwater by neglecting not only the specific way of dealing with the dialectical challenge (as in structural Marxism), but the whole dialectics. Instead of overemphasizing the notion of totality, he stressed the totalization of historicity or ontological contingency. His attempt to reduce dialectics to nothing but a mere synthesis between liberalism and Machiavellism or in his own words as “the philosophical order’s, and perhaps the political order’s, way of colonizing this bitter and partisan discourse of basic warfare” (Foucault 1997: 59) has failed. Failed insofar as this attempt to promulgate the belief that dialectics is not located outside but within the power-full discourses of the past — which was supposed to be the justification and motivation for searching after something completely new and different — is still haunted by dialectical figures of thought.

Ultimately, such impossible dissolutions of the dialectical intermediation necessarily end in a deadlock, in one (totalitarian) or the other (historicist) way. Since the dialectical contradiction is still at the heart of social phenomena — even if Foucault tried so hard to get rid of it — the challenge of social theory is to become dialectical again. Only in this sense, and not because of political trench wars that have long been fought or, worse yet, in order to produce some false radical anachronism, do we recommend the return to materialism. Engaging Foucault today therefore can neither mean to antagonize him as theoretically standing on conservative or even neoliberal political grounds,3 nor can we simply synthesize his radical different thought into materialism. The only possible alliance that appears from this point is that of a unity in contradiction to which the symptomatic reading of Foucault as well as materialist approaches necessarily point us. Engaging Foucault thus means taking on the implicit challenge his theory is confronting us with today, a challenge which is and always has been a dialectical one.

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3. The fact that this form of criticism is mostly put forward by proponents of the philosophical legitimation of western European social democracy, which is arguably the biggest agent of conservative neoliberal capitalism today, should already make us sufficiently skeptical of this narrative.


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Utopia And The Archive. Some Reflections On Archaeology Of Knowledge And The Utopian Thought

1. What are we talking about when we talk about Utopia?

It’s not a simple task to define, synthetically, what utopia is.\(^1\) The variability of the definitions given in time, according to different perspectives and conceptions, is itself one of the main characteristics of a singular tradition of thought. During a long and complex debate, among the most important scholars the Manuels observed that the historical constellations of the western utopian thought are many and in constant motion (Manuel, Manuel 1982); others, like Koselleck (2009), pointed to the presence of a complex cultural tradition behind the concept and to the diversity of receptions at the level of national cultural narratives as one of the main reasons that lead to the continuing difficulties to grasp the meanings.

As for the definition we will soon present, there are two which are very relevant. The first one has been proposed by Bronislaw Baczko. In one of his considerable essays dedicated to this issue, he noted that the concept of utopia presents a unique situation to the scholar. On the one hand there is a possibility, certainly rare in the case of socio-cultural phenomena, to identify with certainty its date of birth which coincides precisely with the publication of More’s “truly golden booklet”: a sort of *imprimatur* of a literary genre from a certain work and a certain author. But, on the other hand, the concept of utopia escaped quickly to its historically determined birth to become a paradigm of the social imaginary – this is the point to underline – causing a proliferation of utopian stories that transcend the original model (Baczko 1981: 869).

The second definition has been proposed in more recent times by Ruth Levitas. Utopia is fundamentally a concept to study addressing content, form and, especially, function; it is considered above the literary form in an interdisciplinary perspective. Following the seminal lesson of Ernst Bloch, which we will discuss later, Levitas stresses that "the concept itself is an ideological battleground" (Levitas 2011: 4), however, considering the variability in time of its content, form and function, there is an element that remains constant: the desire for a better way of being and living.

\(^1\) The paper presents and develops some of the critical results illustrated in Altobelli 2012.
Thus on the basis of assumptions like that, in a philosophical and sociological approach, at first it is possible to consider utopia as the name of a peculiar tradition of thinking which begins with the homonymous book of Thomas More (1516) and that develops a reflection in time, more often a representation of the ideal societies in a multiplicity of forms, contents and functions. Contrary to this background it is possible to indicate some features that we consider as fundamental of utopian thinking and that delineate the profile and accompany the progress in time. Here, these recurring characteristics, although not constant, are not only taken from romances and other literary forms (primary literature), but also from the critical literature on the subject since the twentieth century onwards (secondary literature).

From an epistemological perspective and considering it as a real form of thinking that some scholars have defined in a similar way to the scientific one and mostly to the hypothetical-deductive one (Ruyer 1988), we can indicate some of its basic characteristics.

1. Relation with time and space

A recurrent issue, that involves reflection on tradition of utopian thinking, is that of the relationship between the ideal community and the categories of space and time so that, according to some authors, “the primary characteristic of utopia is its nonexistence combined with a topos? a location in time and space? to give verisimilitude“ (Claeys, Sargent 1999: 1). Utopian stories always put at the centre of representations the notions of space and time. It can be u-topia, good-place, non-place, other-space, outer-space etc.; and it can also or mainly be u-chronia, future, alternative presents, alternative pasts etc.

These relations, conceptions and representations of space and time, far from being extrinsic characteristics related to issues of a literary genre, highlight that they are constitutive parts of the structure of the utopian thought. Louis Marin has observed in that sense:

“La force critique de l’utopie découle, d’une part, de la projection (métaphorique) de la réalité donnée dans un “ailleurs” in-situable dans le temps historique ou l’espace géographique et, d’autre part, du déplacement (métonymique), c’est-à-dire de l’accentuation différente de la réalité exprimée, de l’articulation nouvelle qu’elle donne au modèle analogique que la métaphore utopique a permis de produire.”

(Marin 1973: 249)

2. Inclusive and reflexive mode

Utopian thought transcends its own boundaries both in forms and in contents and tends to incorporate in its tradition also the criticism and, often, the utopian studies. Ernst Bloch’s monumental The Principle of Hope, published in 1954 in German, according this point of view, is an exemplary work and somehow unattainable because it offers both an original theory and a recognition of the utopian manifestations in history (Bloch 1986).

Not only, but utopian thought can contemplate a reflection on its scopes and limits and uses them also as a content for new utopias, sometimes becoming a meta-utopia. You can
find examples in different works from different fields: city planning (e.g. Friedman 2003), science fiction (e.g. Le Guin 1974), political thought (e.g. Nozick 1999).

3. Binary matrix

This is *par excellence* the structural element of a tradition of thought that is born and is organized in the opposition, explicitly or implicitly, of an ideal society to the real society. The speculum *real society – ideal society, history – imaginary, as is – as if*, goes on until the hermeneutic duplicity of the critics on utopias. In other words, following some of the most important critical operations, utopia would be a phenomenon that can be defined and understood adequately only if placed in a bipolar conceptual connection, only if structurally seen as an alternative or in conjunction with another phenomenon that is antithetical or similar. Among many scholar (e.g. Mumford 1922, Ruyer 1988, Trousson 1992, Mannheim 1954,), it is interesting the position taken by Frederic Jameson intended to stress a paradoxical statute:

“It is a paradox that a form so absolutely dependent on historical circumstance (it flourishes only in specific conditions and on certain historical occasions) should give the appearance of being supremely ahistorical; that a form which inevitably arouses political passions should seem to avoid or to abolish the political altogether; and that a text so uniquely dependent on the caprice and opinion of individual social dreamer should find itself disarmed in the face of individual agency and inaugural action.”

(Jameson 2005: 37).

2. Foucauldian paths within the utopian thought

There is a passage in *The Order of Things* in which Foucault indicated two general types of utopias related to the epistemic articulations of the classic and modern forms of knowledge. In the classical thought,

Utopia functioned rather as a fantasy of origins: this was because the freshness of the world had to provide the ideal unfolding of a table in which everything would be present and in its proper place, with its adjacencies, its peculiar differences, and its immediate equivalences; in this primal light, representations could not yet have been separated from the living, sharp, perceptible presence of what they represent (Foucault 2005: 285-286).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the general epistemic framework mutates coming in light “new arrangement of knowledge [...] which accommodated simultaneously the historicity of economics”, “the finitude of human existence” and “the fulfillment of an end to History – whether in the form of an indefinite deceleration or in that of a radical reversal” (Foucault 2005: 285). New epistemic frameworks appear founded on “series”, on “sequential connection”, on the iteration of data and knowledge acquired from time to time by the sciences. Changes accordingly the general configuration of the utopias:
In the nineteenth century, the Utopia is concerned with the final decline of time rather than with its morning: this is because knowledge is no longer constituted in the form of a table but in that of a series, of sequential connection, and of development: when, with the promised evening, the shadow of the dénouement comes, the slow erosion or violent eruption of History will cause man’s anthropological truth to spring forth in its stony immobility; calendar time will be able to continue; but it will be, as it were, void, for historicity will have been superimposed exactly upon the human essence. The flow of development, with all its resources of drama, oblivion, alienation, will be held within an anthropological finitude which finds in them, in turn, its own illuminated expression. Finitude, with its truth, is posited in time; and time is therefore finite. The great dream of an end to History is the Utopia of causal systems of thought, just as the dream of the world’s beginnings was the Utopia of the classifying systems of thought (Foucault 2005: 286).

The temporalization of utopias and the affirmation of a prominent “uchronic” dimension, that it can be seen in most utopian works from the end of the eighteenth century from Mercier’s L’an deux mille quatre cent quarante: rêves s’il en fût jamais (1770), come therefore from a changed general epistemic framework that reflects the social, political, cultural and economic changes of the time. The historical development, marked by the idea of progress, in the nineteenth century began to be thought of as an impetuous and unstoppable process also due to the increasing centrality gradually assumed by science and technology. The utopia acquires a character of deferral than today and, by Mercier onward, many formulations in the ideal society are conceived only in the distant future in which the space of the realization tends to increase up to coincide with the world: the island of More will be supplanted by the world federation of nations in Bellamy (1888) or by the system of national blocs opposing in Orwell (1949).

Foucault seems to suggest, however, that this second type of utopia, not unlike the one that replaces or joins, competing with the inevitable uncertainty arising from representations placed in a distant time, shall enlist anthropological truths that are fundamental in order to give a coherent meaning to the images presented. In the words of the philosopher, the “dream of origins” of the “classic” utopias proves to be mirror of “reverie of an end of history” of the modern utopias and the systems of thought, “classifier” and “causal”, on which they are based, find themselves united in a common matrix formed by the consideration of the “finiteness” of man as such.

This last point reminds us that in the ratio of all forms of utopia there is a reference, express or implied, to the human nature, which is always postulated as a given reality – until you reach the pretension to edit or even “create” it – which claims to stand every time as a truth from a metahistorical order, when instead it is nothing but a historically determined outcome, a conception constantly changing and therefore destined to escape any conclusive definition. It is a significant area of investigation that the utopian thinking articulates in relation to the conceptions of time and history, which determines and presupposes in original ways, and constitutes, even in this respect, a decisive and peculiar characteristic.

From the point of view of this article, this can be considered as the background of a theory of utopian thinking that we can now develop with a direct reference to Archaeology.
3. The Archaeology of Knowledge in order to understand the utopian thought

Archaeology is one of the works with the highest rate of theoretical production in Foucault’s works. It constitutes a systematization of the methodology used in the early works, History of Madness, the Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things, but also raises the stakes and opens wider issues in the theory and practice of historical research. Among the different concepts here proposed, the two of statement and archive have a deep importance for our hypothesis.

The statement is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they “make sense”, according to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation (oral or written).

(Foucault 1972: 86-87).²

While the archive is defined, fundamentally, as “the general system of the formation and transformation of statements” (Foucault 1972: 130). Although Foucault doesn’t give a precise and unique definition, he stresses two characteristics: it is the complex of the rules that governs the statements – the basic unit for his archaeology of knowledge; and it is the whole of the statements produced in a defined socio-cultural context.

In both sides of the definition, the archive is a place of organization, diffusion and dispersion of information in different configurations of knowledge. The main problem the archive poses us is the uncontrollable proliferation of the information, a critical mass that menaces, with its weight and extension both synchronically and diachronically, the dream of a total control over it. In that sense archivist is the name for a particular figure of someone that is capable of tracing the topographic lines of the archive. The archaeologist, that can be the same archivist but also another subject, is the name of the scholar Foucault indicates to us, who is capable of excavating in the matter of human language and its written manifestations under the stratification of time and history. For the archaeologist-archivist, the archive represents the undefeatable manifestation of the “status quo” in the sense of “thus it has been”: a sort of “memento” of the progression of the time in ways that appear to have the strength of a monolithic and unchangeable picture.

Silent monumenta.

Under this perspective, the Archaeology describes also an impotence: the archaeological description is description of a factum in a petrified datum.³

2. In Deleuze’s interpretation, the statement has to be intended as a diagonal that permits to define the statements in relation with 3 spaces: collateral (relations with other statements), correlative (relations with their subjects, objects and concepts) and complementary (discursive relations with non discursive fields) (Deleuze 1988).

3. If we would talk in Derrida’s terms, the Archaeology exposes the archive with respect of its arcontic principle: manifestation of origins and power (Derrida 1996).
In this context it is interesting what Foucault writes at the end of the chapter *The historical a priori and the archive* in a few pages that constitute one the best parts of the book. In particular, Foucault insists on noting that the archive is not accessible in its totality:

> On the other hand, it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say – and to itself, the object of our discourse – its modes of appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity, and disappearance.

(Foucault 1972: 130)

This means paradoxically that the archaeologist-archivist, in other words the subject, cannot access the archive from which he is speaking. He can look back to the archive only by placing himself in a posteriority that must always exceed the size of the archive of his present, although it is through it archaeology can emerge.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 1**

In that sense Foucault can say that:

> The analysis of the archive, then, involves a privileged region: at once close to us, and different from our present existence, it is the border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness; it is that which, outside ourselves, delimits us. The description of the archive deploys its possibilities (and the mastery of its possibilities) on the basis of the very discourses that have just ceased to be ours; its threshold of existence is established by the discontinuity that separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that which falls outside our discursive practice; it begins with the outside of our own language (*langage*); its locus is the gap between our own discursive practices

(Foucault 1972: 130-131).

Therefore the archive is on the edge of the current knowledge: it is knowable and researchable; it is possible to “walk through” it, but only by a distance from now. Coherent with its proper nature, the archive manifests the condition of possibility of the statements, properly the “historical a priori”, only after that they are have come about, only after they have been expressed. There is no possibility of prediction, anticipation, forecast, or maybe only in a statistical way, but it does not seem to be interesting for Foucault. For the philos-
opher the problem remains mainly the way in which to comprehend deeply the past and to give it a sense that can play actively a role in the political scenario of contemporaneity.

Returning now to the topic of this essay, we can try to give a more detailed definition of utopian thinking. As we have said, from a general point of view, the tradition of utopian thought seems to be able to articulate a reflection on man and society in a way both programmatic and critic, mostly presenting ideal societies as alternatives to the existing ones; but this reflection is also crossed intimately, even in its most severe formulations, from a visionary and fantastic vein. The obviousness of this consideration may appear diminished if we consider the fact that the tradition, precisely in terms of these characteristics, can be read in the sense of the *Archaeology* as a form of knowledge about society and man who anticipates or preludes or announces the birth and the affirmation of the humanities and social sciences.

The hypothesis must be understood not in a merely suggestive sense, obviously, but calibrated on a line of interpretation that reworks some of Michel Foucault’s observations. If it is legitimate to sustain, with effective expression, that each book is “a node within a network” (Foucault 1972: 23); and if by “network” we can understand the organization and the order that figures and elements, belonging to different discursive fields, take in the codes of a culture in a synchronic and diachronic perspective (Foucault 2005: XXI); then the *Utopia* of More has to be considered as a node within an epistemic network. And this node witnesses the emergence of a discourse on society and on human being that, while reconnecting to forms of previous knowledge and despite of remarkable characters for analytical ability, will never come to consolidate itself in a scientific form of knowledge in the modern sense of the term.

Far from defining methods of investigation, unable to navigate in terms of the real society except in a sense argumentative, critical and oppositional, the utopian discourse seems to function only by remaining below the threshold of a scientific argument that will instead be taken up from the humanities and social sciences. And therefore it will never become a “knowledge” in Foucault’s sense, that is a set of speeches on which disciplines and power relations can be articulated (Foucault 1978a; 1978b, 2005): it will always be confined to the domain of fantasy, literature and abstract thinking.

Following Foucault, we may add that in the tradition of utopian thought we find:

1. System of main rules of formation and transformation of the statements (the *archive*): the characteristics mentioned above (relation with time and space, inclusive and reflexive mode, binary matrix) constitute the complex of the most important and main rules.

2. System of main statements: e.g. abolition of money and abolition of private property (the most recurrent theme from More onward).

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4. “Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression” (Foucault 2005: XXI).
3. System of secondary statements, thematic, instrumental, etc.: e.g. ectogenesis (see Campanella 2008, Haldane 1924), forms of political organization (see Harrington 1656, Bellamy 1888), role of science and technology (see Bacon 1626, Wells 1895), and so on.

4. System of secondary rules of formation and transformation of the statements (the archive): crossover of the discursive boundaries, freedom of forms of expression, use of systems of statements pertaining to other discursive formations (e.g. science-fiction, humanities, social sciences, etc.), and so on.

The result is a particular discourse, very coherent around a core of recurrent and transforming statements, in which we find all types of literary forms: novels, tractates, essays, studies, history, literary voyages, philosophical works, etc.

Two observations must be made here. On the one hand it can been noted that utopia is a knowledge generally in a negative relation with reality, while in general Foucault’s concept of knowledge is in a positive relation with the powers. The Utopia of More is very clear: the Utopia has its negative correlative in his contemporary England. The relationship is negative because the Utopia does not exist except as a fiction and because it manifests a negative critique of England.

Centuries later, the Bentham’s Panopticon, if understood as a form of utopia, will be, however, in a positive relationship with the architecture of prisons that put it into practice. In this case there is a positive co-implication in the sense that a utopian image is carried out in the historical reality.

On the other hand, taking into account the thesis of Mannheim (1954), utopian thinking is a tradition that is always linked to particular historical contexts and appears under certain social forces. It is, in other words, a form of ideology of emerging groups that may or may not win their match on the stage of history. This explains why at certain times there is a massive bloom of utopias, while in other periods much less; or why there are stronger utopian traditions in certain countries and less or non-existent in others. In an archaeological study of the utopian thought this must be considered as a key variable in the configuration of the utopian knowledge.

4. Controlling the archive: a dystopian model

The foucauldian theorization can be used to understand the dystopian model of Orwell’s masterpiece Nineteen Eighty-Four. In that novel we see that the control of the archive by the power is widely declared: the strength of the power consists precisely in the faculty to define the horizon of thinking of the citizens by manipulating the entire archive of the statements in advance.

WAR IS PEACE – FREEDOM IS SLAVERY – IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH – 2+2=5, are only a few of a complex rebuilding of the language from the lexicon to syntaxes to the structures of the phrases. It is the Principle of Newspeak, the official language of Oceania: “The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and
mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible” (Orwell 1949: 210). It is possible to represent this configuration in that way:

![Diagram of Archive (past and present) and The Power over Time]

**Fig. 2**

Orwell understood the crucial role of the structures of language in defining the reality and it is not surprising that his fiction anticipates powerfully the foucauldian theorization on this point.

It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought — that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc — should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meaning and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods. This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meaning whatever (Orwell 1949: 210).

To control the mind signifies to control the language in its basic units: word and statements.

To give a single example – The word free still existed in Newspeak, but could only be used in such statements as “The dog is free from lice” or “This field is free from weeds.” It could not be used in its old sense of “politically free” or “intellectually free”, since political and intellectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless. [...] Newspeak was designed not to extend but to diminish the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum (Orwell 1949: 210).

Conversely the unknowability of archive is the condition for freedom and social change: a point both Orwell and Foucault had fully understood by addressing the dimension of the present articulation of speech, what we have called “archive of the present”, as a strategic locus for the power and the resistance, for the obedience and the creativity. The abolition of the intermediate space-time between the archive and the subject is the fundamental requisite of Orwell’s power: an effective description of the functioning terms of the historical totalitarian regimes. The dream of control of the archive, and consequently of reality, in a still present configures a hermeneutics of the present as an imprisoned time.
5. Into the “border of time”: a hypothesis for the utopian thought

Starting from the correspondence with the work of Orwell, the archaeological approach to utopian thinking permits to develop a more general hypothesis. Given that the archive is the general system of the formation and transformation of statements; that it cannot be described in its totality; and that in its presence it is unavoidable; then the utopian thinking, as we have seen, operating on the categories of space and time, in an inclusive and reflexive mode and within a dualist matrix, seems to work precisely in that “border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness” (Foucault 1972: 130), achieving to express critical visions and opening up new possibilities in the reality.

The functioning of utopian thinking is located in the transit area, layering, storage, non-coincidence between the time-now in which you pronounce a statement and the settling time of the archive. In that area lies not only the operation of utopian thinking, but everything related to the invention, creation, fantasy and imagination: the artistic and literary work, the philosophical thought, the scientific research. In a word: the faculty of language itself.

It is a different way of resuming Ruyer’s thesis on “un mode utopique, qu’il est possible de définir comme exercice mental sur le possible latéraux“ (Ruyer 1988: 9) represented by the utopian thinking. It is the place where you give renewal and invention that, otherwise, seen from the point of view of the archive, it would not even be able to conceive: it is the place of cultural dynamism and social change. In that sense the description of the archive is valid for our diagnosis. Not because it would enable us to draw up a table of our distinctive features, and to sketch out in advance the face that we will have in the future. But it deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates that temporal identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history; it breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies; and where anthropological thought once questioned man’s being or subjectivity, it now bursts open the other, and the outside. In this sense, the diagnosis does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks. That difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and make” (Foucault 1972: 131).

We may try to represent this idea in the following image:
Foucault may have here indicated a problem area that has not been then continued to follow in his works: the problem of the ontology of language. Compared to other thinkers, Foucault has accurately recognized and given to this issue a social and historical location. Therein lies a point of merit and therein lies the meaning of a philosophical research strongly anchored and implicated in the human sciences.

In that sense Foucault’s approach has enabled us to put the problem in historical rather than phenomenological terms. For access to the archive is barred in every situation and context: it is a fundamental anthropological fact that could be interpreted in terms of unconscious or biological structures, but the attention is instead always focused to that speech, in that context, about that specific archive. In this perspective the historical a priori, defining procedurally the conditions of formation of the archive, “is not a condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for statements”:

“It is not a question of rediscovering what might legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence with others, the specific form of their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, become transformed, and disappear. An a priori not of truths that might never be said, or really given to experience; but the a priori of a history that is given, since it is that of things actually said.”

(Foucault 1972: 127).

The utopian discourse falls exactly in the limits defined by the archive between the historical a priori and the historical realization of statements. In the canonical model of More, book I is devoted to a critique of the conditions of England of the time. It was written after the book II where he describes the kingdom of Utopia. The book wholly considered is the image of the archives of England of his time More recalls, as an archaeologist of the present, to clear up the definition of the world that is not there.

In other studies of the Sixties Foucault addressed the same problem from the side of literature, studying, among others, two writers particularly significant in this respect.
In his study on the work of Raymond Roussel we read that the poet has “mastered all the imperceptible and fragmentary play of chance” by totally removing all that is random at the origin of everything that has speech, on that silent axis where the possibilities of language take shape. Chance does not speak essentially through words nor can it be seen in their convolution. It is the eruption of language, its sudden appearance: it’s the reserve from which the words flow, this absolute distance of language from itself, which makes it speak. It’s not a night a twinkle with stars, an illuminated sleep, nor a drowsy vigil. It is the very edge of consciousness. It shows that at the moment of speaking the words are already there, while before speaking there was nothing. Short of awakening, there is no consciousness. But at daybreak the night lies before us, shattered into obstinate fragments through which we must make our way.

The only serious element of chance in language does not occur in its internal encounters, but in those at the source. These occurrences, both within language and external to it, form its first limitation.

(Foucault 2004: 41).

In The Thought of the Outside, relating to Maurice Blanchot’s work, we read at the end:

Language – in its attentive and forgetful being, with its power of dissimulation that effaces every determinate meaning and even the existence of the speaker, in the gray neutrality that constitutes the essential hiding place of all being and thereby frees the space of the image – is neither truth nor time, neither eternity nor man; it is instead the always undone form of the outside. It places the origin in contact with death, or rather brings them both to light in the flash of their infinite oscillation – a momentary contact in a boundless space. The pure outside of the origin, if that is indeed what language is eager to greet, never solidifies into a penetrable and immobile positivity; and the perpetually rebegun outside of death, although carried toward the light by the essential forgetting of language, never sets the limit at which truth would finally begin to take shape. They immediately flip sides. The origin takes on the transparency of the endless; death opens interminably onto the repetition of the beginning. And what language is (not what it means, not the form in which it says what it means), what language is in its being, is that softest of voices, that nearly imperceptible retreat, that weakness deep inside and surrounding every thing and every face – what bathes the belated effort of the origin and the dawn like erosion of death in the same neutral light, at once day and night. Orpheus’s murderous forgetting, Ulysses’ wait in chains, are the very being of language.

(Foucault 1998: 168).

In both the cases Foucault focused the attention on the margins of the expression, on the void in which a word is said, a statement is expressed, on the mystery of a literature able to force the limits of the language and, playing on the razor’s blade of the non-sense, create new languages by itself.

6. Engaging Foucault for the archaeologies of the future
We have seen that the definition of the archive by Foucault opens up fields of reflexion that do not exhaust the problems evocated. What is lacking, in fact, is a definition of what we have called “archive of the present”: but it is not easy to define it for its avoidance and unreachability. Nevertheless we may suggest some possible trajectories for a comprehension of the problem, also because in our hypothesis we have given to the “archive of the present” a central role for the manifestation of the utopian thinking: trajectories that will be developed in other occasions.

Interestingly, Fredric Jameson in one of his most famous book has used the term archaeology in the title: *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions* (2005). But following Foucault, if you can’t make an archaeology of the present, how could you make it for the future? It seems to be contradictory in terms.

To understand the meaning of the use of the concept in its proper context, we have to consider that the scholar introduced it in a previous study, *A Singular Modernity. Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (2002), at the very end of the book, calling into question Walter Benjamin and Ezra Pound:

Radical alternatives, systemic transformations, cannot be theorized or even imagined within the conceptual field governed by the word “modern”. This is probably the case with the notion of capitalism as well: but if I recommend the experimental procedure of substituting capitalism for modernity in all the context in which the latter appears, this is a therapeutic rather than a dogmatic recommendation, designed to exclude old problems (and to produce new and more interesting ones). What we really need is a wholesale displacement of the thematics of modernity by the desire called Utopia. We need to combine a Poundian mission to identify Utopian tendencies with a Benjaminian geography of their sources and a gauging of their pressure at what are now multiple sea levels. Ontologies of the present demand archaeologies of the future, not forecasts of the past (Jameson 2002: 215).

The context is that of a critical vision that seeks new conceptual tools not only to understand the real and its categories, but also to break the boundaries of the modernity. The possibility of an archaeology of the future depends upon the tensions cast by utopian desire on the structure of reality: it is “the desire for a better way of being and living” proposed by Levitas (2011) as an inherent characteristics of the utopian thought of which we spoke at the beginning. There is a shift in the problem we have addressed: the question turns political, but maybe it has always been wholly political.

It is a matter of discussion if we have to consider utopia in the area of politics (e.g. in terms of political thought, political philosophy, cultural critics, and/or in terms of political enterprises, relations between utopia and the power, revolution, changes in the order of things, etc.), but in any case politics is always a dimension of the utopian issue that you can take in account in different degrees. The fact is that utopia has been, is and will always be a manifestation of a function: an orientation towards the reality at least in the form of a criticism of the existing, also using negative and dystopian configurations, if not with the declared intention of proposing a change in the state of things. Only in this particular, but clear perspective can we try to follow for a while a difficult and original path that links Foucault to Benjamin and Bloch via Jameson.
The reference to Walter Benjamin is necessary not only for it is explicit in Jameson, but in a wider sense: it recalls the famous affirmation that was included as a variation at the end of the *Theses on the Philosophy of History*.

The soothsayers who found out from time what it had in store certainly did not experience time as either homogeneous or empty. Anyone who keeps this in mind will perhaps get an idea of how past times were experienced in remembrance-namely, in just the same way. We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogenous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter (Benjamin 1969: 264).

As is widely known, the unknowability of the present takes in Benjamin the picture of the “Angelus Novus”:

"His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and mage whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress”

(Benjamin 1969: 257-258).

It is certainly a suggestion that need a great care and attention, but the image of the *Angelus Novus* recalls powerfully the archivist-archaeologist in his operation of decoding the history. Exactly like him, also the archivist-archaeologist cannot control the present either, cannot reside in his own contemporaneity, but only comprehend *a posteriori* what has happened, and sometimes what *just* happened.

The second reference is to Bloch’s concept “not yet”: this crucial and complex concept derives from the non-adherence of the subject to himself, from the distance or the difference that separates the subject from his own expression. In *The Spirit of Utopia* Bloch wrote for example:

Too Near
I am by my self.
That I move, that I speak: is not there. Only immediately afterward can I hold it up in front of me. Ourselves within: while we live, we do not see it; we trickle away. What really happened there, then, what we really were there, refuses to coincide with what we can really experience. It is not what one is, and certainly not what one means.

(Bloch 2000: 7)
In his reflexion, the unknowability of the present is founded in the structure of the experience of the self and it communicates with the temporal structure of the “not yet” defined as something that is always about to emerge both to the individual conscience and to the history and society. Exactly here lies the feeling of hope as an utopian impulse to change the existent.

Both Benjamin and Bloch, and then Jameson, underline in different ways the present’s utopian potential and all these conceptions presuppose a locus for the displacement of these potentialities that ultimately coincides also with the limit of the language, namely the archive and its unknowability in a Foucauldian sense, in “a conception of the present as the ?time of the now? which is shot through with chips of Messianic time” (Benjamin 1969: 263).5

These harsh and difficult paths lead us to an original and still-to-finish concept of “messianism”: but is there something else which is more distant from Foucault than the idea of messianism?

Nevertheless engaging foucauldian philosophy to conceive utopian thought as a secular messianism could be a political project that challenges the ordinary regimes of production of truths.

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5. About the connections between Bloch and Benjamin and the utopian issues see Kaufmann 2009.


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I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and universalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of power, who incessantly displaces himself, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the present.

(Foucault, 1996a: 225)

What relationship does, or can, the academic have to herself, today? To what extent can one’s relationship to one self be stylised as a site of resistance in the contemporary university? In this paper, I seek to begin to respond to these questions. I do so, first, through a connective reading of Michel Foucault’s work on (neoliberal) governmentality and his later work on the care of the self. Whilst such a connection was drawn explicitly on a number of occasions by Foucault in lectures and interviews, it is understated in the Foucauldian literature, and at times distinguished by researchers working either on governmentality studies or on his ‘care of the self’. Whilst I do not reject the importance of singular focus in either of these fields, I nonetheless feel that work at their intersection can be fruitful.

More specifically, in this connective reading, I argue that the academic, today – and my focus for this paper’s purposes will be, admittedly, UK-centric - is incentivised to internalise the principles of, and self-govern according to, neoliberal governmentality. Through such self-government, the academic’s everyday practice of ‘knowledge production’, ‘skill transfer’, etcetera, is today in the service of neoliberal governmentality. I cite two examples on this: academic writing and practices of networking. Pivoting on these two examples, I will then suggest and defend two practices of resistance available to the academic today under

1. I would like to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson for his support and enthusiasm from the early stages of this paper, and his feedback which vastly improved and focused it. Of course, I extend my gratitude to the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade, the organisers of the Engaging Foucault conference in December 2014, for giving me the opportunity to present this research. From my fellow panel members in their talks, audience members with their questions, and fellow delegates in our conversations, I received probing feedback and invaluable encouragement.
2. Indeed, important and interesting work is being pursued in each area independently. For example: Death’s (2010) work on Foucault and global protest. Ansell-Pearson’s (2014) work on Nietzsche, Foucault, and the care of the self hints towards this intersection, as does Thompson’s (2003) suggestion that self-formation forms a distinct model of resistance in Foucault.
neoliberal governmentality: writing (again) and friendship. In §1, I pursue this connective reading, before considering writing in §2, and friendship in §3.

I argue that writing and friendship open up the possibility of resistive and transformational practices of subjectivation. Both practices contain a ‘double movement’ comprising (1) the subject’s refusal of objectification in the neoliberal regime of truth; and (2) a transformative and experimental transfiguration of the self through those practices. I insist on both (1) and (2). I do so because much literature discussing Foucault’s work on resistance will situate it as a mere non-productive corollary of ‘power’, and so, speaking generally, resistance becomes situated in a power-resistance (negative) dialectic. So put, all one could do in a power-resistance dialectic is ‘say no’ to governmentality. Nothing to me seems further from the Foucault drawn, and which I draw in this essay, between his work on governmentality and his work on the care of the self. Bernauer (1988: 71, my alterations, my emphasis) captures this well:

Foucault’s notion of self-formation is always in the context of a struggle for freedom within a historical situation. [This self becomes autonomous] only through a struggle with and a stylizing or adaptation of those concrete possibilities which present themselves as invitations for a practice of liberty. Foucault’s employment of aesthetic terms points to the power which [his] agonism has for an ecstatic art, for leaving itself behind in transgressing the prisons of a particular historical determination and for creating a new relation to the event and, thus, self.

This ecstatic component is the reason why I insist on both (1) and (2), enabling the historical situatedness of all resistance, but allowing for a (non-negative) ecstatic component which enables or produces transformation.³ Allow me now, then, to turn to this connective reading itself.

§1

§1.1 Governmentality as a Technology of Power...

In 1977-78 and 1978-79, Foucault’s lecture courses became devoted to the exploration of ‘techniques’ of liberal government. While his then recently published Discipline and Punish (1991a) (in 1975) devoted itself to the operationalisation of disciplinary power in institutional contexts, in sites of enclosure (prisons, schools, the army), his work on liberal (and neoliberal) governmentality was centred on something different: on government at a distance. Governmentality is exercised on the possible field of action of the subject; it is the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1994a: 237, my translation). Foucault’s analytics of governmentality, then, is devoted to uncovering the operationalisation of power outside of institutions of enclosure. So, the move was from the study of the intense regulation of behaviour in disciplinary institutions, to the study of a mode of power that governed through freedom.⁴ Governmentality governs not through injunctions or orders, but through


4. Governmentality governs not through injunctions or orders, but through...
producing a field of action with certain incentive structures. As Jason Read notes: ‘The state [of governmentality] channels flows of interest and desire by making desirable activities inexpensive and undesirable activities costly, counting on the fact that subjects would calculate their interests’ (2010: 6). Governmentality produces a space of freedom for subjects through governing their incentive structures in order that they will be induced to make ‘optimal’ decisions. What constitutes an optimal decision is relative to the particular regime of truth that governmentality utilises: statistical and economic knowledge (2010: 12-13; 46; 66-67). Taking neoliberal governmentality as our example, Foucault notes:

“[Neoliberal governmentality] has to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth. Basically, it has to intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market.”

(Foucault 2010: 145)

Neoliberal governmentality governs the incentive structure of subjects in such a way that subjects are encouraged to govern themselves as competitive and entrepreneurial sites of human capital, as, that is, sites of continuous production and continuous self-investment. In governing the subject as a site of human capital, we can say that that neoliberal governmentality objectivises the subject as a site of human capital. We can say that the ideal subject of neoliberal governmentality is the subject who self-governs herself as a site of human capital.

§1.2 …and a Technology of the Self

This subject, the ideal subject of neoliberal governmentality, who governs herself as a competitive and entrepreneurial site of human capital, is one, then, that objectivises herself in neoliberal governmentality’s regime of truth. This subject is governed through her self-government according to the neoliberal regime of truth. She is one who practices neoliberal governmentality upon herself. A motif that runs through much of Foucault’s work on relationships of power is that the naturalisation of power is a key factor in its perpetuation; or, in other words, that power tends to efface its operational mechanisms:

“[P]ower is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. Would power be

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4. In this way, it seems to me possible to read Foucault’s work on governmentality alongside Deleuze’s Postscript on the Societies of Control (1992).

5. I will not be able to explore these epistemic instruments more fully here. The clearest examples we can draw upon are GDP, inflation and employment rates. Governmentality, this is to say, governs in such a way that individual subjects will make decisions that are most likely to impact upon these figures in ‘positive’ ways. In this way, these figures can function as a measure of how ‘praiseworthy’ the economic conduct of a given population is, and an individual’s contribution (or lack thereof) to these figures is likewise figured as a barometer of praiseworthy or blameworthy conduct.

6. The theory of human capital was an innovative approach to the subject in post-WWII economic theory, particularly in the Chicago School of Economics. See: Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964).

7. To draw this out in terms of a comparative example, this mode of objectivisation in neoliberal governmentality is distinct from the mode of objectivisation we might see under liberal governmentality, related to the distinction between liberal and neoliberal models of the individual. See: Besley and Peters (2007: 18).
accepted if it were entirely cynical? For it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensible to its operation. Not only because power imposes secrecy on those whom it dominates, but because it is perhaps just as indispensible to the latter: would they accept it if they did not see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom – however slight – intact?”

(Foucault 1988: 86)

Transposing this thought onto our consideration of governmentality, we can say that governmentality operates most effectively when its internalisation is treated as a practice of freedom, or when a subject internalises its regime of truth as her own. In other words: a technology of power operates most effectively when the subject practices it as a technology of the self.

It is on this point that the connective reading I am forwarding becomes sharper. As Foucault noted in an unpublished lecture, an analytics of governmentality is an analytics of ‘the surface of contact on which the way of conducting individuals and the way they conduct themselves are intertwined’ (2005: 548). In his famous book length study of Foucault, Deleuze, too, captures this theme when he notes that ‘the theme which has always haunted Foucault is that of the double [which is] an interiorization of the outside’ (1995: 97-98). In short: governmentality’s operation and success is inseparable from the types of relationships that subject’s have to themselves and their conduct.

It is with this take on Foucault’s analytics of governmentality that we can clearly establish the prescience, and indeed, intense continuation, of his apparent ‘shift’ to the ‘care of the self’ in his later lecture courses. These two themes form a thread united by the subject’s constitution through certain practices, games of truth and relationship to themselves. As I noted at the top of this paper, this connective reading is one Foucault himself emphasised. For example, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject:

[If we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self [...] In the type of analysis I have been trying to advance for some time you can see that power relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and the relationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread, and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect together the question of politics and the question of ethics.

(Foucault 2005: 252, my emphasis)

Or in an 1984 interview:

[Governmentality implies the relationship of self to self, which means exactly that, in the idea of governmentality, I am aiming at the totality of practices, by

8. Foucault also phrased it in these terms: “What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives himself as a living, speaking, laboring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal?” (Foucault 1992: 7).
which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other [...] [T]he notion of governmentality allows one, I believe, to set off the freedom of the subject and the relationship to others, i.e., that which constitutes the very matter of ethics.

(Foucault 1988: 19-20)

Governmentality provides the subject with a space of freedom which encourages the subject to have a particular relationship to herself. The relationship one has to oneself under governmentality is, therefore, a site of politics. Furthermore, one’s relationship to oneself is a site of ethics insofar as it involves the subject’s ethos, that is, how the subject negotiates the space of freedom afforded to her by governmentality (what Foucault will call practices of freedom or practices of liberty). Conceived in this way, the relationship one has to oneself is, thereby, ethico-political. McGushin captures this with a sense of urgency:

An ethics of the self [is] an urgent political task because the concern for the self, the formation of the self, and the truth of the self are all already permeated by relations and techniques of power – that is, the self as such is already political.

(McGushin 2007: xvii, original emphasis)

Taking this conception – that is, this connective reading between Foucault’s work on governmentality and his work on the care of the self – I will now pivot to the question of contemporary academic practice. How can we situate the ‘academic’ today? How is the contemporary academic governed today, and what types of relationships is she incentivised to have to herself and her academic practice?

§1.3 Academic Practice Today

Indeed, in Foucault’s own work, the question of the intellectual’s role, or in any case, the role and status of the one who speaks the truth, is central. In his famous introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, Foucault affirmatively situates this book squarely against the ‘ethics of the intellectual’ which had dominated post-war France (1984: xi), broadly, that of the Marxist intellectual who ‘represents’ the masses. Foucault (and, of course, Deleuze) rejected this notion of an intellectual as he who expresses the repressed truth of the repressed collective; and instead situated the intellectual as he who ‘struggles against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of “knowledge,” truth,” “consciousness,” and “discourse”’ (Deleuze and Foucault, 1996: 75). The intellectual, as positioned here by Foucault, is engaged in a struggle in his relationship with himself and in relation to the dominant game of truth, in other words. Braidotti (2011: 268), on this, underlines that for both Foucault and Deleuze, intellectual engagement involved a ‘change of scale to unveil power relations where they are most effective and invisible: in the specific location of one’s own intellectual and social practices.’

9. In an unpublished manuscript, presumably from the preparation for The Birth of Biopolitics lectures, Foucault (2009: 390) wrote: ‘Politics is no more or less than which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation’.
In short, Foucault’s domain of analysis is always practical (himself included) or composed of practices (his own included). As Strausz reminds us (2013):

[W]e can’t exclude *ourselves*, subjects of governmental rationalities and technologies of power, from the study of governmentality. What requires attention are the actual practices through which we become part of how we experience life within the epistemic structure of Western modernity. Caught up in a dense web of relations of “power” and “knowledge,” the “subject” that is being articulated is in fact a who: me, you, *us*.

It is in this spirit, which Braidotti and Strausz highlight, that I wish to centralise the question of academic practice today. When considering the operations and effects of power, academic subjects cannot exclude *themselves* and *their practices* from such analyses. What relationship do ‘we’ – as those in engaged in academic practice – have to ourselves today? This, of course, permits of no catch-all response: those in the academy relate to themselves in heterogeneous styles. Nonetheless, as a general hypothesis, and with the proviso that I am, admittedly, being UK-centric within the confines of this paper, I claim that the academic is today incentivised to govern herself as a site of human capital. Academic practice in the university, today, involves the constant negotiation with the freedom afforded to subjects by neoliberal governmentality.

The academic subject who has internalised and self-governs according to neoliberal governmentality, as I already noted, *objectifies herself in neoliberal governmentality’s truth procedures*. Her relationship to herself, her writing, her professional relationships and to truth hinges upon her objectification in governmentality’s truth regime (economic and statistical knowledge) and how it assesses her conduct.10 Structurally, this subject’s objectification is comparable to what Foucault (2014: 198, my emphasis) highlights in Christianity’s objectification of the penitent and his conduct:

The penitent is the object, but the operator or operators of [these truth procedures] is not the penitent himself, [these are] the truth procedures by which *others*, either the whole community, or the bishops, or the leaders, *are able to know the penitent and make him the object of a truth inquiry*.

Neoliberal governmentality, in other words, objectifies the conduct of its subjects in *its* regime of truth in a manner not unlike Christianity’s objectification of the moral conduct of its penitents. Under neoliberal governmentality, the neoliberal subject constitutes the *penitent* and political economy is the *truth procedure*. Through these procedures, the community can *know, judge*, and assess the subject within categories of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.

For the remainder of this essay, and drawing on the connective reading I have highlighted, I will argue that the *care of the self* can be utilised by academics as a practice of resistance to neoliberal governmentality, specifically in relation to this notion of a subject’s *objectification* within its truth procedures. These will be explored through two specific practices: writing (§2) and friendship (§3). However, and as a disclaimer, I am not suggesting that there are something like two subject-positions or two distinct subjects, an

10. See, for example, Lewis & Hardy’s (2014) paper which researches the impacts of standardised assessment techniques in the effective micro-management of the daily conduct of teachers, drawing on Foucault.
'ideal subject of neoliberal governmentality' and a 'resisting subject'. Rather, the subject’s relationship to oneself occurs within a dense socio-institutional network which involves a variety of negotiations, struggles and compromises. The search is not to uncover what a ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ resisting subject might look like, indeed, such a search would have a moralistic edge. My purpose here is much smaller: to explore two types of micro-practices of resistance available to the contemporary academic subject who negotiates through a constrained realm of freedom, and as a gesture towards the types of possibilities for resistance and self-transformation **immanently available** within present institutional networks. On this I follow Oksala: ‘freedom in Foucault’s ethics is a question of developing forms of the subject that are capable of functioning as resistance to normalizing power’ (2005: 190).

Furthermore, I only suggest two micro-practices here, and I do not suggest that the two I have isolated have any special privilege. As Foucault (1998: 96-97) notes: ‘points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case.’ I have focused on two for purposes of space and clarity, but indeed, a fuller and more comprehensive cartography of resistance would be an extension demanded of this research.

§2 Writing

The only thing that is really sad is not to fight [...] I do not like writing; it’s a very difficult activity to master. Writing interests me only to the extent that it becomes part of the reality of a struggle, as a tool, a tactic, a means of clarifying. I would like my books to kinds of scalpels, Molotov cocktails, or mine shafts, and that they might ignite after use like fireworks [...] I am an instrument salesman, a creator of recipes, a guide to optical devices, a cartographer, a draftsman, a gunsmith (Foucault, 1994: 725, trans. in Stivale, 2008: 105).

If I had to write a book to communicate what I have already thought, I’d never have the courage to begin it. I write precisely because I don’t know yet what to think about a subject that attracts my interest. In so doing, the book transforms me, changes what I think. As a consequence, each new work profoundly changes the terms of thinking which I had reached with the previous work [...] When I write, I do it above all to challenge myself and not to think the same thing as before. And no matter how boring and erudite my resulting books have been, this lesson has always allowed me to conceive them as direct experiences to tear me from myself, to prevent me from always being the same (Foucault, 1991b: 32).

In these two quotes, we see two distinct, but, as I contend, I connected axes in Foucault’s approach to writing. One: as a practical and political tool in and of itself; writing as a political practice and form of resistance. Two: as a practice which transforms and dislodges the self; writing as a practice of the self. If this is the relationship Foucault had to his writing, what, can we say, is the relationship the academic has to her writing, today?
§2.1 Writing Under Neoliberal Governmentality

Of course, writing is, undoubtedly, one of the central practices of academic life (articles, book chapters, references, administrative work, feedback, etcetera). Today, for the academic, writing is captured within the apparatus of neoliberal governmentality. I claim this for two reasons, taking the United Kingdom as my operative example. First: through government assessment programs such as the Research Excellence Framework, the academic’s conduct is micro-managed in relation to his production of ‘impactful’ and ‘serviceable’ units of knowledge. The academic’s job security and status is bound up with his continuous production of impactful and serviceable units of knowledge. Second, the assessment of this production is conducted through the quantification and ranking of departments nationally (recall that the production of statistical knowledge is a tactic of governmentality (§1.1)). A philosophy department’s poor performance in these rankings, for example, will lead to material punishment in the form of reduced funding. The academic’s incentive structure is such that s/he is rewarded (financially and, one can imagine, socially through factors such as prestige) for the continuous production of impactful, well-cited, popular units of academic knowledge.

The academic who self-governs according to neoliberal governmentality objectifies her conduct through channelling her ‘knowledge production’ in these assessment programs. In submitting her labour as the object of its truth inquiry (in the REF, league tables, and so on), she confesses her conduct for punishment or gratification. She, this is to say, objectifies herself in that true discourse.

§2.2.1 Writing and Subjectivation; Askēsis and Paraskeuē

For Foucault, however, writing is a practice through which the subject can resist such objectification. It can do so when stylised as a practice that moves towards what he terms the ‘subjectivation of true discourse’ (2005: 333). The subjectivation of true discourse, here, does not involve the subject’s insertion into a regime of truth (as with the Christian penitent or the neoliberal academic). Rather, it involves the subject’s becoming a subject of veridiction, becoming one who can enunciate or speak the truth, which ‘arises from the subject’s practices of freedom [and is] integral to fashioning oneself as an ethical subject’ (Milchman and Rosenberg, 2008: 121).

Butler, on this, notes how for Foucault, fashioning oneself as an ethical subject involves a double-moment of desubjugation and self-making when the subject risks its mode of existence within a particular regime of truth and pushes against its limits. Fashioning oneself as an ethical subject involves looking ‘both for the conditions by which the object field is constituted, but also for the limits of those conditions, the moments where they point up their contingency and their transformability’ (2002: 222). Instead of inserting the aca-

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11. I am speaking here primarily of writing which is produced as ‘research output’.
12. For more on these points, see: Docherty, 2011; Research Excellence Framework, 2012; Smith, 2012
13. In other words, Butler’s point here is that points of contingency and transformability are at the limits of the object fields, but still, so to speak, within them. Indeed, this is partially why I am focusing on in my discussions of friendship and writing, as practices within the object field of neoliberal governmentality - immanently present in existing institutional networks - but which nonetheless (as I argue) can function as points of transformability.
demic into the neoliberal regime of truth and as a conduit of neoliberal governmentality, writing can function as a transformational and ethical practice where the subject comes to ‘make the truth her own’. In order to more fully elucidate this, I will now turn specifically to the place of writing within Foucault’s exploration of the epimeleia heauton (the care of the self).

§2.2.2 Writing in the Epimeleia Heauton

For Foucault, writing – under the epimeleia heauton – forms part of the first moment of askēsis (which also consists in listening, reading and speaking). Before turning to writing itself, it is worth noting the function askēsis plays under the epimeleia heauton. The askēsis has three components: (i) practices through which the subject makes her self-care her object and end; (ii) establishing a paraskeuē (which are preparatory practices which prepare the subject for the events of life); (iii) practices through which the subject binds herself to truth – rather than submitting to the law (Foucault, 2005: 332).

This threefold process of askēsis is the process through which the subject constitutes herself as a subject of veridiction, as one who can speak and live the truth, and is prepared for life. So, this is not a Christian ascesis of self-renunciation; but an askēsis which is a ‘technique of life, an art of living [...] which is not the objectification of the self in a true discourse, but the subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on oneself’ (ibid: 333).

Within askēsis, writing functions under paraskeuē; writing prepares the subject for life and its events. It is also tied to reading. Through reading and writing the subject alters her relationship to herself through thought. The practice of reading and writing is a transformational practice which prepares the subject for the events of life. It is therefore always a ‘practical’ procedure: the practice of paraskeuē is the element of askēsis which ‘[transforms] logos into ethos’ (ibid: 327). How does reading and writing function as a transformational practice? First, as reading is ‘an exercise by which, through thought, the subject puts himself in a certain situation [and is] shifted with regard to what he is through the effect of thought’ (ibid: 358). Writing, then, functions to temper reading, to develop a ‘corpus’ of our reading and to enable that which has been written to be ‘absorbed’ and established in the soul. It is not, however, a simple ‘incorporation’ of the discourse that has been read; rather it is the ‘creation of an equipment of true propositions for yourself, which really is your own’ (ibid: 358). So: writing is as much a document of what has been read as a creative and affirmative enterprise wherein the subject alters her relationship to herself, makes the truth her own and transforms logos into ethos:

It is a matter of unifying these heterogeneous fragments [of reading] through their subjectivation in the exercise of personal writing [...] The role of writing is to constitute, along with all that reading has constituted, a “body”. And this body should be understood not as a body of doctrine but, rather – following an often evoked metaphor of digestion – as the very body of the one who [...] has appropriated them and made their truth his own: writing transforms the thing seen or heard “into tissue and blood”. It becomes a principle of rational action in the writer himself (Foucault, 1997: 213).
Writing forms part of the movement from *logos* to *ethos*. *Askēsis* is the movement of the subject whereby ‘the subject of true knowledge [is] the subject of right action’ (2005: 485), and such that the subject works on herself in order that she may become an ‘ethical subject of truth’ (ibid: 484) and live her truth. How must this subject of ethical truth conduct herself? Or, around what principles and mechanisms can the subject speak truth?

§2.2.3 Writing and *Parrhēsia*

The subject of veridiction is the subject who has ‘made the truth her own’ and is in a position to convey true discourse to disciples, students, or friends. It is here where the issue of *parrhēsia* arises (‘speaking freely’ or ‘speaking frankly’) and the problem of the *ēthos* required on the part of the subject of veridiction when she conveys true discourse. *Parrhēsia* is a technical term denoting the ethos by which the subject of veridiction speaks the truth to other. For our purposes, this is the ethical problem of how the academic utters, conveys or passes on truth. The role of *parrhēsia* here is very clear – the master (the academic, the subject of veridiction, the philosopher) who engages in *parrhēsia* will speak to the student in such a way that the student ‘will be able to form an autonomous, independent, full and satisfying relationship to himself’ (ibid: 379). The master, this is to say, must speak truth to the student so that the student himself can *epimel-eia heauton*:

The final aim of *parrhēsia* is not to keep the person to whom one speaks dependent on the person who speaks [...] It is insofar as the other [the master in our case] has given, has conveyed a true discourse to the person to whom he speaks, that this person, internalizing and subjectivizing this true discourse, can then leave the relationship with the other person. The truth, passing from one to the other in *parrhēsia*, seals, ensures, and guarantees the other’s autonomy (ibid: 379, my addition).

The master, then, does not engage in flattery, rhetoric, or encourage dependency (this would, effectively, encourage students to *objectify* themselves in that truth). The master’s *parrhēsia* enables students to *parrhēsia* themselves. It involves the ‘passing’ of truth to the student, ‘whose effect and function are to change the subject’s being. This truth must affect the subject. *It does not involve the subject becoming the object of a true discourse*’ (ibid: 243, my emphasis). 14

§2.3 Writing as Resistance

14. A relevant question emerges here on the extent to which this master-student-*parrhesia* relationship resembles the liberal-humanist-Enlightenment model of education, critical pedagogy and *Bildung*. Whilst a further research project would be required in order to more fully explore this, I will point out three things. First, that Foucault’s relationship to the Enlightenment is complex. Whilst he rejects the foundational humanist subject (1994b: 317-318, 344), his work on Kant & Enlightenment (1984b) and Enlightenment & critique (2007) is partially supportive of its historical legacy. Second, McCall (2007) does consider more explicitly the situating of Foucault’s thoughts on writing as correlative to the notion of *Bildung*. Thirdly, a plethora of work has been produced which considers the applicability of these notions of *parrhesia* and ethical self-formation in education research. For example, Huckaby (2007) and Raanen (2011) consider teachers who *parrhesia*; Clarke (2008) and de Marzio (2012) discuss teaching as an ethico-political-aesthetic practice of the self; and Biesta (1998) explicitly discusses the notion of a critical pedagogy without humanism.
Writing, practiced under the *epimeleia heauton*, is a practice of resistance. It resists the subject’s objectification in a true discourse. Under *epimeleia heauton*, writing involves the subject’s subjectivation of true discourse. It is a practice of micro-resistance against those power relations that seek to establish the directionality of conduct and over-determine practices of self-formation, such as, precisely, the power relations of contemporary neoliberal governmentality. Neoliberal governmentality governs academic writing within its game of truth, and the neoliberal academic objectivises herself in this game of truth. Academic writing as a component of *epimeleia heauton* seeks to establish a different, self-transformative, relationship between the subject and truth. Schematically, it is a double movement of resistance which mirrors Butler’s identification of fashioning oneself as an ethical subject as a double movement of *desubjugation* and *self-making*:

α. A strategic refusal of the subject’s objectification in the neoliberal regime of truth and its normalising *conduct of conduct* which governs subjects as sites of human capital.

β. A transformative and experimental affirmation of the self that seeks to constitute itself otherwise.15 Whilst, for Foucault, the ‘author’ is external to the text (1977), the writer is in and transformed through writing:

The essay – which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication – is the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an “ascesis,” *askēsis*, an exercise of oneself in activity of thought (Foucault, 1992: 9)

I will now pivot my attention to my second case, friendship.

§3 *Philía*: the Practice of Friendship

Some people go to priests; others to poetry; I to my friends (Woolf, 1931: 266).

Being-loved certainly speaks something of *philía* [...] It says nothing of friendship *itself* which implies *in itself, properly*, essentially, the act and the activity: someone must love in order to know what loving means (Derrida, 2005: 8)

§3.1 Networking Under Neoliberal Governmentality

The cultivation and practice of friendship is not something often discussed as a component of academic life. What is discussed, however, is *networking*. Networking is, today, incentivised and approached as a ‘professional friendship’ explicitly pursued for reasons of self-interest and of the accumulation of human capital. Blaxter et al.’s *Academic Career Handbook* notes how the ‘search for competitive advantage [is the] primary motivator for developing strategic networks [...] They also provide the individual with group support and

15. For an interesting exploration of micro-practices of resistance in this context, see Ball and Olmedo (2013).
offer scope for collaboration in different aspects of their work' (1998: 57; Jarillo, 1993). Their exploration of network highlights a variety of strategies for developing networks (for example, the five Cs: conferences, collaboration, correspondence, collegiality and community). In order for the academic subject gain recognition and success, she must network. Arnold (1997: 83) makes the direct connection: the ‘effective initiation and maintenance of social relationships for career-related purposes is [...] networking.’ Or Brooks and Brooks (1997: vii-ix), whose third (of seven) ‘Secret of Success’ in academia is: ‘Successful people know how to develop an effective network’.

All of this is to say, then, that the academic’s production of knowledge under neoliberal governmentality is bound up not just with the production itself (i.e., academic writing), but also the academic’s forming of effective networks whom they can both produce knowledge with and as a readership. A readership is necessary so that the academic will be well cited, secure prestige, and score highly in assessment programs like the REF which I noted previously. Networking is a constant and continuous investment in one’s human capital.

§3.2 Parrhēsia & Epimeleia Heauton Between Friends

Just as networking is indispensable for the academic subject’s successful investment in her human capital, the other is indispensable for the epimeleia heauton (Foucault, 2005: 127). The other is indispensable in this passage from objectification in true discourse to the subjectification of true discourse; the other is a condition for the subject’s transformation. This other can take many ‘forms’, but one such form is the friend; the friend is someone who (to return to the notion from §2.2.2) speaks frankly to and guides the subject:

Individual guidance could not take place without an intense affective relationship of friendship between the two partners, the guide and the person being guided. And this guidance implied a certain quality, actually a certain “way of speaking,” a certain “ethics of speech” [...] which is called, precisely, parrhēsia. Parrhēsia is opening the heart, the need for the two partners to conceal nothing of what they think from each other and to speak to each other frankly (ibid: 137).

The practice of parrhēsia comprises an ethics of speech which does not fool or flatter the other or encourage the other’s dependency upon the speaker. To explicitly note the contrast: both the practice of Christian confession and contemporary academic assessment practices require the subject to confess her conduct for a truth regime’s assessment. Parrhēsia is distinct from this; as we saw in §2.2.2, the master or teacher’s practice of parrhēsia has as its objective students who practice their own autonomy and do not become dependent on the master’s truth. This is also to say that the master’s practice of parrhēsia encourages parrhēsia between students; and parrhēsia between students will, further, increase bonds of friendship between them due to the intense affective nature of relationships required for speaking frankly and openly (ibid: 389). Parrhēsia is, therefore, not simply a relationship of hierarchy (or it is not always or simply that). The practice of parrhēsia circulates not solely between teachers and students, but between friends.

16. See, for example, Plutarch’s How to Know a Flatterer from a Friend (2012).
**Parrhēsia** and the exchange of ‘soul services’ (ibid: 497) are important components in the affective intensity of friendship. As Garlick (2002: 569-570) notes:

The parrhesiast was a friend who, somewhat like Nietzsche’s ‘best enemy’, told one the truth about oneself so that one could come to know oneself better. The parrhesiast (or friend), however, does not speak with the force of law, or pass judgment according to an absolute standard (i.e. he or she does not produce a normalizing discourse).

Friendship is, then, an essential component of the **epimeleia heauton**. This care for others forms part of a care of the self: ‘the care of the self also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counsellor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you’ (Foucault, 1997: 287, my emphasis).

This does not mean, however, that friendship ought to be practiced solely for self-interested reasons. Friendship, of course, may **originate** in the realm of social exchange (like practices of networking). Foucault notes – taking the Epicurean model of friendship as his example - how friendships often begin through a search for ‘utility’. However, the nature of this utility is distinct in that such utility is provided not in the form of material or social advantages, but in happiness and trust (2005: 194-195). In short, friendship may originate in practices of network, in the realm of social exchange; but friendship, its affective intensity and the exchange of soul services it comprises, exceeds the realm of social exchange through such intensity and its potential for transformation enabled through such relationships. Whilst networking for the academic is situated with a system of social rewards, prestige and success; friendship is instead connected with the exchange of soul services in the **epimeleia heauton** for the ‘subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on oneself’ (ibid: 333). So practiced, friendship is transformational.17

### §3.3 Friendship as Resistance

Friendship, under the **epimeleia heauton**, can be fashioned as a practice of resistance to governmentality. The friend, as I noted above, does not produce a normalising discourse. Rather, the friend forms part of the subject’s **epimeleia heauton**, that is, that subject’s subjectivation of true discourse. This friendship is distinct from practices of networking since it is precisely focused on refashioning the subject’s relation to truth, rather than objectifying it within a pre-established regime of truth; and due to its affective and transformative intensity. It, thus, resists normalisation and opens up the possibility for – and is a practice of – transformation through ‘short-circuiting’ those institutional and normalised social relations. Foucault’s context was slightly different here, but the point resonates:

Institutional forms can’t validate [those] relations with multiple intensities, variable colors, imperceptible movements and changing forms. [Affective] relations short-circuit [institutional forms] and introduce love where there’s supposed to be only law, rule, habit (Foucault, 1996b: 137, my additions, my emphasis).

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17.As Coker notes discussing Nietzschean friendship, one does not love the friend ‘as they are’, but rather, for what they are becoming (1993: 116).
Again, it is a double movement of resistance (to repeat what I noted in §2.3), and again to parallel Butler’s suggestion that fashioning one’s self as an ethical subject involves desubjugation and self-making:

α. A strategic refusal of the subject’s objectification in the neoliberal regime of truth and its normalising conduct of conduct which governs subjects as sites of human capital.

β. A transformative and experimental affirmation of the self that seeks to constitute itself otherwise.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I first connected Foucault’s work on governmentality to his work on the epimeleia heauton. Governmentality’s operation seeks to objectify the subject’s conduct within the regime of truth of political economy. Similarly, neoliberal governmentality’s operation captures the academic’s practices of writing and networking in its regime of truth. Refiguring practices of writing and friendship, however, as components of the epimeleia heauton, constitutes the refusal of such objectification. Indeed, it constitutes an experimental practice of freedom through which the subject makes the truth ‘her own’. The academic can look to herself as a site of practices of resistance.

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(Re)questioning The Ethical Subjectivity
In one of his last interviews, titled “An Aesthetics of Existence”, Michel Foucault makes the following claim:

From Antiquity to Christianity, we pass from a morality that was essentially the search for a personal ethics to a morality as obedience to a system of rules. And if I was interested in Antiquity it was because, for a whole series of reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics of existence.

(Foucault 1990:49)

This passage is revealing in that it presents in a very clear fashion a dichotomy to which Foucault refers only incidentally in his works: Ancient ethics and modern, code-based morality. Not only the dichotomy, but also the normative stance underlying the related historical narrative is quite clear: In a way that echoes the Foucauldian conception of ethics as a “practice of freedom” (Foucault 1987), the “personal” aspect of the ancient ethical enterprise is emphasized and appreciated, whereas the element of obedience to rules, inherent to modern morality, is disfavored. The good news for the reader is that this despicable enterprise of code-based morality has already disappeared and that we find ourselves at a historical stage where there is wide room for a new, fundamentally liberating aesthetics of existence.

Faced with this critical statement and having in mind other passages (such as Foucault 1990b: 253-254) where Foucault’s blatant repugnance for code-based morality is easily observed, the reader may indulge herself in a more or less conventional narrative according to which a period of freedom is followed by the over-growing dominance of severe discipline through moral codes. Now that this modern enterprise of morality is in crisis, the story may go, the time has come for the old freedom to be restored -in a somewhat renewed form, of course. Admittedly, anyone familiar with Foucault’s work would find it unsettling that the French philosopher subscribes to such a conventional story dominated by a fundamental opposition between obedience and freedom. For one thing, such a misleading opposition constitutes the primary axis of what Foucault harshly criticizes under the rubric of “repressive hypothesis” (Foucault 1990d) and, for this reason, it is at odds with Foucault’s conception of power. Moreover, the opposition overlooks many of Foucault’s concrete and occasionally negative observations on Ancient ethics, such as the
view that many of the Hellenistic schools were marked by a high degree of austerity and discipline (Foucault 1990c: 258) and that, in the end, Ancient ethics appears to be a “profound error” (Foucault 1990b: 244).

Yet, Foucault’s insistent and deliberate use of the “liberty - obedience” pair is there, with a significantly normative tone that Foucault usually (and for many of his critics, notoriously) prevents. There is therefore the task of locating this apparently conventional opposition in the nexus of the problematizations that Foucault presents in his work, and of reflecting on the possible significance of the ethics vs. morality dichotomy\(^1\) for Foucault’s overall historical narrative. This will be the task in the present study.

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Part of the reason why the reader -even the one familiar with the main tenets of Foucault’s enterprise- may be intrigued in front of such an evaluative “ethics vs. morality” dichotomy is that, although the first element of it, i.e. ethics, finds considerable treatment in the Foucauldian corpus, the latter is only incidentally mentioned. At some places -especially in the interviews- Foucault refers to the modern code-based morality that he openly despises without making it an object of detailed scrutiny (Foucault 1990a, 1990b). In fact, considering the overall Foucauldian project, the main dichotomy is not the one between ethics and morality, but rather the one between ethics -as a regime of subjectivation based on the principle of “care of the self”- and the modern system of power-knowledge based on the “objectivation” of the self through scientific discourse concerning various aspects of human experience. As is well known, many elements of Foucault’s historical studies serve to map out the process through which the self’s relation to oneself changed, in such a way that the ancient ethical project revolving around the idea of aske-sis was replaced by a regime based on the knowledge of the self. The difficulty here has to do with the uncertainty of the role played by the code-based morality in this long and multi-faceted historical process and the new regime that it produced. My main question, then, will be: What function does morality play in the new regime of subjectivation based on the proliferation of the knowledge of the self?

I think Foucault’s Collège de France lectures titled *Hermeneutics of the Subject* (*HS*) provide remarkable hints for answering this question. This is hardly surprising, given that this lecture-series offers arguably the most articulate version of Foucault’s historical narrative of the passage from the ancient ethical practices to modern regimes of subjectivation. I would like to argue that the very first session of these lectures contains a highly precious conceptual tool that will help us to make sense of the “ethics vs. morality” dichotomy in Foucault. This is the distinction between “philosophy” and “spirituality” (Foucault 2005: 15-19).

Even though this avowedly sketchy categorization is offered by Foucault with a view to back up his interpretation of the historical significance of the “Cartesian moment”, it sets the framework in which the whole narrative of *HS* will be worked out. At the outset, philos-

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1. For the rest of the paper, I will use “ethics” and “morality” respectively as the shortcuts for ancient ethics centered on the idea of “aesthetics of existence” and the modern, code-based conception of morality. Using the two terms in this way may help one to locate Foucault’s discussion on ethics within the context of the debates between modern Anglo-Saxon scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams or Julia Annas. For these debates, see MacIntyre 1997, Williams 1985 and Annas 1992.
ophy and spirituality are put forward as two separate modes in which the self relates to the search for truth: In philosophy, the search takes the form of an interrogation on “the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to truth” (Foucault 2005: 15) - an enterprise centering on a search for “evidence”, as Foucault will specify in his interview titled “On the Genealogy of Ethics” (Foucault 1984). In spirituality, on the other hand, the self has to go through a series of “researches, practices and experiences” aiming at a deep transformation that will render him receptive to truth (Foucault 2005: 15). Based on the presumption that truth is never given to the subject “by right” (e.g. by means of evidence), spirituality requires from the self a practical engagement that will ultimately change her experiential field. According to the Foucauldian narrative flowing from this duality, ancient philosophical practice (with the remarkable exception of Aristotle) was always coupled with an irreducible element of spirituality. With Descartes, Foucault’s argument goes, the modern period of philosophy “without spirituality” was inaugurated (Foucault 2005: 17-18).

Obviously, Foucault’s philosophy - spirituality pair is not meant to apply to a particular field of knowledge, but to truth in general. For my own purposes, I will propose to focus on a particular field of problematization in which this pair may be operative, a field that I will loosely call “the enquiry on human action”. My fundamental insight is that, considered from this perspective, the philosophy - spirituality pair may help us to delineate different modes in which the self problematizes a given set of actions by having recourse to various conceptions of value, norm, rule, virtue etc. In other words, I will take these two terms as labels for two different modes in which an enquiry on human action can be undertaken by an agent. The differences between these two modes will lead to divergent strategies to be assumed by the agent. These strategies, in turn, will have their impacts on how the agent is convinced about the truth of norms and principles, how he chooses to abide by them, what enables him to integrate them into his life narrative or what kind of a transformation he undergoes in order to open room for them in his field of experience.

Let us start with “philosophy”. What form does an enquiry on human action take when it is undertaken in a “philosophical” mood? Based on Foucault’s tentative definitions in The Hermeneutics of the Subject and “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, one can argue that a philosophical search on human action takes the form of a mainly theoretical enquiry in which the overriding goal is to question the subject’s conditions for reaching true judgments on moral principles and, if possible, to disclose an evidential basis for the truth of this specific kind of knowledge through rational means. The main goal here is to build a framework in which more or less consistent links between various theoretical elements will be maintained with a satisfactory degree of consistency and systematicity. This aspiration to systematicity is inseparable from an interrogation about the “ground” of values, which is expected to end up in a normative theory endowing the sphere of values with a solid basis. In this model, any modification in the self’s practical sphere flows from the outcomes reached throughout the theoretical enquiry that precedes any practical consequence. Ultimately, this mode of enquiry may lead to a rift in the sphere of the self’s experience: On the one hand, we have the outcomes of the theoretical enquiry that usually take the form of abstract, formal principles, and on the other, we have the messy sphere of practices into which the principles reached in theory are to be “applied”. Hence, central to the basic mode of the self’s relationship with the sphere of values is the knowledge of objectifiable principles that will be enacted in life.
An enquiry on human action undertaken in a “spiritualistic” mood, on the other hand, is not based on the same kind of theory-practice division that we find in “philosophy”. As Foucault’s preliminary definition makes it clear, in a spiritualistic undertaking, reaching the truth about the sphere of values can hardly be possible in the absence of an accompanying process of transformation through practice. This means that the self’s relationship with the sphere of values is established within a field of experiences where theoretical interrogation is to be undertaken at the very heart of a web of practices. It is, in other words, an enquiry where praxis, with its fundamentally transformative power, plays the leading role. The self’s field of practices is not a passive material on which the truth reached through theory will be applied, but the very scene in which this truth is discovered, produced, experienced and enacted. This, I think, is what Foucault means when he describes ascesis (in a way that may irritate a modern ear) as a “practice and exercise of the truth” (Foucault 2005: 319).

“Philosophy” and “spirituality”, taken as two different modes in which the self problematizes her actions and the related values, overlap to a large extent with the dichotomy between code-based morality and ethics. If the account presented above is correct, the main difference between ethics and morality does not stem from the variations in the degree of the self’s freedom, but rather from the way the self relates to her field of practices. In morality -where “evidence” constitutes the basic element- the sphere of practices is organized on the basis of the knowledge of objectifiable principles that are given in theory. Here, what is problematic from a Foucauldian standpoint is not the degree of the agent’s freedom, but rather the mode of subjectivation that shapes the field of possible actions. It may well be the case that the ultimate moral principles follow from an allegedly autonomous practical reason, as in Kant’s theory. What makes this enterprise a “code-based morality” (and despicable for Foucault) is the preponderance of objectifiable principles over practices. By contrast, in ethics -where ascesis constitutes the basic element- the truth about values are reached in the very field of practices where they are enacted. The reason why ethics has a “personal” quality and that it is a “practice of freedom” has nothing essential to do with the lack of any limitations on the self. What makes ethics preferable is that the basic mode of subjectivation is practical and that the limitations on the self, even when they are the products of external instances (such as one’s community), do not lead to an attitude of obedience to rules.

A more articulate formulation of the role that morality (as a theoretical enquiry on human action) fulfills in the modern regime of subjectivation (revolving around the knowledge of the self) can be found in the second session of the HS lecture of 24 February. Here, as a part of his highly inspiring account of askesis, Foucault shows how, in our modern regime of subjectivity, knowledge of the self and knowledge of the moral code are inseparable. Foucault once again underlines the fact that our present regime is centered on the question whether the subject can be objectified in more or less the same way as the things in the world are when we know them (Foucault 2005: 318). In such a context, the basic ethical question -which can be formulated as “how should we consider the subject and what he should make of himself?”- is always asked “in terms of the law” (318), in other words with a view to create and maintain a code-based morality. In a significant way, Foucault explains this phenomenon by making use of the notion of apparatus [dispositif] that occupies a key role in his late analyses of power. Accordingly, in the contemporary world, our relationship to ourselves is conditioned by a new “apparatus [dispositif] of subjectivity
which is [...] governed by the question of the subject’s knowledge of himself and of the subject’s obedience to the law.” (319 - my italics). In other words, knowledge of the self and obedience to the law constitute the two facets of the same regime of subjectivation that is dominant now. Hence, I think that Foucault’s genealogy opens room for analyzing the enterprise of “code-based morality” as a modern dispositif that plays an essential role in the way human action and subjectivity are problematized in the contemporary world.

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Foucault’s Ethics: Engaging Antiquity

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine Foucault reflexion on Antique ethics in the works he undertook from 1980 to 1984, in the light of the contemporary debate on the crisis of ethical discourse in secular societies.

As Alain Badiou points out in his Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (2001), we are today witnessing an abundant production of works dedicated to the subject of ethics. Alongside, an important number of ethical committees composed of experts is writing reports on the application of new scientific discoveries, on medical innovations and health issues, on animal rights and environmental protection, on entrepreneurial ethics and on managing “human resources”. Their argumentation is often based on an eclectic mix of scientific data, utilitarianism, ethics of care and of human rights. This ethical discourse is not only serving as a guideline for important societal decisions, it is also addressed to individuals as advice on how to live their lives in a secular world. Antique ethics in particular are living a certain revival through easily accessible works, often reminiscent of self-help guides. A popular French website would for instance advice us through a series of articles by a well-known philosopher on how to experience our coffee break in an epicurean way, or how to stoically survive an end of a relationship. For Badiou, this “ethical turn” is a symptom of a renouncement of collective political goals we’re witnessing in Europe, as well as an expression of our growing individualism. Neglecting the joy of a self-transcending vocation, this type of ethics calls out for a work on the self as an individual.

We will first try to understand why studies of the Antique techniques of the self matter to someone who was implied in much broader studies knowledge-power relations. We will try to briefly outline the genealogy of the principle of the care of the self that is in the heart of Antique ethics, and to present the deadlocks we face when trying to use this principle as a universal guideline. Finally, we will examine how Foucault uses this principle to show us a different relation to truth and it’s potentially beneficent effects.

From Biopolitics to Ethics

Far from proposing any positive ethics, Foucault was approaching ethical questions from a distance, only in the measure in which these questions would allow him to effectuate a
genealogy of the ways in which we constitute ourselves as subjects of a moral codes. If any human experience can be perceived as a conjunction of certain types of knowledge, certain norms and certain forms of subjectivity, it was this third element that became Foucault’s focus with the second and the third part of his *History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure* (1990) and *The Care of the Self* (1986). While the topics of knowledge and power were already broadly examined in his previous work, the final period of his studies centred on the ways a subject integrates a certain moral prohibition into its relation to the self. Through his historical analysis of Antique ethics, Foucault is suggesting that we might be wrong about the origins of the moral rules we are following: it was not so much the moral rule itself that was changing through the history, but the way we relate to it and the way we justify it. Hence, perhaps there exist other ways of relation to the self, which could possibly allow us more freedom.

But, to arrive to these questions, let’s first take a step back, to see how this subject arose in the continuity of Foucault’s work. One of major lessons we can draw from the first volume of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality, The Will to Knowledge* (1998), is that the effects of power relations on individuals can be observed through our relation to ourselves, that is, the way we interpret ourselves. He refuses the so-called repressive hypothesis, the hypothesis according to which in the Victorian age, a command of silence was imposed on our natural, copious sexuality. Following this hypothesis, speaking freely about sexuality should therefore liberate us of the chains of this imposed morality and let us live freely in accordance with our nature. Nevertheless, Foucault shows that is precisely this abundant talk about sexuality that shapes its object and is imposing a certain way of behaviour on us. Much more than any silence, it is this alleged openness that is our real limitation. If Barthes perceives language as fascist, it is because the essence of fascism is not in its prohibition to say, but in the obligation to say (Barthes, internet). Likewise, Foucault exposes that the primal constraint that power imposes on us today is no longer a restriction, but an obligation.

The political power today is no more expressed through it’s right to take life away, but, in contrast, through its capacity to shape or “give” life through a sphere of correctional and regulatory mechanisms. It is therefore a conglomerate of legal, medical, administrative and pedagogical apparatuses that manages life. Indeed, in this context, power relations do not only set the external boundaries of our behaviour, they are positive forces that shape us from within and form our understanding of ourselves. According to Foucault, the way we perceive ourselves is in an important part mediated by different forms of confession. Let it be with a priest or a psychotherapist, or on blogs and social networks, the principle is the same. We are producing a discourse that is supposed to express the truth about ourselves and that should hence allow us to “discover” our true self; following Foucault, it is this discourse precisely that is actually confining us in a certain identity.

What Foucault is revealing through different studies of confession is that there is no external position to power: even when we are talking about ourselves, verbalising our experience, we are tacitly subsuming ourselves to a certain dispositif of power. Moreover, the more we try to resist to power relations, the more we seem to be pulled in their middle. A burlesque example can be found in the music video for the song *I could be the one* by a Swedish DJ and producer Avicii. The song that knew a massive success in 2013 is depicted with a video about a middle-aged woman feeling trapped in her daily life of office
work and plain conversations. She seeks help with a psychotherapist who only suggests her to take more pills. At nights, she is dreaming of a liberation that is vividly represented by her taking off to a tropical resort, wildly spending money, drinking in nightclubs and having fun with local young men. It is not hard to see that this sort of “liberation” is in no aspect an escape from the system she felt trapped in, but rather it’s apogee.

Indeed, as Boltanski and Chiapello showed with conviction in *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2007), the wit of capitalism lies in it’s capacity to integrate it’s critics into it’s own foundations. A simple example would be the artistic critique with its demands for authenticity and creative expression of the individual. Authors show that this appeal to a creative expression of the individual is easily merged into liberal capitalism, to the extent of becoming one of its primal moral requests. Whether working for a bank or a supermarket, today’s worker faces a constant demand to be mobile, flexible, enthusiastic, sociable, creative etc. We only need to think of all the workshops and coachings companies offer to their employees, in order to work on their team spirit, to increase their creativity, or to help them find their true vocation. With that in mind, we are thus obliged to revisit our understanding of political freedom and resistance. If we part from an observation that power relations are inscribed in the way we perceive ourselves, Foucault’s bet is that a possible way to resist the power relations is also by a transformation of ourselves.

Ethics thus appears in Foucault’s thought along with the question of freedom within the power relations. While Nietzsche, in his *Genealogy of morals* (Nietzsche, 2003), explored the often-neglected origins of our moral codes, Foucault, effectuating a certain genealogy of ethics, questions the origins of the personal experience that accompanies these moral codes and moral behaviour. When, in the 1980’s, he begins to analyse how human beings are constituted as subjects, it is with the objective to rethink the ambiguity of a subject who is on one hand a product of power relations and who, on the other hand, is nonetheless granted a small space for self-invention. Foucault is therefore exploring different practices of liberty that could minimize the relations of domination, that is, states in which the fluid relations of power get blocked. Ethics are in this context proposed as a well-thought practice of freedom. We should keep in mind that Foucault considers freedom as a political problem at the same time as a problem of a relation to the self, that is, being free also in the sense of not being a slave of oneself and one’s appetites.

**Genealogy of Ethics**

Before addressing the subject of ethics in Foucault’s thought, we should take into account the specific way Foucault distinguishes the notions of morals and ethics. While “morals” are understood as a collection of values and codes of behaviour, that any sort of social institution (let it be family or church, school or the resident’s council of your building) imposes on the individual, ethics, for Foucault, signify the way an individual constitutes him or herself as a subject of a moral code. We can subordinate ourselves to the same moral rule in many different ways. While the moral code can stay unchanged through centuries, the ways in which the individuals face it will sometimes vary enormously. The same moral code actually allows very different moral behaviours. What strikes Foucault is that the difference between Greek and Christian morals lies not so much in the moral prescrip-
tions themselves, but in the way individuals assume and justify these principles. It would be therefore wrong to presuppose a breaking rupture between the tolerant Greco-Roman morals and the Christian morals of renunciation. Foucault shows that Christianism largely reposes on the “pagan” rules of conduct, that were only rearranged in a new constellation of justifications.

In the 1983 Berkley interview “On Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress” with Dreyfus and Rabinow (Foucault, internet), Foucault distinguishes four elements of the relation to the self through which our moral behaviour is filtered. First element is what Foucault calls “the ethical substance”, that is, the part of ourselves in which we place the moral behaviour. This could be, as in Christian morals, the lust and appetites that need to be controlled, or, if we follow Kant, pure intention, detached of any feelings. If we base our consideration on neurosciences, on the other hand, the ethical substance of our behaviour would be our emotions.

The second element is the way in which we recognise the moral constraint and subordinate ourselves to it. This can be either through our faith in laws of god, or through faith in the laws of nature valuable for all living beings. We can consider ourselves following the laws of reason, or only applying the principles of aesthetics. To take an example, fidelity in marriage can be respected, in the case of Stoicins, for the simple reason that we are human, rational beings, or, in the case of Nicocles, the king of Cyprus, to show to those we are ruling that we are strong and capable of controlling ourselves. The third element defines the different means by which we apply the moral rule, or by which we work on the ethical substance. These practices, more widely explored in Foucault’s lectures at Collège de France in 1983, entited L’herméneutique du sujet (Foucault, 2001), are all different forms of aesis and of any work on the self. The fourth and final element is what we could call “moral teleology”, it is the element that defines the goals we are aiming with our moral behaviour. This element suggests what kind of beings we want to become by acting morally, if we are seeking redemption and after-life, or only to be masters of ourselves... If Nietzsche’s studies of morals were turning around the question whether our values are enhancing or decreasing our health and life force, whether they are confirming or denying life Foucault is doing the same with the relation to the self. Closely examining Greek and Roman ethics, he is revisiting our contemporary ethics and it’s sources, wondering whether the way we are considering and applying moral rules today is stimulant or frustrating.

“Know thyself” and it’s misinterpretations

We know today that the history as we know it is mainly a history of misinterpretations, of lapses of memory, and of bad translations. What we pride ourselves most on in our thought is often a fruit on what Pierre Hadot would call “creative misunderstandings” (Hadot, 2002). According to Foucault, this is also the case with the famous Delphic prescription “know yourself”. According to historians such as Roscher or Dafradas (Foucault, 2001), this slogan, receiving so much praise through the history of philosophy, was first nothing more than a practical prescription for the visitor who sought advice from the oracle. As the time you could spend in the temple was very limited, one should pay attention
to him-herself to only ask the questions that really mattered to him. Another plausible interpretatio
from the 1950s reads “know thyself” as a reminder of our place in the order of creation: we should cont
stantly keep in mind that we are human, not divine, and we should therefore pay attention not overestimate our powers.

As Foucault shows, “know thyself” was at first considered as only one aspect of a much broader prescription of taking care of oneself. A lot of the prestige that we tend to attribute to this Socratic principle should hence actually go to the principle of the care of the self, which became a central point of antique ethics with Stoics and Epicureans. What appeals to Foucault in this principle is the fact that in the Antique care of the self, the self isn’t something given in advance, but something that is yet to be constituted through different practices. It has therefore nothing to do with the contemporary cult of the self, which revolves around the slogan “discover your true self”. What interests Foucault in Antique ethical system that is centred on the care of the self, is the fact that these ethics are not dependant on any institutional or legal system. Foucault is pointing out that our situation today is in many ways the same: as far as the morals for more and more individuals in the western world are no longer based on religion and as far as the legal system itself cannot serve as a working principle of our decisions, we are seeking alternative ways to found our ethics.

The concept of care of the self first appears in Plato’s Alcibiades. Not yet a philosophical notion, the care of the self in this context arises as a condition to exercise power, political leadership. Alcibiades doesn’t know what it is to rule justly. Socrates therefore advises him to take care of himself first, before being able to lead others. Hence, the final goal of the care of the self in it’s primary form is the well being of the polis, the city-state. If taking care of oneself is a condition to take care of others, there is certain circularity at work that allows the social capital to be transformed into a legitimate competence. The care of the self is strongly related to certain political, social and economical privileges. Nevertheless, what was at first an aristocratic privilege and duty, eventually become generalised into an imperative valuable for everyone. With time, the care of the self became perceived as a defence mechanism that helps an individual to face all the problems, burdens and fails of the everyday life in the most efficient way.

Whether it was applied in the terms of education and knowledge, or as with Seneca, as a form of correction that should allow liberation, the care of the self became generally accepted as a certain purifying practice in regard of the values and habits received uncritically from the society. The question arises thus, how could the care of the self be universalised? It is not hard to see that the practices of the care of the self are necessarily related to the possession of free time. Even though Antique texts promote it into a general principle, it was actually most often practiced in close groups, schools, and institutions. Nevertheless, we do encounter similar phenomena within broader populations: with the unprivileged classes, the care of the self was usually related to religious rituals, exposes Foucault (2001). It always took place in certain cultural, therapeutic, and theoretical configuration, but it never was a unified phenomenon.

There is therefore a certain ethical split in the concept itself: on one hand, the care of the self demands a lot of time and capacities, on the other; it is being presented as a guideline for everyone. This form of universal appeal that is in reality only accessible to few is according to Foucault one of the main forms through which European culture, since it’s
Greco-Roman sources, presents itself. It is rather paradigmatic for the neoliberal system as well: the system in which good life is accessible to everyone in theory, but where only a minority can reach it in practice. The question arises if the principle of care of the self does not work as one of the first and most deeply rooted mechanisms that naturalize and interiorize social domination in our society. Stéphane Legrand in his essay on *L’herméneutique du sujet* (Legrand, internet) goes as far as suggesting that any demand for universality can possibly serve as a legitimation of an already existing difference. Nevertheless, it seems that the concept of the care of the self appeals strongly to Foucault. How could we, then, make a sensible usage of it, keeping in mind its internal contradictions?

**Relation to Truth as a Basis of Morality**

As we can see, the studies of Stoic and Epicurean ethics cannot really resolve the contemporary crisis of morals. Foucault himself underlines in one of his interviews that his intention was not to say: “Unfortunately, we forgot about the principle of the care of the self, now here it is, the key to everything…” (Foucault, 2007). What is really at stake with the studies of the care of the self is a different relation to the truth.

In Antiquity, the quest for truth was inseparable of certain practices, of a certain way of life; of what Pierre Hadot named “spiritual exercises” (Hadot, 2002). In this sense, moral questions had a priority over the epistemological ones. Even disciplines as logics or physics held their value in the fact that they helped the lived experience. A privileged relation between subject and the truth was at work, the individual had to get transformed and engage himself actively to access truth. As Foucault expresses it: “In European culture up to sixteenth century, the problem remains: What is the work I must effect upon myself as to be capable and worthy of acceding the truth? To put it another way: truth always has a price, no access to truth without aecesis.” (Foucault, internet: 279). For Foucault, this pattern ceased to be valuable with the break that was produced by the so-called “Cartesian moment”: the moment from which on the knowledge itself was considered to suffice to reach the truth, and the truth itself. From this “moment” on, the truth itself was no longer considered to be capable of transforming or liberating the subject. Thereby, the individual was left with the infinite progress of knowledge that became it’s own purpose. If before this epistemic break Cartesianism produced, the moral behaviour was supposed to be bringing its subject closer to the truth, we are today, on the contrary, trying to resolve the problem of morals through science. Nevertheless, Foucault points out, there are still certain fields of knowledge (as Marxism or psychoanalysis) that demand a personal engagement and transformation from the subject that is approaching them.

What we believe Foucault is trying to show us is that the studies of the Greco-Roman model of the relation to truth, could redefine our relation to truth: far from being a disinterested progress of knowledge, the latter would therefore be perceived as a product of personal engagement and a factor of transformation for the subject. Through re-reading Greek and Roman authors in that perspective, we could thus change our point of view, the posture of reason, and the way we problematize our reality. If Foucault pays that much attention to the Antique techniques of the self, it is to explore an alternative way in which
a subject can relate itself to truth, especially in opposition to practices of confession. Truth is hereby no longer to be said, it is to be practiced. It is in this view-changing perspective that reading antique authors is always beneficent, as well as reading Foucault.

Bibliography


Introduction

The following discussion proceeds against the backdrop of Michel Foucault’s definition of government as “conduct of conduct,” locating it at the point of contact between techniques of the self and techniques of domination (2001: 341). That is why government concerns itself with the “management of probability” and the “fields of possibilities” within which individuals act upon and constitute themselves as subjects, to act on and modify themselves. The concept of techniques of the self allows us to denote the indirectness of government and its operation beyond the state structure, two characteristics of advanced liberal forms of power, thus heightening its present-day conceptual relevance. Since this type of government operates less through subjugation of the subject than through the production of its subjectivity as well as its options of conduct, it has also been described as operating through rather than in opposition to individual freedoms. In other words, it entails the proliferation of techniques of the self, which also implies that such techniques always take place within the dynamics of power relations. Whereas Foucault’s lecture The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2006) has provided us with a rich account of ancient techniques of the self, others have compiled inventories of more contemporary ones; Ulrich Bröckling’s study of the “entrepreneurial self” stands out as one of the most extensive instances (2007). While most of these newer accounts focus on neoliberal practices, it should be kept in mind that self-techniques do not necessarily serve the purpose of or reproduce the relations of power in which they take place.

Giorgio Agamben has demonstrated the relevance of the legacy of the conceptual relation between potentiality and actuality for the analysis of Western practices of government. Following this lead the present paper seeks to inquire into the tension between potentiality and actuality at work within the temporal configuration of techniques of ancient and advanced modern practices of self-government. It begins with a brief conceptual summary of Agamben’s notion of potentiality, to subsequently compare and contrast the temporal

1. Also see e.g. Lemke 2000: 8-10.
2. Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess have shown that liberalism cannot be limited to government through freedom, and instead incorporates authoritarian aspects that do not govern the subject in its freedom; especially with regards to the one’s who are not in the position (or refuse) to realize their potentials out of their own motivated (see Dean 1999b; Dean 2001; Dean 2002; Dean 2007; Hindess 2001. Foucault already noted that individualization and totalization reinforce each other (see Foucault 2001).
configuration of three thematic groups of the two sets of techniques in light of that concept. From the resulting similarities and differences the paper’s conclusion points to possible lines of flight from entrepreneurial subjectivity. In conjunction with Agamben’s notion of pure potentiality Walter Benjamin’s concept of the messianic will be mobilized to briefly set forth a possible starting point for thinking beyond the dominant entrepreneurial relation. This task demands, the conclusion will argue, potentiality to be redeemed from its relation to actuality.

1. The Concept of the Potential

In summary, three conclusions can be extracted from Agamben’s rereading of Aristotle’s doctrine of potentiality. First, since potentialities, understood as capacities to do or be something (for example the capacity to play an instrument), also exist without “pass[ing] over into actuality,” every potential to be or do always also is a potential not to be or do (Agamben 1998: 45ff.). Given that the potential does not cease to exist in the moment of its actualization (the player does not lose their capacity when playing), “pure potentiality” exists autonomously and independently of actuality in the form of impotentiality, or potentiality not to. From this double-sided nature of potentiality follows the second conclusion; the actualization of a potential is the suspension, or setting aside, of its potential not to. From this perspective, the player can play only by suspending their capacity not to play. However, and here we arrive at his third conclusion, as the moment where the two sides find together, this suspension of impotentiality in the passage to actuality has to be understood as the preservation and fulfillment of the potentiality rather than as its destruction.

2. Compare and Contrast: Ancient and Entrepreneurial Techniques of the Self in Light of Potentiality

3. Of course there is a wide range of existing literature on the concept of techniques of the self, both in its Roman-Greek and advanced modern entrepreneurial formulations, including but not limited to: Bernauer 1988; Burchell 1993; Gordon 1991; Davidson 1986; Davidson 1994; Davidson 1997; Rose 1998; Rose 1999; Rose 2008; Taylor 2004. While this paper could not have been written without works such as these, its aim will be to contribute to the ongoing discussion by focusing on the temporal construction of the subject and its relation to potentiality through a comparative analysis of the two kinds of formulations. Foucault’s analysis of ancient practices of the self, and therefore indirectly the analysis conducted in this section, owes much to Pierre Hadot’s historical study of ancient philosophy as way of life that is composed of spiritual exercises. Hadot conceptualizes ancient philosophy as permanent exercise, as an art of living that encompasses, and coincides with, one’s entire existence at every moment (see Hadot 1995; Hadot 2004). His influence on Foucault’s work on ethics, aesthetics of existence, and the care of the self has been discussed (including by Hadot himself) more thoroughly in several analyses, including but not limited to: Davidson 1986; Davidson 1994; Davidson 1997; Hadot 1992. Also relevant in this regard are the some of the interviews with Foucault focusing on the question of ethics (1984).

What has been termed the “entrepreneurial” self or culture has been analyzed at least since the late 1980s. Usually however, those studies have been relatively brief or outlining. One of the more comprehensive analysis has been published by Ulrich Bröckling (2007), which brings together strands of this contemporary framework of techniques of the self otherwise often addressed in dispersed manner, it provides a crucial resource to this paper’s analysis.
It would be facile to portray practices of the self of the entrepreneurial culture of our times as some sort of resurrection of Roman-Greek techniques of the care of self. The ostensible similarities one could call on are plentiful: The ancient *premeditation of evils* reappears in the form of the entrepreneurial imagination of future states of success; one’s ability to face any challenge if one just mobilizes one’s potentials resembles the ancients’ goal of invulnerability to external events acquired by practices of endurance and the rehearsal of death; the test of congruence of principles of truth and one’s actions is revived by the evaluation of the coherence between one’s personal ‘corporate identity’ and its public perception; the periodical review and adjustment of one’s means and goals restores the repeated measuring of one’s progress and recapitulation of one’s deeds, both of which examine a possible mismatch between the means deployed and the ends they are supposed to assist accomplishing; the requirement to start as early as possible with investing in the formation of individual machines of competence looks like the appeal to take care of oneself in young years already; philosophy as lifelong preparation resurfaces as the impossibility to ever complete one’s life project or endless self-optimization. However convenient such an approach would be, in what follows I will try to show that it would mean to prematurely equate and oversimplify the relation between the two arrays of techniques. Examining them through the concept of potentiality by way of three thematic case studies of sorts—each juxtaposing certain ancient and entrepreneurial practices—will instead bring to light both ostensible similarities and significant differences. However, since there is not enough time to provide detailed descriptions of these techniques, the focus will lie on conceptual implications drawn from their analysis. Each theme hopefully contributes insight into a slightly different aspect of the contrast between the two configurations of potentiality.

4. Agamben has dedicated various texts, or sections thereof, to the explicit reinterpretation of the concept of potentiality. He introduces this reading at different points, in varying contexts, and in dispersed stages of his writing (see 1999; 2003; 2005; 2005b; 2006; 2007; 2010). It could even be argued that it occupies a central place within his work and has implicitly permeated all of his writings. However, for the sake of brevity, this paper’s summary will be limited to the account in Agamben 1998. Heller-Roazen (1999) provides an outstanding explanatory summary of the issue.

5. According to Agamben, Aristotle conceptualizes it as the moment where potentiality turns “back upon itself in order to give itself to itself” (1998: 46).

6. In the case of similarities, it should be clear that what is being suggested here, is not anything like a historical continuity but merely that it is theoretically fruitful to examine how certain aspects of ancient techniques seem to reappear (in a reconfigured form) in entrepreneurial self-practices of advanced modernity.
Entrepreneurial speculation fundamentally depends on the future’s uncertainty. It ventures out into the uncertainty of an event’s occurrence, that is, of whether it will actualize, whether it will set aside its impotentiality. Simultaneously, it reinforces the displacement of what is already actualized in the present, which is to say, it aims at the cancellation of said setting aside of impotentiality.

It may seem as if ancient anticipation similarly displaces the current actuality with the actualization of the potential misfortune. However, it does so in order to extend the actuality of the present. Anticipation accesses the not yet actualized potentiality not to prevent it from realization, but to instead defuse its effects. Corresponding closely to the literal meaning of the Latin anticipare as ‘taking beforehand,’ anticipation ‘takes away’ in advance the impotentiality of what it anticipates. Its purpose is neither actualization nor non-actualization of the potentiality of the future, but rather its de-actualization. Put differently, anticipation renders inactive the reality of what it anticipates without preventing it from occurring. The misfortune can still occur but with its potential deactivated. In other words, ancient anticipation invests the future with certainty to such an extent that it passes into actuality in advance, and precisely thereby deprives it of its potentiality to influence reality.

Entrepreneurial speculation as von Mises—one of the forefathers of advanced liberalism—defines it, in contrast, is characterized by the simultaneity and mutual dependence of the uncertainty of the future and the attempts to predict it better than and in competition to others (cf. 1980). This uncertainty is precondition for speculative action. As soon as the future becomes a question of the actualization of possibilities, the passage from potentiality to actuality is charged with uncertainty, around which entrepreneurial speculation revolves. This managerial activity was of utter irrelevance to the Roman-Greek care of the self.

Based on the assertion that human action is future-oriented in general, von Mises quickly extends the definition of speculation (that is, the dealing with the uncertainty of the future) to all human activity. Not only is the entrepreneur “always a speculator” since he deals “with the uncertain conditions of the future,” but moreover is every human action tainted with uncertainty (von Mises 1996: 250/290). To the entrepreneurial self the absence of uncertainty is tantamount to the inability of action. Certainty is standstill, the most despised state of being. Ancient neutralization of the future and freezing of the present thus both contradict entrepreneurial speculation at heart.7

It would be insufficient to locate the difference between ancient anticipation and contemporary speculation in the desire to know the future. Instead, entrepreneurial speculation, unlike ancient anticipation, is highly interested in the future actualization of what it may have foreseen. The entrepreneur recognizes the potentiality of something not yet actualized, and, in the present, invests in its future actualization. While the ancient form of anticipation nullifies the effects of the not yet actualized, the speculation invests in these very effects. The former de-actualizes the potentiality of the future, the latter pushes for

7. The debate about the relationship between uncertainty and risk is not subject of this paper. See instead: Dean 1999; O’Malley 2004; Zinn 2008. As the remarks on von Mises indicate, however, the role of uncertainty in advanced liberalism is underestimated when reduced to “some” management gurus who preach the liberating powers of uncertainty (see e.g. Pat O’Malley 2008: 73).
techniques of the self in view of potentiality

its actualization in the hope it will be rewarding. In Roman-Greek practices of the premeditation of death, the present action, on the one hand, is being confronted, in a similar fashion, with the question of its replaceability by the actualization of an alternative potentiality. On the other hand, the aim instead lies in extending the presence of the activity that is reflective of the last moment of one’s life, and not in the continual displacement of the present.

That, in a market environment, investment is always accompanied by its counterpart divestment indicates that its logic is that of choice. Speculation is the activity that chooses between divestment as the suspension of a potentiality’s actualization and investment as the suspension of an impotentiality in order to actualize its potentiality. Speculation arranges potentiality and actuality in a configuration of mutual dependence, which ultimately leads to the indistinguishability of pure potentiality and pure actuality. As we will see later, what results is perpetual deferral of a goal that one nevertheless seeks to achieve. From the perspective of the entrepreneurial self, the present is reduced to a set of choices of how to replace the present with a state to come, rendering necessary the actualization of at least one of the future’s possibilities. Its present always offers space for improvement. Since the future is uncertain, one can never cease optimizing one’s flexibility, which in turn transforms the future into a horizon of never-ending improvability.

While the entrepreneurial self must look into the future to progress on its never-ending path, the Roman-Greek self walks into the future with the back turned, ignorant of any other source of happiness than the present, which ideally is brought to a standstill.\(^8\) Whereas to the former the future’s openness to human action is constitutive of its conduct, to the latter future is not just unknown but is also closed to human influence. Neither of them, however, is able to predict the future with certainty.

\(2^{nd}\) Theme: On Personal Identity—From “Ethics of Distance” to the Multiplication of Flexible Masks

It may be tempting to conceive of the flexibility that accompanies personal identities of neoliberal subjectivity, along with its quest for personal self-realization, as rediscovery of the so-called ethical distance introduced by Roman-Greek techniques of the self.\(^9\) However, once we recognize that the former maintains this ‘distance’ in the nothingness of what Agamben has described as “an infinite multiplication of masks,” the supposed similarities with ancient subjectivity diminish (2010: 53). The ancient self can ‘be’ a mask—that is, take on an office or fulfill a social role—precisely because they can also not be it, capable of bearing its own impotentiality. The entrepreneurial self, on the other hand, maintains this suspension of the mask and appropriates the emptiness of its flexibility as its own substance. Unlike that of the former, the latter’s ability not to be what it currently is, is always already directed at the potentiality of something else to be actualized.

\(^8\) The idea of walking into the future with the back turned was explicitly expressed in the personification of kairos, the Olympic god who, in a statue at an altar in Olympia, is represented as winged and flying with the wind, the back of whose head is bald and his face covered by a forelock. This representation is usually interpreted as depiction of the fleeting opportunity that can or has to be seized while it is approaching, but cannot be recovered once neglected or passed. You can take kairos by the forelock, but cannot take hold of him from behind (see De la Durantaye 2009: 118; Roscher 1890: 897ff.). While a more detailed treatment of the role of kairos is beyond the scope of this paper, it has been developed more fully in an unpublished version.

\(^9\)
Although the entrepreneurial self is freed from the confinement to the identity of a particular mask, it is being crushed under the weight of having to remain emptied out to such an extent that it is able to flexibly take on whatever mask required or desired. The ethics of the ancient, instead, lies solely in the distance between the actuality of the mask one is currently wearing and its own impotentiality, that is, the ability to not wear that same mask. The ancient “ethics of distance” allows one to fulfill a social function without making it one’s own affair. It limits the mask to its functional and temporary definition, preventing it from attaining the status of a stable “social identity” or from determining one’s self-relationship, hindering the “ethical subject” from ever fully coinciding with its social role (Gros 2006: 542).

The entrepreneurial culture has appropriated the promise of self-realization to such an extent that it has elevated it to one of its maxims. According to this dream, the future holds the resources for everybody’s self-actualization. Under its regime, one is or possesses whatever potentials one is capable of actualizing. In this sense, one at once is what one is and ought to become what one already is. This paradox of becoming what one already is illustrates the relation between potentiality and actuality as it is being configured by the entrepreneurial paradigm. One is the impotential that one is able to suspend. In other words, actualization and suspension collapse into the same activity. One actualizes by forestalling, and one forestalls by actualizing.10

We have seen that, conceptually speaking, potentiality passes into actuality by setting aside its potential not to, and that actuality, in this sense, merely is a “second order potentiality,” that is, a suspended impotentiality (Heller-Roazen 1999: 17). The internalized imperatives of flexibility, self-optimization, to live one’s dreams, and so on are reflections of today’s prevalence of and continuous drive towards the suspension of the potentiality not to. Under its reign, reality is perceived as a field to which one relates by form of suspension of one’s own potential not to. Agamben describes this contemporary form of power that acts on the potentiality not to as even more devastating than the one that aims at preventing what one can be or do (2010: 44). It separates from one’s impotentiality.

9. In Roman-Greek thought, maintaining “the relationship of the to self as the principle, as the rule of the relationship to things, events and the world,” implies maintaining a distance to external factors, such as social roles, but does not entail inactivity or isolative stance (Foucault quoted in Gros 2006: 538). Quite the opposite is the case. The distance produced by the maintenance of self-relationship enables the self to situate itself within the world correctly, Gros deduces. But what this distance and in the form of “an irreducible independence” and the “primacy of the relationship to self over any other relationship” does entail is the restriction of the influence of one’s social functions and roles on oneself. It does not obstruct the exercise of such functions, but limits them to their temporariness and subordinates them to the primacy of one’s self-relationship, hindering an identification of self and social function. Hence, the care of self is a “regulative principle of activity,” a form of withdrawal that allows for the proper devotion to other activities (Gros 2006: 538). It creates a distance from activity which regulates, rather than nullifies, it. Foucault argues that the care of the self should be conceived “less as a choice opposed to political, civic, economic and familial activity, than as a way of keeping this activity within what are thought to be the appropriate limits and forms” (Foucault quoted in Gros 2006: 538-9). This regulation, however, is only possible because of the temporal configuration of these practices. It is the lifelong preparation for external events one may have to confront that generates the distance, allowing one to stand back from activities while one is pursuing them. Mastering these events is “a matter of constituting the individual as rational subject of action.” Such rational action is possible only if “the relationship of the to self” has been maintained “as the principle, as the rule of the relationship to things, events and the world.” This maintenance is nothing else than the lifelong preparation for potential events to come.

10. Hence, every entrepreneurial action has an inherently preventative element.
tentiality by enforcing its suspension in the act. It is this prevention of experiencing what one can not do, and the resulting ‘blindness’ to one’s incapacities, that fosters the belief of individual omnipotence in the face of an unprecedented sense of loss of control over one’s own life. “Nothing,” Agamben writes, “makes us more impoverished and less free than this estrangement from impotentiality” (2010: 45). Separation from what one can do at least leaves available the option of resistance in the form of not doing (civil disobedience, for example), whereas the inaccessibility of one’s own impotentiality bluntly inhibits the resort to resistance.

Analogously, the personal capacity fundamental to the ethics of ancient care of the self to, as Agamben puts it in a different context, “not coincide with the social mask that I have nevertheless taken on” is replaced by the entrepreneurial flexibility to assume any of the “masks” called for (2010: 50). Against this ethical separation “of the individual from the mask” today’s crisis of stable identities “asserts the illusion … of an infinite multiplication of masks” (Agamben 2010: 53).

3rd Theme: From the Neutralization of the Future to its Perpetual Deferral

Similar to the aspects just discussed, elements of the ancient neutralization of the future seemingly resurface in advanced modernity in the form of the nullification of any specific subjective personal destiny. However, the entrepreneurial self maintains this in the form of an empty teleology and thereby, in fact, increases the force of the future’s slipstream that pulls along the present. Ancient techniques of the self, in contrast, follow through with the neutralization of the future to such an extent that the present comes to a standstill.

Although the entrepreneurial self is freed from having to fulfill a specific destiny, it is captured in the perpetual deferral resulting from the inability of completion entailed in the ceaseless succession of tasks. Correspondingly, that one continuously engages in projects is more important nowadays than what their actual content is. The happiness of the ancient lies solely in the frozen present, that is, in this one task pursued right now, which has to be displaced only if it fails to reflect the activity one wishes to conduct on the last day of one’s life. The imperative of temporariness inherent in pursuing a series of projects, conversely, orients every act of the entrepreneurial self towards the subsequent one, thus establishing a paradoxical teleology characterized by an irresolvable dialectical relation between potentiality and actuality. Since this ‘better other’ necessarily lies in the future, it generates the ceaseless striving typical to the neoliberal paradigms of personal progress, growth, and endless optimization—perpetually re-deferring the achievement of what it is aiming at. To the entrepreneurial self, it is this void teleological striving itself that becomes the new task to be pursued. As long as it one strives, which task a person takes on is not relevant any more. Instead of freezing the present, this paradoxical teleology of

11. Although Agamben develops this argument of an impersonal identity via a discussion of biometrics, a reading through potentiality seems as reasonable. He writes: “It is against this separation that the new identity without the person asserts the illusion not of a unity, but of an infinite multiplication of masks. At the moment when individuals are nailed down to a purely biological and asocial identity, they are also promised the ability to assume all the masks and all the second and third lives possible on the Internet, none of which can ever really belong to them.” (Agamben 2010: 53)
late modernity constructs an “unresolved dialectic” between the suspension of potentiality to be and the reinstatement of its actuality in the form of setting aside the impotentiality that has been put in force by the aforementioned suspension (Agamben 1998: 44).

Roman-Greek lifelong preparation ‘makes ready’ by providing the self with a capability of non-reaction, preparing the practicing self not to react when the anticipated event is trying to actualize its disrupting potentiality. The accumulation of potentials under the entrepreneurial imperative of growth, on the other hand, is directed at the increase of the ability to react to whatever situation may occur. In other words, it is through the suspension of the ability not to react that one actualizes the accumulated potentials. Roman-Greek care of the self reminds one of what is and what is not in one’s powers. It reduces one’s powers to the absolute minimum of the present. Entrepreneurial conduct, conversely, mobilizes one’s potentiality to master whatever may come. It increases one’s capabilities to a never-exhausting maximum. While in both cases, the self can deal with whatever may come, the former can so because it is not in its power, the latter, however, because it is in its power to master the challenge. The former does so by warding off, the latter by flexibly adjusting to the effects of external events.

The entrepreneurial paradigms of personal growth, self-realization, and accumulation all share the same form of the management of potentiality and its double-sidedness. On the one hand, they push for actualization, being the only source of ‘reward’. On the other hand, they have to forestall actualization, since only the speculative gaze at the not yet fulfilled future can create advantage over others. The entrepreneurial self is this manager whose field of action is limited to the choice between these two options. We can see here that the entrepreneurial self has applied the speculative logic onto itself. It does not merely conjecture about external events and their potentiality, but instead conceives of itself as the accumulation of potentiality that ought to be managed. The object of management is the configuration of the relation between personal potentiality and actuality. To ‘live your dream’ has become tantamount to the management of your own potentialities and their actualizations. Everybody can live their dream, but in order to do so, one’s potentialities have to be both accumulated and actualized.

3. Conclusion

Our times are characterized by an entrepreneurial dynamic that captures potentiality and actuality in ceaseless tension, simultaneously separating and keeping them in relation, resulting in what has been described as perpetual deferral. In the course of this analysis, the entrepreneurial self has assumed the shape of a manager of the passage from potentiality to actuality, who is called on to both actualize its potential by setting aside its impotentiality (illustrated by the maxim of self-optimization) and suspend actualization by cancelling the setting aside of this impotentiality (exemplified by the imperative to accumulate one’s personal potentials and forestall their actualization). That the entrepreneurial self is called on to take on an infinite multiplicity of masks and tasks, for example, cannot be attributed to the “crushing weight of the necessity of actualization” alone, as Jon Short aptly pointed out (304). Actualization as the setting aside of impotentiality accounts only for one of the two sides of the same coin. The other side consists in its sus-
pension. Together, these two polar yet mutual forces establish a relation of “reciprocal
grounding,” which is the entrepreneurial self’s locus of operation, capturing in unresolv-
able tension while blurring these two potentialities (Agamben 2005: 85).  

*The Messianic*

If we acknowledge the entrepreneurial self as expression of one particular historical con-
figuration of the relation of potentiality and actuality, then the question of alternative con-
figurations inevitably emerges. One such figure operating at the same locus is the
*messianic*, which resurfaces numerously in Agamben’s work. I consider it of particular
conceptual interest, on the one hand, because what he has termed “petrified or paralyzed
messianism” offers new insight into the entrepreneurial configuration of potentiality
(Agamben 1999: 171). On the other hand, as I would like to suggest here, because the
form of potentiality ‘coming’ with the ‘Messiah’, which for the lack of a better term shall
be called *genuine* messianism, confronts precisely the issues trapping our times in the
configuration analyzed throughout this presentation. Instead of trying to either make a
clear-cut distinction or simply collapse the two sets of techniques onto each other, trans-
lating them into the messianic corroborates a more nuanced understanding of their rela-
tion.

The loosening of the identity and congruence between mask and self, enabled by the
ancient ethical distance, seems to have sowed the seeds of the maintenance of the sus-
pension leading to the multiplication of lifestyles, identities, and milieus. Anticipation
enabled acting upon the present by mobilizing the future, aspects of which resurface in
entrepreneurial speculation. Similarly, contemporary forms of improvisation and creativity
may have inherited some of their qualities from ancient conjectural arts. The nullification
of the future, and the standstill of the present entailed by it, has allowed for the suspen-
sion of tasks to fulfill, resulting in the maintenance of an endlessly deferred teleology.
However, construing the relation between the two sets of techniques in this way is viable
only if it comes with the recognition that all these ostensible similarities are accompanied
with significant differences and have only reappear in profoundly transformed guise. In
sum, all their ostensible similarities come with significant differences and their apparent
resurrection only appears in a profoundly transformed guise. I would suggest perceiving
their relation as one of *amplification* or *contraction*, in the process of which certain crucial
characteristics were rearranged. The lose separation between potentiality and actuality

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12. This relationship is structured in the form of an *inclusive exclusion*.
13. Introducing the messianic into these discussions is often met with skepticism or even scorn. The *messianic* (and even more so the *Messiah*) seems antiquated, mystical, or at least mysterious, wherefore one may be better off casting it aside. Perhaps the secularization of the West was believed to have ensured the removal of the desire for messianism. In terms of temporality, messianism could be accused of advocating the return to a lost origin (even if it may lie in the future), or more likely, of endorsing a form of eternal post-
ponement by passively waiting for a Messiah that never comes. These two positions, it could be claimed,
roughly correspond to the two major Judeo-Christian traditions of messianism: One holds that Messiah will
come once humanity has prepared the grounds for such arrival by establishing a messianic kingdom, the
other one maintains that Messiah’s coming is not in the hands of humanity and can therefore solely be
awaited. Eva Geulen (2005), for example, deems the concept of the messianic “mysterious” in the first edi-
tion of her otherwise excellent introduction to Agamben. The second edition, however, which was not possi-
ble to consult here, assumedly approaches the issue differently. This paper takes a different stance, and
claims that it nevertheless makes sense to speak of our age as a messianic one.
'introduced' in the ancient techniques, for instance, resurfaces with a significant amplification of both their separation and their relation. This situation can be translated into the relation between paralyzed and genuine forms of the messianic. Managerial potentiality corresponds to its paralyzed variant because it, “like all messianisms,” nullifies (or suspends) the potential to be actualized, yet—and here we encounter a quality specific to its petrified version—maintains its absence in infinite deferral (Agamben 1999: 171). The entrepreneurial self consigns itself to this indefinitely prolonged progress, the ultimate unattainability of self-realization of endless self-optimizing growth.

A non-petrified or genuine messianism, in contrast, would denote a configuration of potentiality that challenges the capturing of the self in this vicious cycle. Rather than pretending to put forward any specific possibly ‘messianic techniques’, I will outline what I perceive as a more genuinely messianic conception of potentiality, and triangulate that with the ways in which ancient and entrepreneurial techniques have configured them. Unlike its paralyzed counterpart, genuine messianism follows through and redeems potentiality from the reduction to the maintenance of the nothingness of suspension. Following Agamben’s hypothesis that it will be necessary to think of potentiality and actuality “no longer in the form of a relation” if one wants to break with the paradoxical structure at play here, Short isolates the passage from potentiality to actuality as key question (Agamben 1998: 60). He writes,

potentiality must be thought of as a pure means removed from or outside of every posited end, every actualization. This does not mean that potentiality never passes into the actual ... but that potentiality remains indifferent to the divisions and differences to which it gives rise and in which it is also included: in this sense it would remain impotent in the midst of the actualizations it “allows” to occur. (Short 2008: 196)

Genuine messianism would push to the extreme the partial rendering indifferent of social identities introduced by the ancient ethical distance, deepen it while deactivating the spectacularization of flexible identities. In a similar manner, it would escalate the neutralization of the future and the freezing of the present achieved by ancient practices of anticipation into rendering inoperative not only personal destiny but ultimately any task that ought to be fulfilled without carrying on the endlessly deferred telos. It is precisely insofar as this capability not to be must not be appropriated “as a substance and a foundation” which would mean “to regard potentiality itself ... as a fault that must always be repressed,” that the messianic disables the perpetual deferral characteristic to its counterpart (Agamben 2003: 43-4).

Benjamin explicitly separates the messianic present from “a transition,” and instead depicts it as one “in which time ... has come to a standstill” (2003: 396). The fulfillment of the present in the ancient premeditation of death resembles the messianic task of our time insofar as it grasps not the days of the end, but rather “the end of all days, that is, every day,” to use another distinction Agamben makes (2007: 27). Every moment, or “every second,” as Benjamin writes, is “the small gateway in time through which the Messiah might enter” (2003: 397). Every present affair, no matter how small, is an opportunity that may be capable of instituting the required “small adjustment” so that differences existing in actuality may retain and bear their own impotentiality. De la Durantaye likens this to a life which “no longer waits for a culminating event that will crystallize, dissolve, transform, or transubstantiate it” (2009: 389). Thus, the messianic is precisely not that
‘pure future’ of the eternally postponed goal of entrepreneurialism, but instead “represents the effort to see the world as nothing more than it is,” not based on an “order to come,” but instead on what is already present (De la Durantaye 2009: 382). In this sense, only when the administration of the passage from potentiality to actuality has been rendered inoperative, “the Messiah will be able to enter” through this “small gateway” (Agamben 1998: 57; Benjamin 2003: 397). This is why “the Messiah will only come when he is no longer necessary, ... he will come not on the last day, but on the very last day,” as Kafka put it (1946: 57).14

The genuinely messianic abolishes neither potentiality nor actuality but redeems potentiality from having to pass into actuality, or to put it the other way around, redeems actuality from having to spring from potentiality. It brings the striving of self-optimization for a telos never to come to a halt and returns to us the transience of time.15 The standstill it introduces severs the relation between the two, releasing them from being captured in the “unresolved dialectic” between suspension and reinstatement that drives the eternal deferral. As a result, as the self-managing entrepreneur is no longer appointed to his former task to both suspend and reactivate, the passage from potentiality to actuality is freed from administrative supervision. In other words, genuine messianism is capable of the suspension of both potentiality and impotentiality, but no longer maintains potentiality and actuality in relation to each other, that is, no longer maintains them in the unresolved dialectic between suspension and reinstatement that drives the eternal deferral.

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14. Both Agamben’s discussion of the modern phenomena of the ‘charismatic’ power of the doctor (leader) and Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” illustrate this dynamic (Agamben 2005: 81ff.; Kafka, internet). The former, Agamben claims, emerges from the dialectic between auctoritas and potestas in Roman law and ultimately “coincides with the neutralization of law” in the state of exception, or more precisely with the authority to both suspend law (or potestas) “where it took place” and reactivate it “where it was no longer in force” (1998: 85/79). Interestingly, the rediscovery of the notion of auctoritas in the early 20th century, originally describing the power to suspend the juridical order in Roman law, almost coincides with the rise of authoritarian regimes in Europe, and a modern type of power that comes to be defined as “ductus.” The latter (the interpretation of which figures prominently in Agamben’s work) could also be said to tell the story of the confrontation between doctor and Messiah. The doctor administrates the passage, behind which even more dreadful doorkeepers await the one who has not received safe passage. In this sense, the leader (ductor) is the one who regulates the passage; whether by deciding what finds application in it, or by shielding someone from such application by guiding and leading the way (even if its just by issuing a passport), preventing the application from actualizing. Either way, leading means to manage the passage between potentiality and actuality. The Messiah, on the other hand, performs a complicated strategy to have the passage closed and rendered inoperative its administration eventually.

15. See Benjamin 1978: 312 for an example of his use of the notion of transience.


Introducing Experience Into Philosophical Practices
Is There any Other Side of Discourse? Concept of Experience in Foucault’s Early Writings

I

Following essay is a part of a broader project of reading Michel Foucault’s work. I do not focus on the chronological development which usually differentiates three main periods of his thought – interest in knowledge, power, and subjectivity –, neither I pay attention to the specific content or topics of his analysis, like madness, sexuality or biopolitics. My approach is more general. In a logical order it can be sketched in four points: 1) The dissolution of the subject as methodological presupposition and metaphysical thesis; 2) Analysis of the systems of knowledge which constructs the ‘true’/’normal’/’natural’/’objective’ constitutions of subject and experience; 3) Genealogical analysis as a critique – creation of a negative space, where hitherto rationalisations are seen as external, historical and contingent; 4) The ways of moving forward – limit-experience, possibilities of transformation. In this essay I am going to elaborate mainly on the first point with the emphasis on the category of experience and its relation to the category of discourse.

The essay consist of three parts. In the first part I focus on the possibility of discussing the category of experience in Foucault’s thought. I begin with Foucault’s reinterpretation of French philosophy of science and it’s relation to the question of Aufklärung. Then I move to the hitherto elaborations on the category of experience, which is precisely the limit experience. In my opinion it is possible to trace also other kind of experience in Foucault’s works, namely the ‘prediscursive’ experience. For this purpose, in the second part I analyse in detail first chapters of The Archaeology of Knowledge. Defining category of discourse enables to see its relation with reality and experience in a non-dualistic framework. From this perspective, in the third part, I critically discuss a well know article The Evidence of Experience by Joan W. Scott and finally give reasons for the possibility of ‘prediscursive’ experience, which shines through little splits in discourses and efforts of creating a method of their reconstruction.

II

In an article published in 1985 Foucault draw two trajectories of contemporary French thought. The first trajectory, “a philosophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject” was
IS THERE ANY OTHER SIDE OF DISCOURSE?

represented by philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The second one “a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality, and of the concept” is rooted in the tradition of French philosophy of science with lineage of Jean Cavailles, Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyre, and Georges Canguilhem (Foucault 1998: 466). It is not hard to guess, in which of these trajectories Foucault placed himself. But should we understand it as a rejection of a category of experience as his philosophical interest? Definitely he is not interested in a phenomenological approach to it, because “phenomenology tries to grasp the significance of daily experience in order to reaffirm the fundamental character of the subject, of the self, of its transcendental functions” (Foucault 1991: 31). However it does not mean that he entirely abandoned the problem of experience. Although Foucault situated himself in the tradition of French philosophy of science, we should pay attention to the fact, that he reinterpreted it after his fashion. He saw it “as a medium for the philosophical question of historical Aufklärung” (Foucault 1998: 468), i.e. the question concerned with the present. In a well-known essay What is Enlightenment? Foucault retrospectively ascribed to all of his writings a critical aim, which he call a historical ontology of ourselves. I am not going to summarize Foucault’s understanding of Aufklärung, I only would like to point out one important issue, which is closely related to the category of experience. French philosopher emphasised, that “Kant defines Aufklärung in an almost entirely negative way, as an Ausgang, an “exit,” a “way out” (Foucault 1997: 305). This is precisely the ethical aim of his historical ontology of ourselves – the cross-over. It is a cross-over from the hitherto constitutions of our subjectivity. And of the one possibilities for that cross-over is a limit-experience.

There is a line of argumentation, followed or even created by Martin Jay in an article The Limits of Limit-Experience: Bataille and Foucault from 1995 and James Miller (famous biography The Passion of Michel Foucault published in 1993), which emphasised the importance of the category of experience, precisely the limit-experience in Foucault’s life and work. They stressed the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche, Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, and based their argumentation mostly on Preface to the first edition of History of madness, A Preface do Transgression, and Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori. In this view limit-experiences like sadomasochism or drugs are exceeding the limits of coherent subjectivity, in which illusion we live in everyday life. I agree with their view, but in my essay I am going to approach the concept of experience from other side. I am interested not in the experience, which exceeds and blows up limits of a coherent subject, but in experience, which precedes it. Experience, which is ‘predis-cursive’.

III

Although The Archaeology of Knowledge has been written to answer some methodological inaccuracies (raised i.a. by Epistemological Circle of the E.N.S.) concerning previous Foucault’s books, it is not an explication of method applied in The Order of Things, as it is usually thought. Furthermore, archaeological method was never fully used by Foucault in any of the following books. One year after publishing The Archaeology of Knowledge, in a lecture delivered at Collège de France archaeological analysis was not even mentioned. The central concern was put on the critical and genealogical analysis, what allowed to
approach the concept of discourse from a different way, namely as a discursive practice. A split\(^1\), which lead to this shift of perspective, is already present in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

First of all it is crucial to emphasise, that the object of description for Foucault was a document, and not – the world. The task was not to reconstitute the past basing on different kinds of traces and interpretatively filling the gaps made by eroding work of time. The task is to describe documents and establish them in series and “series of series” (organise vertical relations between separate horizontal series). Therefore to describe a discourse – “the patient construction of discourses about discourses” (Foucault 2003: XVIII) – does not mean to describe reality related to a discourse in some specific way, but it is precisely the discourse, that endure the past in the form of documents. In this sense Foucault calls document to be a monument; by transforming documents into monuments archaeology reconstitutes their materiality and, in the same move, places them in the realm of reality.

The level of analysis is a discursive field, discursive unity of statements. For books “it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences” (Foucault 2002: 25). This intertextuality on the level of statements is the reason, why categories such as book and śuvre, great historical individualities (science, literature, philosophy, religion, history, fiction, etc. (Foucault 2002: 24)), notions evoking the theme of continuity (tradition, influence, development, evolution, ‘mentality’, ‘spirit’) should not be merely neglected but should themselves become objects to analysis as discursive facts, events from the same level of dispersion like elements which were previously allegedly described by them – the statements. Foucault proposed their problematization in order to smooth out folds which seemed to be a safe place for posing questions. By questioning all of hitherto fundament his methodology aims at the experience of lack of fundaments, seeing them as historical and contingent. The field of research that is now present, he described as “the totality of all effective statements (whether spoken or written), in their dispersion as events and in the occurrence that is proper to them” (Foucault 2002: 29). It is the same field as in *The Discourse on Language*, where he asked “what discourse is, when it is manifested materially, as a written or spoken object” (Foucault: 216) and that material manifestation imply its elusiveness, “a transitory existence, destined for oblivion” (Foucault: 216). Materiality of discourse is closely connected to its event-driven character. Peculiar consequence of the ambivalence of its materiality, which makes discourse present and elusive at the same time, is an observation that discourse is at once an object and a subject of power. It opened a brand new approach to discursive analysis in Foucault’s later books. Meanwhile, on the pages of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, materiality indicates finiteness of discursive events. Description of discursive events is a description of only these events, which already occurred, materially manifested, and not of possible statements or rules of their constructions. Question posed by analysis of discursive field is following: “how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (Foucault 2002: 30). Materiality clearly require to look at what is already present in a discursive event, not at what it indicates, refers to or manifests. Therefore discursive analysis focuses on the conditions of existence, limits, and correlations between statements. The crucial emphasis is brought with the word event in the category of a discursive event. “(...) a statement is always an event that neither the language

\(^1\) By a split I mean an effort of drawing a relation between discourse and reality, which is solved in *The Discourse on Language* by focusing on discursive practices. I elaborate on this problem later in the essay.
Is There Any Other Side of Discourse?

(langue) nor the meaning can quite exhaust. (...) it is linked not only to the situations that provoke it, and to the consequences that it gives rise to, but at the same time, and in accordance with a quite different modality, to the statements that precede and follow it” (Foucault 2002: 31; underlines A. J.). In a quoted passage a split between dualistic language-reality framework is already present but not overcome. Although a statement is linked to ‘the statements that precede and follow it’, as an event it is situated in the realm of reality just like enigmatic ‘situations that provoke it’ and ‘consequences that it gives rise to’. The disturbance in the methodology, that I would like to point at, is even more clear, when Foucault discussed relations between statements, groups of statements, and “between statements and groups of statements and events of a quite different kind (technical, economic, social, political)” (Foucault 2002: 32; underlines A. J.). As far as two first kinds of relations are horizontal (between statements and/or groups of statements) or vertical (in the case of ‘series of series’), the third kind seems to run crosswise. The space in which discursive events are deployed, constructed at first as flat surface turns out to be an “interplay of relations within it and outside it” (Foucault 2002: 32).

Nonetheless, already in the next chapter (II.2 Discursive Formations) Foucault seems to return to the realm of language by asking for a rule to form a unity of a group of statements. After contextualization and historicization of hitherto ‘super-expressions’, pulling them down to the level of other statements, Foucault is searching for a basis of explanation. Therefore he introduced a new category: a discursive formation, which is an effect of ordering statements according to the system of their dispersion, i.e. description of statement’s system of dispersion. Recognition of the system of dispersion for a unity of a group of statements is a realisation of a postulate to rehabilitate the concept of discontinuity. It is also a consequence of previous failures with effort of forming their unity by notions of object (History of Madness), style (The Birth of the Clinic), concept and theme (The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences). These four notions entered the discursive analysis as main categories of description of a discursive formation. I am not going to elaborate precisely on each one of them, but I focus my attention on these aspects of their description, which help to grasp the concept of discourse more precisely.

It is important to notice that the previous question posted by the discursive analysis: ‘how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?’, is gently displaced and reformulated into a question for a principle of appearance of objects in a discourse. Foucault gave three answers, which turned out to be “planes of differentiation in which the objects of discourse may appear” (Foucault 2002: 47). The first one is a mysterious concept of surfaces of emergence – places, where given objects “may emerge, and then be designated and analysed” (Foucault 2002: 45). For instance, as Foucault wrote, for “nineteenth-century psychopathology, they were probably constituted by the family, the immediate social group, the work situation, the religious community, (...) art, sexuality, penalty” (Foucault 2002: 45-46). The main question of the discursive analysis has been displaced for the second time – the emergence of an object in a discourse (more generally: appearance of a particular statement) is now understood by its emergence ‘in life’, yet still we do not know why it appeared in life at the particular time, and actually we are not going to know it, because this kind of investigation would exceed discursive analysis. At this point it seems like Foucault is very close to Canguilhem’s insights, that“(…) it is norms that are produced by life’s very movement in a completely immanent way” (Macherey: 110). Normativity (not normality) in life precedes normativity in discourse, which can merely grasp
and strengthen it. This view is seems to be present in *Lives of Infamous Men*. It is important to remember that this essay was written in 1977, two years after *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, because crucial elements of method are not only different but rather in contradiction with general view presented in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*\(^2\). *Lives of Infamous Men* is a tentative project of a never written book, where Foucault intended to compile short life-sketches of men, found in the “archives of confinement, of the police, of petitions to the King, and of *lettres de cachet*” (Foucault 2006: 164). Specificity of these texts consist in the mechanism, how, usually random, collision with power enabled discourse to pervade daily life. An attempt in picturing this moment and, therefore, the relation between discourse and reality is explicitly present in methodological parts of the essay, where Foucault wrote for instance: “I was determined, that these texts always be in a relation or, rather, in a greatest possible number of relations with reality: not only that they refer to it but they be operative within it” (Foucault 2006: 160). ‘Being operative within reality’ should be understood in two meanings. Firstly, it is only because these lives entered discourse, we are able nowadays to know about them. “All those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear without ever having been told were able to leave traces – brief, incisive, often enigmatic – only at the point of their instantaneous contact with power” (Foucault 2006: 161). Preserving property of a discourse, which I mentioned discussing it’s materiality, is here revealed. But discourse did not only preserved lives of these men, it also fixed them. I would argue, that this ‘one-dimensional’ picture, where only an enigmatic trace begins to play a role of a variable within a discourse is precisely what Foucault meant by an object, when he discussed the formation of objects in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, nonetheless the way, in which discourses pervade their objects was beyond the perspective of the archaeological analysis\(^3\). Secondly, there is an evident power effect over the subject, which entered discourse and began functioning there as an object. “Real lives were ‘enacted’ in these few sentences: by this I don’t mean that they were represented but that their liberty, their misfortune, often their death, in any case their fate, were actually decided therein, at least in part. These discourses really crossed lives; existences were actually risked and lost in these words” (Foucault 2006: 160).

Although *Lives of Infamous Men* elaborate on some elements present in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, it’s methodology goes beyond limits of the discursive analysis by drawing a twofold relation between discourse and reality: the moment when discourse pervade daily life\(^4\), and the power effect it might have upon subjects. Similar view is also present in a book from 1973 *I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my

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2. Discussion of the *surfaces of emergence* is also not typical for the methodological point, which Foucault tried to achieve in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

3. From the methodological perspective of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, objects should simply appear in a discourse, and the question *how*? (just like frequently asked question about the mechanism of change) is out of importance. Yet it is true, that Foucault took an effort (unsuccessful) to answer this question, however I would claim, that from the clearest (or, if you prefer, most dogmatic) methodological position he reached, which I am going to discuss later in my essay, it should remain beyond his concern.

4. Foucault described this process as ‘leaving traces’, what indicates fragmentary character of the picture of imprinted thing present in a discourse. It is out of importance, whether these traces are true or false. In agreement with Canguilhem and contrary to Edmund Husserl (it is evident how certain passages from *The Archaeology of Knowledge* were written against *Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie*) Foucault took a position that something considered as ‘false’ or ‘a mistake’ has the same effect in reality as something considered as ‘true’.
brother... A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century. The difference between this book and previously discussed article, is that it literally presented different discourses talking about Pierre Rivière, by publishing them. Although this fact might seem unimportant, on the contrary, it is provided us with perspicuous representation\(^5\), where relations between different discourses and their elements can explicitly be observed by readers.

Going back to the analysis of the formation of objects, apart from the already mentioned surfaces of emergence, two other plans of differentiation are: the authorities of delimitation (for instance, in the nineteenth century for madness: medicine, law, literary and art criticism, etc.) and the grids of specification (“(...) systems according to which different [for instance – A. J.] ‘kinds of madness’ are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another” (Foucault 2002: 46)). But interpretation, which I signalled by mentioning Canguilhem, and which seemed appropriate up to this point of analysis, is definitely in contradiction with Foucault’s intentions, as he wrote, that “it would be quite wrong to see discourse as a place where previously established objects are laid one after another like words on a page” (Foucault 2002: 47). To escape the possibility of similar interpretations, Foucault claimed, that precisely the groups of particular relations between plans of differentiation, which are both discursive and non-discursive, decide about the appearance of objects in a discourse, but the appearance of objects is not the interest of the archaeological method. What is of its interest is “the way in which it [a discourse – A. J.] forms objects that are in fact highly dispersed” (Foucault 2002: 49; emphasis – A. J.). Although the question ‘how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?’ remained unanswered and was transformed one more time, it should not be surprising any more. Foucault constructed a method, where the unites of discourse were supposed to be the ultimate basis of explanation and not something, that still needs to be explained. Although the question was correctly formulated, at times, instead of answering ‘how?’, Foucault tried to answer ‘why?’ and was looking for a cause (not a reason) for the appearance of the objects in a discourse, what led him out of the level of the unites of discourse.

Up to this point we could clearly observe, that discursive analysis oscillated between the realm of discourse and the realm of reality. The deadlock was removed by the introduction of a new perspective, namely to see a discourse itself as a practice. The unity of discourse was found in “a group of rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity” (Foucault 2002: 51). Although it is not said explicitly, the category of discursive practice provided Foucault’s analysis with the unity of a group of statements, which he was previously looking for in notions of object, style, concept and theme\(^6\). Therefore, in following chapters – The Formation of Enunciative Modalities, The Formation of Concepts, and most of all The Formation of Strategies – Foucault’s optics slightly changes to finally reach its proper focus in The Discourse on Language. By putting emphasis on the discursive practice instead of objects, Foucault rejected essentialist interpretations of discourses or its elements. His aim was “To define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their histori-

\(^5\) Term coined by Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*.

\(^6\) In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* the notion of theme was transformed into a concept of formation of strategies
cal appearance” (Foucault 2002: 53). Therefore, discourses are neither things, nor words. How, then, should we understand the level on which discourses were placed?

*The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a beautiful straggle against traditional theories of language toward anti-essentialist and anti-referentialist views. In these views, dualistic assumption, in which words and reality have different ontological status is rejected and, instead, in their anti-essentialism, they concentrate on relations between objects and hypothetical and historical status of our knowledge. In my opinion this is the horizon toward which Foucault headed and, therefore, in which we should read his books. There are many reasons for that view, some of them I have already mentioned in my essay, others could be: functional definition of a statement (Foucault 2002: 89-118) or of an author (Foucault 1998) – where essentialist questions what? what is it? are being replaced by questions like how? how does it work? how does it function? --, or Foucault’s well known critique of a commentary (for instance, Foucault 2003). To summarize this part of my essay I would like to formulate three approximations, which will help to grasp the category of discourse more precisely.

1) The ontological status of a discourse – does it belong to the realm of language or to the realm of reality?

Already in *The Birth of the Clinic* Foucault wrote: “Is it not possible to make a structural analysis of discourses that would evade the fate of commentary by supposing no remainder, nothing in excess of what has been said, but only the fact of its historical appearance? The facts of discourse would then have to be treated not as autonomous nuclei of multiple significations, but as events and functional segments gradually corning together to form a system” (Foucault 2003: XIX). Although a statement is lingual it is important to perceive it as an event – groups of statements, which form discourse, are facts or historical events. This perspective brings to attention material character of statements. That material character led to many misinterpretations in later works inspired by Foucault’s methodology, which created a picture of discourses all-embracing and all-penetrating society. This fallacy occurs only when we read Foucault in a dualistic language-reality framework. Therefore, although it is important to remember about materiality, which indicates on the historical dimension, where statements as events do not refer to anything beyond themselves, discourses are neither to be placed in the realm of language, nor in the realm of reality. In anti-essentialist and anti-referential theories of language this categorical distinction is not present.

2) The efface of a difference between heuristic category and an ontological element of reality.

In the first parts of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* discursive formations seems to be historians findings, effects of archaeological analysis. Meanwhile in *The Discourse on Language* (lecture given on the 2nd XII 1970), discourse is both, the object and the subject of power, by which and for which battles in a society take place. Time from 1969, when...
Archaeology of Knowledge was published, to the time when the lecture The Discourse on Language was given, is the period, when Foucault left, at least in some extend, archaeology of discourses for a new method known as genealogy. In is also the time, when power became his main interest. However, in my interpretation, we should regard this period as a final switch from the description of discourses to the description of discursive practices. There is a timid remark at the beginning of The Archaeology of Knowledge, that “The notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one: because it is both an instrument and an object of research” (Foucault 2002: 10). I would claim that the same relates to discourses. In a framework of non-dualistic theories of language the traditional distinction on an object of description and a description of an object is blurred. Therefore, it is not possible to differentiate between a heuristic category and an ontological element of reality, and any attempt of this kind would reduce discourses either to language, or to some peculiar forms of power, which penetrate our reality.

3) The shift from the category of discourse to the category of discursive practices.

The transition from the description of discourses to the description of discursive practices is not a change of Foucault’s interests, but a result of solving some methodological inaccuracies in his previous books, of which he was conscious. The concept of discursive practices appeared for the first time in The Archaeology of Knowledge and was elaborated on in The Discourse on Language, which main question was: how are discourses being produced in a society?

IV

Detailed analysis of the first part of The Archaeology of Knowledge, where archaeological method was discussed, was crucial to definitely reject all interpretations, which try to draw any referential relation between discourse and reality or experience. Foucault definitely did not intend to describe any “historical experience, simultaneously anonymous and collective” (Macherey : 111) as this is precisely the reason, why he criticised some parts of History of Madness. “We are not trying to reconstitute what madness itself might be, in a form in which it first presented itself to some primitive, fundamental, deaf, scarcely articulated experience, and in the form in which it was later organised (translated, deformed, travestied, perhaps even repressed) by discourses, and the oblique, often twisted play of their operations” (Foucault 2002: 52). Neither did he see the role of discursive analysis in historicizing experience, like Joan W. Scott. In a well-known article The Evidence of Experience Scott criticized some of the approaches to writing history which rest the claim to legitimacy of a discourse on the authority of experience. She claimed that at the same time they perceived the subject and its experience as ahistorical (decontextualization), and moreover that they use it in order to essentialise its identity and reify its agency. I would add that approaches like these differentiate between discourse and experience and establish some kind of referential relation between them, where discourse expresses or refers to the experience, which is the basis of explanation or understanding. Instead, Scott proposed to historicize experience by perceiving it in a discursive manner. As Martin Jay noticed, for critiques of experience like Scott, experience emerges from discourses,
language or power relations and therefore cannot be the basis of explanation or understanding, because it is itself being discursively constructed (Jay 1998). If I understood Scott correctly, she claimed that experience is produced by discourses and scholars, instead of considering it as evidence for their scientific discourses, should, roughly speaking, put that experience into discourse and historicize it. In my opinion, that view is very problematic. First of all, Scott’s notion of experience is very narrow. If discourses or language are conditional possibilities for experience, where is no discourse, there is no experience. Therefore, for instance, non-human animals do not ‘have’ experience, what is unacceptable and false view. Secondly, Scott unknowingly introduced two different types of discourse – first type produces experience, and second type is about experience, historicizes it. And finally, although she successfully departure essentialism, yet she remained in a dualistic paradigm with discourse and experience having different ontological status. Scott simply reversed the relation and claimed discourse to be the basis of explanation or understanding of experience. But she did not explain what is the referential relation between them and how is it possible, what she should do, because she proposed to create a discourse about experience, and not discourse about discourses, what Michel Foucault did – what he wrote explicitly in The Birth of The Clinic.

For these reasons it is not possible to reconcile Scott’s approach with Foucault’s insights. I agree with Martin Jay, that Foucault, on the contrary, warns us against reduction of experience to discourse. As I have already mentioned, it is possible to discuss limit experience in Foucault’s thought, especially when we interpret it from the perspective of What is Enlightenment? or his interview with Duccio Trombadori. But is there any place for a ‘prediscursive’ experience? In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault wrote, that “Such a history of the referent [of a discourse – A. J.] is no doubt possible; and I have no wish at the outset to exclude any effort to uncover and free these ‘prediscursive’ experiences from the tyranny of the text” (Foucault 2002: 52). Nonetheless, he changed his opinion seven years later in the essay Lives of Infamous Men, where he wrote: “(...) it is doubtless impossible to ever grasp them [lives – A. J.] again in themselves, as they might have been in a “free state”; they can no longer be separated out from the declamations, the tactical biases, the obligatory lies that power games and power relations presuppose” (Foucault 2006: 161). Yet, what is important to notice, he did not deny the existence of the ‘prediscursive’ experience, but only any efforts of grasping and describing it. Although, almost two years later he claimed, that “(...) an experience is neither true nor false: it is always a fiction, something constructed, which exists only after it has been made, not before; it isn’t something that is ‘true’, but it has been a reality” (Foucault 1991: 36), his early writing’s methodology presupposes a specific kind of ‘prediscursive’ experience. It can be revealed more clearly by taking a closer look at the discursive entanglement of a subject.

It is not true, that discursive analysis ignored the issue of individual or subject. Subject is both, the limit of a discourse – discourses do not speak by themselves or create themselves on their own –, and is entangled in a discourse – looking at the problem from the other side.

8. Lives of Infamous Men was published on the 15th of January 1977, while Duccio Trombadori conducted the series of interviews with Foucault at the end of 1978.
In *The Birth of The Clinic* Foucault wrote, that clinical experience was the first in the Western history “opening up of the concrete individual to the language of rationality, a major event in the relationship of man to himself and of language to things” (Foucault 2003: XVI). Human subject became an object of discourse. This insight is already present in *The History of Madness*, where Foucault mentioned moments in the history, when the truth about man was localised in biology, precisely in his sexuality (this thesis is the main topic of his later book *The Will to Know*). We can trace different modes of implication of the subject in discourses and methods of constructing subject also in *Discipline and Punish*. This peculiar perspective of looking at subject was methodological presumption of anti-anthropologism, explicitly formulated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. “(...) how can we be sure that we will not find ourselves in the grip of all those overhasty unities or syntheses concerning the speaking subject, or the author of the text, in short, all anthropological categories? Unless, perhaps, we consider all the statements out of which these categories are constituted – all the statements that have chosen the subject of discourse (their own subject) as their ‘object’ and have undertaken to deploy it as their field of knowledge? This explains the *de facto* privilege that I have accorded to those discourses that, to put it very schematically, define the ‘sciences of man’” (Foucault 2002: 33)¹⁰.

In his methodology Foucault wanted to create a method of analysis purged of all anthropologism. Traditional history, as he wrote in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, is: “the indispensible correlative of the founding function of the subject (...) [and was – A. J.] making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action” (Foucault 2002: 13). Although the sovereignty of subject’s consciousness was taken from him by psychoanalysis, linguistic and ethnology, in the same move, these three disciplines granted it (the ability to reconstruct that consciousness) to themselves. Therefore, the idea of continuity, if not in life, began to be present in and crucial for scientific texts. Foucault wanted to get rid of the full self-consciousness both: granted to a subject and allegedly reconstructed by scholars. This is precisely the moment, where his methodology postulates a specific kind of experience, namely the thesis of subject experiencing the lack of full situatedness in a socio-historical reality in which he lives. This incomplete, rudimentary, discontinuous experience should not be seen as merely a property of historical documents, which cannot tell us everything about the past, thou the past was complete in subject’s consciousness. Nor should it be restored by historians in their analysis as a full picture of the past, which was from the beginning present in a form of a ‘spirit of the time’, thou it eluded people living in those times. The experience of lack of full situatedness should be seen as an object of research – thus it is the actual experience of subject –, and an instrument of research – it should not be restored in the analysis. In my opinion this is precisely the insight, which stood behind the methodological importance of the notion of discontinuity, as discontinuity is crucial for the experience itself. The emphasis

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9. However, subjects are not reduced to texts. ‘Textualization’ of discursive practices was Foucault’s argument against Derrida in a well-known essay *My Body, This Paper, This Fire* from 1971, where he accused his younger colleague of: “reduction of discursive practices to textual traces; the elision of the events produced therein and the retention only of marks of a reading; the invention of voices behind texts to avoid having to analyze the modes of implication of the subject in discourses” Foucault 1998: 416.

10. On this background, the famous phrase about the death of a man from *The Order of Things*, can be interpreted as departure from anthropologism, an effort to extricate subject from the discursive relations of power. The death of a man could be, paradoxically, a subjectification of an individual, who in the frames of discourses was functioning as an object.
put on discontinuity was also a method of decentring the subject, what places Foucault in the tradition of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.

The concept of experience in Foucault’s early writings is very specific and definitely it is not any phenomenological experience with its strong subject and the sovereignty of consciousness. The subject is weak, and is experiencing a lack of full situatedness in reality. It is reflected in Foucault’s methodology and reveals itself in a cracked picture of discourses. Yet it is not possible to tell anything about a concrete ‘prediscursive’ experience as experience is always retrospectively constructed. Therefore this early questioning of subject in later Foucault’s books “mean to live it [subject – A. J.] in an experience that might be its real destruction or dissociation, its explosion or upheaval into something radically ‘other’” (Foucault 1991: 46). As he said in one of his last interviews, to move forward “We have to create new pleasure. And then maybe desire will follow” (Foucault 1997: 166).

**Bibliography**


Event and Discursivity: On Foucault’s Conception of Singularity

Vincent Garton — A short note on Foucauldian singularity

Foucault, on his own account, was in the first place a historian. The concept of singularity bridges not only the various phases of the development of Foucault’s thought, but also his diverse role as a specifically political thinker and as an historian and philosopher of ideas. Understanding singularity is therefore critical to any attempt at engaging Foucault. Here, I want briefly to consider first the important role of singularity in Foucault’s method, and then highlight its conceptual potential as an entry-point to the political engagement of Foucault. The point I intend to make is, though important, a narrow one, and my analysis will be correspondingly limited.

From virtually the beginning, singularity forms a central concern for Foucault. If Adorno’s criticism of Hegel had been that despite his dialectical method Hegel always decided in favour of the general and the total over the individual (Adorno 1993: 45–6), I imagine it will not be controversial to state that for Foucault it is always the fascination with the singular that predominates over the universal. As early as *Madness and Civilization*, his first major work, Foucault promised to lend emphasis to the way in which ‘madness developed independence and singularity in the muddled world in which it was enclosed’ (Foucault 1972: 438–9). It is therefore of course the formation of particular practices, their particular courses of development, and the particular ensembles of power in and through which they manifest and evolve, that concerns him from even this early stage.

Once deprived of their obviousness and implicit universality, these configurations reveal themselves to be irreducibly limited in both space and time. It is no surprise, then, that when asked by a Japanese philosopher what place was left for the world outside the West in his thought, Foucault responded that his concern was not with the ‘universality of fields of knowledge’ (*connaissances*), but with the ‘historical and geographic singularity of the mode of knowledge’ (*savoir*) that characterised the modern West (Foucault 2001e: 415).

In this most basic sense, there is a certain level of methodological consistency in his treatment of singularity that appears to escape Foucault in many other aspects of his thought—summarised best in Foucault’s famous pronouncement that his method has always been to ‘suppose that universals do not exist’ (Foucault 2008: 3).
Singularity, however, as Foucault himself points out, cannot simply mean, for instance, the ‘singularity ... proper to genius’ as something distinct and ‘deviant’ from the ‘everyday mediocrity’ of ordinary forms of knowledge (Foucault 2001c: 684). His concern for singularity is not just a concern for the deviant and the extraordinary. On the contrary, the analysis of discourse is in every case oriented unavoidably around ‘the singularity of its [that is, the discursive] event’. To the extent that all discourse can take on the aspect of an ‘irruption’ into history, singularity must always already be present.

Yet the power of Foucault’s method lies precisely in the fact that the event is not itself irreducible. Rather, it is the articulation of singularity that constitutes the event as such. To illustrate this, let us consider the paradigmatic example of singularity for Foucault, what he designates explicitly as the ‘paradoxical singularity of the author’s name’ (Foucault 2001d: 797). The ascription of particular texts to ‘Homer’ or to ‘Shakespeare’ and the placement of texts ‘under the same name indicates that there has been established among them a relationship of homogeneity’ (ibid.). It is this unity, this relationship of homogeneity, which serves as the singularity that stems from the act of naming. Similarly, commenting on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s adoption of the pseudonym ‘Jean-Joseph Renou’ in the short period from 1767 to 1770 as he undertook his Confessions, Foucault notes how this act served to radically distinguish the singular authorial persona ‘Rousseau’ from Rousseau the individual (Foucault 2001a: 177).

There is nothing unique about the problematic of the name of the author in this sense: the ‘problem of the relation between name and network’, which Foucault labels the ‘problem of singularity’, is irreducibly an element of discourse as such (Foucault 2001b: 594). Singularity is in some sense everywhere. More particularly, this concept of singularity can be seen to pertain to historical and political events.

The paradigmatic example of the event has for a long time been the French Revolution. A deconstructionist historical analysis, as Paul R. Hanson has advanced, will point out that the “‘Revolution” did not exist as an entity”: the label in some sense exists merely as a kind of ‘dramatic effect or literary shorthand’ (Hanson 2009: 109). Yet precisely in its discursive designation as the Revolution—for as Foucault states, the French Revolution was not ‘an event exterior to discourse’—the complex interweaving of continuities and discontinuities that constitutes the historical basis of this object attains the status of a singularity. In its singularity the event therefore appears to stands outside history, but its singularity is itself constituted through historical practice. Singularity, above all, appears in the name.

This idea of the singularity of the name is quite different from the conception of the Event with a capital ‘E’ advanced by those such as Badiou and Žižek, where the Event is an almost indescribable intervention of the transcendental or the Real in history. To ascribe this conception to Foucault (as Žižek does) is therefore erroneous (e.g. Žižek 2008: 110: “The point is thus not the shift in relations of power and domination ... but the very fact of transcending—or, rather, momentarily cancelling—this very domain, the emergence of a totally different domain of “collective will” as a pure sense-event in which all differences are obliterated”).

For Foucault, in fact, the event is inescapably constituted out of, and not outside, the fabric of discourse. Indeed, he posits a conception that is quite contrary to that of Badiou and Žižek: it is precisely the constituted nature of the singularity of the political event that
marks the continuous emancipatory potential of discourse as a site of contestation and resistance. We can see, for instance, how the politics of the singular can manifest in the negative sense of undermining universal claims, such as those of the state, by constituting their singularity and exposing them to transformative contestation. Built upon the epistemic basis of political reason, as Foucault states in his essay ‘Omnes et Singulatim’, the state acts both to totalise with one hand, and to individualise with the other. The task of resistance cannot be to attack ‘just one of these two effects’: it must be to assault the very conceptual roots of this integrating/disintegrating rationality (Foucault 1981: 254). This is, in other words, the universality of the state concept, and it is to expose the underlying singularity of the state—and counterpose other singularities against it. Foucault then poses the question: Can we conduct politics as though universals do not exist?

Eric Fassin, in his opening remarks to the conference at which this paper was first presented, used the phrase ‘taking as an event’ to describe the operationalising of Foucault’s methods through the analysis of as little as a single word in a sentence. I believe this is a very useful phrase. Singularity is revealed and constituted in this act of taking-as-event; the act, specifically, of naming an event, naming as event, a certain indeterminate content. In his preface to the second volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault remarks that ‘criticism … does not mark out impassable boundaries or describe closed systems’—instead, ‘it brings to light transformable singularities’ (Foucault 1984b: 335). In precisely this way, through the designating power which in itself allows it to open the possibility of transformation, the concept of singularity reveals it therefore as a basis for resistance and emancipatory politics.

Eugene Yamauchi — Imagining Kripkault...: A commentary on Garton’s ‘short note’

The name alone, revealed through a natural death, not the living soul, vouches for that in man which is immortal.

Theodor Adorno, Prisms

There is a peculiar difficulty associated with reviewing the works of personal friends, when their sole fault was to have been, well, wrong (‘It really is a nice theory.’ says Kripke, ‘The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It’s wrong.’ A tautology worthy of Heidegger himself). I also admit at the outset that I am no Foucauldian in conviction, as will no doubt become amply clear as we progress (which raises the inevitable question of what on Earth I am doing writing for a colloquium on Foucault, but we will let that be...); nor do I have Deleuze’s boundless magnanimity in approaching oppositional works. One could summarise the following as a Kripkean critique of Foucault, in particular his doctrine of the name of the author; though the implicit target may well be Judith Butler.

Let me clarify at the outset what I take to be Garton’s principal theses. In no particular order:

1)Singularity has a constitutive relation to the name.
2) The crucial difference between the Badiouian Event and the Foucauldian is that the former is conceived as external to discourse, external even to Being as such, whereas for the latter all events are necessarily in discourse.

3) The singularity of the (authorial) name is a function of a certain homogeneity of the works grouped under this name.

4) Foucault is a thinker of the singular, which allows him to ‘suppose universals do not exist’.

I agree wholeheartedly with 1) (after all it was a collaborative thesis…); 2) I take to be an extremely important and timely reminder, for the irreducible discursivity of the event (or better, the total jurisdiction of power) is probably the single greatest Foucauldian innovation. 3) is at best partial, and if yours truly had been feeling more vicious on the day of writing, quite false. Fortunately though, I wasn’t. 4) I take to be a closely related error, since a proper Kripkean treatment of the function of the name in discourse will, on the contrary, lead to the conclusion that singularity, whose support is the name, is nothing but the entry of the universal (conceived as an indifference to determinate properties) into discourse as such. But lest I hang our friendship on the balance too early on, let me begin with some introductory garble on what I take to be the problematic function of the body in Foucault.

2.1 I’m all for you, body and soul

That singularity should have taken on such a crucial (even if inexplicit) role in Foucault is not surprising. For it is one of Foucault’s chief insights that the state has taken over the function of individualisation, correlative to the exponential growth in the efficacy of its totalisation. Hence, the prevailing liberal discourse upholding individual rights against state power runs headlong into a trap; it is precisely this explosion of the discourse of the individual that is the proof of the omnipresence of the modern state, and ultimately power itself in its specifically modern manifestation. This however leads to a major difficulty: if individuality is no longer viable as a point of resistance against power, how can we reconceptualise our theoretical apparatus such that resistance is again thinkable? Foucault’s solution, it would seem, was the body in its constitutive relation with sexuality\(^1\): since individuality, traditionally understood as a vector of the ‘will’, is now known to be complicit in state power, it is paradoxically now the body in its materiality that must be cast as the point of resistance to discourse. Further, it is clear that the body for Foucault performs an indispensable ‘theoretical’ function: it acts as the point of contact between the discontinuities and continuities of history, the discursive and the non-discursive, or to employ old structuralist terminology (but why not?) between the diachronic and the synchronic. It would be no exaggeration to call it Foucault’s very own pineal gland. For if discourse works directly on the body, the body is therefore inexorably discursive; yet, at the same time discourse is fully material, **bodily**, hence in a significant sense bodies are prior to discourse, or at least function as their condition of possibility (this latter Kantian formulation

\(^1\) Judith Butler offers a characteristically brilliant formulation of this: ‘perhaps the body has come to substitute for the psyche in Foucault – that is, as that which exceeds and confounds the injunctions of normalisation.’ Butler 1997: 94.
is intended to remove any implication of chronological succession). Of course, the two functions are closely related: it is only because the body possesses this unique conceptual geography, inhabiting both the discursive and the non-discursive, that it is capable of resistance against the predominant forms of discourse. Only something which is in discourse can have real discursive effects; yet, equally only something which is external to discourse could potentially escape the determinism of the discursive.

There is no doubt that the body was Foucault’s absolute master-stroke, which thus tied together all the lose threads of his theoretical corpus into a coherent whole. The problem, of course, is that this move is both phenomenological and humanist, even if this is not immediately visible. It would perhaps be clearer if we pointed out the consonance of this step with specific thinkers: namely, Merleau-Ponty and Lévi-Strauss. As analysed, the body for Foucault simultaneously transcends yet is immanent in discourse: it is thus indistinguishable with the transcendence-in-immanence of the Being-in-the-world of the flesh for Merleau-Ponty, subject to a famous critique in Deleuze’s final work. As for the humanism, we can see this from what must be characterised as the cognitivist conclusion of Lévi-Strauss. For there is a major gap in this theory: since kinship structures are taken to be regionally total and systemic, there is no way these regional structures could in turn be explained in their determination. Lévi-Strauss’ solution is first pure idealism (all regional modes are ultimately “expressions” of the structure of structure, the universal combinatorix that is the mind), and then, understandably dissatisfied, he argues that this transcendent structure is the structure of the human brain itself. The move is vulgar humanism, for structure is finally a mere expression of man’s essence, if not his will, then at least his neural networks. The human being is once again enshrined as the supreme origin of all things. And mutatis mutandis Foucault’s transcendence of the body ends up being a similar theoretical move, greater subtleties notwithstanding: the body is, if not the origin of discourse, the site and guarantee of its materiality, its condition of possibility. And most scandalously of all, this disavowed affinity forces us to see yet another unacceptable proximity: Chomsky. For Lévi-Strauss destination is Chomsky’s assumption: it is for him the universal structure of the human mind alone that validates the science of general grammar. The trinity of transcendence is thus complete, and it is Foucault’s flight into the body that allows such a constellation.

Of course, disavowed Chomskyite tendencies do not by themselves disprove a theory (it may even lend it credence in the eyes of some), any more than undischarged transcendence (unless one is a Spinozist, of course). However, it is possible to show that a great many ambiguities of the Foucauldian corpus are in fact conceptually related to the problematic category of the body. Take the following sentence:

2. The two figures at first sight could not be more diametrically opposed: on the one hand, the gold standard of French phenomenology, and on the other the founder of structuralist anthropology. Yet, what of the fact that it was none other than Merleau-Ponty who was instrumental in securing for the latter a seat at the Collège de France? Or that in perhaps the single most endearing photograph of Lévi-Strauss in circulation, the sole portrait displayed in his study was of Merleau-Ponty?

3. It is not only that the body is in the last instance entrusted with a theoretical function comparable to high phenomenology; the very logic of a transcendence that is neither wholly otherworldly (which reduces to just another world), nor world-immanent (as in Kant, where the a priori is nothing but human reason), is Husserlian. See Lawlor 2002: 11–23.

4. For a wonderful reconstruction of these debates through the lens of the Althusserian critique of structuralism, see Montag 2013: 53–72.
The implantation of perversions is an instrumental effect: it is through the isolation, intensification, and consolidation of peripheral sexualities that the relations of power to sex and pleasure branched out and multiplied, measured the body, and penetrated modes of conduct.

(Foucault 1978a: 48)

The somewhat relentless style masks an inadmissible equivocation. For Foucault here rushes through three different versions of the origin of marginal sexualities: first, it is termed an ‘implantation’ (vulgar structuralism, structure as Subject); next, it is an ‘isolation, intensification, and consolidation’ (marginal sexualities pre-exist in some form, inherent in bodies, which discourse merely exaggerates); and finally, it is said to have ‘penetrated modes of conduct’ (in effect a presaging of the Butlerian theory of gender performativity). The question is non-trivial, for aside from pure theoretical interest there is the crucial problem of the possibility of resistance. If sexuality is but an ‘implantation’ by a Super-Subject, resistance is a priori impossible (at least through sexuality); by contrast, if sexualities inhere in bodies prior to discourse, however minimally, then the discursive ‘intensification’ of marginal sexualities is by definition always-already a resistance: hence, all that is required is an openness and celebration of one’s sexuality, which is indistinguishable in the last instance from the liberal quietism that is hegemonic today. Finally, if sexuality subsists in practices, some form of re-articulation of the norm through alternate practices would follow as the possible mode of resistance. While it is evident that (of these three) the last option is the only viable one, that Foucault does not even attempt to differentiate them leaves the question of peripheral sexuality unresolved in his work. The thesis of the body is too ambiguous to allow a rigorous treatment of such questions.

Consider now the following: These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called ‘disciplines’.

(Foucault 1978b: 137)

It is imperative to distinguish Foucault’s theory of the docile body from virtually all previous theories of subjection. As a good Kantian, he dutifully asked the Kantian question with regard to subjectivation: what is the condition of possibility for someone to become amenable to the forces of subjection? Such a question does not arise for Althusser, for example, for whom the pre-interpellated is not conceptually defined, or even definable, since the individual is always-already under the call of interpellation. Hence the (in)famous thesis that ‘Ideology has no history’: interpellation is always-already at work, one is always-already a subject, ideology is always-already effective. By contrast, Foucault’s account of subjectivation is resolutely historical, and not just in the sense that he takes modes of subjectivation as historically dependant. More than that, Foucault constructs a diachronic account of subject-formation even within the disciplinary society considered in isolation. One must thus call this theory a history of bodies: the mechanism of subjectivation we can extract from the above would be something like the following:

)There is a pre-discursive reality of the body, however fleeting and powerless.

)This pre-discursive body must first be made ‘docile’, amenable to ‘constant subjection’.
Subjectivating processes work on this body-made-docile to create subjects.

Moreover, when we combine this outline with the classic position of Foucault, that power works on an undifferentiated mass to individuate them into subjects, we arrive at the following:

There is a ‘pre-mass’ (for want of a better term), as the quasi-mythical and transcendent presuppositionary Origin of origins, which is also the brute reality of bodies.

By a certain ‘preparatory’ process, this pure corporeal entity prior to the mass is ‘massified’, made amenable to processes of subjection.

Discourse acts on bodies, business as usual. The end-product is the individual, a sum of determinate properties.

But what exactly is the (metaphysical?) status of this ‘pre-mass’? It must first be pointed out that this entity is not conceptually defined, it is simply assumed to exist necessarily as the ultimate foundation of discursive reality. This alone should make it suspect (does not Spinoza warn against the confusion of effects for causes, the inevitable result of which is the reintroduction of transcendence?); this ‘pre-mass’ is supposedly neither undifferentiated, nor differentiated in a statist, individualist sense. We would then be looking at a mysterious third term beyond the mass and the individual, presumably differentiated in a qualitatively different way from modern man. Suddenly the second and third volumes of the *History of Sexuality* are reinscribed into the linear logic of the development of Foucault’s thought: one cannot stop at the mass man of the pre-modern era if one is to discover the possibility of authentic revolt, for the making-docile of bodies happened much earlier. One must thus return to the mythic stage of the ‘pre-mass’, the ascetic practices of the Greeks and the early Christians, in order to discover a form of subjectification and differentiation that is neither homogenous, nor individual. That this move is transcendent and humanist is blatant: not only does it consecrate the Origin of origins in the brute reality of bodies prior to their becoming-mass, this Origin is imbued with a certain nostalgic attachment (rather reminiscent of Heidegger), and in the last instance becomes a strategic site for a possible thought of resistance that is not immediately recuperated by state power. Thus the twin theses of this philosophy, already present in *Discipline and Punish* and reaching its apogee in the final works, is Man as the *terminus a quo* of all things, and this originary Man as that which we have lost, and to which we must seek to return. If this is the conclusion to the body of work that had at one time so gallantly declared the death of Man, it is truly a depressing conclusion indeed.

2.2 Name, not body

I hope I have provided reasonably sufficient argument that the doctrine of the body in Foucault, while it does possess many undeniable theoretical advantages, needs to be abandoned urgently. The task before us would then seem to be the following: how does one reconceptualise the singular, which as we know designates the possibility for thought to think a differentiation beyond individuality, and by extension the possibility of authentic resistance today to state power, *without relying on the transcendence of the body?* My
wager is that this can be achieved by thinking through the implications of Saul Kripke’s theory of proper names, arguably the highest achievement of modern analytic philosophy.

As the expected audience of this paper (assuming I flatter myself and my dear friend that we should be graced with one such in the first place) is not the Anglo-American community of linguistic philosophers, it would probably be best to outline what I take to be Kripke’s principal conceptual innovations. As is reasonably well-known, Kripke contends that proper names are not replaceable by a description, or even by a cluster of descriptions; that is, they are ‘rigid designators’, they refer to the same object regardless of its contingent properties. To give a rather trivial example, if I give the definite description of my neighbour as ‘the one who bakes pies which smell sinfully appetising at around 3 pm every afternoon except on Tuesdays’, if he then proceeded to do, or not to do any number of things (bake on Tuesday, bake at 2, bake cookies instead, bake for too long and release toxic-smelling fumes), the definite description would then no longer refer to him, indeed it may no longer refer at all. But if I referred to my neighbour as ‘Vincent’, there is no definite description that must minimally be satisfied for the reference to take place, it refers ‘rigidly’ regardless of properties. Said ‘Vincent’, to the best of my knowledge, in fact does not bake, let alone bake well, or bake regularly at the same time each day except on Tuesdays; indeed, most unacceptably of all, he isn’t even my neighbour. Yet, in all these cases what I have said takes the following form: Vincent … This means that none of these contingent properties of Vincent are at all relevant in the efficacy of the proper name’s referential function. We can in fact go further: take the case where one has been introduced to a person via a mutual friend, and knows their name and certain characteristics, but we have yet to meet them in person. Thus, for me, Mina is nothing but the name of a beautiful model with flowing brown hair. If someone were to ask me, ‘who is Mina’, I would in fact reply that Mina is a beautiful model with luscious brown hair, as a total definition. But then we finally get to meet, and Mina has dyed her hair red for an upcoming model shoot; I exclaim, ‘oh! Mina is actually a beautiful ginger!’ Yes, Mina is actually a beautiful ginger; and this despite the fact that Mina was for me previously entirely synonymous with ‘the beautiful brown-haired model my friend won’t stop going on about’: thus Kripke’s thesis is just as valid even in cases where it would make sense to say that a name is, for a certain agent, nothing but a cluster of properties.

Based on Kripkean thought examples of the above sort, one can tentatively construct the following thesis, nowhere explicitly stated in Kripke but nonetheless the logical conclusion of this philosophy: it is the necessity (qua rigidity) of the name that inaugurates the possibility of an entity possessing necessary/contingent properties, the distribution of properties into the categories of necessity/contingency. Or, at the risk of replicating the worst sophistic excesses of modal logic, the union of the necessity of contingency of necessity and the necessity of contingency of contingency. The easiest way to see this is as a response to the hypothetical critic. Our critic reasons as follows: if the name refers rigidly

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5. I recently came across a hilarious (and possibly apocryphal) tale, where on one of Derrida’s trips to the United States he was given a copy of Naming and Necessity, to which he replied that he had attempted to read the book in the past, but had found it nigh on incomprehensible: see Wheeler 2000: 2. This is hardly surprising; I know of no commentary (analytic or continental) which I feel has genuinely grasped what is most scandalous in Kripke, that he has ‘named the name’ (in Agambenian terms), an impossibility that has haunted philosophy since its very beginning. It is doubtful indeed whether Kripke himself has understood what exactly he has done, a strictly blasphemous achievement. But this is a story for another day...
across all possible worlds, presumably then an object’s name must be a necessary property of that object. But how can the property of ‘being named X’ be a necessary property? Indeed, if this critic were a childhood friend of mine (back then I was not so averse to telling close friends my deepest, darkest secrets. A public announcement to an indeterminate audience, on the other hand, is far less embarrassing...), they would remind me that my father had originally intended to name me Duncan, vetoed (thankfully) by my dear mother. But say my mother were of Scottish descent; or she may have been a scholar of Shakespeare: in these and any number of other cases, I would now be named Duncan. How then is it plausible to construe one’s name as a necessary property? The response would be as follows: the ‘frienemy’ would have to phrase his claim as ‘Eugene could have been named Duncan, if circumstances were only slightly different.’ But notice that this statement already relies on the rigid designation of my name, Eugene, since this name has to refer to the same individual (me) in all possible worlds, for one even to construct a hypothesis that my name could have been otherwise. In other words, an object’s name is fully contingent, as per our intuition; but the very distribution of necessary/contingent properties, including the contingency of the name, is a dimension made possible only because the name refers rigidly in all possible worlds. That the object has its signifier in discourse is the condition of possibility for the categorisation of its properties; the necessity of the name inaugurates the very distinction of necessary/contingent.6

With reconstruction out of the way, we can see how Kripke can be used to radicalise the notion of the author’s name in Foucault’s famed lecture, ‘What Is an Author?’. Foucault is attempting to construct a line of demarcation between the proper name, and the authorial name, which he sees as possessing certain extra-ordinary functions within today’s discourse. Foucault seems to have an intuition that the author’s name has a constitutive relation to singularity, though this term is used without rigorous definition:

this relationship between writing and death is also manifested in the effacement of the writing subject’s individual characteristics. Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he writes, the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality. As a result, the mark of the writer is

6. Incidentally, those familiar with Kripke’s work will notice that this runs uneasily with some parts of his text. For Kripke believes that entities ‘really’ have necessary and contingent properties, and that these are not dependent on the way an entity is described (Kripke 1980: 40–42). Of course, the Quinean version is surely superseded by Kripke’s logic, but in a minimal sense the distribution of properties in this way does depend on how the entity is referred to (not described), namely the name’s rigid designation. Thus the consequence of Kripke’s philosophy is not that objects have necessary/contingent properties no-matter-what, but that this distribution of properties arises as a result of the intersection of name and named, signifier and signified, discourse and the non-discursive. It is thus fully compatible with the ‘deconstructionist’ critique of reified essences, Kripke’s own prejudices notwithstanding (indeed, it is easy to see that this particular view of his is entirely subsidiary to the whole theoretical edifice). Also incidentally (or rather not really that incidentally at all, though for considerations of space I have had to bury it in a footnote that is rapidly losing control of its decency in length... excuse me), a radical political consequence of Kripke is that merely asserting that something is not essential (the vulgar critique of reification, epitomised in Axel Honneth for example) is not really a critique at all, since it is the same single stroke by which the very categories of necessity and contingency are opened up. Thus, to attack a formation as reified, a contingency masquerading as a necessity, is still caught in the same discursive horizon which maintains this very distribution of properties. A genuine political critique would have to go beyond these categories altogether: not, is this ‘sacred’ essence in fact not contingent (historically, societally, linguistically etc), but rather, what nominative function is it that makes it possible in the first place to think of this formation as ‘essential’.
reduced to nothing more than the singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the dead man in the game of writing.

(Foucault 1984a: 102–103)

The singularity of his absence, that is, his paradoxical presence in name alone. From my perspective this essay is particularly interesting, as it opens up the possibility, immanent to Foucault, of thinking singularity not as a function of the body, but of the name (indeed, insofar as we are here concerned with the interrelation of singularity with death, it is not merely singularity beyond the body, but in spite of, even against the body). However, there is a major obstacle, in that Foucault wants to maintain a clear separation of the authorial name from the ‘mere’ name. As it stands, at best we will end up with a somewhat Kristevian-sounding conclusion that only authors can be singular... Our first task would thus be the good old deconstruction of dualisms.

‘There are several differences’, says Foucault. I count six, although they could probably be grouped otherwise. First we have the idea that the author’s name is not entirely rigid: ‘if we proved that Shakespeare did not write those sonnets which pass for his, that would constitute a significant change and affect the manner in which the author’s name functions’ (Foucault 1984a: 106). At the risk of sounding dogmatically Kripkean, we repeat that it is the rigidity of the name alone that can open up the very dimension of necessary/contingent properties. Why does the fact that Shakespeare lived in a different house from the one hitherto believed by historians not alter the status of Shakespeare, but the fact that all the sonnets were in fact stolen from a contemporary institute such a drastic change? This is because the former is a contingent property of Shakespeare, as he functions in present discourse, while the latter is deemed necessary. But as previously analysed, such a question can only be asked because the (proper) name refers rigidly; the distribution of properties is a discursive effect of the signifier’s fixity of reference. All Foucault is then saying is that the distribution of the authorial name is specific to it, which is trivially true, but so is the specific discursive distribution of any given type of name, the proletarian, the fishmonger’s, the suburban housewife’s. Thus this reasoning in no way justifies Foucault’s attempt to isolate the authorial name from all other nominative functions (an attempt, incidentally, which does not really square with the central impulse of the essay, which is to delineate the true death of the author. Since this is his aim, what business does he have trying, on the contrary, to save the specificity of the author?)

Foucault then moves on to the ‘pure’ analytic domain of the analysis of negative existentials, which he should probably have left to the experts... for ‘[t]o say that Pierre Dupont does not exist’ in no way ‘means that no one has the name Pierre Dupont’; not only does the existence of thousands of ‘other’ people named Pierre Dupont not necessarily invalidate this assertion (trivially), we have already seen that the name itself is utterly contingent. To quote Kripke, ‘[n]or need he have been called ‘Jonah’ by the Hebrews; the ‘J’ sound does not exist in Hebrew, and Jonah’s historical existence is independent of whether we know his original Hebrew name or not’ (Kripke 1980: 67n28). Indeed, it is independent of all possible properties of his, except existence (which, of course, is not a property, or at least cannot be taken on the level of other properties without giving rise to theoretical antinomies). In fact, negative existentials involving the name do not, stricito sensu, mean anything, since names are not compressed descriptions. Hence their peculiarly difficult status in analytic linguistics (and Kripke himself does not actually give a
definitive ‘translation’ of his own; this is because there is none). Foucault is right to express mild bewilderment at the negative existential for authorial names, which can be used in a whole host of ways, an ambiguity deliciously exploited by Kierkegaard; but crucially, this ambiguity is fully present in the case of proper names as well. It is telling that Kripke seems to have an almost pathological aversion to discussing cases of vacuous reference; for how can the name, which refers rigidly beyond all variation of properties, refer at all if the referent does not exist? In one sense it surely must, and indeed does (Take for example ‘if his parents had not met, John would not have existed’); but then how can this be ‘reference’ in the same sense as we have been using it hitherto, since it does not actually ‘refer’ to anything? Are we thus compelled to introduce Meinongian subsistence? Such issues are far beyond the concern of this demi-paper; I only bring them up to show that the complexity of the negative existential in the case of the author’s name is by no means absent for the simple proper name, hence Foucault’s distinction fails yet again.

The next three can be lumped together, as they are rather easily dismissible, and I doubt Foucault took them all that seriously. We have in close succession the idea that 1) the authorial name performs ‘a classificatory function’; 2) ‘the fact that several texts have been placed under the same name indicates that there has been established among them a relation of homogeneity, filiation, authentication of some text by the use of others, reciprocal explication, or concomitant utilisation’; 3) the authorial name designates ‘speech that must be receive in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status’. That the authorial name performs all these functions is indisputable; however, so does the ‘mere’ proper name. With respect to classification, what is the surname/patronymic but a ‘classificatory function’, grouping individuals into units (and indeed, do not all signifiers perform this role?). As for homogeneity, statements of the form ‘that’s what X is like, there’s nothing you can do’ demonstrate that the proper name plays the same function in ordinary language. And 3) is really rather feeble, for which names come to attain this discursive prestige is a discursive effect, and there is a distribution of prestige appropriate to all different types of name. As mentioned, I doubt Foucault meant these particularly seriously, hence the lack of discussion, though we will analyse 2) is greater detail at a later stage.

The final point Foucault makes is more formidable than the preceding, and accordingly it would yield the greatest theoretical progress if we are able to deconstruct it successfully. Deleuze used to say that one of Foucault’s great achievements was the reconceptualization of the distinction of Inside-Outside, such that the Outside was always already folded in the Inside, and vice versa. This is surely one such passage:

It would seem that the author’s name, unlike other proper names, does not pass from the interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it; instead, the name seems always to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least characterising, its mode of being.

(Foucault 1984a: 107)

7. See for example his paper, ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’, included in Saul Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers Volume I, pg 100-101: ‘So as to avoid any unnecessary and irrelevant entanglements of the present question with the issues that arise when definite descriptions are vacuous...’
The authorial name is thus conceived of as more than simply referential, its ‘object’ is not one that can exist independently of the name. The authorial name is not supplementary to a concrete standalone object, it delimits the boundaries of this very object. Its referent is thus in a literal sense its ‘product’, since the name alone secures the integrity of the object in discourse. But here we can see that Foucault almost ‘tries too hard’ to deny this functionality to the proper name: for if the object of the authorial name is produced by the name, to maintain a genuine distinction one would have to claim that on the contrary for other proper names the causality is reversed, it is the referent that produces the name. Which indeed he does; but this is an absurd assertion, for one does not name oneself in general, one is always named as a passive recipient. This is of course the meaning of Althusser’s thesis that interpellation is always-already taking place: even prior to birth, one is named, and thus an obligation and an imperative is placed that one is to be ‘worthy of one’s name’. If anything, it is rather the ‘author’ who is sometimes able to take a critical distance towards this exercise of power through the medium of the name, by adopting pseudonym(s), refusing capitalisation (like bell hooks), and so on. The elementary consequence of the theory of interpellation is that the subject is a discursive formation, a function of his/her name: thus it is not the named individual who produces his/her own name, it is rather the name that produces them, just as in the case of the authorial name. In this respect, it is striking that the analytic tradition seems to be in agreement. Henry Hiż, for example, having discussed some difficult antinomies of determining the precise boundary of an individual (does the surface layer of an object A belong to it, the outside, or to neither? Presumably neither, but then if we consider an object B that in turn includes the whole of the original object A with some of what surrounds A, presumably this new object B does have to include the surface layer. But how can it, if it initially belonged to neither inside nor outside?), bluntly asserts: ‘[i]t is a remarkable fact that logic does not have the means of defining individuals’ (Hiż 1971). This is because the individual does not pre-exist his signifier, it is the name alone that defines the boundary of what is to be included and what is to be excluded from this object. This means that finally Foucault’s last attempt to demarcate the authorial name from the proper name has failed; but it is a productive failure, one that opens up the possibility of conceiving of the proper name itself beyond its ‘mere’ referential function, to its role in the very delimitation of where boundaries of the referent lie.

2.3 Kripkault: Naming and singularity

The preceding discussion of Kripke and (with) Foucault leads to the following conclusions:

1) The name simultaneously performs a homogenising and heterogenising function with respect to its referent. The name is both that which delimits the referent as an object, as this thing and not another, and at the same time through its rigidity what allows all of the object’s properties to change without it losing its integrity and identity as this object.

2) The name therefore, in a very literal sense constitutes its referent: by delimiting it in the paradoxical unity of its homogenising and heterogenising functions, it alone organises ‘matter’ in such a way that an object can be conceived of as such, as an object.
3) If we conceive of singularity in opposition to individuality, this latter being defined as the totality of an individual’s properties, then the name, which alone allows a referent to be thought as persisting in its identity beyond all possible variation of properties, this name alone can be said to grasp/constitute an object in its singularity, or to use the great Spinozist term, in its singular essence.

These conclusions are all intimately related. The name as discursive agent constitutes the referent by framing the boundaries of its object, and this alone makes the object an object (we could call this step interpellation). However, the name’s rigidity paradoxically works in the opposite direction to the work of interpellation, such that having quilted an object as an object, it then opens up the discourse of possibility and contingency, and ultimately allows the object to undergo all possible variation in its properties while nonetheless remaining this object. This discharging of properties as ultimately contingent to the individuation (or more precisely, singulation, though I confess this neologism is rather harsh on the eyes and ears...) of the object finally allows the object to be conceived in its singularity, beyond all determinate characteristics, but not for that matter indeterminate, a mere undifferentiated mass. For the object has already been fixed, rigidly, by the designation of the name; it is thus a One, not the formless mass of the multitude (as some bastardisations of Deleuze would have it). It is, irreducibly, but not as the hypokeimenon of Aristotelian theory (which has survived in disguised form even in modern capitalism and economistic ideology). It is in spite of its determinate properties, not because of them, or worse because it is them. This, we feel is the proper way to go about conceptualising the singular, not as the transcendent function of the phenomenological and humanistic body, but the sterile logic of the name-function in its rigidity and indifference to properties.

2.4 Concluding remarks: The name of the One?

In lieu of a traditional ‘academic’ conclusion, which bores me insufferably, I should like to offer some notes on a possible direction further work in this area could take. For we have yet to confront in any way the great philosophical problem, implicit since Plato, of the impossibility of naming something that is One. How can the singular have a name? Would this not immediately render it dual, and thus no longer singular? This is an extremely complex problem, and I confess that I have no definitive solution of my own, yet at any rate. It is clear that any solution based on the ‘impossibility’ of naming cannot work. Laclau for example, in his essay, ‘On the Names of God’, generalises the impossibility of a proper name of God into the impossibility of any term to capture the political as such, which for him is the condition for the open field of hegemonic contestation. But this is not the actual issue, for what we must explain is not the impossibility of nominative reference, but rather its absolute possibility, indeed its necessity against all odds. The limits of this liberal politics of agonistic pluralism lies in its sanctification of the category of the impossible: the ultimate consequence of this agonism founded on impossibility is the repression of the real of social antagonism as beyond politics, thus forfeiting the possibility of radical transformation a priori. What the theory of hegemony cannot think, indeed must be foreclosed from being able to think at all, is therefore ‘revolution’; in this respect, it is the great merit of Foucault that he did not shy away from a serious confrontation with the category of revolution. And in the aptly titled ‘What Is Revolution’, he writes the following apropos of Kant: ‘[o]ne must isolate an event in history that will take on the value of a sign’ (Foucault
1997: 90). This ‘event’ is of course revolution; only, the revolution in its ‘permanent virtuality’ (a term he co-opts from Deleuze), the ‘Idea’ of revolution as such, beyond its specific instances of success or failure. And we have already established that a being can only be freed of determinate characteristics if it is given a name; in this way the revolution is recast as a singular event. Garton writes that ‘[s]ingularity is revealed and constituted in this act of taking-as-event; the act, specifically, of naming an event, naming as event, a certain indeterminate content.’ But can we not go one step further, for Foucault and Kant seek to find an event that takes on the value of a sign, is its own sign: in other words, a singularity that has absolutely coincided with its own name. Naming empties a being of content, rendering it singular; but this is not yet the end, for the name itself remains to disrupt the singularity. But instead of conceiving this as an impossible impasse, we can see it as the true condition of possibility for a radical engagement: it is only passionate and relentless commitment that can affirm the singular as nothing but its own name, the revolution as nothing but its own sign. What if the paradoxical impossibility and necessity of naming the singular cannot in fact be resolved by theory? Might it then be recast as a theoretical impasse that calls, indeed necessitates an answer in the form of concrete, actual political engagement?

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In this presentation I will attempt to rediscover the links between the several sources of Foucault from the early 19th century and the philosophical-political group of the Ideologists whose work was well known during and after the French Revolution. The simultaneous reading of these texts might help us to comprehend the transition from *Unreason* to *Madness*, from physiology to psychiatry and its influences in the work of Foucault and especially in his notion of bio-power.

It is commonly known for Foucault-readers that the question of madness, *la folie*, is a central subject for his theory of bio-power. Not only it is a central subject, such as the prison or discipline, but it ensures a certain framework, a skeleton that illustrates and makes more visible the dynamism of power and knowledge (*pouvoir et savoir*). If we follow the steps of the Foucauldian analysis of the asylum through his courses in the Collège de France (*Les Anormaux, Le pouvoir psychiatrique*), we might find that his research limits itself to methods of cure and discipline of the 19th century. The most mentioned figures are all well-known physicians of the era: Pinel, Tissot, Trélat, Esquirol. Nevertheless, this should not astonish the reader: in the short history of psychiatry, the beginning of the 19th century is a clear turn point, for several reasons. The famous law of 1838 ("loi des aliénés") purifies the asylum and liberates those marginal figures, who are not medically considered as abnormal, such as the homeless, the idle and the prostitutes. This act, mainly linked to the name of Pinel, called as the liberation of the mad – which allegedly happened in 1793 –, has been the victim of several misleading interpretations. As Foucault points out in the *Psychiatric Power*, the mad were not set free at all: on the contrary, it was only the mad, seen as the only *Other* – in medical terms – from now on, who was kept in the asylum.

At the same time, we see a major shift in the French jurisprudence regarding the practice of mitigating circumstances. The article 64, that came in vigor with the law of 1832, acquits the accused if it is proven that he was currently suffering of dementia. As we see it in the case of Pierre Rivièrè (Foucault 2007), a young man, who after killing his mother, his sister and his brother, and who after a quite long and complicated process is acquitted and sent to asylum in 1835, there are still uncertainties regarding the status of the mentally ill. In fact, the Court had to address the King Louis-Philippe given that it was unable to decide whether the mitigating circumstances could be applied to this case or not.
The inertia of the judicial machine directs our attention to the multiple, problematic facets of the medicalized body in the late 18th – early 19th century. First of all, we have to assert that Unreason was indeed a cause of exemption in the earlier times: the case of Pierre Rivière (or we could also just refer to the story of Herculine Barbin or to the observations of Trélat) is a sign of convergence. Convergence of criminality and lunacy. Before the late 18th century, mentally ill (lunatics, mad) were automatically exempt, given their inability of reasoning and committing a crime. Which on the other hand meant that the criminal himself was indeed a reasoning human being. Nevertheless, this changes when criminal acts became symptoms of deviance, analogous to lunacy: “whereas in previous periods madness was carefully distinguished from criminal conduct and was regarded as an excuse, criminality itself becomes – and subsequent to the celebrated ‘homicidal monomanias’ – a form of deviance more or less related to madness” (Foucault 1972: 41).

It is the body as object, which becomes the focal point of psychiatry – as a branch of judicial machinery: the criminal subject is forthwith deprived of its own subjectivity, because he or she is abnormal, but not in the sense of the monster, as described e.g. by Aldrovandi in the 17th century (Foucault 1972: 58), but as a deviant in the disciplinary society. In the works of Foucault the disciplinary and psychiatry are inseparable, from one another: psychiatry as it existed in the 19th century was the product of the disciplinary, moreover not just a product, but also an organic part of it (Foucault 2003). If we look at the evolution of this science, we can observe a certain displacement from the classification to observation, from the physiological to the psychological. Meanwhile Condillac still maintained the idea that mental troubles and thus the unreason is caused by lesions, Pinel elaborates his theory of intrinsic madness, detached from localized physiological causes: “as in the case of psychiatry and organic medicine which were virtually not distinguished from one another before the end of the eighteenth century, and which established from that moment a gap that has since characterized them” (Foucault 1972: 67).

This progressive disconnection and move from a global distribution – as in natural history – to a more detailed symptomatology is analyzed by Foucault himself in his early work *Maladie mentale et psychologie*.

The birth of the “journal d’asile” (asylum diaries) is the trace of objectification, an institution elaborated by Cabanis: “A journal shall be kept where a picture of each form of madness, the effects of remedies, and autopsies, are to be recorded with scrupulous exactitude. The names of all individuals in the section are to be recorded, enabling the administration to draw up a nominative report on their condition week by week, or even day by day, if that is what is judged necessary.“ (Foucault 2006: 485). The unreason could no longer stroll on the streets, leaving an impression of futile lunacy, just as the *Rameau's Nephew*, who eccentrically laughs at the aristocrats and lives on their ignorance. Nor could it be confined with the other marginal characters. Unreason becomes madness when a new order of authority judges it necessary to confine the lunatic and solely the lunatic; at least theoretically, if we take into account that those in danger during the Terror had to declare themselves lunatics in order to save their lives (Murat 2011: 111-161). If the mentally ill was now freed from the status of Unreason – if we accept that it is not anymore the immediate environment of the Insane/Unreasoned who reports his or her behavior –, his freedom is indeed limited within the walls of an asylum, and the subjectivity of the mad is lost under the gaze of others: “If this evolution was to be summed up in one sentence, we might say that the kernel of the experience of Unreason was that madness was there its own subject, but that in the experience that came into being in the late
eighteenth century, madness was alienated from itself through its promotion to a new status as object“ (Foucault 2006: 487). Herculine Barbin and Pierre Rivière fell into objectivity when they wrote their own diaries, whether or not these are read later by physicians or judges. What makes them objects – medical objects – is that their body might not be seen anymore as mere spectacle, abnormality, but they are inserted in the system of description. It is important to note that the scandalous act of Herculine Barbin was not being a hermaphrodite, but making an immoral decision when changing her female lifestyle and becoming a man. Undeniably, we are not only talking about pure medical observation. All the cases described by Trélat for example (Trélat 1861) are incessantly tied to the moral position of the “acts”. Being mad is indeed seen as committing an act, which has a moral impact; although we might have some difficulties when we look for the very source of this kind of discourse. The isolation of the unreasoned1 - from now on called the mad - is not a simple fact, but it is the trace of the latent dissolution and reformulation of the discourse of the Other. If we follow the argument of Foucault in the History of Sexuality, we can easily discover that the so-called sexual repression is turned into its opposite, into the overgrowth of the discourse of desire in the act of confession and the control of the child: “What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the secret” (Foucault 1978: 35). This process may be analogous to what we see in the case of the discourse about the asylum, which supposedly did not begin with purely practical observations, but by a new theory of physiology.

This physiological philosophy was elaborated by the Ideologists – the so-called Idéologues – in the second half of 18th century. The Society of the Ideologues included several well-known French philosophers, from whom Pierre Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy are the most mentioned in Foucault’s work. In fact, we already talked about Cabanis when analyzing the importance of the asylum diaries – as it was him who emphasized the scientific importance of inscription and scrutiny, which leads to the confession like genre of the personal journal of the mad –, but we have to turn to the writings of Destutt de Tracy, if we want to understand the theoretical context of the birth of body-object. Destutt de Tracy, who devised the term “ideology”, from the word idea and logos (and as such, it is not to be confused with its current connotations) in his Projet d’éléments de l'idéologie – Elements of ideology, 1800 –, builds an entire system based on the human sensation, stating that all of our simple and complex ideas are the results of our involuntary sensations. This might sound familiar if we think of the works of Hobbes or even those of Francis Bacon, but something different is mentioned in the work of Destutt de Tracy: he does not build this theoretical system for the sake of description, but for a possible practical use and as a result, he dedicates several passages of this work to the study of the abnormal functioning of sensations. Cabanis comes to the same conclusions and even suggests possible cures based on the equalization of humors (Cabanis 1805: 298-299). As we can see, the medicalization of the body was certainly an important aspect of the physiological philosophy of the Ideologists, but not only on an individual, but also on the social level. If this equalization was possible, the confinement could become superfluous and the dynamics of the disciplinary a lot more efficient. The energy invested in the confinement is indeed

1.We have to note as well that the English version cannot translate the difference between the notions of ‘Déraison’ and “Folie” as they appear in the original text. By choosing the medicalized term “Insanity” the translator had to overlook the spatial-temporal division Foucault wanted to emphasize. Thus we have to use ‘Unreasoned’ in this presentation.
lost, but meanwhile Cabanis plays with the idea of the elimination of natural inequalities, this act reinforces the constraints of bio-power. The objectification of the unreasoned might be the foundation of this new discourse and Foucault, even if he does not detail the work of the “Ideologists”, emphasizes the importance of their work in this process: “The philosophy of the “Ideologists,” as a theory of ideas, signs, and the individual genesis of sensations, but also a theory of the social composition of interests – Ideology being a doctrine of apprenticeship, but also a doctrine of contracts and the regulated formation of the social body – no doubt constituted the abstract discourse in which one sought to coordinate these two techniques of power in order to construct a general theory of it” (Foucault 1978: 140).

The Elements of ideology was not simply a philosophical work, it was an attempt to reform the educational system. Hence the complete title was: Project of elements of ideology for the use of central schools in the French Republic. Seemingly, the years of Revolution granted the perfect occasion for rewiring the education system and with it the notion of the individual. The human being as a machinery of sensations is not completely self-sufficient and should perfected and those who show symptoms of defective functioning should either be cured – if possible – in confinement or be confined forever.

The role of the Ideologists in the creation of the body as object is more than clear: implicitly claiming the inferiority of the unreasoned, because of their deviance and explicitly stating that they should be cured, these philosophers — under the revolutionary motto of Equality – chained them. The humanism of Cabanis, while he advocated for better conditions in the general hospitals is undermined by the fact that instead of abolishing a constraining order, he wished to reinforce it (Cabanis 1790). The extension by which the disciplinary machinery was able to be fortified is indeed the hospital: but it is important to note with Foucault (Foucault 2006: 45) and Frédéric Gros (Gros 1997: 82-85) that the term “General Hospital” (Hôpital Général which can hardly be translated to English) till the end of the 18th century did not indicate a place of treatment and cure. The Hospital is a correction center where the idle, the destitute, the unreasoned and sometimes criminals are redressed. What does that even mean? It means that being unreasoned is a fault in the moral conduct of the individual. When the other groups are released, new asylums are opened (e.g. les Petites Maisons), exclusively for the redress of the mad – an event that is linked to the liberation of the mad (Foucault 2003: 21). And redressing at that moment means the protection of the reasoned. We might not want to refer to the initial mechanics of capitalism in France – and in Europe in general – during the 18th century, but it is clear that those groups who are freed are partly absorbed by the fluctuating work-market, and what is left is the group which is either incapacitated (invalids), dangerous (prisoners) or insane (Petites Maisons).

Now, we could ask ourselves: what is the function of Ideology in the constitution of the secularly abnormal and how is this philosophy inserted or recycled in Foucault’s work? When the so-called unreason was replaced by madness, it was added to the nosography of monstrosities, but in the same time the importance of the monstrous receded. The body of the sick became surface upon which the disciplinary was able to inscribe its rules from that moment. The body – through medicalization, which was first an instrument of discipline and secondly a science – became an object: a receptacle (collection of various symptoms without visible physical causes) and a surface (masses to be redressed). With
the *Ideology* that does not change, moreover this philosophy reinforces this system by wiring it to a moral-political discourse maintained by the fully medicalized revolutionary discourse itself (Martin 2008: 60-124). If the equality of man is not only restricted to political and legal terms, but is also extended to the nature of man – exceeding the limits set by Rousseau –, then this same equality is about to become a medical question. We still have to emphasize that we do not talk about helping mentally ill people, but redressing-correcting them, we talk about eliminating their otherness. We could then ask what is exactly equality for the *Ideologists* during and after the Revolution? We do not exactly know, however we see its implications. If in this philosophy the mad can be an object, it is because the discourse of absolute truth (of a certain transcendental knowledge) cannot be applied to man anymore. The phylogenesis of psychiatry – tied to the evolution of the disciplinary system, which takes off at the moment of the fall of the Ancien Regime – can be traced back to this moral-political and more importantly, epistemological change. The mad represents an unclassifiable singularity, a disturbance to be observed in its very particular elements, the mad individuals. The classification of natural history not being valid anymore, a morally engaged *logos* has to replace it, which is psychiatry in the late 18th and during the whole 19th century. In the same time, we have to admit – although Foucault does not give any detailed information about the Ideologists or their work – that one of the sources of this science is a certain drive to fill in the void caused by the inflated value of natural history and to correct the only group the political and economical changes of the 18th century could not reinstate in society. It is important for understanding Foucault’s analysis of archaeology and episteme in the case of psychiatry and scientific discourse that there was a peculiar group of philosophers in that era who made the first steps towards a new way of thinking, correcting and seeing the maladies of the soul.

**Bibliography**


Trélat, Ulysse (1861), *La folie lucide : étudiée et considérée au point de vue de la famille et de la société*, Paris.
[...] language does not fail to impress us, it carries itself languidly beyond its temporal intonation (another’s death), the audacity of an amplified speech, registering silences, interstices, and disappearances. La lengua no deja de impresionarnos, lleva en sí languardamente más allá de su entonación temporal, la muerte de otro; la audacia de un discurso amplificado, registrando silencios, intersticios y desapariciones. Die Sprache scheitert nicht, sie selbst trägt lässig über seine zeitliche Intonation (des anderen Tod), die Kühnheit einer verstärkten Ansprache, Registrierung, Schweigen, Zwischenräume, und das Verschwinden.

die Sprache trägt lässig über (over and above) vor sich hin
dessen zeitliche Intonation

bearing the name, Foucault

sustaining or carrying the written
wearing wearing language,

wearing itself, reciting, declaiming

Er trägt nichts nach\(^1\)
bearing no enmity,

the sound and the fury

that calls forth elegant, luxurious speech.

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extraordinary and outrageous, accented and thoughtful, promiscuous, inordinately clever ausgefuchst\(^2\) and refined raffiniert\(^3\)

“I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture [...]” (Foucault 1972: 215)

thus begins Foucault’s “The Discourse on Language.”\(^4\)

A footnote informs us that the “lecture was delivered in French at the Collège de France on December 2\(^{\text{nd}},\) 1970” and that the “original French text has [that is, had or has] been published with the title [as] L’ordre du discours,” in Paris, by the publisher Gallimard, in 1971.\(^5\)

Le désir dit: «Je ne voudrais pas avoir à entrer moi-même dans cet ordre hasardeux du discours ; je ne voudrais pas avoir affaire à lui dans ce qu’il a de tranchant et de décisif ; je voudrais qu’il soit tout autour de moi comme une transparence calme, profonde, indéfiniment ouverte, où les autres répondraient à mon attente, et d’où les vérités, une à une, se lèveraient ; je n’aurais qu’à me laisser porter, en lui et par lui, comme une épave heureuse.» Et l’institution répond: «Tu n’as pas à craindre de commencer ; nous sommes tous là pour te montrer que le discours est dans l’ordre des lois ; qu’on veille depuis longtemps sur son apparition ; qu’une place lui a été faite, qui l’honore mais le désarme ; et que, s’il lui arrive d’avoir quelque pouvoir, c’est bien de nous, et de nous seulement, qu’il le tient.»

Mais peut-être cette institution et ce désir ne sont-ils pas autre chose que deux répliques opposées à une même inquiétude:

inquiétude à l’égard de ce qu’est le discours dans sa réalité matérielle de

\(^{2}\) German: ausgefuchst. English: clever, crafty, cunning.
\(^{3}\) German: raffiniert. English: refined.
\(^{4}\) Foucault 1972: 215
\(^{5}\) Foucault 1972: 215
chose prononcée ou écrite ; inquiétude à l'égard de cette existence transitoire vouée à s'effacer sans doute, mais selon une durée qui ne nous appartient pas ; inquiétude à sentir sous cette activité, pourtant quotidienne et grise, des pouvoirs et des dangers qu'on imagine mal ; inquiétude à soupçonner des luttes, des victoires, des blessures, des dominations, des servitudes, à travers tant de mots dont l'usage depuis si longtemps a réduit les aspérités.

Mais qu'y a-t-il donc de si périlleux dans le fait que les gens parlent, et que leurs discours indéfiniment prolifèrent ? Où donc est le danger?

(Foucault 1971: 9-10)

In the afternoon, she climbed up the stairs, and stared out the window el verano, cayendo hacia diciembre
La ville blanche, décembre
Sugar Man
Sweet Mary-Jane

Private, personal, reserved, and confidential, set apart, privileged, and cloistered within the distance and anonymity that is language. Alight rain is falling in the White City Singidunum Сингидунум, the bells are tolling at St. Mark’s Church (Црква Светог Марка / Crkva Svetog Marka) people are hurrying along East 10th Street, toward Second Avenue. (listening to Radio B92).

8. Rodriguez 1970a
9. Ibid.
10. Singidunum, internet
11. St. Mark Church, internet
12. St. Mark Church, internet
On Second Avenue, it is 2005, possibly 2004. Sche,\textsuperscript{13} that is her, is двадесет четири dvadeset pet,\textsuperscript{14} peut-être vingt-quatre, back East, dreaming of the West; Oh, to be 19\textsuperscript{15} again, \textit{rolling hills} North Beach bookstores \textit{Potrero Hill} sweaty sheets. In the White City elegant avenues lead to smaller streets, hidden passageways, pedestrians, laughter, university students, passers by a crowd elsewhere, alongside veiled corridors. The most укусан ukusan\textsuperscript{16} deliciou\textsuperscript{17} (delicious, luscious, scrumptious) pastries can be \textit{had} in \textit{this} city, filled with promises. Hollowed spaces carved out of stone, quiet; a bustling city \textit{dehors fora} напољу.\textsuperscript{18} Walking down \textit{Bulevar Revolucije},\textsuperscript{19} listening to the city in precise and intricate intervals breathing in and out, in and out, in and out.

Those who have not gone to sleep are busy (re)arranging their lives. Cleaning sidewalks, lights shimmering from their windows. Turning the corner on Germania Street, I turn toward Dolores Park, hurrying past Predsedništvo the Presidential Palace, Skupština grada the City Assembly, turning back toward Narodna skupština the National Assembly on Bulevar kralja Aleksandra, backing up via Kneza Miloša, taking yet another turn in the direction of Studentski Trg\textsuperscript{20} and the People's University, passing \textit{Pozorišni Trg}

\textsuperscript{12}This is a reference to Belgrade independent Radio B92 founded in 1989 and its pending internet project made possible through the Amsterdam Internet site XS4ALL in 1996 (Pantic, internet; B92, internet).
\textsuperscript{13}She: Middle English - sche (Sche, internet).
\textsuperscript{14}Serbian: двадесет четири/dvadeset pet. English: twenty-five.
\textsuperscript{15}This is a reference to Jose Luis Borges' poem, “The Other Tiger,” in a line that reads: “O tiger on the Ganges’ banks / Oh tigre de las márgenes del Ganges” (Borges 1964: 70-71).
\textsuperscript{16}Serbian: укусан/ukusan. English: delicious.
\textsuperscript{17}Catalan: deliciou. English: delicious.
\textsuperscript{19}Bulevar Revolucije Boulevard of the Revolution) (Bulevar kralja Aleksandra, internet).
\textsuperscript{20}Studentski Trg/Студентски Трг (Students Square) (Studentski Trg, internet)
Theater Square that is *freedom square* Trg Slobode Трг Републике and Trg Republike21 La Place de la République. It is 1944 and you I sche catch catches caught a glimpse glimpses of the Belgrade Offensive *Beogradska operacija*, Београдска операција.22 Back up to Vasina, then, suddenly, finding myself facing Palata Srbije the Palace of Serbia flanked by Bulevar Mihajla Pupina and Nikole Tesle. On the corner of Bulevar Oslobođenja (Boulevard of the Liberation) and Takovska, I stop, caught in stillness turning about face, pivoting 180 degrees to admire the General Post Office. Dolores Park looks inviting, the palm trees are swaying in the San Francisco sun. In 1966, the scent of jasmine and honeysuckle adorn cobalt blue verandas affording splendid vistas over the open sea. azul23 cerulean, caelum,24 and heavenly, sky taking another turn sche enters The Blocks (Blokovi) Блокови. walking passed the mall, a gas station and the primary school sche stops in front of Block 45. New Belgrade. 25

I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture, as into all the others I shall be delivering, perhaps over the years ahead. I would have preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond all possible beginnings. At the moment of speaking, I would like to have perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving me merely to enmesh myself in it, taking up its cadence, and to lodge myself, when no one is looking, in its interstices as if it had paused an instant, in suspense, to beckon me. There would have been no beginnings: instead, speech would proceed from me, while I stood in its path – a slender gap – the point of its possible disappearance. [...] (Foucault 1972, 215)

March '68 26 Tunis

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21. Republic Square, Belgrade, internet
22. Belgrade Offensive, internet
25. Blokovi, internet
Brick by brick, you are building a wall in front of the Federal Parliament Building, spray painting the slogan: *We are not destructing but constructing.* At Trg Republike women are holding the banner, ŽENE U CRNOM PROTIV RATA жене у црном против рата. In this city crossing the sidewalk entails getting swept away by frenzied dancers, cheering wildly. Rodríguez’s voice lingers in the background, singing

I wonder how many times you’ve been had
And I wonder how many plans have gone bad
I wonder how many times you had sex
I wonder do you know who’ll be next
I wonder I wonder wonder I do
I wonder about the love you can’t find
And I wonder about the loneliness that’s mine
I wonder how much going have you got
And I wonder about your friends that are not
I wonder I wonder wonder I do
I wonder about the tears in children’s eyes
And I wonder about the soldier that dies
I wonder will this hatred ever end
I wonder and worry my friend
I wonder I wonder wonder don’t you?
I wonder how many times you been had
And I wonder how many dreams have gone bad

26. Foucault recalls his Tunisian experience thus, “What I mean is this: what on earth is it that can set off in an individual the desire, the capacity, and the possibility of an absolute sacrifice without our being able to recognize or suspect the slightest ambition or desire for power and profit? This is what I saw in Tunisia. The necessity for a struggle was clearly evident there on account of the intolerable nature of certain conditions produced by capitalism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. In a struggle of this kind, the question of direct, existential, I should say physical commitment was implied immediately (Foucault 1991: 136-37).

27. Balkan Peace Team-Belgrade, internet
28. This is a reference to a photograph by Peter Emerson, “Women in Black Against War, 1993 (Emerson, internet). Founded October 9, 1991, жене у црном жене u crnom (Women in Black) is a women’s feminist - antimilitarist organization based in Belgrade, Serbia (Women in Black, internet). See in addition, “Neither Whores, nor Saints” (Women in Black, internet).
29. Balkan Peace Team-Belgrade, Internet
I wonder how many times you’ve had sex
And I wonder do you know who’ll be next
I wonder I wonder wonder I do

(Rodriguez 1970b)

On Divisadero Street there is a man who wears his heart on her sleeve, unfolding his heart in her mouth sipping thé aux pignons on the corner of Mission Street, Her heart flies over her head and lands on 898 Carolina Street.

May 10 Night of Barricades

Commodities Are The Opium Of The People, Revolution Is The Ecstasy Of History

Feel the spirit of Belgrade! Make the NOISE. On Wednesday, the 5th March, the members of the Initiative and Main Board of the Student Protest managed to enter the building where the Chancellor’s office is. Most of them entered through a window, whereas a smaller group got in through a passage between that building and the School of Philosophy. Still in the building, they have the attention of remaining there until the Chancellor resigns.

Welcome to the University of Belgrade - PROTEST- The Official World-Wide Web Site

As long as this situation is taking place in Belgrade, on this page you will be able to find the latest news about the happenings here, so reload this page often. Latest Events: Education Minister Threatens to Stop University Funding 10.03.1997 (22:35 GMT); University President Lacks Credibility Among Students 09.03.1997 (18:35 GMT); Demand For Government Dismissal 09.03.1997 (18:25 GMT); 107th Students’ Protest Walk 08.03.1997 (23:50); CHANCELLOR RESIGNED!!! 07.03.1997 (12:45 GMT)

The time returns,
That is to say, we are in Paris, at this moment;
it is December, December 2nd to be precise, and it is 1970. An adumbrating

30. Night of Barricades, internet; Karen Moller, internet
31. Ali, internet
32. Welcome to the University of Belgrade - Protest - The Official World-Wide Website, internet
light casts its shadow into the long longue [prolonged, and elongated,] Parisian afternoon aprèsi-midi.

Summer, falling towards Winter

We are at the Collège de France Francuska, located in the Latin Quarter, the 5th arrondissement, in full view of La Sorbonne.

Le Collège de France belonging to le grands établissements, that is to say, Établissements publics à caractère scientifique, culturel et professionnel (EPSCP) 33, that is, no discreet matter (in parentheses), located at the intersection where Rue Saint Jacques and Rue des Écoles meet.

Foucault is forty-four years old. Foucault és quaranta-quatre anys d’edat. 34

“L’ordre du discours” represents his inaugural lecture; an inaugural lecture that signals the insurrection of a continued disruption, a radicalization of (in)possible 35 beginnings.

what remains in this instance, or, so we imagine, is Foucault’s singular voice, his “velvety” erudition

For me, writing is an extremely gentle activity, hushed. I get the impression of velvet when I write. For me, the idea of a velvety writing is a familiar theme, at the limit of the affective and the perceptive, which continues to haunt my writing project, to guide my writing when I’m writing, and that allows me, at every moment, to choose the expressions I want to use (Foucault 2013: 38).

where writing and speaking collapse into one another, each other

33. EPSCP, internet; Collège de France, internet
34. Catalan: Foucault és quaranta-quatre anys d’edat. English: Foucault is forty-four years old.
35. Hözl 2012: 124
there there a silent intonation, and gesture,

Foucault’s auditory glance anothers’ (speech, the written), soundless, still silent, hushed, you could hear a pin fall in the room

filled with excitement and expectation

inaudible, remaining unspoken indiscreet, reticent wortlos, unhörbar, geräuschlos, lautlos und still silent, hushed, you could hear a pin fall in the room

inaudible, remaining unspoken indiscreet, reticent wortlos, unhörbar, geräuschlos, lautlos und still silent, hushed, you could hear a pin fall in the room

and inflammatory in kind.

dashing, debonair, and suave

A provocative (outrageous) speech, presented in the most unassuming of manners; unadorned, deceptively simple, discreet, and controlled. A deliberative erudition unhinging “systems of constraint,”38 a purposeful substance or tonic, dare we say, (tēmētum)39, an auditory consternation (edging upon uneasiness and unrest), at once fluid and discontinuous in its predisposition экстравагантно и дивља ekstravagantno i divlja extrapol+wild

“I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into”
silence тишина, anonymity анонимност anonimnost,

into the occasion that is language језик jezik,41 that is Foucault’s erudition ерудиција erudicija,42 his speech говор говор,43

“imperceptibly slipped into this [his] lecture” that is here, in Belgrade, on this occasion, audibly and gallantly ascending into another(s) tongue anothers’ (language), into the labyrinth that is the audible tenderness of another(s) speech, his or her, your his breath. I would have liked thus, that is, “I would really like
to have slipped,” fallen, stumbled or tumbled into the sonority, elegance of another; reserved, reserving the guarded ferocity of another(s) listening, engaging in a mode of restraint, and

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36. German: wortlos silent, unhörbar inaudible, geräuschlos soundless, lautlos without a sound und still silent.
37. Serbian, English, French
40. Serbian: экстравагантно и дивља ekstravagantno i divlja. English: extravagant and wild.
passivity, as it were in a “radical
reversal and dispossession” of that
which we may call (upon) language. The
resonance or behaviour and
comportment, its rhythmic cadence,
literary érudition, an “Anonymous
language,” communal, and
unrestricted, “deposited there in large
sheets” as Foucault tells us,
“Immigrant discourse.” Exilic,
sybaritic and abstemious, “doubly
political,” a discourse situated
between rivers. marked by poverty and largess
pleasure and luxury.
in friendship and fidelity, yet accusatory
in kind.

Die Sprache language carries itself languidly beyond its
temporal intonation (another’s death),
the audacity of an amplified speech,
registering silences,
interstices, and disappearances.

Anonymity within the instance of a
suspension, that precedes, and
“enmeshes” itself within the sanctity of
an expansive discourse dislodging itself
across tiers, rows, steps, parallels, and
architectural planes, the lecture hall,
and the auditorium, depositing itself
across “white sheets” white linen the

44. Rayner, internet
46. Foucault 2000a: 141
47. Sybaritic as in: “1. Devoted to or marked by pleasure and luxury. 2. Of or relating to Sybaris or its people”
(Sybaritic, internet; Sybaris, internet).
48. Abstemious: “from Latin abstēmius, from abs- ab- 1 + tēm-, from tēmētum intoxicating drink” (tēmētum,
internet).
49. Referring to Jean Hyppolite, Foucault notes, “I think this work, articulated in a small number of major
books, but, even more, invested in research, teaching, in a perpetual attentiveness, in an everyday alertness
and generosity, in its apparently administrative and pedagogic responsibilities (i.e., doubly political), has tra-
versed and formulated the most fundamental problems of our age. Many of us are infinitely indebted to him”
(Foucault 1972: 237).
50. La pauvreté, la sécheresse, French for drought, dryness, aridity, barrenness, curtness, poverty.
51. sybaritic, internet
materiality of a cadenced dispersion, “Immigrant speech.” “There would have been no beginnings: instead, speech would proceed from me, while I [that is, we, you] stood in its path [we stood you stood in its path, the point of its possible disappear-
rivals any previously rendered

I confess to my longtime anti-war activity;
that I did not agree with the severe beating of people of other ethnicities and nationalities, faiths, race, sexual orientation;
that I was not present at the ceremonial act of throwing flowers on the tanks headed for Vukovar, 1991 and Prishtina, 1998;
that I fed women and children in the refugee camps, schools, churches, and mosques;
that I sent packages for women and men in the basements of occupied Sarajevo in 1993, 1994, and 1995;
that for the entire year I crossed the walls of Balkan ethno-states, because solidarity is the politics which interests me;
that I understand democracy as support to anti-war activists/friends/sisters - Albanian women, Croat women, Roma women, stateless women;
that I first challenged the murderers from the state where I live and then those from other states, because I consider this to be responsible political behavior of a citizen;

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52. Foucault 1972: 215
that throughout all the seasons of the year I insisted that there be an end to the slaughter, destruction, ethnic cleansing, forced evacuation of people and rape;
that I took care of others while the patriots took care of themselves

Women in Black, 9 October 1998

The Awesome materiality that is language, agreeable, pleasing, melodic, plastic, maneuvering itself at once
in the modality of an auditory texture, an insurrectionary template that rests on the “principle of reversal,”

“parasitic” in disposition, running parallel in structure. Affected, and (dis)affected, ostentatious, and modest, the “fabrication” of a language spreading itself far beyond any notion of an originary speech, calling forth the delicate intonation of dissemblance, dissimilarity and un ‘likeness. “A discourse even more exterior,” that is in the distance between the speech of others and my own.

And my speech is nothing other

53. Mladjenovic and Hughes, internet (Part 2)
54. Foucault 1972: 216
55. Foucault notes, “A principle of reversal, first of all. Where, according to tradition, we think we recognise the source of discourse, the principles behind its flourishing and continuity, in those factors which seem to play a positive role, such as the author discipline, will to truth, we must rather recognise the negative activity of the cutting-out and rarefaction of discourse” (Foucault 1972: 229).
56. Foucault 2000a:138
57. In a conversation with Lucette Finas, Foucault notes: “I am fully aware that I have never written anything other than fictions. For all that, I would not want to say that they were outside the truth. It seems plausible to me to make fictions work within truth ... and in some way to make discourse arouse, ‘fabricate,’ something which does not yet exist, thus to fiction something. One ‘fictions’ history starting from a political reality that renders it true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in existence starting from historical truth” (Foucault 1979: 75). Commenting on Madness and Civilization, in an interview conducted by D. Trombadori, Foucault goes on to state, “ [...] the book constituted a transformation in the historical, theoretical, and moral or ethical relationship with madness, the mentally ill, the psychiatric institution, and the very truth of psychiatric discourse. So it’s a book that functions as an experience, for its writer and reader alike, much more than as the establishment of a historical truth. [...] the essential thing is not in the series of those true or historically verifiable findings but, rather, in the experience the book makes possible. Now, the fact is, this experience is neither true nor false. An experience is always a fiction: it’s something that one fabricates oneself, that doesn’t exist before and will exist afterward. That is the difficult relationship with truth, the way in which the latter is bound up with an experience that is not bound to it and, in some degree, destroys it.” (Foucault 2000b: 243).
than the distance
I assume,
that I measure,
that I welcome,
between the speech of others
and my own
(Foucault 2013: 74).

Speech Begins After Death

let us say, generating
itself between speech.

that is bringing “distance into focus.”

Speech Begins After Death

An extraordinary accent, elegant, cordial, civil, yet insurrectionary, thus

Foucault animates disappearance.

I want nothing to do with it insofar as it
is decisive and final; I would like to feel
it all around me, calm and transparent,
profound, infinitely open, with others
responding,

and truth emerging, one by one. All I want is to allow myself to be borne along, within it,
and by it, a happy wreck


Yet, maybe this institution and this inclination are but two converse responses to the
same anxiety: anxiety as to just what discourse is, when it is manifested materially, as a
written or spoken object; but also, uncertainty faced with a transitory existence, destined
for oblivion – at any rate, not belonging to us; uncertainty at the suggestion of barely imagin-
able powers and dangers behind this activity, however humdrum and grey it may seem;
uncertainty when we suspect the conflicts, triumphs, injuries, dominations and envelop-
ments that lie behind these words, even when long use has chipped away their rough
edges (Foucault 1972: 216).

58. In “Behind the Fable,” Foucault notes, “A discourse even more exterior to the visible forms of the fable
recaptures it in its entirety and refers it to another narrative system [...]” (Foucault 2000a: 140).
59. This is a reference to Foucault’s Speech Begins After Death (Foucault 2013).
60. Foucault explains, “Discourse must be treated as a discontinuous activity, its different manifestations
sometimes coming together, but just as easily unaware of, or excluding each other” (Foucault 1972: 229).
61. Foucault 2013: 74
how to begin, at the start, then, wheretobeginbeforethebeginning to circulate around lan-
guage she thinks and how is it that one desires another’s language as if language were
her lover, your lover, another, pure desire, but also beholden to the secrets of language,
another’s breath dreaming desires bound, as it were, to

look here, she said, it’s Foucault’s voice.

I now know which voice it was I would have wished for, preceding me, supporting me, inviting me to speak and lodging within my own speech. I know now just what was so awesome about beginning; for it was here, where I speak now, that I listened to that voice, and where its possessor is no longer, to hear me speak.  

(Foucault 1972: 237).

It may be said that we are, in this instance, “infinitely indebted” to Foucault, to language, resoluteness, resistance, and courage храброст enveloped in the elegance of said speech, the written, Foucault’s élan.

What is so perilous, then, in the fact that people speak, and that their speech proliferates? Where is the danger in that?

(Foucault 1972: 216)

Mais qu'y a-t-il donc de si périlleux dans le fait que les gens parlent, et que leurs discours indéfiniment prolifèrent ? Où donc est le danger ?

(Foucault 1971:10)

An extraordinary accent, elegant, cordial, civil, yet insurrectionary, thus Foucault animates disappearance.

This time, at the inclination or diversion of two rivers flowing together, as it were, a stranger(s)’ tenacity and address; In another city, (and still) another December, let us say, in a

(Београд/Beograd), at the conversion

62. Foucault ends his lecture invoking the French philosopher, Jean Hyppolite.
63. Foucault 1972: 237
64. Serbian: храброст; English: courage.
65. Belgrade, internet
of two rivers, flowing
to the Black Sea.

that afternoon, she climbed up the
stairs, combed her hair and stared out the window. It was as if time had lingered,
returned, then disappeared. She could feel the garden spreading before her; unkempt, its
interior darkened by shadows. Sche must have been 10.

era setembre.
Ella tenia nou anys. o deu.66

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66. Catalan: era setembre. Ella tenia nou anys. o deu. English translation: it was September, sche must have been nine or ten.


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