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***An example of creating a personality cult in postwar Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito vs. Arso Jovanović***

In this paper an explanation is given for the creation of the cult of Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Yugoslav Partisan movement and the head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ). Tito's cult was an integrating factor of socialist Yugoslavia and represented the basis of Yugoslav collective identity. In parallel with the construction of Tito's personality cult, the importance of Arso Jovanović, Tito's associate during the war, was diminished. During World War II Jovanović held the duty of the chief of Supreme Staff of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ), i.e. the Partisan army. Accordingly, Jovanović conducted military operations together with Tito and was second-in-command in the Partisan movement. However, after Jovanović had been liquidated for reasons that had nothing to do with the war, his role in World War II was greatly diminished, and Tito's personality cult was built up at the expense of his legacy.

*Key words*: *Josip Broz Tito, Arso Jovanović, cult of personality, Partisan movement, socialist Yugoslavia, military operations*

With the end of World War II, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) took over the rule of the reigned Yugoslav state. Until its first post-war congress, the Fifth Congress of the KPJ held in Belgrade in mid-July 1948, the KPJ operated under illegal circumstances, under the auspices of the multi-party National Front.[[1]](#footnote-1) Consequently, the KPJ did not emphasize its ideology, but a key role in the so-called, liberating the country from the occupier. Also, in the regime press did not mention the KPJ as a key political organization that governs the state, but emphasized the National Front.  
Accordingly, it was emphasized that Yugoslavia was restored as a result of the uprising and struggle of all its peoples, not the decisions of the great powers. According to this, in the then press, the new Yugoslavia differed from the old "Versailles" Yugoslavia, which was "created for the green table after the war".[[2]](#footnote-2) A distinctive example of this promotional phrase is this quote: "In two years of fierce clashes, without anybody's help, with robbed weapons from our enemy, our army killed 100,000 Italian fascists. These kills and kills of the Allies brought Fascist Italy to the capitulation of the month of August 1943.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

The author of this statement was Arso Jovanović, a pre-war officer of the Yugoslav royal army of Montenegro who during the war had served as the mayor of the Supreme Staff of the Partisan Army. Although Josip Broz Tito, in addition to the function of the Secretary General of the KPJ, also had the position of Supreme Military Commander ("Supreme Commander"), Jovanović had effectively conducted all military operations, apparent on the basis of published wartime books. Namely, most of the orders were signed by Jovanović and not by Tito.[[4]](#footnote-4)

According to the position in the war, in the first postwar years, Jovanović was one of the most influential and most personal figures of the restored Yugoslav state. His statements were cited as evidence of new social development, and his articles were the basis for an official interpretation of the war period.[[5]](#footnote-5) However, his position changed in the summer of 1948, when under still unclear circumstances he was killed without a court verdict and a public proclamation of autopsy. Since then, Jovanović was literally cut off from the official Yugoslav version of the Second World War.   
 The relationship with Jovanović after 1948 ignited, and if it had been accentuated, it would emphasize only his negative characteristics. In such a relation to Jovanović, the generals of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), Peko Dapčević, Kosta Nađ and Koča Popović, who were Jovanović's subordinated officers during the war. Dapčević wrote for Jovanović that he was "a weak military leader who lost a whole host of battles”.[[6]](#footnote-6) Nađ accused Jovanović for the Partisan defeat at Kupres in August 1942, arguing that he (Jovanović) insisted on attacking Kupres, although Nađ it allegedly refused because, as he wrote in his memoirs, his "experience he taught that Kupres is not worth attacking”.[[7]](#footnote-7) Popović went further than that, saying that Jovanović did not understand the guerrilla warfare, and that Dapčević and he (Popović) were hiding when Jovanović appeared nearby.[[8]](#footnote-8) Popović's critique of Jovanović was the most impertinent, since the first two, irrespective of their factual foundation, at least admitted that Jovanović commanded the operations led by the Partisans movement, that he (with Josip Broz Tito) was the key person who decided whether they would fight at all. On the other hand, Popović has also in the critic of Jovanović questioned not only the then unquestionable military hierarchy (from which it was clear that Jovanović was superior to Dapčević and him, so hiding could not have any purpose), but also the entire official version about the Partisan Movement as a successful military organization. Popović's assertion was meaningless for ignoring the context he referred to in his memories: if Jovanović did not understand the guerrilla warfare, then he was questioned how he could command military operations and why he was assigned to that task. More accurately, the allegation of Jovanović's misunderstanding of the guerrilla warfare would imply that the entire military partisan movement was also dysfunctional (Popović, citing Dapčević and negating himself).[[9]](#footnote-9)

Removing Jovanović from the official description of the past, in a methodological sense, can be compared to the way in which the role of Lav Trotsky, founder and first commander of the Red Army in the Soviet version of the Civil War in Russia.[[10]](#footnote-10) However, in the ideological sense, removing Jovanović was a shift of importance from the military to political structures. More precisely, Jovanović's overturn in the descriptions of war events led to the creation of an interpretation by which the political organization (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) was superior to the military organization (Supreme Staff). The importance of Jovanović until his death in the interpretation of war events has gradually been replaced by political figures such as Vladimir Bakarić, Edvard Kardelj, Moša Pijade or Ivo Lola Ribar, whose objective significance in planning the Partisan Movement's War Actions even in the official version of the event, was very small.[[11]](#footnote-11)

In accordance with the interpretation of this kind, an impression of the Partisan movement as a homogeneous army in the service of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) was formed, whose aim was to establish a one-party system based on the model from the moment of the decision on the beginning of the uprising in the summer of 1941 to the Soviet Union ("socialist social organization"). The described process of interpretation of the war period, in which the focus was shifted from military to political institutions, reflected on the interpretation of the national composition of the Partisan Movement. By highlighting personalities who played a key role in the war period interpretation, the Partisans movement   
has largely gained the significance of "international" than it really was. Contrary to post-war interpretation, the Partisans movement was until the arrival of the British and aiding and disarming the Italian army in the summer of 1943.[[12]](#footnote-12) was essentially a military organization of several thousand people who moved through the most difficult hilly and mountainous areas of Western Montenegro and Sandžak, then eastern Bosnia and Eastern Herzegovina and the Bosnian Krajina. The descriptive area, with the exception of the Bosanska Krajina, was an interconnected area that, at that time, represented an area overlaid by several borders: the boundaries of the German and Italian interest areas (dotted north - south - east) and the borders of the Croatian independent state (NDH) with Serbia and Montenegro. In both areas, and in the Bosanska Krajina, in a unique area of western Montenegro, Eastern Herzegovina, Sandžak and Eastern Bosnia, the Serbian (and Orthodox) population was large in many places and most of the local population. The populace of these two areas mobilized to the Partisans movement lived on a rural way of life, ie beyond the modernization process, which led to a large part of the influence in their socialization that they had a family surrender, religious affiliation, and circumstance that they lived in a difficult passage that had weaknesses communication links with the surrounding places.[[13]](#footnote-13)

The population of these two areas did not belong to any political party (in terms of closer interconnection over a longer period of time), and for this reason it was largely unheard of for the KPJ, which was officially banned since 1920. The paradox of the development of the Partisan Movement was that he was the strongest in the area where until 1941 the KPJ organization did not exist but was created in the war within the partisan military units. Until 1941, two strong Partisan war bases in the Bosanska Krajina, such as Glamoč and Ključ, did not have any members of the KPJ, and similar situation was in Foča, which during the first half of 1942 was the center of the Partisan territory.[[14]](#footnote-14)

However, even in the smallest part of this area, where the KPJ 1941 organizations existed and operated under illegal conditions, as was the case with Western Montenegro, the whole social life was quite different from the way of life in large cities of the former Yugoslavia, such as Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb, since it took place on a tribal basis. For this reason, the local population and the central institution of the KPJ in that area (Provincial Committee of the KPJ for Montenegro) experienced primarily as an (illegal) organization through which prominent individuals from one tribe (in this particular case were the Piper tribe) have their influence on other tribes of that area.[[15]](#footnote-15)

In accordance with the foregoing, the post-war interpretation of the Partisan Movement as a single army of the subordinate KPJ with the aim of implementing the "socialist revolution" and establishing a social order based on "fraternity and unity" and established through the "provinces and republics" was a completely inaccurate description of the state of war. Given the described social structure of the area that was part of the partisan territory during the war, the KPJ could influence the local population only through a military organization that, in its composition and nominal wording, reflected the mental structure of the population of these regions. Accepting this circumstance, the KPJ as a political institution of the Partisan Movement could not be superior to the Supreme Staff as its military institution. After all, Popovic confirmed in the statement after the war: “ When the war ended, it became normal for Politburo to stand above all else, which was not the case in war. After all, CK did not even meet until war lasted. At that time, the Supreme Command was at the head of the Supreme Command and she independently acted.”[[16]](#footnote-16)

The stated Popović's statement was confirmed by another prominent member of the KPJ, Milovan Đilas, who wrote the following about the activities of the leading party authorities during the war:

"But what is CK? Plenum CK, elected at the 5th V Conference in 1940, did not meet until Stalin's conviction of the Yugoslav leadership in 1948, and was not even complete since several members were killed. Politburo CK has, for a while, met the war often, in the wake of the war: we were together, or at least most, so the current issues were settled by the way, and at meetings on important issues were joined by the plenum members who were with us or nearby (Pijade, Žujović). CK was, in fact, a group around Tito, in which the most prominent were Kardelj, Rankovic and me – mostly because we were angry with time and were with Tito since his arrival at the forehead of the Party...”[[17]](#footnote-17)

From these two quotations comes a logical conclusion as well as an indispensable question as its only consequence: if the CK of the KPJ (and the Politburo as its constituent body) had no meetings during the war, ie until the summer of 1948, in which the institutions made the key decisions of the same enforced by the CK of the KPJ (and its Politburo)? Popović did not offer an answer to this question, while Đilas stated that it was a group of people (including him) who were in the immediate presence of Tito. However, during the war, Tito did not separate himself from the head of Jovanović's staff, who carried out most of the decisions (taken by Tito and his associates). For this reason, it is apparent from the aforementioned two quotations, although in an indefinite manner, that Jovanović was not only an inevitable person on the military but also at the political level because of his position during the war, since these two positions were in the war were linked in a way that the military level was superior to the political. The causes of this Jovanović influence come to the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, or to the system of social relations that he had before the beginning of the Second World War. Two important facts point to this. First, Jovanović's origin and, secondly, Jovanović's connections from the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Like the leading members of the KPJ in Montenegro and Jovanović originated from the Piper family, although he had no connection with the KPJ until 1941.[[18]](#footnote-18) The affinity of this tribe was supported by the political structures of the local organizations of the KPJ, which through their contacts maintained communication with other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Second, Jovanović's goddess was Đorđe Lašić, who during the war became one of the leading commanders of Montenegrin Chetniks.[[19]](#footnote-19) Kumšić, on the one hand, gave him a good insight into the everyday habits of a man who in time turned more and more against the Partisan movement, while on the other hand, such a linkage was an argument for the mobilization of local Chetniks in the Jovanović unit.

After the Serbian uprising had collapsed until 1941, the key uprising territory in the former Yugoslavia (p) remained Western Montenegro. Montenegrin Partisans, who called (by November of that year) "guerrillas”,[[20]](#footnote-20) in the circumstances were a well-formed military formation that was tactically divided into "tribal-territorial battalions ”.[[21]](#footnote-21) Part of the Montenegrin troops in their actions were occupied by large areas of eastern Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia, whereby their command, through the Montenegrin organizations of the KPJ, established contact with members of the KPJ who came from the nearby big city centers (Belgrade and Sarajevo). In this way, the officer of the pre-war Yugoslav royal army came under the conditions of close co-operation with persons who had been in prisons (domestic and foreign) for a year or so, and considered the "robbers" and " traitors ". The close co-operation of people who were literally "two worlds" could not have been possible even if the conditions in which they were at that time were not - it was just "impossible". By completely changing the context, or redefining the entire social structure due to the attacks of the German and the Italian armies, what was considered logical, normal and usual in the period of just one year before the one year, during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, disappeared in less than two weeks. Commander of the Yugoslav royal army disappeared as a subject of social trends (most of it was taken to German captivity, part of it managed to escape the areas under British supervision, part of which accepted the new German German-Italian model of social development and became a factor of the new system). As a result, a lower officer like Jovanović suddenly came to the fore as a person who was expert in leading the military operations of rebels against the new order. This allowed Jovanović, as seen from the context of 1945, that in his military career in 1941 it was almost inconceivable - "skipping rows", or coming to the position that he personally commanded the total armed force (which was in the period of four year since the garrison became permanent).[[22]](#footnote-22)

Jovanović's war co-operation with pre-war members of the KPJ was therefore conditioned by the situation that began in April 1941. It was the cooperation of persons who, according to the criteria of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, represented "marginal groups". However, the co-operation of this kind had its limits: Jovanovic never became part of the "inner party circuit" (as evidenced by his unexplained death in 1948), while, on the other hand, in war conditions where preoccupations were marchers, finding food and mobilizing new people, the question of post-war social order for people like Jovanović was not a matter of interest. Consequently, due to the conditions in which the Partisans movement evolved during 1942 and 1943, Jovanović's pre-war members of the KPJ who found himself in his environment were not seen as persons who might come into the situation to impose their will on others. Throughout his life experience, he taught him: in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia they were almost invisible, and now they were part of the movement he was leading to or which he (perhaps wrongly) thought he was guided by.[[23]](#footnote-23)

However, social processes have gone in the other direction of the expected. After the war in which he emerged as one of the leaders of the new government, Jovanović's position was objectively weakened, as he ended the (war) period in which his role was decisive. The mentioned process of weakening military structures, characteristic of all the countries that emerged from the war, came to be particularly pronounced in Soviet-based states, where the key strength of the new government became a security service, which, in addition to other parts of the society.[[24]](#footnote-24) In the new, peaceful conditions, Jovanović's influence was significantly weakened, but at a formal level this could not be noticed because the new government legitimized the events of the war, for which Jovanović's role, in addition to the then-mythologist Josip Broz Tito, was most prominent.

The importance of Jovanović in the new context is especially pronounced in the reconstruction of the national composition of the new elite, especially the national composition of the military commander. Although this issue, in accordance with the word "fraternity and unity," in socialist Yugoslavia, was equally tabutised, as well as the question of Jovanović's importance in the Partisan hierarchy, then a thorough answer to this question is given by accurate statistical surveys, as confirmed by the then holders of power. Given the number of inhabitants compared to the total Yugoslav population in the post-war period, the most prominent members of the new elite were officials of Montenegro's origin.[[25]](#footnote-25) The percentage of Montenegrin share in the new government was particularly pronounced in the army and the police, on the most important (so-called) federal duties.[[26]](#footnote-26) Observed from the perspective of the largest city centers in Yugoslavia from the pre-war and post-war period, this may be considered as a kind of periphery over the center.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Because of his war role, Jovanovic had the position of one of the leaders of the Montenegrin part of the new Yugoslav elite and the role of the most prominent representative of the Montenegrin structure in the military hierarchy. Such a state was suddenly changed by Jovanović's liquidation and settlement with those members of the Yugoslav military structures who were loyal to him.

Accordingly, after Jovanović's death and removal of his people from positions of social power, the percentage of Montenegrin representatives in the Yugoslav elite has slowly decreased,[[28]](#footnote-28) although their number in the total proportion until 1954 represented the most prominent ethnic group in the military top.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Concluding with Jovanović's personality, one can state that he was one of the key figures of the Partisan Movement and of the Yugoslav authorities in the first years of the war. In view of the development of the events from 1941 to 1948, this was one of the most important figures of the former Yugoslavia in the mentioned period. His unexplained death raises several questions and points to further research related to the way the political elite of post-war Yugoslavia works, not only towards political opponents but also to their own members.

Conclusion

With the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the April 1941 war, the entire social structure had suddenly collapsed. The disappearance of this hierarchy in war was attempted by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ). The KPJ, in line with the new political structure built on the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia, began to build its own army (Partisans). The ordination of the organizers of that army was taken over by the pre-war officer of the Yugoslav royal army Arso Jovanović. Jovanović originated from the peoples of Piperi in Montenegro and was recognized as capable and reliable man according to his kinship. The head of the Supreme Headquarters was appointed to the recommendation of the leadership of the KPJ in Montenegro (the Provincial Committee of the KPJ for Montenegro), who, most of all, as Jovanovic, were from the Piperi tribe. Precisely because of this fact, at the Montenegrin level, the KPJ has been viewed as a means through which the Piperi tribe is fulfilling its interests. During the war, the Partisans movement was continually strengthened and developed especially in a rural area where there were no party organizations until then. Consequently, the KPJ organization in this area was built over a military structure, whose junior personality was Jovanovic. After the war, Jovanović became one of the leading representatives of the new elite because of his duty in the war, which had a high percentage of persons of Montenegrin origin in a large percentage, primarily in military structures. Three years after the end of the war in 1948, Jovanovic was killed under unclear circumstances. Along with this, he was removed from the duties of officers of the Yugoslav Army who were considered to be his men. His death gradually began to diminish his war role, and he in the official party descriptions of war events was mostly cut off. Reducing Jovanović's role of war was directly related to the interpretation in which the KPJ organization was presented as a creator of social trends, while members of the military structure, whose main character was Jovanović, were shown as the drivers of her decisions.   
 For this reason, the marginalization of Jovanović was a necessary prerequisite for the formation of Tito's cult as well as the image of the leadership of the KPJ as a group of visionaries who foresaw and conducted war operations to the point of their completion, which resulted in the arrival of the KPJ into power. Given that the KPJ and Tito, as its leading personality but also the key symbol, had their legitimacy force after the war had come out of the war, it was necessary to emphasize their military skills in the postwar warfare interpretation. By constructing narratives about Titus as the supreme leader Jovanović, who as the head of the Supreme Staff had this role during the war, inevitably had to be silenced or at least marginalized.

1. Dušan BILANDŽIĆ, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Golden marketing, Zagreb, 1999., 204.-205.;

   Branko PETRANOVIĆ, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1992., 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [Josip BROZ] TITO, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svjetlosti narodno-oslobodilačke borbe*, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1945., 4.-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Arso JOVANOVIĆ, *Šesta i sedma neprijateljska ofanziva*, Izdanje „Nove Jugoslavije“, Beograd, 1945., 3. (The material used is in the possession of the author.) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This conclusion was made on the basis of the research of the Partisan War Documentation published in the military edition titled *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda*. For this theme, key volumes II, III and IV are included, and the books contained therein. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Magdalena NAJBAR-AGIČIĆ, *U skladu s marksizmom ili činjenicama? Hrvatska historiografija 1945-1960.*, Srednja Europa, Zagreb, 2013., 227. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ivo BANAC, *Sa Staljinom protiv Tita: Informbirovski rascjepi u jugoslavenskom komunističkom pokretu*, Globus, Zagreb, 1990., 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Kosta NAĐ, *Ratne uspomene: Četrdesetdruga*, Centar za kulturnu djelatnost Saveza socijalističke omladine Zagreb, Zagreb, 1979., 335.-336.; Davor MARIJAN, *Borbe za Kupres 1942.*, AGM, Zagreb, 1999., 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Aleksandar NENADOVIĆ, *Razgovori s Kočom*, Globus, Zagreb, 1989., 69.-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. A. NENADOVIĆ, *Razgovori*, 53., 69.-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Isaac DEUTSCHER, *Staljin: Politička biografija*, Globus, Zagreb, 1977., 156.-157.; Richard OVERY, *Diktatori: Hitlerova Njemačka i Staljinova Rusija*, Naklada Ljevak, Zagreb, 2005., 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Unlike Bakaric and Kardelj, who did not spend most of the war in the main partisan group around the Supreme Staff, Pijade had spent the whole war with the Supreme Staff, but their importance in making the key decisions at that time was relatively small. He (Pijade), together with Milovan Djilas, mainly engaged in writing propaganda texts. Ribar, on the other hand, acted as an external associate of the Supreme Staff, acting as an illegal in large cities. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. These two facts are apparent from Titus's letter to Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempa of October 9, 1943. *Zbornik*, II/10, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1962., 361. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. On the territory of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) there were two main roads (Zagreb - Brod on Savi - Zemun and Brod on Sava - Doboj - Sarajevo - Konjic - Mostar - Metković - Dubrovnik) none of which was passing through the only two mentioned areas . Observed from the then viewing angle, both of these areas represented the periphery, not only for the NDH, but also for the surrounding states. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Such was the case with Glamoč and Ključem in the Bosanska Krajina, and with almost the entire eastern part of Bosnia. Vladimir DEDIJER, *Dnevnik: Od 6 aprila 1941 do 27 novembra 1942*, prva knjiga, Prosveta – Beograd / Svjetlost – Sarajevo, 1970., 163.; ISTI, Antun MILETIĆ, *Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945: Zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1990.,157.; Nikola PILJAK, "Ustanak u Glamoču", *Ustanak naroda Jugoslavije 1941*, II., VIZ Vojno delo, Beograd, 1964., 400.; Milan N. ZORIĆ, *XIII krajiška brigada*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1968., 7.

    “ In Foča and its vicinity, there was a very small influence on the part of the Party, and the party organization there »never existed«.” Radomir BULATOVIĆ, *Titov borbeni put (1941-1943): Posebni osvrt na objekte u kojima je boravio i radio*, Knjiga 1., Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, 1988., 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Milovan ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, Književne novine, Beograd, 1990., 47.; Tamara NIKČEVIĆ, *Goli otoci Jova Kapičića*, VBZ, Beograd / Zagreb / Sarajevo, 2010., 35.-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. A. NENADOVIĆ, *Razgovori*, 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. M. ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Jovanovic was born in Zavala village in Gornji Piper. M. ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, 50., 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. M. ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. M. ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, 84.-85., 97., 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Obrad CICMIL, "Durmitorski odred", *Vojna enciklopedija*, svezak 2, drugo izdanje, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1971., 585. Obrad Cicmil was the commander of the Durmitor Detachment, one of the strongest units of the Montenegrin Partisans in the first half of 1942. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. M. ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. It was not just a difference between Jovanovic and pre-war members of the CPC, but also the generational opposition within the pre-war party membership itself. The key among them was described by Đilas as an example of the interrelation between Moša Pijade and him: "Between Moša and me, the generational provocation came to light: from the robbery, he found a party of dogmatic practitioners who did not endure either delay or long distances and family relationships." (M. ĐILAS, *Revolucionarni rat*, 67.) The difference between Jovanovic and Pijade in terms of their life paths until 1941 could only have been greater. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Observed in this context, a comparison between Jovanović and the most famous Soviet military commander from the Second World War, Georgij K. Žukova, marshal, could be drawn, whose influence soon became worse after the war. I. DEUTSCHER, *Staljin*, 483.-484. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. [Želimir LATKOVIĆ i suradnici] *Zapovjedni vrh JNA siječanj 1990. – svibanj 1992.*, Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske / Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, Zagreb, prosinac 2010., 126.-127. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. T. NIKČEVIĆ, *Goli otoci Jova Kapičića*, 88.-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Bojan B. DIMITRIJEVIĆ, "Pobuna jugoslovenske periferije: Generalski kor Jugoslovenske armije 1945-1953. godine", *Dijalog povjesničara / istoričara 7*, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Beograd, 2002., 295.-296. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. T. NIKČEVIĆ, *Goli otoci Jova Kapičića*, 127.-130. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. B. DIMITRIJEVIĆ, "Pobuna jugoslovenske periferije", *Dijalog povjesničara / istoričara 7*, 302.-303. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)