Democratisation and Europeanisation of Political Parties in Central and South-Eastern Europe
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ESSAYS

The Democratisation and Europeanisation of Party Systems
(Visiting Editor’s Editorial)

Danica Fink-Hafner

A »cordial link« between Democratisation and Europeanisation Processes

The last wave of EU enlargement involved countries for which the processes of democratisation were closely linked to the processes of Europeanisation. Namely, in Central European post-socialist countries the transition to a democracy interfered with a geopolitical shift expressed in the slogan »back to Europe«. In addition, to a great extent a »cordial link« between democratisation and Europeanisation was also established by the EU political conditionality defined by the Copenhagen criteria. While all of the 2004 enlargement wave post-socialist countries were eager to fulfil them, in the case of Slovakia this was true for some time primarily on the declaratory level. The only 2004 EU accession country where the EU interfered in domestic politics was Slovakia since in other countries the EU membership incentive worked as a sufficient EU instrument. Yet, in the Slovakian case, the EU intervened in the domestic party system dynamics in such a way that practically true pro-European political parties (as opposed to the previous government’s only declaratory pro-European orientation) emerged as winners at elections and enabled Slovakia to remain in the 2004 EU enlargement group of countries (see e. g. Harris, 2004; Henderson, 2005; Haughton and Malová, 2007). An earlier general model of patterns of the relationship between democratisation and Europeanisation (see Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2006), also involving the Slovakian two-level political game, has now been further developed in this special issue for the purpose our research in a comparative article by Danica Fink-Hafner.

The countries we look at in more detail in most of this special issue (all but Slovenia) have experienced a delayed transition to democracy as well as an involvement in a war. Their experience has so far been closer to the Slovakian »model« of democratisation/Europeanisation dynamics (especially Croatia), but at the same time these countries were given other kinds of statuses and additional EU conditions to be fulfilled in order to achieve closer relations with the EU. In fact, in the case of all the investigated countries except for Slovenia we can see the impact of »the EU policy mix« on the domestic (national) party system dynamics related to the EU integration.

1 In this special issue we primarily understand Europeanisation in terms of European pressure (setting preconditions and conditions for integration with the EU, political pressures on potential candidate states to fulfil the EU’s expectations). Our research interest is restricted to the top-down Europeanisation of certain aspects of the adaptation of a party system.
issue. The EU policy mix has consisted of: a) a combination of a »one-size-fits-all« EU policy of spreading political democracy (especially in the case of Croatia); as well as b) a predominantly foreign policy attitude vis-à-vis third countries involving some elements of inconsistency also known from the EU’s attitudes to other regions in the world (for more inconsistencies, see Schimmelfennig 2007).

What we can still observe in all the investigated countries is that domestic political interest in integration with the EU has developed in a close relationship with the transition to a democracy. While in Slovenia these processes openly took place already in transition from the late 1980s to the early 1990s (even the reformed League of Communists of Slovenia used the slogan »Europe now/Evropa zdaj« in its election manifesto for the first free elections in 1990), in other former Yugoslav republics we have seen a delayed or postponed transition to a democracy (clear cases are Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro having watershed elections in 2000 or at the end of the 1990s). So with a delay of approximately ten years (when compared to transitions in Central European post-socialist countries including Slovenia) a delay in strategic orientation as regards integration with the EU could also be noticed. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a special case with its still unfinished transitions to a democracy and market economy and externally defined political system (its Constitution was determined by the Dayton agreement signed in 1995 enabling the political elites involved in the Yugoslav war in the first half of 1990s to stop the war). Kosovo has some similarities with Bosnia due to its intensive ethnic conflicts and the crucial role of international forces in keeping the peace as well as in the building of a functioning political system. Macedonia leans in a way towards the Bosnian and Kosovar experiences with regard to its heavily ethnically-based party politics, fragile democracy burdened by ethnic conflicts, significant indirect involvement in a war and dependence on world powers for maintaining peace. Still, Macedonia has been able to govern itself.

The Europeanisation Impact on National Party System Dynamics

Only since the end of the 1990s has Europeanisation research seemed to have developed into a distinct research area in EU studies. Although it has developed in a quite lively way since 2003 (see an overview of the literature in Sedelmeier 2006), it has offered some valuable insights especially into impact on the polity – e.g. on the implementation of liberal democratic principles (democracy and political rights) as well as the adaptation of national executives, parliaments and administrative structures. One of the least researched areas is the EU’s impact on politics, especially political parties, party systems and interest groups. This issue of the Politics of Central Europe focuses exactly on national politics. It not only presents some research findings that fill in the gaps in the existing literature (research into parties and party systems in the Europeanisation framework), but it also covers countries that have so far been less researched and at the same time also (with the recent exception of Croatia) been left out from a realistic range of full EU-membership expectations. From the theoretical
and conceptual point of view it is also important that we combine the Europeanisation theoretical approach with the Comparative Politics approach (the latter having been very much left aside in the literature until very recently).

The European Union’s impact on national party systems has so far been the subject of just a few, relatively recent research attempts. The most visible of these have so far been presented in the following publications: Mair, 2000; Ladrech, 2002; Rybář and Malova, 2004; Henderson 2005; Rybář, 2005; Pennings, 2006; Poguntke, Aylott, Carter, Ladrech and Luther, eds. 2007; Lewis and Mansfeldová, eds. 2006; Enyedi and Lewis, 2006. Only in the case of Slovakia has a substantial EU ‘social influence’ (Rybář, 2005) arisen in order to change the course of the national party competition. Namely, EU actors focused their activities on the opposition party actors and voters. We expected to find more similarities between the Slovakian pattern of party dynamics regarding EU integration issues and other investigated former Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Slovenia (Slovenia being similar to the majority of the post-socialist countries of the 2004 wave of EU enlargement). So a significant EU impact on national party competition was expected in the circumstances of relatively big gaps between the EU’s political criteria and a third country’s political characteristics. We also expected to find domestic political actors the EU can relate to in the circumstances of the national political elite’s two-level game regarding the fulfilment of EU criteria – similarly to the case of Slovakia (voters, NGOs and oppositional pro-European political parties). Still, in order to make these party system dynamics work several pre-conditions need to be met. The research model for analysing specific elements of a party system dynamics is presented in more detail in a comparative chapter by Danica Fink Hafner. We hypothesised those possible explanatory variables that have led to the very different characteristics of party system mechanics seen in the investigated countries. They are: a) institutionalisation of the party system; b) the European socialisation of national parties; and c) the characteristics of voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration with the EU.

Research Questions, Factors and Country Selection

In this special issue we predominantly focus on four former Yugoslav republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. The selection is based on the main characteristics of the predominant logic of party organisation. Namely, in these four politico-territorial units political parties based on a liberal principle (the representation of individuals) seem to have prevailed – when we compare them with the predominant ethnic-based logic of party organisation in other former Yugoslav politico-territorial units (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia). Since political parties can (and currently still do in Serbia) to a large extent stand for nationalist policies and those voting for most of them express extreme-right ethnic feelings they may currently still be seen as »a borderline case« compared to parties in the other three countries (Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro).
In the country case studies and in three-country comparative article the authors present the following three main factors of a country’s national party system’s adaptation to common European pressures: a) institutionalisation of the national party system; b) the European socialisation of national party elites; and c) voters’ attitudes to integration with the EU. The following indicators were used to capture the selected variables:

a) for institutionalisation\(^2\) – the stability of the core parties in the national party system and the autonomy of parties in relation to external centres of power, such as organised crime, the ‘grey economy’, the tolerance of a conflict of interests between members of party elites and other influential social positions, party links with important state structures (such as the military, secret police) and influential veteran interest organisations.

b) for the European socialisation\(^3\) of national party elites – the links between national parties and European Union-level party federations (timing of the first unofficial links, timing of the first official links and memberships), the importance of EU-level party links in relation to other international party links such as international party associations and changing domestic party characteristics under the influence of EU-level party federations.

c) voters’ attitudes to integration with the EU – national public opinion survey data (general/abstract support for one’s own country’s inclusion in European integration processes; informed support for one’s own country’s inclusion in European integration processes – support involving voters’ awareness of the EU’s pre-conditions as well as the relationship between voters’ support for EU integration and voters’ support for integration with NATO).

The abovementioned research model was applied thoroughly when investigating the Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin party systems’ dynamics in the process of Europeanisation. As Slovenian studies concerning the described research questions have already been published before (Lajh and Krašovec 2004; Krašovec, Lajh and Kustec Lipicer 2006), the findings on the Europeanisation of Slovenian parties and the Slovenian party system’s idiosyncrasies are incorporated in comparative articles by Fink Hafner as well as by Lajh and Krašovec, while Deželan’s contribution presents an insight into changes in political party election activities brought about by the first European elections in Slovenia in 2004. Deželan’s contribution confirms previous studies’ findings that, in general, Slovenian political parties and party system competition do not exert a substantial amount of change due to European integration (similarly to most Central European post-socialist countries which became EU members in 2004).

Krašovec and Lajh move further toward future research steps by discussing the potential interlacement of democratisation and the Europeanisation processes of party

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\(^2\) See e.g. Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) and Enyedi (2006).

\(^3\) On social constructivism see e.g. Risse (2004).
Politics in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the two ‘extremes’ in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Research into the EU’s impact on national parties and party system dynamics in other former Yugoslav politico-territorial units (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo) remains on the agenda as special cases of neighbouring countries (or countries in the making – such as Kosovo) burdened by ethnic conflicts and characterised by special EU foreign and security interests (Tzifakis 2007).

References


Does Europeanisation matter? The Case of Slovenian Political Party Electoral Campaign for the European Union

Tomaž Deželan

Abstract: This article is based on a comparative analysis of five major Slovenian parliamentary political parties at the time of the elections of deputies to the European Parliament (EP). The electoral campaigns of individual national political parties were scrutinized, with a special consideration of organizational features and strategic activities linked to the dynamics of the European Union (EU). The essence of the study lies in the detection of changes in political party election activities brought about by the impact of EU processes. The EU’s political, social and economic influence on the national political discourse through analysis of the EP electoral campaign structures and identities complements the more conventional approach to investigating the Europeanization of national political parties, with a conceptual framework based on Ladrech’s (2001) attempt to embrace the Europeanization phenomenon. Consequently, the emphasis is on identifying programmatic and organizational changes, patterns of party competition and relations beyond the national party system. Party references to transnational interactions and networks, cooperation with foreign national and supra-national party structures or representatives, the organizational and power relations of electoral campaign teams, the relevance of EU issues and institutions’ assessments and the perception of the pro and contra EU dimension therefore make up the core elements of this paper.

Key words: Europeanization; political parties; electoral campaign; European parliament elections

Introduction

Europeanization is a concept widely (ab)used in contemporary political science debates and literature. The apparent contradictio in terminis (Lajh, 2003) derives from the absence of a common definition with the ability to “surpass the present trap of boundlessness. The importance of boundary formation is therefore an imperative task to avert the concept of Europeanization from escalating expansion” (Radaelli, 2003). In order for the concept to surpass the obstacle of becoming a “catch-all” term for various kinds of processes of transformations and adaptations at the (sub)national level (Grabbe and Lajh, 2003: 38), a number of helpful strategies have been constructed. One is the “negative definition” approach, which identifies the range of phenomena and processes that are not encompassed by the term. Another is to analyse the field

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1 The aforementioned criterion for the selection of political parties is based on the number of deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 2000–2004 parliamentary term.
and put forward the empirical evidence of potential misconceptions and misuses of the concept to stimulate the accurate manner of prospective utilization. The exemplar instance is such endeavour is Featherstone’s (2003: 5–6) classification of academic articles on Europeanization. This author elaborates that the general trends in literature reflect four typologies: where Europeanization is applied as an historical process; as a matter of cultural diffusion; a process of institutional adaptation and as the adaptation of policy and policy processes. The last two categories (minimalist interpretation) are closely linked with the operation of the European Union.

Of course there is a “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspective to Europeanization; nevertheless, if we remain with the former, Europeanization can be defined as “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994). In a similar fashion, acknowledging the relevance of change in the logic of political behaviour, Radaelli (2003: 30) argues that the concept of Europeanization refers to “Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.” Europeanization may therefore be considered as a process by which individuals and organizational actors and institutions respond to the altered conditions generated by the development of the European Union (Ladrech, 2001: 4–5). Within this “top-down” perspective Boerzel and Risse (2000) distinguish three aspects in which the domestic impact of Europeanization can be analysed and the processes of domestic change traced: policies, politics and polity. The second primarily draws our attention with the question of “How the European structure impacts on the processes of political contestation and interest aggregation, in the member states?”, since we are interested in exploring the process of Europeanization in the field of political parties. According to Boerzel and Risse (ibid.: 3), a modest amount of attention has been devoted to the field of Europeanization of electoral and party politics; however we must bear in mind that most of this work has been done in recent years.

Two pivotal contributions in the aforementioned field – the Europeanization of political parties and party systems – should be pointed out. The first is Peter Mair’s (2000) study of the impact of Europeanization on national party systems, their format and mechanics. The second key study is Robert Ladrech’s (2001, 2002) attempt to put forward a framework for analysis of the Europeanization of political parties. While Mair (2000: 27) intentionally leaves out the analysis of the impact of Europe on individual domestic political parties, and concentrates on national party systems, the national political arena and the direct impact of Europe, Ladrech (2001) outlines five broad areas of investigation to show evidence of Europeanization in political parties and party activities. Four out of five the proposed areas of investigation serve also
as a general framework for the analysis in this study. Hence, programmatic change, organizational change, patterns of party competition and relations beyond the national party system are the four fundamental cornerstones of our analysis; while we intentionally omitted party-government relations, as the fifth of Ladrech’s areas of investigation, due to insufficient data.

The rationale behind this paper is to re-evaluate existing research observations on Europeanization of political parties in Slovenia through a study of election campaign for the elections of deputies to the European Parliament 2004\(^2\). We argue that the process of European elections\(^3\) confirms prior observations regarding Europeanization of Slovenian political parties, despite the specific nature of such elections. In the analysis we utilized data gathered from three rounds of interviews with representatives of five leading parliamentary political parties\(^4\), with the first interviews carried out around one month before the election day, the second round approximately one week before the elections, and the last round conducted after the elections. Additionally, the analysis investigates on a comparative basis the observations from the interviews. The EU-25 data was used, available through the author’s involvement as the Slovene participant in the sixth research framework programme – “Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society” – representing the Centre for Political Science Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. This study was a specific targeted research project “The determinants of active civic participation at European and national level” coordinated by University College Dublin\(^5\). Somewhat a control variable for the investigation provided the data collected by performing analogous interviews with the party representatives in the case of national elections (elections of deputies to the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia), which were held on 3 October 2004\(^6\).

\(^1\) Citizens of Slovenia and EU citizens with permanent residence in the country elected Slovenian deputies to the European Parliament for the first time on 13 June 2004. The voters decided from 13 lists of candidates, with the list of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the Democratic Party of Retired People of Slovenia forming the only joint list of parliamentary political parties. With electoral turnout reaching barely 28.35 percent, the surprising winner of the elections was the candidate list of New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party, which managed to gain two of the seven available deputy posts. The lists of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, the Democratic Party of Retired People of Slovenia and the Slovenian Democratic Party gained two seats each, while the remaining seat was won by the United List of Social Democrats. The list of the Slovenian People’s Party can be characterized as the only evident defeated list among the major parliamentary political parties, and it did not gain a seat in the European Parliament.

\(^2\) The term is used as a synonym for the elections of deputies to the European Parliament and will be applied throughout the remainder of the paper.

\(^3\) Extensive insight into the presented research project is available at http://www.ucd.ie/civicact/.

\(^4\) Representatives of campaign teams of five major parliamentary political parties for national elections 2004 were interviewed in a single post festum round. The interviews were performed by Tomaž Deželan on behalf of the Centre for Political Science Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, with an identical questionnaire to that which was employed in the case of the three-round interviews regarding the European parliament elections.
This article continues with an evaluation of the research findings of several studies regarding the Europeanization of Slovenian political parties. Afterwards we present the analysis of the evidence of Europeanization of political parties in the case of European elections, according to Ladrech’s four areas. The observed evidence is subsequently put in a comparative context, according to identical data from old/new member states, and “controlled” by the national elections records. The paper concludes with the comparison of our empirical research findings with the observations of previous studies and identifies potential incongruence between them.

Evidence of Europeanization of Slovenian political parties

As is generally the case in Europe, there is a limited amount of studies conducted in the field of Europeanization of political parties in Slovenia. Of the available research in the field we must above all mention Fink Hafner (1999), Fink Hafner and Krašovec (2006), Fink Hafner and Lajh (2003), Krašovec and Lajh (2004, 2007 – in print), Lajh and Krašovec (2004), and Krašovec, Lajh and Kustec Lipicer (2006). There are, however, certain dissimilarities in the observations of Europeanization process and political parties between the aforementioned authors, although these discrepancies materialize due to different frameworks of investigation and not in the perception of the process itself.

Fink Hafner and Krašovec (2006) distinguish between two periods in the observation of EU impact on the national party system. The researchers put forward pre- and post full EU membership periods, where in the first phase they do not observe any significant problems in the consolidation of democracy, EU-related cleavages in the national party arena, nor any direct EU-political pressures in relation to national party competition. The authors identify an “asymmetrical Europeanization effect”, which denotes a certain degree of impact on party manifestos and changes in direct party organizational structures on the one hand, and no significant direct impacts on the format and mechanics of party competition on the other hand. In the light of the experience of the pre-full EU membership period and the substantial inauguration of the full EU membership period (since 2004) Fink Hafner and Krašovec (2006) put forward a synthesized view of the impact of Europe on political parties and party system. To begin with, with regard to the programmatic content, they observed slight modifications in political party programmes, which included Europe mainly as a positive reference. Concerning the organization of parties, the authors’ state that there is only a marginal impact, since a very moderate organizational modification of the majority of the parties was carried out, usually by enhancing the role of the secretaries for international cooperation. Similar observations can be made about the format of the national party

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7 Krašovec and Lajh (2007), on the other hand, identified three periods of the same process, where they divided the pre-full EU membership period in two stages: “the first steps towards joining the EU”; and the “pre-accession and negotiation period“.
system, which was influenced only in an unimportant way. More precisely, only one clearly Eurosceptic political party was established, which remained in obscurity, and one minor populist parliamentary party preached “Eurorealist” rhetoric lacking in pro-EU sentiment in order to attract voters.

Regarding the topic of patterns of party competition, EU-related issues have been mostly marginalized in the pre-full EU membership period due to the special European agreement of the parliamentary political parties, except one. They agreed not to politicize European issues at home (Fink Hafner and Krašovec, 2006). After full membership parties EU-policy-related cleavages based on the domestic pattern of party divides began to emerge, the most prominent of which regarded the implementation of the Lisbon strategy (ibid.). The authors also point to the work of Slovenian MEPs, the majority of them being top rank party officials, in involving the European Parliamentary arena to influence national party system competition, mainly according to left-right and government-opposition axes. When talking about relations beyond the national party system, most of the Slovenian parliamentary political parties developed contacts and cooperation with or even integrated into EU-level party organizations. The aforementioned interactions principally materialized through the engagement of party staff in partisan networks and transnational forums or by recruitment of active individuals to EU appointive and elective offices (ibid.).

A glance at the Europeanization of Slovenian political parties from the viewpoint of the European election campaign

The fact that policies in the member states are increasingly made at the European level is likely to have consequences for societal interest formation, aggregation, and representation (Boerzel and Risse, 2000: 4). According to Gabel (2000: 52), European integration influences national politics through mass voting behaviour. The Europeanization of party politics, and in our case equally importantly electoral politics, are however topics which have received far less attention than they deserve. Boerzel and Risse (ibid.) therefore urge researchers to investigate the effects of European Union structures on the processes of political contestation in member states, which can also be done by examining the features of party contestation on European elections. Mair (2000) acknowledges the importance of the “B channel” as means of access to European Union decision-making, inevitably influencing national party equilibrium, although the degree of the impact has not yet reached significant levels. Mair (2000: 27), however, intentionally did not investigate the effects “that Europe has wrought on forms of inter-party competition within the European arena as such”. Hence, he consistently excluded modifications to national party systems that emerged only within the context of the European parliament elections, although he did not deny the importance of the elections.

Acknowledging these deliberations, we decided to analyse the European elections with the intention of evaluating the degree of Europeanization of parliamentary political
parties in this context. The election race in the European elections has in certain circumstances an important impact on national elections (Gabel, 2000) – the “first-order” arena. Thus, we decided to investigate various aspects of electoral campaigns for European elections of five major Slovenian parliamentary parties. As noted in the introduction, we employed the framework for analysis proposed by Ladrech (2001). Accordingly, we resume in that manner by presenting each area of the proposed framework in the Slovenian EP elections context.

**Programmatic change**

Ladrech (2001: 8) noted modifications in party programmes as part of the programmatic change area, as one of the most obvious and explicit examples of Europeanization. Of course, if we look at the party election programmes, since we are investigating the European elections campaign, the issue becomes somewhat intangible. Naturally, EU-related topics will prevail according to the type of elections, or as pointed out by Mair (2000: 43) “European elections should be about European politics and the questions of Europe itself”.

As was predicted, EU issues played an important part in the election programmes of individual parties. Kustec Lipicer (2005) acknowledges that the degree of EU level references in party election programmes outnumbers the national level. According to the results presented by the aforementioned author, around 60 percent of all identifiable references to either level were concentrated on the EU level. (United List of) Social democrats8 demonstrated incredibly around 90 percent of all references focused on EU level. Nevertheless, the high degree of references to the EU level in the election programmes proved to be irrelevant since the party representatives left out EU issues when pointing out the most important issues in the campaign. According to the results of the interviews, only one out of five investigated parties said that at least one EU issue is one of the three most important for its campaign. When we look at the cross-national data (Table 1) we can see that the focus on national issues prevails, which Fink Hafner and Krašovec (2006) term the “nationalization of debated issues”. In addition, the authors also observe that the mass media played an important part in “derailing” the issues flowing from the EU to the domestic level. Semetko, De Vreese and Peter (2000) also perceived a similar pivotal role of the mass media with having the “role of editorial gatekeeping”. All in all, we can say with a substantial amount of confidence that references to EU issues decrease with the importance of a topic for an individual party.

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8 The party changed its name from United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD) to Social Democrats (SD).
### Table 1: Focus on European vs. national issues by type of member states

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Focus on European vs. national</th>
<th>Focus on European vs. european</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within old or new member state</td>
<td>% within old or new member state</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old or new member state (EU 15)</td>
<td>61,7 %</td>
<td>37,4 %</td>
<td>100,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new member state (EU 25)</td>
<td>66,7 %</td>
<td>26,3 %</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63,6 %</td>
<td>63,6 %</td>
<td>100,0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Raw data source: Bicchi (2006)

In addition to modifications in party programmes, the improved policy expertise among party officials, in our case election campaign team members, also provides a measure of Europeanization of political parties in terms of programmatic change (Ladrech, 2001: 8). Around 40 percent of campaign team members of the investigated parties showed experience of the EU issues in their parties prior to the campaign. Ludicrously, the unanticipated winning team had the lowest share, with only 10 percent. Additionally, 15–20 percent of campaign team members had experience with EU bureaucracy or national administration in EU matters in three cases, while the other two parties did not act with such personnel. The education of team members about the EU also proved to be reasonably high, reaching around 35 percent.

The integration of the EU dimension in references to domestic policy and through references to cooperation with transnational organizations were also expected to be supplementary indicators of Europeanization in the programmatic change area. In the case of the former, four out of five investigated parties integrated the EU dimension by referring to domestic policy when pointing out one of three most important issues, which is in accordance with the observations of Fink Hafner and Krašovec (2006). The latter indicator – references to transnational cooperation, demonstrated a somewhat diverse attitude towards the subject. Only three out of five parties referred to the EU by using its symbols on banners as well as using the logo of a European party federation or an EP party group. Surprisingly, only one party referred to a European party federation or EP party group by using their logos on banners. In this respect, the level of referrals decline compared to the EU accession referendum (Deželan, 2004), which indicates the reluctance of parties to Europeanize increasingly.

### Organizational change

When talking about organizational change Ladrech (2001: 9) clearly stated that explicit statutory change in parties may not be evident, although change in practices
and power relations may occur. Minor organizational modifications should nonetheless be visible, which would indicate the pattern of change. In fact, a number of authors (Fink Hafner and Krašovec 2006; Lajh and Krašovec, 2004; Krašovec and Lajh, 2007) confirm such speculation, since they observe enhanced roles of international cooperation secretaries and the inclusion of formal definition of relations between the party and its MEPs in some cases.

In our case, we attempted to identify organizational changes in the election campaign team structure. To perform such tasks we compared the data on campaign teams’ organizational structure in the European elections with the data gathered for the same category in the case of national elections9 in 2004. The comparison we carried out demonstrated that party executive members are the most common team members in all five investigated parties. The situation is exactly the same for the profiles of campaign teams in the case of national elections. Members of the campaign team comprised senior MPS in three out of five interviewed parties, while in the case of national elections this situation applied in two of the five parties. The same ratios also apply to the inclusion of external consultants in the campaign team. When we look at the size of campaign teams for the national and European elections we observe no considerable difference, with the exception of one political party. Additionally, the average age of team members in national elections and European elections per individual political party does not differ significantly.

The observed information indicates that there is no conclusive difference when comparing campaign team structures for national elections and European elections. The degree of contrast is far higher between political parties regarding the same type of elections than between parties when looking at the European and national elections. Although we were able to observe certain attributes of campaign teams that would indicate a certain degree of Europeanization in the case of programmatic change, we cannot make the same assumption for the organizational change area. We were able to identify the participation of former EP observers in the campaign team; many of them also future MEPs, but they were primarily performing the role of party executive members or senior MPs. The comparison of the campaign teams for two arenas therefore added additional stone to the mosaic for the statement that political parties and party systems are “impervious to change” (Mair, 2000).

Patterns of party competition

Although Mair (2000: 28) believes that “the absence of a genuine European party system serves to inhibit any restructuring of domestic party competition that might result from competition at the European level”, Ladrech (2001: 10) points out that voters may be opportunistically targeted by the fact that the EU becomes politicized in

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9 Elections of deputies to the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia.
national politics. The EU increasingly becomes an important factor for party management since several parties may focus their strategy on capitalizing on EU issues and potential divides these issues generate.

As we mentioned before there is a high level of convergence between major parliamentary parties regarding EU issues, and this was particularly so in the past. The period before the accession to the EU was tagged with the signing of the already mentioned European Agreement on Cooperation between parties. Since 2004, however, excluding certain strategic goals of Slovenian politics (e.g. adoption of the single European currency), EU issues became more strongly politicized than before. This was evident in the debate over rapid ratification of the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe and certain other instances. The lack of clear conflict regarding the EU and the absence of “domestication” of EU issues that could clearly disturb the national political party equilibrium is somewhat consistent with the observation that the EU “hollows out” competition among parties with governing aspirations since government policy manoeuvrability is constrained (Mair, 2000). All five investigated parties had and still have governing aspirations and additionally participated in at least one of the governments of Slovenia in the period of independence. Hence, the aforementioned chain of events is somehow understandable. Nevertheless, several parties recognised the EU related divide in the case of European elections. A number of parties identified the EPP\textsuperscript{10} members versus non-EPP members conflict. Three of the five major parliamentary political parties are the members of a European-level party mentioned above. One major party also recognized the conflict national sovereignty versus EU-level decision-making as an important divide in investigated European elections. In addition, four out of five investigated parliamentary political parties “nationalized” certain EU issues as important points of campaign in order to capitalize versus the opposition, by generating the potential divide and thus attracting potential new voters.

When we look at the type of conflicts that prevailed in the European election campaign across member states (Table 2) we are able to identify similar characteristics to those of Slovenia. The dominant conflict dimension in the examined elections across member states was left versus right, although somewhat more evident in the old member states (EU 15). The conflict between national sovereignty versus EU-level decision-making was reflected as the dominant conflict in individual political parties in around one-fifth of cases, without a considerable difference between old and new member states. However, the data illustrates a large number of other conflict dimensions, which dominated the elections in the eyes of certain parties. In the Slovenian case this dimension was centred on EPP membership. All things considered, we have to point out that the share of “other” issues is considerably higher in the case of new member states, which is probably the consequence of “inexperience” in the field of European elections, where parties had to explore completely new grounds.

\textsuperscript{10} European People’s Party.
Table 2: Dominant conflict in the campaign by type of member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>left vs. right</th>
<th>nat. sov. vs. EU decis.-making</th>
<th>Other dimension</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old member state (EU 15)</td>
<td>39,1 %</td>
<td>17,2 %</td>
<td>43,8 %</td>
<td>100,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new member state (EU 25)</td>
<td>20,5 %</td>
<td>20,5 %</td>
<td>59,0 %</td>
<td>100,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,0 %</td>
<td>18,4 %</td>
<td>49,5 %</td>
<td>100,0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Raw data source: Bicchi (2006)

Relations beyond the national party system

The process of Europeanization is probably the most evident to the voter when looking at the transnational interactions of individual national or local political parties with an international or supranational fashion. Party relations beyond the national party system may result in “new perspectives on transnational cooperation with parties from other EU member states to the extent that new organizational and programmatic activities are promoted” (Ladrech, 2001: 11). Slovenian major parliamentary political parties have all reached the level of integration into EU-level party organizations in Niedermayer’s terms, most frequently by engagement of party personnel in partisan networks or extra-national forums, and by recruitment of active party members to EU appointive and elective offices (Fink Hafner and Krašovec, 2006).

In the context of the European election campaign, according to the performed interviews among major Slovenian parties, all the investigated parliamentary parties actively cooperated with parties in other member states. In this respect the data provided by Bicchi (2006) (Table 3) reflect that Slovenian parliamentary political parties demonstrated a higher degree of cooperation with parties in other member states than was the EU average (76 percent). Interestingly, the degree of such cooperation of political parties is higher in new member states than in the old, and is inevitably also due to the desire to overcome the “immaturity” regarding European elections with the experience of old member state correspondents.

Table 3: Transnational cooperation by type of member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active cooperation with</th>
<th>coordination and support of EP group</th>
<th>participation of foreign politician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties in other member states</td>
<td>parties of the same EP group</td>
<td>transnational/European party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old member states (EU 15)</td>
<td>73,9 %</td>
<td>74,6 %</td>
<td>53,8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new member states (EU 25)</td>
<td>80,5 %</td>
<td>78,0 %</td>
<td>56,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU average</td>
<td>76,4 %</td>
<td>75,9 %</td>
<td>54,5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Raw data source: Bicchi (2006)
Four out of five Slovenian investigated parties actively cooperated with parties of the same EP party group. All five parties have had former EP observers and therefore established some ground for future cooperation. The only party that intentionally rejected the option of cooperation with parties of the same EP group regarding European elections was Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, the main governmental party at the time. Across member states, the average of parties cooperating with other parties of the same EP group was somewhat similar to the Slovenian case, without major differences between old and new member states.

The same number of Slovenian investigated parliamentary political parties also actively cooperated with their corresponding transnational party federation/Europarty regarding European elections. Again, only Liberal democracy of Slovenia refused to cooperate with its transnational party federation, while all the other parties sought to gain any kind of additional advantage in this respect. When we look at the European average provided by data gathered from interviews across member states (Table 3), we are able to observe that major Slovenian political parties demonstrate a far greater degree of cooperation with transnational party federations than their European counterparts. On the other hand, there seems to be no significant difference between old and new parties across member states. A similar occurrence is seen in the case of contributions to the EP party group in terms of coordination of and support for the campaign. Four out of five Slovenian parties intended that their corresponding EP party group would contribute to their European elections campaign. Once again, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia did not plan such contributions and proved to be the most reluctant to cooperate beyond the national party system. The degree of contribution of EP party groups to their corresponding national political parties in the new member states proved to be similar to that of Slovenia, while across old member states parties were somewhat less likely to contribute (55 percent). On the other hand, when considering the participation of foreign politician as part of the European elections campaign the parties from older member states demonstrated much higher average. Sixty-nine percent of investigated parties from older member states planned a participation of foreign politician, while the new member states’ average was considerably lower (56 percent). Slovenian parliamentary political parties were no exception in this respect, since three out of five planned the participation of a foreign politician in their campaign.

Overall, when considering relations beyond the national political system, we can say that major Slovenian parliamentary political parties reflect a significant degree of cooperation with their European national and supranational counterparts. Comparatively speaking, Slovenian parties demonstrate a higher degree of cooperation than national political parties across the EU member states (Table 3). This proves to be significantly higher in the case of active cooperation with European party federations and EP party groups, which in effect could indicate a potentially higher degree of influence of EU-level arena on national political parties and party systems. Therefore, when taking into account the aspect of relations beyond national party system, according
to the organization of activities for the European elections campaign, Slovenian political parties provided the impression of being somewhat more Europeanized than their national counterparts across member states.

Conclusion

In order to encompass entire status quo regarding the Europeanization of Slovenian parliamentary political parties in the context of European elections campaign we have to consider the “global” – holistic view of the presented areas of investigation. Taking programmatic change area into consideration, we can say that Slovenian parliamentary political parties demonstrated very diverse practices. This was the integration of the EU dimension into references to domestic policies and through references to transnational organizations, where mainly opposition parties adopted the strategy of putting forward those attributes compared to the governmental ones. When looking at the degree of EU-level references in the election programmes they reach quite an enviable level (60 percent), however when adding the importance to the equation the true image begins to emerge. To be precise, only one major political party recognized the EU issue to be one of the most important ones for its, campaign therefore confirming the assumptions that EU issues play only minor role also in the race for the EP arena.

As far as the organizational change area is concerned, we observed no indication of possible effects of Europe on individual political parties. By this we mean that the organizational differences between election campaign teams for two types of elections within individual political parties appeared to be minor and completely inconclusive. Such an observation has two consequences: European elections do not seem to be as “second-order” in this respect as predicted; and parties – campaign team structures – appear to be impervious to change. The patterns of party competition area confirmed fairly genuine and favourable attitude of Slovenian political parties and electorate towards Europe. However, despite the high degree of convergence, the prospect of a new pattern of party competition has been identified, i.e. political parties identified a new category of divide between parties, which originates in EU-level politics. EPP members versus non-EPP members divide promises to have some amount of potential since the new Slovenian mainly right-wing government is assembled out of three EPP members, which are also the three largest governmental parties. Regarding relations beyond the national party system, Slovenian parliamentary political parties reflect a high intensity of interaction. In this area, parties seem to be very open to cooperation and integration into various transnational party networks. This was evident from the arrangement of election activities in relation to other European national or supranational structures.

In an attempt to answer the proposed research question in the introduction we may state that the process of European elections mainly confirms the prior observations regarding Europeanization of Slovenian political parties, despite the specific nature of such elections. Regarding the programmatic content we indicated a shift towards
Europe, which was expected due to the nature of elections, but the concrete shift was marginal as is the case in other studies (Fink Hafner and Krašovec, 2006; Krašovec and Lajh, 2007). Similar observation goes for the party competition, which is not shaken by Europe, although there is a potentially new conflict as was anticipated by others (ibid.) in the shape of new government versus opposition cleavages. Overall, acknowledging the limitations of our analysis of European elections campaign, we have to state that in general Slovenian political parties do not exert a substantial amount of change due to European integration, despite demonstrating notable degrees of Europeanization regarding certain aspects of analysis.

References


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Factors of Party System Europeanisation: 
A Comparison of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro

Danica Fink-Hafner

Abstract: For the former Yugoslav republics involved in the 1991–1995 War, the EU’s demands are not only defined by the relationship of these EU-aspiring countries to EU political criteria and harmonization with the acquis communautaire, but primarily, and very importantly, in relation to maintaining peace and developing security in the region. Our primary research interest is to find an explanation for the variations seen between Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro in their responses to very similar EU demands. While the three analysed countries share some common characteristics (former communist rule, involvement in the War in former Yugoslavia, postponed transition to democracy and Europeanization pressures), their relations with the EU as well as their national party system competitions regarding EU matters have differed quite significantly. Variations in the three countries’ national party system mechanics in the field of EU matters are explained by the three following variables: institutionalization of the national party system; the European socialization of national party élites and voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration into the EU.

Key words: Europeanization, party system institutionalization, European party socialization, voters’ attitudes to EU integration, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro

Introduction

Most post-socialist countries have been confronted with the challenges associated with transformation (social, economic, politico-institutional). Some have not only had to face problems of building the institutions and developing the practices of a democratic political system and a market economy, but also those of building an independent state, including the establishment of institutions previously set up in the political centres of the former multinational states they used to belong to (such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and the former Yugoslav republics).

The Central and Eastern European post-socialist countries (including Slovenia), as well as Romania and Bulgaria, and more recently the countries of former Yugoslavia, have also been exposed to adaptations to Europeanization processes. Unlike in the case of the recent post-socialist EU newcomers, in the former Yugoslav Republics (except Slovenia) Europeanization pressures have not been primarily focused on the institutional adaptation or harmonization of national law with the acquis, but on issues and policy adaptations closely linked to the 1991–1995 War and its implications for this region bordering the EU.
Like the older member states and EU newcomers (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels 2001), potential EU candidates have also been passing through several stages of “EU Europeanization”. Even in the early stages the integration of post-socialist countries into the EU started to interfere with their national political systems. The EU’s indirect influence on national political systems and their practices took place through its evaluation and estimation of the level of democracy achieved (first in the applicant countries and then the candidate countries). It was also possible to see institutional adaptation in the EU post-socialist countries, and this was partly the result of the coordinating EU affairs and implementing policies of the EU in response to its demands made during the negotiating process, and partly an expression of the economic, political and security interests of those states seeking full EU membership. While the development of the coordination of EU matters could have been observed in all the post-socialist EU members of the 2004 membership wave, only in Slovakia did the EU interfere in internal political matters and influenced the party system’s mechanics.

In this article we will focus on several countries that emerged from the former Yugoslav republics, where EU demands are strong not only in the relationship of these EU aspiring countries to EU political criteria and the *acquis*, but primarily, and very importantly, in relation to maintaining peace and developing security in the region. Our primary research interest is not the changing role of the EU but finding an explanation for the variations seen between Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro in their responses to very similar EU demands. Building further on the example of the Slovak path to the EU, we will look at factors that influence the party system’s mechanics in a particular field – the inclusion of a particular country in EU integration processes.

We are searching for an explanation of these variations by taking into account controlled variables (common characteristics), common Europeanization (European Union) pressures and several hypothetically explanatory variables. The controlled variables include: former communist rule, involvement in a war and a postponed transition to democracy. We hypothesize that possible explanatory variables that have led to the very different characteristics of party system mechanics in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are: a) institutionalization of the party system; b) European socialization of national parties; and c) characteristics of voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration into the EU.

After presenting the theoretical framework we describe some common characteristics of the analysed countries in order to take account of the “controlled” variables. A closer look at national variations in EU integration processes is followed by an analysis of the factors that, in our opinion, can explain these variations. For the analysis we used data gathered as part of the following research projects financed by the Slovenian Research Agency: Political Science Research Programme (P5-0136), the project Politics in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia (J5-6154-0582-15) and the project involving visiting professor Robert Ladrech (contract no. 1000-06-780001-6). The research findings are summarized in the conclusion.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Europeanization and National Party Systems

The Europeanization concept is understood in many different ways (e.g. Bulmer and Burch 1998; Hix and Goetz 2001; Olsen 2002a). Some commentators also include a clarification of its direction: “top-down”, “bottom-up” or a combination of both (e.g. Ladrech 1994; Bulmer and Burch 1998; Knill 2001; Goetz 2001; Demmke 2002; Radaelli 2003). In clarifying our understanding of Europeanization we start with Radaelli (2003: 30) who defines Europeanization as “the processes of: a) construction; b) diffusion; and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated within the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.” Our research interest is restricted to the top-down Europeanization of certain aspects of party system adaptation.

The pioneers of the framework of research into the Europeanization of political parties and party systems (Mair 2000 and Ladrech 2002) defined three areas of political party Europeanization: national political parties, the national party system and the transnational party level of organization and functioning. In this paper we are focusing only on the national party system. This includes an aspect that Ladrech (2002) calls “patterns of party competition”, whereas Mair (2000) uses the term “mechanics of party competition”. Ladrech’s more thorough explanation of the term “patterns of party competition” includes the politicization of the EU in national politics, a change in the tactics and strategies by parties designed to capitalize on the “EU issue”, the presence of a strongly pro- or anti-EU party and the nature of a party’s ”dominant coalition” in Panebianco’s terms (Ladrech 2002). On the contrary, Mair’s definition (2000) is a little simpler – it includes competition at the pro- versus anti-European integration level. In this article we are focusing on the mechanics of party competition only in terms of the (re)creation of competition between pro-European versus anti-European integration-oriented parties.

Impact of Europeanization on national party system mechanics

So far, research in the West has shown no significant European Union impact on national party systems (Mair 2000; Ladrech 2002; Pennings 2006; Poguntke, Aylott, Carter, Ladrech and Luther, eds. 2007), while studies of the post-socialist 2004 EU member states has mostly shown that there has been little direct impact of the EU on national party politics (Lewis and Mansfeldová, eds. 2006). Some Europarty impacts on national party political orientation (“bringing them closer to the standard European families”) can be found in several parties in the CEE countries (Enyedi and Lewis 2006). The only real exception among the 2004 post-socialist EU newcomers was Slovakia, which had serious difficulties in building democracy during the
1990s\(^1\) and was the only applicant country to have been negatively assessed according to the EU political criteria in the 1997 screening carried out by the European Commission. However, it met the criteria after the change brought about by the 1998 elections (Rybář and Malova 2004; Henderson 2005; Rybář 2005). Recently, Slovakia again raised questions of EU policy regarding national political developments that led to a decline of some important aspects of democracy\(^2\).

When looking at the possible explanatory variables for Slovakia’s exceptional status among the 2004 new EU member countries, the relationship between the fulfillment of the EU political criteria on behalf of a particular country and the number of EU impacts on the national party system competition was considered (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2006). Slovakia stood out as a case where the gap between the EU’s prescribed political criteria and Slovakia’s fulfillment of them was considered to be quite large. The EU criticism especially stressed problems in respecting the rights of the parliamentary opposition, the protection of minority rights and stability of statue institutions (for more information, see Rybář and Malova, 2004). As the party in government was electorally successful, it played a two-level game: it made statements supporting pro-European policies, but at the same time it did not change activities in the national arena that had been criticized on behalf of the European Commission. Among the 2004 post-socialist new members of the EU Slovakia was the only country where EU actors decided to become directly involved in a national party system’s mechanics. Since the mechanics were determined by three factors (the leading party in government, the opposition party and voters), the EU actors focused their activities on the opposition party and voters in order to change the course of the national party competition. The EU’s “social influence” (Rybář 2005) brought about the holding of free and fair parliamentary elections in Slovakia: a strategy of distinguishing between the Slovak government of the day and the Slovak voters, and bringing together EU and non-EU states in donating substantial sums of money to Slovak non-governmental organizations for their pre-election activities. This encouraged a strong voter turnout (beneficial for the opposition) and let Slovak citizens know that they should choose their political representatives carefully in the 1998 parliamentary elections because ”Slovakia had its destiny in its hands”. The new ruling coalition gave high priority to EU accession and demonstrated its policy to catch up with the enlargement wave.

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\(^2\) In the aforementioned report it is noted that the installation of the new (the Fico-led) government in 2006, comprised of coalition partners from the pre-1998 era (nationalist and populist forces which were linked with an authoritarian system/non-liberal democracy), means that the democratic reform gains made in the past eight years might be challenged to some extent. The list of the new government’s faults, which are causing the worsening of Slovakia’s democracy score, includes its overtly partisan tendencies in concentrating power through a number of key political appointments and by adopting measures to curb independent regulatory institutions; its statements and actions curbing the independence of courts, attempts to abolish the Special Court and the Special Attorney’s Office (which had been successfully investigating corruption and organized crime); and the new government’s efforts to increase government regulation in certain sectors threatened to increase corruption.
(Haughton and Malová 2007). This is how Slovakia became case D, as shown in Table 1. All the other 2004 post-socialist new EU countries fit into box A in Table 1.

**Table 1: The EU’s impacts on the national party system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The EU’s impacts on national party system competition</th>
<th>NO / MINOR</th>
<th>BIG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fulfilment of the EU’s political criteria?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINOR GAPS</td>
<td>A: a candidate /accession country with little/no EU impact on national party competition (national political consensus)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNIFICANT GAPS</td>
<td>C: a country has not expressed any interest in integrating with the EU</td>
<td>D: significant EU impact on national party competition (a two-level game)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: adapted from Fink-Hafner and Krašovec (2006)*

While Table 1 could be useful in helping us understand other more recently accepted EU post-socialist countries, it is not simply applicable to countries in former Yugoslavia, apart from Slovenia (case A in Table 1). The cause of the large difference between the new EU countries and all the republics of former Yugoslavia except Slovenia is the direct or indirect involvement of the latter in a war between 1991 and 1995, i.e. the war and its consequences made the whole region a special security and foreign affairs matter for the EU (Tzifakis 2007). However, the three countries included in our comparative analysis have had varying levels of success so far in meeting EU preconditions (in addition to the Copenhagen political criteria) and becoming involved in EU integration processes.

**Europeanization** in terms of European pressure (setting preconditions and conditions for integration into the EU, political pressures on potential candidate states to fulfil the EU’s expectations) is included in our analysis as a common factor. The variables that in our expectation may explain variations in the three cases include: a) national party system institutionalization; b) the European socialization of national party élites (links of national party élites with European party federations); and c) voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration into the EU. With the last variable there should be a distinction between “abstract” voter support for integration into the EU (general support, which is not necessarily based on information about all EU preconditions) and “informed” support for integration into the EU (support that includes awareness of the preconditions defined by the EU).

We believe the model in Figure 1 explains the party system mechanics in the three analysed countries (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) to an important extent. It includes
the following three variables: a) voters’ preferences that put pressure on the party system (bottom-up pressure); b) the achieved level of party system institutionalization offers voters a party choice; and c) party élite linkages and socialization through European networking with their parties’ European counterparts influence the institutionalization of parties and party system (top-down pressures).

**Figure 1: A model of party system mechanics in the Europeanisation process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-down pressures:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of national party elites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutionalization** in politics means “that political actors have clear and stable expectations about the behaviour of other actors” (Mainwearing and Torcal 2006: 206). From a party system mechanics point of view, we start with the assumption that when a party system is institutionalized voters can make reasonable choices and are thereby also in a position to put pressure on party orientations. The institutionalization of a party system is best understood as a continuum of party system characteristics expressed in several aspects: stability of the main parties in the party system; strong party roots in society and according political legitimacy to parties on behalf of political actors\(^3\) (ibid.) as well as party organizations not being subordinated to the interests of leaders or external centres of power, such as a sponsor organization or coterie (Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988; Mainwearing 1999; Mainwearing and Torcal 2006). In a weakly institutionalized party system, parties often appear in and disappear from the party arena, patterns of party support are unstable (including support for established parties in the party system), parties have difficulty structuring and articulating popular preferences, voters have difficulty identifying with particular parties, and there is a lack of autonomous party organizations which go beyond being an extension of individual leaders or coteries. Weak party system institutionalization is even linked to problematic democratic consolidation, as parties in such circumstances are unsure of their survival.

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\(^3\) Parties are accepted as a necessary part of democratic politics.
or stability in terms of electoral support and may opt to prevent democratization (Birch 2001; Thames 2007). What may be of a special importance in the process of Europeanization is the finding that in otherwise generally weakly institutionalized party systems relatively institutionalized individual political parties can be found (Thames 2007).

The European socialization of national party élites is understood in terms of social constructivism theory (see e.g. Diez 1999; Risse 2004), which explains European integration processes as the creation of shared conceptions of an identity or role. One of its main theses is that interaction with other states or individuals leads to shared conceptions of identity or role, which further influences the creation of preferences of further cooperation and integration. National party élites joining with their counterpart European party federations do interact with their counterparts from EU member and candidate states. The expectation that these interactions have an impact on national party élites of the new EU member states has so far received inconclusive empirical support. According to the quite limited research on post-socialist countries’ parties’ linkages with European party federations (e.g. Lajh and Krašovec 2004; Krašovec and Lajh 2004; Lewis and Mansfeldová, eds. 2006), European party linkages could lead to minor and sometimes modest national party changes. However, Enyedi and Lewis (2006: 236) point out Europarties’ impacts on the political orientations of some existing EU member parties as a result of the parties of the new EU member states moving towards membership of one of the standard European families, including a party name change, or a rethink of existing EU member parties’ relationship with other national parties. Although Europarties sometimes encourage collaboration or even the merging of national parties, so far there has been no clear evidence of the direct impact of Europarties on national parties’ ideological or behavioural change. Since political parties in the analysed (potential) candidates for EU integration have been largely based on the extreme politicization of ethnic feelings (unlike in the partially already studied Central and Eastern European countries) we expect that the European socialization of national parties may be a relatively important factor in the recreating of party-system institutionalization. Although so far (in the cases of Central and Eastern European countries) it only seems to have been the Polish party system that has internalized a pro/anti-European cleavage (Lewis 2006: 13), we can probably expect that the phenomena will be more evident in those countries with potential losers in the approaching process of European integration – both in society (voters from the losing sectors of society) as well as in the élite (especially in those parts of élites with war-related responsibilities and/or illegally gained wealth).

Common characteristics and relationships of the analysed countries with the EU

The three analysed countries share many important common characteristics: former communist rule, involvement in the 1991–1995 War, strong nationalist party
orientations and intensive electoral engineering during the 1990s prolonging the power position of parties that won the first multi-party elections in the respective countries – and by so doing – also postponing the transition to a democracy by a decade. Due to these characteristics as well as other EU security and regional interests (Tzifakis 2007), a special new set of similar preconditions was established for all three countries – including the joint demand to hand over alleged criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a result of the Civil War in the first half of the 1990s (Pridham 2006; Tzifakis 2007).

Table 2: Brief presentation of countries’ relations with the EU with respect to EU pre-conditions and political conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>EU pre-conditions</th>
<th>Content of other problematic issues/ emphasised EU political conditions beside the Copenhagen political criteria</th>
<th>Status of the integration with the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia* during accession negotiations</td>
<td>No special pre-conditions in 2000</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>In 1997 negative EU evaluation, but positive after 1998 elections; Full EU membership on 1 May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>co-operation with the ICTY (the reason for the interruption of negotiations)</td>
<td>Minorities; return of refugees; bilateral problems with neighbours fight against corruption</td>
<td>Stabilisation and association agreement signed in October 2001; Application for EU membership in March 2003; EU accession negotiations started in June 2004, but postponed in March 2005; continuing since 3 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>co-operation with the ICTY (the reason for the interruption of negotiations)</td>
<td>human rights and minorities; civilian control over the military, constructive approach as regards Kosovo</td>
<td>EU negotiations on stabilisation and association agreement started on 10 October 2005, but called off on 3 May 2006; de-frozen again on 13 June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>co-operation with the ICTY (the reason for the interruption of negotiations)</td>
<td>fight against corruption and organised crime</td>
<td>EU negotiations on stabilisation and association agreement started on 10 October 2005, but called off on 3 May 2006 (S+MG); (re)started 26 September 2006; Stability and Association agreement initialled on 16 March 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ICTY... International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Since the Croatian government started an official policy of integration into the EU earlier (the strategic political initiative started with the change in government in 2000; Croatia officially applied for EU membership on 21 February 2003) and has to some extent been reacting more in accordance with the EU’s expectations than the other two analysed politico-territorial units (a short postponement of accession negotiations in 2005 due to Zagreb’s failure to arrest war crimes suspect General Ante Gotovina), it has been catching up with the path that Slovakia took to the EU. While Serbia is clearly a laggard, Montenegro is becoming an “in between” case due to the relatively strong interests of part of the economic and political élite in maintaining the status quo (independence from Serbia, but non-compliance with EU standards in certain critical condition policy fields other than collaboration with the ICTY). At the time of writing (early July 2007), Croatia was in the process of accession negotiations, Montenegro had just signed the Stability and Association agreement with the EU, while Serbia was just about to restart negotiations on a stability and association agreement with the EU, which had been frozen due to its failure to hand over major war criminals (Table 1).

VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS

National variations

Although national party systems have some common characteristics, they also differ. They have responded to European integration issues differently. In Croatia, democratization and Europeanization have been linked together. In Montenegro, Europeanization was primarily linked with winning the country’s independence from Serbia, and it currently seems to be in a stalemate position; while in Serbia democratization and Europeanization have been delayed.

A specific feature of Croatian politics is that the HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica) opposition party won the first multiparty elections in 1990, contrary to the expectations of the reformed Communist Party, which had led the transition. The HDZ prevailed in a context of the War by the successful manipulation of ethnic feeling and political institutions up until 2000. The predominant party (HDZ) was the key cause of totalitarian tendencies in the Croatian state (Lalović, 2000). In spite of the fact that during the 1990s Croatia was considered a ”delegated” democracy, a non-liberal, parliamentary democracy, a defective democracy or even an authoritarian, populist, nationalist populist régime (Kasapović 2000: 47), there were peaceful electoral cycles even against the background of war, and voters did accept the parliamentary rules of the game. On the one hand, we could say that the Croatian party system did become institutionalized during the 1990s in some aspects, such as the continuous presence of

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4 It should be stressed that the Croatian path to the EU has been partly influenced by the context of EU decision-making concerning Turkey’s candidacy (see e.g. Sošić 2006; Pridham 2006).
a core of political parties in the party system, the net volatility (according to Kasapović (2001: 34) it was 17.4 percent between 1990 and 1995) and party identification was 56 percent in 1995\(^5\), (but dropped to 36 percent in 2003) (Čular 2005: 140). On the other hand, the predominant party in the party system (the party in power) was the HDZ – a charismatic organization (Kasapović 2001: 22). The president of the HDZ was also the President of Croatia between 1990 and 2000, which was at that time a semi-presidential system. Croatian politics in the 1990s were not democratic and may be described as the “institutionalization of nationalist discourse and authoritarian democracy”, the “delayed consolidation of democracy” (Čular 2000) or ”democratic despotism” Vejvoda (2000). In the struggle to maintain its ruling position, the HDZ (the Croatian Democratic Community), the party of both the president and the parliamentary majority, even succeeded in broadening its electoral support to include not only the Croatian diaspora, but also Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina (then already formally an independent state). Croat voters from Bosnia-Herzegovina benefited from financial help from the Croatian national budget (Kasapović 2001; Cvrtila 2001) and behaved like a “clientelistic group” (Kasapović 2001: 23). Some HDZ voters preferred a strong leader more than voters of other parties (Čular 2005: 157). As early as the 1990s political parties attracted very low levels of trust. According to public opinion polls in 1990 and 1999, only about 12 percent of voters substantially or fully trusted political parties, while at the end of 1999 46 percent did not trust the parties at all (Čular 2005: 124). Party identification in Croatia decreased immediately after the de-freezing of the transition to democracy (ibid.: 167–168).

After the Civil War and the death of the charismatic leader Franjo Tudjman, Croatia moved towards a democratic system, including institutional reforms introducing a parliamentary system and a democratic electoral process. Čular estimates that institutional socialization after the 2000 elections brought about the socialization of the party élite and led to a shift in party politics away from extreme political positions (ibid.: 156). However, the overall picture of the party system shows that party preferences and the level of democratic legitimacy in 2003 are a little lower than in the previous period (ibid.: 152). In spite of the fact that more democratically-oriented voters left the HDZ (ibid.: 157), only the HDZ did not lose its principal democratic support among the electorate (ibid.: 152). The watershed elections of 2000 did bring about a shift towards a more fragmented party system, with a prevailing conflict between centre-left and centre-right parties, but the HDZ still received the relatively stable support of part of the electorate (ibid.: 152). The 2000 elections saw a shift from the predominant cleavage of the 1990s (a territorial-cultural versus an ideological-cultural cleavage) towards

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\(^5\) In 1995 voters with a quite strong party identification showed support for considerably stronger authoritarian tendencies (Čular 2005: 143). These voters were primarily supporters of the HDZ, which was consistently more authoritarian in its tendencies than the other main parties (ibid.: 152). As it was revealed that party identification was related to satisfaction with democracy, it could be understood why in the period between 1990 and 2000 mainly non-democrats were satisfied with democracy in Croatia (ibid.: 144).
ideological-cultural cleavages characteristic of the divisions between traditionalism and modernism. The Croatian party system shifted away from predominant nationalism and ethnocentrism towards socio-economic divisions marked by a cleavage between the beneficiaries and losers of the 1990s (Zakošek 2001). There were stable opposition voters who mostly felt their economic position was worse in 2000 than in 1990\(^6\). The Social Democratic Party (SDP) (a successor of the reformed Communist Party), the main representative of opposition parties, became the party of the prime minister after the 2000 watershed elections and started a policy of Croatian joining the European integration processes. Other parties adopted a pro-European orientation, at least in their discourse, with a delay.

Although up until early June 2006 Serbia and Montenegro were the two former Yugoslav republics that had remained in the framework of the common state after the independence of all the other former Yugoslav republics, their party system developments differed in some important ways. While in both former republics there were old élitess which were able to freeze the transition to a democracy (see e.g. Goati, ed. 1998; Ramet 2006), the question of Montenegrin independence made political developments in this republic somewhat idiosyncratic.

The logic of party system development in Serbia and Montenegro cannot be understood without taking into account the broader picture of conflicts in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Probably the most plausible explanation is linked to the thesis that it had been a centre-periphery conflict that had so far been decisive for the party system logic in the two units. In the transition from 1980 to the 1990s political engagement on an ethnic basis became predominant in the nationally heterogeneous former Yugoslav republics (Serbia and Montenegro as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia). Political élites in the former republics played nationalist cards in their political conflicts and added to the ethnic homogenization within “their own” republics (Goati 2000b: 179). In each ethnically heterogeneous republic the parties of the majority ethnic group (apart from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had three major ethnically-based parties) strove for a quite broadly defined “ethnic territory” and more or less minimized rights of other ethnic groups. In these terms the centre/periphery cleavage in the framework of former Yugoslavia was expressed in the range of independent states that were created (at the beginning of the 1990s the creation of the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and, at a later date, in 2006, Montenegro. Thus, Serbia was left on its own). Even in July 2007 Kosovo remains to be “a question of all questions”\(^7\) for the Serbian government.

\(^6\) Zakošek (2001: 120) states that the share of “losers” of the 1990s among stable opposition voters was 72.9 percent, while among the stable HDZ voters the share of losers was 27.2 percent and among former HDZ voters who transferred their votes to opposition parties it was 64.5 percent (data are from the Izbori 2000 survey conducted by the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb).

\(^7\) Pitanje svih pitanja (an estimation on behalf of the Serbian foreign minister during his visit in Ljubljana; TV news at 7 p.m. on Slovenian TV station POP-TV and national RTV Slovenia on 16 July 2007).
The phenomena of segmented pluralism within the republics led to the political homogenization of ethnic minorities and in some cases led to their demands for self-determination (as with the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia). Although party systems in both units were marked by the “ethnification of the political sphere” (predominant party organization and functioning on an ethnic basis), this happened to a larger extent in Serbia (Goati 2000b: 180). Among the indicators of the range of party system ethnification phenomena is the fact that Albanian parties refused to even participate in the party system of the Republic of Serbia and created an illegal party system of their own, while in Montenegro the parties of ethnic minorities (Muslim, Albanian) participated in a Montenegrin party system from the beginning of its development and, beside the parties in favour of ethnic homogenization, there were also some which opposed it (ibid.: 179).

In addition, the cleavage between parties of the national majority and the parties of national minorities in Montenegro was accompanied by the cleavage between pro-independence and pro-common state supporters. In the context of war, the politicization of ethnic feelings and intensive institutional engineering in favour of the parties in power, it was impossible to talk about democracy and reasonable voter choices. Yet in Serbia the polarized pluralism anti-democratically-oriented SPS and JUL were able to occupy the central position and take advantage of a situation with a double opposition (Goati 2000b: 197). On the contrary, the Montenegrin party system developed in a moderately pluralistic way during the 1990s and became more polarized only in the context of Montenegro distancing itself from Serbia in the 1997–2000 period. The end of Serbian and Montenegrin involvement in the war in other former Yugoslav republics between 1991 and 1995, and the international intervention in Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia in 1998–99 changed the social and political context of both party systems. The first peaceful change in power occurred in Montenegro, with presidential elections in 1997 and parliamentary elections in 1998. A little later, in 2000, change also happened in Serbia (Miller 1997; Goati 2000a; Ramet 2006), although this was achieved with more difficulty than in Montenegro.

Serbian and Montenegrin party systems have not yet been institutionalized (Goati 2000b), although it is possible to identify several continuous parties within each of the two party systems. In both units, the party roots have been quite weak, as reflected in the rather large shifts in party electoral support. Besides a relatively large electoral volatility\(^8\), the overall large importance of party leaders\(^9\) can be noticed in

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\(^8\) According to Goati (2000b: 200), the average electoral volatility during the 1990s in Serbia was 34.6 percent and in Montenegro 34 percent (in Montenegro the greatest was in the watershed elections in 1998 – 63.4 percent).

\(^9\) According to research, support for particular party leaders even has a predictive power for electoral support for parties (see Rejting lidera i izborne orientacije građana Srbije i Crne gore krajem 2004 godine./ (Raitings of Leaders and Election Orientations among Serbian and Montenegrin citizens at the end of 2004, Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, January 2005).
both Serbia and Montenegro (ibid.) and quite significant external centres of power can also be identified. In Serbia in particular there have been cases where the secret services and economic élites have prospered from war profits and illegal activities, and in Montenegro economic élites and some political élites have prospered from illegal economic activities\(^{10}\). In spite of the fact that after the 2000 political change Milošević lost the army’s support and the government arrested him and sent him to The Hague, the assassination of Djindjić, a leader of the more liberal, pro-European Democratic Party in 2003, this had shown the level of external party centres of power influence in Serbia (for more information, see Ramet, 2006).

Contrary to Serbia, the pro-European political stream gained predominance in the Montenegrin parliament after the May 1998 parliamentary victory (Goati 2000b: 182)\(^ {11}\). As the Montenegrin political élite was engaged in democratic change, changes in ownership and international linking up, it clashed with opposing interests within Montenegro as well as in Serbia and the federal level of the joint state. Demands for a confederal state and for Montenegrin independence became two expressions of its ”reactive confederalism” (Goati 2000b: 183). Due to the high level importance of this kind of centre/periphery cleavage, the centre-right versus centre-left cleavage was secondary. In 2000 pro-confederal (pro-independence) parties won 62 percent of parliamentary seats (49 out of 78) in the national Montenegrin parliament (Goati 2000b: 180).

In 2000 Serbian political conflicts within the cleavage of a pro-European orientation (pro-modernization) versus traditionalism (anti-modernization) traditionalist political options still prevailed, as shown in their parliamentary strength (the three main traditionalistic parties of the SPS, the JUL and the SRS gained 187 (74.8 percent) parliamentary seats) and their black-red coalition government fought for “a continuity of politico-economic development”, against the full introduction of democracy, a market economy and links with economically developed Western countries (Goati 2000b: 181). On 12 April 1999, during the NATO bombing (24 March–9 June 1999), the National Assembly went as far as unilaterally deciding to join a federation with Russia and Belarussia.

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\(^{10}\) Montenegro has been very vulnerable to drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering as well as financial crimes and has a significant market for smuggled goods (see e.g. International Narcotics Control Report 2007, released by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, accessed at http://podgorica.usembassy.gov/policy/reports/070305.html, 6.7.2007 and the analysis by Vanja Čalović at Balkananalysis.com on 11 August 2005, accessed at Balkananalysis.com: http://www.balkananalysis.com/?p=597, 6.7.2007). Even politicians in the highest positions in Montenegro have been accused of being involved in illegal activities. For example, in July 2007 it was reported that at a court in Bari, Italy, Milo Đukanović was accused of being involved in an international mafia gang smuggling cigarettes and benefiting financially from this activity (Slovenian weekly newspaper Nedelo, 24 June 2007, p. 3). In the same article it was reported that Đukanović had recently opened his own private university and predicted the setting up of several new enterprises.

\(^{11}\) Beside the pro-European coalition “to live a better life” – “Da živimo bolje” (composed of the DPS, NS CG, SDP), which gained 49.5 percent of votes and 53 percent of seats in parliament) there were also some additional small parties with mandates (the LS CG, DS and DUA), which together with the coalition won 58.3 percent of votes and 62.8 percent of seats (Goati 2000b: 182).
Since the political change in Serbia in 2000 democratization processes have been linked with Europeanization processes. Two clusters of parties have been created in terms of the pro-European (all the relevant parties) versus anti-European cleavage (Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia – Miloševič’s former party). While the general pro-European orientation is not in question, the practical implementation of EU preconditions along with the concrete facing up to the causes and consequences of the war in the first half of the 1990s have remained very problematic (Komšić 2007).

**Table 3: National variations in party system changes, 1990–2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CROATIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREDOMINANT CLEAVAGES IN PARTY COMPETITION</td>
<td>In the 1990s: nationalism, traditionalism vs. modernism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2000: C-L vs. C-R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGIC OF CHANGE IN POWER SINCE UNFREEZING OF THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION</td>
<td>WATERSHED ELECTIONS 2000; alternative C-R and C-L coalitions available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREDOMINANT PARTY INFLUENCE IN 1990s</td>
<td>Anti-communist party predominant until 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONALISATION OF PARTY SYSTEM?</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) stability of main parties in a party system</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) relevant external centres of power (relative to parties)</td>
<td>Occasional political pressures on behalf of army veteran’s interest organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*economically-based interest in the status quo*
European party socialization

In line with our understanding of the European socialization of national party élites (as presented in the theoretical framework of this article) we expect that in the analysed countries national parties’ links with the European party federations would lead to the creation of shared European party federations’ conceptions of identity or role. We expect that this impact would be expressed also in national parties’ ideological positioning in the domestic party arena and in party behaviour.

The main Croatian political parties have longer experiences of links to European party federations and other political actors at the EU level when compared with the Montenegrin and Serbian situations. Currently, European party links do not only include the main Croatian political parties, but also party youth organizations. The Croatian Social Democrats, the party which initiated a clear policy of Croatian integration into the EU after its parliamentary victory in 2000, has been associated member of the Party of European Socialists since April 2004.

The process of Europeanization can in some aspects at least be seen in the more intensive contacts of leading party élite members (especially prime ministers – Ivica Račan and Ivo Sanader, who have also been presidents of their parties) since the beginning of the accession stage. The President of the HDZ (the prime minister’s party, which led the Croatian accession negotiations with the EU)\(^\text{13}\), Ivo Sanader (2006) stresses not only the import of European values into his party through its links with the European party federation European Peoples’ Party (EPP) (the HDZ became a member of the EPP in 2002)\(^\text{14}\), but also using these links for pursuing his party and his country interests in relation with the EU\(^\text{15}\).

A peculiarity of Montenegrin party international socialization is that it started by linking with international party organizations, and only recently has it become more oriented towards European parties. As shown in the contribution by Komar and Vujović, parties included a mention of the EU or Europe mainly in their party manifestos, among the general rhetoric, but did not specify any EU-related policies.

\(^{12}\) See information on membership of Croatian party organizations in international party organizations at http://www.hidra.hr/stranke/tab1_10.htm.

\(^{13}\) HDZ was accepted into the European Union of Christian parties (EUCD) in 1995.

\(^{14}\) Sanader (2006) stresses the important role of linking with the European Peoples’ Party federation in the period between 2000 and 2003, during which the party was in opposition for the first time since 1990. The party’s reorientation under the EPP influence included the intensification of bilateral contacts with EPP members (especially those in the region), emphasizing the party’s European orientation in addressing some policy issues, proving that the HDZ shares the values and principles of the EPP (e.g. successful integration of national minorities), and developing a network and regional cooperation with party counterparts in Southeast Europe.

\(^{15}\) Sanader (2006) also stresses that the EPP party federation helped HDZ interpret Croatia and the whole of South-East Europe to EU institutions and EU member states. In September 2005, on the initiative of EPP President Wilfred Martens, a letter from nine EU Prime Ministers was sent to British Prime Minister and President of the European Council, Tony Blair, asking for the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia.
in Montenegro. There are also no visible organizational adaptations to the processes of Europeanization, although contacts of Montenegrin parties with their counterparts across the Montenegrin borders are noticeable. Due to the internal characteristics of Montenegrin society and politics, the deepening of the pro-European and anti-European cleavages may become more important in future integration processes.

In Serbia, even after 15 years since the first multi-party elections, the political and economic élites have problems with inconsistent values – a persistent mixture of liberal and collectivist patterns (Lazić 2007). Sociological analysis (Vuletić 2007) has shown that political and economic élites have established close mutual links (members of the political élite are connected with the economic élite through friendship, marriages and other social ties, making the whole élite quite cohesive and powerful). Structurally, they do not have a real interest in integration into the EU – quite the opposite: the more this goal becomes realistic the more they will probably resist it (Vuletić 2007: 99). Rhetorical general talk about integration into the EU could serve as a legitimizing source in relation to voters, but it has its limitations. While voter support for integration into the EU is uninformed and confused, there is still also a lack of the European socialization of Serbian party élites. Milivojević (2007) note the scarce close contacts with European institutions involving various actors. Just a few political parties have official links with Europarties starting with 2005 and 2006 (Milivojević 2007; Orlović 2007). Although the Democratic Party (Djindjić’s former party) moved from the centre towards a social-democratic orientation by establishing closer links first with the Socialist International and later with the Party of European Socialists, the DSS came closer to the people’s parties (it can be characterized as a conservative-ethnic party), and G17 is close to the liberal European party grouping, the impact of Europarties should not be overestimated (Orlović 2007: 139–141), especially not in relation to domestic variables.

Voter preferences

Voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration into the EU vary considerably among the three countries. While in Croatia they are informed of the EU’s preconditions, they also support European integration processes. Although a more detailed look at public opinion polls shows changes in the amount of support, it has been revealed that the majority of the two main parties in the party system representing the centre left (SDP) and the centre right (HDZ) do support European integration and the majority of several other parties’ voters (HSS, HSLS-LS, HSP, HSU) as well as the undecided are somewhat more doubtful\(^\text{16}\). The swings seen in public opinion polls are probably to some extent influenced by informed journalists’ contributions to European debates in Croatia. As shown in the analysis of commentary in leading Croatian newspapers

\(^{16}\) Crobarometar – Travanj 2006, izveštaj, Puls, Zagreb, p. 9.
in 2004, Croatian journalists expressed argued criticism of the government’s decisions and the “insincerity” of Croatian politics vis-à-vis the Hague tribunal and the possible consequences of these politics for the postponement of negotiations with the EU – which indeed happened (Vilović 2005).

In Serbia voters generally support Serbia’s integration into the EU, but the majority of them are unaware of the EU’s preconditions. Blagosavljević (2007:51) suggests they are confused due to both a lack of information and inconsistent political messages about the EU (over the years it has sometimes been praised and sometimes criticized according to political parties’ needs). This also results in a low level of trust in the EU\(^\text{17}\). A large proportion of voters believe that the EU brings about the free movement of people (50 percent), an open market (43 percent), democracy (39 percent), human and minority rights (27 percent) (Bogosavljević 2007: 56). As many as 50 percent believe the reason for Serbia’s lagging behind in the integration processes is the constantly adding new conditions and blackmailing of Serbia, 23 percent believe that it is due to the incapability of the domestic leadership and 15 percent the mentality of people who are not ready for change (only 12 percent believe there are objective obstacles and a need for major reforms in all fields) (Bogosavljević 2007: 61). In fact, voters of all parties (pro-European and anti-European) have problems understanding the preconditions of integration into the EU, and the majority believes that once Serbia fulfils the Hague precondition the EU will invent new additional criteria that Serbia needs to meet in order to move forward in the integration process (Bogosavljević 2007: 62). Voters’ general pro-European orientation is also to a certain extent misleading, as in 2006 the majority of citizens still felt a personal link to their nation, and around one-third of voters of the main political parties in the party system (except the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party) as well as the population of the non-decided is characterized by very high ethnocentrism. This is true of even 51 percent of Serbian Radical Party voters and less (18 percent) of Democratic Party voters\(^\text{18}\).

\(^{17}\) According to a survey conducted by the Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje Institut društvenih nauka in Belgrade in 2004 (Stavovi građana o međunarodnoj zajednici i odnosima Srbije i Crne gore krajem 2004. godine, Beograd, januar 2005), 34 percent of Serbian citizens did not trust the EU and 46 percent did, at the same time the proportion of distrust in the UN was even lower (48 percent did not trust it; 33 percent did trust it) and the international organizations with the lowest trust were the Hague Tribunal and NATO, with the same proportions of distrust (70 percent) and trust (13 percent).

\(^{18}\) Low ethnocentrism is characteristic of 34 percent of the non-decided; of 27 percent of those who did not want to disclose their voting intentions; 40 percent of non-voters; of 13 percent of the Serbian Radical Party voters; 35 percent of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) voters and as much as for 52 percent of Democratic Party voters (Istraživanje javnog mnenja Srbije, leta 2006. godine, CeSID, Center for Free Elections and Democracy, Belgrade, September 2006, p. 26).
Table 4: EU strategy and public opinion support for integration with the EU in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU STRATEGY</th>
<th>CROATIA</th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>MONTENEGRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pressures on governments primarily to meet EU preconditions</td>
<td>pressures on governments primarily to meet EU preconditions</td>
<td>pressures on governments primarily to meet EU preconditions; support for the reformed, liberal bloc / with a time-lag also for MG’s independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| GENERAL PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE COUNTRY’S INTEGRATION WITH THE EU | Y | Y | Y |
| PUBLIC AWARENESS OF WAR CRIMINAL PRE-CONDITIONALITY? | Y | 50 % NOT aware | Y |

Public opinion results as reported by Slobodna Evropa 6.11.2006 (Internet)

A pro-European orientation clearly prevailed in Montenegro by the end of the 1990s. In a public opinion survey in April 2000, 80.7 percent of Montenegrin voters were clearly in favour of Montenegrin integration into the EU, but only 23.9 percent of integration with Russia and Belarussia (contrary to Montenegrin MPs). The main reason for a pro-European orientation was that Montenegrins expected a better standard of living, closer to that of the EU. A survey at the end of 1999 also showed a shift in public opinion towards a change in the status of Montenegro. The public opinion data were interpreted as a gradual shift towards pro-independence, autonomistic ideas, while the still quite strong federalism was becoming “a minority idea, supported by the Belgrade régime” (Goati 2000: 180–181). In spite of the relatively strong distrust of international organizations, including the EU, held by Montenegrin citizens,

20 Among the reasons for joining the EU the highest proportion (45 percent of those surveyed in December 2004) answered it was an improvement of the economic situation and citizens’ standard of living (Position regarding statehood issue and key socio-economic problems, CEDEM, Department of Empirical Studies, December 2004, available at www.cedem.cg.yu).
21 According to a survey conducted by Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje Institut društvenih nauka in Belgrade in 2004 (Stavovi građana o međunarodnoj zajednici i odnosima Srbije i Crne gore krajem 2004. godine, Beograd, januar 2005), 21 percent of Montenegrin citizens did not trust the EU and 54 percent did, at the same time the proportion of distrust in the UN was only slightly lower (28 percent did not trust it; 47 percent did trust it) and the lowest among international organizations were the Hague Tribunal (50 percent did not trust it; 27 percent did trust it) and NATO with the same proportions of distrust (50 percent) and slightly different trust (27 percent trusted the Hague Tribunal and 22 percent trusted NATO).
a pro-EU orientation is predominant among voters. In comparison with Serbian voters, Montenegrins are much better informed about the EU’s preconditions regarding one of the most sensitive issues in the former union of Serbia and Montenegro – collaboration with the ITCY. According to data from the CEMI of 20 April 2006, 42.6 percent of the surveyed supported extradition of war criminals to the ITCY and 42.2 percent were against that. Still, in case if collaboration with The Hague was a precondition of further integration into the EU 53.7 percent of those surveyed would still be in favour of integration and the proportion of opposers to war criminals extradition would decline to 27.2 percent.

Comparisons and tentative conclusions

Comparing the impact of national party system institutionalization, the European socialization of national party élites and voters’ attitudes to their country’s involvement in European integration processes (Table 5) shows an interesting variety of factors determining the party system mechanics.

Table 5: Comparative view of national party system mechanics, European party socialisation and voters’ pro-European pressures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CROATIA</th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>MONTENEGRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTY SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONALISATION?</strong></td>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– stability of main parties in the party system</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– strong external party power?</td>
<td>Y/N (interest groups)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIALISATION</strong></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VOTERS’ PRO-EU ATTITUDES?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– general</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– informed</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Croatian party élites have been socialized through their links with European party federations (as well as other EU actors) for the longest period (compared with the other two analysed cases) and at the same time they have been pressured by quite a strong pro-European orientation on behalf of voters. National party system mechanics regarding EU matters seem to have become closer to the Slovak case, where the party

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system’s mechanics respond to dual pro-European pressures: voters’ preferences as well as EU actors’ pressures. Croatian European integration processes seem to have been working in a way that is ever more similar to those in Slovakia (from the 1997–2004 period), involving a push-pull relationship and a two-level game, although the latter was largely linked to war-related issues and actors (especially the anti-Hague lobby including war veteran interest groups, and for some time even part of the military leadership).

As in Serbia, voters’ support for European integration processes is not predominantly informed about the EU’s preconditions, the Serbian national party system is not in a comparable relationship with the electorate as in Croatia or even Montenegro. Still, national party autonomy in Montenegro is endangered by external party power, as in Serbia. While in Montenegro it is concentrated in organized crime and unclear relationships between the party élite members and economic power functioning against European standards, in Serbia the external party power lies not only in war profiteers’ economic power but also in segments of the state apparatus still faithful to Milošević’s politics (especially the secret services).

So although at first sight Montenegro seems to have been quite a successful Europeanization story, it may in fact not be the case. Despite the fact that voters’ support for integration into the EU is informed (voters are largely aware of the EU’s preconditions) an important part of Montenegrin party élites has retained general pro-EU rhetoric. It is national party subordination to the economic interests of an important segment of party élites that is preventing Montenegro from fulfilling other special EU preconditions besides cooperation with the ICTY – especially the fight against organized crime.

When looking at comparisons we can notice that in Croatia the (although not quite an institutionalized) party system is now in a position to respond to both Europeanization pressures – from the top and from the bottom. On the contrary, in Serbia, both aspects of party system institutionalization are relatively weak (besides that, the bottom-up pressure is not informed of the EU’s preconditions). What is common to Serbia and Montenegro is the strength of nationally influential centres of economic and political power that are outside political parties. In a situation where these centres of power do not see their interests in integration processes with the EU, political parties can only follow general voters’ preferences of joining the EU with a general pro-EU discourse – without doing anything significant in relation to fulfilling the EU’s preconditions. From this point of view, another aspect of party system institutionalization (stability of the main parties in the party system) is obviously insufficient for the full development of party system mechanics responsive to pressures from the top and from the bottom in the field of EU matters.

All three cases show a close link between democratization and Europeanization processes. It seems that voters’ demands do play quite an important role in shaping the party system by offering pro- versus anti-European competition. It also seems that the
European socialization of party élites plays a weaker role in this context. Our analysis has revealed that voters’ pro-European orientation needs to be analysed in more detail as its characteristics are important for the impact on party system competition. A general, uninformed pro-European orientation which co-exists with traditionalism and the politicization of ethnic feelings in fact supports merely declaratory pro-EU party politics without providing any concrete steps for meeting the EU’s preconditions.

While undertaking this comparative research we noticed several variables that need to be taken into account in further research. Among them is trust in the EU as an international organization, which seems to be an additional factor shaping voters’ and party élites’ attitudes to integration into the EU. Here EU behaviour (especially its inconsistency: politically determined individual decisions are not always in line with the generally declared policy) as a variable needs to be taken into account. Unlike the previous post-socialist EU candidate (now already member) states, the idiosyncrasies of societies in those countries that were involved in the Yugoslav Civil War need to be explored in more detail – especially due to the distortion of their social structures – as well as the characteristics of their (party) élites, their centres of power as well as due to other consequences of the war (the “ghettoization” of these societies). These additional variables especially come to the fore when we look at Serbia and Montenegro; while in Croatia our preliminary study has also indicated the need to do more thorough research into the role of non-party actors (such as the mass media and non-governmental actors) in shaping the party system’s mechanics when it comes to the area of European issues.

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Europeanisation of National Political Parties and Party System: Case Study of Montenegro

Olivera Komar and Zlatko Vujović

Abstract: The process of European integration is at the very early stages in Montenegro. However, certain influences of this process on politics at the national level can be observed, including the building of a strong consensus on integration, which is partly due to the significant influence the European Union (EU) had in the organization of the referendum on the state status of Montenegro in May 2006, as well as the special dynamic between political parties and citizens. These internal changes so far include changes in party rhetoric, mentioning the EU in party manifestos and declaring membership of it as a goal of political action. Other structural changes are less visible at the moment. Although the process of integration is at the very beginning, bearing in mind the period of time that has passed since the referendum (all other issues except the status of Montenegro as a state remained in the background until this issue was resolved), changes are happening rapidly, and one could argue that process of Europeanization of the party system might be faster in new EU accession countries.

Key words: political parties; party system; Europeanization; European integration

Introduction

The stimulus for analysing the influence of the process of Europeanization on national parties in Montenegro came from theoretical assumptions made in a study conducted by a group of authors including Thomas Poguntke, Nicholas Aylott, Elisabeth Carter, Robert Ladrech and Kurt Richard Luther1. This article accepts one of the possible meanings of the term “Europeanization” and sees it as the institutionalization of the European political system, which has certain effects on domestic structures and member states, and on concrete, intra-organizational change in national political parties, as a result of the ongoing process of European integration (Carter et al., 2007: 4–5). The study is especially concerned with the top-down dimension of the Europeanization process, and the hypothesis underlying this research is that European integration has enhanced the intraparty power of two partially overlapping categories – EU specialists2 and party élites.

2 In this study EU specialists are seen as a “heterogeneous group of actors who are characterized by the fact that a considerable part of their political activity is related to the process or substance of European governance” (Carter et al. 2007: 12). They include MEPs, members of national parliamentary EU affairs committees, EU spokespersons, etc.
Although inspired by this study, we realize that the model of research introduced in it is not fully applicable to Montenegro. First of all, it is not a part of the EU; it is in the very early accession stages and therefore: 1) its political parties do not have representatives in the European Parliament; 2) political parties’ representatives do not participate in the work of EU bodies that work on the basis of member state representation and; 3) Montenegrin EU specialists are not yet intensively participating in the work of EU institutions. In this sense the process of Europeanization is still at the very early beginning and has had very limited consequences in Montenegro.

On the other hand, the first changes can be noticed. The negotiation process between Montenegro and the EU resulted in certain consequences due to which it is not possible to say that the process of Europeanization has had no influence on political parties in Montenegro. Some of these consequences included: 1) sections of the political élite are involved in the process of negotiations on accession to the EU because some of their work is for the Government and Council for European integration; 2) some EU specialists, as members of the national parliament and EU specialists in parties, are involved in the process of association through: a) participation in government negotiations with EU representatives; b) participation in the work of European Parliament political parties’ joint bodies; c) participation in the cooperation between the national and European Parliaments, including parliamentary delegations in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Partnership for Peace; (d) participation in the work of the National Parliamentary Board for European Integration.

This is why this article is based on another semi-hypothesis made in the aforementioned study, namely, that the authors of the study choose not to include in their comparison the new EU member states because they felt that their political parties did not have enough time to respond to the new environment (Carter et al., 2007: 17). On the other hand, the authors pose the question: was joining the EU in the post-Maastricht period for the new EU countries an “external shock”, which was consequently followed by faster organizational adaptation? This article develops this question, and extends it to the countries that have yet to join the EU, including Montenegro.

As we are limited by the fact that the article is an in-depth qualitative study of a single country, this question cannot be properly answered. It can, however, provide a thorough description of the early stages of the process and therefore contribute to further research in this field; which could continuously monitor the process and provide more accurate “measurements”. This essay argues that the new accession countries are suffering from rapid changes due to the aforementioned “external shock”, which

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3 The (Montenegrin) Council for European integration was founded in April 2004 and its head is the President President of Montenegro. Its members include the President of the Government; the President of Parliament; the Vice-president of the Government for European integration; the Rector of the State University, President of the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, President of Constitutional Court and the President of the Supreme Court. One seat that is intended for an opposition party representative has still not been occupied.
makes them change and adapt rapidly. This would be especially true if, as in the case of Montenegro, the role of the European Union was extremely strong in one phase of a new EU member state’s development and provided a base for firm consensus among political parties about integration.

At the beginning the article will provide brief a description of the party system in Montenegro, with a brief chronology of the main developments on the political scene since the multi-party system was reintroduced after the break up of Yugoslavia. Then, it will seek to explore the consensus on European integration, which exists in Montenegro among political parties and citizens, from three angles: its rationalization, manifestations and effects. In terms of rationalization, the article will look into the roots of EU rhetoric in the party scene in Montenegro and try to localize the main points of development, events that put the issue at the top of the political agenda, as well as events that accelerated this process. In this regard, the role of the EU in the main political events in Montenegrin society, including the recent referendum, will be explored. In the second part, the article will try to identify and present all manifestations of a positive attitude to the EU in the work of political parties, specific party decisions, party rhetoric, manifestos and policies, etc. This part of the article will also focus on effects of the presence of the EU in Montenegrin politics and the impact of its work, as well as internal changes in political parties as a result of greater integration into EU politics in terms of policy and structural changes. The third part of the article will look into the effects of this process and will try to measure the achieved effects of such attitudes in society and the party system. The main types of data to be used will be the results of the relevant public opinion polls, party manifestos and public statements of the representatives of political parties in Montenegro.

Overview of development of post-communist party pluralism in Montenegro – Two Montenegrin transitions and one dominant party

The Montenegrin post-communist transition after the break-up of Yugoslavia comprised two basic phases. The beginning of the first was the “anti-bureaucracy revolution”\(^4\), which started in January 1989. During this “revolution” the former communist governing élite was deprived of power. A curious feature of the first Montenegrin transition was the fact that the main clash happened inside the governing Communist Party élite, and the main goal was not to change the system but the leadership structure. The leaders of the revolution were all members of The Alliance of Communists of Montenegro and held high positions. Srdan Darmanović (2007: 84) describes first Montenegrin transition in his article *Long transition in Montenegro – from Semi-competitive Elections to Electoral Democracy* as comparable to Romania, because a new political élite emerged from the old system, from the previous centre

\(^4\) Popularly called the “Anti-bureaucracy revolution” revolution, this change of the ruling élite within the governing Alliance of Communists of Montenegro took place in January 1989 as a result of a number of riots caused by the economic and political crisis in the country.
of power. Thus, the Democratic Party of Socialists was created from the former Alliance of Communists of Montenegro and continued to dominate the political scene in Montenegro for at least the first 16 years of party pluralism.

After the “Anti-bureaucratic Revolution” Montenegro entered a period that Darmanović describes as a hybrid semi-authoritarian régime, led by one overwhelming authoritarian party – the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its “oligarchic ruling élite” (Darmanović, 2007: 85). Since then voters in Montenegro have had an opportunity to choose their representatives eight times, and on all eight occasions they chose this party or its representatives.

In this period free and fair elections were held, but the opposition never had a real opportunity to win. Thanks to its monopoly position, and moreover the fact that it was created as a “state party”, the DPS won all the elections, leaving the opposition helpless. There is no doubt that this party was winning the elections based on the will of the voters. However, this desire was a significant product of the DPS’s monopoly position, which was inherited from the ex-Communist party from which it emerged, acquiring mechanisms for controlling various aspects of the state system.

The second Montenegrin transition started in a very similar way to the first: through conflict inside the ruling élite. This happened not long after the parliamentary elections in 1996, when the DPS gained a significant victory again thanks to gerrymandering, among other things. The main opponent of the DPS was the united opposition led by the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, a party which strongly supported the independence of Montenegro, and the People’s Party, which supported union with Serbia. This unusual coalition was formed with the main aim of winning elections and taking power from the existing ruling party. It undertook to put aside all other differences until this goal was achieved.

Although this coalition represented one of the most important steps forward in creating a more tolerant society and an attempt to at least temporarily eliminate polarization in society concerning state and national issues, success was not achieved. Thanks to a sudden “reform” of electoral constituencies (one of the good examples of gerrymandering) just before the elections, as well as other mechanisms that were at the disposal of the DPS, this party once again managed to preserve power (the DPS won 51.2 percent of votes, or/and 45 out of 71 seats in parliament).

At that moment a relatively unexpected conflict emerged inside the ruling party, which split it into two almost equal parts. It surfaced within the highest oligarchic élite, and the DPS was divided into two new parties: the DPS, which had an anti-Milošević programme and was led by Milo Đukanović, who was prime minister at the time; and the Social People’s Party, which became a strong supporter of Milošević’s politics in Montenegro and was led by Momir Bulatović, who was until then President of the Republic.

This conflict was followed by presidential elections, which were extremely important not because of the amount of power accumulated in the hands of the president of the republic (although elected by the people, the president had only ceremonial
powers and the real centre of power was the Government), but because of their strong symbolic meaning. For the first time the pro- and anti-Milošević camps clashed, with both having almost equal chances of victory. One thing should be emphasized here: the split of the ruling party was not a consequence of any ideological differences, but a direct consequence between the struggle for power and influence within the ruling party, and ideological differences were the field in which both sides would seek to establish their legitimacy. This “theme” would be repeated often in contemporary Montenegrin political history.

Assessing that their chances win this time were not so good, the DPS concluded the Agreement on the Basic of Principles for Development of the Democratic Infrastructure in Montenegro with the opposition parties, and this document enabled basic guarantees for free and fair elections, which were to be held from then on. In return, the opposition supported the DPS candidate Milo Đukanović, who won the elections, and therefore the SNP officially became the opposition.

The second political transition in Montenegro is considered to have ended after the fall of Milošević in October 2000 (Darmanović, 2007: 87). From that moment until the referendum in May 2006, the two main “blocs” changed their field of clashed, although not the subjects and characteristics: instead of being for and against Milošević, they became for independence and for the union with Serbia.

### Basic characteristics of party system in Montenegro from 1990 until 2007

It is generally acknowledged that the number of registered parties, and even the number of parties that actually have seats in parliament is not enough to accurately describe the type of party system in one state. Many scientists tried to find more precise ways to calculate an index that would make the data comparable. Here we chose to use two that can, in our opinion, quite accurately describe party system in Montenegro – the index developed by Markku Laakso and Taagepera Rein and the classification devised by Jean Blondel (Source: Liphart, 2003: 119).

#### Table 1: Development of party system in Montenegro – Calculation of effective number of parties after elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year of elections</th>
<th>Number of parties that won mandates</th>
<th>Effective number of parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1990.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1992.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1996.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1998.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2001.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>2002.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>2006.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Classification of party systems based on numbers and relative size of political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party system</th>
<th>Hypothetical example of seat distribution</th>
<th>Effective number of political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two party system</td>
<td>55-45</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two and half party system</td>
<td>45-40-15</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty system with dominant party</td>
<td>45-20-15-10-10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty system without dominant party</td>
<td>25-25-25-15-10</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Liphart, 2003: 118

The first table shows how many parties entered the Montenegrin Parliament after each election, and column 4 shows the effective number of parties in specific terms. As can be seen, the total number of political parties varied from 11 at the beginning to four (the lowest number in 1992), and the latest number is 16. The latest figures show a fragmentation tendency in the Montenegrin Parliament, as can also be shown by the index of the effective number of political parties.

At the very beginning of the multi-party system, in Montenegro in the early 1990s, many political parties entered parliament. This was the case partly because of a very large coalition inside the Alliance of Reform Strengths of Yugoslavia, which comprised six parties, and the Democratic Coalition, which comprised three. The trend of building coalitions was more marked in the period after 1998 and reached its peak after the parliamentary elections in 2007, when 16 parties won seats in parliament through nine party lists.

After the parliamentary elections in 2006 there were 16 parties represented in the Montenegrin Parliament. According to a calculation based on Laakso and Taagepera’s index, the effective number of political parties in Montenegro would be 4.8. The table shows that while number of political parties had fluctuated somewhat, their effective number continued to grow. However, the period until 2002 can be regarded without doubt as a multi-party system with a dominant party, according to Blondel’s typology. The description provided by Andrew Heywood (2004: 490) of the main characteristics of a multi-party system with a dominant party through five main characteristics fits Montenegro quite well: 1) the urge to shift political attention from competition between parties into conflicts between factions within a dominant party; 2) internal struggles as a way of enabling discussion inside the system in which small parties are usually marginalized; 3) a long period of holding power which causes self-satisfaction, arrogance and corruption inside the dominant party; 4) weak and inefficient opposition; and 5) the weakening of a democratic spirit, which frightens voters away from any change and makes them stick to the ”naturally“ governing party.

The 2006 parliamentary elections brought change in the sense that the number of effective political parties increased to 4.8, which, apart from indicating fragmentation,
indicates a slight weakening of the dominant party, which can also be tracked by some qualitative indicators such as the blocking of some DPS decisions by the other coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was almost unimaginable before.

There is another point to be made – the engine that drove all the changes until 2006 was in fact conflicts within the dominant party, which polarized society concerning two basic topics (one can argue that it is the same topic with two variations): 1) support for the régime of Slobodan Milosević (until 2000); and; 2) support for an independent Montenegro (from 2000 until 2006).

The opposition tried to unite in order to change the government but was not successful because it was weak and divided. An additional reason was the fact that voters were for more than a decade “blackmailed” by major issues that “only the main parties could solve”. There were, however, two interesting brief moments in the opposition’s strategy, when it managed to moved beyond the issues on the agenda set by the ruling party. The first was already described – formation of the coalition People’s Agreement (Narodna sloga) which united pro-independents and pro-unionists with one goal – to change the government and put the DPS out of power. This pattern was repeated again when the Movement for Changes avoided giving its opinion publicly on whether Montenegro should be independent; therefore giving it space to form a broad front in order to change the government after this issue was resolved by the referendum.

Once the country’s status was decided by the referendum, Montenegrin voters were “liberated” from major issues, creating space for more realistic political debate, which included questions related to social and economic development. European integration also appeared on the political agenda; however, the question remained whether the public discourse about this issue among political parties could be called a debate at all.

Europeanization of the party system in Montenegro – Is there truly a consensus on integration?

Democratization and Europeanization are strongly connected processes in Montenegro. In its current position, the European Union served and serves even now as a very effective “carrot” for all political subjects in the country. The urge for integration into the EU was very strong, before independence was gained, and there was and is a silent “consensus” among all political parties about this goal, although this was not the case in the 1990s.

Polarization is one of the basic characteristics of Montenegrin society in almost every aspect. The strong divisions that appeared in the 1990s, which implied different

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5 The Movement for Changes (Pokret za promjene) was established in 2005 from a non-governmental organization called Group for Changes, which worked with the goal of changing the dominant state status debate with social and economic related issues.
attitudes related to the war, became apparent in other subjects and issues that were being debated in that period. The question of war in the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia divided the public and political activists on the issue of cooperation between Montenegro and the European Union. For a long time the EU, together with other western countries, was an issue that did not enjoy good reputation among a clear majority of the political parties until 1997.

At the same time as the Democratic Party of Socialists was breaking up (1997) and the Socialist People’s Party was being established, the process of formulating an official change of stance towards European values and EU politics began. The biggest challenge for certain political parties’ relationships with the EU was the period during the bombing of former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO. The bloc of parties that supported Milošević’s political stance towards the other republics of the former Yugoslavia significantly reorganized its politics. Although on the side of Milošević’s government (Serbian People’s Party and Socialists People’s Party), their stance should have had suggested confrontation with the EU; instead, these parties argued for European integration.

The change of régime in Belgrade in 2000 changed attitudes of sections of political parties in Montenegro towards this question but also many other issues as well. Certain sectors of opposition parties with a pro-Serbian orientation changed their attitude towards the international community and looked for an ally in finding a solution for the state status of Montenegro. The section of the international community opposed to Montenegrin independence at that time supported unionist forces, which suddenly became proponents of European integration. The fight for the support of the international community in the Montenegrin referendum pushed the unionist opposition towards the European Union, which was an interesting shift. Defeat in the referendum and the search for a new political identity forced some of the parties to move from merely saying declaring they would adopt European values to actually doing so. Modifications to the opposition political scene, the formation of a new strong opposition (Movement for Changes) as well as strong positioning with the coming of a new leader of the Socialist People’s Party, once an associate of Milošević, according to the platform of European integration, made the political scene when considering the same pretty homogeneous.

Until the parliamentary elections in 2006, no political party in parliament declared itself against European integration in any way. The affirmation of these intentions was shown in the Declaration of the Parliament of Republic of Montenegro that was, based on the initiative of non-governmental organizations6 passed in parliament in 2005. At

6 The Declaration on Accession to the EU was adopted within the regular session of Montenegrin Parliament on 8 June 2005. The Text of the Declaration was made on the initiative of European Movement in Montenegro as well as some other NGOs in Montenegro (Centre for Citizen Education, Centre for the Development of NGOs, CEDEM, Group for Changes and The Monitoring Centre (CEMI).
that time, the declaration, which was supported by all parliamentary parties, showed
the readiness and resolution of parliament to do everything in its power to accelerate
the process of joining Euro-Atlantic integration.

Parliament in Montenegro became very fragmented after the 2006 parliamentary
elections; 16 parties entered it, and nine of them had only one representative, and we
could argue that the support of some of the new parties in parliament for Euro-Atlantic
integration is, at the very least, debatable. For example, through the pre-electoral coali-
tion named Serbian List, led by the Serbian People’s Party, two parties that had and
are presumed to still have negative attitudes towards the EU entered parliament. The
Serbian Radical Party of “Vojislav Seselj”, which is part of the Serbian Radical Party
in Serbia, firmly opposes ideas of European integration, and argues for the concept of
a single Serbian state in the Balkans. Other members of this coalition: the Serbian Peo-
ple’s Party; the Democratic Party of Unity; and the People’s Socialist Party, have very
similar attitudes. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the Serbian People’s
Party, as the strongest party in this coalition, has declared that it supports the successful
finalization of the process of Montenegrin accession to the European Union, which is
in a way proved by the programme it adopted after the establishment of Montenegrin
independence.

The Declaration of independence and first elections results in the independent
country raised the question of distinction between the European and Euro-Atlantic
integration. The Liberal party, which followed the former and through its own deci-
sion disbanded Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, supported European, but was against
NATO integration. One can also emphasize the fact that all five larger parties support
European integration, and just a few parties with one representative all publicly or
off the record opposed this process. If under the consensus we consider the support
of the majority, which in this case could amount to over 90 percent of Montenegrin
MPs, than we can conclude that there is a consensus in Montenegro. To what extent
it corresponds to the true acceptance of values, and to what extent is motivated by
political pragmatism in order to increase voter support is a separate question which
will be considered in the section concerning the manifestations of consensus.

Rationalization of EU rhetoric

Now that we have determined that there is a basic consensus among the political
parties about the inevitability of European integration, we will look more closely at
the reasons behind this consensus in Montenegro. They can be divided into two main
groups: 1) “common” reasons that are likely to be found in all countries joining the EU
and: 2) reasons that are more specific for the Montenegrin context. Common reasons
could include: 1) a generally high support among the population for EU integration;
2) a process of integration that included all countries in the neighbourhood; and 3) the
lack of information that citizens and political parties have about the level of change
that is expected in different structures of society. Reasons that are more specific to Montenegro include the context in which it gained its independence and in which the European Union, being a key important subject, became willingly and unwillingly a place where all political parties found common ground.

**Popular support for European integration as a reason for “consensus”**

The third common subject which was used in the campaigns of all political parties (the first would be state status and the second related to the social and economical status of the country) was EU integration. All political parties in Montenegro supported the integration process in some form. However, in the pre-referendum period pro-independence parties believed that Montenegro could faster integrate as it was independent, and pro-union parties believed that the process would be faster with Serbia. This was how the same goal was “used” in political debate, especially before the referendum, as a crucial argument for attracting voters on both sides. This campaign was again deployed during the 2006 parliamentary elections. Each political party argued that it offered a more secure and faster road to the EU. Therefore voters were offered basically the same goal – integration into the EU, and the only difference was that the roads leading to integration differed according to each of the political parties, as seen in their campaigns and although this is debatable. This contributed to the public support for the process and vice versa overwhelming public support generated through campaign encouraged and strengthened the consensus among political parties to be in favour of the process. This was a very good tactic regarding public opinion that exists in Montenegro about this issue. The 2006 and 2007 public opinion researches showed exact figures (CEDEM7).

**Table 3: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 and 2007 conducted by CEDEM on question whether Montenegro should enter EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whether Montenegro should join EU?</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76,5 %</td>
<td>74 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5,6 %</td>
<td>8,4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know</td>
<td>17,9 %</td>
<td>17,6 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007*

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7 The Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) is a Montenegrin non-governmental organization which periodically conducts public opinion research in the field of politics. It has enjoyed success in its work.
Table 4: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 cross tabulated with information about party affiliation conducted by CEDEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party affiliation</th>
<th>DPS-SDP</th>
<th>Liberal and Bosniaks party</th>
<th>Movement for changes</th>
<th>SNP-NS-DSS</th>
<th>Serbian list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relation towards</td>
<td>Pro-independent</td>
<td>Pro-independent</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Pro-unionist</td>
<td>Pro-unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>92.4 %</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1.8 %</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know</td>
<td>5.9 %</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007

From the acquired data, we can see that one of the reasons that political parties support European integration can be found in the fact that a clear majority of people in Montenegro support it. From the information gathered in 2006, which is cross-tabulated with information about party affiliation of voters, one can see that in the period before the referendum supporters of all political parties, regardless party of position on the issue of independence were in majority in favour of integration. This majority was larger when it comes to pro-independence voters. These figures slightly changed in 2007, and the number of people against integration increased. This trend is partly to be expected to continue, as in integration progresses. However, importantly, most people still support integration. There are several reasons for this, one of them being the desire to belong to modern and wealthy societies, and this is very often believed to be synonymous with EU membership.

The other reason could be the low level of understanding among people about what integration actually entails. We can offer one argument supporting this theory. It is related to the question of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (see Tables 5 and 6). Opinion polls conducted by CEDEM showed that a significant percentage of people do not understand that cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is one of the preconditions for European integration.

Table 5: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 and 2007 conducted by CEDEM on question whether Montenegro should cooperate with The Hague Tribune

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whether there should be cooperation with The Hague Tribune?</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>45.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>27.4 %</td>
<td>32.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know</td>
<td>21.7 %</td>
<td>22.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007
Table 6: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 cross tabulated with information about party affiliation conducted by CEDEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party affiliation</th>
<th>DPS-SDP</th>
<th>Liberal and Bosnians party</th>
<th>Movement for changes</th>
<th>SNP-NS-DSS</th>
<th>Serbian list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relation towards independence issue</td>
<td>Pro-independent</td>
<td>Pro-independent</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Pro-unionist</td>
<td>Pro-unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78.7 %</td>
<td>83.7 %</td>
<td>42.3 %</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.7 %</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
<td>27.6 %</td>
<td>66 %</td>
<td>72 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know</td>
<td>16.6 %</td>
<td>6.1 %</td>
<td>30.1 %</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>16.5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007

Table 7: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 and 2007 conducted by CEDEM on question whether Montenegro should cooperate with The Hague Tribune

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whether Montenegro should join NATO (CEDEM, 2007)?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>34.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know</td>
<td>28.8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from these figures. First of all, there is a lack of information and understanding of the integration processes among citizens, who do not understand that this issue is strongly connected to the integration process. Also, it is evident that this is the area in which politicians start to differentiate their policies. An example of this could be the referendum campaign, when pro-union parties used two arguments, which were in fact contradictory. On one side they supported EU integration and on the other they sought to mobilize voters through a campaign against supporting the Hague Tribunal. This strategy in fact worked quite well. In addition, as could be seen before, some political parties do not support accession to NATO. This could be also explained by the fact that the percentage of people supporting NATO integration is significantly lower than those supporting EU integration. Some political parties are searching for their identity in this field (see Table 7).

The role of EU in organization of Referendum as a reason for “consensus”

The union of Montenegro and Serbia was established in 2002 by the “Belgrade Agreement” after which the Constitutional Treaty was signed. Article 60 of the Treaty
contained a provision that three years after signing The Belgrade Agreement member states can call for a referendum and reach a decision about their state status. In 2005 the Agreement on the Amendment to the Treaty was signed, introducing a provision that a referendum should be held according to democratically recognized international standards which are in line with European Union. This provision opened the doors wide for EU intervention. This intervention, from today’s perspective, was very important and had an important role in the peaceful resolution of the Montenegrin state problem. However, that does not make it uncontroversial.

The European Union, through the Council of Europe and The Venice Commission and negotiation process, set the rules for the referendum. What was at the beginning perceived as impossible actually happened. In the end, all the political parties except the Serbian National Party agreed to participate in the referendum, according to all the rules, which were partly set before the “game began”. They included some strange criteria, such as a 55-percent majority, a Slovak citizen appointed as the Head of the Republic Referendum Commission – a figure who had very important powers, etc. There was a true consensus because no party had all its demands met and therefore nobody was completely satisfied, although they all agreed upon the rules at the end. There can be two main explanations of how political parties that refused to communicate at the beginning of the negotiation process agreed to these imposed rules. One was external and included strong pressure hinted at by EU bodies, and the second was internal and related to the perceived chances to win (for the first time, both sides actually had the chance to win; in fact pro-union bloc at the end lacked only 2000 votes for victory) which were priority to formal rules for political parties. In this sense they agreed to accept certain strange rules implied by EU in order to achieve their final goal – victory. Although the formal side of the process ended up the strongest legitimization pillar, at the beginning it was almost neglected from the side of political parties.

Although at the time perceived as dangerous tactic (what would had happened if the result was in a “grey zone?”), EU on behalf of international community was the factor that enabled swift movement forward for Montenegro by resolving one of the most important issues – state status. As a result, Montenegro became the unique example of a country resolving, through a peaceful ballot, such an important issue that divided society into two. From this perspective, the role of the European Union was crucial, and it brought the political parties in Montenegro closer to the process of Europeanization.

8 One of the powers was the “golden vote”. Referendum commissions on all levels, including the Republic Referendum Commission, consisted of an equal number of members from both sides, and if the decision-making process was blocked decisions would be take at a higher level. The highest level was the Republic Referendum Commission, which was made up of eight members from each block. The Head of the Commission had a “golden vote” to actually decide if voting is blocked.

9 The expression “grey zone” was used for description of possible result between 51 and 55 percent of people voting for independence, in which a very strange situation would occur: the pro-independence movement would win a majority of votes and yet lose the referendum. It was perceived that such a situation in which winners would be losers would lead to possible civil unrest and deepen conflict instead of being a solution.
Manifestations of consensus

In our attempt to identify different signs of party consensus related to EU integration we will look only at the parties that had more than two members in parliament after the 2006 elections. This means that we will consider the two governmental parties – the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) and three opposition parties: the Movement for changes (PZP), Serbian National Party (SNS) and the Social National Party (SNP).

The first positive results appeared from the efforts made by the political parties that supported Milošević in the past. They started to change as a result of Euro-integration; the best example would be the SNP. After failing to win in the referendum and a number of elections, this party started seeking a new political identity in the promotion of European values. Although at the beginning there was an impression that this stance was merely rhetoric, after the election of the new leader, the actions of the SNP became more and more trustworthy. The new leader was someone who had been in the past in charge of EU related issues in this party. A significant movement forward was made also in the educating the SNP’s members, who traditionally had a negative attitude towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

The second party in the unionist bloc, the SNS, which after referendum became the strongest Serbian party in Montenegro, did not move towards European issues. Although formally supporting European integration, as it claimed in its programme, its strong coalition relationship with Serbian radical parties and a number of controversial extremist attitudes so not speak in favour of any substantial change. In its programme the SNS states also that it is in favour of Euro-Atlantic integration if there is a general popular consensus on it. If not, a referendum should be called. It is interesting that in its programme the SNS states that it sees itself in future as a part of the European conservative family of parties, especially the European People’s Party.

The Movement for Changes dedicated part of its programme to European integration, although this party is strongly pro-European. The NGO (Group for Changes) from which this party emerged was one of the authors of Pro-European declaration of NGOs, which was adopted by the Montenegrin Parliament in 2005. The Programme of the Movement for Changes includes clear statements about its goal – integration to EU and draft of the strategy for European integration of Montenegro.

The leading coalition (DPS-SDP), in its own programmes as well as a number of other statements, supports European integration and says there is no alternative. However, the comments of people close to the ruling coalition, who have a considerable amount of economic power and whose financial interests would be jeopardized in process of integration, started speaking in public against integration in a measured way. Because of their very strong influence on society and the ruling party these informal centres of power could in future put obstacles in the way of EU integration in Montenegro. Conflicting interests surrounding privatization, and lobbying for interests of owners of capital outside the EU, which are interfering in the ruling coalition could
also have an influence on future integration. The linkage between party politics and the grey economy is very strong in Montenegro, especially in the incumbent parties. In the above description of the its party system it was said that in fact there has been one party in power in Montenegro since the multi-party system was introduced. Its clear majority and time in power over time resulted in its involvement in corruption and enabled the creation very powerful centres of informal economic power which are now strongly influencing political processes.

The DPS clearly defines its goal – integration into the EU, without mentioning Euro-Atlantic integration specifically. In its programme the SDP states it believes that it is strategically important for Montenegro to be included in European integration processes and other integration important to for the country’s development. Also, the SDP argues for Montenegro’s inclusion in European and Euro-Atlantic military structures.

The poor staffing of political parties as well as a high level of non-professionalism in dealing with many issues, as well as integration, are characteristic of the Montenegrin party system. Apart from a few examples, parties are not making significant efforts in the field of EU integration. The poor work inside parties can also be described by the fact that only one political party changed its programme after independence. EU integration is not even mentioned in several political parties’ programmes, although it is present in their rhetoric.

The consensus between political parties about the Montenegrin goal of joining the EU does not mean that there are palpable elements of Europeanization of the party system in Montenegro yet. Most programmes of the political parties include a mention of the EU or Europe in different contexts, mostly as a vision or goal that should be realized.

In addition are no changes in the internal structure and organization of the political parties in Montenegro, which can be described as overwhelmingly oligarchic. In 2003 a new law on political parties was passed, and one of its provisions introduced obligatory elements of each party internal acts. A number of political parties that made any changes to their programmes can be neglected. Parties still strongly oppose women quotas in Parliament or free mandate for example which are all changes they will have to accept once the EU accession process accelerates. Two parties – SDP and PZP have introduced gender sensitive language in their internal acts. Not one political party has set up special bodies working only on EU issues.

As for acting supranational, Montenegro has so far had delegations in Parliamentary Assemblies of Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly. These delegations are being chosen by a special Committee gathered around the President of the Parliament. According to the electoral results, standing members of the delegations include two members from Government (DPS and SDP) and one member of opposition, who is appointed by the opposition. These are the first steps towards participation in decision making at supranational level, and we cannot still see any significant shift of power in the members’ direction; moreover, the parties choose very important and high positioned members and because their power within Parliamentary Assemblies is low.
Table 8: Areas of political party Europeanization in Montenegro according to Mair (2000) and Ladrech (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS OF POLITICAL PARTY EUROPEANISATION</th>
<th>Research findings in Montenegro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy/programmatic content</td>
<td>Very modest modification of programs can be observed. Traces of program support are clearly defined in Declaration about European integrations which was adopted in Montenegrin Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>No changes can be observed in this field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National party system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Marginal impact at the moment. One can expect that little political parties might look for legitimacy into radicalisation of EU and NATO accession in future and therefore form stronger front against it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of party competition / mechanics of interactions between parties</td>
<td>Topics related to EU integrations are only partly subject of true debate. This is the case only with NATO accession, which is indirectly connected to EU accession. Debate is superficial and mostly includes criticizing government of being too slow. As said before, little parties might seek for legitimacy in euro sceptic field in the future. At the moment this is only case with NATO accession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-government relations</td>
<td>Until recently there was no constructive relation considering European, as well as any other questions, between the Government and the opposition. The situation is slowly changing within the field of European integrations, after constructive positioning of two leading opposition parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations beyond the national party system</td>
<td>Currently, the scene is witnessing the increase of the number of contacts with factors outside Montenegro related to this question. Although not numerous the existence of contacts with parties outside Montenegro is noticeable as well as cooperation expanding related to this question.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: a synthesised view presented at Slovenian Political Science Conference and Central European Political Science Association in Portoroz, Slovenia, may 2007
Concluding remarks

No Eurosceptic party has been established in Montenegro yet among parties with strong voter support, and all parties have declared themselves to be pro-European Union. There is, however, a difference among political parties when talking about accession to NATO. Most political parties support joining NATO, however, one is strongly against this kind of decision – the Liberal Party. Certain sections of the Serbian nationalist parties are also sceptical about NATO integration, but are not publicly against it. The People’s Party, one of the Serbian parties, has slowly become an opponent of NATO integration. It could be expected that fragmentation of the Parliament would influence radicalization of part of the political parties in their quest for identity. This could lead to the establishment of true Eurosceptic parties. In this article we analysed only political parties with more than one MP, however there are other nine parties with one MP which might take a negative attitude towards security and European integration. Some of them could become significantly stronger at the next elections, and this could especially be the case with the Serbian Radical Party which in 1992 had 9.4 percent representation in Parliament and whose central headquarters – the Serbian Radical Party in Serbia is having significant successes. Apart from getting stronger, this party might strongly influence the SNS, leader of the Serbian list and this could cause shift of this strong party regarding EU and Atlantic integration.

The work of the small parties might sow seeds of Euroscepticism in Montenegro, since there are grounds for it in the light of the strong empathy of a part of the population with Kosovo. This issue may again become topical in the near future, bombing of Serbia and which can once again awake negative relation towards western values and integration.

A significant part of the population supported the EU because the EU supported the union with Serbia. Now that the issue is off the agenda, their support might decrease. The other danger comes from some strong and influential informal economic centres of power close to ruling party, which are announcing their disagreement with fast integration to EU in order to protect their existing financial monopolies.

Apart of the above stated, a significant number of political subjects believe that accession to EU will not happen in the near future so that they are not putting any effort into better informing themselves about this process. Thus, their statements about this issue are more a signal of political inertia than a manifestation of concrete interest.

If the results of CEDEM’s research before the referenda in 2006 and 2007 are compared, a slight trend of decrease in support for Montenegro’s membership of the EU can be seen. Support fell from 76.5 percent to 74 percent, and the number of those opponents increased from 5.6 percent to 8.4 percent, while the number of those with no opinion on the matter remained more or less unchanged, at 17.9 percent in 2006 and 17.6 percent in 2007. It could be expected that this trend will continue but that it will not jeopardize the accession process. As Montenegro approaches accession, the level
of information among citizens will increase and this will affect party rhetoric, which will continue to adjust to public attitudes in the quest for voter support. This will be the most visible in the opposition parties.

The process of stronger Europeanization of the political parties’ system could become stronger once Montenegro becomes a candidate country. When this happens it will be able to send a delegation to European Parliament with observer status, and this possibility might open the door to stronger influence of European party system on Montenegrin parties. The expected consequences are as follows: 1) more clear ideological profiles; 2) ideologically close parties working together more closely; 3) better understanding of work of European institutions; 4) improvement of the work of party administrations; 5) improvement of the work of members of parliament and their clubs in parliaments; and 6) connecting and receiving support for improving party resources from partners outside Montenegro.

The integration of political parties at the European level would more strongly affect the Europeanization of the Montenegrin party system. Moreover, in this regard, we must not neglect the possible influence of Eurosceptic MPs from the European Parliament.

As a final conclusion one can expect clearer positioning of political parties regarding the question of European integration, which will be accelerated in the future, when Montenegro gains EU membership status. This will be followed with better information, closer contacts and an understanding of what membership of the EU really means. This might in the future more strongly influence their internal structures.

Such a process might also lead to a clearer definition of supporters and opponents of European integration between political parties and might also reflect in general Montenegrin public and these two processes might mutually affect each other. One could expect that this might weaken support for integration in time in relation to current statistics; however this might not jeopardize the process in general.

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Manifest of Movement for Changes
Manifest of Serbian People’s Party
Manifest of Social Democratic Party
Standing orders of Montenegrin Parliament
Statute of the Democratic Party of Socialists
Statute of the Movement for Changes
Statute of the Serbian People’s Party
Statute of the Social Democratic Party
Statute of the Socialist People’s Party

Abbreviations:
DPS – Demokratska partija socijalista – Democratic Party of Socialists
PzP – Pokret za promjene – Movement for Changes
SDP – Socijaldemokratska partija – Social Democratic Party
SNP – Socijališta narodna partija – Socialist People’s Party
SNS – Srpska narodna stranka – Serbian People’s Party
Europeanism of National Political Parties and Party System: Case Study of Montenegro

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Post-Yugoslav Region between Democratisation and Europeanisation of Party Politics: Experiences from Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Damjan Lajh and Alenka Krašovec

Abstract: The main aim of this article is to discuss the potential interlocking of democratisation and Europeanization processes in party politics in Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two “extremes” in former Yugoslavia. While Slovenia has already gained full membership of the EU and has experienced the Europeanization processes in various aspects of the political system and public policies, Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the status of “potential candidate state for EU accession”, is still facing deep challenges related to the processes of Europeanization. While Slovenia has already gone through the five steps of Europeanization processes, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still stuck at the first step. Although at the very first stage Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the Slovenian pattern of Europeanization of party politics that includes establishing incremental formal links between national political parties and European party federations, further Europeanization processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina above all demand a democratically consolidated party arena, that for political parties would not lead to pressure to adapt themselves in order to mobilize their voters along ethnic lines. All in all, the conducted analysis revealed the two investigated countries are very different for making direct comparisons; nonetheless there was a common Yugoslav tradition in the past. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a unique European state, due to its mixed ethnic structure and strong ethnic cleavages, and thus we cannot expect a Slovenian and consequently a Central and Eastern European pattern of Europeanization processes, in Bosnian party politics.

Key words: democratisation; Europeanization; party politics; Slovenia; Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction

Europeanization, as one of the “sexiest” terms in the field of political science in the last decade or two, is generally closely connected with terms such as “innovation”, “modernization” or “formation”, and is thus mostly used in different ways to describe a variety of phenomena and processes of change. Therefore it is not surprising that the investigation of Europeanization processes is also becoming ever more attractive in former Yugoslavia, which has certain peculiarities in terms of its history, and how the European Union (EU) views the former country. It is also facing particular issues in its relationship with the EU.
In all of the former Yugoslav republics, although under different conditions, the democratic transition started at the beginning of the 1990s, when all the republics adopted new constitutions and conducted their first democratic and free elections. With the exception of Slovenia, in all the other former republics the democratic transition was more or less heavily blocked at the beginning. There are plenty of reasons for this, above all (in)direct involvement in a war, strong ethnic cleavages, and socio-economic determinants. The Yugoslav state was very diverse in the past, and the region of former Yugoslavia remains so, both politically and socio-economically. As a result, Slovenia was the only one of the former Yugoslav republics to join the EU on 1 May 2004, and experience the Europeanization processes in different aspect of the political system and in public policy; whereas all the other former Yugoslav republics faced delays in democratic transition. They fought for democratic survival rather than confronting the challenges of becoming part of European integration processes. In general, this delay in the democratization processes consequently had a negative influence on the development of market economies (one of the conditions of full EU membership is that markets should be capable of survive the openness and competitiveness of the EU single market). Moreover, the other Yugoslav republics have also had to meet additional criteria in the process of EU accession. Above all, these criteria include cooperation with the International Court of Justice in The Hague, especially in the countries that were heavily and directly involved in the Civil War: Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.

One of the main preconditions of a functioning democratic political system is the existence of a party system, which articulates different interests and offers (political) choice in the government-opposition relationship. Accordingly, democratic political systems need political parties to re-establish the link between politicians and the electorate, and to ensure the government’s political responsibility (Abromeit, 1998: 33-4). As such, political parties certainly have a crucial role in processes of modernization, i.e. the processes of democratization and Europeanization. On the one hand, political parties have been the key players in establishing new independent states, following the disintegration of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The parties had the position of key constitutional and institutional political engineers. On the other hand, a closer inspection shows us that party organizations take centre stage in the case of EU politics too (Hix, 1999: 168). The majority of politicians in the EU are party politicians, including those in the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. As the main actors in election campaigns, political parties are the key actors in domestic elections and in elections to the European Parliament, while as the main actors connecting governments to parliaments and parliaments to voters, they are central to the relations between the EU institutions and between the national and EU levels (ibid.).

In the light of these considerations, the main aim of the article is to discuss potential interlacement of democratization and Europeanization processes of party politics in...
Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two “extremes”\(^1\) in former Yugoslavia. In last fifteen years both countries have been subjected to different modernization processes. While Slovenia has already obtained full membership in the EU and has experienced the Europeanization processes in various domains of political system and public policies, Bosnia-Herzegovina with the status of “potential candidate state for EU accession” is still up to challenges, related to processes of Europeanization. Due to large differences in many aspects of political, social and economic life, even taking into account the common Yugoslav state of the past, our main research thesis is that we cannot expect the Slovenian pattern of Europeanization processes in party politics to be applied equally in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (at least not in a very short period).

The article is based on an analysis of formal documents, and interviews conducted with responsible persons in selected political parties in Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Slovenia interviews were conducted by the authors in the period from April to June 2004 in Ljubljana. Interviews were held with the secretaries for international cooperation or the general secretaries of the five analysed parties: New Slovenia; Liberal Democracy of Slovenia; the Slovenian Democratic Party; the United List of Social Democrats; and the Youth Party of Slovenia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina interviews were conducted by the authors in the period from September to November 2005 in Sarajevo. Interviews were held with senior officials or deputies of the House of Representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the five analysed parties: the Party of Democratic Action; the Croatian Democratic Community; the Serbian Democratic Party; the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This article is structured as follows: section two presents an outline of the research agenda for investigating Europeanization processes in the post-Yugoslav region. In section three Slovenian experiences with Europeanization processes in the field of party politics are elaborated. Section four discusses the potential development of Europeanization processes of party politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and identifies the main obstacles to the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the EU. Finally, section five synthesizes the main findings.

**Research agenda for investigating Europeanization processes (of party politics) in the post-Yugoslav region**

Until recently, within the framework of investigating the effects of Europeanization processes the role of political parties has largely been neglected. As a result, the EU has only recently begun to be acknowledged as an environment that has potentially

\(^1\) Of all the former Yugoslav republics Slovenia has had the most favourable economic, social and politico-cultural circumstances, whereas Bosnia-Herzegovina, frequently called “Yugoslavia in miniature”, has had the least favourable of these conditions, and at the same time it has been adversely affected by its heavily mixed ethnic structure.
significant consequences for the functioning of national parties. According to Panebianco (1988: 207), different environments (for example, the EU) directly influence parties, which are in turn structured by institutional constraints. These environments can be conceived as arenas in which relations between parties and other organizations take place. They are like gambling tables at which a party plays and obtains, based on its performance, the resources it needs to function. In some arenas the party exchanges resources with other organizations. This exchange can be mutual, in favour of the party or in favour of the other organization, whereas in other arenas the party competes with other organizations for resources (ibid.). In respect of European integration, national political parties connect and cooperate with European party federations. However, social scientists have only recently started to conceive both party arenas (EU and national) as interdependent and as a network of “relevant” environments. They have thus only gradually started to follow Panebianco’s (1988: 207) observations on how resources obtained in one arena have been spent in another, and how success at one gambling table – the exchange of resources in favourable conditions – has been affecting the extent of a party’s success at other tables.

The literature bringing together European integration and national political parties can generally be divided into three categories. The first explores attempts to recreate party activity outside the national political system, i.e. a focus on party groups in the European Parliament and the development of transnational party federations or European parties. This literature dates from the end of the 1970s, when the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held. The second approach focuses on the European policy orientation of individual political parties (Ladrech, 2002: 390). Finally, the third approach explores the impact of Europeanization processes on party systems (Mair, 2000; Ladrech, 2002) and national political parties (Ladrech, 2002).

In relation to the organization theory of political parties, there are particularly interesting research challenges here involving questions about (the extent of) influences (if there are any at all) of the EU level on national parties. The organization theory “expects” parties to adjust their organization and activities to the changes seen in political and social environments. For example, Panebianco (1988) identified two different aspects of the organization-environment relation: the effects of pressures and environmental changes on an organization; and the importance of its hunting ground, i.e. the part of the environment targeted by the organization’s ideology, which the

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2 According to Niedermayer (1983), we can talk about three stages of interaction within European party federations and also between them and national parties: contact, cooperation and integration.

3 What is important is that in neither of these two approaches national parties are viewed as actors in European integration or the European policy process, nor as actors affected by this process, apart from instances when the EU has itself become politicized in elections (Ladrech 2002: 390).

4 Five research dimensions concerning the possible impacts of Europeanization processes on national parties are important: changes in party programmes; internal organizational changes; changes in national party competition, changes in relations between the government and parties, and changes in relations between parties at the supranational level (i.e. outside the national party arena) (Ladrech 2002).
organization must control if it is to maintain its identity. According to Panebianco (1988: 204), the degree of adaptation to the environment depends on two factors:

1) environmental characteristics, since certain environments demand adaptation while others allow for manipulation; and

2) the level of institutionalization, since the more the institutionalization the less the party tends to passively adapt itself to the environment, and the more it is able to dominate it, and vice versa.

The degree of adaptation to the environment in the case of Europeanization processes depends on the “goodness-of-fit” between the European level arrangement and domestic structures: the lower the compatibility (fit) between the new requirements on the one hand, and national structures on the other hand, the higher the adaptational pressure (Risse – Cowles – Caporaso 2001: 6–7). Europeanization processes thus “require” that various national actors (for example political parties) take part in the internalization of the EU norms and the development of new identities. Satisfying these new requirements means changing actions, routines and even formal procedures (North, 1990), depending on the level of adaptational pressure. Due to different political arrangements in the EU, the result is a very diverse pattern of problem-solving approaches and styles of organization (Héritier, 1999) in EU member as well as accession states. Hence, this internalization (or adaptation) is not mechanical.

**Figure 1: Adaptation pressures as a consequence of Europenisation processes: narrow view**

The “goodness-of-fit”, however, does not tell the full story of Europeanization. For example, in some cases governments are under little adaptational pressure from EU regulations, whereas in some others adaptational pressure may not be the best predictor of how a country responds to Europeanization: a country can be under strong adaptational pressure but can implement EU policy without too many problems (Radaelli, 2003: 44–6). In addition, while taking into account EU accession states or candidate states, adaptation pressures on different domains of political system vary dramatically with respect to the level of institutional relations with the EU. In this context, Lippert,
Umbach and Wessels (2001) talk about five steps of Europeanization in the accession states. In the pre-phase of Europeanization, the first contacts between applicant states and the EU are re-established. In the first phase of Europeanization the European or Accession Agreement is signed, and this represents the backbone of (future) institutional relations. The second phase of Europeanization embraces the pre-accession period, which brings to the first elementary (authors’ note: this is usually incremental) institutional adaptations, especially towards efficient coordination of European affairs at the national level. The third phase of Europeanization includes the negotiation process, in which first either incremental or radical changes in individual policy fields occurs. Finally, the last phase of Europeanization embraces the period of full membership (ibid.: 985-1000).

**Figure 2: Five steps of Europeanisation in EU accession/candidate/potential candidate state**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pre-phase of Europeanisation processes</th>
<th>Europeanisation processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>first contacts between EU accession/candidate/potential/ member states and the EU</td>
<td>signature of Europe Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pre-accession period</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negotiating process</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full membership in the European union</td>
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Source: Adapted by Lippert et al. (200).

In the case of pre-phase of Europeanization and first phase of Europeanization, Ágh (2003: 117) discusses “anticipatory Europeanization”, which in the case of Central and Eastern European post-socialist states applies in the first half of the 1990s and was combined with processes of democratization and modernization under the supervision of various international organizations (not only the EU, but also for example the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund), as “institutional mentors”. From the second phase of Europeanization, according to Lippert, Umbach and Wessels (2001), Ágh talks about “adaptive Europeanization”.

As we already mentioned, Europeanization processes are closely linked to the processes of modernization. With respect to anticipatory Europeanization, and in accordance with Article 6 of the EU Treaty, principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law are the main preconditions of full EU membership. In this way, to become part of the EU the

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5 Similarly, Hix and Goetz (2001: 21) for example argue that the processes of Europeanization interlock with the processes of democratization, liberalization and privatization in the post-socialist countries.

6 Article 49 of the EU Treaty states: “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.

The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the Applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”
respective country has to fulfil the economic and political conditions known as the Copenhagen Criteria, according to which a candidate country should: a) be a stable democracy, respect human rights and the rule of law and protect minorities; b) have a working market economy; and c) adopt the common rules, standards and policies which make up the body of EU law (Jacobsen, 1997: 1).

Taking into consideration the post-Yugoslav region, only Slovenia followed the Central and Eastern European “natural” pattern and passed the test, according to Ágh, of both anticipatory and adaptational Europeanization. The other former Yugoslav republics only recently entered the phase of anticipatory Europeanization, while Croatia has started the adaptive Europeanization phase. However, at this point at least two additional important facts must be mentioned. Besides the aforementioned preconditions of not only full EU membership, but also for building up deeper institutional relations, practically all other former Yugoslav republics met additional criteria related to their accession to the EU. Among these criteria, cooperation with the International Court of Justice in The Hague is especially evident. Secondly, particularly in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU is not the only “institutional mentor”, as this role is still very much in the hands of the wider international community.

Following the above theoretical considerations, a research agenda for investigating Europeanization processes in the post-Yugoslav region is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Research agenda for investigating Europeanisation processes in post-Yugoslav region

In the next section we will present the Slovenian experiences of Europeanization processes in the field of party politics.

Slovenian experiences with the Europeanization processes in the field of party politics

The Slovenian experiences with Europeanization processes are summarized in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Critical junctures of the EU impacts to party politics in Slovenia
In the next section we will present the Slovenian experiences of Europeanization processes in the field of party politics.

**Slovenian experiences with the Europeanization processes in the field of party politics**

The Slovenian experiences with Europeanization processes are summarized in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4: Critical junctures of the EU impacts to party politics in Slovenia**

Legend:

*EFGP/EG* European Federation of Green Parties/European Greens  
*ELDR/ALDE* – European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party/Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe  
*EPP* – European People’s Party  
*LDS* – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia  
*NSi* – New Slovenia  
*PES* – Party of European Socialists  
*SDP* – Slovenian Democratic Party  
*SPP* – Slovenian People’s Party  
*ULSD* – United List of Social Democrats  
*YPS* – Youth Party of Slovenia

Post-yugoslav Region between Democratization and Europeanisation of Party Politics: Experiences from Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Damjan Lajh  
Alenka Krašovec
Slovenia had its first “touch” of the EU even before its independence. In addition to the establishment of independent statehood in 1991, it has also been pursuing integration into the West, expressed through full membership of the EU. In fact, “Europeanization has become a kind of substitute for the old ideology” (Fink-Hafner – Lajh, 2003), with EU membership becoming a strategic goal of Slovenian foreign policy even before its formal independence. In accordance with the Basis of Slovenian Foreign Policy, adopted in March 1991, EU membership was declared “an important step forward in the creation of a democratic, stable, strong, economically successful and well-organized country”. Moreover, the reformed former Slovenian League of Communists had adapted to civil society’s demands at the end of the 1980s to such a great extent that it chose the slogan “Europe Now!” for its party manifesto, prepared for the first free elections held in April 1990 (Fink-Hafner – Lajh, 2003: 74).

It is interesting that in their electoral programmes and presentation all (important) competing parties in the parliamentary elections in 1992 and in 1996 stressed the need for integration or cooperation with the EU and approaching European standards, and the EU was used as a reference point in several policy fields in the parties’ electoral programmes. This means that the EU (and Europe and European standards) was mentioned in a very broad, undefined sense (Krašovec – Lajh – Kustec Lipicer, 2006).

In the Slovenian case the period of anticipatory Europeanization in the field of party politics was generally characterized by a broad consensus among the political élite and all the relevant (parliamentary) parties regarding Slovenia’s accession to the EU. With the exception of the Slovenian National Party⁷, no other parliamentary party has publicly opposed this aim. Moreover, as early as 1997, almost all the parliamentary parties (again with the exception of the Slovenian National Party) and the representatives of the Hungarian and Italian minorities, despite their other differences and conflicts, decided to sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Accession Process with the EU. However, in this period public Euroscepticism slowly began to emerge to some extent. This was connected with negotiations on the European Agreement, especially when the issue of foreign ownership of real estate became a question in mid-1996 and 1997 (Fink Hafner – Lajh, 2003). Thus, some parties, especially the newly emerged New Party and the aforementioned Slovenian National Party, tried to take an advantage of the gap between the EU-supporting politics of practically all the parliamentary parties and growing negative public opinion when Slovenia’s accession to the EU was in question. Some minor efforts to mobilize electorate on this raised issue had already been made by both parties in 1996, but the question became more salient over the following years and especially in the parliamentary elections in 2000. However, these parties were not very successful because together they only attracted 5.0 percent of the total vote, (one party gained only 0.6 percent, while the other 4.4 percent). If we try

⁷ The Slovenian National Party won 3.2 percent of the votes in the 1996 parliamentary elections, 4.4 percent in those of 2000, 5.02 percent in the first elections to the European Parliament in 2004, and 6.3 percent in the 2004 parliamentary elections.
to find an explanation for their poor electoral result we can think about marginality of a question of EU accession to party, and particular to electoral competition (Krašovec – Lajh – Kustec Lipicer, 2006: 186).

When looking at the establishment and evolution of contact and cooperation between national parties and European party federations, we can identify only two parties in this period, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the United List of Social Democrats (now the Social Democrats), which have established contacts and cooperation with their European counterparts. In 1994 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia was granted associate member status in the European Liberal and Democrat and Reform Party, while in 1996 the United List of Social Democrats became an observer in the Party of European Socialists.

The period of adaptive Europeanization brought some further formal links between the Slovenian parties and their European counterparts. Liberal Democracy of Slovenia became a full member of the European Liberal and Democrat and Reform Party in 1998, while the United List of Social Democrats became an associate member of the Party of European Socialists in 1999 and a full member in 2003. The Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (now the Slovenian Democratic Party), the Slovenian People’s Party and New Slovenia in 2001 became observers in the European People’s Party grouping, while in 2003 they became associate members. In addition, the Youth Party of Slovenia in 2003 was granted observer status in the European Federation of Green Parties.

One of the clearest types of evidence of Europeanization, as a result of contacts and cooperation between Slovenian parties and their European counterparts, is the modification of party programmes (Ladrech, 2002: 369). Analysis of “standard” party programmes from this period revealed that the majority of the Slovenian parties that are members of their European counterparts had incorporated some of these parties’ general orientations or values (Lajh – Krašovec, 2004). In this respect, the programmes of all the analysed parties had become slightly more Europeanized in the second period, in the sense of the increased mention of the EU in terms of European policy per se, and in references to other policy areas normally considered the remit of domestic policies (Ladrech, 2002: 396). Hence, in part we can think about increased mention of EU issues in the programmes of the investigated parties as the result of their cooperation with European party federations. But on the other hand, it is hard to avoid the feeling that the increased mention of EU matters was largely still a result of Slovenia joining the EU.

The next issue that can be raised is the potential organizational modifications made within parties. According to Ladrech (2002), affiliation with EU-level institutions (in this case particularly with European party federations) may generate some form of organizational changes. In the period of adaptive Europeanization before Slovenian full membership of the EU, none of the analysed parties had been subjected to any
significant changes in their internal organizational structure. In most cases any changes had been quite minor; if there had been any at all (Krašovec – Lajh, 2004). Nonetheless, in practically all the studied parties the increased role of secretaries for international cooperation had been shown, since they started to be on the basis of *ex-officio* criteria – permanently invited to all relevant party bodies meetings. This has, however, not been reflected in any of the parties by way of explicit statutory changes, only in practice.

Finally, adaptive Europeanization in the circumstances of full EU membership additionally strengthened formal links between Slovenian parties and their European counterparts, as beside Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the United List of Social Democrats all other analysed Slovenian parties became full members of European party federations.

With regard to the programmes of the analysed parties the picture slightly differs from the findings in the period before full membership, but in general not substantially. In essence it is still impossible to show the parties’ standpoints on specific EU policies. In this context, the parties still, as in the past, stressed the importance of the EU *per se* as well as using the EU in an instrumental way (they lean on the European standards in policies). However, in the cases of some parties it is obvious that the EU has been becoming more important since it has been more frequently mentioned in their programmes. Particular attention has been paid in the programme of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia to the EU financial perspective, different EU funds and further enlargement of the EU. Likewise, three other parties (the Slovenian Democratic Party, Slovenian People’s Party and New Slovenia) have expressed support for further enlargement of the EU, while the Social Democrats have mentioned the need to diminishing of the democratic deficit in the EU. The Slovenian People’s Party in particular has stressed the continuing need for the implementation of the idea of subsidiarity.

After full EU membership was gained some modifications could also been seen in the party statutes. These modifications above all formally defined the relations between the party and its deputies in the European Parliament, which is their (formal) inclusion in relevant party bodies in accordance with their function (ex-officio inclusion). We have noted formal arrangements in the Slovenian Democratic Party, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, New Slovenia, the Youth Party of Slovenia and the Democratic Party of Retired People of Slovenia. An important change to the internal organization of the Social Democrats occurred when its party leader was elected as a Member of the European Parliament, which led (in)directly to the establishment of a new party position. This took the form of a permanent deputy position – the vice-president of the party is appointed as permanent deputy to the party’s president (nominated by the president of the party). Mr. Jelko Kacin, a Slovenian MEP and a member of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, was in mid-October 2005 elected on the post of the president.

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8 The party had for European Parliament elections in 2004 proposed a joint candidate list with the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the list received two MEPs.
of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, but the party has not followed the path that the Social Democrats have taken (Krašovec – Lajh – Kustec, Lipicer 2006: 186).

Finally, we would like to mention two more important decisions that were taken in the period of full EU membership. The first one is related to the adoption of the single European currency in 2007. This is a point where one could expect some division or polarization between parties or the impact of the EU on parties and the party system. However, once again the Slovenian political parties surprised commentators, since all strongly supported the idea and they also supported the economic measures that had to be taken to make this possible. The ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty could be another way of observing the attitude of Slovenian parties towards the EU issue. It should be noted that the Slovenian government decided (this was decided already by the government of Anton Rop – the 2002–04 period – although it was implemented by the current government of Janez Janša) that a referendum on ratification would not be held. Even more, Slovenia very quickly ratified the EU Constitutional Treaty without a referendum, at the beginning of 2005. There were some objections from the Slovenian National Party to this decision but in parliament ratification came about without any problem (only some MPs from the Slovenian National Party voted against ratification).

**Bosnia-Herzegovina – between democratization and Europeanization of party politics ... or not?!**

As we already mentioned, of all the former Yugoslav republics the mixed ethnic structure and direct involvement in the Civil War were the main influences on political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to the war, the period from 1990 to 1996 was even marked by the absence of any kind of elections. Following the mediation of the international community, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended in 1995. At the same time, as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina “received” its own constitution (as Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement), which in the short-term enabled the revival of political life, but in the long-term locked Bosnia-Herzegovina in a stalemate, not only in political and socio-economic terms, but especially with regard to ethnic division.

On the basis of the Dayton Constitution the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska\(^9\). Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina therefore have citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina and citizenship of either of respective entities. Among all six former Yugoslav republics Bosnia-Herzegovina as the only one has a collective organ of the chief of the state – a presidency consists of three members based on ethnic structure (one Bosnian, one

\(^9\) In the article, we use term Republika Srpska (Republic of Serbia in Bosnia-Herzegovina) as is stated also in Annex IV. (i.e. the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina) in the English version of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Croatian and one Serbian member). All three members of the presidency are elected directly: the Bosnian and Croatian member in the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Serbian member is elected in Republika Srpska. The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina is bicameral, consisting of the directly elected House of Representatives (Zastupnički dom)\(^{10}\) and an indirectly elected House of Peoples (Dom naroda).\(^{11}\) Both entities have also their own, directly elected parliaments (House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska).

This short description of the political and institutional arrangements of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows us the dominance of ethnic equality, which in fact means ethnic division. The split of the country into two entities, which to some extent is a “state-in-a-state”, strongly influences party politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we take into consideration Panebianco’s thesis on the degree of adaptation to the environment we can see that such a state/institutional arrangement makes strong demands on political parties, because they have to “adapt” to this environment by mobilizing their electorate (each in particular entity) according to ethnic affiliation. In this sense the prevalence of ethnic over other cleavages in the party arena of Bosnia-Herzegovina is no surprise, as well as the fact that practically all its parties are characterized as “ethnic” or even “nationalistic”\(^{12}\). As long as the parties tend to adapt to the ethnically demanding environment it is hard to expect that their Europeanization or adaptation to European integration processes will prevail, either as a result of their cooperation with their European counterparts, either simply in the sense of accession of the Bosnia-Herzegovina to the EU.

In the theoretical part of the article we already mentioned that during the processes of democratization and modernization post-socialist states were frequently under the supervision of various international organizations as “institutional mentors”. This has been especially evident in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the EU proved to be completely ineffective during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mediation of the wider international community, especially the United States of America, was needed. This situation resulted in Bosnia-Herzegovina having a “forced” Constitution from the outside, and at the same time long-term not only an institutional mentor, but also an external mediator in the form of the High Representative of the

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\(^{10}\) Two-thirds members of the House of Representatives are elected in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while one-third of members are elected in Republika Srpska.

\(^{11}\) Members of the House of Nations are delegated by the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.

\(^{12}\) Some authors (for example, Pejanović 2006) argue that political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be classified as ethnic-based or state-based. In such a case, the ethnic-based parties are above all defined as the Bosniaks Party of Democratic Action, Croas Croatian Democratic Community, and Serbian Democratic Party. However, taking into consideration election results as well as conducted interviews with high officials of all relevant political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, our presumption is the strong prevalence of ethnically based political parties.
International Community\textsuperscript{13}, who became responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the accord ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pejanović, 2006: 56–7). As such, the High Representative was given responsibilities that enabled him to adopt decisions with legislative force, as well as to replace officials if they did not act in line with the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Since 1996 the High Representative of the International Community adopted more than 100 decisions about which there was no consensus in the political structures of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while on the other hand he has also changed the President of the Republika Srpska, three members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and more local officials (ibid.). Although the High Representative of the International Community works towards the transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina it is important to emphasize that his decisions (as well as his presence \textit{per se}) have caused scepticism and to some extent also political apathy among the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been evident also in ever decreasing voter turnout (Fink Hafner – Lajh – Krašovec, 2005: 103). In the eyes of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina the changes of various officials have been problematic in particular, especially for two reasons: firstly, these officials were legitimately elected, and secondly, the High Representative has lacked legitimacy for such a strong involvement. This statement was in fact confirmed also by all interviewees, regardless of which party they belonged to.

Nevertheless, as EU integration is one of the main political objectives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first signs of Europeanization processes, more or less independent from the International and EU structures, are already visible\textsuperscript{14}. They include formal links between some political parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina and European party federations. Three parties – the Party of Democratic Action, the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina\textsuperscript{15}, and the Party of Democratic Progress of Republika Srpska – obtained the status of observers in the European People’s Party in 2004. Similarly, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina has observer status in the Party of European Socialists, whereas the Liberal Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina had even become a full member of the European Liberal and Democrat and Reform Party as early as 1994.

\textsuperscript{13} The High Representative of the International Community is at the same time the EU Special Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aim is that the EU Special Representative will be retained well after the abolition of the post of High Representative of International Community (available at: http://www.ohr.int/).

\textsuperscript{14} As no contractual instrument between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been present so far, in 1998 a Consultative Task Force was established, primarily with the aim of institutionalized political dialogue and expert advice. In January 2006, as a result of the start of the negotiations of a Stabilization and Associations Agreement, the Consultative Task Force was re-named the Reform Process Monitoring (European Commission 2007).

\textsuperscript{15} On January 2006, the EPP placed the Presidency of HDZBiH under a „political embargo“.
Figure 5: Party politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and European integration

**Legend:**

CDC – Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ELDR – European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EPP – European People’s Party
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PDA – Party of Democratic Action
PDP – Party of Democratic Progress of Republika Srpska
PES – Party of European Socialists
SDP – Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Further Europeanization processes of party politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina are by and large dependent on the subsequent development of relations between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, Bosnia-Herzegovina has the status of a potential candidate state for EU accession. The first next crucial step towards the status of a candidate state is signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement started in November 2005. Technical talks have been completed, but signing the Agreement is contingent upon

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16 The development of relations between EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina can also be examined from the point of view of the EU financial assistance. Between 1991 and 2000 the EU financial support to Bosnia-Herzegovina mostly focused on refugee programmes and reconstruction, while in the period after 2000 it shifted from postwar assistance to institutional capacity-building and economic development. In this period, key target areas have been public administration reform (including customs and taxation), issues, connected to justice and home affairs (including police reform, integrated border management, and judicial reform), and improvement of the investment climate (including trade, education, environment and infrastructure) (European Commission 2007).

17 Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, including Kosovo, have the same status.
sufficient progress in addressing key priorities: police reform, cooperation with the International Court of Justice, public broadcasting, and public administration reform (European Commission, 2007).

Closely connected with public administration reform is also the necessary change of the Dayton Constitution – the internal adoption of Bosnia’s “own” Constitution, without the mediation of the international community. To achieve this aim, according to the opinions of the interviewees, abolition of ethnic cleavages is necessary, as members of parliament continue to vote along ethnic lines and in this way block the adoption of some important decisions. Similar conclusions are outlined in the Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report (2006: 7), which states that political parties and delegates have continued to delay and block the adoption of specific laws necessary for progress in the Stabilization and Association Process. For example, the state parliament was negatively affected by the Serb representatives’ decision to boycott its sessions in May 2006. The boycott, which lasted one month, was a protest against delays in establishing a “Truth Commission on the Sufferings of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Jews and Others” in Sarajevo during the Civil War. In addition, deputies also remain highly influenced by pressure groups pursuing their individual interests.

Police reform is one of the most problematic issues in the modernization processes of Bosnia-Herzegovina and consequently its accession to the EU. According to the Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report (2006), only little progress has been made in this area, as the requirements set out in the Agreement on Police Restructuring of October 2005 have not yet been fulfilled. While the Police Restructuring Directorate has been established, the work of this organization has been undermined by the obstructive attitude of the Republika Srpska representatives. This has led to delays in the implementation of the Agreement.

In contrast to police reform, more visible progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been made in the field of public administration. Other post-socialist countries have been faced with regular reports of the EU about the reforms in the field of public administration. As Krašovec – Kovačić (2007: 139) pointed out, in other post-socialist countries these actions clearly had the effect of speeding up the reform processes. In addition, in Bosnia-Herzegovina The National Strategy for the Reform of the Public Administration was finally adopted, and support staff for the Public Administration Reform Coordination Office have been appointed. In addition, coordination between the State and Entity level Civil Service Agencies has improved. However, further efforts in the field of public administration are vital, especially in order to build a transparent, efficient and independent public administration, able to respond better to the needs of its citizens and the requirements of EU integration (for more information about public administration reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina see the Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report 2006: 9–10). According to the role of the EU in other post-socialist countries we can expect its similar effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the field of public administration. Despite the impact of the EU on reform processes in public administration in other post-socialist countries, it has to be stressed that reform of this field had never been presented as a formal criteria for full membership in the EU (Krašovec – Kovačić, 2007). It is the same in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which clearly distinguish public administration reform from police or custom reforms in this country – these two reforms are formally set criteria defined especially for Bosnia-Herzegovina in establishing the process of cooperation between it and the EU.

So far, efforts to gradually reform the constitutional framework in Bosnia-Herzegovina have failed. The Parliament rejected a reform package agreed by political party leaders in April 2006. Among other, the package included enhanced state-level competencies, improved and simplified decision-making procedures and representation of minorities in the state Parliament. Bosnia-Herzegovina thus missed the opportunity to take a first and important step towards a more democratic and efficient state (Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report 2006: 7).
All in all, the conclusion of the negotiations of the Stabilization and Association Agreement as the next important evolutionary step in relations between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina is dependent on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s progress in implementing key reforms, which demands broader consensus among political élite and – consequently – the abolishment of ethnic cleavages. In the meantime, Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to benefit from financial assistance granted by the EU.

Tentative conclusions

Our analysis showed a great divergence of two former Yugoslav republics – Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – concerning the processes of Europeanization of party politics. While Slovenia has already gone through five steps of Europeanization processes (presented in Figures 2 and 3), Bosnia-Herzegovina is still stuck at the first step. In general, Europeanization processes in Slovenia were predominantly dealt with in the second half of the 1990s. Similar example is evident also from the viewpoint of party politics. There is some evidence that for national party politics the EU arena is more and more becoming an additional arena to exert an influence on domestic policy issues and actors. During the last years before full EU membership, Slovenian political parties steadily devoted more and more attention to various EU issues in their programmes (in this period mainly still in principle), while in the organizational aspect, explicit statutory changes in parties were not evident, although some minor changes in practice have already occurred. The first minor statutory changes thus emerged only in the full membership period. Furthermore, in this period some parties’ programmes also showed that the EU is becoming more important as well as more frequently and specifically mentioned. However, by and large, Europeanization processes still only have minor influences on Slovenian political parties as a result of Slovenia’s full membership in the EU and on party cooperation with European party federations.

On the other hand, in fact, at the very first stage, Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the Slovenian pattern of Europeanization of party politics, which includes establishing incremental formal links between national political parties and European party federations. However, there is still an enormous difference between Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina when observing processes of Europeanization. Due to various socio-economic determinants, the high level of direct involvement in the Civil War and an exceedingly mixed ethnic structure, Bosnia-Herzegovina has faced delays in its democratic transition. As a result, during recent years it has rather sought the democratization of social and political life rather than confronting the challenges of accession to the European integration processes. It has had a long-term institutional mentor in the form of the High Representative of the International Community, while political parties have been operating in circumstances of strong ethnic cleavages. Hence, further Europeanization processes demand a democratically consolidated party arena, which
would establish an environment that for political parties would not lead to pressure to adapt themselves in order to mobilize their voters along ethnic lines. In addition, more explicit and direct EU influences on party politics will probably be visible only after more intensive institutional relations between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily including the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which will enable the start of official negotiations. However, the mixed ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to an extent in the future and will probably influence peculiar Europeanization processes vis-à-vis the current Central and Eastern European pattern. We can agree with Fink-Hafner – Krašovec (2006: 17) that the EU and Europeanization processes have not had the same prominence in all the countries that have become EU members or are still in the process of establishing cooperation with the EU. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been, for several reasons mentioned above, so far in fact one of the most clear examples of a country which experienced very limited impact of the EU seen in the absence of its pressures toward limiting the strength of extremism, forcing larger parties to moderate their behaviour and helping pro-reformist, liberal parties/forces (Fink-Hafner – Krašovec, 2006: 18). However, we should not overlook the fact that the first period after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was (due to the weak role of the EU) marked with the processes of internationalization and not Europeanization. Such internationalization represented even greater adaptation pressures than the processes of Europeanization, and the result was visible especially in the (“forced”) adoption of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, when the role of the international community will be to a larger extent replaced by the EU, we could, based on the data presented above, probably expect that Bosnia-Herzegovina in the future will present one of the most clear examples of the EU two-level model developed by Fink-Hafner – Krašovec (2006).

References


**Other Sources**


Interviews with secretaries for international cooperation or general secretaries in New Slovenia, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, Slovenian Democratic Party, United List of Social Democrats, and Youth Party of Slovenia, conducted by the authors in the period April to June 2004 in Ljubljana.

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Abstract: The basic argument outlined in this paper is that in order to understand the impact of European integration on national parties and party systems, we have to find out how the majority of parties made adjustments to their programmes, platforms and public statements. There is a relationship between process of democratization and Europeanization. It is necessary to divide the period from 1990 to 2007 into the time of Milošević and the time after him. Political life in Serbia during the 1990s had characteristics of a closed state, closed society and closed system. During 2000, under external and internal pressures and with assistance of the civil society, democratic opposition parties united in the DOS, around the idea against Milošević and on the principle of a civic European orientation. After the political changes of 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been integrated into international institutions and organizations in a very short time. The party system in Serbia changed in the time frame 1990–2007, and this was primarily a consequence of the results of the seven parliamentary elections called in the period 1990–2007. An important trait of all these elections is that there were major oscillations in the strength of all parties. Also, the electoral system was changed several times. The major change was carried out in 1992, with transition from majoritarian to proportional electoral system. The last change of the electoral system came after the elections of 2003, when the census was abolished for parties of national minorities. After a ten-year isolation of the country, integration with the EU enjoys a large support among the citizens of Serbia. Although a significant percentage of citizens of Serbia support the idea of accession of Serbia to the EU, but the necessary changes are often neglected. The negotiations between Serbia and the EU are continued on June 13, 2007. Some Serbian parties have become members of European party federations (families). Parliamentary elections were held on January, 21st 2007. The government is formed by DS, DSS-NS and G17, as a majoritarian, democratic and pro-European government. Two the biggest challenges for this government are the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, and unsolved status of Kosovo.

Key words: Europeanization, political parties, party system, Europarties

The aim of this paper is to determine the existence – and the level of impact – of the process of European integration, i.e. Europeanization, on the political parties and party system of Serbia. The process of Europeanization is closely connected with that of democratization, based on which it is necessary to divide the period from 1990 to 2007 into the time of Milošević and the period after him, when admission to the EU became a priority. This paper also treats the changes of the party and electoral systems
in that period and analyses the surveys and research, carried out after 2000, on the questions of EU integration. Also mentioned is cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, as an important factor for integration, as well as the admission of some of the Serbian parties to European party federations.

This article is based on previous research and used methods, which are focused on the institutionalization of party systems (Mainwaaring, 1998). In addition the article is also based on research and used methods focusing on the European influence on national party systems (Mair, 2000) and some other fields, influenced by Europeanization; policy/programmatic content, party organization, patterns of party competition, party-government relations and relations beyond the national party system (Ladrech, 2002), the role of Europarties (Enyedi and Lewis, 2006), as well as concrete case studies and comparisons (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2005; Fink-Hafner, 2007). The issue is shown by the fact that Serbia is in the initial phase of the process of admission to the EU, and therefore the mentioned models cannot be used completely.

Europeanization and democratization

When discussing Serbia we can say that there is a direct interdependence between democratization and Europeanization processes. They both require the respect of defined standards and the application of specified criteria. These processes are, therefore, complementary. It is not rare that democracy is understood as harmonization with the EU standards, and states applying for the EU membership, depending on their status and phase in this process, are supervised and monitored by the EU. In these processes, Serbia has certain similarities with other post-communist societies of this region, but also some significant differences. While on the one hand integrative Europeanization processes are underway, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia is entering its final phase (Montenegro in 2006; Kosovo is awaiting a new status in 2007). The 1990s were the most difficult period for Serbia: the wars for the legacy of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, isolation and UN sanctions, the NATO bombing campaign and Slobodan Milošević’s authoritarianism, which was anti-European and isolated Yugoslavia from Europe. After the political changes of 2000, the improvement of relations with the EU, and membership of it became the priorities for the new Serbian Government.

In terms of similarities with other post-communist states, Serbia did not miss the process in which the collapse of communism caused the dissolution of communist federations (USSR, Czechoslovakia and SFRY) along national-federal lines. The implosion of communism was simultaneously followed by an explosion of nationalism. During the 1990s political competition was reduced to a conflict between nationalists and pro-Westerners. Nationalism always potentially bears or reproduces anti-Western sentiments, and ever since the introduction of the multi-party system, nationalists have shown an “unattainable advantage in elections” (Pavlović, 2004: 184).
Serbia during the 1990s and after 2000

Political life in Serbia during the 1990s had the characteristics of a closed state (through sanctions), closed society (by prohibitions) and a closed system (through blockades), with fair political competition neither being allowed nor even possible. Milošević and his SPS party won a majority of votes only in the first multi-party elections in 1990 and had a single-party government, but until 2000 he and his party were in power with the assistance of other parties in coalition governments.

In 2000, under external and internal pressures and with the assistance of civil society, democratic opposition parties united under the DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia). The DOS joined together against Milošević, on the principle of a civic European orientation. An agreement was reached that the President of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) would be the presidential candidate of this coalition in the election of the President of Yugoslavia, and the President of the Democratic Party (DS) would be the future Prime Minister of the Republic. Milošević lost the presidential elections, but he had to be defeated twice, once in the elections and for the second time through demonstrations when he defended his election victory. After the political changes of 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been integrated into international institutions and organizations in a very short time.

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1 In the first multiparty elections in 1990 there was a majoritarian electoral system (two-round). The SPS won 46 percent of votes which, thanks to the electoral system, gave it 77.6 percent of mandates, i.e. 194 out of 250 seats in the Assembly of Serbia, and this was a single-party government. In the next elections in 1992 a proportional electoral system was introduced, with nine electoral districts. SPS won 28.8 percent of votes and 40.4 percent of seats in parliament (101 out of 250); this government lasted for nine months. In the 1993 elections (proportional representation system; nine electoral districts). The SPS won 36.7 percent of votes and 42.2 seats (123 out of 250), and the Socialists needed three seats for a majority. They formed a government with the assistance of the “opposition”, New Democracy, which won six deputies’ seats on the list of the DEPOS Coalition, consisting of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), New Democracy (ND) and the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS). In the 1997 elections (proportional representation system and 29 electoral districts), the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)-Yugoslav Left (JUL)-ND won 34.25 percent of votes and 44 percent of seats (110 out of 250). A coalition government was formed, made up of the SPS, JUL and Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the “red-black coalition”, but without the ND, on the insistence of the radicals.

2 The DOS – the Democratic Opposition of Serbia was created by uniting 18 political parties at the beginning of 2000, although not all the members were (classical) parties, as follows: Democratic Party (DS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS); Social Democracy (SD); the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS); Demo-Christian Party of Serbia (DHSS); New Serbia (NS); Movement for Democratic Serbia (PDS); Social-Democratic League of Vojvodina (LSV); Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina (RDSV); Alliance of Hungarians of Vojvodina (SVM); Vojvodina Coalition (KV); Democratic Alternative (DA); Democratic Centre (DC); New Democracy (ND); Social-democratic Union (SDU); Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP), League for Šumadija (LZS); Serbian Resistance Movement – Democratic Movement (SPO-DM) and Association of Free and Independent Unions.

3 In the presidential elections held on 24 September 2000 the DOS candidate, Vojislav Koštunica, defeated Milošević, winning 50.24 percent of votes (2,470,304) versus 37.15 percent (1,826,799 votes for Milošević). The DOS also won the elections to the federal parliament by winning 42.9 percent of votes and 53.7 percent of mandates against 32.25 percent of votes and 40.7 percent of seats of the SPS.

4 Firstly, on 26 October 2000, it was admitted in the Stability Pact for the Southeast Europe; on 1 November to the United Nations; and on 10 November the membership in OSCE was renewed. On 17 November Serbia resumed diplomatic relations with the USA, Germany, France and Great Britain; on 20 December it became a member of the International Monetary Fund, and in April 2003 a member of the Council of Europe.
The DOS won the elections for the Assembly of Serbia on 24 December 2000 (on a proportional representation system; Serbia was a single electoral district), by winning a two-thirds majority of seats. The government of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić (DS President at the time), formed after these elections, was a coalition, and the first democratic government, composed of both politicians and experts, was extremely pro-European and reformist.

The political changes of 2000 did not eradicate all the vestiges of Milošević’s rule, and on 12 March 2003 forces of the old régime, which survived in the structure of the secret services, assassinated the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Đinđić. The anti-Hague lobby, which criticized Đinđić for arresting Slobodan Milošević and extraditing him to the Hague Tribunal on 28 June 2001 (Milošević was extradited under the Đinđić government) is linked with the assassination. The killing of Zoran Đinđić was a huge loss for democratic Serbia and a step backwards in the Serbian process of democratization, reform and Europeanization; Zoran Živković of the DS was appointed prime minister. These events have had consequences for cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, with the threat of destabilization of Serbia.

After the elections in 2003, a minority government was formed, composed of a coalition of DSS, G17 Plus and SPO-NS, with a total of 109 out of 250 deputies, with the support of the SPS (plus 22 deputies), which is 131 out of 250 seats. Vojislav Koštunica, the President of the DSS, became the Prime Minister. As V. Goati points out referring to this Government: “The programme of the Government of Serbia is, in its most important items, located in the middle of a linear continuum of pro-European/traditional: on the extreme points of the continuum, there are two opposition parties: the DS and SRS...” (Goati, 2006: 73).

**Serbian party system**

Changes of the state frames (borders) (SFRY, FRY, Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia) also changed the framework and nature of party competition. We will consider the party system, “the network of competitive relationships between political parties” (Rae, 1967: 47), through influences of institutional elements and social structures, first of all of social cleavages.

The party system in Serbia changed in the period between 1990 and 2007, and this was primarily a consequence of the results of the seven parliamentary elections called in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2007. An important characteristic

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5 In these elections the DOS won 64.4 percent of votes and 70.4 percent of seats in the Parliament – a two-thirds majority (176 out of 250). In just two months, from 24 September to 23 December, the SPS lost 1,016,996 votes (from elections for the Federal Parliament 1,532,841 votes to 515,845 votes in the elections for the Assembly of Serbia).

6 In the elections for the Assembly of Serbia held on 28 December 2003, (proportional electoral system; single electoral district; turnout of 57.72 percent or 3,748,623 (of 6,493,672 registered voters) the SRS won 82 seats; the DSS 53; the DS 37; G17 Plus 34; SPO-NS 22 and the SPS 22.
of all them is that there were major oscillations in the strengths of all parties, which is an indicator of weakness of both the parties and the party system. One could quantify these oscillations by the “total electoral volatility”, which means the percentage of votes which “went from one party to the other” in comparison with the previous elections. These data were obtained by adding all the positive and negative differences in the percentage of votes given to the parliamentary parties as compared with previous elections. Diachronically, the data in the difference in the percentage of votes given to Serbian parliamentary parties are as follows: 1992: 48.1; 1993: 24.4; 1997: 26.2; 2000: 110; 2003: 41.5; and 2007: 18.84 where the “average total electoral instability’ is 44.84. This high fluctuation of the achievement of parties in elections is not typical of the other countries in the process of transition.

Electoral system

Since the introduction of a multi-party system in 1990 the electoral system in Serbia has been altered several times. The most significant change to the electoral system was carried out in 1992, with a transition from a majoritarian to proportional electoral system. The other changes dealt with the number of electoral districts; in the 1992 and 1993 Serbian elections there were nine electoral districts; in the 1992 elections there were 29; and in the elections in 2000 and 2003 Serbia was a single electoral district. Throughout this time the electoral threshold was five percent. The last change to the electoral system came after the elections of 2003, when the threshold was abolished for parties representing national minorities. Throughout this period d’Hondt’s formula for converting votes into seats was used. In Serbia the 1990 Constitution introduced a semi-presidential system, which was retained also in the new 2006 Constitution.

Social cleavages

When it comes to social structure, there is a particularly deep historical-ethnical cleavage (national-civic) in Serbia, which largely defines itself in the country’s political scene and slows down democratization and Europeanization processes. Slavujević (2003: 96) reminds us that the “horizontal” line of the historic-ethnic cleavage is supplemented by the “vertical” dimension, concerning the cleavage between nationalist and civic orientation among representatives of each ethnic group. Besides, empirical findings show that the axis of the “national-civic” historic-ethnic cleavage and the axis of “traditionalism-modernism” cultural-value cleavage do not intersect, but largely overlap, with “national” coinciding with “traditionalism” and “civic” with “modernism” (Slavujević, 2003: 98). In Slavujević’s opinion, this leads to the conclusion of synergic effects of these two axes of divisions to party grouping.

Parties and the party system of Serbia are not institutionalized (Mainwaring, 1998: 71). During the 1990s the party system of Serbia had characteristics of a system with a dominant party (SPS), and in the period 2000–2006 it had characteristics of polarized
pluralism according to Sartori’s criteria (Sartori, 1976: 120–127). Evidence for this is in the following characteristics: firstly, the existence of “anti-system parties”, which do not share values of the political order in which they act. After the political changes of 5 October 2000, the SRS and SPS did not recognize the results of changes, considering them illegal and illegitimate. Secondly, the existence of a “bilateral opposition”, meaning that the two opposition parties could be closer to the ruling parties than to each other. The SRS and DS were closer to parties within the ruling coalition than each other: the DS is a natural ally of the DSS (once they were the same party) but when it comes to national issues, the SRS and DSS are closer.

Public opinion of Serbia on European integrations

After the 10-year isolation of the country, integration into the EU enjoys large support among the citizens of Serbia. The Imperatives of integration are in that larger as experiences of the UN sanctions and “ghetto society” are strong and fresh.

A large percentage of the citizens of Serbia, when asked whether Serbia should join the EU, replied “yes”, about 72–26 percent, compared to 8–13 percent who said “no”. The vast majority of supporters, including both the radicals (SRS) and Milošević’s socialists (SPS), are in favour of joining the EU. Since June 2002 the (pro)-European mood of the public opinion of Serbia has been gauged quarterly or annually by opinion polls. According to these surveys, in Serbia the idea of the EU is, in some senses, a generator of optimism, as citizens associate it with a better quality of life, higher living standards and the opportunities to travel. Besides positive associations, for a smaller percentage of the population the EU represented a lack of trust, constant ultimatums, unjustified policies and excessive demands. Although a significant percentage of citizens of Serbia support the idea of Serbian accession to the EU, it is not clear what this exactly means. The majority sees entry as benefits and privileges with respect a rise in living standards, although a consideration of the necessary changes which have to be made on the way to adjustment to a market economy and the rule of law has been neglected. From 2002 to 2006, about 70 percent of citizens of Serbia voted “yes” in the referendum on joining the EU. There is an anomaly here: although 70 percent of citizens support entry, a significantly smaller number supports extradition of those indicted for war crimes, although it is a condition for negotiations on the Association Agreement.

The EU enjoys greater trust than any other international organization, and although only half of the population trusts it, this is still a much higher level of support than for any Serbian national political institution.

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7 Srbobran Branković, EU na srpskom politickom jelovniku/ (The EU on the Serbian Political Menu Evropski forum, 1; http://www.becei.org/EF 0105/SBrankovic0105.htm
8 Survey carried out by the SMMRI Group (Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute Group) for needs of the EU Integration Office of the Government of Serbia.
Table 1: How would citizens of Serbia vote on referendum on entering the EU

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>I would vote yes (%)</th>
<th>I would vote no (%)</th>
<th>I would not vote (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>June 02</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 02</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 02</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 03</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 03</td>
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<td>September 04</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 05</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 06</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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In the last survey (SMMRI, September 2006), when citizens were asked to name a political figure who contributes the most to helping Serbia become a member of the EU, two-thirds of citizens named Boris Tadić (President of Serbia and President of the DS), and one-third mentioned Vojislav Koštunica (at that moment Prime Minister of Serbia and President of the DSS). Two more figures are recognized as significant: Mladjan Dinkić (Minister of Finance and President of G17 Plus) and Vuk Drašković (Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the SPO). When a political figure is replaced by a party in the aforementioned question, more than a half (52 percent) of votes go to the DS, followed by the DSS (19 percent), G17 Plus (13 percent), and 6 percent of disappointed citizens claim that there is no such party. These results are also in accordance with the parliamentary election results, because the DS, DSS and G17 plus obtained the majority of votes and formed the new government.

Srbobran Branković, director of Medium Gallup, based in Belgrade, breaks down the picture of citizens of Serbia about the EU, asking the interviewees to choose the statement about Europe that most corresponds with their own attitude, from four options. The statements are:

1. *Euroenthusiasts* say: “Europe is very important to me, and I think that we have to do everything we can to become part of it, which includes fulfilling all of the conditions it sets.” Twenty-two percent of interviewees share this attitude.

2. *Eurorealists* say: “I cannot say that Europe is particularly important to me, but I think that integration into the EU is necessary and that we have to work on it.” Thirty-five percent of interviewees have such an attitude.

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3. *Eurosceptics* say: “I am suspicious of the intentions of Europe and the West in general, and I think that we have to join its structures very cautiously and slowly.” Twenty-nine percent of interviewees responded this way.

4. *Europhobes* say: “Integration with Europe would mean European and other forces would be more important than our people; Serbia does not belong to that world, and therefore we should maintain our traditional values and not be allowed us to enter that furious race”. Thirteen percent of interviewees share this attitude.

When these responses are compared with the party support, we find that the supporters of G17 Plus and the DS (of President Tadić) are the most devoted pro-Europeans. Forty-four percent of supporters of G17 Plus are Euroenthusiasts and 42 percent are Eurorealists; the figure similar is among supporters of the DS, of whom 37 percent are Euroenthusiasts and 42 percent Eurorealists. Supporters of the DSS (Koštunica) comprise 51 percent Eurorealists, 24 percent Eurosceptics and 17 percent Euroenthusiasts. The “Power of Serbia” (PSS) movement of Bogoljub Karić had an unexpected number of Euroenthusiasts – 20 percent. Most PSS supporters are Eurorealists – 41 percent – and Europhobes – 31 percent. Supporters of Milošević’s SPS are the most anti-European. Among them there are no Euroenthusiasts: 47 percent are Eurosceptics; 41 percent Europhobes and 12 percent are Eurorealists.¹⁰

According to the poll carried out by the Medium Gallup Belgrade in August 2004, party affiliation and determination for accession to the EU are as follows:

DS: 93 percent said yes, 1 percent said no; G17 Plus: 87 percent said yes and 9 percent said no; DSS: 86 percent said yes and 4 percent said no; PSS: 62 percent said yes and 16 percent said no; SRS: 66 percent said yes and 23 percent said no; SPS: 67 percent said yes and 25 percent said no; unaffiliated: 69 percent said yes and 9 percent said no; and abstainers: 63 percent said yes and 10 percent said no.¹¹

Similarly, according to the research of the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID)¹², 97 percent of DS supporters are in favour of EU entry; 93 percent of supporters of small parties; 93 percent of supporters of the PSS and 87 percent of the DSS. On the other hand, the smallest number of advocates of a pro-European stance can be seen among the supporters of the SPS – 49 percent,

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¹² *Izgradnja proveropske demokratske kulture kroz jačanje kapaciteta kreatora javnog mnjenja (Building of pro-European democratic culture through enforcement of capacities of public opinion creators)*, Spring 2005, Političke podele u Srbiji – pet godina posle, Srećko Mihailović et. al. (*Political divisions in Serbia – five years after*), http://www.cesid.org/programi/istrazivanja/index.jsp
and the SRS – 52 percent. When we count the relation to democracy without those who did not reply to this question (23 percent in the total sample, and among those without a party affiliation as much as 37 percent), then we see “clearer” relations to democracy. Specifically, pro-democratic attitudes everywhere are seen among more than half the population, except among the Socialists (SPS) and Radicals (SRS). Pro-democratic attitudes are the most frequent among the supporters of the DS (85 percent), DSS (74 percent), small parties (69 percent) and the PSS (68 percent), and the least frequent among those without a party affiliation (49 percent), SRS (30 percent) and SPS (only 18 percent). The claim: “In some cases, an undemocratic government can be better than a democratic one”, is the most frequently accepted by supporters of the SPS (66 percent) and SRS (44 percent).

A survey of the results of public opinion in Serbia leads to the conclusion that while Milošević’s Serbia during the 1990s kept its distance from Europe, the post-Milošević Serbia after 2000 sees that returning to Europe is the only way (three-quarters of citizens) forward.

EU Negotiations and Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal

Serbia entered the European integration processes within an arrangement of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. In October 2004 the EU offered the “dual track” principle. Serbia and Montenegro had a single market, but two currencies, as Montenegro accepted the euro at the beginning of 2002. “Dual track” meant that the two republics negotiated separately with the EU on economic issues, which make about 80 percent of the content of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, but would been treated as a single state in terms of political criteria (democracy, rule of law, minority rights and harmonization of foreign policy with the EU). There was an important political condition to get the Feasibility Study. In spite of problems in the functioning of an otherwise dysfunctional joint state of Serbia and Montenegro, slow progress in the association process was caused rather by another reason. Serbia was requested to demonstrate a satisfactory level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Through the principle of “voluntary surrender”, in January and February 2005, many of those indicted for war crimes arrived in The Hague (although the main suspects, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, remained free). Twelve of those indicted for war crimes voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal, the financial assets of the Hague fugitives were frozen, and good cooperation was established between the Hague Tribunal Prosecutor’s Office and the Special Court for War Crimes in Serbia. With guarantees from the Government of Serbia, several indicted were released until the beginning of the trial. The resumed cooperation with

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13 Montenegro chose independence in the referendum in May 2006
14 In December 2004 Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, and then in 2005 Vladimir Lazarević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić.
the Hague Tribunal since the beginning of 2005 was enough to initiate association negotiations, and in April 2005 a positive EU Feasibility Study was obtained, recommending opening negotiations on stabilization and association with Serbia and Montenegro. The negotiations commenced on 7 November 2005 and were suspended in June 2006, also due to a lack of cooperation with The Hague. The cooperation with the Hague Tribunal keeps Serbia in the “trap of an unfinished past”. The Hague’s pressures and requirements, and the experience of the NATO intervention are used by extreme nationalists (and by the anti-Hague lobby) to exploit anti-Western and anti-democratic feeling because of their association with the bombing of Serbia (1999). The government and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica (President of the DSS) deserve merit for starting the negotiations on association with the EU, but is also responsible for suspension of the negotiations. The negotiations between Serbia and the EU continued on 13 June 2007, but completing cooperation with The Hague is necessary to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).

Members of European party federations (Europarties)

Recently some parties in Serbia became members of European party federations (Europarties). Of the relevant parties, the DS has been admitted as an observer to the Party of European Socialists (PES), a federation of social-democratic, socialist and labourist EU parties (December 2006). The DSS and G17 Plus have been accepted (June 2005) as associate members of the European People’s Party (EPP), a federation of conservative, Christian-democratic and people’s EU parties. This type of membership does not entirely correspond with programme contents of these parties or the way they are perceived by the electorate (Goati, 2006: 48). New relations with European party federations (Europarties) bring them in a privileged position in relation to rival parties in their countries from the aspect of obtaining European legitimacy and increase of possibilities for further lobbying. But first of all, as a signal of recognition of forces which bear and share European values and beliefs. For parties in Serbia, Europarties can represent crucial mechanisms of programme and value standardization (Lewis – Mansfeldova, 2006: 263). Their important role is explaining the importance and necessity for carrying out the reforms in a society that pretends to the EU membership of the Union, aimed at the overlapping of democratization and Europeanization.

Besides party membership to supranational federations, typology of party families is founded also on genesis from social conflicts and political orientation of parties (Beyme). When party programmes are concerned, certain changes in some parties are becoming evident. The impact of membership in the Socialist International (and later also in PES) can most be felt in the case of the Democratic Party (DS). It started to move towards transformation from the position of the “civic centre” to a social-democratic orientation. The DS defined itself as a “modern party of the civic centre” (Electoral Programme of the DS, 1992). The 1997 manifesto offered a more developed
definition of the DS as a party of the centre; in the May 2001 programme the Party
de-ideologized its position, while in the programme adopted in October 2001 the
ideological positioning of the party was completely abandoned. With admission to
the Socialist International, the Party turned towards social democracy (2007 election
manifesto). Although some parties have not changed their formal programmes, the
pro-European rhetoric is far more present in public appearances.

The DSS more clearly moved towards the grouping of people’s parties. It might
be characterized as a conservative-national DSS. With G17 Plus and LDP we feel
closeness to liberal party family. The DSS, SPO, NS and PSS-BK are closer to the
conservative party family.

Elections 2007

After the adoption of the Constitution of Serbia\(^{15}\), parliamentary elections in
Serbia were called on 21 January 2007. At these elections, 20 electoral lists were
submitted, with about 30 parties participating in them. Among the submitted
lists, there were six minority and seven coalition lists. Electoral campaign was
largely marked by European topics. There was less nationalist rhetoric while
socio-economic issues were the most present. During the electoral campaign,
many signals came from the EU that confirmed that Serbia has the political and
economic capacities to become a member and that, with the cooperation with The
Hague, the door of European integration can be opened more widely. This was
confirmed by postponing presentation of the proposal for the solution of the final
status of Kosovo and Metohia, commencement of visa facilitation negotiations,
admission to the Partnership for Peace\(^{16}\) and admission of the DS to the PES. The
results of the elections\(^{17}\) can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it
can be said that the parties which participated together in the political changes
of 2000 (pro-democratic and pro-European block) won a two-thirds majority.
On the other hand, the anti-European SRS is individually the largest party, with
81 mandates. After three-month coalition negotiations the government is formed

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\(^{15}\) The new Constitution of Serbia was adopted on 28–29 October, 2006 on the referendum and proclaimed
on 8 November 2006 in the Assembly

\(^{16}\) “The Partnership for Peace programme is the most important institution of NATO oriented towards
enforcement of trust and cooperation among member-states of NATO and other countries in the Euro-
Atlantic region, aimed at development and strengthening of stability and security in Europe. Although
the main task of the Partnership for Peace is cooperation in the field of defence, the character of the
programme is primarily political and it is a very important factor in the security architecture of Europe”
(p. 393), Četiri godine tranzicije u Srbiji (Four years of transition in Serbia)), Begović Boris and Djilas
Milica (2005), Medjunarodni odnosi /International Relations/, in Četiri godine tranzicije u Srbiji, group
of authors, Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies, Belgrade

\(^{17}\) Election results 2007: SRS: 81; DS: 64, DSS-NS: 47; G17 Plus: 19; SPS: 16; LDP-GSS-SDU-LSDV:
15; SVM::3; List for Sandzak: 2; Roma Union of Serbia:1; Coalition of Albanians from the Presevo
Valley:–1 Roma Party: 1
by DS (64) + DSS-NS (47) + G17 (19) = 130 from 250 MPs, reflecting the will of voters, formation of a majoritarian, democratic and pro-European government. Two the biggest challenges for this government are the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and the unresolved status of Kosovo.

Conclusion

The role of parties is to bridge the political and cultural gap and remove obstacles standing in the way of the path to Europe. It is sometimes in discrepancy with electoral calculation, as it requires also some unpopular actions, such is the cooperation with The Hague. Considering that political changes in Serbia occurred some ten years later, Europeanization of parties and party system is of smaller volume when compared with other countries in the region. During the 1990s, the dominant was the competition of Milošević’s SPS and opposition on relation ‘isolation nationalism – European modernism’. After the political changes of 2000, parties in Serbia do not have that many dilemmas about the European way as there are issues of dynamics and removal of obstacles standing on that way. The Hague Tribunal and the status of Kosovo are the biggest among them. Parties in Serbia disagree about these issues. When it is about programmes, the influence of the EU is obvious (DS and G17 Plus). In the field of party organization, we observe innovations related to introduction of international cooperation bodies with the DS, SPO and GSS. Influence of the Europarties is in sight, but parties in Serbia have been admitted to these party federations only recently. Serbia is still not a candidate for accession to the EU, which might have influenced that overall impact of europeanization of parties and party system is moderate.

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Serbian European Integration Office

**Abbreviations**

DOS  Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS  Democratic Party
DSS  Democratic Party of Serbia
G17  G17 Plus
SPO  Serbian Renewal Movement
SPS  Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS  Serbian Radical Party
PSS  Movement "Power of Serbia"
NS  New Serbia
SDP  Social Democratic Party
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party
SSJ  Party of Serbian Unity
DHSS  Christian Democratic Party of Serbia
SVM  Alliance of Hungarians of Vojvodina
GSS  Civic Alliance of Serbia
LSV  League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina
JUL  Yugoslav Left
ND  New Democracy

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Democratic Transition in Slovenia

In the year 2009 politicians and social scientists will commemorate the 20th anniversary of the *annus mirabilis*, the year when the “real socialism” régimes started to collapse, beginning with the ruptures in régime stability in Poland and Hungary in 1989, followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and the violent revolution in Romania. The two decades of democratic development in the post-communist countries of former Eastern bloc will be analysed, and political scientists will repeatedly compare the situation in the new democracies. What we could also expect, as in the previous years, is that in the years to come analysts will stress in particular Russia and the countries of the Visegrád Four. For this reason we should strongly welcome the new book edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet and Danica Fink-Hafner *Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education and Media*, published in Texas, USA, in 2006.

Sabrina P. Rametis is a well-known author of articles and books focusing on political development and contemporary history. We can mention two of her works in particular. The first, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, was published in its fourth edition in 2002 and could be recognized as one of most important sources of information about Yugoslavia and its demise and development in the Western Balkans during the 1990s. The second book is *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (1997). Rametis is currently active as teacher and researcher at several Norwegian institutions, including the well-known PRIO – Peace Research Institut in Oslo – and the University of Science and Technology in Trondheim.

Danica Fink-Hafner could also be mentioned as an important researcher focusing on the issues of democracy establishment and development in (Central) Eastern Europe, political actors (political parties, new political movement etc.) and Europeanization. Two of her publications (in Slovene) are a two-part book, *Demokratični prehodi* (Democratic Transitions, 2000 and 2001, edited with Miro Haček); and an important analysis of civil society development in the 1980s in Slovenia entitled *Nova družbena gibanja: subjekti politične inovacije* (New Political Movements: Subjects of Political Innovation, 1992). Important also are her works in English, including the *Making a New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia* (with J. R. Robbins, 1997). Also significant is Fink-Hafner’s organizational work at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana, where she developed curricula in the policy analysis field and established

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and guaranteed the work of Centre for Political Science Research, producing empirical analysis in the “Anglo-Saxon” style, based on quantitative methods rooted in the sociology of politics and political sociology respectively.

Her current analysis is the result of the work of an international group of authors, including scholars from Slovenia, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. In this sense the editor’s aim was to incorporate the empirical data and analysis about Slovenia into a broader comparative framework. The comparison with similar “peripheral” European countries (Sweden and Norway) but also with other EU countries is based mostly on opinion polls and enabled the presentation of the Slovenian issue not just as a useful but limited case study, but as a complex question. Such a method is based especially on falsification, bringing the “self-position” of Slovenians (including the domestic Slovenian discourse) into comparison with “the Others”. Some “mythical” characteristics of Slovenian society in comparison with the results from other countries do not seem as important and “specific” when presented by the media or scholars preferring normative approaches towards Slovenia and generally (Central) Eastern European/post-communist countries.

Nevertheless, the book is not based only on surveys or statistical results; in addition to the empirical analysis more normative-based chapters are included. Thus, the overall analysis might be characterized as mixture of empirical and normative research giving complex scientific results. This fact cannot be downplayed, although the book is aimed at the reader who likely has an average rather than excellent knowledge of Slovenian society or politics.

There is no place in the book review to present all the contributions from in the book and to evaluate them comprehensively. We will stress only selected chapters and present – in our opinion – the most interesting analytical results.

In the first chapter – *Values, Norms and Education* – the editors briefly present the aim of the book and their position on democracy as a civil society product and/or inhibitor. Ramet and Fink-Hafner clearly separate democracy and liberalism, showing that “building democracy means creating certain institutions and passing a number of laws, building liberalism means disseminating values not only within the government but throughout the society” (p. 4). In other words, democracy cannot be established as consolidated and stable without a civic culture, which for Ramet and Fink-Hafner defined as “coherent set of foregoing values, which are generally supportive of individual rights, popular participation in politics, and human equality” (p. 4). The civic culture is based on liberal values, such as tolerance, equality, church-state separation and the laicity, the rule of law, human rights, and civic-mindedness.

In the post-communist (or generally post-totalitarian or post-authoritarian) states and societies the development and strength of civic culture and civil society seems to be one of the most important preconditions for the long-term stability of democratic procedures. The role of the media and education in the process of diffusion of
democratic/civic values seems to be extremely important, and the current study focuses on the development of media market and education reforms (including the content of textbooks) in Slovenia.

The liberal values orientation clearly shows that the editors and authors do not accept the minimal definition of democracy (free elections), but understand it as differing in terms of quality from the electoral democracies that we could often observe in Eastern Europe (as a reminder we could mention the most recent example, from August 2007, when the “presidential” party in Kazakhstan won in the parliamentary elections with 88 percent of votes and won all seats!). Paradoxically, the most important term that has to be mentioned in the sense of understanding democracy – inclusiveness – in not mentioned in the book. Nevertheless, the inclusiveness of democracy understood is by the editors and authors as the immanent characteristics of a stable, consolidated democracy. This fact is reflected in the analytical agenda – minorities or, rather marginalized groups (women, immigrants, homosexuals etc.) and on the other side, among the critics of specific epistemic communities and/or influencing non-state actors (culture, Catholic Church) disturbing the Weberian monopoly of violence in the state’s hands.

Despite the stress on other than clearly political actors in Slovenia the first chapter, also written by the editors – Slovenia since 1988: Building Democracy and Liberalism – describes and analyses in particular the development of important political institutions (elections, parliament, government, political parties). An interesting assumption is that in the last two decades the “Slovenian political landscape has been dominated by four figures” (p. 30) – the liberal (post)Communist President Milan Kučan, the former Prime Minister (from the Slovenian Liberal Democrat party), Janez Drnovšek, Minister of Defence and current Prime Minister for (from the Slovenian Democratic Party) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (initially from the Liberal Democrats; now from the Democratic Party), Dimitrij Rupel. The former Archbishop of Ljubljana, Franc Rode (1997–2004), is mentioned as the fifth most important figure. We could see that the Catholic Church – and personally F. Rode – embodies in the eyes of the authors an important spiritus agens in the post-1990 development in Slovenia, creating “cleavages” in the Slovenian society and politics. We could agree with such an opinion, although the importance of Dimitrij Rupel in particular is neither clearly shown in the chapter nor in the book itself. As the main characteristic of the Slovenian society the authors mention among others strong individualism and the specific position of the Catholic Church. Both characteristics could be understood as opposite values or norms of (political) behaviour in the dichotomy of liberalism versus clericalism; in the authors’ opinion clericalism (and chauvinism) presents the most important challenges for the liberalism and (inclusive) democracy in Slovenia.

In the next part of the book, in three chapters, Slovenian (civic) values are compared with the situation in selected countries. Ola Listhaug and Kristen Ringdal, using the empirical data from European Social Survey (ESS) and European Values Study,
show that the Slovenes are the happiest and satisfied nation in the group of post-communist nations, and with the specific exception of Poland they are the most active in religious affairs in post-communist countries. Slovenes actively participate in social dialogue as labour union members, they do not trust political institutions, and they are not satisfied with the democracy in their country. The dissatisfaction with politics is not clearly analysed; it would be important especially in the happiness and satisfaction comparison. We could only guess that one of the reasons might be the media style of presenting present politics (as a conflict of incompetent politicians).

The chapter written by Zachary T. Irwin is also interesting. He compares civic values in Slovenia with those in Sweden. Among other issues he analyses the position of Catholic Church in Slovenia, stressing the efforts of church representatives to have an influence in education and schools. In contrast, the chapter by Anna Jonsson – *Changing Concepts of Rights in Post-Communist Societies* – with a positivist, legal vocabulary and absence of well-based comparative analysis, does not fit well with the rest of the book. In my opinion, the most important “mistake” of the chapter is the strong focus on normative aspects and also on Soviet Union/Russia. In political science, the comparison of Slovenia and Russia would be acceptable as a comparison of two extremely different political (and legal) systems. Nevertheless, Jonsson often compares Slovenia with Russia; for example the sub-chapter *Legal Transitions* (pp. 73–74) is based on the Russian experience, similarly the issue of human rights in the Eastern Bloc is presented only in the example of Soviet Union (but how do we compare the situation in the Soviet Union with for example “goulash Communism” in Hungary). To resume, in my opinion the chapter is too “scholastic”, ignoring that the development and situation of democracy in Central Europe and the post-Soviet area (with the exception of Baltic States) is extremely different two decades after the fall of the communist régimes.

In the next part three chapters about public attitudes and the media are presented. In the first one, written by Mitja Hafner-Fink, we come back to the values of the Slovenian population. Using the results of surveys the author shows that Slovenes are not as religious as Poles, Slovaks and Hungarians (the result differs from the result from the European surveys presented by Listhaug and Ringdal; the difference lies in the different content of the question: church attendance versus being religious), they strongly support equality as an important value, they are nationalistic and xenophobic, but less so than other post-communist nations; and they prefer their local identity etc. In the general evaluation by Hafner-Fink Slovenes remain at the turning point between traditionalism and (post)modernity.

The next chapter, by Aleš Gabrič analyses, if the culture – during the national movement and also during the non-democratic régimes understood as important political actors (the conscience of nation) – lost its “political function” and became non-exclusive in the political life of Slovenian democracy. Subsequently, Sandra Bašić Hrvatin analyses the development of the media market in Slovenia after 1990. She
observes the media concentration during and after privatization, which, in her opinion, could endanger pluralism in Slovenia, as a basic challenge for and danger to Slovenian democracy.

The next part of the book is dedicated to education and gender issues. Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj describes and analyses the discussion about the school reform and its content. She devotes special attention to the attempt of the Catholic Church to include religious education (verouk) in the schools and denying all attempts of the state officials to compromise (the subject religions and ethics includes other themes beside the Catholic religion and was rejected by church officials). Milica G. Antić opens her chapter about gender equality with the assumption that after 1990 (or 1986) we could observe tendencies towards repatriarchalization in Slovenia. Nevertheless, her analyses shows that such tendencies were limited by the state and society, and that in Slovenia the situation of women is much better in the comparison with all post-communist states, but also many traditional democracies worldwide. Last, but not least Roman Kuhar presents his contribution, focusing on homosexuality as a litmus test of Slovenian democracy. The issue of homosexuals seems to be a real test, where we could clearly differentiate between the traditional, non-democratic positions of the Catholic Church in Slovenia and the liberal majority in society, which accepts homosexuals without adopting extreme counter-positions.

The concluding chapter, subsuming the results of previous analyses, was written by Matjaž Klemenčič. In his opinion, the traditional values of (Slovenian) Catholic Church often deny human rights (of women, homosexuals, non-religious citizens etc.). Also for him, clericalism presents the most important challenge for Slovenian democracy and liberalism. We could agree with his partial conclusions, but we could also find an interesting disharmony here. Klemenčič is asking: “Is there then such thing as clerical democracy? We would argue that there is. It is democratic in form, offering multi-candidate elections, separation of powers, an independent judiciary and an uncensored press, but it is founded on a clericalist political culture in which the core values are defined from the perspective of the dominant faith” (p. 278). Klemenčič understands the Slovenian democratic development therefore as the “ultimate shape” between liberalism (presented by the Liberal Democrats and parties to the left of them) and clericalism (championed by the political parties in the current government). Such a conclusion seems to be too weak in the comparison with the good and in places excellent analysis in the previous chapters. Klemenčič does not see any differences between the three political parties in the government, and external observers could find large differences between clerical New Slovenia party and Democratic Party, promoting liberal-conservative values and behaving in a very pragmatic way. Nevertheless, all declarations about “ultimate shape” immanently contain the same portion of faith and intransigence (and absence of liberalism) as the criticized (non-democratic) clericalism.

Despite the criticism of the concluding remarks on the last page of the book, the analysis of democratic transition in Slovenia, stressing the role of the media, education...
and the importance of democratic values not only in the transition period, but also – and especially – in the long-term process of democracy development and consolidation in the presented work, could inspire social sciences in (not only) other new democracies. The reflection of the democracy and its quality in the post-communist countries of (Central) Eastern Europe and comparison with other such countries, but even more with the “traditional democracies” seems to be a major challenge not only for political scientists in Central Europe. The book edited by Sabrina P. Ramet and Danica Fink-Hafner presents a good example, how such analysis – as case study and also comparison – could be based.

Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic in World Politics

Antonín Dvořák, Miloš Forman, Martina Navrátilová, Emil Zátopek, Jaromír Jágr, Pavel Nedvěd, Václav Havel. If you ask the question „Do you know the Czech Republic?” abroad, you should get these names. In some places people do not know that the Czech Republic exists, in others they know the former Czechoslovakia or its famous natives. But in the first half of 2009 the Czech Republic will chair the European Union. For foreigners it is therefore good to know something more about this small country in the middle of Europe. And with the book written by Ladislav Cabada and Šárka Waisová Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic in World Politics they have the chance.

Although the book was published in 2006, the basic data and historical facts are done. The participation of the authors is also obvious – Cabada and Waisová wrote all chapters. In the preface the authors proclaim that the book is „designed for use in courses on Czech and Central European politics for foreign students participating in various study programs at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen“ (p. 7). Given this target group, they adjust the structure of the book and put the accent on the events of Czechoslovak and Czech history that document most significantly the Czech presence. The authors stress that their goal is „to provide the basic theoretical and conceptual tools required to make some further research and analysis in this issue area“ (p. 7) We can acknowledge that their attempt is successful. Cabada and Waisová do not want to present a comprehensive monograph but try to use their 158 pages to help us understand the evolution of Central Europe and above all the role and position of the Czech Republic in world politics.

The authors describe political and historical processes as the most important. Economic and societal dimensions remain in the background and we should note that this is to the detriment of the cause. For foreigners who know only little about the Czech Republic, it should be interesting but also important to know more about the society of the country and habits which determine the behaviour of the people at turning points in history.

The book is not a chronology. Instead, Cabada and Waisová picked up some interesting themes and analyzed them. Let us follow their steps and look for what they found as really important. In the first chapter, Origins of Czech Statehood and Formation of Czechoslovakia, Cabada turns our attention to the year 1918 and the proclamation of the free state of Czechs and Slovaks and it remains clear that the establishment of Czechoslovakia is inseparably linked with World War I which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The purpose of the first chapter is to introduce historical development of Czech statehood and the deliberations about the

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political development of the Czech nation and its settlement in Central Europe. It is clear that historian František Palacký and journalist Karel Havlíček must be mentioned here – both are considered the key authors of the Czech national program and Cabada describes why. Especially Palacký stressed that small Central European nations do not have enough power to confront the pressure of big nations such as Russia, Germany, or the Ottomans. Although Palacký looked critically at the character of the Habsburg monarchy spoke about a federation of equal Central European nations. Cabada explains Palacký’s ideas correctly but it would be better if he cited which sources he used (p. 10).

When the Czech national program is discussed, it is necessary to mention the development of its conception. As Cabada writes, the conception had changed between the second half of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century. A few politicians rather than the parties figured as important bearers of the idea of Czech independence. The concepts differed among various politicians. Karel Kramář, chairman of the National Liberal Party supported the idea of a Slavonic Empire under the auspices of the Russian Emperor. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, the leader of the Czech exile movement sympathized with the West and his authority was the main factor that helped the birth of the new state of Czechoslovakia to be born.

In this chapter Cabada analyzed in detail the events that took place during the days before and after the establishment of Czechoslovakia. He has used different sources (Olivová, Kalvoda, Balík, Urban) and we can say that those that knew nothing about Czechoslovakia and its establishment prior to reading the book should know more than most Czech graduates.

The second chapter, *The Czechoslovak Republic in Interwar International Politics*, describes why Czechoslovakia was considered a democratic island of freedom at the time. The newly established state which experienced life under the pressure of the Germans was the place to which the Russians first escaped from communism and alter also the Jews and some Germans escaped to from the threat of Hitler’s regime. This was a really important aspect of Czechoslovakia between the years 1920–1938 but Cabada stresses other points of view. We could find enough information about Tomáš Masaryk’s struggle about territorial borders (p. 30–32), the promise to large German minority to accept German language as the second state language (p. 33) or about the position of Czechoslovakia in interwar international system (p. 35–43). It is the description at the macro level that still pays attention to the Czechoslovak position as a newly founded and nearly unimportant state. This statement should be demonstrated on the ties within Little Entente. In spite of this deal not a single one of the allies helped Czechoslovakia in the clash with Germany. In short we could say that this chapter is a chronology of chosen important facts which are contextualized and offer a better understanding of the whole situation prior to World War II.

The situation after the Munich Agreement is the theme of the third chapter, *From Munich to Czechoslovak Renewal*. As Cabada reminds us „Hitler’s interest in
Czechoslovakia was connected with the idea of German *Mitteleuropa* that in Nazi regime also retained its continuity within the German policy (p. 44). For people unaware of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia the information about Sudeten-German Party led by Konrad Henlein, which won the parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia in 1935, is interesting. Although it was the strongest German party in Czechoslovakia Cabada draws attention to the fact that smaller political parties that represented Czech Germans were against the policy of *Mitteleuropa* and were the part of the government together with Social Democrats, Christian Socialists and Agrarians. This equilibrium did not last too long. The war was close and the situation and relationship between Czechs and Germans was getting worse. Cabada did not forget not only about the differences between Czech and Slovak part of Czechoslovakia but also about the international treaties and positions of the main players on the international diplomatic field (argument between Churchill and Chamberlain, supporting of Germany by Italy and France, etc…). This chapter also in short exposes the situation in Slovakia whose leaders (Hlinka, Tiso) were satisfied by the disunion of former Czechoslovakia. It clearly shows the different position of the Czech and Slovak political elites – Czech leaders escaped abroad and formed in London the exile government, Slovak leaders supported the steps of Adolf Hitler.

We should say that this chapter not only shows precisely the war period in the Czech lands and Slovakia but also describes the reasons which led to the next division of Europe to the West and states arising under the sphere of the Soviet influence. The problem is analysed further in the fourth chapter, *Czechoslovakia in Divided Europe. Formation of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy and Relations with Neighbours and Great Powers during the Cold War Period*. In the beginning Waisová again mentions some facts connected with the war period but then show different steps which brought Czechoslovakia close to the Soviet Union (refusal of the Marshall Plan, Comecon, the Warsaw Pact). By reading this chapter it becomes clear that in Czechoslovakia there was during few decades no attempt to change the course of foreign policy. Waisová therefore focuses on the relations of Czechoslovakia with France, Britain, and both German states, Poland, Hungary and Austria. It should be a little bit surprising when we get the information that Czechoslovak-British and Czechoslovak-French relations were very different. After the fall of the iron curtain and on the basis of the war experience when both France and Britain helped Hitler to destroy Czechoslovakia it is interesting that French-Czechoslovak relations were much better than the British-Czechoslovak relations but Waisová clearly explains the reasons (p. 68–69). Relations with West Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary and East Germany were determined by the geopolitical situation – West Germany was the enemy, Poland, Hungary and East Germany were allies and satellites of the Soviet Union. The relation to Austria was for the whole time problematic and difficult due to the Sudeten-German problem which was in the end of the 1970s followed by the disputes about the (in)security of Czech nuclear power plants.
For those not interested in international relations it should come as a surprise that Czechoslovak-Polish and Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations were not as friendly as expected among partners of the Warsaw Pact. Waisová illustrates that the reason lay in several territorial disputes (with Poland in the border area in Upper Silesia, with Hungary in the south part of Slovakia). Another reason was different historical experience and the rigidity of the communist regime. The chapter does not mention or analyze this standpoint in depth.

The fifth chapter, *Czech Republic and Foreign Development Assistance: from Beneficiary to Donor*, first introduces the concepts of development and humanitarian assistance (*Official Development Assistance*) and defines the difference between development and humanitarian assistance. It is a little bit surprising because in the preceding chapters the authors showed the history and position of Czechoslovakia in the international system chronologically up until 1990 and now there is a text about the Czech Official Development Assistance. Therefore it is useless to explain the differences between the types of assistance. But if we accept the scenario then we are satisfied with the explanation of Czechoslovak experience with development assistance before 1989 and the description of the way that Czechoslovakia went from donor to recipient of assistance. Nevertheless the reader will appreciate some exact numbers and data when reading about the marginalization of Czechoslovak development assistance at the beginning of 1990s (p. 80) as it is by the data of Czech ODA donation (see page 82). This reservation however cannot undermine the fact that Waisová analyzed Czech development and humanitarian assistance in detail and provided data that is not known to Czech society or the foreigners.

In the sixth chapter, *Czech Foreign Policy – Small State or Middle Power Approach?*, which one would expect to find before the fifth chapter, Cabada deals with the question of the abilities and role that the Czech Republic play on the international field. He compares several approaches (Krejčí, Robejšek, Behringer, Štěpanovský) that use different criteria of the middle power. But if we take as relevant the economic strength and Czech position in international area we have to agree with Cabada’s conclusion that „Czech foreign policy in the medium-term perspective could become the foreign policy of a medium-sized state“ (p. 110). Nowadays we have to see not much important role in international politics (UN, EU, NATO) which is obvious in the discussion with the USA about visas for Czech citizens coming to USA. Cabada, at the end of the sixth chapter, insists that if Czech Republic really wants to play the role of middle power it has to strengthen its economic power and the effective investment of the means gained through this (especially development aid).

The position of the Czech Republic in the international arena is closely connected to the direction of its foreign policy. This topic is the theme of the seventh chapter, *Between Atlanticism, Anti-Americanism and Europeanization: Dilemmas in Czech Foreign Policy and the War on Terrorism*. At the beginning of the chapter Waisová stresses that the aim „is to analyse US-Czech bilateral relations in the post-Cold War
period“ (p. 111). She reminds us of four distinct periods in the relationship between Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic) and the USA. There is a question about the differences of third (1989–2001) and fourth (after September 11, 2001) period. Is it done either by the geopolitical situation or by the change in the White House? For the USA the Czech Republic never was the key partner. On the other hand some Czech politicians wanted Czech Republic to be closer and get better US protection (p. 115). But as we can find in the book there is also really loud voice that prefers the Czech Republic leaning to the European Union. Waisová correctly shows the different opinions and mentions the trouble acts (the Kosovo intervention, Afghanistan intervention) which make the partnership with the USA problematic for many people in the Czech Republic. At the end of the chapter Waisová claims that „the US perceives the Czech Republic as one of many small states, whose relationship to Washington is not decisive for US global interests“ (p. 125). This is undoubtedly true. We should expect more cogent arguments about the prophecy of the Czech parliamentary election in 2006. Waisová guessed that „if the Civic Democrats win an election, the Atlantic and pro-American orientation would be strengthened“ (p. 125). The party led by Mirek Topolánek won the election but the transformation of the Czech foreign orientation cannot be mentioned. It is also done by the situation in the Czech government and also by the discussion in European Union about the European Constitution but we should comment that the direction remains the same as it was in the era when the Social Democrats were the most powerful party in the Czech government.

The last chapter, Regional Cooperation and Integration in Central Europe. Czech Republic as Regional Organizations Member, is closely connected with regional integration. It describes its problems and perspectives. Waisová briefly presents the history of the Central European integration process and what we can expect to happen in the future. But there is also hindsight and a reminder of the time when Central and Eastern Europe was part of the Eastern Bloc „in which the Soviet Union controlled all aspects of life“ (p. 127). After these historical reminiscences, the endeavour to become a member of NATO and EU is mentioned. It is correct that a few paragraphs about Russian politics (p. 138) are included because it is clear that Russia still rates the states of Central Europe as the lands which should be counted to its sphere of influence. Beside this Russian tension it was the effort to become sooner the part of important institutions as European Union which led post-communist countries in Central Europe to create the Visegrad Cooperation. Its role was successfully fulfilled and we should agree with the author that „there is probably no future for the Visegrad framework“ (p. 142). The result of this development is clear – mutual contacts between the Central European states are very weak. This should create trouble in the future – if these states do not cooperate more, each will play a weak role in the European Union. As it is shown at the end on the chapter the incorporation into the EU led to the weakening of Central European regionalism and cooperation (p. 146). This is also case of the Czech Republic which is therefore playing the role of a small state.
Generally, we can say that the book has fulfilled its objective. *Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic in World Politics* may help those interested in the past, present and future of the Czech Republic to understand the main aims and the strategies used by the Czech political representation. We should appreciate the chronological composition of the book. In some places it lacks a perfect sequence (chapters 4 and 5). As was mentioned before sometimes we should also expect more precise citations of sources. The book is a work by two authors and in some chapters we find information that appeared in a previous part of the book. More precise work by the publisher would also be contributive.

Despite these reservations, *Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic in World Politics* is a good attempt to show foreign students the Czech Republic in different way than they can see by living here. In addition to important data from Czech history, the book also offers a collection of analysis and opinions which in the context show the role of the Czech Republic and the possibilities which led to the steps of the Czech political representation. And it is a benefit not only for foreigners but also for Czech natives who sometimes forget important events of their own Czech history and very often do not know much about institutions where the Czech Republic plays any role as its member state.

*Ladislav Cabada and Šárka Waisová, Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic in World Politics, Plzeň/Pilsen, Aleš Čeněk 2006, 158 pages.*
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