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Razprave

Anđelko Vlašić

Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press towards the Trieste Crisis, 1945–1975

VLAŠIĆ, Anđelko, Ph.D., Research Associate, Croatian Institute of History, Branch for the History of Slavonia, Syrmia and Baranya, Ante Starčevića 8, 35000 Slavonski Brod, Republic of Croatia, andelko.vlasic@gmail.com

Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press towards the Trieste Crisis, 1945–1975

Zgodovinski časopis (Historical Review), Ljubljana 72/2018 (157), No. 1-2, pp. 232–255, 117 notes

Language Sn. (En., Sn., En.) The article shows changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press toward the Trieste Crisis from 1945 to 1975 through analysis of the most important Yugoslav newspapers of the period. The claims made on the disputed territory diminished through time, from claims on all ethnically Yugoslav (Slovene and Croat) areas to the claims solely on Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste. The press reacted according to official views of the Yugoslav leadership, demonstrated aggressiveness during Italian-Yugoslav negotiations and acquiescence with the outcome of negotiations once an agreement had been made.

Key Words: Trieste Crisis, socialist Yugoslavia, Yugoslav-Italian relations, World War II, territorial disputes, newspaper reports

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Spremembe stališč jugoslovanskega tiska do tržaške krize v letih 1945–1975

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Na podlagi analize najpomembnejšega sočasnega jugoslovanskega časopisja so v članku predstavljene spremembe stališč jugoslovanskega tiska do tržaške krize v letih 1945 do 1975. Zahteve po spornem ozemlju so se sčasoma zmanjševale, segale so od zahtev po celotnem etničnem jugoslovanskem območju (slovenskem in hrvaškem) do takih, ki so zahtevale zgolj cono B Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja. Reakcija tiska je odražala uradno stališče jugoslovanskega vodstva, agresivnost v času italijansko-jugoslovanskih pogajanj in strinjanje z njihovim izidom po sklenitvi dogovora.

Ključne besede: Trst, kriza, socialistična Jugoslavija, jugoslovansko-italijanski odnosi, 2. svetovna vojna, ozemeljski spori, časopisna poročanja

Introduction and methodology¹

Origins of the Trieste Crisis can be found at the end of World War I, when the Julian March, i.e., the cities Trieste, Fiume, and Zara (the latter two today are called Rijeka and Zadar) and their environs were still part of Austria-Hungary. The end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on November 3, 1918, was followed by a dispute between Italy and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (from December 1, 1918, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) over the Julian March. In 1915, with the Treaty of London, signed between England, France, and Russia on the one side and Italy on the other, Italy was promised a part of the eastern Adriatic coast in exchange for its participation in World War I on the side of the Entente. In 1918, Italy occupied the mentioned territories and, with the diplomatic help of the Entente, officially annexed a substantial part of the former Austrian littoral in 1920 through the Treaty of Rapallo. The peaceful coexistence of Italians, Croats and Slovenes in the region was over when Italy started to repress the activities of Croat and Slovene schools and cultural and sports societies, and continued to do so throughout the Interwar Period. In 1945, feeling that the mentioned treaties were unfair and wanting to include the Slavic population of those annexed parts into the after-war Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Partisans fought the retreating German forces, captured Trieste on May 1, 1945, and, in their eyes, corrected the above-mentioned injustice.²

The topic of this research are Yugoslav press articles dealing with the Trieste crisis from 1945 to 1975, i.e., from the moment when Yugoslav forces entered Trieste until the Osimo Treaty of 1975, which finally resolved the problem of minority rights for the Italian and Yugoslav minority in Yugoslavia and Italy, respectively. Yugoslav newspapers were publishing numerous comments of the mentioned events. In the 1940s and in the later decades, when newspapers were the biggest medium and thus extensively used for proliferation of state propaganda, Yugoslav regime tended to control the press through direct ownership or through appointment

¹ This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled *With Time Comes Change? Evolution of Yugoslav Press Opinion on the Trieste Crisis, 1945-1975*, which was presented at the International scientific conference *Ethno-political conflicts between the Adriatic and the Aegean in the 1940s* in Vienna, Austria, July 3-4, 2014. I wish to express my appreciation for helpful comments to Petar Bagarić.

² For more on this topic, see: Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*; Dukovski, *Istra: kratka povijest*, p. 168-178.

of trusted persons in the editorships of Yugoslav newspapers. Those individuals were taking care that the views of newspapers were compliant with the views of the regime.³ It can be posited that during the Trieste crisis Yugoslav newspapers were used generally as a propaganda tool for the construction of a favorable public opinion and for ameliorating Yugoslavia's negotiating position towards Italy and the Allies. Yugoslav leaders imposed their own views on the Yugoslav public through propaganda in newspapers and then justified their demands by relying on the public opinion that they had created in the first place.⁴ This assumption will be further discussed in this article.

Newspapers analyzed in this article were chosen with the aim to give a broad picture of the Yugoslav press in the mentioned period. Besides the most important daily newspapers of the Yugoslav federal republics whose territories were disputed during the Trieste Crisis (Serbian newspapers *Borba* and *Politika*, Croatian newspaper *Vjesnik*, Slovenian *Delo* and *Ljubljanski dnevnik/Dnevnik*), this article is based on regional newspapers of the mentioned republics (Croatian *Slobodna Dalmacija*, *Riječki list/Novi list* and *Glas Istre* and Slovenian *Primorski dnevnik* and *Primorske novice*), whose circulation covered the area disputed during the Trieste Crisis. All of these newspapers were controlled by the Yugoslav communist regime. The main aim of their editorship was to mobilize the public in favor of the Yugoslav side in the border dispute with Italy.⁵ One can also argue that the journalists of the regional newspapers demonstrated their own views too, because their professional activity was characterized by a resolute and emotional strive to fight for the accession of the disputed territories to Yugoslavia.

Politika is a Serbian daily newspaper founded in Belgrade in 1904, and it has been under the control of the communist regime as described above. *Borba* is also a Serbian daily; it was established in 1922 in Zagreb, but was finally moved to Belgrade in 1944 and published simultaneously in Belgrade and Zagreb from 1948. It was founded as the official bulletin of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It also changed its name a number of times but the word "Borba" was always present. Zagreb-based Croatian daily *Vjesnik* was established in 1940 as a primary publication of the Communist Party of Croatia. It was published as a daily since 1945 and has changed its name many times, but the word "Vjesnik" was always present. It was the central Croatian newspaper after World War II and its views were consistent with the views of the regime.

Croatian newspaper *Riječki list* was issued in Rijeka in 1947 as a regional newspaper concentrated on Rijeka, its immediate surroundings, and the Istrian Peninsula. It changed its name to *Novi list* in 1954. The role of the Yugoslav Communist Party's officials in the editorship of *Riječki list* was significant. Its texts concerning the Trieste Crisis were numerous and extensive, and the aim of the editorship was to mobilize the public so it would show solidarity with the official policy of the

³ Spehnyak, Uloga novina, pp. 166-167.

⁴ Compare: Samsa, 'Riječki' Novi list, p. 105.

⁵ Spehnyak, Uloga novina, p. 177.

regime.⁶ Croatian daily *Slobodna Dalmacija*, based in Split, was issued in 1943 as a Partisan weekly newsletter and a regional Dalmatian newspaper; it became a daily on November 29, 1945. *Glas Istre* is another Croatian regional newspaper, established by the Istrian Partisans in 1943 and later situated in Pula as a regional bulletin of the Istrian Peninsula. During its first years it was published irregularly, and then as a weekly newspaper until 1969 when it became a daily.⁷ *Primorski dnevnik* is a Slovenian regional daily newspaper issued in 1945 in Trieste by the Yugoslav Partisans. It became the main news source of the Slovenian community in Trieste and the surroundings. *Primorske novice* is a Slovenian regional newspaper published in Koper. It was first issued in 1947 as a biweekly named *Nova Gorica*. It became a weekly in 1948 and changed its name to *Primorske novice* in 1953. It was the official journal of the anti-fascist Liberation Front of the Slovene Nation for the Gorizia region. Ljubljana-based Slovenian daily newspaper *Ljubljanski dnevnik* was issued in 1951 and renamed to *Dnevnik* in 1968. Another Ljubljana-based Slovenian daily, *Delo*, established in 1959, was the official journal of the Communist party of Slovenia.

The change in the attitude of the Yugoslav press on the extent of territories Yugoslavia (in their view) should have encompassed during the Trieste crisis will be examined based on nine key dates of the crisis: May 1, 1945 (Yugoslav Army's entering into Trieste), June 12, 1945 (Yugoslav Army's retreat from Trieste), May 16, 1946 (end of the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of USA, USSR, UK and France), February 10, 1947 (the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty), September 15, 1947 (establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste), March 20, 1948 (Tripartite Declaration), October 8, 1953 (Two-Power Declaration), October 5, 1954 (Memorandum of Understanding), and November 10, 1975 (Treaty of Osimo).

Yugoslav Army's entering into Trieste on May 1, 1945

The Yugoslav 4th Army entered Trieste on May 1, 1945, and the British 8th Army arrived on the next day. Yugoslav newspapers were consistently calling the Yugoslav Army campaign in Istria and the Slovene Littoral liberation of the region.⁸ Belgrade daily newspaper *Politika* published the call originally announced by a Yugoslav radio-station and addressing the inhabitants of Trieste, urging them to fight against the German occupation forces in Trieste and join the Yugoslav forces: "Citizens of Trieste, it is up to you to help", "you need to be united, everyone: both Italians and Slovenes".⁹ Yugoslav Army's "liberation" of Istria, Trieste and Pula was called "the culmination of an epopee", i.e., of the Partisan liberation war: "The arrival of our army in Trieste

⁶ Novak, *Hrvatsko novinarstvo*, p. 439; Samsa, pp. 113, 119.

⁷ Novak, *Hrvatsko novinarstvo*, pp. 345-346.

⁸ Naše trupe oslobodile su Rijeku i Pulj i očistile od neprijatelja celu Istru i Slovensko Primorje, *Politika*, No. 11971, May 4, 1945, p. 1; Veličanstveni dani Istre, *Glas Istre*, No. 36, May 6, 1945, p. 1; Osvoboditev Trsta, *Primorski dnevnik*, No. 1, May 13, 1945, p. 1.

⁹ Osvobodilna fronta poziva građane Trsta na ustanak, *Politika*, No. 11968, May 1, 1945, p. 4.

and the Slovene Littoral is an event of such importance that there are only few equally great events noted in our history.”¹⁰ “The victory of the national liberation struggle in Istria is not just victory of Yugoslavia; it is also a victory of the entire Slavdom. [...] Wide Italian masses within the Italian minority have already been convinced that the new Yugoslavia was something completely different from the imperialist and fascist Italy. This is why the Italian masses of Rovinj, Vodnjan, and other places greeted the liberation of Istria with enthusiasm.”¹¹ “Trieste cordially greeted our Yugoslav soldiers. Citizens showed us places of enemy resistance. Italians as much as Slovenes. [...] Trieste was shining in liberty. Continuous manifestations lasted many days. Masses assembled and cheered for freedom. At one occasion, 30.000 people gathered. Italian anti-fascist songs, our songs, mixed flags, enthusiasm and applause, all this reveals an indestructible brotherhood of Italians and Slovenes of Trieste...”¹²

Glas Istre clearly expressed its opinion on the future of the Julian March: “For us [...] the question of these territories is forever settled. The heroic Yugoslav Army settled it [...] Italian imperialists are now on the other side of the river Isonzo. Centennial struggle for the Slavdom of these areas has ended with a final victory of freedom, democracy and justice [...] If the Italian imperialists wish to enslave Trieste again [...] let them come and try to take it; Yugoslav Army will teach them how to respect Tito’s Yugoslavia.”¹³ Yugoslav journalists unanimously defended actions of the Yugoslav Army and the right of Yugoslavia on the northern Adriatic lands inhabited by Slavs: “Trieste was never an Italian city neither by the feelings of its inhabitants nor by its material interests [...] Trieste was always ours, Slovenian, Yugoslav, and Slavic” and Italians were “just an oasis in a Slavic ethnographic area”.¹⁴

Those views were consistent with the official views of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito expressed his government’s stance by defending the right of all Yugoslav peoples to live inside the borders of Yugoslavia.¹⁵ This stance soon changed due to Allies’ wish for Trieste to be part of western-oriented Italy, and not of communist Yugoslavia; with that aim, Allies started pressuring Yugoslav leaders to order the retreat of their army from Trieste.¹⁶ Although Yugoslav press expressed the desire for the inclusion of Trieste in Yugoslavia and stated that the “Italian minority [of Trieste] with its participation in the national liberation struggle and the organization of people’s authority has demonstrated that it is for the unification with Yugoslavia”,¹⁷ that desire was suppressed when leading Yugoslav

¹⁰ Oslobođenje Istre, *Politika*, No. 11968, May 1, 1945, p. 4.

¹¹ Veličanstveni dani Istre, *Glas Istre*, No. 36, May 6, 1945, p. 1.

¹² U bojovima i slavlju s borcima, *Vjesnik*, No. 22, May 16, 1945, p. 3.

¹³ Bonomi provocira, *Glas Istre*, No. 36, May 6, 1945, p. 2.

¹⁴ Naš Trst, *Politika*, No. 11971, May 4, 1945, pp. 1-2.

¹⁵ Jugoslavija, čiji su narodi dali milion i sedam stotina hiljada žrtava u ovom ratu, dostojanstveno će braniti svoje tekovine i pravo da njeni narodi žive u okviru njenih granica, *Politika*, No. 11991, May 28, 1945, p. 1; Jugoslavija ne traži ništa drugo nego da njezini narodi, narodi njezine krvi budu u okviru njezinih granica, *Vjesnik*, No. 33, May 29, 1945, p. 1.

¹⁶ Sluga, Trieste: Ethnicity, pp. 289-290.

¹⁷ Tražimo slobodu za sav svoj narod kao i za sve ostale narode, *Politika*, No. 11980, May 16, 1945, p. 1.

politicians stated their demand for autonomy of Trieste. Yugoslav vice-president Edvard Kardelj in his interview said that Yugoslav Army “liberated Istria and the Slovene Littoral with Trieste by its own forces through heavy fighting and with great sacrifice. [...] For us, those territories were by no means someone else’s lands, but our own national territory that, in the past, was violently torn apart from Yugoslavia” and this is why Yugoslav rights to those territories were “substantiated by moral-political arguments”. Kardelj stated that Yugoslavia had demanded recognition of its national territories: “We do not ask for something that belongs to others; only our ethnographic borders. [...] It is true, undoubtedly, that Trieste’s population is mostly Italian with a significant Slovenian majority” but “a city belongs to its hinterland, not the other way around. [...] It would be the most correct thing to give Trieste autonomy within Yugoslavia, which would assure all national rights to Italians in Trieste and free cultural development”.¹⁸ This demand then became a constant in the Yugoslav press.¹⁹ The same request for autonomy came from the Yugoslav civilian authorities established in Trieste, whose actions had probably been instructed by Belgrade.²⁰ Delegation of Yugoslav-ruled Trieste’s civilian authorities visited Belgrade on May 30, 1945, and stated that they do not want an “abruption of Trieste from its natural hinterland”.²¹

With regard to reasons the Yugoslav press stated as crucial for the decision of the Allies in favor of Yugoslav claims, the period of forty days throughout which the Yugoslav Army stayed in Trieste and the actions of the Yugoslav forces in the city were deemed as very positive. Newspapers tell us that Trieste’s civilian authority was being built, Italian-Slovene cooperation supported²² and the Italians and Slovenes of Trieste lived in harmonious coexistence.²³ Moreover, the Yugoslav press claimed on countless occasions that it was the Yugoslav forces, and Yugoslav

¹⁸ Potpredsednik vlade Edvard Kardelj o položaju Trsta, Istre i Slovenskog Primorja, *Politika*, No. 11979, May 14, 1945, p. 1.

¹⁹ Istinska autonomija oslobođenog Trsta, *Vjesnik*, No 27, May 22, 1945, p. 4.

²⁰ Istorisko zasedanje skupštine 1348 delegata stanovništva grada Trsta, *Politika*, No. 11985, May 21, 1945, p. 1; Manifestacije Trščana Titu i Jugoslaviji, *Vjesnik*, No. 29, May 24, 1945, p. 1.

²¹ Pretstavnici Oslobođilačke skupštine grada Trsta i NOO Slovenskog Primorja pozdravljaju maršala Tita, *Politika*, No. 11994, June 1, 1945, p. 1.

²² Zasedanje plenuma Italo-slovenačkog antifašističkog izvršnog odbora za grad Trst, *Politika*, No. 11981, May 17, 1945, p. 1; Uspostavljena građanska narodna vlast u Trstu, *Vjesnik*, No 26, May 20, 1945, p. 2; Istorisko zasedanje skupštine 1348 delegata stanovništva grada Trsta, *Politika*, No. 11985, May 21, 1945, p. 1; Borba protiv fašizma i njegovih terorističkih bandi mora se nastaviti do kraja, *Politika*, No. 11989, May 26, 1945, p. 5; Velebna proslava oslobođenja Istre, *Glas Istre*, No. 38, May 14, 1945, p. 1.

²³ Jugoslavija ne može dozvoliti da se teritorije naseljene Jugoslovenima stave na milost i nemilost Bonomijevih vlasti, *Politika*, No. 11983, May 19, 1945, p. 1; Svečana predaja civilne vlati Italijansko-slovenačkom antifašističkom odboru za grad Trst, *Politika*, No. 11983, May 19, 1945, p. 3; Za učvršćivanje bratstva s Talijanima Istre, *Glas Istre*, No. 44, May 29, 1945, p. 2; Manifestacije bratstva i jedinstva italijanskog i slovenačkog stanovništva u Trstu, *Politika*, No. 11992, May 30, 1945, p. 3; U Trstu, čitavoj Istri i Slovenskom Primorju vlada red i mir, *Politika*, No. 12002, June 10, 1945, p. 2; U nerazorivom bratstvu Hrvata i Talijana Istra je proslavila 27. srpnja, *Glas Istre*, No. 68, July 28, 1945, p. 1.

forces only, which liberated Trieste from the Germans.²⁴ In addition, numerous articles were emphasizing that the population in question should decide in which country they want to live: "The peoples of Istria and the Slovene Littoral made countless sacrifices during the struggle of national liberation and we [i.e. Yugoslavia] have a moral obligation to ensure that they can truly freely express their opinion on the matter of self-determination".²⁵ "One of the most essential principles of international law: the right to national self-determination is obviously completely deserved in this region of ours, which was taken by Italy after the last war. Istria, Trieste, Gorizia and the Slovene Littoral are ethnographically an integral part of Yugoslav lands. Out of 10.000 km² of that area, the Yugoslavs inhabit 9.500 and Italians just 500 km². [...] The population of these lands stood up against fascism and placed themselves in the ranks of the Yugoslav Army: *Garibaldi* Battalion consists of Trieste Italians..."²⁶ One Yugoslav journalist expressed the opinion that Yugoslavia needed to protect the population of the region in question from the Italian oppression that those peoples experienced during the Interwar Period: "Through a four-year struggle, the peoples of these lands deserved the right to be given protection, and Yugoslavia cannot deprive them of that."²⁷ As for the manner in which the dispute should have been settled, the predominant view in the Yugoslav press was that the destiny of the concerned region should have been decided in a post-war peace conference.²⁸

Yugoslav Army's retreat from Trieste on June 12, 1945

Under the pressure of the Allies, an agreement was signed in the town of Duino on June 10, 1945, according to which the Yugoslav Army had to withdraw from Trieste, Slovene Littoral, Pula, and their immediate environs. The Yugoslav Army eventually withdrew from Trieste on June 12, 1945.²⁹ The official Yugoslav

²⁴ Postoje takvi ljudi i takvi krugovi u Evropi i u svetu koji misle da treba početi sa uređenjem Evrope na taj način što će se sprečiti hiljadugodišnja težnja slovenačkog naroda da se ujedini i postane srećan na svojoj zemlji, *Politika*, No. 12004, May 13, 1945, p. 1; Mi ćemo braniti svoja prava, *Glas Istre*, No. 40, May 19, 1945, p. 2; Jugoslavija ne može dozvoliti da se teritorije naseljene Jugoslovenima stave na milost i nemilost Bonomijevih vlasti, *Politika*, No. 11983, May 19, 1945, p. 1.

²⁵ Braneci svoja prava ratujućeg saveznika, Jugoslavija je spremna da učini sve moguće za držanje dobrih savezničkih odnosa, *Politika*, No. 11982, May 18, 1945, p. 1; Istra želi i hoće živjeti samo u slobodnoj i demokratskoj Jugoslaviji, *Vjesnik*, No. 31, May 26, 1945, p. 3; Dve osnovne činjenice u pitanju Istre i Slovenskog Primorja, *Politika*, No. 19990, May 27, 1945, p. 1.

²⁶ Oslobođenje Istre, *Politika*, No. 11968, May 1, 1945, p. 4.

²⁷ Jugoslavija ne može dozvoliti da se teritorije naseljene Jugoslovenima stave na milost i nemilost Bonomijevih vlasti, *Politika*, No. 11983, May 19, 1945, p. 1.

²⁸ Jugoslavenska armija, kao saveznička armija, ima pravo da ostane na teritoriji koju je oslobodila od zajedničkog neprijatelja, *Politika*, No. 11984, May 20, 1945, p. 1; Sporazum o Istri i Slovenskom Primorju, *Politika*, No. 12005, June 14, 1945, p. 3.

²⁹ U Beogradu je juče potpisan sporazum između jugoslovenske vlade i vlade Velike Britanije i Sjedinjenih Država Amerike o okupaciji i privremenoj administraciji u Istri, Trstu i Slovenskom Primorju, *Politika*, No. 12002, June 10, 1945, p. 1; Banac, *Sa Staljinom protiv Tita*, p. 31.

opinion can be seen in the declaration soon afterwards released by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ivan Šubašić. He stated that the feelings and interests of the Yugoslav population in Istria, Trieste and the Slovene Littoral were “severely injured” because much of the Yugoslav Army had to retreat “from the territories that it liberated with so many victims from the yoke of strangers, and especially because almost all of those places, except Trieste, were inhabited by a compact Yugoslav population”. According to Šubašić, Yugoslav retreat was carried out in order to avoid a conflict with the Allies and “with the aim of building peace and security”.³⁰ As for the Yugoslav press, it emphasized the demonstrations of the population of Istria and Trieste, allegedly both Italians and Slovenes, throughout the months of May and June 1945, demanding to stay inside the borders of Yugoslavia.³¹

From the month of May 1945 onwards, the Yugoslav press published numerous articles on manifestations throughout Istria calling for unification with Yugoslavia, especially the regional newspapers. Their front pages were full of pro-Yugoslav propaganda regarding the future of the disputed territories. Articles were reiterating the claim that the Italian minority wished to stay within Yugoslavia, that the Allied occupation of Trieste and Pula was only temporary and that the people of Istria should have decided on their own in which country they wished to live.³² Thus, the Yugoslav press repeated the stance of the Yugoslav government, which claimed that “in almost all of the places [in the Julian March], except in Trieste, lives a compact Yugoslav population”.³³ The mentioned propaganda continued throughout 1945 and 1946 at reduced intensity, but it would heighten whenever there was an instigation stemming from the decisions of the Allied authorities in Zone A or the Italian authorities in Rome. This situation occurred many times in the following years and throughout the 1950s. Yugoslav regional newspapers led the way in intensity of such articles. As one article puts it, the population of Trieste had known that Yugoslavia “guarantees them that the rule of the people will be assured and its democratic achievements, gained through bloody fighting, preserved”.³⁴ Situation in Zone A had been very difficult, claimed the Yugoslav press: the people of Trieste had been organizing protests and voicing their wish to be joined with their compatriots in Yugoslavia but the authorities of Zone A were harassing them and suppressing their protests. Numerous articles described the

³⁰ Izjava Vlade Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije povodom potpisivanja vonog sporazuma sa vladama Velike Britanije i SAD, *Politika*, No. 12004, June 13, 1945, p. 1.

³¹ Život Istre pod okupatorima i danas u slobodi, *Vjesnik*, No. 35, May 31, 1945, p. 3; Trst hoće da živi slobodan, *Politika*, No. 12007, June 16, 1945, p. 1; Trst od 12 do 17 juna, *Politika*, No. 12015, June 24, 1945, p. 4; Zašto je u Trstu izbio generalni štrajk, *Politika*, No. 12017, June 27, 1945, p. 1; Protestni zborovi i štrajkovi naroda Istre i Slovenskog Primorja u zoni okupiranoj od Saveznika, *Politika*, No. 12017, June 27, 1945, p. 1.

³² Plebiscit Istre za Titovu Jugoslaviju, *Glas Istre*, No. 50, June 13, 1945, p. 1; Gradjani Pule manifestiraju svoju ljubav i odanost novoj – Titovoj Jugoslaviji, *Glas Istre*, No. 51, June 16, 1945, p. 1; Hoćemo slobodu, hoćemo Tita i Jugoslaviju, *Glas Istre*, No. 52, June 21, 1945, p. 1; Talijanske i hrvatske žene Istre čvrsto će braniti tekovine borbe, *Glas Istre*, No. 57, July 3, 1945, p. 1.

³³ Naša prava ostaju i nadalje na snazi, *Glas Istre*, No. 50, June 13, 1945, p. 1.

³⁴ Stanovništvo Trsta za demokraciju i slobodu, *Vjesnik*, 213, January 26, 1946, p. 3.

position of the Slavic minorities of Trieste and Zone A as “unbearable”, and the “terror” of the Allies and Italian “fascist” authorities.³⁵

End of the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 16, 1946

The third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of USA, USSR, UK, and France held in Paris between April 25 and May 16, 1946, resulted in four propositions for the settlement of the border dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia, which was to be decided during the Peace Conference in July 1946. Among the propositions, the French one was regarded as the most suitable by the Allies, probably because it seemed as the most moderate solution: the towns of Gorizia and Monfalcone with their respective surroundings and the region called Venetian Slovenia (Slovene: Beneška Slovenija; Italian: Slavia Friuliana) were to be given to Italy, and the city of Trieste with a narrow coastal strip and the northwestern part of the Istrian peninsula were to be included in an independent state called the Free Territory of Trieste. Yugoslav Vice-President Kardelj voiced his dissatisfaction with the fact that the majority of propositions neglected the ethnic principle of demarcation, i.e., the propositions did not mind that a considerable number of Italians and Yugoslav would have to stay on the opposite side of the proposed border. Kardelj said in his interview for *Vjesnik* that “it is not only a flagrant injustice for the peoples of the Julian March, but also a humiliation for Yugoslavia, which has given so much in this war [i.e. World War II] for the cause of the Allies”.³⁶ Yugoslav newspapers also expressed their disagreement with the Allies’ decision. Articles detailing Yugoslav government’s views appeared almost daily on the front pages of newspapers. Yugoslavia was described as a victim whose territories were being taken from it for decades.³⁷

Signing of the Paris Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947

The Peace Conference held in Paris between July 29 and October 15, 1946, ended with the decision that the towns of Gorizia and Monfalcone with the aforementioned Venetian Slovenia would be given to Italy. Furthermore, the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) was confirmed. The FTT was established on February 10, 1947, when the Paris Peace Treaty was officially signed, but it effectively came into existence on September 15, 1947. Its administration was divided into two areas, Zone

³⁵ Današnja stvarnost u Trstu, *Vjesnik*, No. 296, April 5, 1946, p. 3; Kako sudi izvanredni sud u Trstu, *Vjesnik*, No. 309, April 20, 21, and 22, 1946, p. 3.

³⁶ Samsa, ‘Riječki’ Novi list, p. 107; Ono što mi tražimo, to je samo da nam se vrati nasilno oteti teritorij, koji je vjekovima naseljen našim narodom, *Vjesnik*, No. 321, May 8, 1946, p. 1.

³⁷ Samsa, ‘Riječki’ Novi list, pp. 108-109; Jugoslavija neće potpisati nikakav ugovor u kojem njeni opravdani zahtjevi neće biti zadovoljeni, *Vjesnik*, No. 364, June 30, 1946, p. 1.

A and B, one being Trieste with a narrow coastal strip named Zone A and administered by British and American forces. The other zone was formed from the northwestern part of the Istrian peninsula and was administered by the Yugoslav Army. Those two decisions had been seen as losses for the Yugoslav side. The decision of the Peace Conference that had been seen as positive for Yugoslavia was the handover of parts of Gorizia, Carniola, the biggest part of Istria, the Kvarner islands with Rijeka, Zadar and the islands of Lastovo and Palagruža, which were all part of Italy until 1941, to Yugoslavia. The official Yugoslav stance was that they were not satisfied because “Yugoslav ethnic territories such as Kanalska dolina [Italian: Val Canale], Venetian Slovenia, the territory of Gorizia, Monfalcone, Trieste, and northwestern Istria were taken” and Yugoslav “elementary national interests were truncated”.³⁸ Furthermore, Yugoslavia was “deeply worried for the destiny” of its population on the other side of the border and “by signing this contract did not renounce its right to the territories that ethnically belong to it” and “still lays claim to those territories regardless of any ethnic changes which could occur in the future”.³⁹

Before the announcement of the mentioned decision of the Peace Conference, and knowing that a sizeable share of the territory claimed by Yugoslavia would be given to Italy or included in the FTT, the Yugoslav regime apparently instructed Yugoslav newspapers to publish articles blaming the Allies, and especially the Italian authorities, for using propaganda with the aim of instigating migration of the Italian inhabitants of Zone B to Italy.⁴⁰ Since the start of the crisis, Yugoslav newspapers unanimously called all Italian officials and protesters in Zone A “fascists”⁴¹ and filled their front pages with headlines accusing Allies of mistreating the Slavic population of Zone A and provoking incidents on the border of the two zones.⁴² By publishing articles detailing pro-Yugoslav protests on the occasion of signing of the peace agreement with Italy, the Yugoslav press demonstrated on whose side the inhabitants of Pula, Koper, and the population of Zone B had supposedly been.⁴³ The press emphasized the determination of Yugoslav authorities to continue

³⁸ Deklaracija Vlade Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije povodom potpisivanja mirovnog ugovora s Italijom, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 36, February 11, 1947, p. 1.

³⁹ Deklaracija vlade FNRJ povodom potpisivanja mirovnog ugovora s Italijom, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 637, February 16, 1947, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Okupacione vlasti Zone ‘A’ vrše propagandu da se narod iseli iz krajeva koji će pripasti Jugoslaviji, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 631, February 5, 1947, p. 1.

⁴¹ Dostojan odgovor fašističkim provokatorima u Trstu, *Glas Istre*, No. 51, June 16, 1945, p. 1; Iz talijanske pomoćne policije otpuštaju se svi partizani, a postavljaju fašisti, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 631, February 5, 1947, p. 1; Saopćenje jugoslavenske delegacije pri savezničkom Savjetodavnom vijeću o napadu fašističke rulje na službene prostorije delegacije, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 638, February 13, 1947, p. 1.

⁴² Vojna uprava JA za zonu ‘B’ Julijske Krajine uputila je protest anglo-američkoj Vojnoj upravi za zonu ‘A’ Julijske Krajine povodom odnošenja mašina i fabričkih postrojenja, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 632, February 6, 1947, p. 1.

⁴³ Stanovništvo Kopra i okolice pozdravlja maršala Tita povodom potpisivanja mirovnog ugovora sa Italijom, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 639, February 14, 1947, p. 1; Manifestacije naroda Pulja povodom potpisivanja mirovnog ugovora sa Italijom, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 639, February 14, 1947, p. 1.

the fight for Val Canale, Venetian Slovenia, Gorizia, Monfalcone, Trieste, and northwestern Istria because those were Yugoslav "national territories" and their unification with Yugoslavia would have been "the only justified and proper solution of the problem of the Yugoslav-Italian border".⁴⁴ During the following month, newspapers continued to write about the allegedly difficult situation in which the Yugoslav minority in Zone A had been.⁴⁵

Establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste on September 15, 1947

From September 15, 1947, onwards Yugoslav newspapers generally described the mentioned events as a victory for Yugoslavia: many territories that were earlier under fascist Italy were "returned to mother country" and this was the reason for celebration throughout Istria, Slovene Littoral, and the entire country.⁴⁶ Especially regional newspapers celebrated "liberation of Istria from eternal slavery" under Italy. The French proposition was called "an injustice" because "Trieste, Gorizia, Koper and Buje, a part of our land and our nation", were still outside of Yugoslavia's borders.⁴⁷ The Slovene Littoral was still "truncated", lacking Trieste and surrounding areas, and its population had to wait for the whole Littoral to be returned to Yugoslavia.⁴⁸ Until that day, the Slavic population of Trieste was "barehanded" and under constant attacks by Italian "fascists".⁴⁹ Moreover, the Yugoslav press claimed that the Italian minority in Yugoslavia enjoyed all their civil rights without discrimination and had a rich cultural life⁵⁰ and that the authorities of Zone A suppressed free political and cultural life of its Yugoslav minority.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Ugovor o miru s Italijom – nov doprinos naših naroda stvari mira, *Vjesnik*, No. 553, February 12, 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Okupaciona uprava u Trstu pokušava da oduzme prostorije Gradskom oslobodilačkom vijeću Trsta, *Riječki list*, No. 22, March 27, 1947, p. 1; Grubi postupci savezničkih okupacionih trupa u Puli, *Riječki list*, No. 31, April 6, 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Darko Dukovski, *Istra: kratka povijest dugoga trajanja. Od prvih naseobina do danas*, Istarski ogranak Društva hrvatskih književnika, Pula, 2004, p. 180; Jedinice Jugoslavenske armije posjele teritorij Istre i slovenskog Primorja koji se priključuje Jugoslaviji, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 222, September 17, 1947, p. 1; Manifestacije povodom priključenja Pule, Istre i Slovenskog Primorja, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 223, September 18, 1947, p. 1; Živjela slobodna Pula u Titovoj Jugoslaviji, *Glas Istre*, No. 29, September 19, 1947, p. 1; Narod Istre i Slovenskog Primorja proslavio je veličanstvenim manifestacijama u Puli i Lijaku priključenje Jugoslaviji, *Glas Istre*, No. 30, September 26, 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Ostvaren je vječni san Istre, *Riječki list*, No. 168, September 16, 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁸ Istra i Slovensko Primorje, *Riječki list*, No. 168, September 16, 1947, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹ Narod Trsta bori se goloruk protiv fašizma, *Riječki list*, No. 172, September 20, 1947, p. 1.

⁵⁰ Talijani u Istri i Rijeci razvijaju bogat kulturni život, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 63, March 14, 1948, p. 2.

⁵¹ Okupacione vlasti u Trstu zabranile rad Savezu ratnih invalida i porodica palih boraca oslobodilačkog rata, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 63, March 14, 1948, p. 3.

Tripartite Declaration on March 20, 1948

Due to their inability to ensure the FTT's full establishment, the Tripartite Powers (USA, UK, and, France) issued a note to Moscow and Belgrade on March 20, 1948, recommending that the FTT be returned to Italian sovereignty. The Yugoslav press immediately accused the Allies of making a political maneuver with the aim of aiding the Italian political right during Italian parliamentary elections in 1948.⁵² The Yugoslav government sent a protest note to the governments of USA, UK, and France in which they, inter alia, repeated the mentioned claims of the Yugoslav press and accused the Tripartite powers of "completely neglecting the democratic will of the Trieste inhabitants" and making the agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy "more difficult to achieve", thus "hindering what would unconditionally be the best for good-neighborly relations".⁵³

During subsequent days, the Yugoslav press did not respond in its usual aggressive manner to Allies' Declaration. Even regional newspapers remained silent, probably because of lack of propaganda instructions from the Yugoslav government circles, which were in a difficult position because of the ongoing Tito-Stalin clash and altercations with the Soviet Union through the Cominform.⁵⁴ With the Stalin-Tito split, the Yugoslavs lost extremely important Soviet backing in international relations and this new situation reflected in the more moderate stance of the Yugoslav press. Yugoslav newspapers emphasized the will of Yugoslavia to find a peaceful solution of the Trieste Crisis in cooperation with Italy.⁵⁵ Only *Politika* published a comment in which the author called Allies' Declaration an "impudent, stunning and unparalleled provocation".⁵⁶ Yugoslav high officials through their statements in Yugoslav newspapers advocated a bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy as the best path to resolving the Crisis.⁵⁷ One can argue that, due to their mentioned

⁵² Imperijalistički manevar sa Trstom pred izbore u Italiji, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 69, March 21, 1948, p. 2; Toljati osuđuje imperijalističke manevre s Trstom, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 70, March 22, 1948, p. 3; Imperijalistički manevar s Trstom, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 71, March 23, 1948, p. 1; Ponuda triju sila u pogledu Trsta je predizborni manevar prema Italiji a provokacija prema FNRJ, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 987, March 24, 1948, p. 1; Imperijalistička igra s Trstom, *Vjesnik*, No. 898, March 24, 1948, p. 1; Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*, p. 125.

⁵³ Protestna nota vlade FNRJ vladama SAD, Velike Britanije i Francuske, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 71, March 23, 1948, p. 1; Protestna nota vlade FNR Jugoslavije vladi SAD, Velike Britanije i Francuske, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 987, March 24, 1948, p. 1.

⁵⁴ For more on this topic, see: Banac, *Sa Staljinom*; Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*; Marković, *Beograd između istoka*.

⁵⁵ Vlada FNRJ i danas je spremna da zajedno s Italijom nadje sporazumno rješenje tršćanskog pitanja u duhu razgovora Tito-Toljati, *Riječki list*, No. 328, March 24, 1948, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Avanturističko izazivanje, *Politika*, No. 12878, March 12, 1948, p. 1.

⁵⁷ Vlada FNRJ je uvijek bila, a ona ostaje i danas vjerna principima dobrih susjedskih odnosa sa svim miroljubivim narodima, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 72, March 24, 1948, p. 1; Sve ono što bi moglo razdvajati talijanski narod od naroda Jugoslavije mogu riješiti samo demokratske snage Italije i narodi nove Jugoslavije, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 74, March 27, 1948, p. 1.

clash with the Soviets, the Yugoslav leaders decided to soften their stance, reduce their demands, and fight for what at that time seemed achievable.

Two-Power Declaration of October 8, 1953

Throughout the early 1950s, Yugoslav newspapers published many articles criticizing Italy's foreign policy and political, economic, and cultural actions in Zone A as being to the detriment of Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ Furthermore, they periodically published articles analyzing Italian newspapers and accusing them of pro-Italian propaganda and defamation of Yugoslavia.⁵⁹ Yugoslav high officials in their interviews for Yugoslav newspapers claimed that Trieste and Zone A should belong to Yugoslavia based on their ethnic composition and those statements and resulting foreign press reactions were given wide publicity in Yugoslav newspapers.⁶⁰

At the beginning of October 1953, reacting to the news that the proposition of the USA and UK would be to cede the administration of Zone A to Italy, the Yugoslav press criticized such a proposition by claiming that it had "ignored such important elements of the Trieste problem as the international economic function of the city of Trieste and the ethnic problem of Trieste and Zone A". The proposition would have prevented Trieste "to serve its natural international economic function, which would lead to economic downfall of Trieste, and leave our [i.e. Yugoslav] inhabitants at the mercy of Italy". This is why Yugoslavia would "not leave the city of Trieste and zone A at the mercy of Italy".⁶¹ *Slobodna Dalmacija* also claimed that a bad economic situation would have arisen in the case of a permanent division of the Slovene Littoral.⁶² Only "internationalization of the city of Trieste" was the "concrete, practical path" towards the solution of the crisis and "the only realistic solution".⁶³

On October 8, 1953, when the USA and UK announced their decision to withdraw from Zone A and leave its administration to Italy, Yugoslav officials reacted aggressively and announced that Yugoslavia would "take all measures necessary based on the UN Charter to protect Yugoslav interests in Zone A".⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Italija se upliće u robnu razmenu Trsta s našom zemljom, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 252, October 6, 1953, p. 1.

⁵⁹ 'Giornale di Trieste' sam pobija svoje laži i klevete o zoni B STT, *Riječki list*, No. 41, February 19, 1952, p. 1.

⁶⁰ Trščanski 'Primorski dnevnik': Trst ne pripada Italiji nego jugoslovenskim narodima, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 251, October 7, 1953, p. 3.

⁶¹ Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom*, p. 534; Ne, mi zonu 'A' nećemo ustupiti Italiji na milost i nemilost, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 254, October 8, 1953, p. 3.

⁶² Što otežava razmjenu Jugoslavije sa zonom A STT, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 2693, October 7, 1953, p. 1.

⁶³ Ne, mi zonu 'A' nećemo ustupiti Italiji na milost i nemilost, *Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije*, No. 254, October 8, 1953, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom*, p. 546; Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, p. 385; Vlade SAD i Velike Britanije predale Zonu A STT i grad Trst Italiji, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 363, October 9, 1953, p. 1; Jugoslovenska vlada nije spremna da se pomiri sa stanjem stvari, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 363, October 9, 1953, p. 1.

Regional newspapers were the loudest in defending Yugoslavia's stance, claiming that Yugoslav "elementary rights" were harmed because a part of Yugoslavia's "body was ruthlessly handed over to Italy".⁶⁵ The Allied decision was deemed as "unjustified" and a "reward to the aggressor", i.e., Italy.⁶⁶ For days, the Yugoslav press published articles describing the extent of massive protests across Yugoslavia, in Zone B, and in Trieste, against the Allies' decision⁶⁷ and the "bitter opposition of the entire Yugoslav nation" and the willingness it demonstrated to "defend western borders [of Yugoslavia] from the new assault of bloodthirsty imperialists". According to *Glas Istre*, protesters wanted to "help their brothers in Zone A".⁶⁸

Yugoslav leaders held fiery speeches and accused the western powers of escalating the crisis and neglecting both economic and ethnic principles in the case of Zone A.⁶⁹ In his speeches on October 10 and 11, 1953, Tito said Yugoslavia would have considered "the entry of Italian troops into Zone A as an act of aggression". Tito proposed a solution of the crisis in the form of autonomy of Zone B and the hinterland of Zone A under the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, and autonomy of Trieste under the sovereignty of Italy.⁷⁰ Yugoslav Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandar Ranković in his speech on October 11 claimed that Trieste would "sooner or later" be in Yugoslav hands.⁷¹ At the same time newspapers were reporting of reinforcement of the contingent of Yugoslav People's Army in Zone A.⁷²

⁶⁵ Ova koncesija talijanskom imperijalizmu udara po elementarnim pravima naroda Jugoslavije, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 2695, October 9, 1953, p. 1.

⁶⁶ USA i Britanija predale Trst i zonu A Italiji, *Vjesnik*, No. 2675, October 9, 1953, p. 1; Nagrada agresoru, *Vjesnik*, No. 2675, October 9, 1953, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Demokratsko stanovništvo Trsta zaprepasčeno monstruoznim postupkom zapadnih sila, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 253, October 9, 1953, p. 1; Val ogorčenja ustalao je grade i sela Dalmacije, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 2695, October 9, 1953, p. 2; Ogorčeni protesti širom zemlje, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 253, October 9, 1953, p. 2. Talas demonstracija zapljuskuje celu zemlju. Milioni Jugoslovena sa bolom i ogorčenjem protestuju protiv odluke o Trstu i zoni A, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 256, October 10, 1953, p. 2; U čitavoj Jugoslaviji narod ogorčeno protestira, *Vjesnik*, No. 2676, October 10, 1953, p. 3. Narodi Jugoslavije zahtevaju da se ne sprovede odluka o predaji Trsta i zone A Italiji, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 255, October 11, 1953, pp. 1-4; Spremni smo da branimo svoja prava, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 257, October 13, 1953, p. 2.

⁶⁸ Ne damo da se trguje našom zemljom, *Glas Istre*, No. 40, October 9, 1953, p. 1.

⁶⁹ Posezanje Italije za Trstom nema nikakvog ekonomskog ni etničkog opravdanja, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, No. 2696, October 10, 1953, p. 3.

⁷⁰ Tito: upotrebit ćemo sva sredstva da spriječimo agresiju na teritorij Trsta, *Vjesnik*, No. 2677, October 11, 1953, p. 1; Onog momenta kada italijanski vojnik stupi u zonu A – i mi ćemo tamo ući, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 256, October 12, 1953, pp. 1-2.

⁷¹ Naša slovenska braća biće s nama i Trst će kad-tad biti naš, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 364, October 12, 1953, p. 3.

⁷² Pojačani kontingenti jedinica Jugoslovenske narodne armije u zoni B, *Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, No. 363, October 11, 1953, p. 2.

Memorandum of Understanding on October 5, 1954

Months leading to the signing of the agreement on the final distribution of the FTT were characterized by a wave of Yugoslav articles blaming Italy for the escalation of the crisis.⁷³ A correspondent of *Politika* pointed out on September 15, 1954, that “in order to reach a compromise in the dispute over Trieste” Italy was the one that had to be more cooperative. Yugoslavia’s actions, however, were “constructive and realistic” and it demonstrated “a wish to end the Trieste conflict”. For this goal, it was “ready to make new sacrifices”.⁷⁴

The Yugoslav press changed its discourse when, on October 5, 1954, London Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the ministers of the USA, UK, Italy, and Yugoslavia. It gave former Zone A with Trieste to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav press described in a poised way the decisions made in London. The whole text of the agreement was published in newspapers and articles were supplemented with numerous maps of the new border with Italy.⁷⁵ *Vjesnik* published a commentary in which its author called the agreement a “somewhat good solution” and emphasized the opportunity for the Yugoslav town of Koper to develop “as the biggest center of local Slovenes who have lost Gorizia and Trieste. [...] The most important thing in the agreement is the determination of Italy’s and Yugoslavia’s obligations toward national minorities.” The author called the agreement a “victory of our policy that has continuously taken into account the rights of our compatriots outside of our borders.”⁷⁶ *Novi list* called the agreement “reasonable and constructive”.⁷⁷ *Politika* published a commentary in which its author argued that “after the Tripartite Declaration that envisioned the cession of the whole Free Territory of Trieste to Italy and the last-year October 8 attempt to impose an unjust decision on our country [...] an agreement has been reached, which could help the removal of, until now, the biggest threat for peace in this part of the world and enable creation of good-neighborly relations between the two countries. By making another huge sacrifice at the expense of its interests and justified demands, Yugoslavia agreed [...] in order to ease tensions in the world.” The author added that the Yugoslav public could not “forget that, by ceding the larger part of the former Zone A to Italy, around 60.000 of our [i.e. Yugoslav] people were left outside of their mother country”. Nevertheless, “tens of thousands of Slovenes in Trieste and the former Zone A surely understand the sacrifice of their mother country. They know that the Yugoslav government would never accept a solution that would not

⁷³ U zoni STT mora prestati svaka diskriminacija prema tršćanskim Slovencima, *Politika*, No. 14891, August 5, 1954, p. 3; Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*, pp. 451-452.

⁷⁴ Rešenje tršćanskog problema zavisi od Rima, *Politika*, No. 14926, September 15, 1954, p. 2.

⁷⁵ Bivša Zona B i deo Zone A stavljaju se pod jugoslovensku upravu, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 1; Potpisan sporazum o Trstu, *Vjesnik*, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1. Memorandum o suglasnosti, *Vjesnik*, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1; Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*, Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom*, p. 652; Dukovski, *Istra: kratka povijest*, p. 182.

⁷⁶ Realna politika, *Vjesnik*, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1.

⁷⁷ Razumno i konstruktivno, *Novi list*, No. 2241, October 6, 1954, pp. 1-2.

take their interests into account.” The commentator was even optimistic: “All this represents just the first step of a large number of possibilities for economic, cultural, and every other cooperation between the two countries in the future”.⁷⁸

In the following days, when describing the agreement, every Yugoslav newspaper used the same terms: the agreement was a compromise and Yugoslavia had to make a sacrifice. This implied willingness of the Yugoslav authorities to settle the dispute and the requisite of giving away territory it considered its own.⁷⁹ The press emphasized that the satisfaction for Yugoslavia had to come from the preservation of minority rights on both sides of the border and the economic benefit for the Trieste hinterland from the transformation of Trieste into a free port.⁸⁰ The Yugoslav government must have prompted this discourse, and the proof can be found in the unanimous comments of Yugoslav officials. Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Koča Popović stated that the agreement was a compromise and that Yugoslavia “made numerous and painful sacrifices”. Yugoslavia accepted the agreement “by taking into account the future of [...] the people living in the area [and the] necessity to remove the cause of the dispute on our borders”.⁸¹ Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleš Bebler said that “the old definition of the notion of ‘compromise’ stating that it is a solution with which both sides are not satisfied, is a good definition” but emphasized that Yugoslavia and Italy “can expect to greatly benefit from the favorable development” of their relations. Bebler insisted on a “definitive solution” of other border disputes with the impetus of the London agreement.⁸²

Newspapers published articles detailing Yugoslav border disputes with Italy in the 20th century as a sort of reminder that mutual understanding with Italy and the definitive solution of the Trieste crisis was a contrast to earlier settlements.⁸³ Furthermore, London Memorandum was characterized as the end of a centuries-old struggle of Croats and Slovenes for their homeland on the shores of the Adriatic, with the national liberation struggle of World War II as the hardest time in the history of fighting against Italian irredentism.⁸⁴ One author praised the fact that the city of Pula remained inside Yugoslav borders as the urban center of Istria and thus the paradox of Rijeka and Zadar during Interwar Period was annulled, when those cities were cut off from their natural hinterland. But the author denounced the fact that in the Slovene Littoral “two new paradoxes” appeared: “almost whole

⁷⁸ Sporazum, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 2.

⁷⁹ Realna politika, *Vjesnik*, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1; Potpisan sporazum o rješenju Tršćanskog pitanja, *Glas Istre*, No. 39, October 8, 1954, p. 1; Drug Tito o rješenju tršćanskog pitanja, *Novi list*, No. 2243, October 8, 1954, p. 1; Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*, p. 461.

⁸⁰ Slobodna luka Trsta – jedna velika i opće korisna realizacija, *Vjesnik*, No. 2986, October 7, 1954, p. 2.

⁸¹ Verujemo da će uzajamna dobra volja i razumevanje utrti put prijateljskoj saradnji, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 2.

⁸² Rešenje tršćanskog problema – polazna tačka na poboljšanju jugoslovensko-italijanskih odnosa, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 3.

⁸³ Jugoslovensko-italijanski granični problem za posljednjih četrdeset godina, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 4.

⁸⁴ Italijanski iredentizam u Istri, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 5.

gravitational area of the city of Gorizia belongs to our state, and the city itself now belongs to the Italian side, so today on one side we have a city without life, and we are compelled to build Nova Gorica [i.e. new Gorizia] on the other side”.⁸⁵

Unanimous comments in the Yugoslav press continued in the following days. Newspapers published Tito's speech in which he commented the London agreement by saying that he is “dissatisfied because we had to make a huge sacrifice in the interest of easing tensions” but satisfied because it “secured peace in this part of Europe”. “If we look at what happened in 1945, we will see why we cannot be satisfied. We had to leave Trieste, which we liberated. At that moment [...] I clearly understood that in that phase we could not have had Trieste. The peace treaty [with Italy in 1947] further confirmed the fear that we will not be able to take Trieste, that it will not be ours. Later development, and especially the Tripartite Declaration, which was not only about Trieste but about the whole FTT [...] worried us [...] Only two years ago, it was not only about Zone A; it was about the entire coast from Trieste to Umag, and we were supposed to get only the hills above it. Of course, we decisively refused [...] to negotiate about those cities and that coast. We finally came to Koper, to the border between Zones A and B. [...] We acquired one small piece of land in Zone A, but we also acquired the whole Zone B.”⁸⁶ Tito's comments could be interpreted as the summary of the whole Trieste dispute and the strategy of the Yugoslav diplomacy.

Numerous articles describing London Memorandum as the long-awaited solution of the Trieste Crisis demonstrated contentment both on the side of the Yugoslav authorities and on the side of the Yugoslav press⁸⁷ as if to say: “A long-time agonizing Trieste problem is finally resolved.”⁸⁸ Somewhat free and loose comments of the agreement were published in almost all Yugoslav newspapers. Interestingly, the most positive views were voiced in regional newspapers; *Glas Istre* wrote about “the first serious signs of improvement” in Italy-Yugoslavia relations and of “joy” (instead of the usual “anger” and protests) in the counties along Italian-Yugoslav border.⁸⁹

Treaty of Osimo on November 10, 1975

At the beginning of March 1974, Yugoslavia renewed its official state signposts on the Italian-Yugoslav border crossings (on the former demarcation line between Zones A and B) bearing the inscription “SFR Yugoslavia – SR Slovenia”. With this action, Yugoslavia instigated a reaction of Italian political circles concerned with Yugoslav pretensions on the territory of the former Zone A. In the Yugoslav press,

⁸⁵ Bivša Zona B, *Politika*, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p. 5.

⁸⁶ Sporazum o Trstu predstavlja krupan doprinos svetskom miru u jačanju snaga koje su protiv agresije, *Politika*, No. 14945, October 7, 1954, p. 1.

⁸⁷ Rešenje tršćanskog pitanja neće biti na korist samo Italije i Jugoslavije, nego in a korist učvršćenja mira u Evropi uopšte, *Politika*, October 8, 1954, p. 1.

⁸⁸ Posle sporazuma, *Politika*, No. 14945, October 7, 1954, p. 3.

⁸⁹ Pozitivan početak, *Glas Istre*, No. 40, October 15, 1954, p. 1; Radost u Bujskom i Koparskom kotaru, *Glas Istre*, No. 40, October 15, 1954, p. 1.

these reactions were called the “astonishment and anger of Trieste irredentists”.⁹⁰ The Italian government reacted with a diplomatic note on March 11, 1974, calling against the installation of those signboards and thus, according to the Yugoslav press, “sided with irredentists”.⁹¹ The Yugoslav government in its note to the Italian government concerning the Italian note of March 11, in which “some parts of Yugoslavia were called Italian territories”, expressed a wish that Italy “eliminates every irredentist activity and influence” from its ranks.⁹² The Yugoslav press claimed it was the Italian side that was “causing a crisis in the relations between the two states and rudely attacking the sovereignty of Yugoslavia”.⁹³ According to one Yugoslav journalist, the Italian note had an “impermissible tone” and was “an old, ugly story with its date as the only thing new”. Italian-Yugoslav boundaries were “solved” already, and the “incriminating Italian note” was “not accidental”, nor did it “represent a stance of the Italian people. [...] Mutual understanding had given a chance to the betterment of bilateral relations, and then the mentioned note (which was preceded by a specific ‘climate’) grossly undermined a good-neighborly cooperation through instigation of territorial pretensions towards parts of Yugoslavia.” Yugoslavia “did not challenge” the Memorandum of Understanding and had been “adhering to the provisions of the said agreement” more than Italy, stated the journalist.⁹⁴ According to the unanimous Yugoslav press, Italy was harming bilateral relations through its “irredentism” and “revanchist ideas” published in its press.⁹⁵

In the following days and weeks, the Yugoslav press was flooded with reactions of diverse Yugoslav organizations and with news of protests throughout the Slovene Littoral.⁹⁶ It was as if the Yugoslav authorities used the good old technique of combining fiery articles and fervent protests in order to reach their goal. During the demonstrations, the Italian note was called a “political diversion of the Italian government” and a “rude assault on the sovereignty and integrity” of Yugoslavia.⁹⁷ The Yugoslav federal government joined in and blamed Italy for “endangering good-neighborly relations and sowing mistrust between the two nations”.⁹⁸ Newspapers again voiced the official Yugoslav opinion that the question of Trieste was

⁹⁰ Spodkopavanje miru in sožitja v Evropi, *Delo*, No. 63, March 16, 1974, pp. 1, 4; Manevri iredentista, *Glas Istre*, No. 65, March 19, 1974, p. 3.

⁹¹ Spodkopavanje miru in sožitja v Evropi, *Delo*, No. 63, March 16, 1974, pp. 1, 4; Manevri iredentista, *Glas Istre*, No. 65, March 19, 1974, p. 3.

⁹² Jugoslavenska nota vladi Italije, *Glas Istre*, No. 63, March 16 and 17, 1974, p. 1; Protestna nota Italiji, *Vjesnik*, No. 9638, March 16, 1974, pp. 1-2.

⁹³ Ne samo diverzija, *Vjesnik*, No. 6939, March, 17 and 18, 1974, p. 2.

⁹⁴ Kakšne sile so krive za objune appetite?, *Delo*, No. 70, March 25, 1974, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Napad na suverenitet, *Glas Istre*, No. 65, March 19, 1974, p. 3.

⁹⁶ Slovensko primorje protestira, *Glas Istre*, No. 66, March 20, 1974, p. 9; Rijeka oštro odbacuje iredentističke pokušaje, *Glas Istre*, No. 67, March 21, 1974, p. 3; Provokativan napad na suverenost SFRJ, *Delo*, No. 68, March 22, 1974, p. 1; Ni pedlja domovine!, *Vjesnik*, No. 9648, March 22, 1974, pp. 1-2; Odlučno ne iredenti!, *Vjesnik*, No. 9646, March 26, 1974, pp. 1-2; Protest tisočev, *Delo*, No. 72, March 27, 1974, p. 1.

⁹⁷ Mi s granice poručujemo..., *Glas Istre*, No. 66, March 20, 1974, p. 9.

⁹⁸ Otvoreni atak na suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet SFRJ, *Glas Istre*, No. 67, March 21, 1974, p. 3; Obsodba note iz Rima, *Delo*, No. 68, March 22, 1974, p. 1.

forever settled by the “sacrificing of Zone A” for the cause of “establishment of good-neighboring relations” with Italy.⁹⁹ Some articles even described a bad social and economic state of the Yugoslav minority in Italy.¹⁰⁰ A wave of protests and reactions throughout Yugoslavia and press articles stemming from those activities continued daily throughout the months of March, April, and May.¹⁰¹ We can posit that the Yugoslav press followed Yugoslav government’s instructions on how to stir up the situation and boost support before new negotiations on the border dispute – by employing press propaganda reiterating, as demonstrated above, the same old discourse that was employed 21 years ago, and even earlier: Yugoslav minority on the other side of the border was suppressed, Zone A was “sacrificed”, etc.

A different perspective on the ongoing dispute could have been seen in the London-based Croatian emigrant newspaper *Nova Hrvatska*. The newspaper was the voice of the liberal-democratic current of the post-1945 Croatian political diaspora and it promoted an argumentative, pro-democratic, pro-Western European, anti-Ustaša, and antiwar critique of the Yugoslav regime.¹⁰² Throughout its publishing history (1959-1990) it was highly critical of Yugoslavia and it blamed the Yugoslav regime, among other things, for escalating the Trieste Crisis by engaging in a “war of diplomatic notes” with the Italian government. In a highly interesting article¹⁰³ *Nova Hrvatska*’s contributor put the blame on the Yugoslav and not on the Italian side for starting another diplomatic fight between the two neighbors and “such a sudden change in generally peaceful interstate relations on the Adriatic coast.” The Italian protest note considering the Yugoslav act of installing official state signboards was followed by a “nervous” and “even stronger note” from the Yugoslav side although the Italian note “was not published and therefore was not calculated to instigate an effect in the public sphere”. *Nova Hrvatska*’s contributor accused the Yugoslav leaders for trying to divert public attention from the internal Yugoslav situation and its diverse problems to the external one by worsening Yugoslav-Italian relations. The overall opinion of the *Nova Hrvatska* on the Trieste Crisis was reflected by the title of the article (“Why again Trieste?”). The opinion was that both sides were over-exaggerating and scoring political points by reacting harshly to everything concerning the future of Trieste and its environs. The “political tussle between Rome and Belgrade” evoked memory of the events in 1953 when “the entire ruckus was just a – scene. Now the same thing is happening again.”

The bilateral Treaty of Osimo was signed in the Italian town of Osimo on November 10, 1975, and was ratified in 1977.¹⁰⁴ It definitely divided the FTT

⁹⁹ SIV: Pretenzije na jugoslavenske teritorije znače napad na suverenitet i sigurnost naše zemlje, *Vjesnik*, No. 9642, March 21, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Obespravljena Beneška Slovenija, *Glas Istre*, No. 87, April 13 and 14, 1974, p. 4.

¹⁰¹ Tude nećemo – svoje ne damo!, *Glas Istre*, No. 68, March 22, 1974, p. 1; Val pravičnoga srda, *Delo*, No. 75, March 30, 1974, p. 1; Snažni stojimo na zapadnim granicama, *Glas Istre*, No. 85, April 11, 1974, p. 12.

¹⁰² Vlašić, Suradnja Tihomila Rađe, pp. 85-86.

¹⁰³ Zašto ponovno Trst?, *Nova Hrvatska* 26, No. 99, 1974, p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ For more on this topic, see: Škorjanec, *Osimska pogajanja*; Škorjanec, Die Verträge von Osimo zwischen Italien und Jugoslawien (1974/75). Ein schwieriger Verhandlungsweg, pp. 394-405.

between the two countries. The Treaty specified the border regime, legislation of minority rights in both countries and other questions not having been settled with the Memorandum of Understanding in 1954. It should be emphasized that minority rights were imposed according to the UN Declaration. Moreover, the Treaty regulated economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation between the two countries. A number of other problems concerning minorities were resolved¹⁰⁵ and the agreement is in power still today.

The Yugoslav press pointed out that “all opened [Italian-Yugoslav] border questions” were “definitely” closed and “the widest possibilities for the development of minorities in both neighboring countries” were created.¹⁰⁶ It was deemed as “a historical moment in the relations of Yugoslavia and Italy” as both countries “stated their willingness to settle the question of minority rights to their maximum extent”¹⁰⁷ and the wish to ratify the agreement as soon as possible with the aim of bettering economic ties of the two countries. There was no mention of a sacrifice; this time, it seemed as if Yugoslavia did not have to insist on the fact that it had left a considerable number of its people on the other side of the border.¹⁰⁸ The treaty was printed in Yugoslav newspapers in its entirety.¹⁰⁹ *Primorske novice* – whose readership was probably best acquainted with the situation on the Italian-Yugoslav border – characterized the treaty as a “path to better days” and did not mention any negative effect on the Slovene minority in Italy.¹¹⁰ The word “realism” was mentioned in almost all of the articles on the topic of the treaty. Under the title “Realism of Adriatic neighbors”, an analysis of articles in the Italian press regarding the treaty was published.¹¹¹ The only mention of the past troubles was the reminder that the agreement reached in 1954 was “legally incomplete” and that at that time Yugoslavia “for the cause of world peace and good-neighborly relations waived a significant part” of its “national body”.¹¹²

As expected, Yugoslav authorities were extremely satisfied with the agreement and did not fail to mention their satisfaction.¹¹³ The ratification of the agreement

¹⁰⁵ *United Nations – Treaty Series*, No. 24848, Italy and Yugoslavia, Treaty on the delimitation of the frontier for the part not indicated as such in the Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, pp. 73-75, <http://www.triestelibera.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Treaty-OSIMO-English-1975.pdf>; Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954*, pp. 464-465; Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*, p. 388; Dukovski, *Istra: kratka povijest*, pp. 193-194.

¹⁰⁶ Potpisan ugovor s Italijom, *Glas Istre*, No. 263, November 11, 1975, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Potpisan ugovor o definitivnom rešenju graničnih i drugih pitanja između dve zemlje, *Politika*, No. 22308, November 11, 1975, p. 1; Širenje dobrih sosedskih odnosov, *Dnevnik* (Ljubljana), No. 308, November 11, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Minić in Rumor včeraj podpisala pogodbo o obmejnih vprašanjih, *Delo*, No. 263, November 11, 1975, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Ugovor između Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Italije, *Politika*, No. 22308, November 11, 1975, p. 2.

¹¹⁰ Odprta pot v lepše dni, *Primorske novice*, No. 46, November 14, 1975, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Realizam jadranskih susjeda, *Vjesnik*, No. 10148, November 12, 1975, p. 1.

¹¹² Korak k dobremu sosedstvu, *Primorske novice*, No. 46, November 14, 1975, p. 3.

¹¹³ Veliko značenje sporazuma s Italijom, *Vjesnik*, No. 11049, November 13, 1975, p. 1; Podpis pogodbe – začetek novega obdobja v odnosih, *Delo*, No. 264, November 12, 1975, p. 1; Zadovoljstvo ob sporazumu s Italijo, *Delo*, No. 265, November 13, 1975, p. 1.

was expected to be carried out until the end of that year, which would “complete a huge work of resolving border questions and other questions with mutual satisfaction and mutual advantage”.¹¹⁴

No calls for another future border agreement were voiced – Yugoslavia’s borders “on land and sea were definitively established”.¹¹⁵ An article commenting reactions of the world press to the Treaty of Osimo bore the title “A victory of common sense”.¹¹⁶ One journalist called the Treaty “an agreement of historical proportions” and praised the solution of “sensitive issues which triggered emotions and needed careful harmonization” because, “especially in part of the Italian public and political circles, certain nostalgia was tied to the question of borders” and those elements “kept open a question that was practically settled a long time ago”. The agreement “resolved certain paradoxes that have, during past decades, burdened relations of the two Adriatic neighbors”.¹¹⁷

The extent of idealism included in the comments surrounding the Treaty in the Yugoslav press is best represented by one portion of the speech made by Miloš Minić, Yugoslav Foreign Minister and one of the signatories of the treaty: “Our good-neighborly and friendly relations represent not just the factor of peace and trust but directly contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for a necessary settlement of unresolved acute international problems, especially in the Mediterranean region. The Adriatic, which has even until now been somewhat exempt from military competition, in the future should even more be a lake of peace and cooperation.”¹¹⁸

When one searches for reasons for the positive response of the Yugoslav press towards the Treaty of Osimo, one has to bear in mind that Yugoslavia had after its rapprochement with the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin in 1953 and the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 stabilized its international position. The change in the attitude of the Yugoslav press also happened because 21 years had passed between the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and the Treaty of Osimo. The Yugoslav public had forgotten its postwar antagonism towards Italy and the passage of time helped to alleviate tensions between the two countries. The main reason lies, however, in the fact that the Yugoslav government, through manipulation of the Yugoslav press with the aim of instigating anti-Italian feelings among the Yugoslav public, achieved its goal, i.e., secret Italian-Yugoslav negotiations during spring 1974. When the negotiations were over and the agreement was signed, the press was apparently instructed to ease the tensions and praise the agreement, and this explains the unanimous reaction of both Yugoslav officials and journalists.

¹¹⁴ Povijesni document mira, suradnje i prijateljstva, *Vjesnik*, No. 10147, November 11, 1975, pp. 1-3.

¹¹⁵ Definitivno utvrđena granica na kopnu i moru, *Glas Istre*, No. 263, November 11, 1975, p. 3.

¹¹⁶ Pobjeda zdravog razuma, *Glas Istre*, No. 264, November 12, 1975, p. 2.

¹¹⁷ Sporazum istorijskih razmera, *Politika*, No. 22309, November 12, 1975, p. 1.

¹¹⁸ Nova etapa saradnje i prijateljstva, *Politika*, No. 22308, November 11, 1975, p. 1.

Conclusion

The analysis demonstrates that the claims made by the Yugoslav press in the name of Yugoslavia on the territory disputed between Italy and Yugoslavia diminished through time, from the claims on all ethnically Yugoslav (Slovene and Croat) areas in 1945, to the claims solely on Zone B of the FTT and proper minority rights of the Yugoslav minority on the other side of the agreed border in 1975. The analysis also reveals that the Yugoslav newspaper editorships reacted to ongoing events concerning the Trieste Crisis according to the official views of the Yugoslav leadership. This can be seen from the concordance of opinions of the Yugoslav press and Yugoslav state officials on every event throughout the years of the Crisis. The only deviation in their comments occurred when journalists over-emphasized their anger towards the Allies or the Italian side but those moments were rare. Furthermore, there were no changes in the propaganda methods of the Yugoslav regime concerning handling of the crisis. One good example is the technique used in 1953/1954 and 1974/1975: on both occasions, the Yugoslav press demonstrated aggressiveness in their articles with the aim of extorting Italian-Yugoslav negotiations (negotiations in 1953 and secret negotiations in 1974) and conciliatory and peaceful acquiescence with the outcome of the negotiations once the accomplishment of an agreement had been proclaimed. As mentioned in the introduction, Yugoslav newspapers were used widely and indiscriminately not only as a propaganda tool for the construction of a favorable public opinion but also as a means of ameliorating one's negotiating position. Thus, credibility of the Yugoslav side was being improved by imposing its own views on the Yugoslav public through newspapers: Yugoslav diplomats could then justify their demands by relying on the public opinion that they had created in the first place.

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POVZETEK

Spremembe stališč jugoslovanskega tiska do tržaške krize v letih 1945–1975

Andelko Vlašić

Namen članka je prikaz spremenjenih stališč jugoslovanskega tiska do tržaške krize v letih 1945 do 1975, od prihoda jugoslovanske vojske v Trst 1. maja 1945 do podpisa osimskega sporazuma 10. novembra 1975. Z analizo najpomembnejšega jugoslovanskega časopisja tistega časa, še posebej časopisov, ki so izhajali na ozemlju jugoslovanskih federativnih republik, katerih ozemlje je bilo predmet spora v času tržaške krize (hrvaški časniki *Vjesnik*, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, *Riječki list/Novi list* ter *Glas Istre*, slovenski časniki *Delo*, *Ljubljanski dnevnik/Dnevnik* ter *Primorske novice*, srbska časnika *Politika* ter *Borba*), so v članku opisane spremembe v stališčih jugoslovanskega tiska do obsega ozemlja, ki bi ga naj Jugoslavija takrat pridobila. Analiza je pokazala, da so zahteve jugoslovanskega tiska po ozemlju, ki je bil predmet italijansko-jugoslovanskega spora, sčasoma nižale, od zahtev po celotnem jugoslovanskem (slovenskem in hrvaškem) etničnem ozemlju leta 1945 do takih, ki so zahtevale zgolj cono B Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja in manjšinske pravice za jugoslovansko manjšino onkraj meje, dogovorjene leta 1975. Analiza je pokazala tudi, da so uredništva jugoslovanskih časopisov na tržaško krizo reagirala v skladu z uradnim stališčem jugoslovanskega vodstva, kar je razvidno iz usklajenih mnenj jugoslovanskega tiska in jugoslovanskih državnih uradnikov ob dogodkih, ki so se odvijali v kriznih letih. Nasploh je jugoslovanski tisk izražal agresivnost v času pred in med italijansko-jugoslovanskimi pogajanjmi in spravljivo strinjanje z njihovim izidom po sklenitvi dogovora. Jugoslovanskega časopisja niso uporabljali samo kot propagandno orodje za oblikovanje pozitivnega javnega mnenja, ampak tudi kot sredstvo za izboljšanje lastne pogajalske pozicije. Jugoslovanska stran je preko časopisja javnosti vsiljevala lastna stališča in si na ta način dvigovala kredibilnost. Jugoslovanska diplomacija je tako lahko upravičevala svoje zahteve in se pri tem opirala na javno mnenje, ki ga je sama oblikovala.

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