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NOVEL METONYMIES, WINE AND WINESKINS, OLD AND NEW ONES

The present article is concerned with the topic of novel or creative metonymies. This topic, itself a novelty, has recently cropped up in a series of articles (e.g. Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang 2013a and b 2016; Van Herwegen, Dimitrou and Rundblad 2013; Littlemore 2015; Falkum Lossius, Recasens and Clark 2017). The phenomenon in question, just like many other aspects of metonymy, such as its definition, typology, etc. is surrounded by lots of uncertainties and mystery. In this article I examine various dimensions along which the novelty of metonymy may manifest itself and argue that, unlike novel or creative metaphors, novel metonymy is actually somewhat of a unicorn of cognitive linguistics. What examples are brought up in the literature as cases of novel metonymies, turn out on closer inspection to be at best just novel instances of established and well-known types of metonymy. I also demonstrate why novel metonymies are hardly possible on theoretical grounds. However, I show in the final part of the article that metonymy may be involved in the creation of novel metaphors, specifically those realized as the XYZ construction.

Keywords: metonymy, novel metonymy, metaphor, conventionalization, typology of metonymy, XYZ construction, paragon model.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Discussions of novel or creative metonymies do not abound in the literature, but a number of recent publications (e.g. Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang 2013a and b, 2016; Van Herwegen, Dimitrou and Rundblad 2013; Falkum Lossius, Recasens and Clark 2017) take up this issue. The phenomenon in question, just like many other aspects of metonymy, such as its definition, typology, etc. is still shrouded in mystery and uncertainties. Although the phenomenon is considered in different contexts, i.e. first language acquisition, second language acquisition, or natural language processing, all the above mentioned articles take it for granted that there is such a thing as novel or creative metonymy. However, this assumption is suspect on both theoretical and conceptual grounds, as I show in this article. Consequently, my central questions in this article are: Are the examples of metonymies discussed in the above literature really cases of novel or creative metonymies? If they do not qualify as such, i.e. if they are not novel metonymy types, then what are they? Is the rise of novel metonymy types possible at all within the frame of the theory of conceptual metaphor and metonymy as practiced in mainstream cognitive linguistics?

Looking for a satisfying answer to this question I first briefly consider novel metaphors in Section 2 as a sort of background phenomenon in the matter at hand, as discussions of metonymies in the literature often contrast metonymy with metaphor. Various dimensions along which the novelty of metonymy may manifest itself are inspected in Section 3. I argue there that, unlike novel or creative metaphors, novel metonymy is actually somewhat of a unicorn of cognitive linguistics. Whether we find it or not, depends mostly on what we understand under novel metonymy. The analysis of the above mentioned studies of the phenomenon of novel and/or creative metonymy shows that none of the examples on which these discussions rest can be assumed to be a genuine novelty. In fact, I go on to claim that, in contrast to conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy can hardly ever be novel. However, I show on some

cases of the so-called XYZ construction in Section 4 of this article that metonymy may be involved in the creation of novel figurative expressions, i.e. novel metaphors.

2. NOVEL METAPHORS

Novel or creative metaphors seem to abound, and are quite easy to find, as shown by the following sets of examples:[1]

(1) ***Life is like Facebook***. *People will like and comment your problems, but only a few will try and solve them because everyone else is too busy trying to update their status*. (Lucy Hale)
(2) *My mom always said **life was like a box of chocolates**. You never know what you're gonna get.* (Forrest Gump)
(3) *I've learned that **life is like a roll of toilet paper**. The closer it gets to the end, the faster it goes*. (Andy Rooney)
(4) *Peanut Butter is **the Miley Cyrus of spreadable edibles***.
(5) *Is Goldman Sachs **the Gwyneth Paltrow of the Banks**?*
(6) *Messi is **the Mozart of football***.

Admittedly, the first three examples are formally not typical metaphorical expressions, as they are realized as similes. However, they clearly exhibit metaphorical nature.

This plethora of novel metaphorical expressions (and conceptual metaphors) is no wonder if we bear in mind the fact that metaphors, unlike metonymies, involve mappings across two distinct conceptual domains. In other words, because we have a large number of such domains that can potentially function as either source domains, or as target domains, or perhaps as both, we also have an even larger number of their possible combinations, i.e. conceptual metaphors.

Needless to say, some of these conceptual metaphors have become conventionalized, but there are still many potential conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions out there that have not yet been utilized. We also know that conceptual metaphors are always part of a larger system of figurative network (as demonstrated in Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 9, or in Kövecses 2010: 149ff), i.e. they can be more or less general or specific. It is therefore quite possible that some more specific subtypes of a conceptual metaphor may occasionally emerge as new metaphors. What is more, we know that primary metaphors can be combined into complex ones (cf. Grady 1997a and b), and even form so-called cascades, as described in David, Lakoff and Stickles (2016), and these combinations may result in further novel complex metaphors. But, as we very well know, a single conceptual metaphor can be expressed lexically, or linguistically manifested in Lakoff's (1993) terms, in more than one way, which means that novelty may occur not only at the level of type, but also at the level of token or instance. In other words, we may have novelty at the metaphor type level, but also novelty at the metaphor token or expression level.

3. NOVEL METONYMIES ARE COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC UNICORNS

Let us now take a look at what is discussed in literature under the heading of novel/creative metonymy. We first take a look at how these are defined, or, if not defined in any particular way, how they

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[1] The data were collected from various Internet sources using Google, specifically by using a simple query based on the conventional formula for metaphorical expressions A IS B, including its variant in which a metaphor is manifested as a simile (A IS LIKE B), or on the constructional template for the XYZ construction (*a/the* X *of* (Y), where X was a proper name). The queries were formed by using Boolean operators, most importantly placeholders or wildcards (*) were used and double inverted commas were placed around the search strings yielding to ensure yielding the exact match. Needless to say, the range of search domains was depersonalized by adding the "&pws=0" parameter to the end of the Google query URL and narrowed down to the USA and Great Britain.

are described, and also at the specific cases of novels considered to be novel/creative. What we could, however, expect on the basis of the analogy with novel metaphors is that these novel or creative metonymies are metonymic items that have previously not been documented in metonymic use and do not fit any of the low-level or specific types of metonymies as described in the relevant literature.

Frisson and Pickering (2007: 597, 600), which most of these recent studies refer to as being about novel metonymies, actually talk about novel senses of metonyms, i.e. unfamiliar metonyms (contrasting these with lexicalized senses and familiar metonyms, respectively). The fact is that they are **not** talking about novel metonymy.

Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang (2013a and b, 2016) do not actually define novel metonymies, but just contrast what they call "regular metonymies," i.e. widely conventionalized metonymies such as *Paris is in a huff* (capital for government), with those that are "not widely conventionalized although they use the same mental processes" (2013a: 226). The first time the expression crops up after the title in their 2016 article is when they admit being "mindful of the fact that regular and novel metonymy are not mutually exclusive, but rather two opposites on a cline of metonymy conventionalization" (2016: 177). This effectively means that novelty of a metonymy is equated with its conventionalization, which is tightly linked to the frequency of its use. It follows that the metonymy novelty that Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang (2013a) keep talking about is not a phenomenon of the type level, but only the novelty at the instance or token type. This is a sort of rule-governed creativity, and not a rule-breaking type. What they call novel metonymies are just analogical formations on the basis of what the current system allows. Thus, to give an example, we could say that according to Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang's logic, the incorporation in the USA of Kia Motors America in 1992, and the subsequent appearance of Kia cars on the American market produced a novel metonymy, i.e. the expression *Kia* was added to a set of items such as *Ford*, *Chevrolet*, etc., where the name of the company producing cars metonymically stands for cars produced by those companies. Although Tesla Inc. (originally Tesla Motors), eponymously called after the electrical engineer and inventor Nikola Tesla, was founded in 2003 as a producer of electric cars, solar panels and energy storage, it is now synonymous with high-class electric cars, and the shortened form of the company name has also been added to the above set in this century.

Ironically, this is precisely where and how metonymies can be quite regular. This is a well-established subtype of the widely used metonymy type PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT. So what Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang see as novel, as opposed to regular, actually belongs to the realm of the completely regular. It has been noted in literature that, in contrast to metaphor, metonymy can be quite regular, or logical. This is the reason why some patterns of metonymic shifts are referred to as regular or logical (and producing regular polysemy) (cf. Lapata 2001; Brdar, Zlomislić, Šoštarić andVančura 2009; Sweep 2010, 2012; Jódar Sanchez 2014). In the case of cars and car makers, as we have seen above, the appearance of a new car maker would automatically result in metonymy, i.e. in the addition of a new instance to the already existing set of metonymic expressions realizing a given metonymic type.

The system itself is in no way changed, apart from the fact that certain metonymic patterns in it are further strengthened. This becomes clear when we take a look at the actual examples Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang discuss as novel metonymies. There is hardly anything novel about *a good Agatha Christie,* metonymy that forms part of the title of their 2016 article. This is a well-known type of metonymy, WRITER FOR HIS/HER WORK, examples of which can be easily found. One of the conditions favourable to the metonymic use seems to be that the author should be fairly prolific, which apparently makes quite felicitous the premodification by means of *good (old)*, which is very common:

(7) *I've got **a good old Christie** listed today.*
(8) *Possibly **a Salinger** or **a Steinbeck** who I would have been discovering just around then, or **a good old Austen** or **a Hardy**.*
(9) *I mean, I enjoy **a good Austen** or even an action-romance, but historical romance?*
(10) *Much like when you read **a good Dickens**, when you read Crooked Heart you relax into a colourful, imaginative, well-paced period drama.*

Metonymic uses are found even with authors far less well-known than Agatha Christie:

(11) *Egan, who also wrote The Keep and Look at Me, is a writer of solid, plainspoken prose. Saying that seems like a diss when it isn't. But the connections she's trying to make among characters don't hold a candle to the brilliant plotting of **a Kate Atkinson** or **a David Mitchell**.*

These metonymic uses are not novel even if further extended as in:

(12) *We adore watching **Agatha Christie** and have a large collection.*

to refer to a film based on a work by the author in question. Sometimes the name of a character from a series of novels, or from a film based on these novels, can be used in the same way. Occasionally, this pattern can be mixed with the metonymy AUTHOR FOR HIS/HER WORK, as can be seen in (15) below. It is quite possible (even quite likely, to the best of my knowledge) that this type of metonymy, CHARACTER FOR A (TYPE OF) LITERARY/CINEMATIC WORK, has not yet been discussed in literature, but this is not what counts here. The fact is that this low-level metonymy type can be neatly situated with a more general type of metonymy, and there is a long history of its use.

(13) *I like **a good Poirot** or **Sherlock Holmes** (Jeremy Brett version) every now and again. We'll probably watch The Blue Carbuncle at some point this weekend (the plot revolves around a Christmas goose).*

(14) *The story apes all the hallmarks of **a good Poirot** or **Miss Marple**, to a frighteningly comforting degree.*

(15) *I think the hallmark of his show is the twists and turns that **a good Sherlock Holmes** or **a good (Raymond) Chandler** has.*

Another example Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang bring up in (2013a) is *binders full of women*:

(16) *And I said: "Well gosh, can't we—can't we find some women that are also qualified?" And—and so we—we took a concerted effort to go out and find women who had backgrounds that could be qualified to become members of our Cabinet. I went to a number of women's groups and said: "Can you help us find folks," and they brought us **whole binders full of women**.* (Mitt Romney, 2012)

This again hardly qualifies as novel, although it may leave such an impression because it is some-what unusual and surprising, as it is demeaning and insensitive towards women. This is just another instance of the well-known metonymy of the type CONTAINER FOR THE CONTAINED. Note, however, that this is not a simple metonymy, as *women* do not directly constitute the CONTAINED. Rather, it is documents as containers standing for CVs as their contents, and these in turn represent people. This apparent complex-ity may lend it some additional novelty flair, but it is not genuinely novel:

(17) *"I did some research — several **bookshelves full of women of the Bible** — and I carefully went through the books if I was going to do 'such and such' woman.*

(18) *The world I live in, one with two women senators representing my state, **bookshelves full of women writers**, music with women's voices — all of that is the fruits of our own Girl Effect, of investing in women's education and employment.*

Van Herwegen, Dimitrou and Rundblad (2013: 1032), too, adopt a similar procedure: "Novel metaphors and metonyms differ from lexicalised ones in that their meaning has never or rarely been encountered before."

(19) **The apron** *burned the dinner*.

Such equating novelty with the frequency of use of metonymies could be shown to have some absurd consequences in research contexts other than language learning and acquisition.

It is well-known that metonymic patterns can be attested in many languages, but also that their productivity is subject to some, more or less severe, constraints, which means that they are less frequent in some languages than in some others (cf. Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2003a, 2003b; Brdar 2005, 2006). We might then ask ourselves whether such metonymies are more novel in one language than in another?

We also know that metonymies can function both as euphemisms and dysphemisms (Gradečak-Erdeljić 2005; Gradečak-Erdeljić and Milić 2011; Milić 2009; Silaški 2014), and the latter could be more systematically avoided in one language than in another. The difference in their frequency of use can hardly be said to have anything to do with their novelty—a dysphemism that is infrequently used in one language is not novel, or more novel, than its counterpart in another language that is used more frequently.

Even one of the most frequent metonymies, CAPITAL FOR GOVERNMENT, can exhibit cross-linguistic differences in their use due to the reasons that have nothing to do with their novelty. These reasons can range from grammatical ones to stylistic and pragmatic ones, often combining. Some metonymies may even be blocked due to the presence of some word-formation patterns in a given language (cf. Brdar 2007, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2009, 2011a, 2017a, 2017b).

Falkum Lossius, Recasens and Clark (2017: 92) approach the problem in a slightly different manner:

"When children acquire lexicalized metonyms (e.g. Lego, where the name of the brand is used to refer to the toy bricks), they do not necessarily make the association that renders the metonym transparent; rather, the metonym could be acquired as a conventional term for the referent in question – only later will they learn that Lego is a brand name. While understanding a novel metonym requires pragmatic skill and relies on contextual knowledge to license the metonymic association, comprehension of a lexicalized metonym may simply depend on whether the child has already acquired its conventional meaning."

The above begs for a couple of comments. First of all, one of the two types of metonymies Falkum Lossius et al. (2017) distinguish, i.e. the one that is excluded from their research, are lexicalized metonymies that children are not yet aware of, and as such are the acquisitional mirror image of so-called dead metonymies, or what Riemer (2002) calls post-metonymies. All other metonymies were treated by them as novel metonymies. It is clear that what these studies examined, when seen from the perspective of the linguistic system, were not novel, but just ordinary transparent metonymies. However, these could be interpreted as novel in a special sense of the term, if we assume the perspective of individual language acquisition, i.e. they might be novel to the extent that a language learner (that is included in the research) is first exposed to a given pattern of metonymic extension. However, in the study in question transparent metonymies are still considered novel even if they are not encountered for the first time by the language learner.

It transpires from what we have seen so far that discussions of novel metonymies in recent literature are actually **not** discussions of what we would expect novel metonymies to be. In fact, we could say that this is not really surprising in light of the fact that there could hardly be any genuinely novel metonymies, i.e. speaking figuratively, they are as common as unicorns.

There are several reasons why novel metonymies should in principle not exist. Depending on what we metaphorically consider to be wine or wineskins, instances or tokens, or types of metonymies (metonymic patterns), respectively, we could say that we are talking about old wine in new wineskins, or about new wine in old wineskins. Now, what is what here? If wineskins are the linguistic means by which conceptual metonymies are realized, and wine are patterns or types of conceptual metonymies, this means that we may come across new instances, but they are all examples of age-old metonymic patterns, and new metonymic types can hardly be expected to arise, in particular, as we progress towards higher-level metonymies. If, on the other hand, we conceptualize types or patterns of conceptual metonymies as containers for their instantiations, i.e. as wineskins, these wineskins are old, and the instances, i.e. tokens of metonymies, as wine, may be occasionally new (though mixed with old ones). Whichever perspective or conceptualization we choose, it comes to the same, there are no genuinely novel metonymic types or patterns, only instances or tokens can be relatively new. This means that there is a clear contrast between conceptual metaphors and conceptual metonymies in this respect, as new types, i.e. genuine novelty, can only arise with the former.

4. NOVEL FIGURATIVE XYZ CONSTRUCTIONS AS BLENDS, OR RATHER AS METONYMY-BASED METAPHORS

Now I return to examples like (4-6), which, we said, exemplify novel metaphorical expressions. Due to their peculiar structure, they have been recognized as so-called XYZ constructions. The family of XYZ constructions has received a lot of attention in cognitive linguistics, from their first mention in works by Turner (1991, 1998) and Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002). Typical realizations of the construction family exhibit the following constructional schema:

(20) *Rodney Mullen*   *is*   *the Einstein*   *among skateboarders*
       X   COP   Y   Z

In addition to these three elements, Turner (1991) points out that there is also an element W that is normally not mentioned explicitly but which relates to Y in the same way that Z relates to X:

(21) **Jones is the Ronaldo of MMA***, whereas Anderson is Zidane*
    X (Jones)   Z (MMA fighting)
    Y (Ronaldo)   W (football)

Most of the time the element W can easily be inferred, even if it is not explicitly mentioned in the context.

It has several subtypes: there is also a biclausal variant:

(22) **Soleimani** *is* **to terrorism** *sort of what* **Trump** *is* **to real estate***,…"*
     X   Z   Y   W

What all these, however, share according to Turner and Fauconnier (1999), even the most literal ones is that their meaning arises through blending:

"XYZ construction is specialized to evoke blending." (Turner andFauconnier 1999: 413)

Veale (2014: 16) believes that these are "double-edged comparisons that can cut both ways, since information inevitably flows in both directions, from Y to X (the real message) *and* from X to Y (the

humorous bonus), to meet in the middle to construct a blended mental image." Let us take an example like (23) and check what "meets in the middle" and whether a blended image is indeed constructed.

(23) Is *sad singleton Vladimir Putin* **the Jennifer Aniston of European politics**?

It is clear that in (23), the target domain, i.e. Vladimir Putin, gets something from the source domain (Jennifer Aniston). However, on closer inspection, we realize that the source domain does not get any elements from the target domain, i.e. Jennifer Aniston inherits no attributes of Vladimir Putin. In other words, there is no two-way traffic in the sense predicted by the blending theory (as also adopted by Veale 2014): what sentence (23) is about is not a fictive creature resembling both Putin and Aniston at the same time.

There is, however, another outstanding property of such examples that goes uncommented by the proponents of the blending approach. This property can be, as a rule, noticed in most cases in somewhat broader context. The crucial point is that such constructions are accompanied by some sort of explications that look like ordinary metaphorical mappings that happen to be spelled out. The figurative bit in our example actually stretches over a larger portion of the text:

(23a) *Is sad singleton Vladimir Putin* **the Jennifer Aniston of** *European politics? Since splitting with his wife, Lyudmila (VladMila called it a day in June 2013), the* **unlucky-in-love** *leader has* **healed his heart by focusing on his passions** *– mainly shirtless horseriding, waging war in Ukraine and predicting the recovery of the rouble. At his annual press conference on Thursday, however, Vlad finally opened up about his heartache. "Everything is fine – do not worry," he reassured the concerned journalist.*
[http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ghosts-of-christmas-past-what-effect-could-posting-pictures-of-nativity-plays-have-on-the-next-9937919.html]

The paragraph apparently puns on the many relations of Jennifer Aniston after her breakup with Brad Pitt as well as on the fact that she practices yoga and budokan karate. The text does not stop with making fun of politicians, next paragraph takes up Tony Blair:

(24) *Putin is not the only statesman to have been taken off guard by a sudden interest in his love life. The* **irrelevant yet ubiquitous** *former PM Tony Blair –* **the Kerry Katona of European politics**? *– probably hoped the interview in The Economist would focus on his vision for peace in the Middle East and various charitable endeavours. Alas, all anyone really wants to know is this: was he schtupping Mrs Murdoch or what*?

Tony Blair gets here two properties from Kerry Katona[2]—being irrelevant and ubiquitous, but Kerry Katona does not get anything Blair-like.

The explications in question can be sparse, or very rich, or even somewhat enigmatic, they can come in front of the XYZ construction (as in the case of the Miley Cyrus example), or follow it:

(25) **People shove peanut butter, nastily, into too many things. It's an unhealthy obsession**. *Peanut Butter is* **the Miley Cyrus of spreadable edibles**.

What all these examples reveal is that XYZ constructions are most of the time used in authentic discourse in such a way that the speaker provides explications justifying the pairing of X and Y:

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[2] Kerry Jayne Elizabeth Kay (*née* Katona) is an English singer and media personality best known for her television work, predominantly in light entertainment and reality shows.

(26) *Coriander is* **the Gwyneth Paltrow of the herb world** *– some people love it, some people don't!*

(27) *Beaches are* **the Valium of the travel world**. *They soothe, they relax, they make you realize that* "real life" occasionally needs escaping.

I would like to claim that it is actually these explications that "cut both ways," i.e. apply to both X and Y, which means that we witness a dynamic (re)construal of meaning whereby a paragon model is strengthened or modified, or is being created. For Lakoff (1987: 87), a paragon is an individual member or a set of individual members of a category "who represent either an ideal or its opposite." Needless to say, paragons can be based not only on humans, but also on organizations and inanimate objects.

As pointed out by Veale (2014), some XYZ constructions are congruous, while some are incongruous. In the former case, X and Y belong to domains that are in an analogous relation, as in (6), where both X and Y refer to human beings (Messi – Mozart). This is also true of (28) because both X and Y are objects:

(28) a. *Milka is* **the Mercedes of chocolates**

b. *Valrhona, keenly sought by patissiers for its purity, is known as* **'the Ferrari of chocolates'** *and available up to 85pc cocoa butter*

c. *… they exist to cater to the so called "gamer market", which is basically marketing amazingly over-priced hardware to people willing to pay anything to feel like they've gotten* **the Ferrari of computers**.

However, it is also possible for the elements X and Y to belong to disparate domains and thus qualify as incongruous, e.g. X can denote an institution, a company, an object, an animal, a plant, or even a place, as happens in the following examples:

(29) a. *McDonald's is* **the Donald Trump of corporations**. *Trump AND McDonald's have a long history of sexual harassment, stealing from or refusing to pay employees, and ripping off taxpayers. Trump himself said wages are "TOO HIGH" – and we know all too well that McDonald's agrees with that.*

b. *Peanut Butter is* **the Miley Cyrus of spreadable edibles**.

c. *Betty the Crow (sadly deceased) was an* **Einstein among birds**. *She not only used tools but made them herself, for example creating a hook out of a straight piece of wire for fishing.*

d. *This mountain is pretty, but not stunning. Despite not being a huge peak, Mount Rose is underrated. The personality of the trail and the summit make it all worth it, enough so that I refer to this as* **the Sandra Bullock of Mountains**.

e. *Coriander is* **the Gwyneth Paltrow of the herb world** *– some people love it, some people don't!*

I would like to claim that these are special cases of the so-called metonymic paragon models. A paragon model is essentially metonymic (just like stereotypes, etc.) as an ideal member of a category stands for the whole category. Barcelona (2003, 2004: 364) improves on Lakoff's (1987) analysis as he demonstrates that the model is based on two metonymies, first the name of the bearer of a given outstanding property comes to stand for the property in question, which is followed by the ideal member of a category for the whole category. Thus, the paragon *Shakespeare* stands for the class of writers that have an immense literary talent. As a result, *Shakespeare* becomes a class name and is in part coded as a common noun as far as its grammatical behaviour is concerned.

As pointed out in Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007), the axiological notions 'best of' and 'worst of' as the most problematical in the paragon model arise in another metonymic tier due to the imposition of a scalar model (Israel 1997) on these contrastive properties. The scalar model allows the metonymic

mappings of the type WHOLE SCALE FOR UPPER/LOWER END OF SCALE (cf. Radden and Kövecses 1999: 32), whereby the property is interpreted as being exhibited to the maximum, either in the positive or negative sense. The scalar model and this type of metonymy have been shown to motivate a number of hyperbolic expressions in Brdar-Szabó and Brdar (2010), but also lexical reduplications (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2011b) as well as some intensifying adjective compounds (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2013).

The constructions in (29) seem to be creative, novel expressions. It could be hardly claimed that Ys in these examples have attained the status of anything close to paragons in the above sense – there is simply no unique property with which they could be identified. Rather, speakers seem to be engaged in creating an ad hoc quasi-paragon model, the reasons for which (mostly ephemeral) are typically explicitly stated in the context. In a manner of speaking, these are attempts at creating some cultural models that are open and dynamically structured in the sense they are open to revisions and additions. While paragons may be said to belong to offline, archived collective memory, these quasi-paragons are part of online collective memory that must be kept alive unless it perishes or gets transformed into something more permanent.

The humorous effect that Veale (2014) points out is in part due to the unexpected pairing of the two entities, but not to any sort of clash of their properties in the blended space, which is a common place in analyses carried along the lines of the blending theory. This humorous effect stems from the fact that the expectation that paragons should evoke some important property (something memorable, essential which marks the referent as either best or worst in its category) is actually not fulfilled, as the explications usually point out something trivial, ephemeral, and often even some negative characteristic.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

What I hope to have demonstrated beyond any doubt in the first part of this article is that the concept of novel metonymy that plays a central role in some recent articles on the acquisition of metonymy is not only poorly understood, but actually highly suspect as such on theoretical grounds. The analysis of the data discussed in recent literature on this phenomenon reveals that what is assumed to be a novel metonymy is actually just another realization of some well-established metonymies. However, I have also demonstrated in the second part on the example of some XYZ constructions that some well established metonymic models (paragons) can underlie the creation of what seems to be a novel metaphorical expression.

It has been suggested that figurative XYZ constructions are "double-edged comparisons that can cut both ways, since information inevitably flows in both directions, from Y to X (the real message) *and* from X to Y (the humorous bonus), to meet in the middle to construct a blended mental image." (Veale 2014: 16). Although these constructions seem at first sight to be very good candidates for an analysis based on conceptual integration I have provided evidence that they are better explained as metaphors based on metonymic paragon models. Authentic discourse data indicates that speakers very often engage in creating ad hoc quasi-paragon model, the reasons for which (mostly ephemeral) are typically explicitly stated in the context. In a manner of speaking, these are attempts at creating some cultural models that are open to revisions and additions.

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O NOVIM METONIMIJAMA:
STARO VINO U NOVIM BAČVAMA, ILI NOVO VINO U STARIM BAČVAMA

Rezime

U radu se raspravlja o problematici novih, tj. inovativnih i/ili kreativnih metonimija. Ta je tema relativno nova i pojavila se u nekoliko recentnih članaka. (npr. Slabakova, Cabrelli Amaro and Kang 2013, 2014; Van Herwegen, Dimitrou and Rundblad 2013; Littlemore 2015; Falkum Lossius, Recasens and Clark 2017). Ta je pojava, kao i niz drugih koje su vezane uz metonimiju, nedovoljno rasvijetljena. U ovom se radu ispituju načini na koje se ona može očitovati te se tvrdi da inovativne metonimije u načelu ne mogu niti postojati u onom smislu kako metafore mogu biti inovativne. U najbolju ruku, možemo naići na nove primjere, odnosno realizacije već postojećih i manje više dobro poznatih tipova metonimija. U drugom dijelu članka se, međutim, pokazuje, kako metonimije mogu biti uključene u stvaranje inovativnih metafora na konkretnom primjeru metafora realiziranih kao konstrukcije tipa XYZ.

Ključne riječi: metonimija, inovativna metonimija, metafora, konvencionalizacija, tipologija metonimija, konstrukcije tipa XYZ, paragon.

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