Non-UN entities in peacekeeping operations
Can they do what the UN cannot?1

Abstract:
Although, during the Cold War majority of all peacekeeping operations have done by the UN, later on some of Non-UN entities became very active and took significant role in peacekeeping. Nevertheless, UN still keeps a dominant position in peacekeeping, regarding the wide accepted positive historical results, neutrality in conflict, position of unique global collective security organization, and legitimacy to intervene with or without consensus of parties in conflict. Widely accepted assumption that the non-UN entities cannot perform peacekeeping operations like the UN is false. Many executed non-UN operations in last two decades, as well as many ongoing operations, have proofed that. Furthermore, the UN in last two decades officially encourage shared burden in maintenance peace and security. Performing peacekeeping operations by non-UN entities is positive trend in maintenance world peace and security, which should be encourage. Nevertheless, it should be monitor by the UN, regarding the fact that not all non-UN entities can perform peacekeeping in good manner and stick to the “Purposes and Principles” of the United Nations.

Keywords:
Peacekeeping operations, United Nations, non-UN entities, regional organizations.

INTRODUCTION

"The United Nations has developed a range of instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts … preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peace-keeping; peace-building; disarmament; sanctions; and peace enforcement. The United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these instruments." (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1995)2

Nevertheless, when somebody mentioned “peacekeeping” people usually imagine the UN, but that is only public perception and in reality as well as according to the Charter of the UN, nobody has a monopoly on peacekeeping operations. Although, during the Cold War majority of all peacekeeping operations have done by the UN, later on some of Non-UN entities became very active and took significant role in peacekeeping. The most important players after the UN in peacekeeping matters are regional organizations, which have executed the most of the non-UN peacekeeping operations after 1990. Furthermore, ad hoc groups of States (coalitions) or individual States are also important non-UN entities with experience in performing peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, UN still keeps a dominant position in peacekeeping, regarding the wide accepted positive historical results, neutrality in conflict, position of unique global collective security organization, and legitimacy to intervene with or without consensus of parties in conflict.

Assumption that the non-UN entities cannot perform peacekeeping operations like the UN is false and many executed non-UN operations in last two decades, as well as many ongoing operations, have proofed that. Furthermore, the UN officially encourage shared burden in maintenance peace and security regarding the fact of increased number of conflicts, as well as necessity to overcome several operational shortfalls which the UN faced during peacekeeping in the


past. The non-UN entities also have they own reasons to perform peacekeeping, which are national interests, prevention of conflict spilling effect in their region or just reaction because security and human rights norm “responsibility to protect.”

This essay will discussed the UN dominant position in peacekeeping matters, the UN limitations and burden sharing wish, as well as its role as a wanted provider of legitimacy in the non-UN operations. Furthermore, essay will examine arguments for performing peacekeeping operations by the non-UN entities (regional organizations, ad hoc groups of States, and individual States), through reasons and advantages, but also listed some risks of these operations. Possible perform of peacekeeping by Private Military Companies will not be discussed in this essay, regarding the fact that still exist many open questions and obstacles for that (accountability, legitimacy, neutrality, command and control, etc.).

1. THE UN: DOMINANT ROLE, LIMITATIONS, AND BURDEN SHARING

Although, after the end of the Cold War many other non-UN entities started to perform peacekeeping, the UN is still number one in the business. The UN’s dominant role in peacekeeping has several reasons, but unparalleled historical experience under immaculate name is the most important. Furthermore, the UN system is prepared to execute day by day long term missions, if necessary for more decades.3

Although, overall the UN peacekeeping was positive and awarded with the Nobel Price for Peace 1988, during execution fase the UN showed several limitations, which sometimes led to operational failure. First, at the beginning of the conflict it is necessary to react very fast, but UN Security Council’s decision making system (veto problem) and voluntary force generation system (absence of willingness) caused slow UN crisis respond. Second, in compare with regional organizations or conflict neighboring states, UN requires more time to understand the roots of conflict (history, cultural and ethnic dynamics) to be able to respond with appropriate measures. Third, the UN has problem with disjointed command and control and regarding to that member states with strong and well trained armed forces are rarely committed troops to the UN operations, because the refuse to give the UN operational command over their troops. Fourth, the UN mandates don’t account for the “spill-over” effect or do not have measures for strong reaction in case when violence erupted again after cease-fire.4

So what the U.N. can do to overcome these limitations? First, Charter of the UN recognized a role in maintenance of peace and security by other non-UN entities, as member states in the Chapter VII (Article 42 and 43) and regional organizations and agencies in the Chapter VIII (Article 52 and 53).

Article 52: (1) “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”

Article 53: (1) "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.”

These opportunities have not been used a lot before 1990, but some non-UN entities have executed rarely peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, such as:^5

- 1965 – Organization of American States (OAS) in Dominican Republic restored normal activities in country, observed human rights, and supported development of democracy. It was successful mission, but neutrality was questionable; US had 85% of the troops.
- 1976 – League of Arab States (LAS) in Lebanon temporarily stops fighting, but did not last long and whole mission was failure. Also, neutrality was questionable; Syria had majority of the troops and overused military force.
- 1981 – Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad was unable to stop fighting, what lead to failure of mission.
- 1990 - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sponsored a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, but they were not able to impose a cease-fire, what lead to failure of mission.

Although many of these engagements are considered failures, this highlights that regional organizations can and should be used more often to help “bridge the gap” that is experienced by the UN’s inability to meet the demand for peacekeeping operations. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, Secretary General expressed the need for burden sharing peacekeeping with other entities, especially with regional organizations. A typology and modalities for cooperation with non-UN entities, state arrangements and regional organization, was stressed in several official UN documents, followed with many multilateral meetings and later on with execution of many peacekeeping operations led by non-UN entities (Documents: “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992 and its Supplement in 1995, UN General Assembly Resolution “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects” in 1994).^6 Burden sharing strategy from UN was proposed in 1992 and maintenance after, in order to support share engaged and expenses in emerging number of new intrastate conflicts around the world, particularly many of them in Europe and Africa (Table 1).

Table 1. UN Peacekeeping operations 1988- 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of UN PKO</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Budget (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11,121</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13,856</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>77,783</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>118,756</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations^7

2. NON-UN ENTITIES IN PEACEKEEPING: ADVANTAGES AND RISKS

Non-UN entities are mainly organized regionally, and they have larger influence in the region and ability to keep conflict out of global (UN) area, as well as they can easier adjust to the

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belligerence needs. That was one of the main idea original designers (founders) of the Charter of the UN. Behind that, they are several important advantages of using non-UN entities, especially regional organizations in peacekeeping. First, they can achieved faster and greater consensus in compare with often Security Council problems in the crisis decision making process, regarding the fact that nations as members of coalitions, organizations or even alone always have shared interests in their region. Second, willingness of states to commit forces in coalitions or regional organizations under operational command is great advantage in compare with disjointed command and control recognized as UN limitation. Better command and control, as well as grater and faster consensus will provide a faster deployment in the area of operations, which is crucial factor in the conflict management. Third, states within the proximity of conflict “usually” have better relationships and will be accepted as friendly forces, as well as they definitely do not need time for cultural or operational awareness, which is also large problem of the UN operations. Fourth, regionally organized non-UN entities are more interested in conflict resolution in order to prevent conflict spilling effect on other states in the region. According to that, they will use more frequently preventive diplomacy, but also cease-fire negotiations, or later on supporting a nation building. Last advantage, but not always with positive outcomes (like UN), is greater opportunity to mediate with third party in conflict, or even to get support from them in a conflict resolution. Third parties are usually interested more to work through non-UN entities; because they can easier influence in operation. Their limited influence sometimes is recommendable, in order to avoid counter measures and treats to conflict resolution from the third party (especially power ones) in case when they cannot manage their interest.  

Regarding to risks, one of the most used arguments against engagement of non-UN entities in peacekeeping operations is absence of neutrality. Several failure examples support this argument, India in Sri Lanka, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad, and Organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti. Nevertheless, non-UN entities forces composition can have troops from non-neutral countries in the conflict, but it is possible to solve with limitation of troop contribution for member states that share a border with disputants. Also, there are non-UN entities which never compromised their neutrality status in peacekeeping operations and today they are executing many ongoing operations, regionally as well as internationally, such as: European Union (EU), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  

Second risk of using non-UN entities in peacekeeping operations is threat of absence of quality troops in UN operations. According to the Brahimi Report (2000), “the growth in European regional peacekeeping initiatives further depletes the pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led operations.” Lack of resources in peacekeeping is third risk, which faced “some” non-UN entities in the past, especially regional organizations in Africa, such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), OAU which later became African Union (AU). Financial intervention of third party can be solution, and happened through UN financial injection for OAU and European Union for AU. Fourth, there are organizational problems which related mainly to “some” regional organizations as non-UN entities, which have structural underdevelopment (ASEAN, SAARC, AU, LAS, OAS, OIC). Nevertheless, some other non-UN entities, regional organizations as EU, OSCE or NATO, or powerful states have no such problems and solution could be that they can help in overcoming

problems in mentioned underdeveloped organizations (Example: development of AU, organized by UN and EU).

3. UN AS PARTNER AND PROVIDER OF LEGITIMACY IN PEACEKEEPING

“If United Nations efforts are to succeed, the roles of the various players need to be carefully coordinated in an integrated approach to human security.” (Boutros Boutros-Ghali)

All documents of UN related to engagement of non-UN entities in peacekeeping always stressed that maintaining peace and security of non-UN entities is positive as long as they stick to the “Purposes and Principles” of the United Nations. On the other side, non-UN entities constantly seek for UN legitimacy in their peacekeeping engagements and therefore majority of non-UN led peacekeeping operations in last two decades were executed under the UN SC resolutions or even through direct partnership with the UN. Broad cooperation with non-UN entities began with end of the Cold War (1990) and Secretary-General “An Agenda for Peace,” (1992), which devoted whole chapter VII to “Cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations.” Continued with the UN General Assembly Resolution “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects,” (1994), that encourages necessity “to enhance the cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and those regional arrangements and organizations able to assist it in its peace-keeping activities.” Recently after, Secretary-General met in August 1994 with the heads of several regional organizations with which the United Nations had recently cooperated in peacemaking and peace-keeping efforts. Finally, this mutual benefit partnership has developed in several different forms, specified in Supplement of “Agenda for Peace” in 1995, (1) consultation (exchange views on conflicts), (2) diplomatic support (UN diplomatic support and non-UN entities technical inputs, as OSCE in Georgia, EU in Bosnia and Kosovo), (3) operational support (regional organizations act as back up to UN forces, as NATO in UNPROFOR, US in Somalia), (4) co-deployment (non-UN entities carry the bulk of the mission burden, as ECOWAS in Liberia, CIS in Georgia, or NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo), and (5) joint operations (shared staffing, strategy and financing, as OAS in Haiti).

This division of labor really works and since 1995 many peacekeeping operations have executed by non-UN entities under one of the mentioned forms. The United Nations supports these operations, but in the same time control and verifies that execution is in a manner, which will not ruin the UN peacekeeping reputation.

During first decade after the Cold War non-UN entities executed ten peacekeeping missions with mixed outcomes (5 successful, 3 failed, and 2 missions with partial success), but majority under UN mandate.

1989-2003 Liberia – ECOWAS (support to the UN), mission was partial success, executed under UN resolution.

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14 UN SG, Supplement to “Agenda for Peace,” Article 81.
17 UN SG, “Cooperation with Regional Organizations.”
19 Various sources (footnotes 18-27), following list of missions and conclusions of success or failure are results of an author’s analysis.

1992-1993 Rwanda – OAU (Neutral Military Observer Group, NMOG), mission failed, executed without UN resolution, and incorporated 1993 in UNAMIR, OAU left Rwanda in 1996.\(^{22}\)

1993-1996 Haiti – OAS/UN (International Civilian Mission in Haiti, MICIVIH), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.\(^{23}\)

1993-2004 Burundi – OAU (African Mission in Burundi, AMIB), successful mission, executed according to AMIB mandate and incorporated in United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004.\(^{24}\)

1994-2008 Georgia – CIS (Russian “peacekeeping”), mission failed, executed without UN resolution, but with United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring.\(^{25}\)

1994-2008 Georgia/Abkhazia/OSsetia – OSCE (observer’s and facilitator’s role), mission was partial success, executed without UN resolution, but extensively integrated effort and staff with UNOMIG.\(^{26}\)

1995-1996 Bosnia and Herzegovina – NATO (Implementation Force, IFOR) successful mission, executed under UN resolution.\(^{27}\)

1996-2004 Bosnia and Herzegovina – NATO (Stabilization Force, SFOR), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.\(^{28}\)

1999 Kosovo – OSCE (observers), mission failed, executed under UN resolution.\(^{29}\)

Although, ten years of executions with mixed outcomes, non-UN entities have collected large experience and even some of them became regular and trustful partner of the UN in peace operations. That is especially important in context of operations that were provided by European Union and NATO. These two non-UN entities concluded successfully seven missions in last decade, six under UN mandate and one after invitation of host nation.

2003 Macedonia – EU (EUFOR Concordia), successful mission, executed without UN resolution.\(^{30}\)

2003 Congo – EU (ARTEMIS), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.\(^{31}\)

2006 Congo – EU (EUFOR), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.\(^{32}\)

2004-2011 Iraq – NATO (NATO Training Mission), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{28}\) Ibid.


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
2005-2006 Sudan/Darfur – EU (Support of AMIS II), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.  
2008-2009 Chad – EU (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, support MINURCAT), successful mission, executed under UN resolution.  
2011 Libya – NATO (Operation Unified Protector) successful mission, executed under UN resolution.

Nowadays, there are fifteen ongoing peacekeeping UN led-missions and nine non-UN entities’ led-missions around the world. NATO is running operations under UN mandate in Afghanistan (ISAF since 2003), and in Kosovo (KFOR since 1999).  
37 European Union is running operations under UN mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ALTHEA since 2004), Kosovo (EULEX since 2008), and monitoring mission without UN mandate, but with consensus of belligerents in Georgia/Ossetia (EUMM since 2008).  
38 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is running observation mission with consensus of belligerents in Nagorny Karabakh (Minsk Group since 1995), and mission under UN mandate in Kosovo (since 1999).  
39 The Organization of American States is running mission under the UN resolution in Haiti (since 2005).  
40 Finally, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is running mission under special partnership with UN Security Council in Thailand/Cambodia (since 2011).

Therefore, the UN willingness to share burden and legitimacy in peacekeeping is visible through fact that almost all of the mentioned non-UN led-missions were established according to UN mandate (except OSCE in Nagorny Karabakh and EU in Georgia).

CONCLUSION

Non-UN activities in a conflict resolution are not always successful as well as UN’s, but they are more frequent and complementary to the UN. Furthermore, to be more frequent non-UN entities are encouraged by the UN, in order to try first to reach conflict resolution in regional level, before it comes on the global UN level. So, primary assumption that non-UN entities cannot perform peacekeeping operations like the UN is wrong and many of peacekeeping operations in the world today are organized by non-UN actor. Especially active are these who earned respectable experience and have had success in peacekeeping, as European Union (13 missions), NATO (5 missions), and OSCE (16 missions).

Today, almost all of non-UN entities operations have UN support through one of earlier mentioned relationship forms in order to share conflict resolution burden. Also, non-UN entities constantly seek the legitimacy for their actions from the UN, as the number one name in peacekeeping and the only one legitimate collective security global player. So, the UN provides
required legitimacy through SC resolutions or joint operations, but in order to protect good reputation the UN also developed control mechanisms (observers, joint bodies, and time limited mandate). One of newest positive example of the UN/non-UN partnership is UN and League of Arab States joint efforts through UN diplomatic support and LAS information inputs to SC in order to find conflict resolution in Syria.⁴³

Ultimately, non-UN entities are performing peacekeeping operations like the UN today, and majority of them through mutual beneficial partnership with the UN. It is positive trend in maintenance world peace and security, which should be encourage, but also should be monitor by the UN, regarding the fact that not all non-UN entities can perform peacekeeping in good manner and stick to the “Purposes and Principles” of the United Nations.

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RESOURCES


36. UN Secretary General. “Cooperation with Regional Organizations.”