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Are There Any Sets out There? (CROSBI ID 538565)

Neobjavljeno sudjelovanje sa skupa | neobjavljeni prilog sa skupa | međunarodna recenzija

Trobok, Majda Are There Any Sets out There? // SEFA 5 – 5th Conference of The Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy Barcelona, Španjolska, 07.09.2007-09.09.2007

Podaci o odgovornosti

Trobok, Majda

engleski

Are There Any Sets out There?

In the philosophy of mathematics, one of main concern is whether mathematical statements have objective truth values. One possible answer to the question is the realistic one: mathematics concerns itself with certain objects - numbers, sets, functions, groups etc. – and the claims it makes about these objects are determinately and objectively true or false. At this point a question naturally arises though. Where are these objects, and what sorts of things are they? Different answers to this question reflect different versions of realism. The most basic division amongst them is one between so called “ faint of heart” realism, and Platonism. Due to the problems that Platonism has to face, the faint of heart realism might seem to be more appealing. In the paper I first concentrate on one of the most tempting contemporary formulations of this answer (if not the only one), Maddy's “ set-theoretic” realism. Maddy's 'set-theoretic realism' is the theory according to which some sets are concrete objects located in space and time, and we grasp them in pretty much the same way in which we see physical objects. In this talk, I characterise the view more precisely, then try to criticize it and give reasons why I do not find Maddy's 'set-theoretic' realism acceptable. Secondly, my attempt is to answer the (more general) question, if other versions of 'faint of heart' realism are untenable too. I namely aim to show that faint of heart realism is intrinsically flawed and that Maddy’ s set-theoretic realism encounters a general difficulty that any version of faint of heart realism will encounter.

Maddy; set-theoretic realism; platonism

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Podaci o prilogu

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Podaci o skupu

SEFA 5 – 5th Conference of The Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy

predavanje

07.09.2007-09.09.2007

Barcelona, Španjolska

Povezanost rada

Filozofija