John Perry e l’argomento della conoscenza (CROSBI ID 146536)
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Malatesti, Luca
talijanski
John Perry e l’argomento della conoscenza
In this paper, I reply to John Perry’s response to Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (KA). The KA aims to prove, by means of a thought experiment concerning the hypothetical scientist Mary, that conscious experiences have non-physical properties. Mary has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision without having had any colour experience. The central intuition in KA is that by seeing colours Mary will learn what it is like to have colour experiences. Perry has argued that what Mary learns is just a new way of thinking about facts described by her scientific knowledge. Particularly, he maintains that she will acquire just indexical knowledge of certain physical properties of her experiences. This knowledge involves a demonstrative way of thinking about these properties by means of demonstrative concepts. My reply proceeds in two stages. Firstly, I attack Perry’ s model of introspective knowledge of colour experiences. Secondly, I argue that adapting his type of response to a more promising model of introspection does not succeed. Mary’ s knowledge of what it is like to have colour experiences involves concepts of colours that are not indexical.
argomento della conoscenza; qualia; concetti fenomenici; John Perry
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engleski
John Perry and the knowledge argument
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knowledge argument; qualia; phenomenal concepts; John Perry
nije evidentirano