engleski

Argument from Relativity and Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper author offers an analysis of one type of standard skeptical arguments - notorious Aenesidemus' ten modes, presented by Sextus Empiricus in The Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The general pattern of Aenesidemus' arguments is: P1: In circumstances C1 object x looks ф . P2: In circumstances C2 object x looks not-ф . P3: Object x either is ф or is not-ф . P4: We have no way to find out whether x really is as it looks in C1 or as it looks in C2. K: Therefore, we have to suspend judgment about x's being ф . However, Aenesidemus goes wrong here ; P4 is false. As far as the hypothesis that x is ф enters into the best explanation of the fact that x looks not-ф in C2, we are justified in accepting the belief that x is ф . This view supports coherentistic and inferential picture of our knowledge. Also, a number of Aenesidemus' examples may be axplained away as cases of voilation of a pragmaticaly justifed convention, conflation of secondary and primary properties, etc. Therefore, author believes that Aenesidemus' modes poses no serious threat to our knowledge, although they do show that things need not be as they appear to us.

Skepticism; Knowledge; Relativity; Ten Modes; Inference to the Best Explanation

nije evidentirano