Nalazite se na CroRIS probnoj okolini. Ovdje evidentirani podaci neće biti pohranjeni u Informacijskom sustavu znanosti RH. Ako je ovo greška, CroRIS produkcijskoj okolini moguće je pristupi putem poveznice www.croris.hr
izvor podataka: crosbi

The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience (CROSBI ID 59099)

Prilog u knjizi | izvorni znanstveni rad

Malatesti, Luca The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience // Perspectives on the Self / Berčić, Boran (ur.). Rijeka: Sveučilište u Rijeci, 2017. str. 123-137

Podaci o odgovornosti

Malatesti, Luca

engleski

The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience

We can have thoughts that are expressible with sentences such as “I am having the experience of a pain in my elbow, ” “I am having a conscious experience of red.” These thoughts involve the self-ascription of conscious experiences of a certain type on the ground of having such mental states. Philosophers investigate what is involved in the understanding of these thoughts to account for special features of our first personal knowledge of conscious experience and their nature.1 In this article, I elucidate some aspects of our understanding of these self- ascriptions by focusing on the concepts that concern the type of conscious color experiences that we have and the self. Within a controversial area of investigation, I characterize concepts, minimally and intuitively, as ways of thinking about objects, properties, and other entities. I introduce concepts so understood by means of that-clauses reporting ascriptions of beliefs or thoughts. I take that concepts are individuated by the conditionsv that a thinker must satisfy to possess them.

phenomenal concepts, experience, introspection, concept of self

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

Podaci o prilogu

123-137.

objavljeno

Podaci o knjizi

Perspectives on the Self

Berčić, Boran

Rijeka: Sveučilište u Rijeci

2017.

978-953-7975-57-9

Povezanost rada

Filozofija