Freedom and rationality: the case of psychopathy (CROSBI ID 680141)
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Podaci o odgovornosti
Malatesti, Luca ; Jurjako, Marko
engleski
Freedom and rationality: the case of psychopathy
Recently it has been argued that certain neuropsychological findings about the decision- making, instrumental learning, and moral understanding in psychopathic offenders offer reasons to consider them not criminally responsible, due to certain epistemic and volitional impairments. We reply to these arguments. Preliminarily we defend an account on how neuropsychological data can be used to bear on ascriptions of criminal responsibility. The basic tenet of this proposal is that the legal notion of control underlying criminal responsibility should be taken to require as necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions certain capacities that fall under the rubric of practical rationality. Then, in the light of such an account, we show that the available neuropsychological data do not support the claim that psychopathic offenders lack or have diminished criminal responsibility.
Enhancement, psychopathy ; freedom of will
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Podaci o prilogu
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Podaci o skupu
Poboljšanje i sloboda
predavanje
26.09.2016-26.09.2016
Beograd, Srbija