engleski

Neuropsychology and the criminal responsibility of psychopaths: reconsidering the evidence

Recently it has been argued that certain neuropsychological findings about the decision- making, instrumental learning, and moral understanding in psychopathic offenders offer reasons to consider them not criminally responsible due to certain epistemic and volitional impairments. We reply to these arguments. Preliminary we defend an account on how neuropsychological data can be used to bear on insanity defenses. The basic tenet of this proposal is that the legal notion of control in these defenses should be taken to require as, necessary but not sufficient preconditions certain capacities that fall under the rubric of practical rationality. Then, in the light of such an account, we show that the so far available neuropsychological data at issue do not offer sufficient considerations for supporting a diminished responsibility or insanity defense in the case of psychopathic offenders.

psychopathy, legal responsibility, neuropsychological correlates, reason responsiveness, executive functions, rationality

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