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Thinking about phenomenal concepts (CROSBI ID 183653)

Prilog u časopisu | izvorni znanstveni rad | međunarodna recenzija

Malatesti, Luca Thinking about phenomenal concepts // Synthesis philosophica, 26 (2011), 2; 391-402

Podaci o odgovornosti

Malatesti, Luca

engleski

Thinking about phenomenal concepts

Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of the phenomenal concept strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master argument, a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the master argument does not advance the debate between the supporters of the anti-physicalist arguments and those of the phenomenal concept strategy.

consciousness; qualia; zombies; a posteriori physicalism; phenomenal concept strategy; David Chalmers’s master argument

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Podaci o izdanju

26 (2)

2011.

391-402

objavljeno

0352-7875

Povezanost rada