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Reasons: A Naturalistic Explanation (CROSBI ID 407609)

Ocjenski rad | doktorska disertacija

Jurjako, Marko Reasons: A Naturalistic Explanation / Nenad Smokrović ; Luca Malatesti (mentor); Rijeka, Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci, . 2016

Podaci o odgovornosti

Jurjako, Marko

Nenad Smokrović ; Luca Malatesti

engleski

Reasons: A Naturalistic Explanation

The thesis has two aims. The first one is to discuss the nature of normative reasons and to investigate which account of them would be compatible with a broadly naturalistic world view. The second aim is to show how a naturalistically constrained account of normative reasons and rationality can be fruitfully applied to some practical contexts that involve interfacing normative constraints and empirical data. The structure of the thesis is the following: in the first chapter, I introduce the concept of a normative reason. Following the literature, I distinguish between object-based and subjectbased theories of normative reasons and discuss their attractions and disadvantages. In the second chapter, I defend one type of subject-based theory, the response-dependentist view of normative reasons. In the third chapter, I argue that subject-based theories of reasons receive support from evolutionary and naturalistic considerations. Moreover, I argue, on the basis of evolutionary considerations, that the object-based theories of reasons face serious difficulties, and therefore that we should adopt an attitude-dependent conception of normative reasons. In the fourth chapter, I further develop a positive account of one type of subject-based theory of normative reasons. I develop a naturalistically based account of reasons that is able to account for an important distinction between hypothetical and categorical reasons. Finally, in the fifth chapter I apply the developed framework to the case of psychopathy in order to discuss the question whether some recent neuropsychological studies show that psychopaths are irrational in their decision-making processes and behavior. I argue that current neuropsychological data do not warrant the conclusion that psychopaths are on average more irrational than other non- psychopathic individuals.

Normative reasons ; hypothetical and categorical reasons ; rationality ; evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics ; psychopathy and irrationality

Teza je napravljena u sklopu projekta CEASCRO 8071, doktroska stipendija od HRZZ-a 9522

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Podaci o izdanju

201

31.10.2016.

obranjeno

Podaci o ustanovi koja je dodijelila akademski stupanj

Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci

Rijeka

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

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