engleski

Free will, causation, and Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will

No matter what side one takes in the debate about free will, one will also have to accept certain metaphysical assumptions about causation and causal laws and, consequently, posit a certain ontological framework. In Causation and Free Will, Sartorio develops a compatibilist, actual causal sequence account of free will which is grounded on certain controversial features that causation presumably has. In this paper, we argue that those features cannot be jointly incorporated adequately into any plausible philosophical account of causation regardless of the validity of the thesis of causal determinism, and that they work against one another in Sartorio’s account of free will. We argue that no philosophical account of free will can establish the freedom of the will without offering a plausible answer of how an agent can have a grip on causation.

Free will, causation, omissions, causal history, causal powers.

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