engleski

Acceptance without Belief

The starting point of this paper is that acceptance and belief are really different doxastic attitudes. The main motive for introducing the concept of acceptance and opposing it to the concept of belief is to provide an adequate analysis of knowledge and of justification, but also to elucidate the relations between normative and descriptive elements of knowledge, between its active and passive dimensions, as well as to resolve the ancient problem of voluntariness and involuntariness of belief and knowledge and to explain the phenomenon of frequent unreasonable inferences (reported by Kahneman & Tversky). It is shown that acceptance is a necessary ingredient or prerequisite of belief and, therefore, that belief is sufficient for acceptance. Belief entails acceptance, but not vice versa. Therefore, acceptance is possible without belief. Some cases of communal knowledge are adduced as a confirmation of this conclusion.

acceptance; belief; justification/warrant; normative and descriptive; voluntariness and involuntariness; communal knowledge

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