Aristotle on Dividing the Soul (CROSBI ID 521308)
Neobjavljeno sudjelovanje sa skupa | neobjavljeni prilog sa skupa | međunarodna recenzija
Podaci o odgovornosti
Gregorić, Pavel
engleski
Aristotle on Dividing the Soul
Aristotle's account of the soul requires an adequate division of the soul. However, Aristotle refuses to divide the soul spatially, and insists that it is divided only conceptually, that is 'in being' or 'in account'. In this paper I explain what this division amounts to and how Aristotle executes it. Then I discuss three important advantages of such a division of the soul. First, it enables Aristotle to avoid problems that he identified in Plato's account of the soul. Second, it allows him to treat a particular capacity of the soul as itself divided into distinct parts or aspects. Third, it allows him to treat a particular capacity of the soul as a distinct part or aspect of some more comprehensive capacity.
Aristotle; Plato; division of the soul
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
Podaci o prilogu
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
Podaci o skupu
Pozvano predavanje, CEU Philosophy Department and the Center for Hellenic Traditions
pozvano predavanje
06.12.2005-06.12.2005
Budimpešta, Mađarska