engleski

Allocation of Votes in the Council of the European Union: Equity, Equality, or Proportionality?

The paper is analysing allocation of votes in the Council of the EU. Using Game-Theoretic measures such as Shapley value, and various proportionality and equality measures, it is shown that the proclaimed representation principles have little relevance for the real distribution of voting power in the Council. The results strongly indicate that the voting power will increase with the number of votes in the case of minimum winning coalitions (MWC) as long as MWC threshold is greater then minimum blocking coalitions (MBC) threshold. Similarly, it is also shown that that the higher the MBC threshold (i.e., veto), the more advantaged larger states will be, that is, their voting power in the Council will increase. Most of these findings sharply contradict the common assumption that the more votes a state has, the greater its voting power, proving that the opposite might happen as a function of the general distribution of votes in the Council.

proportionality, equity, equality, voting power, Shapley value, minimum winning coalitions, blocking coalitions

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