engleski

Consciousness: Problems with Perspectives

The paper deals with some misconceptions concerning the 'privileged' (and at the same time 'mysterious'?) access to our own experiences from the first-person perspective, points to the limitations of this immediacy, and questions the solipsist privacy of subjectivity. Based on the conviction that the identification of 'point of view' with 'perspective' proves to be problematic, the author argues that we may take different perspectives from the same (person) point of view. As embodied and embedded cognitive persons we practice the exchange of perspectival attitudes towards our own subjectivity in our daily lives far more easily and frequently than we are prone to admit in our theories. This kind of methodology, part of which is also the objectivist third-person approach, does not have the power to revise the irreducibility between the subjective and the empirical, although it does plea for the mind open to the intersubjective space, in which the irreducible can still be communicated, compared and complemented.

consciousness; point of view; first/second/third person perspective; subjectivity; heterophenomenology; intersubjectivity

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