engleski

Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry

At the beginning of the second book of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, immediately before he begins to scrutinize the theories of his dogmatic opponents, Sextus Empiricus discusses the objection that the skeptics can neither inquire into nor think about the objects of the dogmatists’ theories. The objection is framed in the form of the so-called Meno’ s paradox and says that the skeptics either apprehend the statements of the dogmatists, in which case they cannot be puzzled about them — so that, consequently, they cannot maintain the skeptical disposition of suspending judgment about everything — or they do not apprehend them, in which case they cannot even talk about, let alone inquire into, them. I try to show that if we take a closer look at Sextus’ immediate response to this objection, we can see that, instead of trying to provide a direct justification of the skeptics’ credentials to inquire against the dogmatists, he adopts a different strategy. It consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire. Thus, the dogmatists are asked to show first that we are indeed able to discover how things really are, and only then to argue that those who maintain the skeptical disposition are not entitled to inquire against them. If we appreciate why the dogmatists fail to provide justifications for their claims, we will realize that the skeptics’ idea that inquiry should be based on how things appear to the inquirer is just a move in a dialectical game with the dogmatists. I also try to show that the fact that Sextus proceeds dialectically in this particular case as well can help us understand some deeper problems with the skeptical position in general.

Sextus Empiricus; inquiry; concepts; appearances

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