engleski

Consciousness, Attention and Levels of Perceptual Content

The difference between sensory-based "phenomenal" and the representational "intentional" levels of perceptual content has a long tradition within philosophy (Aristotle, Berkeley, Reid, Brentano, Husserl) and psychophysics (Helmholtz, von Kries, Stumpf). This difference still looms large in the current approaches to perception – both empirical and conceptual (Marr, Rock). However, some recent findings and theories concerning the role of attention and consciousness in perceptual experience challenge the traditional construal of the two levels. Specifically, evidence of preattentive and preconscious perceptual processes opens a host of questions and issues, some of which have a bearing on our general understanding of the human mind and its relation to the world. My contribution will give an overview of these questions and issues from a broader, perspective, with an emphasis on the implications of the offered solutions for a theory of mind. In particular, the problem of contentfullness (intentionality) of subconscious mental states and processes will be addressed together with the related problem of its personal-level manifestations. Phenomena of paradigmatic relevance for my discussion include inattentional blindness, amodal seeing, perceptual filling-in, and preattentive selection of bound sensory features.

consciousness; attention; perceptual content; phenomenal level; intentional level; subconscious mental states; perceptual filling-in; preattentive selection

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