engleski

Doxastic voluntarism and the libertarian notion of freedom

In this paper I'll try to show the main problems that emerged in the discussion regarding the plausibility of doxastic voluntarism and it’ s applicability in the realm of the deontology of belief. In the first part of the paper I’ ll briefly illustrate why should we regard the thesis of doxastic voluntarism as an important one for the applicability of deontological judgments and I’ ll criticize both the conceptual and the psychological impossibility thesis. Through a confrontation of the involuntaristic stance defended by Willam Alston, Richard Feldman and Robert Audi and the voluntaristic stance defended by Matthias Steup and Carl Ginet in the second part of the paper I’ ll try to show that the argumentation used while discussing the availability of the thesis of doxastic voluntarism resembles the argumentation that is implemented in the free will debate. On the basis of this analysis I’ ll try to show that the volutaristic stance may be defended from two different approaches very similar to the compatibilistic and libertarianistic stance used in the free will debate. Finally I’ ll try to defend the voluntaristic position from a libertarianistic point of view.

Doxastic voluntarism; Free will; Libertarianism; Compatibilism

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