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Separability vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle (CROSBI ID 156301)

Prilog u časopisu | izvorni znanstveni rad | međunarodna recenzija

Corcilius, Klaus ; Gregorić, Pavel Separability vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle // Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, 39 (2010), 81-119

Podaci o odgovornosti

Corcilius, Klaus ; Gregorić, Pavel

engleski

Separability vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle

According to the standard view, Aristotle makes no difference between a capacity of the soul and a part of the soul. We argue that Aristotle made a clear and methodologically important distinction between parts and capacities, and we explicate Aristotle's criterion for deciding which capacities count as parts of the soul.

psychology; unity; partition; mereology; Plato; Whiting

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

Podaci o izdanju

39

2010.

81-119

objavljeno

0265-7651

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

Indeksiranost