hrvatski

Spoznaja i metoda u Ruđera Boškovića

In Bošković, there is not a separate and systematic exposition of the theory of knowledge. In his work, there is not a paper, which is completely dedicated to the epistemological problem. Yet, in various of his dissertations, on this or that occasion, as to the need of this or that physical or mathematical argumentation, Bošković resorts to considering certain epistemological topics or issues, too. Thus, some of his epistemological standpoints (on the origin of ideas acquired through the senses, on the reliability and the limits of sensory perception, on the so-called innate ideas, on solipsism), here or there in his work, get exposed more seriously. These standpoints are the subject matter of the first part of this book (chapters II� IX) � thus, not a theory of knowledge (because there is not a separate and systematic exposition of the theory of knowledge in Bošković), but certain of Bošković� s epistemological standpoints, scattered about in various dissertations of his on physics and mathematics. In his natural-philosophical argumentation, Bošković often calls upon analogy, simplicity and continuity in nature. These views (on the analogy and simplicity in nature, on the continuity in nature), however, within Bošković� s physical system, are linked to the inductive (and not the deductive) method of resoning. Namely, Bošković holds induction to be the fundamental scientific method. He sets it forth in more detail (its conditions, its reliability, its principles) in De continuitatis lege, no. 134-135, pp. 60-61, in Supplementum I 11, 89-95 and in Theoria philosophiae naturalis, no. 40-43, pp. 17-20. This Bošković� s doctrine on the inductive scientific method is the subject matter of the second part of this book (chapters X-XII) � thus, not certain Bošković� s methodological principles (the principle of analogy and simplicity in nature, the principle of continuity), but his fundamental scientific method, the method of induction. I consider Bošković� s epistemological ideas and views, firstly, from the ontological viewpoint, in the context of the scholastic doctrine of cause (causa), condition (conditio) and chance (casus), and secondly, from the logical aspect (the aspect of criterion), in the context of the scholastic concepts of evidence (evidentia), knowledge (scientia), assent (assensus), certainty (certitudo), infallibility (infallibilitas) and fear of error (formido). In the exposition of these two contexts, I pay special attention to Tolomei � not only because he was very influential among the Jesuits of the 18th century, but because his influence is very manifest in Bošković, too. Apart from Tolomei, in the exposition I also include some other representatives of the Jesuit scholasticism of the 17th and 18th centuries � Thierry, Jaszlinszky, Redlhamer, Biwald, Radić, Horváth (moreover, sometimes I also help myself to some neo-scholastic authors, such as Gredt, Willems, Hugon, Pirotta). I examine successively: Bošković� s standpoint on the so-called innate ideas, Bošković� s doctrine of the origin of ideas acquired through the senses and his idea of truth (Bošković� s position toward veritas repraesentationis and veritas judicii, and Bošković� s so-called consensus theory). To the examination, I add the topic of the epistemological and comparably the ontological natures � Bošković� s standpoint toward solipsism. As to the exposition of Bošković� s doctrine of the origin of ideas acquired through the senses, it showed to be necessary for some of Bošković� s fundamental physical notions (mostly the Newtonian provenance) to be firstly discussed. In the same way, as to the exposition of Bošković� s standpoint on solipsism, it showed to be necessary for the scholastic notions of instinct and common sense to be firstly clarified � the scholasticism at matter is again, of course, the Jesuit scholasticism of the end of the 17th and during the 18th centuries (thus, Tolomei, Jaszlinszky, Horváth, etc.). Finally, the examination of Bošković� s notion of truth is directly prompted by Tolomei� s differentiation between veritas repraesentationis and veritas judicii, and gradually it grows into a brief comparison of Bošković� s epistemological position to that of Kant� s. I conclude firstly that Bošković is distinctly closer to rationalism, than he is to empiricism from the epistemological point of view ; secondly that in the background of Bošković� s doctrine of the origin of ideas acquired through the senses lies the scholastic doctrine of chance ; thirdly that Bošković is a realist from the epistemological (and ontological) point of view ; fourthly that he is rather close to Kant in some of his fundamental epistemological stands, and in others, though, that he is distinctly different from Kant ; and fifthly that he holds veritas judicii, but not veritas repraesentationis, possible. Bošković� s doctrine of the natural-scientific induction I consider both in the context of the scholastic doctrines of doubt (dubium), suspicion (suspicio) and opinion (opinio), and in the context of the classical calculus of probability. I conclude firstly that � according to Bošković � natural-scientific induction rests on Bernoulli� s principle of moral certitude (on the one hand, on the a posteriori established regularity without exception, analogy, relative frequency =1, and on the other, on the a priori valid principles of the calculus of probability and the law of great numbers) ; secondly that � on the basis of the previous � natural-scientific induction is restricted in regard to the knowledge of real (physical) causes of the respective regularity (the respective law of nature or the general physical property) ; thirdly that � according to Bošković � natural-scientific induction does not result in certain assent (knowledge), but only in reliable assent (opinion) ; fourthly that, in Bošković, the method of natural-scientific induction is conditioned by the reasons, which follow from his epistemological conception of ideas acquired through the senses ; fifthly that Bošković is distinctly closer to rationalism, than he is to empiricism, from the methodological (and not only epistemological) point of view, too.

teorija spoznaje; indukcija; urođene ideje; očitost; znanje; sigurnost; mnijenje; sumnja; dvojba; solipsizam; racionalizam; empirizam; klasični račun vjerojatnosti; a priori; a posteriori; uzrok; uvjet

nije evidentirano