engleski

Acting Otherwise in a Fixed Moment

In the free will debate Peter Van Inwagen in his famous paper “When the Will is Free?” argued that everyone who is a libertarian and accepts rule beta, as used in the consequence argument, should also accept that only on rare occasions we are able to exhibit free will. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza labeled this position as restrictive incompatibilism and in “When the Will is Free?” argued that there is a way out for an incompatibilist who doesn’t want to commit herself to restrictive incompatibilism namely that in cases of indefensible acts or acts of unopposed inclination a person might be able to acquire opposing desires and act otherwise. I will argue that their analysis fails because they are adopting a strategy very similar to the hypothetical analysis of the notion “can do otherwise” used by compatibilist in the debate regarding the consequence argument.

Free Will; Restrictive Incompatibilism; Acting Otherwise; Consequence Argument

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