engleski

HOHFELD'S CONCEPT OF IMMUNITYHOHFELD'S CONCEPT OF IMMUNITY

The topic of this paper is analysis of Hohfeld’s concept of immunity. The paper is divided into three sections. The first part includes analysis and evaluation of Hohfeld’s concept of immunity. The main goal of this section is to outline using existing knowledge what is relevant and still not satisfying in Hohfeld’s concept of immunity and how these flaws can be corrected. The second part reviews contemporary debates on Hohfeld’s concept of immunity. Arguments for and against inclusion of immunity into a type of legal rights are investigated in this part. The third part is aimed at showing that it is not possible to analyse some extremely relevant constitutional rights without the concept of immunity. Hohfeld’s fundamental legal concepts enable precise interpretation of what is understood by people when they require their rights. The concept of Hohfeldian immunity is useful for denoting a specific status of citizens protected from a particular harmful change by means of constitutional restraints or by the disability of the legislator. Unlike the relation right-duty which refers to required conduct, the relation immunity-disability is characterized by conduct which cannot bring to legal changes. The concept of immunity is irreplaceable when it comes to the ’’rights’’ of citizens not to be deprived of their property or freedoms without due process of law, then when it comes to the right to freedom of speech, the right to freedom of confession, the principle ne bis in idem.

immunity; constitutional rights

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