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The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership? (CROSBI ID 186870)

Prilog u časopisu | izvorni znanstveni rad

Marijan, Davor The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership? // Review of Croatian history, 7 (2011), 1; 103-123

Podaci o odgovornosti

Marijan, Davor

engleski

The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership?

The topic of this work is the post-war controversy centred on the view that the Croatian political leadership made an error in January 1992 when, with mediation by the United Nations, it agreed to and signed a ceasefire with representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Sarajevo. Those who hold this view are retired Croatian Army generals, who maintain that the war should have been continued during 1992, which would have achieved a military victory and the liberation of Croatia’s occupied and rebellious territories. Since these speculations are systematically promoted by influential media outlets, the author has attempted to respond to the extent allowed by historical scholarship

Republic of Croatia; Yugoslav People’s Army; Homeland war; strategy; Sarajevo Ceasefire

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Podaci o izdanju

7 (1)

2011.

103-123

objavljeno

1845-4380

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

Poveznice