The agency problem in healthcare and the importance of incentives (CROSBI ID 593784)
Prilog sa skupa u zborniku | izvorni znanstveni rad | međunarodna recenzija
Podaci o odgovornosti
Cerović, Ljerka ; Dukić, Nikolina ; Horvat, Tijana
engleski
The agency problem in healthcare and the importance of incentives
The agency problem in healthcare is caused by information asymmetry between the principal and the agent and is different than the agency problem in other economic fields due to the specificities of healthcare systems. Although other principal-agent relationships are present in healthcare, the most common one is the one between the patient - principal, and his physician - agent. Bearing in mind that there is a certain conflict of interests between the patient and the physician, the ultimate goal is to create an incentive compatible contract which will maximize utility of both the principal and the agent. A well designed payment system in healthcare has a great importance in influencing physicians’ behavior and when determining the payment system which will contribute the most to the motivation of the physician to maximize the patient’s utility, the guiding principles should be optimal use of resources and effective resource allocation to ensure an efficient healthcare system.
Information asymmetry ; Incentive compatible contract ; Health care efficiency ; Resource allocation ; Healthcare payment systems
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Podaci o prilogu
61-68.
2012.
objavljeno
Podaci o matičnoj publikaciji
Knowledge and Business Challenges of Globalisation in 2012
Merkač, Skok M. ; Cingula, M.
Celje: Faculty of Commercial and Business Sciences Celje
978-961-6825-67-2
Podaci o skupu
4th International Scientific Conference “Knowledge and Business Challenges of Globalisation in 2012”
predavanje
15.11.2012-16.11.2012
Celje, Slovenija