Nalazite se na CroRIS probnoj okolini. Ovdje evidentirani podaci neće biti pohranjeni u Informacijskom sustavu znanosti RH. Ako je ovo greška, CroRIS produkcijskoj okolini moguće je pristupi putem poveznice www.croris.hr
izvor podataka: crosbi !

Grasping Aristotle's Intellect (CROSBI ID 214789)

Prilog u časopisu | izvorni znanstveni rad | međunarodna recenzija

Gregorić, Pavel ; Pfeiffer, Christian Grasping Aristotle's Intellect // Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 26 (2015), 13-31

Podaci o odgovornosti

Gregorić, Pavel ; Pfeiffer, Christian

engleski

Grasping Aristotle's Intellect

In this paper we offer a novel interpretation of the second aporia stated in Aristotle’s De Anima III.4, the question whether the intellect can think itself. We propose that the aporia does not aim at reflexive awareness of one’s own thoughts, as is commonly assumed, but relies on a more objectivist account. The question, we claim, is whether the intellect can itself become an object of intellectual grasp. On our interpretation of III.4, Aristotle argues that the intellect is itself thinkable insofar as it thinks its objects, which means that grasping the intellect is a matter of grasping the objects that it thinks. We show that, on this account, there is no difference in the way one grasps one’s own intellect and the way one grasps another person’s intellect.

intellect; object of thought; self-awareness; reflexivity; aporia; De Anima

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

nije evidentirano

Podaci o izdanju

26

2015.

13-31

objavljeno

1122-5750

Povezanost rada

Filozofija