engleski

Design and Operation of the "Hybrid" Presidency - Evaluation of the Power-Sharing in the Croatian Top Executive

Constitutional experimentation with the organization of government in Croatia has not been completed in the twenty five years of independence. The discussion is ongoing and has been revived with each presidential elections. It is not limited exclusively to the academic community ; the important political leaders, as usual, reopened the discussion during the presidential electoral campaign of 2014/2015. The previous discussions, often with the aim of examining the public opinion had, generally speaking, been disguised under the pretext of demanding a "pure parliamentary system", as if the "hybrid" character of the constitutional system per se has created problems. Those arguments were scientifically rather easy to dismiss, since there has been virtually no "pure system" functioning in practice. The recent contention, however, puts an emphasis on the necessity to establish a more efficient government which would be energetic enough to deal with the serious and prolonged economic, social and political crisis. The analysis of this makes the primary purpose of this paper, departing from the question whether the time has come to amend the Constitution and to abandon the particular arrangement of checks and balances developed during the Constitutional reform of 2000, the primary objective of which had been to prevent a reocurrence of the system of personalized and concentrated power, as developed during the first decade of independence under the pretext of the French model of a semi-presidential system. It is not out intention to analyze anew whether that might be a "pure semi-presidential system", nor a "pure parliamentary system" or a real cohabitation à la française. Rather, ours is the aim to provide an overview of and evaluate the actual functioning of the specific Croatian variation of "a two-headed executive", as well as whether the expectations from it have been fulfilled. The question we pose is a crucial one: has the young Croatian republic achieved such a level of democratic development and rule of law that the checks might be forgotten and the full authority be confined to the Government in order to strengthen its' economic and reformist capacities, or do we still believe that the necessary checks should be maintained? Instead of a proposal for change, we conclude with a caveat: do not undertake substantital changes of the system without a solid scientific projection of possible consequences.

Croatia; President of the Republic; Constitution; pure parliamentarism; crisis; "hybrid" presidency

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