engleski

The Philosopher's Virtues

The growing discipline of metaphilosophy has turned the sharpness of philosophical investigations on philosophy itself, asking what philosophy is, why it matters and for whom. This paper is a contribution to some of the current attempts to engage with these issues. It addresses a recent view on philosophical virtues developed by Soren Overgaard, Paul Gilbert and Steven Burwood. Inspired by Socrates’ criticism of the Sophists, they claim that the distinctive intellectual virtues of philosophers are a curiosity, which leads them to seek understanding rather than ignorance, and intellectual integrity, manifested in their dedication to get things right rather than to tolerate error. I examine this view from a perspective of the ‘No Progress View’ as formulated by David Chalmers and Eric Dietrich and conclude by offering a modified version of the Virtue Account, which is better equipped to do justice to the value of philosophy.

knowledge ; metaphilosophy ; no progress view ; philosophy ; truth ; sciences ; virtues

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