The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience (CROSBI ID 59099)
Prilog u knjizi | izvorni znanstveni rad
Podaci o odgovornosti
Malatesti, Luca
engleski
The Self-Ascription of Conscious Experience
We can have thoughts that are expressible with sentences such as “I am having the experience of a pain in my elbow, ” “I am having a conscious experience of red.” These thoughts involve the self-ascription of conscious experiences of a certain type on the ground of having such mental states. Philosophers investigate what is involved in the understanding of these thoughts to account for special features of our first personal knowledge of conscious experience and their nature.1 In this article, I elucidate some aspects of our understanding of these self- ascriptions by focusing on the concepts that concern the type of conscious color experiences that we have and the self. Within a controversial area of investigation, I characterize concepts, minimally and intuitively, as ways of thinking about objects, properties, and other entities. I introduce concepts so understood by means of that-clauses reporting ascriptions of beliefs or thoughts. I take that concepts are individuated by the conditionsv that a thinker must satisfy to possess them.
phenomenal concepts, experience, introspection, concept of self
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Podaci o prilogu
123-137.
objavljeno
Podaci o knjizi
Perspectives on the Self
Berčić, Boran
Rijeka: Sveučilište u Rijeci
2017.
978-953-7975-57-9