Identification and Self-Knowledge (CROSBI ID 62453)
Prilog u knjizi | izvorni znanstveni rad | međunarodna recenzija
Podaci o odgovornosti
Malatesti, Luca ; Čeč, Filip
engleski
Identification and Self-Knowledge
Recently, Matt King and Peter Carruthers have argued that the Real Self accounts of moral responsibility or autonomy are under pressure because they rely on a questionable conception of self-knowledge of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. In fact, they defend, as a plausible assumption, the claim that transparent self-knowledge of propositional attitudes is incompatible with mounting evidence in the cognitive sciences. In this chapter, we respond to this line of argument. We describe the types of self-knowledge that might plausibly be involved, as psychological prerequisites, in the processes of identification and integration that lead to the constitution of the real self of an agent. We argue that these forms of self- knowledge do not require the type of transparent knowledge of propositional attitudes that, according to King and Carruthers, is incompatible with the results of contemporary cognitive science.
King and Carruthers’s criticism to the “Real self” ; “Real self” accounts of responsibility ; Identification with our mental states Self-knowledge ; Conscious attitudes ; Self
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
nije evidentirano
Podaci o prilogu
177-189.
objavljeno
10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_10
Podaci o knjizi
Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative
Pedrini, Patrizia ; Kirsch, Julie
New York (NY): Springer
2018.
978-3-319-98644-9