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Aristotle on deliberation and contingency (CROSBI ID 63199)

Prilog u knjizi | izvorni znanstveni rad | međunarodna recenzija

Grgić, Filip Aristotle on deliberation and contingency // Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives / Grgić, Filip ; Davor, Pećnjak (ur.). Cham: Springer, 2018. str. 103-115 doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-99295-2_8

Podaci o odgovornosti

Grgić, Filip

engleski

Aristotle on deliberation and contingency

The author discusses Aristotle’s notion of deliberation and shows that it differs considerably from the model of deliberation as is common in contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility. As opposed to the contemporary model, Aristotle’s account does not require that the deliberator has any belief (or lack thereof) concerning the availability of possible courses of action. However, the action that is chosen by deliberation, before it is performed, is still contingent––i.e. such that it can both be and not be done––and up to us. Moreover, the action’s being up to us can be seen as grounded in our having rational capacities that are necessarily two-sided. This might suggest that the agent can do otherwise than she has decided by deliberation. The author argues that this is not the case: after deliberation, or after forming the relevant desire, the agent can actualize only one arm of her two-sided capacity, and hence, she cannot act differently than as decided by deliberation. If it makes sense to say that she can act differently, it is only because there may occur, in the interval between deliberation and action, some other desire which takes over a role of the decisive factor.

Aristotle, Compatibilism, Contingency, Deliberation, Incompatibilism, Up-to-usness

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Podaci o prilogu

103-115.

objavljeno

10.1007/978-3-319-99295-2_8

Podaci o knjizi

Free Will & Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

Grgić, Filip ; Davor, Pećnjak

Cham: Springer

2018.

978-3-319-99294-5

2509-4793

2509-4807

Povezanost rada

Filozofija

Poveznice