Trust - Between the Disposition to Cooperation and Evidence (CROSBI ID 100157)
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Prijić - Samaržija, Snježana
engleski
Trust - Between the Disposition to Cooperation and Evidence
In this paper, I defend a certain moderate version of Humean evidentialism against Redian non- evidentialist's position about trust and testimony. My proposal of cooperative viewpoint of trust is based on following theses: (i) any form of cooperative activity, including division of labor, requires that cooperators trust one another (ii) epistemic cooperation as a necessary condition for us to attain knowledge (because of the scope and complexity of the task, of the inequalities of capacities and background information, etc.) assumes the trust between cooperators. In contrast to Redian anti- reductionism or non-evidentialism, justified trust cannot be blind or uncritical but it has to rely on some evidence. However, the fact that we depend on other people for most of our knowledge can be a good reason to weaken the Humean evidentialism and epistemic self-reliance and to accept as epistemically responsible and rational the trusting partly based on epistemic forward looking reasons (gathering of information). Further, I try to defend the thesis that the crucial evidence the hearer can have is the evidence about trustworthiness of informants, i.e. their moral and epistemic character, not the evidence about the content of informant's report.
trust; trustworthiness; evidence; disposition to trust; epistemic cooperation
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