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Autori: Gregorić, Pavel; Grgić, Filip
Naslov: Theophrastus on knowledge: An interpretation of Metaphysics §§19-26
Skup: SEEAP Meeting 2008: Theophrastus: Metaphysics
Mjesto i datum: Budimpešta, Madžarska, 26-28. 6. 2008.
Ključne riječi: Theophrastus; Aristotle; Metaphysics; knowledge; perception; difference; explanation
Theophrastus shares some basic metaphysical assumptions with both Plato and Aristotle. He believes that reality consists of sensible things that are subject to at least one kind of change, and intelligible things that are subject to no change whatsoever. Moreover, he believes that intelligible things are causes or explanations of sensible things, so that we need to grasp intelligible things in order to understand sensible things. He sides with Aristotle, and parts way with Plato, in believing that we come to grasp intelligible things by careful empirical study of sensible things, rather than by recollection or dialectic. Consequently, he resents the idea that the two domains of reality are separated from each other and hence that we can, or even should, study intelligible things in separation from sensible things or sensible things in separation from intelligible things. ‘ Reality is not episodic, ’ as Theophrastus would say. In §§19– 26 he discusses epistemological repercussions of such a view of reality. His discussion revolves around the relationship between two fundamental cognitive capacities, perception and thought, and the relationship between two fundamental types of knowledge, knowledge by explanation and knowledge by intuition. The former relationship is explored in §§19-21 and the latter in §§22-26. Theophrastus aims to show that just as reality is not episodic, neither is our knowledge of reality. In other words, it is not the case that our two fundamental cognitive capacities – perception and thought – are entirely separate and independent from one another. Perception and thought are interconnected. For instance, perception seeks and occasionally finds things and facts from which thought can extract the relevant explanatory universal. Similarly, two fundamental kinds of knowledge are interconnected because one finds its end and purpose in the other. To think otherwise would involve grave difficulties. For instance, if knowledge by explanation does not find its end and purpose in knowledge by intuition, the search for explanations will be never-ending. This insistence on interconnectedness between two fundamental cognitive capacities and between two fundamental kinds of knowledge can be seen as anti-Platonic in the same measure in which they are Aristotelian. While Theophrastus is faithful to his master, we hope to show that he introduces some interesting modifications by tightening some of Aristotle’ s suppositions or by discussing them from a different point of view.
Vrsta sudjelovanja: Pozvano
Vrsta prezentacije u zborniku: Nije objavljen
Vrsta recenzije: Međunarodna recenzija
Projekt / tema: 191-1911111-1099
Izvorni jezik: ENG
Kategorija: Znanstveni
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Upisao u CROSBI: (, 30. Lip. 2008. u 23:09 sati

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