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Autori: Valerjev, Pavle
Naslov: Deductive Reasoning: Why People Are Not Always Logical
Izvornik: Review of Psychology, 23(1-2), Special Section 12th Alps Adria Psychology Conference
ISSN: 1330-6812
Skup: 12th Alps-Adria Psychology Conference
Mjesto i datum: Rijeka, Hrvatska, 29.09.-01.10.2016.
Ključne riječi: deductive reasoning; cognitive biases; dual process theory; mental model theory
Sažetak:
Research on reasoning deals with the processes of deductive, inductive and analogical reasoning. Since the theoretical frame of cognitive psychology considers thinking as a process of mental representation manipulation, the traditional intelligence-test approach is not enough. A psychological experimental approach is needed to gain insight into the mental processes of thought. Systematic research on deduction originated in the 1960’s when the British psychologist Peter Wason investigated this subject. These experiments demonstrated that there were significant and systematic deviations in human deduction when related to traditional and formal logic. For example, the paradigm of the Wason selection task reveals the biases in human reasoning such as the confirmation and matching bias, among others. These biases are connected to specific reasoning heuristics and are usually the cause of the characteristic fallacies in specific reasoning situations. A change in reasoning conditions (e.g. the use of abstract or concrete content) can change the activation of the specific bias and drastically change the reasoning outcome. Therefore, these situations encourage a strong and confusing impression of people being limitedly logical or even non-logical. However, these observations nicely fit into the modern Dual process theory. Dual process theory explains that there are two types of processes involved in thinking: Type 1 which is rapid, automatic and based on the activation of heuristics and biases, and Type 2 which is slow, demands mental effort and is based on mental skills (e.g. mathematical or logical skills). Theories of deductive reasoning are usually divided into three classes: deduction as the process of factual knowledge connecting ; deduction as the syntactic process based on the rules of formal logic ; and deduction as the sematic process based on representations called mental models. The third theory describes mental models as crucial representations that are related to systems of long-term and working memory and offers explanations of a broad set of phenomena which includes reasoning with syllogisms, conditionals, inductive reasoning, and representation of discourse, probabilities and mental simulations. The information that models include cannot only be abstract, but also based on perceptive and motor systems which can be a link that relates reasoning studies with embodied cognition. Finally, the reasoning constraints described by mental models theory contribute to the explanation of characteristic logical fallacies and reasoners as limited in logical problem solving.
Vrsta sudjelovanja: Pozvano
Vrsta prezentacije u zborniku: Sažetak
Vrsta recenzije: Međunarodna recenzija
Projekt / tema: Projekt 4139 Hrvatska zaklada za znanost
Izvorni jezik: ENG
Kategorija: Znanstveni
Znanstvena područja:
Psihologija
URL Internet adrese: http://aapc16.com/plenary-talks/
Upisao u CROSBI: Pavle Valerjev (valerjev@unizd.hr), 2. Lis. 2016. u 17:06 sati



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