THE EU’S ARMY TRANSFORMATION: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT: National armies of the present day must transform to campaign-capable forces of high quality, with joint and expeditionary capabilities, in order to provide a relevant and ready military power to combat commanders, when they use battle groups. National armies are focusing its efforts to enhance military capabilities for those units that meet requirements of the full range of military commitments on the contemporary battlefield. Modern armies need to have guidance into the Transformation Roadmap that describes the path the army is taking to adapt its institutions and capabilities. Each national army turns to operational experience, in order to develop operational concepts and capabilities that ought to be sustained interoperability between comparable European armies. The army transformation develops the force structure as to achieve full joint interdependence between European armies. What can we expect from the EU member states’ contributions – maybe they will invest more into national capabilities? International obligations and agreements are respected between the EU states, but the major plan, to constitute the European army had failed politically, after the proposal of the EU Constitution was rejected at the referendums in France and in the Netherlands in 2005, respectively. If state investments will not be provided for modern military capabilities than army transformation could stop. Therefore, the EU needs to rebuild a new command staff intelligence program, which will distribute, dispatch, dislocate, dislodge, and supply modern armies on versatile battlefields around the globe under artificial C4I architecture platform command. This military program, at strategic level, as the third generation of transformation paradigm will use human brains to automatically command and control both to unmanned robotics systems and to military troops on the ground, in the Earth’s space, at the sea and in the air, by using selective weapons systems. Key words: European Union (EU) member states, army transformation, military capabilities, NATO, EU Battle Groups (EUBGs), the Helsinki Goal document.

1 INTRODUCTION
Before we start with explaining the meritum addressed in this paper, we need to explain terms from military terminology used here. Military transformation process is termed as army transformation. Transformation process includes: theories for command, development of
military capabilities and forming units into military organization. Definition for military transformation single out as military forces are able to face with new security challenges, so they need to reorganize, reequip, and rearm for carrying out multirole missions that include non-military tasks. At the 2010 Lisbon summit, the EU – NATO states confirmed new NATO’s Strategic Concept. After this security concept was accepted, the topics for military challenges for transforming process were discussed. What had to be transformed in the military were military elements, such as: military units, command posts, military installations, and capabilities. If these military elements were changed or upgraded than military forces get smaller, agile, effective, professional, modern equipped and armoured, interoperable and interconnected, to be able to conduct multirole tasks in security missions. Modern transformation for military infrastructure, as well as command posts and capabilities, were put into praxis as conversion process of outdated military assets and demobilization of surplus cadres into military organisation inside parent units. Derivative results should bring new modern armies, at the end of the transformation process, into more flexible, mobile, and protective forces.

2 THEORETICAL VIEWPOINTS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARMIES IN THE U.S.A. AND IN EUROPE
What does it mean army transformation for the modern military into the 21st century? The transformation of the US Army began in 2006, under the development military team of the then Army Chief of Staff, General P. Schoomaker. This military expert team had to move the old army structure from its Cold War divisional orientation to a full-spectrum capability with fully manned, equipped and trained brigades with reserve components. Modern military forces were organized around large, mostly mechanized divisions, each with around 15 000 soldiers but under the new plan were organized modular brigades of 3 000 – 4 000 soldiers each, with the aim of being able to deploy continuously in different parts of the world.

Beside organizational changes into modern military, the armies faced with technical challenges that had been able to overcome number of technical challenges as reducing the weight of soldier equipment, improving soldier protection, making lightweight combat systems survivable, and ensuring command and control centres more mobile and capable for fighting on ground. The aim of army transformation, in science and engineering, was to save soldiers lives on the battlefield, by putting them into formed smaller, lighter, faster, and smarter force (Parmentola, 2004: 33-41).

The term military transformation should simply be understood as the means to achieve profound change in military affairs. The changes, however, should be dramatic rather than mere improvements on the margin, such as modestly better aircraft, tanks or ships. Discussion about military transformation began in the mid- to late 1990s, through the debate about the impending revolution in military affairs (RMA) that should involve into major changes in technology, doctrine and organization (Davis, 2003: 2-3).

Modern states need transformation strategies, enabling them to transform culture through innovative leadership and adaptive defence institutions, able to transform processes include with risk adjudication that are using the Trends of Future Force (re)construction and transformed capabilities for interdependent joint operations through force transformation (Army Transformation Roadmap, 2004: 14).

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1 Today, there are 22 members states of both EU and NATO.
The EU member states have drafted a strategy how to transform own parent army units with added organic military capabilities into a defence reform. Therefore, it has written an Army Transformation Roadmap, the Defence Strategy and Transformation Planning Guidance as the framework documents that serve as directions and manuals to achieve sustained mayor goals into military. These documents include main attributes to handle out the future operational environment, joint concepts that identify required joint force capabilities and interdependencies, operational experience that identifies both known shortfalls requiring change and promising improvements to joint and Army operations, and explorations of technological advantages. The Army’s transformation strategy includes three transformed components as military culture, processes and capabilities. A support to change through efforts achieved from the Headquarters, Department of the Army staff, supporting agencies and activities should not be omitted (Army Transformation Roadmap, 2004: 8-9). The changes in military sphere had been organizational, to be made lighter and more deployable, in an attempt to give them an asymmetrical information advantage through leveraging information technology in the strategic, operational, and tactical spheres of military knowledge on the battlefield against probable peer competitors. The first change is reshaping the way the military looks and staffs itself and the second is adjusting its firepower and intelligence acquisition and processing capabilities to highly sophisticated units on the world in the 21st century (Leonard, 2004: 2-3). Military transformation is an advanced military project or development program of highly industrialized states in the contemporary Information Age.

EU–NATO member states had accepted instructions as Army Transformation Plan and A Campaign-Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, to provide a strategic approach to transformation, along with campaign plan for executing the desired changes, by adopting modular formations and later fielding networked systems, in a carefully phased manner over the coming decade and beyond it. The new plan began by discussing the imperatives of defence transformation and the Army’s roles in ongoing operations were blurred the traditional distinction between combat and stability operations. In addition, the Army transformation plan emphasized the important role of new-era joint operation concepts in determining how new ground forces and capabilities should be built and used with joint functional concepts (battle space awareness, force application, focused logistics, and network-centric operations), and joint integrating concepts (forcible entry operations, global strike, joint logistics, and joint urban operations). The effect of these joint concepts was to create an operational framework within transformation efforts as to emphasize the importance of pursuing joint interdependencies for expeditionary operations in joint battle command, joint fires and effects, joint air and missile defence, joint force protection, and joint sustainment (Kugler, 2008: 13-14).

The EU member states fell into the military dilemma how to develop advanced military capabilities when the framework document Helsinki Goals 2010 expired. Any advanced military solutions were not found from the EU member states in the second decade of the 21st century. A new vision, for 2020, was presented from the European Defense Agency (EDA). Nevertheless, the EU member states had to approve the Strategic Lift Joint Coordination, for conducting necessary capacity and full efficiency in the strategic lift (air, land, and sea) and support of anticipated operations by 2005, had to construct an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort capabilities by 2008, had to develop appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based by 2010 (Headline Goal 2010, 2004: 3).
A special group, the *EU-NATO Capability Group*, had worked intensively on these cases, and put them into catalogues as to remove the discrepancies in military panels of cooperation between EU member states, which had produced fallout in the military transformation process. The EU member states cannot cease military development plans, because for some EU member states, it was impossible to substitute military setback with new technical solutions. The solutions present more financial investments into development and research for advanced military technologies. Here a question should be posed: Could smart defence follow, to correct trends for developing renewed military facilities for the *EU Battle Groups* (hereafter: the EUBGs)? Every EU member state has made decision, to initiatively cooperate into common military modernization with using pooling and sharing method, share defence burdens for financing military programs as to invest more financial resources into common military programs. Otherwise, they ought to eliminate surplus outdated military equipment from operative use and buy a new one. The problem was found here by the army’s strategic posture how to dedicate efforts directly through the Army Campaign Plan as able to synchronize transformation planning, preparation and execution of military obligations during the period of the army transformation (The Army Transformation Roadmap, 2004: 17).

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements under the mechanism Berlin Plus had enhanced European operational capability and provided the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management. A small military body, the EU cell at the NATO military headquarters (SHAPE) had been approved to prepare EU operations by using NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin plus arrangements. This military cooperation had enhanced transparency between the EU and NATO partnership (Headline Goal 2010, 2004: 5). This bilateral coordination body intensively discussed military capabilities and took decision. It also needs to revise the Berlin Plus agreement. The EU member states were disengaged from financial investing to acquire advanced military capabilities for sending more EUBG troops into theatre of operations abroad and made their more agile on the range field. The EU member states agreed that they might not attend to invest more money for military modernization programs and pooled out EUBG troops from hot spot areas out of Europe.

### 3 PRESENTING MILITARY CAPABILITIES INTO QUANTITY OF ITEMS

Military transformation process in Europe is not finished yet, because final formulation of the EUBG is not carried out successfully until the financial constraints for military investment into European military shall be removed. The framework document, Helsinki Goal 2010, has imposed the obligation to the EU member states, to contribute more than 60 000 soldiers inside the military core that might set up nineteen battle groups. Sustainable battle groups were integrated but not operative enough within intensive military training in the field and had not enough battle autonomy for theatre of operations outside of Europe. Strong efforts were taken to attain main priorities into military programs, such as the EUBGs, sustainable and independent militarily strong units in the battlefield, with using advanced military capabilities that were produced on highest military technical standards from European defence producers inside the EU defence market.

Modular formations that shall be able to be organized and prepared expeditionary forces faster are needed. Additionally, smaller brigades, command structures, and support assets, combined, with lightweight weapons reduce tonnages to vehicles that must be sent overseas in any given situation via strategic airlift. For major deployments troops to overseas areas are needed fast sealift capabilities (Kugler, 2008: 25). The EU states had decided to gradually eliminate the outdated land force capabilities that presented in army self-propelled vehicles.
(main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, and howitzers) in order to reduce maintenance costs and save lives of soldiers on battle fields. Military transform forces include both national and the EUBG troops, equipped with advanced military capabilities as multi-wheeled vehicles (4x4, 6x6, 8x8, and 10x10), in order to save lives of soldiers into fire area and reduce the costs for maintenance on field, get higher mobility on field, have better efficiency in logistic supply, and spend less ammunition for destroying military targets quickly. These advanced vehicles have strongpoints in speed, ballistic protection, and fire power on the battle field, with extended range of observing.

Total European land force capabilities at present day come up to 3 810 items. With this quantity of land force capabilities it is possible to equip exactly 20 armoured brigades. Potential users of air capabilities as airbuses, transportable helicopters and advanced multirole airplanes are the EU states: Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. EAG air wing capabilities count into quantity to 1326 items that the main core of EU air fleet might set up to four air transport regiments, teen air force regiments and thirty helicopters battalions. Potential EU users for maritime capabilities are: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, which modernized sea fleets with advanced frigates, submarines and other surface ships as to carry out offshore military activities to protect national sea borders and transport sea lanes. Maritime space was less covered with advanced military capabilities, because maritime projects for each EU maritime member state were too expensive and some maritime programs needed long time as to being realized. The maritime EU fleet consists of 51 frigates and 12 submarines (Military Balance, 2016: 71-181).

The future EU maritime development cannot be deemed as optimistic; hence power projection in the oceanic waters without purchasing new air carriers cannot declare the EU as a globally relevant maritime power.

European military capabilities might be reinforced with land and air components near coastal areas. France and the United Kingdom had rendered to compound together an air carrier group as a mini blue navy fleet for conducting limited maritime operations over 2 000 miles away from the EU coastal waters.

4 WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

The first draft of framework document Headline Goal 2003 was accepted from EU states that had contributed to 50 000 – 60 000 professional solders for military operations abroad, formed in 15 brigades that were able to conduct non-military Petersberg tasks, with autonomy of work in logistical support to 60 days. These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, combat support services, with appropriated air and naval elements (Headline Goal 2003, 1999).

Headline Goal 2010, issued in 2004, included renewed conceptualization of functioning multinational task forces on battle fields that ought be reinforced with added military strength up to 100 000 professional solders and included to 400 airplanes and 100 ships, capable to operate in range to 6 000 miles at geographical distance from Brussels to the Middle East (Sommer, 2012: 77). Implemented document included following activities that were finished until 2010 were the Finalisation of the Requirements Catalogue, including Rapid Response in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism (2005); the Force Catalogue and Progress Catalogue (2005), and a completed development of rapidly deployable battle groups.
Between 2006 and 2010, the Capability Development Mechanism continued to take place with the involvement of the European Defence Agency (Headline Goal 2010, 2003). The Military Staff of the European Union i.e. the European Union Military Staff (hereafter: the EUMS), situated in Bruxelles, will be capable of running executive operations of up to 2 500 troops (approximately the size of one battle group) by 2020. The EUMS had for the coming years planned to demand more troops with boots in hot spot areas and the EU states need to increase military strengths up from 100 000 to 180 000 soldiers, if the EUMS is able to (re)cover all organisational military needs as to carry out three rotates of roll call for conducting military missions on different geographical locations into operational times without military strength shortages but unfavourable financial circumstances had crossed over mayor military plane of the EUMS for demanding more troops with boots on floor. In this case, a larger pool with military personals meant that additional combat brigades could be promptly mobilized for demanding situations on battle field in the case if active forces were overstretched and scattered around military missions. The military plan put battle groups into a six-year readiness cycle that would allow for 40 percent of those units to surge for a contingency, while still maintaining the capacity to support other missions necessary as an Army Reserve Expeditionary Force being submitted to Plan B (Kugler, 2008: 16).

The battle groups concept based on building small, effective, agile, mobile, and connectable forces that are able to operate autonomously and independently. Battle groups are formed into battalions reinforced with close air support and logistical supply task groups that are submitted to operative headquarters (EU Battle Group Concept, 2006). The main characteristics of the EUBGs include multirole military activities and interoperability. Each unit has up to 1 500 professional solders, capable of mobility in the air and at the sea, and capable to be operative without supply rates up to 30 days etc. In the first rotation, the EUMS is able to send at most two EUBGs on battle field, while other forces at most two prepared EUBGs are being deployed for lifespan of one half year cycles. These EUBGs are being ready to intervene from 5 to 10 days after they become mobile, agile, trained, and certified to carry out multirole military tasks, under one condition – if they pass an exam during a field training exercise, in military training camps and centres.

The military transformation plan put a considerable emphasis upon the ability of successful progress toward effort to produce new technologies (new types of protective armour and sensors to warn of impending attack and enemy use of IED explosives). Battle group leaders expressed confidence that by using such new technologies, faster mobility, and higher survivability during military engagement, more safety was felt at the battlefield. However, some military critics expressed worries that many of these new technologies were still unproven and intercept too early to manual into battle groups (Kugler, 2008: 22). The EU member states accepted The Declaration of European military capabilities (2004) and decided to form task forces. The EUMS has the lists from the participating EU member states, which joined this military project and formed those task forces3. The European Council had formed operative bodies, in order to coordinate, supervise and control operative activities for

3 Parent units are 1st French EUBG, 2nd Italian EUBG, 3rd Spanish EUBG, 4th British EUBG, multinational 5th EUBG from France, Luxembourg and Spain, bi-national 6th EUBG from France and Belgium, a multinational 7th EUBG from Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland, multinational 8th EUBG from Germany, Austria and Czech Republic, a multinational 9th EUBG from Italy, Hungary and Slovenia, multinational 10th EUBG from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, a multinational 11th EUBG from Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, a multinational 12th EUBG from Sweden, Finland and Norway, bi-national 13th EUBG from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a medical team from Cyprus, the units for water purification in Lithuania, the Centre for seawater transport coordination in Greece, and the Operative HQ in France (Lindstrom, 2005: 4).
command and control, equip and armour those battle groups as they work successfully and independently on battle field. These operative bodies are: Operative cell for command and control, the European Defence Agency, Coordination Centre for transporting troops, HQ for transporting of troops, Catalogue for operative EUBG troops, maritime strike groups within air wing carrier, and the Information-Communication centre for command and control (Lindstrom, 2005: 5). A preliminary agreement between EU states to participate forming battle groups was written into the framework document Helsinki Goal 2003, and it was signed in Feira (2000). The EU member states had been banded up to commitment before as to sum up to 100 000 professional solders with transportable facilities and carry out non-military missions in autonomy without NATO assistance in C4I, and logistics supply (Kugler, 2008: 18). Each EU member state had put troops, commanding and staff cadres submitted to operative work to the national HQ. The EU Concept for Military Planning at Political and Strategic Level had accepted by the European Council4.

Transformation plan created new and modular headquarters for commanding on operative level to battle groups on three high-echelon commands for operating its forces – divisions, corps, and field armies. The initial transformation plan was made for consolidating the three national command echelons and a joint HQ (Kugler, 2008: 18). However, one problem occurred – how to modulate operative HQ with different national armies in the EU.

EUBG concept envisioned a military unit such as battalion, counts to 450 professional solders with full organic military support mounted or dismounted by using wheeled infantry (Kerttunen, 2005: 40-42). This concept includes next modulated units that are the command post (HQ), companies, multiplier fire support, logistic support and maintenances on company level, transporting troops with strategic and tactical air lift and sea lift, maritime support with an aircraft carrier (capable of carrying an air wing) group in forward staging areas, near sea lanes and air ports for departing or withdrawing units. The EU member states had formed the first operative multinational formation Eurocorps for carrying out multiplier non-military missions abroad. Then, the EU member states have gone further and have talked about a tidy common military cooperation with the signed Letter of Intent that might bring signatories to cooperate into panels for military project as get to set up both aerial transport capability and maritime groups for carry out missions under the EU flag5.

Larger maritime EU states, such as the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy, had participated in a common maritime program of the EU Strategic Projects Squadron as to realise signed European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative (2008) and decided to construct strategic blue water navy capabilities for maritime activities over the horizon sealing. At first, they planned two maritime battle groups that consisted of two nuclear propelled aircraft carriers (one from France and one from the United Kingdom), with escort submarines or surface ships for force protection and another two maritime battle

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5 To project military power, twelve EU states had participated in the EATF, to join multinational aerial group (Belgium, Czech, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain), and to project European maritime strike capability. Maritime military capabilities under military cooperation are limited to nine maritime EU states (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) (Skubic, 2010: 63).
groups being built, like amphibian ships for supplying and transporting maritime infantry into blue water areas (Rogers, 2009: 37-38). This maritime program should to be realized until 2020, without expecting financial constraints in future if some participating maritime states drag out from maritime multiplier military project. In this particular case, pooling and sharing method had increased fundamentally military cohesion between EU states as both to join operative strengths and military capabilities without duplication of military assets. The EUMS had grounded a joint operative HQ and an operative HQ within military branches. Both EU militarily leading states, France and United Kingdom, had led an experiment, as they planed military mobilization to enrol up to 10 000 professional solders during the military project Task Force 5000, to join French and British tactical units into joint land, maritime, and sea components. The activated mobilization core was held on only with British and French units in preparedness – as they were able to send high trained and mobile unit in the battle field. France had decided to send its own troops individually or join a coalition of the willing or a mini coalition, formulated between the EU states such as France and the United Kingdom. They had to engage into the military operations in Libya rapidly or had to carry out the French-led military expedition in Mali swiftly.

5 CONCLUSION
Army transformation gives the correct answer on how to optimize activities of battle groups for strategic thinking against versatilities, by making them more mobile, more lethal, and more agile, so they might dominate in any future conflict with sustaining military power. What is the most important case or matter into army transformation as to achieve this five key joint attributes by expeditionary interdependencies are battle command, military fires and effects, air and missile defence, force projection and sustainment by using versatile forces, services and commands. The transformation of current forces in military capabilities, forces, infrastructure, and education programs is needed. Therefore, these will be more capable to carry out full spectrum operations. If the EU member states have best wishes to achieve those upper goals than they must deepening military integration process toward reinforcing EUBGs with advanced military capabilities, facilities, manning new EUBGs with fresh enrolment professional solders as to better approved consolidation, and reorganization process of European military into a sustained military power in a certain region or towards the World. The EU-NATO member states have to carry out more effort themselves – invest more military knowledge and expertise, to show higher political motivation, and invest more money into army transformation progress programs. These states fulfil all conditions and they are able to achieve political goals within obligations of the Helsinki Goal.

6 REFERENCES
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