THE RIGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AND SHORT-TERM REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Round Table organised by the Slovenian Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

*Bled, Slovenia, 21-22 September 2009*

Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs
Council of Europe

Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Slovenia
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Aiming to contribute to the efforts to improve the efficiency of the European Court of Human Rights within the existing legal system, the Slovenian Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers organised a Round Table in Bled, Slovenia on 21-22 September 2009.

Part I of the Round Table aimed to look at countries’ experiences of ways of protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time, in particular: national models of legal remedies for protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time; best practices, including administrative ones, for the enforcement of these remedies; types of just satisfaction associated with them; and the institutional reactions of, for example, the judiciary, ombudsmen and others to the regulation and implementation of these remedies.

Part II addressed the issue of the short-term reform of the European Court of Human Rights, including the identification of the aims of the new Protocol No. 14 bis to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Madrid agreement on the provisional application of certain provisions of Protocol No. 14, the assessment of the possible development of practices concerning class actions or collective applications in the context of the problem of repetitive applications and an exchange of views on ideas and goals for the short-term reform of the European Court of Human Rights.

The Round Table concluded with the adoption of general, non-binding conclusions on the various issues discussed.
In this text we will present Croatian experiences of the protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). Although the right to a prompt and effective legal protection was a part of the human rights instruments that were in force for several decades, the right to a trial within a reasonable time only became an issue since Croatia became member of the Council of Europe in 1997. The submission to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court) that is implied in the membership of the Council of Europe swiftly led to a number of cases in which the Strasbourg Court found violations of the reasonable time requirement in an ever-growing number of cases.

The surfacing of the judgments finding human rights violations at the international level required an action by the national authorities. Of course, the attempts to reform national judiciary and accelerate judicial proceedings were an important element of such reactions. However, even irrespective of their appropriateness and speed, such attempts could only secure significant progress in the long run. As every member state has to ensure that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are effectively protected within its own national system, it was necessary to establish a domestic mechanism that would enable all under

37. For example, in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
national jurisdiction to complain about the violations of their right to a trial within a reasonable time. This requirement became even more pronounced since the Strasbourg Court issued the ground-breaking judgment in the *Kudla* case\(^\text{39}\) that emphasised the obligation of the states to act at domestic level to address problems of excessive length of proceedings. After that case, the Strasbourg Court started to systematically insist on the need to establish effective national remedies for the length of proceedings, applying Article 13 of the Convention to all length of proceedings cases in which such remedies did not exist. This development of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court was greatly affected by the significant growth of the caseload of the Court which was largely due to cases complaining of violations of Article 6 of the Convention (in particular from the new members of the Council of Europe from eastern and southern Europe).\(^\text{40}\)

This paper presents the development of the Croatian national remedies for the length of proceedings, as well as their current status and functioning. Firstly, we will outline a short history of trials and tribulations regarding the legal means of complaining of the length of proceedings at constitutional and statutory level. These mechanisms were changed and further elaborated several times, partly because of the negative echo coming from the Strasbourg Court cases, partly because of the expansive domestic use of the available remedies, which raised fears of overfilled dockets. The national remedies will be described at the three levels – at the constitutional level (the remedy established by the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court in 1999, amended in 2002), at the statutory level (the remedy established by the Courts Act in 2005, abbreviated hereinafter as RPRTRT), as well as at the administrative level (requests and appeals based on “silence of administration” under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Disputes Act). The impact of the aggregate of these remedies on the current situation with respect to length of proceedings will be analysed from the two perspectives: from the external perspective (perspective of the Strasbourg Court), and from the internal (national) perspective. Both perspectives will include the currently available statistical data on the number of cases and their outcome. Based on these findings, in the last part of this text we will give some synthetic conclusions and assessments regarding the current status and the future of the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

\(^{39}\) See *Kudla v. Poland*, application no. 30210/96, judgment of 26 October 2000.

\(^{40}\) The Strasbourg Court expressly stated that if states failed to react by establishing effective national remedies “individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the Court in Strasbourg complaints that would otherwise […] have to be addressed in the first place within the national legal system. In the long term the effective functioning, on both the national and international level, of the scheme of human rights protection set up by the Convention is liable to be weakened”. *Kudla*, cit. *supra* (note 3), para. 155.
Development of legal remedies for the length of proceedings (2000-2005)

General

Croatia became a member of the Council of Europe on 5 November 1997. This moment almost coincided with the coming into effect of the new procedural rules provided by Protocol 11 to the Convention. In any case, as there were no decisions or judgments prior to 1999, all Croatian cases were decided according to Protocol 11 mechanisms.

The very first case that found a human right violation regarding Croatia was a length of proceedings case. In the Rajak case, the proceedings lasted 22 years prior to the entry into force of the Convention, and were still pending some four years later when the Strasbourg Court made its judgment. Consequently, it was not difficult to find that the length of proceedings in that case was excessive. Since the Rajak case, there was a long line of various cases in which unreasonable length was established, as well as a number of cases in which friendly settlement was concluded. In spite of the introduction of the various national remedies (described infra), the line of cases finding the length of proceedings violations extended to the present day.

According to governmental sources, 92% of the human rights violations found before the Strasbourg Court regarding Croatia involved violations of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention either alone or in conjunction with other human rights violations. All in all, the Court statistics for the 1998-2008 period show that out of 151 judgments issued in respect of Croatia during that period, 66 judgments concerned length of proceedings violations and 21 judgments were violations of the right to an effective remedy (large majority of the latter dealt with the lack of effective remedy for the length of proceedings). Therefore, it was only natural that both legislative and practical interventions in this area have high political weight and priority.

41. The first decision regarding Croatia was the admissibility decision in Očić v. Croatia, application no. 46306/99, decision of 25 November 1999.
The first attempt to create a remedy that could address the length of proceedings within the domestic system of protection of constitutional rights happened in 1999 when the new Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court was enacted (Constitutional Act 1999). Inter alia, the new Act reformed the provisions on the constitutional complaint, which were prior to those changes practically useless as a remedy for the length of proceedings. Therefore, “to end the period without the appropriate protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time”, the Constitutional Act 1999 inserted a new paragraph which had to address specifically the “failures to act within a reasonable time”, which read:

**Article 59 (4)**

“The Constitutional Court may, exceptionally, examine a constitutional complaint prior to exhaustion of other available remedies, if it is satisfied that a contested act, or failure to act within a reasonable time, grossly violates a party’s constitutional rights and freedoms and that, if it does not act a party will risk serious and irreparable consequences.”

The issue of whether the new constitutional complaint was an effective remedy for the length of proceedings soon arose before the Strasbourg Court. In the *Horvat* case the Court held that the new remedy was not satisfactory, and that, therefore, no “true legal remedy enabling a person to complain of the excessive length of proceedings” existed in Croatia. Explaining this finding, the Strasbourg Court in particular relied on several arguments. As first, it noted that the new remedy depends on the discretionary powers of the Constitutional Court to admit it, after a preliminary examination of the complaint. Second, it noted that the two conditions that had to be cumulatively satisfied – “gross violation of the constitutional rights” and the “risk of serious and irreparable consequences for the applicant” are both “susceptible to various and wide interpretation.” Finally, the Strasbourg Court came to conclusion that only one case offered by the government as proof indicates the uncertainty of the remedy in

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46. The old Act provided that every person who considers that his or her constitutional rights were violated by the decision of any public authorities may launch a constitutional complaint (see Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court, NN 13/1991). However, this complaint could be launched only after a final decision was delivered, and the only remedy was the quashing of the decision and the remittal of the case to the respective authority (Articles 29 and 30).
49. Horvat, ibid., para. 48.
50. Horvat, ibid., para. 43.
practical terms and does not amount to conclusive proof of the settled case-law which demonstrates the effectiveness of the new remedy.\footnote{Horvat, ibid., para. 44.}

The Strasbourg Court did not even need to enter in this case into the examination of the possible redress that could be offered in the case of success of the complaint, although it might have been another reason for the same conclusions. Namely, even if the complaint under Article 59(4) was granted, how the Constitutional Court should react was still problematic since the available means of reaction to a violation had not changed – they were still limited to annulment of the impugned decision and the remittal of the case to the relevant body for retrial.\footnote{See Article 72 of the Constitutional Act 1999, which was quoted in the admissibility decision in the Horvat case (see decision of 16 November 2000), but omitted in the final judgment.}

\textit{Request for administrative supervision as a remedy for the length of proceedings}

In the \textit{Horvat} case, the government also objected to the non-exhaustion of other legal remedies, such as the request for speeding up the proceedings that could allegedly be brought to the attention of the president of the competent court (in the said case, the Zagreb Municipal Court), or the Ministry of Justice. Dismissing those objections, the Strasbourg Court noted that these requests for acceleration of the proceedings “represent a hierarchical appeal that is, in fact, no more than information submitted to the supervisory organ with the suggestion to make use of its powers if it sees fit to do so”. The applicant does not have the status of party in such proceedings and might eventually only be informed of whether and how the supervisory organ dealt with such requests.\footnote{Horvat, ibid., para. 47.}

\textit{Petition for constitutional review as a remedy for the length of proceedings}

In some cases the government attempted another pretty far-fetched avenue of objecting to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, which still deserves attention for the sake of completeness. In \textit{Crnojević},\footnote{Crnojević v. Croatia, application no. 71614/01, decision of 29 April 2003.} \textit{Varičak},\footnote{Varičak v. Croatia, application no. 78008/01, decision of 11 December 2003.} and \textit{Freimann}\footnote{Freimann v. Croatia, application no. 5266/02, judgment of 24 June 2004, paragraphs 19-21.} the government argued that the applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies because they had not filed a constitutional claim challenging the constitutionally
of the legislation in question (so-called \textit{inicijativa za ispitivanje ustavnosti zakona}), and in \textit{Aćimović} the Strasbourg Court observed that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. In all of these cases, the Strasbourg Court came to conclusion that a possible positive decision by the Constitutional Court would only lead to annulment of the questioned legislation and enactment of the new legislation, what would not directly prevent or remedy the excessive length of proceedings.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, the claims to examine constitutionality with the Constitutional Court were not regarded as effective remedy for the length of proceedings, and, consequently, they need not be exhausted prior to applying to the Strasbourg Court.

\textit{Constitutional Act on Constitutional Court after 2002 Amendments, Article 63}

As a direct consequence of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, the government decided to change the legislative provisions on the constitutional complaint as the special remedy for the length of proceedings. The amendments to the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court were enacted in March 2002,\textsuperscript{59} revising a number of provisions of that act, \textit{inter alia}, also Article 59(4), which became Article 63 in the revised 2002 text of the Act.

The new Article 63 reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
“(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint even before all legal remedies have been exhausted in cases when a competent court has not decided within a reasonable time a claim concerning the applicant’s rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him […].

(2) If the constitutional complaint […] under paragraph 1 of this Section is accepted, the Constitutional Court shall determine a time-limit within which a competent court shall decide the case on the merits […].

(3) In a decision under paragraph 2 of this Article, the Constitutional Court shall fix appropriate compensation for the applicant in respect of the violation found concerning his constitutional rights [… ] The compensation shall be
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Aćimović v. Croatia}, application no. 61237/00, ECHR 2003/XI, decision of 7 November 2002.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Crnojević}, cit. supra (note 18).

\textsuperscript{59} Amendments 2002 are published in the Off. Gaz. (NN) 29/02. They came into force on 15 March 2002. Subsequently, a revised text with re-numerated articles of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court was published in NN 49/02.
paid from the State budget within a term of three months from the date when the party lodged a request for its payment.”

The most important novelties of the Article 63 constitutional complaint were, firstly, the elimination of the discretionary power to admit the complaint by the Constitutional Court; secondly, the elimination of the vague language and the conditions of “gross violation” and “serious and irreparable consequences”; and thirdly, the introduction of the combination of the two types of remedies, one designed to expedite the proceedings and the other to afford compensation.

In the first cases that occurred after the introduction of the new remedy, the reaction of the Strasbourg Court was generally affirmative. As a matter of principle, the constitutional complaint under Article 63 was recognised as effective remedy for the length of proceedings. In the Slaviček case, the Court noted that the new legislation is “clear and specifically designed to address the issue of the excessive length of proceedings before the domestic authorities”. As such, it “removed the obstacles that were decisive when the Court found that [former remedy] did not comply with all the requirements to represent an effective remedy”. Thus – even prior to any existing jurisprudence in which the Constitutional Court would effectively deal with the concrete length cases – the Strasbourg Court decided that the applicants further on have to exhaust this remedy prior to turning to this Court, as required by Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

Deciding on the admissibility of the pending Croatian length cases, the Strasbourg Court extended its new approach even to the cases which were lodged with it prior to the entry into force of Article 63. In the Nogolica admissibility decision, it was stated that normal rules on the availability of domestic remedies in the moment of applying to the Strasbourg Court may be subject to exceptions justified by specific circumstances, and therefore declared the application as inadmissible, applying the precedents from Italian cases lodged prior to enactment of the Pinto Law.

The Croatian model of the constitutional complaint as a combined remedy that unites compensatory and expediting relief was often cited in a positive context along with examples from Austria, Spain, Poland and Slovakia in a number of Italian cases, most notably in Cocchiarella and Apicella. The Strasbourg Court argued that “a remedy designed to expedite the proceedings in

60. See Slaviček v. Croatia, application no. 20862/02, decision of 4 July 2002.
63. See Brusco v. Italy, (dec.), application no. 69789/01, European Convention on Human Rights 2001-IX.
64. Cocchiarella v. Italy, application no. 64886/01, GC judgment of 29 March 2006.
order to prevent them from becoming excessively lengthy is the most effective solution”, especially in the countries whose judicial systems suffer from systemic deficiencies in ensuring that courts hear cases within a reasonable time. In particular, the Strasbourg Court noted that such remedy does not only afford the compensation *a posteriori*, but also “prevents a finding of successive violations in respect of the same set of proceedings”. As such, when criticising the simple and unilateral mechanisms of some countries, the Strasbourg Court listed Croatia among the states “that have understood the situation perfectly.”

*The issue of already concluded cases in the practice of the Constitutional Court under Article 63*

After Slaviček, most of the Croatian cases concerning length of proceedings were declared inadmissible if the constitutional complaint for length of proceedings was not lodged. But, in certain cases the practice of the Constitutional Court exhibited certain limitations and difficulties. So, in the Šoć and Debelić cases, it was noted that under the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court the constitutional complaints under Article 63 have to be rejected if the proceedings, the length of which is being complained about, were concluded before the Constitutional Court made the decision on the complaint. A fortiori, the Constitutional Court also had not left open any chance for the success of the constitutional complaints that would be launched only after the (excessively long) proceedings were finally concluded.

Such practice by the Constitutional Court led the Strasbourg Court to infer that, for the cases that had already been concluded, Article 63 did not represent an appropriate remedy for the length of proceedings.

The judgments of the Strasbourg Court convinced the Constitutional Court to change its approach, at least partially. It reversed its earlier jurisprudence and

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65. Apicella v. Italy, application no. 64890/01, GC judgment of 29 March 2006 (see paras. 63-105).
66. Cocchiarella, cit., para. 74.
67. Cocchiarella, cit., para. 77.
71. See Camasso v. Croatia, application no. 15733/02, judgment of 13 January 2005. In the same case, the government claimed that the applicant had failed to complain to the Constitutional Court about the length of the proceedings under Article 62 of the Constitutional Court Act, but the Court did not find any evidence that an Article 62 complaint might result in prevention of excessive delay or in an award of damages for delay which had already occurred. Camasso, cit. para 24.
72. Šoć, cit., para 94.
started to examine on merit the constitutional cases which had been initiated while the respective judicial proceedings were pending, irrespective of the fact that the courts in the meantime rendered their final decisions.\textsuperscript{73} Explaining this twist in its practice, the Constitutional Court referred to the fact that in an ever growing number of cases the courts react and make their decisions only after communication of the constitutional complaints.\textsuperscript{74} Still, if the proceedings were completed prior to launching the constitutional complaint, as in the Šoč case, the applications were (and still are) continually rejected by the Constitutional Court.\textsuperscript{75}

**The issue of the length of the enforcement proceedings**

In spite of the well-established practice of the Strasbourg Court according to which, for the purposes of the Article 6, the enforcement proceedings have to be viewed as an integral part of the “trial”,\textsuperscript{76} the Constitutional Court refused to apply Article 63 to the enforcement proceedings in the first two years of application of the Constitutional Act 2002.

According to its interpretation given in a 2003 decision,\textsuperscript{77} Article 63 would be applicable only in cases where the court has not decided within a reasonable time on the merits of the rights and obligations of the complainant. This opinion was repeated in the subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court on the same issue in the next year.\textsuperscript{78}

In the Pibernik case,\textsuperscript{79} the Strasbourg Court raised for the first time the issue of non-applicability of Article 63 proceedings to the excessive length of enforcement proceedings. *In passim*, the applicability of Article 6 guaranteed the enforcement proceedings were affirmed in Cvijetić\textsuperscript{80} and Kvartuć\textsuperscript{81} cases. Later, in Karadžić\textsuperscript{82} and Majski,\textsuperscript{83} the Strasbourg Court noted the practice of the Con-

\textsuperscript{73} This was the factual setting in the Debelić case, which, as opposed to the Šoč case, would be taken into consideration under the new approach of the Constitutional Court.

\textsuperscript{74} See, for example, Constitutional Court Decision U-III A-905/2003 of 5 May 2004.

\textsuperscript{75} See also Perin Tomičić, op. cit. supra, pp. 1365-1366.


\textsuperscript{79} *Pibernik v. Croatia* application no. 75139/01, decision of 4 September 2003.

\textsuperscript{80} *Cvijetić v. Croatia*, application no. 71539/01, decision of 4 September 2004, para. 43.

\textsuperscript{81} *Kvartuć v. Croatia*, application no. 4899/02, judgment of 18 November 2004, para. 36.

\textsuperscript{82} *Karadžić v. Croatia*, application no. 35030/04, judgment of 15 December 2005, para. 38.

\textsuperscript{83} *Majski v. Croatia*, application no. 33593/03, judgment of 1 June 2006, para. 24.
stitutional Court, recognising however that its jurisprudence had changed since a decision rendered in 2005. In conclusion, it found that “before 2 February 2005, a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act could not be regarded as an effective remedy” in cases in which the length of enforcement proceedings was complained. The change of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence was effected with an express reference to the wish to harmonise its practice with the Strasbourg Court’s case-law, and the Hornsby case in particular was expressly quoted in the text of the decision on constitutional complaint of 2 February 2005.

The sufficiency of the amount of compensation

The amount of compensation that the states should afford to the victims of the violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time is not strictly determined in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. Generally, it is accepted that the member states enjoy a certain discretion in setting the level of the compensation, which has to be in line with the general economic conditions and standard of living in the respective country. The amount of compensation can also depend on the availability of the domestic remedies that could accelerate the proceedings, in which case the Strasbourg Court was allowing that the compensation awarded under domestic remedy (if this remedy was a combined remedy) would be somewhat lower that the usual compensation awarded before it. However, the compensation given in the domestic proceedings was subject to the assessment of the Strasbourg Court which considered whether the amount awarded was adequate and sufficient in the light of the principles established under its case-law, as pronounced in Scordino.

In the Croatian cases, the compensation awarded to the successful claimants in the Article 63 proceedings was rarely questioned by the Strasbourg Court. However, since 2007 the issue of its appropriateness has been raised in several cases. In Jakupović the Constitutional Court awarded the applicant 4,400 Croatian kunas (about 600 euros) and in Kaić 4,000 Croatian kunas (about 530 euros) in compensation for the proceedings that lasted about nine-and-a-half (9.5) and seven (7) years respectively. The Strasbourg Court held that such an

85. Majski v. Croatia, ibid.
86. Cit. supra (note 48).
87. Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), application no. 36813/97, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 March 2006, para. 206.
amount is “manifestly unreasonable having regard to the Court’s case-law”\textsuperscript{89} and found it to be “approximately 20\% of what the Court generally awards in similar Croatian cases”.\textsuperscript{90} Accordingly, the applicant could still claim to be a victim, and therefore his application was admitted and decided (affirmatively) on the merits.\textsuperscript{91} In both cases, regard was given to the time that elapsed since the Constitutional Court issued its decision to accelerate the proceedings (see \textit{infra}).

\textit{Effectiveness of the orders to expedite proceedings}

In the \textit{Oreb} case,\textsuperscript{92} the facts were similar to \textit{Jakupović} and \textit{Kaić} insofar as the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court was regarded to be inadequate (although it was the highest amount among all of the cases in which the adequacy was assessed).\textsuperscript{93} The most important element of this case was related to the manifest lack of compliance of the lower court with the order to end the proceedings. Namely, after the Constitutional Court found the violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable time, it ordered the Split Municipal Court to adopt its decision in the shortest time, but no later than 10 months from the publication of its decision. However, the case was still pending in the court of first instance more than three years after the receipt of the acceleratory order.

In such circumstances, the Strasbourg Court considered “that the obligation of the States under Article 13 encompasses also the duty to ensure that the competent authorities enforce remedies when granted” noting that “it has already found violations on account of a State’s failure to observe that requirement”.\textsuperscript{94} The Court explained that “the cessation of an ongoing violation is for the Court

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{89} Kaić, \textit{cit. supra} (note 8), para. 20.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Jakupović, \textit{cit. supra} (note 51), para. 17.
\item \textsuperscript{91} In Kaić case the Strasbourg Court awarded additional 1,350 euros to each of the applicants, whereas in Jakupović the additional compensation was 5,900 euros. In Jakupović the alleged violation of Article 13 was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded, noting that,[t]he mere fact that the just compensation awarded to the applicants at the domestic level does not correspond to the amounts awarded by the Court in comparable cases does not render the remedy ineffective (para. 28). In Kaić, a year later, a violation of Article 13 was found. More extensive explanation of this shift in the Strasbourg Court’s case-law in Croatian cases can be found in Oreb (see \textit{infra}, at i.).
\item \textsuperscript{92} Oreb, \textit{cit. supra} (note 52).
\item \textsuperscript{93} Each applicant was awarded 8,600 Croatian kunas (about 1,200 euros) after 7 years and three months at one level of jurisdiction (after the ratification of the Convention) plus 17 years before the entry of the Convention into force (the original claim was submitted in 1980).
\item \textsuperscript{94} Kaić, \textit{cit. supra} (note 8), para. 40. The County Court in Zagreb had a delay of six months in implementing the Constitutional Court’s decision. In this respect, the Strasbourg Court noted that the Zagreb County Court is an appellate court, “which means that the list of possible reasons for the delay non-attributable to the authorities […] is relatively short”. Ibid., para. 41
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
an important element of the right to an effective remedy,” and continued to find that:

“... where the applicants did not receive sufficient compensation for the inordinate length of their proceedings and where the competent court exceeded the time-limit set by six months and thereby has failed to implement the Constitutional Court’s decision in due time, it cannot be argued that the constitutional complaint the applicants resorted to was an effective remedy for the length of those proceedings. The combination of these two factors in the particular circumstances of the present case rendered an otherwise effective remedy ineffective.”

**Effectiveness of the remedies available to expedite administrative proceedings**

Another point of divergence between the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the case-law of the Strasbourg Court was related to the calculation of the period that was to be taken into account in the administrative proceedings. In the beginning, the Croatian Constitutional Court held that only the conduct of judicial authorities was relevant in the context of the constitutional complaint under Article 63. The duration of the administrative stages of the proceedings was not taken into account when determining the reasonableness of their overall length. Such an approach was different from the Strasbourg Court’s, which recognised that, when under the national legislation an applicant has to exhaust a preliminary administrative procedure before having recourse to a court, the proceedings before the administrative body have to be included when calculating the length of the civil proceedings for the purposes of Article 6.

The Strasbourg Court noted the practice of the Constitutional Court in the Počuča and Božić cases. Inter alia, the Strasbourg Court noted one complaint that was dismissed on the basis of finding that the proceedings before the

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95. Oreb, cit. supra (note 51), para. 37.
96. Kaić, cit. supra (note 8), para. 43. Same in Oreb, cit. supra (note 51), para. 38. Unfortunately, these cases of non-compliance with the Constitutional Court orders are not isolated. In some of these cases, the applicants chose to launch several constitutional complaints in the same case. See e.g. Constitutional Court decision U-III A/825/2008 of 9 December 2008, which was rendered in the same case in which another decision was already made (Constitutional Court decision U-III A-4905/2005. Reported in Maganić, A., Pravna sredstva protiv neučinkovitog suca, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 30(2009), 1, note 128.
98. See, for example, Kiurkchian v. Bulgaria, application no. 44626/98, judgment of 24 March 2005, para. 51.
Administrative Court had lasted only seven days (whereby the whole process since launching of the applicant’s request addressed to the Croatian Pension Fund lasted over seven years). 101

In 2007, the Constitutional Court reversed its earlier case-law and started to take into consideration the period of the proceedings before the administrative bodies. 102 In the reasoning behind the decision, the Court referred to “well-settled case-law of the Strasbourg Court” and cited several cases, including Počuća and Božić. 103

“Silence of the administration” (appeals and actions for failure to respond) as a means to accelerate administrative proceedings

The cited 2008 decision of the Constitutional Court in passim noted that it will take into account the length of proceedings of the preliminary stages in administrative proceedings only if two conditions are satisfied: first, if the complainant has expressly objected to the unreasonable length of the proceedings before the administrative bodies, and, second, if the complainant proves that he has exhausted another means of legal protection – the actions brought on the basis of the “silence of administration”.

As to the latter condition, the Constitutional Court was referring to an alternative remedy provided by the Administrative Procedure Act and Administrative Disputes Act. These procedures were summarised in the Štajcar case 104 as follows:

Article 218, paragraph 1 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that in simple matters, where there is no need to undertake separate examination proceedings, an administrative body is obliged to issue a decision within a period of one month after a party lodges a request. In all other, more complex, cases, an administrative body is obliged to issue a decision within a period of two months after the request was lodged. Article 218, paragraph 2, enables a party whose request has not been decided within the periods established in the previous paragraph to lodge an appeal, as if his request had been denied.

100. Božić v. Croatia, application no. 22457/02, judgment of 29 June 2006. See para. 34: “That approach of the Constitutional Court differs from the one of the Court (…) as it does not cover all stages of the proceedings.”
103. Ibid., p. 4.2.
Article 26 of the Administrative Disputes Act enables a party who lodged a request with an administrative body to institute administrative proceedings before the Administrative Court (administrative dispute) in the following situations:

1. If the appellate body does not issue a decision upon the applicant’s appeal within 60 days the applicant may repeat his request, and if the appellate body declines to issue a decision within an additional period of seven days the applicant may lodge a claim with the Administrative Court.
2. When a first-instance administrative body does not issue a decision and there is no right to an appeal the applicant may directly lodge a request with the Administrative Court.
3. If a first-instance administrative body does not issue a decision upon the applicant’s request within 60 days in matters where a right to an appeal exists, the applicant may lodge his request to the appellate administrative body. Against the decision of that body the applicant may institute administrative proceedings as well, and if that body has not issued a decision there is a right to institute administrative proceedings under the conditions as above under 1.105

The Strasbourg Court in principle considered that these provisions contained a remedy that should effectively accelerate the administrative proceedings. Therefore, the prospective applicants were required to make use of these proceedings before complaining of the length of proceedings in further Strasbourg proceedings. If this was not the case, the applications were generally held to be inadmissible and were rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 4 of the Convention.106

In spite of the general assessment of the “silence of administration” provisions as effective means to suppress the excessive length of the administrative proceedings, in some cases the actions brought for failure to respond did not render an adequate accelerating effect. So, for example, in Počuća the applicant lodged an appeal and brought an action for failure to respond. However, the consequence of appeal in that case was only further silence from the higher authorities, and the consequence of his action for the failure to respond brought before the Administrative Court was, in the beginning, further silence from this court for the next three years, and then the decision that only sent back his case to the

105. Štajcar, ibid., p. 3-4.
106. See for example Rauš and Rauš-Radovanović, application no. 43603/05, admissibility decision of 2 October 2008. Until this case such applications were dismissed as manifestly ill-founded (which may be taken as a reflection of the old, pre-Kudla jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court) – e.g. Štajcar, ibid. On this development of the Strasbourg Court’s practice, see Bašić v. Austria, (dec.), application no. 29800/96, ECHR 1999-II and Pallanich v. Austria, application no. 30160/96, 30 January 2001.
same passive authorities with an order to decide on the applicant’s appeal, setting a further deadline of 60 days. This deadline was, naturally, not met, but when, eventually (after some four months) the appeal was decided, the only result was the new decision ordering the first-instance administrative body to issue a decision, and (some three months later) a negative decision of the body which was again subject to appeal and the further action before the Administrative Court. Such a “merry-go-round” of presumed and actual negative decisions followed by decisions which remit the (never decided) case back for another decision did cast a shadow on the overall effectiveness of the alternative remedy in the administrative proceedings, at least in certain types of cases.

The issue of the length of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court

Not only could the proceedings on the account of the alternative remedies available in administrative proceedings become excessively long, but the same occasionally happened to the proceedings initiated by the main remedy, the constitutional complaint.

A good example may be found in the Vidas case,107 where the Constitutional Court added insult to the injury (figuratively speaking) when it needed three years and 15 days to decide on a (not overly complex) complaint regarding the already lengthy proceedings which lasted already almost seven years (out of which five years came after the ratification of the Convention).108 Based on that finding, the Strasbourg Court emphasised that a remedy designed to address the length of proceedings may be considered effective only if it provides adequate redress speedily, or else the effectiveness of the (otherwise effective) remedy for the excessive length of the civil proceedings could be undermined by its own excessive (i.e. unreasonable) duration.109

108. The Constitutional Court received the complaint on 28 March 2002, on which the Court decided in a decision published on 2 May 2005. Vidas, cit., para. 9.
109. See Vidas, cit., para. 37.
Reformed legal remedies after the Amendment to the Courts Act 2005

The reasons for the change to the internationally recognised effective remedy

In spite of all the occasional problems with the practical implementation, the Strasbourg Court has until present generally recognised the constitutional complaint of Article 63 as an effective remedy for the length of proceedings. Moreover, the Strasbourg Court actually praised the model of the Croatian constitutional complaint – especially its combination of acceleratory and compensatory powers – in a number of decisions related to other Council of Europe countries wherever a problem with the effectiveness of the domestic length-of-proceedings remedies occurred. The circle of countries in whose cases the Strasbourg Court openly advertised the Croatian model (and the model of some other similar jurisdictions) did not only include the “usual suspects” (e.g. Italy\(^\text{110}\)), but also countries of otherwise well-developed legal tradition of efficient adjudication, such as Germany.\(^\text{111}\)

Yet, already at the point of its invention, some knowledgeable commentators warned that the Article 63 remedy may soon become the victim of its own success.\(^\text{112}\) Even before the entry into force of the 2002 amendments, the number of constitutional complaints quickly rose from several dozen to several thousand, the largest number of them being complaints for the length of proceedings.\(^\text{113}\) As demonstrated in the Vidas case, the Constitutional Court in its own practice occasionally surpassed the average duration of processing of length of proceedings cases in Strasbourg.

In order to prevent the proceedings for unreasonable procedural length becoming themselves unreasonably lengthy, the Constitutional Court incited in

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\(^{110}\) See cases **Scordino (No. 1), Cocchiarella, Apicella** (cit.) and a number of others.

\(^{111}\) See **Sürmeli v. Germany**, application no. 75529/01, judgment of 8 June 2006, para. 100.

\(^{112}\) Already in 2002 the then President of the Constitutional Court argued that the new amendments will overburden the Constitutional Court with the length-of-proceedings complaints, thereby becoming “the requiem for the Court”. See Crnić, J., 2002. Ustavni zakon o izmjena i dopunama Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnim sudu RH, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 52 (2), 259-288.

\(^{113}\) According to the general statistics of the Constitutional Court (see http://www.usud.hr), the number of new complaints regarding unreasonable length of proceedings developed in the following way: 64 in 2000; 43 in 2001; 442 in 2002; 542 in 2003; 925 in 2004 and 1443 in 2005. See also Uzelac, A., “The Rule of Law and the Judicial System: Court delays as a barrier to accession”, in: Ott, K. (ed.) **Croatian Accession to the European Union**, Zagreb (IJF), 2004, pp. 105-130, at 121 and 128.
2005 several changes to the Courts Act. The idea (which partly followed Polish and Italian examples) was to introduce a supplementary remedy for the length of proceedings which would be decided by the regular courts, and to leave the Constitutional Court with only subsidiary powers.\textsuperscript{114} In fact, the Constitutional Court advocated a model according to which the Court would have the same role in relation to the new remedy as the Strasbourg Court in relation to the remedy before the Constitutional Court: in both cases, the examination of the merits would follow only after exhaustion of the “lower level” remedy (if such remedy had existed).

The request for the protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time under 2005 Courts Act

The enactment of the new Courts Act happened swiftly, and the new legislation came effectively into force at the end of December 2005.\textsuperscript{115} The Act contained a new chapter entitled “Protection of the Right to a Hearing Within a Reasonable Time” and two articles, Articles 27-28.

Article 27

“(1) A party to court proceedings who considers that the competent court failed to decide within a reasonable time on his or her rights or obligations or a criminal charge against him or her, may lodge a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time with the immediately higher court.

(2) If the request concerns proceedings pending before the High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia, the High Petty Offences Court of the Republic of Croatia or the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, the request shall be decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia.

(3) The proceedings for deciding the request referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall be urgent.”

Article 28

“(1) If the court referred to in article 27 of this Act finds the request well founded, it shall set a time-limit within which the court before which the proceedings are pending must decide on a right or obligation of, or a criminal charge against, the person who lodged the request, and shall award him or her appropriate compensation for the violation of his or her right to a hearing within a reasonable time.


\textsuperscript{115} See Courts Act (\emph{Zakon o sudovima}), NN 150/05 of 21 December 2005 (the Act came into force on 29/12/2005). Subsequent amendments were published in NN 16/07 and 113/08.
(2) The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three months from the date the party’s request for payment is lodged.

(3) An appeal, to be lodged within fifteen days with the Supreme Court, lies against a decision on the request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. No appeal lies against the Supreme Court’s decision but one may lodge a constitutional complaint.”

Although the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court was not changed in any way, the Constitutional Court promptly declared that it would take into consideration new complaints under Article 63 only after the new “request for protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time” (RPRTRT) was exhausted.116

Thereby, a new, decentralised, multi-layered system of complaints for length of proceedings was established, with a number of potential scenarios. Here are the three most typical (but several more are possible):117

- if the applicant was to complain about the length of proceedings of the trial courts, he should first lodge a RPRTRT with the “immediately higher court” (i.e. to the County Court if the Municipal Court was competent, or to the High Commercial Court if the Commercial Court was competent). Subsequently, the decision on the RPRTRT could be appealed with the Supreme Court. If the applicant was still not satisfied, he could lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court;

- if the applicant was to complain about the length of proceedings of the appeal courts, or about the length of the proceedings before higher courts (i.e. Administrative Court or High Commercial Court or county courts when they decide in the first instance), the RPRTRT would be decided by the Supreme Court with no appeal options, but the applicant could turn instead to the Constitutional Court;

- if the applicant was to complain about the length of proceedings before the Supreme Court there would be no option of a RPRTRT, but the applicant could immediately lodge an Article 63 constitutional complaint.

Otherwise, the powers of the courts deciding on the RPRTRT are equally formulated as the powers of the Constitutional Court – they also contain both a right to issue an acceleratory order (fixing time-limits for decision-making), and the right to award compensation for the length of proceedings.

116. In fact, the Constitutional Court announced on its Internet pages that after the coming into effect of the Courts Act it no longer decides on violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time “in the first instance”. See http://www.usud.hr/default.aspx?Show=c_praksa_ustavnog_suda&m1=2&m2=0&Lang=hr.
117. For example, if the applicant complains about the length of enforcement proceedings, or the length of proceedings before the administrative bodies (both examples are not expressly covered by the Courts Act).
New decentralised system in practice: domestic criticisms and problems in the implementation of the remedy

From the beginning, the introduction of the RPRTRT was followed by controversies. Some of them were of the principled nature and dealt with the way the new remedy was introduced, whereas others were more practical and considered the implementation issues.

As first, the intensive involvement of the Constitutional Court itself in the drafting of the new provision of the Courts Act was in itself not unproblematic. The Constitutional Court acted in its own cause, what might be seen as a violation of the old rule *nemo judex in causa sua*. In 2005, the Strasbourg jurisprudence was very positive about the effects of the current legal remedy in which the Constitutional Court played the central role. There were some, but not too many instances in which the Constitutional Court did not manage to fulfil its constitutional obligations. Most importantly, there were no serious studies or objective pieces of research that could neutrally evaluate the impact of the increasing caseload on the institutional capacity of the Constitutional Court and/or offer alternative solutions. The reasons for the introduction of the new remedy was not to improve the protection of human rights – on the contrary, the main motive for change, pronounced bluntly, was to deflect cases from the Constitutional Court and shift the main burden of decision-making to the system of the regular courts. In this respect, admittedly, the new system was instantly effective: the number of annual length-of-proceedings applications lodged with the Constitutional Court dropped from 1,433 in 2005 to 55 in 2006, which is a decrease of over 95%.

Another objection based on constitutional principles and the rule of law came from the Constitutional Court itself. The long-time President of the Constitutional Court (who retired not long before the enactment of the new legislation) questioned whether the Courts Act, as a piece of "ordinary" statutory law, can change or overrule the mechanisms contained in the constitutional legislation of the higher rank, i.e. in the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court. He argued that the normative act of the lower rank could not interfere in the area specifically covered by the hierarchically higher act and therefore has to be treated independently. The submission made by this critique was, therefore, that two systems of the protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time

118. See statistics of the Constitutional Court at http://www.usud.hr.
120. It would also imply disregard of Article 28, paragraph 3, which expressly regulates the admissibility of the constitutional complaint.
should not be mutually dependant, and that the applicants should freely chose either the statutory or constitutional avenue. The acting members of the Constitutional Court ignored, however, these criticisms of their past President and continued to treat the constitutional complaint as only a subsidiary remedy.

All principled critiques aside, the new system was swiftly put into effect, which brought about new practical problems and doubts. Some of them were caused by the relatively short and incomplete regulation of the new remedy. One of the issues which was not clear was related to the type of proceedings according to which the courts should rule on the RPRTRT. As the new law was silent on this issue, the customary rules of interpretation would point to the application of the regular litigation rules of the Code of Civil Procedure. This, however, did not seem to be appropriate, as the consequence would be the application of the full set of procedural guarantees, such as the right to adversarial proceedings, full-fledged oral hearings, the right to appeal (by both sides) etc., which would necessarily add to the time needed to decide and turn the new request into the genuine “trial about the trial”. In fact, some state attorney’s offices that represented the government in the RPRTRT proceedings started to file replies, request oral hearings and launch appeals against the decisions rendered in favour of the applicants. In certain cases, the state attorneys even felt obliged to lodge constitutional complaints if they were not in agreement with the awarding of compensation or the amount. All in all, the overly formalistic approach had risked jeopardising the effectiveness of the new remedy.

Last legislative tweaking: the 2008 amendments to the Courts Act

To eliminate the doubts and confirm the already dominant practice, in the 2008 amendments to the Courts Act121 Articles 27 and 28 were partially amended. In paragraph 3 of Article 27, the law expressly provided for the use of more flexible rules of non-contentious proceedings,122 and the time-limit for the appeal in Article 28, paragraph 3, was shortened from 15 to 8 days.

Soon after these amendments, the Constitutional Court also clarified the issue of the right of the state attorney to complain about the decisions on the RPRTRT under Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Courts Act. In the decision published in the beginning of 2009123 the Court held that the sense and purpose of the protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time speak against the

121. NN 113/08 (the amendments came into effect on 11 October 2008.
122. New paragraph 3 of Article 27 read as follows: (3) “The proceedings for deciding the request referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall be urgent. The proceedings will be conducted under the appropriate application of the rules of extra-contentious proceedings. In general, no oral hearings will take place”.
conclusion that the state would be authorised to contest the redress afforded by
the Supreme Court. With some reluctance, this fact was noted by the General
State Attorney’s Office, which also observed that thereby the Republic of Croatia
was deprived of its right to a legal remedy in all cases in which the Supreme Court
ruled on the RPRTRT in the first instance.\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Obiter dicta}, it is interesting to note
that the State Attorney did not see any absurdity in letting the state use against
the individuals the remedy that is designed for the protection of individual
human rights against the state.

\textbf{New decentralised system in practice: the perspective of the Stras-
bourg Court}

New remedy for the length of proceedings is still a relatively recent occur-
rence, and the Strasbourg Court has not yet had an opportunity to fully evaluate
its effectiveness. It is partly due to the fact that the applicants now have at their
disposal a complex, multi-layered system of domestic remedies. This increases
the likelihood that they will obtain some kind of redress at the domestic level (see
infra for concrete figures), but also requires more time and effort to fulfil the con-
dition of exhaustion of domestic remedies in cases in which the redress provided
at the domestic level was inappropriate, ineffective or insufficient.

Still, had the decisive criterion of effectiveness of the domestic system been
its potential to deflect cases from the Strasbourg Court, the new model of rem-
edies would have had chances to be considered effective. Although the violations
of the right to a trial within a reasonable time are still frequent in the recent juris-
prudence,\textsuperscript{125} the influx of the new length cases communicated to the government
seems to have been reduced.\textsuperscript{126} The Strasbourg Court so far noted the existence
of the new request under the Courts Act in Cerin,\textsuperscript{127} Jeans,\textsuperscript{128} Čiklić\textsuperscript{129} and

\begin{itemize}
\item[124.] Izvješća o radu državnih odvjetništava u 2008. [Annual Report of the State Attorneys’
most likely wanted to raise the question of whether such jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Court violates the constitutional right to appeal, although this might seem to be a rather mis-
placed argument in the context of the proceedings which should protect the citizens’ right to
a trial within a reasonable time, and not the right of the state as the formal counter party in the
proceedings.
\item[125.] In 2008, out of 16 Strasbourg Court judgments finding a violation, 11 dealt with the
length of proceedings and 1 with the right to an effective remedy.
\item[126.] While in the pre-2005 period over two thirds of the communicated cases were the length
cases, from 2006 to 2008 the portion of the length cases dropped to less than half of all com-
unicated cases (according to data from the Court statistics and the information from the
Court registry).
\item[127.] Cerin v. Croatia, application no. 45043/05, partial admissibility decision of 26 June 2008.
\item[128.] Jeans v. Croatia, application no. 45190/07, statement of facts of 7 September 2009.
\item[129.] Čiklić v. Croatia, application no. 40033/07, statement of facts of 10 July 2008.
\end{itemize}
Kvartuč\textsuperscript{130} (and in some of those cases it communicated to the government objections to the effectiveness of the new remedy) but until today no straightforward decision on the status of RPRTRT as the length-of-proceedings remedy was issued. From an even more general perspective, it can be observed that the total number of applications against Croatia in 2008 was still held within relatively acceptable limits, at least compared to some neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{131} According to the external perspective, the new model of remedies would seem to be satisfactory, at least at the time of writing of this paper.\textsuperscript{132} A change of perspective and a more careful introspection might, however, suggest different conclusions.

**Current situation and possible future course: how long is the draining of the leaking boat possible?**

*The high tide approaches (manageable high tide or a devastating flood?)*

The Republic of Croatia has since the beginning of its membership of the Council of Europe diligently followed the hints from the Strasbourg jurisprudence. It has to be noted that very few Council of Europe countries have changed their legislation and the case-law of their highest tribunals on so many occasions and on such a broad scale. For the agility and the responsiveness to international demands Croatian authorities have, with no doubt, to be praised.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Kvartuč v. Croatia, application no. 34830/07, statement of facts of 15 December 2008.

\textsuperscript{131} So, for example, in 2008 according to the statistics of the Strasbourg Court there was a total of 793 applications against Croatia, which is, in absolute numbers, four times less than the number of applications raised against Slovenia. Among these cases, there were 10 times less cases that were awaiting first examination (163 in respect of Croatia and 1,759 in respect of Slovenia). See *ECHR Annual Report 2008*, Strasbourg (2009), p. 129-133 (http://www.echr.coe.int).

\textsuperscript{132} Early November 2009.

\textsuperscript{133} The vigilance of the Croatian authorities was certainly enhanced by the notable place of the chapter on judiciary and human rights in the European accession negotiations. In the *Avis* (Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM(2004)257final of 20 April 2004) the European Commission listed the “widespread inefficiency of the judicial system” among the major challenges, and noted that “citizens’ rights are therefore not fully protected by the judiciary” (p. 16). The same problem continued to play an important role in the accession negotiations. For example, in the Progress report of November 2007, it was noted that “the excessive length of proceedings remains a serious problem” and that “ECtHR continues to issue judgments against Croatia for violations … regarding the length of proceedings”. See Croatia 2007 Progress Report, SEC(2007)1431, p. 49.
Admittedly, some of the reforms were more motivated by internal reasons than by the statements of the Strasbourg Court. The introduction of the RPRTRT was in the eyes of many viewed as a self-defence of the Constitutional Court from the influx of unpopular length cases, or even as a move intended to push the hot potatoes back into the hands of judiciary.

Yet, even the new remedy could be considered as a welcome tool for the maintenance of the important ingredient of the system of protection of the right to a prompt adjudication – its effectiveness. As retrospectively proved by some of the recent Strasbourg cases, in at least some constitutional complaints the effectiveness of the remedy for unreasonable length was undermined by its own excessive duration. Moreover, the new competence acquired by the regular courts to rule on their own (non-)efficiency could be hoped to produce over time a sobering effect: faced with the judgment of the peers, the courts might autonomously recognise the pressing need to ensure prompt adjudication; deciding about the sins of others, they might be forced to acknowledge their own sins and make an effort to correct them.

The figures for the post-2005 period show that the courts have generally taken the new obligation to rule on their own effectiveness seriously. The criteria for the length of proceedings were somewhat simplified, and therefore the proceedings were relatively short. As noted by the State Attorney’s Office in the very beginning of the application of the new legislation, the courts held that the “reasonable length of civil litigation, which by its nature is neither urgent nor complex, and in which there was no contribution to the length by the applicant would be three years, whereas the first instance and the second instance proceedings are viewed as a unique whole.”

The Supreme Court and the lower courts in most cases awarded amounts of compensation that were not dramatically different from the compensation given in Strasbourg, and allegedly in some cases even gave more than the Strasbourg Court would. The courts also regularly fixed a time-period for decision-making in the delayed cases. However, the general effectiveness of the new remedial system is perhaps best demonstrated by the reception of the users of the system – and this reception was almost unexpectedly enthusiastic.

The case flow of the RPRTRTs can best be traced through the annual reports of the State Attorney’s Offices that have had the ex officio duty to represent the state before the courts. Their statistics are quite indicative, demonstrating a 500% to 600% increase in the 2006 to 2008 period.

134. See supra quotes from the Vidas case (note 70).
Here is the graph demonstrating the continuing growth of the number of requests, both those lodged with the appellate courts and those lodged with the Supreme Court (defended by the county State Attorney’s offices and national State Attorney’s Office\textsuperscript{137} respectively).\textsuperscript{138}

As visible from the graph, the number of cases rose from 1,146 in 2006 to 5,108 in 2008. This is an increase of almost five times, whereby the increase of the cases decided in the first instance at the level of the Supreme Court is even bigger, i.e. it is an increase of 6.5 times (650%). The number of the RPRTRTs was the main reason why the State Attorney’s Offices caseload increased in 2008, in spite of the continuing trends of decrease in all the other areas of their work (representation in litigation, enforcement and bankruptcy proceedings).\textsuperscript{139}

136. \textit{Obiter dicta}, one of the main virtues of the new remedy was engagement of the State Attorney’s offices; before the enactment of the Courts Act in 2005 the only governmental office responsible for the length of proceedings issue was the Government Agent (in the constitutional complaint cases under Article 59(4) and Article 63, there was no direct representation of the state government as the cases were regularly solved as a quasi-one-party matter).

137. As to the composition of cases represented by the national State Attorney’s office and decided by the Supreme Court, 60% of the proceedings were related to the length of proceedings before the county courts, 22% to the High Commercial Court, 16% to the Administrative Court, and 0.48% to the High Misdemeanour Court.


As to the amount awarded, the situation is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Awarded amount (total)</th>
<th>Average amount (total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.957.580 kn (0,8 million euros)</td>
<td>5.200 kn (712 euros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>17.057.171 kn (2,3 million euros)</td>
<td>5.350 kn (732 euros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>35.549.940 kn (4,8 million euros)</td>
<td>7.000 kn (960 euros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 06-08</td>
<td>58.564.691 kn (8 million euros)</td>
<td>6.200 kn (850 euros)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the State Attorney’s report observed, the increase of the amount of compensation in the three year period was almost six-fold (from about 800,000 in 2006 to 4.8 million euros in 2008). The increase in the compensation paid urged the State Attorney to reflect on the ways to alleviate the burden on the state budget and prevent future violations.\textsuperscript{140}

**Further development – drawing the “worst case scenario”**

It might be too early to draw definitive conclusions out of the presented figures. They are still too ambiguous. If we start with the financial impact on the state budget, the increase in the amount paid as compensation for the inefficiency of the justice system is dramatic, but the total amount paid in the 2006-2008 period (about 8 million euros)\textsuperscript{141} still seems relatively low compared to the overall budget of the justice system, which was about 240 million euros in 2006.\textsuperscript{142}

Yet, it is hard to predict the further development. If the number of cases and the amount of the compensation paid continues to grow at that rate (approximately doubling each year), in five years’ time (around 2014) the state would have to pay on behalf of its ineffective judiciary more than it pays in total for the whole judicial system.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 141. It should be noted that these amounts cover only the compensations paid via the RP/RT system, and exclude the compensation awarded by the Article 63 proceedings, as well as the amounts paid by the state as the result of the Strasbourg Court judgments, as well as the amount voluntarily paid due to friendly settlements with the Strasbourg applicants. All these figures (presumably lower than the above quoted amounts) are not readily available and are therefore hard to report.
\end{itemize}
Will this happen? Most likely, in the times of the economic crisis, the government will not be overly generous when availing the victims of the human rights violations the appropriate compensation for the violations. It is also not probable that the skyrocketing trend will continue at the same pace.

However, one can hardly deny that there is quite a potential for the further increases. Consulting only the scarcely available statistics on the average length of proceedings, we may reveal some disturbing findings. For instance, as a result of the casual survey of cases pending in the largest Croatian court – the Municipal Court in Zagreb – the mean duration of civil proceedings in two instances in 2001 surpassed the “reasonable” limit of three years – it was about 3.6 years. In addition, over 20% of cases in the sample lasted (only in first instance) more than four years.144 After 2001, the situation did not instantly improve. On the contrary, according to the statistics collected by the Supreme Court, on 31 March 2006 in the Municipal Court of Zagreb about 30% of cases were pending for over five years.145 Under the (hopefully wrong) assumption that these ratios are representative, one might conclude that only in civil litigation (excluding other branches of jurisdiction, such as enforcement and criminal proceedings) there is a potential that from 187,000 annually pending litigation cases in over 50,000 cases, parties could request compensation for the unreasonable length of proceedings. This would bring us dangerously close to the previous rough estimate that in five years’ time the compensation paid could equal the total budget of the judiciary.

Budgetary considerations aside, there are some further unanswered systemic questions that might have an impact on the effectiveness of the new remedy. Simplified as they might be, the RPRTRT proceedings still take some time. More requests for the protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time mean less time for the court to concentrate on its main function – delivering the right to a trial within a reasonable time. More work may mean more backlogs, and more backlogs could lead to more violations of the right to a trial within a rea-

143. It may also be noted that the overall budget of judiciary in Croatia is not low – it is 54 euros per inhabitant, which is one euro more than in France, and significantly higher than in Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Greece, Czech republic, Slovakia, Estonia and in a number of other Council of Europe countries. See EJS 2006, p. 44.
144. Mean first instance duration at that court was 843 days, i.e. 29.3 months, plus a further 444 days (14.8 months) that passed on average between the filing of the appeal and the returning of the decision on appeal back to the first-instance court. See National Centre for State Courts, Functional Specifications Report for Computerization in Zagreb Municipal Court of the Republic of Croatia - Municipal Courts Improvement Project – Croatia, USAID project # 801, AEP-I-00-00-00011-00, Zagreb, September 2001 (unpublished), p. 10-15.
145. According to the statistics presented by Katarina Buljan at Plitvice bilateral meeting of the Croatian and Slovenian Ministries of Justice in December 2006. More precisely, out of a total of 94,674 pending cases, 28,351 were more than 5 years old.
sonable time. As time goes on, the launching of the RPRTRTs becomes more customary, and in fact turns into another branch of the industry of legal services. This could lead to more sophisticated requests, which could provoke more sophisticated decision-making, and the consequence would be a more time-consuming process. Complex procedures in several instances have little chance to be effective remedy for unreasonable length. It is a way to end a vicious circle - *circulus vitiosus*.

The decentralised system of decision-making could be a source of problems in itself. More bodies involved in decision-making may mean less uniformity in the application of the set criteria. Less uniformity may mean more need for intervention of the higher bodies i.e. more appeals. Also, the system in which the higher body decides about the length of proceedings before the lower body contains a systemic incentive to concentrate exclusively on one stage of proceedings, and disregard the overall proceedings as a whole. This would further invoke need for harmonisation, meaning more appeals and more constitutional complaints. Again, the *circulus vitiosus* is ended.

For the effectiveness of the system of remedies, one of the decisive elements is its capacity to speed up the proceedings. As such, the higher courts may fix time limits to lower courts. But, the sheer fixing of time-limits does not necessarily bring more effectiveness, as demonstrated by a number of examples from law and practice.\(^{146}\) In the case of the RPRTRT the authority of the higher court to fix the time-limit is not accompanied by any concrete sanction for the cases in which the lower authority would not comply with the set deadlines. Of course, the sheer authority of the higher court might be sufficient to give a priority to an occasionally dormant or forgotten case. But, the order to finish the case cannot be of much help in the cases of institutional incapacity to deal with the assigned caseload in the timely manner, and it can help even less in the instances of systemic problems that cause delays in certain types or classes of cases. Without an appropriate reaction and sanction for disobedience, when the disregard for accelerating orders becomes a part of the daily routine, the effectiveness of the remedy would be definitely buried.\(^{147}\) This is also a place where the *circulus vitiosus* might end.

**Some indications of future jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court**

So far, the circle is not closed, and will hopefully never be closed. The process of judicial reforms, initiated in the mid-90s, has eventually produced some pos-

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146. For example, the legislative fixing of the deadlines for decision-making in the Family Law was, over many years, entirely ignored and disregarded in practice. See *Obiteljski zakon*, NN 116/03, 17/04, 136/04 and 107/07, Articles 265 and 266.
itive results. Among them, the most important is the reversion of the trend of growth of court backlogs, and the close monitoring of “old cases” conducted by the Supreme Court. The introduction of an integral, computerised system of case monitoring and court management (ICMS) may be helpful in the introduction of the advanced time-management policies, as well as further procedural reforms that should deal with some systemic problems, e.g. with the delays in the delivery of court documents, lack of concentrated proceedings, successive remittals, etc. All this is expected to ameliorate the situation and prevent the “worst case scenario” from coming into life.

Still, some worrying signs could be seen in several recent cases of the Strasbourg Court. The possibility that the request for the protection of the right to a prompt adjudication could itself get into a maze and finish in the drawer is demonstrated in the Cerin case. In this case (which, by the way, was the second case concerning length from the same applicant) the court communicated to the state the complaint about the unreasonable duration of the proceedings following his two requests for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The RPRTRT was lodged on 30 March 2006 with the County Court, but that court decided on 28 November 2007 that it no longer had jurisdiction because the Municipal Court had in the meantime given its decision in the meantime.

For that reason, some commentators have supported introduction of further supervisory complaints against judges who do not fulfil their functions timely, accompanied with specific disciplinary sanctions. See Maganić, cit. supra (note 60). The State Attorney’s Offices Report also noted that “in the certain cases the length of court proceedings is a consequence of acts or omission of judges that have all elements of incorrect or illegal work in the sense of Article 106 of the Courts Act”; in such cases “the payment of compensation has caused damage to the state which might be requested to be covered by the responsible judge”. Izvješće, cit. supra (note 87), p. 71. The introduction of appropriate sanctions for non-enforcement of judicial decisions (including the non-enforcement by the courts themselves) is also the topic of discussions at the international level. See, for example, Conclusions of the Round Table on “Non-enforcement of domestic courts decisions in member states: general measures to comply with European Court judgments” (Strasbourg, 21-22 June 2007), where strengthening the individual responsibility (disciplinary, administrative and criminal where appropriate) of decision makers in case of abusive non-execution was proposed, along with the introduction of efficient penalties and fines against the state agents that refuse to execute orders. See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers document CM/Inf/DH(2007)33.

The court backlogs were continually on the rise from 1992 (about 550,000) to 2004 (1.3 million). Since then the figures are decreasing: 2005 (1.1 million), 2006 (1 million), 2007 (970,000) and 2008 (890,000). Source: Annual Statistical Surveys of the Ministry of Justice (http://www.pravosudje.hr).

Some scepticism is still sound in this matter: see e.g. in this respect the wise remarks of a current judge of the Constitutional Court in Radolović, A., Zaštita prava na suđenje u razumnom roku – realna mogućnost (pre)skupa avantura ili utopija?, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 29:1(2008), pp. 277-280.
cipal proceedings. The County Court transferred the RPRTRT to the Supreme Court, but that court did not make any decision on it prior to the rendering of the Strasbourg Court admissibility decision on 26 June 2008. After communication of this case to the government, the case was resolved by a friendly settlement. However, a period of over two and half years in which the courts did not respond to a request for acceleration of the proceedings would have left no doubt as to its effectiveness in the eyes of the Strasbourg Court.

In the facts of the Čiklić case, we can see that even if the court obeys promptly to the time-fixing order, it might not be the end of the case. In that case, a RPRTRT was lodged with the Supreme Court on 3 May 2006. The Supreme Court granted the request 10 months later (!) and ordered the High Commercial Court to give a decision on the pending applicant’s appeal within one month. The High Commercial Court rendered its decision on appeal on 26 September 2007, quashing the first-instance judgment and remitting the case back for retrial. In July 2008, over two years after the RPRTRT, the proceedings were still pending in the first instance. In this case, we might be reminded of the systemic problem recognised in the earlier jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, namely of the possibility of the endless cycle of remittals. The RPRTRT, just like all the other remedies for the length of proceedings, seem to be equally helpless in respect to the issues of this type – they can only be resolved by the reforms on the general level.

Therefore, although it is not very likely that catastrophic scenarios will be realised, it is quite likely that we will soon see more Strasbourg Court judgments finding violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time in Croatian cases. It is also highly probable that the RPRTRTs will at least in some cases not be found effective as a remedy for the length of proceedings. This, however, should only encourage further reforms. As noted in a draft of the new Council of Europe document, “the rights to trial within a reasonable time and to an effective remedy […] are fundamental to the Convention system and to the notion of a democratic state governed with respect for human rights and the rule of law. Whilst no

151. In the first Cerin case, a violation of Article 6 was found and the applicant was awarded 30,000 kn compensation for delays in the case that was initiated in 1984. See Cerin v. Croatia, application no. 54727/00, judgment of 15 November 2001.
152. Cit. supra (note 92).
153. See, for example, Zagorec v. Croatia, application no. 10370/03, judgment of 6 October 2005. In that case the first-instance court had given three judgments on the merits, all of them subsequently quashed and remitted by the appellate court. In several cases, the Strasbourg Court ruled that successive remittals “may disclose a serious deficiency in the justice system.” See Grgić, Aida, The length of civil proceedings in Croatia – Main causes of delay, in: Uzelac, A./van Rhee, C.H.(eds.), Public and Private Justice. Dispute Resolution in Modern Societies, Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007, p. 159.
Council of Europe member state can be said to have achieved perfection, membership itself implies an obligation to strive constantly for self-improvement.”

The case is not over: a few concluding thoughts

In conclusion, we may only echo the wise saying of the Strasbourg Court: “The best solution in absolute terms is indisputably, as in many spheres, prevention.”

Without denying the remarkable successes in the establishment of the whole network of remedies for the length of proceedings in Croatia, we would like to recall the underlying rationale: the individual right to a fair trial in reasonable time. This right imposes on the member states of the Council of Europe the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time. The remedies such as constitutional complaints and RPRTRTs can appropriately cure the individual and isolated occurrences of the disease, but cannot fight the epidemic. For that, persistent structural changes are needed. Some of them are outlined in the documents of other bodies of the Council of Europe, most notably in the documents of the CEPEJ.

In the meantime, we have to be aware that the effectiveness of legal remedies for the length of proceedings is not measured by their ability to deflect the cases from the Strasbourg Court, but by their ability to provide appropriate redress in the individual cases. We also have to be aware of the risks that determination of the (un)reasonable length of proceedings becomes “a trial within a trial”. This would be self-defeating, since the purpose of the remedies for the length of proceedings is to shorten the judicial activities, and not to add more formalities and costs to the system.

Finally, we have to recognise that the most effective way of dealing with the lack of effectiveness of judicial system is not in the awarding of compensation, but in the thorough study of the reasons for this lack, and in the constant fight against the discovered causes. Replacing the struggle for efficiency with the passive payment of compensation for inefficiency is not an option: the capitulation is the most costly way of the quest for the Holy Grail of effectiveness of the justice system.

155. Cocchiarella, cit. supra (note 28), para. 74.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. The participants underlined the high contracting parties' obligations under Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights to resolve the problem of excessive length of proceedings at national level.

2. To this end, they supported and encouraged the Committee of Experts on effective remedies for excessive length of proceedings (DH-RE) in its work on a draft Recommendation intended to assist member states in fulfilling these obligations through both prevention and effective legal remedies in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.

3. It was recognised that the excessive length of proceedings is only one example of a situation that may arise from structural or systemic problems in member states.

4. The participants appreciated that the repetitive applications that may result from such situations are a grave threat to the effective functioning of the Convention system at both national and European levels.

5. They considered that procedures allowing for class actions or collective applications may represent a way of addressing this situation.

6. They therefore welcomed and supported the Interlaken Conference to be organised by the Swiss Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers in February 2010, at which these and all other proposals that might help the Court and strengthen the Convention system should be further and fully considered. Any such reforms should stem from the viewpoint of effective protection of rights and freedoms of natural and legal persons, whilst also reinforcing the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights.

249. Provisionally entitled “Draft Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on effective remedies for excessive length of proceedings”.
## Programme

### of the Round Table

**Monday, 21 September 2009**

**Part One: Ways of protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time —countries’ experiences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09.30</td>
<td>Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>Welcome address: <strong>Mr Aleš Zalar</strong>, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.15</td>
<td>Introduction: <strong>Moderator of Part One: Mr Peter Palvin</strong>, Secretary, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>Presentations of countries’ experiences/practices concerning the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Articles 6, paragraphs 1 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights):</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Italy, Dr Marco Fabri</strong>, Acting Director, Research Institute on Judicial Systems (IRSIG-CNR), Bologna</td>
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<td><strong>Poland, Mr Jakub Wołasiewicz</strong>, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, Government Agent of the Republic of Poland before the European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td><strong>The Netherlands, Dr Pim Albers</strong>, Senior Policy Advisor, Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Czech Republic, Dr Vít A. Schorm</strong>, Government Agent of the Czech Republic before the European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>Continuation of presentations of countries’ experiences/practices concerning the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Articles 6, paragraphs 1 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights):</td>
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<td><strong>Views of the Council of Europe bodies/representatives:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Mr Jakub Wołasiewicz</strong>, Chairperson of the Committee of Experts on effective remedies for excessive length of proceedings (DH-RE)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dr Bogdan Lucian Aurescu</strong>, European Commission for Democracy through Law, Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Romania, substitute member of the Venice Commission</td>
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<td><strong>Ms Corinne Amat</strong>, Head of Division, Department for the Execu-</td>
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</table>
Tuesday, 22 September 2009

Part Two: Between Madrid and Interlaken – Bled discussions

Short-term reform of the European Court of Human Rights

09.30 Introduction: Moderator of Part Two, Mr Roman Završek, Attorney at law

09.45 Statements:

Ms Simona Drenik, Head of the International Law Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia

Mr Erik Fribergh, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights

Dr Almut Wittling Vogel, Vice-chairperson of the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH)

Dr Frank Schürmann, Agent of the Swiss Confederation before the European Court of Human Rights

Prof. Dr Michal Balcerzak, Independent expert, Faculty of Law and Administration, Nicholas Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland

Ms Nuala Mole, Director, The AIRE Centre (Advice on Individual Rights in Europe)

10.45 Coffee break

11.00 Repetitive applications

Introductory presentations:

Mr Erik Fribergh, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights

Dr Vit A. Schorm, Member of the Bureau of the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH)

Dr Frank Schürmann, Agent of the Swiss Confederation before the European Court of Human Rights

Prof. Dr Michal Balcerzak, Independent expert, Faculty of Law and Administration, Nicholas Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland

Ms Nuala Mole, Director, The AIRE Centre (Advice on Individual Rights in Europe)

12.00 Discussion

12.30 Lunch

14.00 “Class actions” or collective applications

The concept of “class actions”:

Mr Alexandre David, Magistrate, Ministry of Justice, France

“Class actions” in the perspective of the European Convention on Human Rights system: Prof. Dr Andrea Gattini, University of Padova

Collective complaints – the experience under the European Social Charter: Prof. Dr Polonca
Programme

Končar, President of the European Committee of Social Rights

Comments from a representative of a non-governmental organisation: Ms Jill Heine, Amnesty International

15.00 Coffee break
15.15 Discussion
16.15 End of the Round Table
PARTICIPANTS

Bled (Slovenia), 21-22 September 2009

Pim Albers
Dutch Ministry of Justice

Corinne Amat
Council of Europe

Michael Apessos
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs

João Arsenio de Oliveira
Portuguese Ministry of Justice

Bogdan Lucian Aurescu
Venice Commission, Council of Europe

Andrej Ausperger Matić
European Parliament

Michael Balcerzak
Faculty of Law and Administration, Nicholaus Copernicus University, Poland

Lucijan Bembič
State Attorney’s Office of Slovenia

Domen Bizjak
Slovenian Ministry of Public Administration

Guro Camerer
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Alexandre David
French Ministry of Justice

Katja Debeljak
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Zlata Debevec
Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman Office

Ida Dimec
Labour Court in Celje, Slovenia

Emma D’Ortona
Italian Ministry of Justice

Simona Drenik
Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Liselot Egmond
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Andrej Ekart
Faculty of Law, University of Maribor, Slovenia

Elisabeth Ellison Kramer
Permanent Representation of Austria to the Council of Europe

Marco Fabri
Research Institute on Judicial Systems (IRSIG-CNR), Bologna, Italy

Erik Fribergh
European Court of Human Rights

Aleš Galič
Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Andrea Gattini
Faculty of Law, University of Padova

Fokion Georgakopoulos
Greek Ministry of Justice

Jill Heine
Amnesty International

Irena Jager
Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Helena Jaklitsch
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Jan Jeram
Pravna praksa (law magazine in Slovenia)

Mamuka Jgenti
Permanent Representation of Georgia to the Council of Europe

Inger Kalmerborn
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Urška Klakočar
Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia

Rajko Knez
Faculty of Law, University of Maribor, Slovenia

Biserka Kogej Dmitrovič
Higher Labour and Social Court in Ljubljana, Slovenia

Polonca Končar
Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
(at this table on behalf of the Council of Europe)
Participants

Arto Kosonen
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nina Koželj
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Vasilija Lackovič
Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia

Jasmina Leskovec
Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia

Rob Linham
UK Ministry of Justice

Dragana Lukić
Serbian Ministry of Justice

Jure Markič
Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman Office

Ales Mercina
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Martina Metelko
State Attorney's Office of Slovenia

Tjaša Mihelic Žitko
State Attorney's Office of Slovenia

Monika Mijić
Office of the Government Agent, Bosnia and Herzegovina

David Milner
Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Europe

Maria Moldotsova
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nuala Mole
Advice on Individual Rights in Europe (AIRE) Centre

Madalina-Ioana Morariu
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nina Nikolova
Bulgarian Ministry of Justice

Brigitte Ohms
Federal Chancellery Constitutional Service, Austria

Stanko Omerzu
Labour Court in Maribor, Slovenia

Ahmet Münci Ozmen
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Peter Pavlin
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Natalia Pavlova
The Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation

Matevž Pezdirc
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Miroslav Pliberšek
Higher Court in Maribor (Slovenia)

Kristina Potič
Ministry of Human and Minority Rights of Serbia

Inga Reine
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jernej Rovšek
Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman Office

Marko Šamardžić
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Vít Alexander Schorm
Czech Ministry of Justice

Frank Schürmann
Federal Office of Justice, Switzerland

Jasna Šegan
Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia

Ivan Šelih
Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman Office

Heili Sepp
Estonian Ministry of Justice

Katarina Škrbec
Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Edvin Skrt
Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Rok Janez Šteblaj
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Lene Steen
Danish Ministry of Justice

Anita Števanec
Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Stavroula Trekli
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Marjetka Urbančič
Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia
Participants

Alan Uzelac  
Law Faculty, University of Zagreb

Maja Velič  
Slovenian Ministry of Justice

Jaša Vrabec  
Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia

Nenad Vujić  
Judicial training centre, Srbija

Almut Wittling-Vogel  
Federal Ministry of Justice, Germany

Jakub Wołasiewicz  
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Alenka Zadravec  
District Court in Maribor, Slovenia

Aleš Zalar  
Minister of Justice of the Republic of Slovenia

Roman Završek  
Slovenian Attorney at Law