In the 16th and partly in the 17th century, the Croatian and Slavonian nobility often threatened the Habsburgs with surrender to the Ottomans, especially in times of fierce combats. Other social strata, the peasants and the military, even voluntarily changed sides and accepted the jurisdiction of a more amenable overlord in their attempt to survive. Their interactions with the Ottomans therefore cannot be characterised as merely confrontational. Actually, conditioned by an attempt to avoid devastation and annihilation, the opposing sides were engaged in various types of rather complex interactions and thus challenged the paradigm of antemurale Christianitatis.

The introduction of the term antemurale Christianitatis as a synonym for the border kingdoms on the European southeastern fringe coincided with the earliest substantial defence investments undertaken by all regional Estates from the end of the 15th century. The term was employed by the local Croatian nobility from the 1490s in addresses to Pope Alexander VI and the Emperor Maximilian I. By the 1520s, the term was accepted and widely used in Europe. In a letter to the Croatian Banus Petar Berislavić in 1520, Pope Leo X declared that Croatia is the antemurale Christianitatis. Some years later, at the Slavonian Diet held in Dubrava on 8 January 1527, the following words were uttered: »Ne igitur hoc regnum, quod antemurale clupeusque christianitatis existit et magna su et suorum cede semper christianatatem ipsam defendit«. Examples are numerous.

This paper aims to address two main problems that challenged the paradigm of antemurale Christianitatis. Firstly: were the threats of surrender to the Ottomans a plausible political option in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom? Secondly, the question as to whether the Ottomans can be seen as the principal adversaries of the Croatians and Slavonians during the early modern period, the archenemy of Christianity. For this purpose, several contexts are to be reconstructed and presented. After outlining the official political and military strategies of the Habsburgs, the Croatian-Slavonian and the Inner-Austrian Estates towards the Ottomans, I shall scrutinise everyday practices of interactions with the Ottomans at the Military Border as well as forms of negotiations of different representatives with the Ottomans. Finally, I shall discuss the question as to whether the Ottomans were the only Christian adversary in the region.

**Political Strategies**

The Habsburg strategies and interests concerning the Ottomans necessarily differentiated from those of the Estates of their various territories. The Estates on the frontier were directly endangered, unlike the Habsburgs, a dynasty of wider European reach. The Croatian and Slavonian Kingdoms were continuously attacked from the 1470s, as were the Inner-Austrian provinces Carniola and Styria. This forced the Inner-Austrian Estates to invest into a defence of the impoverished territories of Croatia and Slavonia from the 1520s. Financial investment in the Croatian and Slavonian Military Border provoked long-lasting modifications of the internal political (and military) power-relations between the Inner-Austrian Estates and the Habsburgs as their rulers. Still, in the Military Border affairs, the Habsburgs and the Austrian Estates had a rather unified policy throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. In practice, this policy was executed through various salaried offices and servants (informants on the ground, military personnel at the border, personnel of the Aulic War Council (Hofkriegsrat) in Graz and Vienna, emis- saries and orators in Istanbul, etc.) financed by the Austrian Estates and, in lesser amount, the Habsburgs.

The Croatian-Slavonian Estates neither developed similar institutional preconditions for participating in military and foreign affairs determined by the Habsburgs, nor had they enough financial means to influence Habsburg policies. This
significantly reduced their capacity to decide on the foreign policy even of their own kingdoms. Their defence potentials were rather weak by the 1530s. In the following decades, they were either forced to put up with solutions presented by the Habsburgs and their Austrian Estates or attempted to blackmail them by threatening to surrender to the Ottomans.

The Inner-Austrian Estates did not discuss options of surrendering to the Ottomans that could be interpreted as an act of treason. This could have ruined their political balance with the Habsburgs that rested on religious freedoms granted to the Estates – which had become largely Protestant by the mid 16th century – in return for their financial contribution to the defence. They could not afford, nor did they want to endanger negotiations over religious issues by abandoning their strongest political argument – the financing of the anti-Ottoman defence. The Croatian and Slavonian Estates could afford the latter, because the Habsburgs did not consider them to be a strong and vital strategic partner, but they still needed them as a buffer zone towards the Ottomans. The Estates could afford it as long as they were on the immediate combat-line and the Ottoman Empire was advancing. With the cessation of Ottoman danger, any attempt to come to an arrangement with the Ottomans would have entailed harsh consequences for the Croatian-Slavonian Estates. What prompted the Croatian and Slavonian Estates to open negotiations with the Ottomans?

Inner-Austrian financial help and institutional cooperation with the Habsburgs was not sufficient to fund and provide for an army that would be capable of fighting the Ottomans effectively. Therefore, the Habsburg policy in Central and South-Eastern Europe, from the 1530s until the consolidation of the Military Border in the 1630s, was restricted to defence, especially when being faced with substantial Ottoman campaigns. As early as 1532 the Habsburgs complied with the humiliating condition of paying an annual tribute (Verehrung, tributum) of 30,000 guilders to the sultan. This actually prevented further major Ottoman campaigns and hostilities. The psychologically devastating loss of Sziget in 1566 only assured the Habsburgs that they had made a sensible decision by conceding to pay. War councillors explained that:

»If one takes a look back, it is clear that the postponement of tribute gave Sultan Suleiman the best reason to advance with such a strong force in 1566, and to seize the fortresses Gyula and Sziget. On the contrary, experience shows that if the tribute would have been sent on time, he would not have advanced.«

The peace treaties of Edirne (Adrianople) 1547 and 1568 as well as others until 1606 stipulated the same conditions. However, the peace treaty signed in 1606 at Zsitvatorok did not specify the payment of a tribute. Still, the emissary of Rudolf II had to deliver one final gift to the sultan – a huge sum of 200,000 guilders. The Ottomans were considered invincible by Habsburg military strategists for a long time. An anti-Ottoman strategy was succinctly formulated by the Aulic War Council and participants at the Viennese Assembly on the setting-up (Gränitz-Bestellung) of the Hungarian, Croatian and Slavonian Military Borders in 1577.

»We have to either be in peace with him [the enemy, N.S.], or fight against him in greatest jeopardy. Regarding this, the necessity forces us to preserve peace. The nature proves and teaches that the weaker should retreat in front of the stronger and it happened everywhere with this enemy, who is nothing else than a whip of God. Those who confronted him with force were subordinated or completely ruined. Those who drew back in time – persevered. In such a way, Transylvanians, Wallachians, Armenians, Georgians and others which reached a timely agreement with him, proudly outlived. Even if they are paying a tribute they still have their own government, their religion, their language and their own law. On the contrary, people in ‘Aesia Graecia’ and in other places that confronted him by force were either exterminated or enslaved. We have to admit, if the war breaks out, we are the weaker side.«

Stripped of emotions, this example shows how the Habsburgs’ survival instincts and political interests recommended a course of caution and restraint, thus legitimising submission to the Ottomans. The question as to when to send a tribute turned into a matter of minor philosophy. Payment had to be delayed as much as possible in order to collect the necessary amount of money. Yet, too long a delay might have been interpreted by the Ottomans as an insult and breach of the truce, and thus prompted a military retribution at their hands.

Such tactical concessions by the Habsburgs had grave consequences for the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom, since they were no safeguard against everyday local conflicts and devastations in the border zone. Habsburg policy fuelled discontent and aversion in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom, and therefore paved the way for the repeated reconsideration of a justified alliance with the Ottomans during the next century and a half. It came to a peak with the conspiracy of Hungarian and Croatian magnates against the Habsburgs in
the 1660s and an open proposal for an alliance with the Ottomans by Petar Zrinski (Hung. Zrínyi Péter).

The Habsburgs’ willingness to come to temporary agreements with the Ottoman Empire was not an isolated case. It is often referred to that France concluded a treaty of friendship in February 1536 to secure trade and political interests.16 The Republic of Dubrovnik negotiated a treaty with the Ottoman Empire in 1481, strengthening its position against the rival of the Ottomans in the Mediterranean – the Venetian Republic. A payment of 12,500 ducats of annual tribute ensured protection and privileges for the citizens of Dubrovnik on Ottoman territory. The Republic maintained its freedom. The principalities of Wallachia and Moldova were Ottoman vassals too, from 1394 and 1455/1538 respectively.17 Moreover, János Szapolyai forged an alliance with the Ottomans, and the Slavonian nobility supported him for years.18 After his death, the Transylvanian territory east of the river Tisza along with some eastern Hungarian Counties (Partium) formed the vassal Principality of Transylvania, with an autonomous administration in domestic affairs and the obligation to pay an annual tribute.19

Consequently, the Croatian and Slavonian Estates were surrounded by states and rulers in various degrees of submission to the Ottomans, from tributary status to vassalage. They were therefore provided with models that could help them to justify politically and morally the option of cooperation with, and/or surrender to, the Ottomans.

Arrangements with the Ottomans at the Military Borders

The Habsburg compromises with the Ottomans thwarted major campaigns but could not prevent the so-called «small war» in the border zones from Transylvania to the Adriatic Sea. The Croatian-Slavonian Banus kept informants on the payroll, while magnates and influential warriors at the border developed their own networks of spies and agents, often exchanging information – sources are abundant in this respect.20 Postal and information services developed by the Aulic War Council in Graz and the Inner-Austrian Estates were exemplary for its time, delivering daily information on Ottoman troops and attacks. The territories of neighbouring kingdoms were attacked despite the peace agreement between the Empires. It included lootings and attacks carried out by both sides every day, thus creating a special Military Border economy. It was not unlikely that a Christian nobleman looted and devastated a Christian village on the Ottoman side. Military commanders from the Christian side of the border, whether local nobility, local voivods, or the Austrian commanders, often went to the other side looting and endangering the peace.21 Ottoman troops did the same.22 Both the Habsburg and the Ottoman imperial administrations officially condemned such activities, but could not prevent them from happening.

An insight into these circumstances is provided by a record from the Viennese Aulic War Councillors in 1576: «due to widespread poverty and starvation, the warriors at the frontier are often forced to go out, to rob and grab, refusing to recognise and calculate what harm might be caused if 20 or 30 of them take away several sheep or bulls and kill one, three or four ‘Turks’. The ‘Turks’, on the other hand, occupy entire villages, even the emperor’s own houses and castles.»23 Habsburg ambassadors to the High Porte constantly exchanged letters with the Grand Vizier, enumerating small breaches of the truce at the border. For example, after three dense pages of text that itemised all recent Christian offences, Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha continued a letter to Emperor Rudolf II with the following words:

»If one were to enumerate all other incursions, raids and pillaging done by Your Majesty’s warriors in His Highness’s lands, the people and cattle taken away, killing of souls and the looting of the estates of the poor it would not be possible – so, on account of their length, they are left out (…) The true God is wise and knows all things (…) the perpetrators on Your Majesty’s part are not contained but rather give us a cause to lament with their ceaseless damaging, committing of evil deeds and trespassing, I, as Your Majesty’s true friend, desiring and wishing the constancy of peace and favourable quietness, have directed all my thoughts, sense and mind towards such a state that both parts’ subjects and vassals live in good security, peace and unity. (…) Through all kinds of reports, information and well adjusted accounts we have softened and alleviated His Highness’s fire of anger. From what has been narrated above, Your Majesty may conclude to be in our kind disposal and mind.«24

The «small war» and occasional large campaigns led to the evolvement of various practices facilitating survival and fostering tolerance and co-existence on either side of the border. These and other practices compromised the sacred duty to fight against the Muslims. They directly contradicted the notion of antemurale Christianitatis by establishing new codes of honour – the so-called «law of the borderland»
It was a customary law, valid at the border along the Dinaric Mountains throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, and holding military honour and bravery in high esteem. As such it was respected by the nobility and members of other social strata living across the frontier area. The existence of such a law was feasible, since people of similar or even the same ethnic and familial origin lived on both sides of the border in spite of their different religions. Moreover, it provided a degree of security indispensable for people living in high-risk circumstances.

The ethics of bravery manifested itself in duelling between Ottoman and Christian heroes and nobles. For example, in March and April 1568, Franjo Frankopan Slunjski (Hung. Frangepán Ferenc) was exchanging letters with the Emperor Maximilian II in order to obtain permission for a knightly duel (megdan, međan) with Hamza, sanâkbeyi of Bosnia. The emperor explicitly forbade it. Furthermore, in 1554 letters were exchanged elaborating on the potential duel between Nikola Zrinski IV (Hung. Zrínyi Miklós) and beglerbeysi Mehmed Pasha Sokollu near Đurđevac. One more example of an intended duel is provided by the request of the well-known Christian hero Ivan Margetić, asking Captain Hans Lenković for the permission to challenge Budak-aga in order to defend his faith.

The »law of the borderland« comprised various other everyday practices, such as the institution of blood-brotherhood (pobratimstvo) between Christians and Ottomans on the one hand and among various Christian confessions on the other, comprehensively and vividly depicted by Wendy Bracewell. It enabled Christian and Muslim soldiers to help each other as blood-brothers in case of need, such as captivity and/or injury.

Moreover, special procedures of liberating and exchanging captives developed. Prisoners were allowed to return to their homes in order to obtain ransom and thus liberate themselves from captivity. The ransom was evaluated according to the prisoner’s social and economic status (Schätzung, čina). It was discreditable and shameful to avoid paying ransom, since it would have impaired the entire system. The offenders were, therefore, disciplined on all sides. Apart from local frontiersmen and the lower nobility, the official military authorities and distinguished noblemen in the border regions of both empires were involved in such activities. In what follows, several exemplary cases involving the highest officials shall be presented and discussed.

First, in 1652, Juraj Rattkay published a story on Gašpar Alapić, an influential and rich aristocrat, a famous Christian hero, and Croatian-Slavonian banus (1574–1577), who was captured during the siege of Sziget by the Ottomans in 1566. Nobody recognised him due to his »small stature, ugly face and distorted body« except one »Turkish« soldier, who had once been captured by Alapić. Since he had been treated kindly and gently, the soldier did not betray Alapić, and even quietly advised him to fetch ransom money as soon as possible, before being recognised by anyone. Rattkay’s narrative continues: »using the benefits of the Turkish silence, Alapić was released by the Turks after his warrantees were named according to the custom and intending to send his ransom through other people.« Following the release, the »Turkish« soldier in question told his companions who Alapić was in order to protect himself, but only once it was too late to recapture him. The Ottomans were enraged when they found out about his high status, because Alapić had managed to slip away with an inappropriately low ransom required from him.

It is interesting to note that Rattkay, though writing the story almost a century later, still did not find anything strange or problematic in the described procedure, rationalising it with the words »according to the custom«. It also becomes obvious that, on both sides, it was considered customary to respect the price of a captive once it had been determined. Officially, imperial as well as church authorities strongly resented such practices and strived to contain and abolish them, since they diluted the Habsburg-Ottoman enmity, endangered discipline, and jeopardized higher-level imperial and ecclesiastical interests.

Second, as early as 1529, the Croatian banus was instructed by King Ferdinand I (1526–1564) to keep imprisoned Ottomans firmly in captivity, because they were sometimes released without the knowledge of the Banus. Moreover, in the standard instruction to the chief commander of the Croatian border issued by the Aulic War Council in Graz and the Inner-Austrian archduke in March 1578, it was stated that there existed a »perilous disorder regarding captured Turks, who were, (...) often allowed to travel in and out, although the experience showed that during that time, pretending that they would fetch their ransom, (...) they frequently just escaped from the border area, travelling to the centre of their land and delivering information.« According to the same instruction, the defence of the border was based on the impenetrability of dense forests and swamps, causing great fear of spies and double agents that were able to discover secret passages. The chief commander was ordered to be suspicious of all escapees (Pribåkhen) from Ottoman territory. Moreover, if detainees turned out to be guides or martoslovci – who were possible spies – he was allowed to...
spend up to ten ducats (taller) to purchase and impale them immediately.\textsuperscript{48} The Croatian-Slavonian Diet also condemned those practices officially. For example, in September 1567, the diet decreed severe punishment to those who passed on secrets to the Ottomans through messengers or letters. It also prohibited the practice of releasing Ottoman prisoners who had been granted a guarantee (faith, 

\[\text{vjeta/vira, fides}\] by fellow captives and were thus able to travel freely from one place to another. Henceforth the diet allowed everyone to seize such individuals and hand them over to the Banus.\textsuperscript{39}

Admittedly, local practices with the detainees could be dangerous for all sides, but everyone at the border knew that the captives were not solely responsible for the betrayal of information. In any case, official instructions to military commanders or the occasional diet decrees attempting to prohibit similar practices on a local level were not successful, and established customs continued well into the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.

Third, there existed a small-scale trade between Ottoman and Christian subjects along the border – even markets were held facilitating the exchange of goods needed for everyday life.\textsuperscript{49} Of course, this was not welcomed by the authorities, and in June 1529, King Ferdinand I demanded from Banus Ivan Karlović to forbid trade between Croatians and Ottomans.\textsuperscript{50} In spite of such objections, trade continued, on local as well as international levels – between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. In everyday life, close involvement with the »archenemy« was a common feature, in many ways regulated by the »law of the borderland«.

**Negotiations with the Ottomans**

With regard to what has been said thus far, it has been indicated that various types of either submission or alliance with the Ottomans were possible, disregarding the ethical issues imposed by the paradigm of antemurale Christianitatis. In what follows, I shall discuss the question as to which aristocratic groups or individuals actually opened negotiations with the Ottomans, what aims they pursued and what results they achieved.

Around 3% of magnates (barones) held around 75% of all noble estates in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom. The majority of the nobility – titled as nobiles – made 90% of all nobles in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom and held only around 25% of all noble estates.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, the economic and political influence of the nobles was limited in comparison to that of the magnates. The lesser, middle and high nobility of the Kingdom could hardly afford to travel to the diet. The magnates practically ceased to participate in the work of the Croatian-Slavonian Diet towards the last decades of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century. Though the Croatian-Slavonian Diet threatened with surrender to the Ottomans in the first half of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, it gradually ceased to be a viable and representative political partner for negotiations with them. Moreover, as the responsibility for foreign policy rested in the royal prerogative, the Banus was not in a position to send ambassadors or emissaries to the High Porte himself.\textsuperscript{51} Hence, channels of communication (and exchange of information) with the Ottomans mostly operated at lower and individual levels.

During long sieges, leading Ottoman commanders or emissaries of the sultan used to send messages, offering favourable terms to all Christians in return for surrender.\textsuperscript{52} Some of the lesser nobles, estate managers and lower military officers were given letters from agas, sancak-beyis or bešlerbešis who attempted to convince them to surrender. Such arrangements did not require involvement of higher-level Ottoman diplomacy. The offers were occasionally accepted, as testified by well-known cases of the surrender of individual fortresses (Klis, Kostajnica, Gvozdansko, Kaniza etc.) throughout the period under consideration. Sometimes, Christians contemplating such treasonable acts with the Ottomans were traced and killed, like »fat« Marko, voivod and castellan of the counts of Erdödy in the small fort Hrastilnica. In 1592, Hasan-pasha, bešlerbeši of Bosnia, had written to him in Croatian Cyrillic letters, proposing to the population around Sisak and Hrastilnica to surrender and to accept his protection.\textsuperscript{45} Ordinary people were frequently prepared to surrender. After a visit of Croatian emissaries, who had come to the Austrian lands asking for help against the Ottomans, Habsburg officials at the Aulic Chamber (Hofkammer) reported to the emperor in 1525 that Croats might submit to the Ottomans, if left without assistance.\textsuperscript{46} In 1536, peasants from Sopje and its environs started to surrender to the Ottomans, and people in the entirety of Slavonia were prepared to do the same, following an Ottoman offer. According to a letter that Nikola Zrinski IV obtained from his servant Stjepan Kapitanović in 1558, the entire population of Pounje intended to surrender.\textsuperscript{57}

Various magnates occasionally obtained letters or verbal messages from local Ottoman commanders or even sancak-beyis with proposals to surrender or to become vassals. One of the most interesting such cases is provided by the letters written in 1560 by Malkoč-bey, sancak-beyi of Bosnia, to the counts Ivan Rebrović and Nikola Frankopan of Tržac, using Croatian Cyrillic script and Ottoman Turkish stamps and
signatures. Malkoch-bey warned Nikola about his land being ruined and things going badly. He also emphasised that Nikola’s predecessors had been good people that had lived well together with the Ottomans. He asked Nikola, as the oldest among the Frankopans, to agree with the Frankopans of Slunj and of Blagaj to give in to the sultan («tere se pridate čestitomu caru»), assuring that the sultan would not take anything away but reward him instead, and that they would all live in peace. The letter Malkoch-bey wrote to Rebrović was similar.48

The sultan also had it at his command to send emissaries directly to representatives of the Croatian and Slavonian nobility (never to the diet as such) or to some distinguished magnates, offering various conditions for an agreement. Surely, the acceptance of such concrete Ottoman proposals was a viable political option considering the circumstances – no matter how repugnant it would have been to the king or the archdukes of Inner-Austria. Based on these offers that were mostly semi-official, the threat of surrender to the Ottomans was a semi-official diet policy – throughout the 16th century. The diet stated that the Croatian and Slavonian Estates would consent with the Ottomans in case the promised Christian help did not arrive. Still, at official level it remained mostly a threat with meagre or no results, an attempt to blackmail their Jagiellon or Habsburg kings for more assistance. The first decades of the 16th century witnessed a number of such attempts.

Already in 1506, several Croatian counts were suffering such territorial losses with the result that the most powerful among them (Bernardin Frankopan, Ivan Torkvat Karlović) agreed on various treaties with the Ottomans in order to bring about peace. King Vladislav II Jagiello (Croat. Vladislav II. Jagelović / Pol. Władysław II Jagiełło / Czech. Vladslav Jagellonský) was duly notified – in 1507 he received a representative of the Croatian magnates and the nobility informing him that they would surrender to the »Turks« or to another Christian ruler if Vladislav did not provide the necessary support.49 In December 1524, King Louis II Jagiello (Hung. II. Lajos / Croat. Ludovik II. / Pol. Ludwik II Jagiełło) wrote to the Slavonian Banus Ferenc Batthyány, recounting that the Croatian magnates and nobility had sent delegates to him proclaiming their intention to reach a settlement with the Ottomans, if he did not assist them.50 Moreover, documents from the Vatican archives uncovered by Matija Mesić reveal that the Dalmatian and Croatian Kingdoms sent their representative to the Hungarian king in 1519, declaring that they were no longer his subjects and ready to surrender to the Ottomans, because the king had made a peace agreement with Sultan Selim I. (1470–1520) in which the Croats were not mentioned.51 Bernardin Frankopan, one of the most powerful magnates in the Croatian Kingdom, addressed the representatives of the imperial diet in Nuremberg in 1522 thus: »If you leave us without help, one of the two is bound to happen: The Croats will either accept the Turkish offer and subdue to the Turks or leave their homeland and wander all around the world in order to escape the Turkish slavery.«52

In 1525/26, the Ottomans were promising that they would release all imprisoned subjects of the Croatian magnates and nobility and leave them in peace, if they allowed them to pass their kingdom on their way to other Christian lands. The Croatian magnates (knjazovi) and the rest of the nobility were ready to comply and sent a delegate to King Louis II, asking for support in defence matters. Since the king was not able to provide it, they held a diet in Krševci on 26 January 1526, declaring quite unequivocally to renounce the king and to conclude an agreement with the sultan who had previously sent an emissary to them.53 At the diet in Cetin in April 1527, the Croatian Estates appealed to the new Habsburg King Ferdinand I to send military help, since the sultan had sent envoys in the previous year, offering to return their properties, to respect their religion, freedoms, and customs, to release the serfs from their duties for ten years, and emphasising that he was already overlord of several Christian lands on equal terms.54

At Augsburg in 1530, count Vuk Frankopan Slunjki repeated the famous Nuremberg words of Bernardin Frankopan, stating that if no help arrived, people were ready to give in to the »insatiable dragon« – the Ottomans.55 At the diet of Kenese in 1532, some Slavonian aristocrats like Ivan Tahy warned their Croatian and Slavonian peers about the Ottomans, yet others replied that they would not even know the difference between »Turks« and »Germans«.56

Cooperation with the Ottomans was actually practised by a group of Slavonian noblemen during violent unrests in the first half of the 16th century. In spite of the dramatic Ottoman territorial advances in the 1520s, the Croatian and Slavonian Estates – divided in their support of two claimants to the throne, Janos Szapolyai and Ferdinand of Habsburg – started a fierce civil war in 1527. Historiography rather neglects to discuss the fact that, during the civil war, the Slavonian and some Croatian magnates (Frankopans) sided with Szapolyai and the so-called »Turkish Party«.57 The leader of the Slavonian nobility, the Bishop of Zagreb (Hung. Zagreb / Germ. Agram) and the Slavonian Banus from 1530, Simon (Croat. Šimun) Erdödy, led a pro-Ottoman party. In 1529, he went to
Buda to pay homage to Szapolyai, thus complying with the latter’s inauguration as Hungarian ruler by the Ottomans in recognition of their alliance. In January 1530, at the diet in Ivanic, the Slavonian nobility, led by Banus Simon Erdödy, decided to make a pact with the Ottomans, too. Despite some voices of discontent expressed by the so-called «Middle Party», led by Péter Perény in the 1530s, the majority of the Slavonian nobility followed Simon Erdödy. The Ottomans actually started to assail Carniola and Croatia in consequence of this alliance. The Croatian nobility was severely disappointed by their previous Slavonian allies, condemning them as traitors of the Christian name and accusing them of being the same as the «Turks» with whom they had associated themselves. In January 1530, the Croatian nobility sent an additional letter to King Ferdinand I asking him for assistance against the treason, because rumour had spread that the despot Vuk Branković intended to surrender Kostajnica to the Ottomans. After 1535, when Erdödy withdrew support from Szapolyai and accepted Ferdinand as rightful ruler, the Ottomans began new offensives, promising to halt once the nobility returned to their protégé, Szapolyai. The civil war ceased only in 1538, after major Ottoman victories on Croatian (Klis) and Slavonian (Požega / Hung. Pozsega) battlefields in 1537. Disregarding numerous changes of allegiance, and innumerable military actions in the decades discussed here, one may conclude that the alliance with the Ottomans was effectively made use of as a political option in the Slavonian Kingdom.

In September 1567, the Croatian-Slavonian Diet decreed that nobody was allowed to send emissaries or captives into «Turkish» lands henceforth, thus attempting to prevent any future arrangements with the Ottomans. In December 1574, Banus Juraj Drašković reported to King Maximilian (Emperor Maximilian II) from the Croatian-Slavonian Diet that the nobility had decided to surrender to the Ottomans. The king replied in January 1575, asking Drašković either to put all his efforts into dissuading them from this decision or else to incarcerate them. The king also assured Drašković that he knew how to act, if the renegades sent their representatives to him. Croatian-Slavonian political elites clearly did not have a unified political stance on these issues in the second half of the 16th century. In January 1593, the Croatian-Slavonian Diet authorised its deputies to the Hungarian Diet to state solemnly that they would do what destiny and necessity required as the most appropriate and opportune in order to save their lives and survive in that utmost danger, if Archduke Matthias and the Hungarian Estates did not send proper help, and that they would thus be forced either to give themselves up to the Ottomans or to migrate elsewhere. However, none of these threats did bring tangible results.

Those who actually entered negotiations with the Ottomans and temporarily benefited from coming to some kind of settlement were the magnates. In the period under consideration, there were less than ten magnate families in the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom. The Zrinski family was the most powerful among them, economically as well as politically. Throughout the period, and especially from the 19th century, this family became a symbol of Croatian-Slavonian resistance to any foreign menace. Still, the families Zrinski, Frankopan, Karlović and Erdödy were involved in various private arrangements with the Ottomans. For example, in 1524 Krsto Frankopan was negotiating with the Ottomans on the subjugation and tribute payment regarding two of his castles – in order to protect them – he could not get sufficient support from the Christian side («Prundl und Terschitz mit dem Turgken gehuldigt und triwut geben soll»). In what follows, the Zrinski case will further exemplify the unofficial relations between the magnates and the Ottomans.

Nikola Zrinski III made a pact with the Ottomans in 1530 in order to protect his most valuable properties along the Una valley and his principal castle Zrin. Around Zrin, Zrinski had numerous silver mines and was minting silver coins. He agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Ottomans and promised not to attack Ottoman troops passing through his lands – in return Zrinski possessions and subjects would be left in peace. In the same year, Ivan Karlović was complaining that Zrinski’s people had led the »Turks« across the river Una giving them directions. Nikola was soon blamed as illoyal and started to defend himself. He sent his men to Christopher Rauber, Bishop of Ljubljana (Germ. Laibach) and to the head of the estates (Landeshauptmann) in Carniola, where they justified Nikola’s actions as crucial to his and his subjects’ survival and the protection of his lands. Rauber in return sent envoys to Zrinski in order to clarify the situation, and Nikola explained to them the tactics he planned to deploy against the Ottomans in this area. He claimed he would assemble 10.000 people and provide for them for 20 days, if the Christian side started a serious war against the Ottomans. In other words, in case of a declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, he would act accordingly and help with all his might. Yet, in view of the Christians’ repeated failure to do so, he did what was needed for his own survival. It is obvious that Nikola III acted opportunistically, according to his rather straightforward explanation, and got away with it as the king was too weak to punish him.
After Nikola’s death in 1533, his sons Nikola IV and Ivan withheld their annual tribute and attacked the Ottomans, compromising the imperial peace treaty between Ferdinand I and the sultan concluded earlier in the same year. In the negotiations between the two imperial powers, the Ottoman side had urged Ferdinand’s emissaries to promise not to help the Zrinski brothers if the Ottomans attacked them — in other words, to exempt the Zrinski properties (and those of Petar Kružić, captain in Klis, who was relentlessly fighting the Ottomans) from the peace treaty.68

In any case, Nikola IV was more resistant to Ottoman overtures than his father, though he also considered them. After the battle at Gorjan (October 1537), Hans Katzianer, the head-commander of the Emperor’s army, was jaled as the main culprit of this infamous Habsburg defeat. He fled from his Viennese prison to northern Slavonia and subsequently received permission from the Zrinski brothers to settle in their castle Kostajnica until Ferdinand of Habsburg were to exonerate him. A ransom was put on his head. Having sufficient funds at his disposal, Katzianer started to gather soldiers and noblemen across the region, convincing them to defect to Szapolyai and offering good wages. Initially, Zrinski and other nobles followed him and did not allow Ferdinand’s officials to collect taxes on their properties. But Katzianer opened direct negotiations with the Ottomans, writing to local pashas who passed on his letter to Istanbul (according to famous Hungarian chronicler and royal official Miklós Istvánffy). Finally, he confronted the Zrinski with the choice of either joining him in pledging allegiance to the sultan, or facing his surrender of Kostajnica, leaving its inhabitants to their destiny. Judging that the situation might get out of control, the Zrinski brothers concluded that it would not be opportune to support Katzianer any longer. Fearing his next move, they ordered his assassination in Kostajnica. According to their subsequent letter to Ferdinand, they thus intended to avert great danger from Christianity and their own kingdoms and humble lands — not for the sake of money, but out of respect towards the Christian religion and His Majesty.69 All the appropriate words were used, but their course of action was once again primarily motivated economically: their principal aim was to save valuable landholdings. The same properties motivated Ivan Zrinski to wage a fierce private war against the Chapter of the Zagreb Cathedral (Capitulum Zagrabienne) in the late 1530s and early 1540s, completely disregarding the Ottoman danger and devastating the Chapter’s villages and lands. During these raids, Ivan Zrinski’s warriors apparently even wore «Turkish» turbans (turban, čalma) and carried the Ottoman flag so as to feign an Ottoman raid.70

However, Zrinski’s apparently contradictory actions during this period may ultimately have been motivated by political ambitions. As a matter of fact, slightly later Ottoman sources appear to indicate that Nikola Zrinski IV pondered to become Croatian King. Seen in this light, his policies towards Szapolyai, Ferdinand, and the Ottomans deserve further investigation and are to be considered fully in a much wider context.71

In September 1577, Juraj Zrinski IV (Hung. Zrínyi György) sent a letter to King Rudolf II asking for military assistance to defend his fortress in Legrad and his most valuable estate Medimurje (Hung. Muraköz / Germ. Murinsel). Listing his numerous accomplishments, he was emphasising that Archduke Charles and the Inner-Austrian Estates had refused to help him. Insolvency would eventually force him to dismiss his soldiers and to secure Medimurje by paying tribute to the Ottomans.72 On mentioning tribute in connection with Medimurje — a site on the frontline of Styrian defence — Rudolf II reacted promptly. He ordered support for Zrinski, hastily informing the latter about his decision. The magnate did not raise the issue of tribute again.73 In 1592, the Estates of Carniola supplied wrong information to the Styrian Estates according to which Juraj Zrinski was considering to surrender Međimurje to the Ottomans. Zrinski immediately wrote to Archduke Ernst dismissing such plans.74

To sum up, the magnates could negotiate with the Ottomans more efficiently than the lesser nobility, even extracting some advantages having their lands temporarily spared from Ottoman raids. They were also in a position to blackmail the Habsburgs by threatening to change their allegiance because the Ottomans would have welcomed such defections. Since the Habsburgs depended on the military support by the magnates, they usually shied away from reprimanding their vassals for various disobediences. This situation lasted until the 1630/40s, that is, until the consolidation of the Habsburg religious and military position in the region. In the second half of the 17th century, any attempt to negotiate with the Ottomans could have grave consequences, as will be shown in what follows.

Probably the most famous historical event of Hungarian and Croatian 17th-century history was the magnate conspiracy against the Habsburgs.75 The sudden death of Nikola Zrinski during a hunting expedition changed the plans of the conspirators. Nikola’s brother Peter Zrinski became the leader of the conspiracy as the head of the family that had been the most serious economic and political competitor to
the Habsburgs in the region. Following several unsuccessful attempts to form a secret pact with other European powers (France, Poland) and the withdrawal of Ferenc Nádasdy from the conspiracy, Petar Zrinski sent his servant, Captain Bukovački, to the Bosnian pasha with a letter and a signet ring, conveying the information that he was willing to submit to the sultan. Bukovački departed in November 1669. In the letter (reinforced with money), Zrinski was asking the pasha to provide his envoy with travel documents. Bukovački journeyed to Thessalonike, where he presented Zrinski’s terms directly in front of the sultan: Accordingly, Petar agreed to pay an annual tribute of no more than 12,000 tallers and intended to acquire the title of King of Hungary and Croatia for himself and his heirs. There were further terms and subsequent negotiations which have been widely discussed by scholars. For the purpose of this paper, it suffices to mention that the Ottomans played a double game; in December 1669, the Habsburgs learned of these schemes and obstructed Petar’s final attempt to form an anti-Habsburg coalition. At this time, unlike in the 16th century, Habsburg rule was sufficiently powerful to indict Petar for treason and have him duly executed, though he had been a mighty opponent.76

To sum up, the Croatian and Slavonian aristocracy had several options to come to an arrangement with the Ottomans: payment of tribute; vassalage; full surrender; or the cross-border cooperation legitimised by the »law of the borderland«. As shown, negotiations with the Ottomans followed certain patterns, depending respectively on the seriousness of the Ottoman threat, private policies of some magnates and nobles, clashes of interest between the Habsburgs on the one hand and the Hungarian, Croatian and Slavonian Estates on the other, and on the extent to which the Habsburgs were able and willing to punish collaboration with the Ottomans. The Croatian and Slavonian magnates sometimes came to private settlements, agreeing to pay tribute to the Ottomans. The Croatian-Slavonian Estates and the diet as a political body were neither in a position nor had the financial means for tributary payments as did the magnates, the Habsburgs, or the Republic of Dubrovnik. The only strategies left to them were those of surrender or possible vassalage. The Croatian and Slavonian Estates and the diet used these options rather for negotiating purposes than putting them into practice and only ever arrived at questionable political results.77

Religious Clashes

The Ottomans were certainly perceived as a threat to Christianity, but, as has been shown in this article, various practical arrangements were made with them nevertheless. Thus, we may ask: Were the Ottomans in fact perceived as the archenemy of Christianity in the region discussed here? The shaping of auto- and hetero-perceptions during the early modern period as well as the relevant ideologemes operating in this context form an extensive research field requiring systematic and comparative investigations of a wide spectrum of sources (fine arts, literature, historiography, travelogues, private correspondence, visual representations etc.).78 For the purpose of this article, I could neither embark upon a complex visual analysis with regard to the Ottomans (»Turks«) nor explore the symbolic configuration of the »self« in opposition to the Ottomans, whether the »self« be defined as Christianity, Europe\(^\text{79}\), antemurale, or the Croatian Kingdom. Instead, I am focusing on one of the aspects relevant for this paper, namely the question as to whether the Ottomans were considered to be the only enemy of Christianity in the geographical area analysed here.

In official documents and private correspondence on political and military issues, the Croatian and Slavonian nobility as well as the Estates used a limited number of attributes for the Ottomans. Those most regularly used were »the Turks« and the »enemy of Christian faith«, which was not too pejorative. Sometimes the Ottomans were referred to as a »cruel«, »wild« or »merciless« enemy, or as an »enemy that by flame and sword raids this gloomy Kingdom« (also »sad«, »divided« or »wrecked« Kingdom, etc.).80 Croatian early modern literature significantly expanded and developed the anti-Ottoman rhetoric\(^\text{81}\) – the Ottoman threat had become the topos of the so called »Speeches against the Turks« introduced by Enea Silvio Piccolomini in the 1450s. These were appeals expressed through humanist rhetoric and formulations adopted from ancient Roman and Christian writers. They were describing the ills allegedly brought about by Ottoman rule: poverty, destitution, inhumanity, robbery, fear and dreariness. Already from the beginning of the 15th century they had been addressed to popes, emperors, and other figures of power seen to be able to provide some protection as well as resources for a ‘crusade’ against the Ottoman Empire.82 Thundering against the Ottomans in the 1490s, priest Martinac said:

»Already at that time, they robbed all Croatian and Slavonian lands..., and all lands from Carniola unto the Sea, robbing and raiding, burning by fire godly homes..."
and godly altars, killing old and young people, as well as girls, widows, and also crying children; taking godly mournful folk into slavery, bonding people with iron and selling them at their markets – according to their beastly customs.»83

The »speeches« thus presented the Ottomans as the arch-enemy of Christendom, the menace of all menaces. Both the »speeches« and various documents issued by the Croatian-Slavonian Estates and nobility stressed the cruelty of the Ottomans, the aggravated state of affairs at the border, and the consequences for other European countries, if the antemurale Christianitatis were conquered. Instructive for this kind of argument is one of the paragraphs from the letter Nikola Zrinski V wrote to the Inner-Austrian Estates gathered at Bruck in January 1578, saying that he and also his brother Juraj had often

»explained at great length the notable danger and eventual disaster that would certainly befall not only the distinguished principality of Styria, but also other lands and neighbours lands, if the mentioned ground between the rivers Mura and Drava should be left helpless and thus fall to the bloodthirsty archenemy of the entire Christendom in his tyrannical violence and unbearable servitude.«84

The same argument – when the neighbour’s house is burning, your own property is endangered, too – was abundantly used in anti-Ottoman writings across Europe, whether by Erasmus of Rotterdam,85 in official political correspondence, or humanist literature. The Inner-Austrian Estates presented the Ottoman danger in a similarly emotional way. Actually, their official statements were much more elaborate and emotional when speaking about the Ottomans than were comparable decrees of the Croatian-Slavonian Diet:

»how horrible and pitiful a sight it is when one sees with own eyes, how the beloved homeland is attacked by such a menacing tyrant, conquered and torn apart, how Christian faith and divine glory are overthrown, women and children dishonoured, debased and humiliated, dear Christian youth forced to Islam, Christians turned to Turks and pagans. Under this enemy and his government all virtues extinguished, all Christian public order and all laws were abolished, as well as all rights. Poor captured Christians are suffering more than a beastly servitude, scarcity, shame and misery. (...) it should be a heart of stone, that would not to the utmost and strongest, with all its power, strength, thoughts and feelings endeavour and seek to help and with all its potential repulse this misfortune that is right in front of our eyes.«86

This pattern in the presentation of the Ottoman danger is to be found in the authorised instruction of the Inner-Austrian Estates to their Chief Commander at the Croatian and Maritime Border in 1580:

»... the archenemy of the Christian name and faith, the Turk, for who knows how many years attacked and pursued His highly esteemed Imperial Majesty’s etc. Kingdom of Hungary and its adjoining frontiers by flame and sword in a tyrannical way and unfortunately also forced its larger parts under his beastly servitude, and even further, day and night, ever more, focussing all his thoughts on how to set his foot deeper into the adjoining (...) kingdoms, also our hereditary Principality and Land, and afterwards into the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, disregarding the peace treaty.«87

In Europe, the Catholic clergy and the pope prescribed daily prayers, appealing to God to expel the Ottomans. The Jesuits even composed victory songs. Sermons contra Turcos accompanied those against famine, fire, epidemics, floods, etc. The Ottomans were perceived as one of the natural catastrophes, indeed as one of the enemies of humanity.88 In Inner-Austria the Protestant attitude towards the Ottoman expansion prevailed. Accordingly, the Ottomans were to be feared as judgment from above. Only the pure Protestant faith could save Christians from damnation.89 In Styria, »Turkish bells« rang every day, and the entire population had to attend mass and say an anti-Turkish prayer or at least Pa-

ter Noster after hearing them. Any refusal met with penalties, prison, substantial fines for members of the upper echelons of society or up to 14 days of forced labour on fortresses for ordinary folks.90

No matter how horrible, the »Turks« were not the only enemy of humanity though. In view of the religious clashes within Christianity itself, they inevitably lost their role as the only enemy of Christianity, too. More archenemies of the Christians appeared on the scene – other Christians. Christianity fiercely split apart just at the time when the antemurale rhetoric and its set of values were still being formed. Both discourses evolved for decades. Contemporaries recognised the issue. One notion present in the humanist literature mentioned above was also articulated in political writings across Europe: The Ottomans were successful only, because the Christians were not united and conducting themselves improperly.91 Therefore, there existed at least two enemies
of Christendom, heretics and the Ottomans. The importance attributed to one or the other Christian enemy depended on each region, the contemporary context, or the literary genre.97

In the 16th century the Inner-Austrian estates were predominantly Protestant (Lutheran), as were most of the Croatian-Slavonian magnates at the border towards the Ottomans. The majority of the Croatian-Slavonian nobility remained Catholic, however. Verbal insults and animosities between Protestants and Catholics were comparable to those applied to the Ottomans, if not even more harsh. In Germany, Martin Luther addressed the pope and monks as liars, antichrists, devils, monsters, whores, while the »Turks« were God’s punishment for the sins of the people.99 The Inner-Austrian Diet employed a highly emotional discourse when discussing the Catholics, comparable to the one directed against the Ottomans – which has been set out above. In Inner-Austria, Jesuits vocally denounced Protestants as »damned heretics« and did not allow them to bury their dead in consecrated cemeteries.94 The Protestant Estates emphasised that »the source of all fickleness and misunderstanding were the Jesuits (...) who caused a lot of suffering and a bloodbath through various evil doings and inquisition.«95

The most influential Protestant in the Inner-Austrian and Croatian-Slavonian context – Primož Trubar, a follower of Luther – positioned the Ottomans in a wider eschatological context.96 It has to be stressed that Trubar was respected and supported by the most influential Croatian and Slavonian magnates.97 Trubar did neither fear the »Turks« nor the pope nor the plague; instead, he feared the devil, the Antichrist – there existed good and evil, the God and the devil. He transmitted words on numerous victories over the Ottomans at the Croatian Military Border, especially those by Hans Lenković and Herward Freiherr von Auersperg, but he did not believe that the war could be won without an inner-Christian religious change and the evangelisation of political estates and peoples throughout Europe. Trubar told the Crainian youth that they should fear the devil, trust in the word of God, and pray continuously in order to find comfort »under this heavy cross that they carry daily due to the Turks and the pope.«98 The Ottomans were the people that had to be rescued – alongside other seduced Christians – through preaching and the distribution of religious books in vernacular all over the Croatian and Ottoman territories. The name of Christ would not be announced to the »Turks« by sword but through Catechism, Trubar said.99 Yet the »Roman whore from Babylon« must: »be revealed in front of all the people in the world and put to shame. Then we shall all be glad, hal-leluiah.«100 In the writings of the most influential Protestant in the region, the so-called archenemy could appear more humane than the pope. In this particular symbolic instance, the paradigm of the archetypical Muslim-Christian clash dissolved on the Croatian-Slavonian border, too.

Instead of a Conclusion

From what has been set out in this paper, it is possible to state that the population at the border of both Empires (and to a certain extent also the European population as a whole) developed various psychological and practical mechanisms (systems of values) of dealing with the Ottomans in order to survive armed conflicts lasting for centuries. Though the noble strata was the basis of the anti-Ottoman defence, the nobility (both magnates and lesser nobles) was involved in negotiations with the Ottomans, in order to spare their territories from devastation, or to profit politically. Threats with surrender to the Ottomans could result with short-term political gains in the 16th century, depending on the political strength and importance of an individual or the Estates, but were heavily punished in the 17th century. Ethics of the border nobility were also influenced by the wide spectrum of approaches towards the Ottomans, as exemplified above. The archetypical concept of the Ottomans as the archenemy of Christendom – although widespread and the most persistent one in shaping attitudes towards the Ottomans – had the useful function of mobilising Christian forces against the Ottoman invasion. It comprised a system of values, an ethical codex, thus creating an (ideological) basis for one of the possible approaches towards the Ottomans – open confrontation. Apart from this concept, the nobility at the border, and in fact on all sides involved in the conflict, developed various other mechanisms. Due to the ethnic and religious variety in the large frontier zone and the imperative to survive, the nobility, and frontiersmen in general, cultivated more flexible attitudes towards, and ways of engaging with, the Ottomans, such as the »law of the borderland« with its own ethical code of honour, or the possibility of entering concrete political arrangements with the Ottomans, which brought about its own moral justifications. Finally, as exemplified briefly, the divisions and conflicts within Christianity further diluted the strictly bi-polar nature of the Ottoman-Christian conflict. This paper may offer a basis for further research on everyday practices and value systems at the border with the Ottoman Empire.
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ENDNOTES

1 An important study on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the antemurale Christianitatis: OSTERRIEDER 2005.

2 For more details, see KRUHEK 1995, 47–53.
ermath solle werden, Sonnst haben Ier Mt: Kriegsleuth Im Beueich, gegen Poln vnd Silbenburgen, vill weniger als gegen dem Turggen was feindthätt-
löch furzunemen.« Vienna, KA, AFA, 1576-13-1, 3v–4r: See also: PETRITSCH 1993.

11 »Vnd da man hinte sich siehet, Ist wissentlich, Das durch die
aufhaltung der VerEerung dem Sultan Soliman die maiste vrisch ist geben
worden, das er Im 66 Jar mit einem solchen gewaldt heraus gezogen, die
Festen Sigeth vnd Jula eingenumen, da hergeben, wen die VerEerung Zeitlich
hinein geschickt worden, Er wie man dessn gutte erfarung, nit anzogen
wäre.« English translation by the author. Vienna, KA, AFA, 1577-13-2, 7v.


13 English translation by the author. Vienna, KA, AFA, 1577-13-2, 12v–13r.

14 Vienna, KA, AFA, 1577-13-2, 6r–7v. »Vnd weil es ye an deme, Das man
die VerEerung muß hinein schicken, Es steet nun kurz od[er] lang an, So kan
man so viel vleiß woll brauchen, Wo die im Septemb[er] od[er] Octob[er]
vorgeschickt würdet Das soliche im Martio od[er] zeitlicher zusam-
gebracht, vnd hinein verordnet werde, Vndt ist allein vmb so viel merem
vleiß vnd sorg zuhath, Das man diese zeit die Sechs od[er] Sieben Monat
also vorkume vnd gewinne.« Vienna, KA, AFA, 1577-13-2, 7v.

15 »alles was bil[heero] geschehen, d[α]β es gescheney sey, künffig
aber, Wann etwas wid[er] die sicherheit vnd aufgerichen Friden, was sich
Zuetrag[en] vnd erhoben wurde, sol man alsdann allen möglichen Vleiß
anwend, damit die henig[en], so die beuell übertretten und darwid[er]
gehandlet haben, wie es sich gebürt, gestrafft werd[en], (...) So soll Er
M[ajestät] überflissigen, aufrechten freundschaft vnd volkhomnen laut-
tern Zuenaigung nach, so Er M[ajestät] mit der Portten, die ain Nesst der
Glückshäligkeit ist, (...) Er M[ajestät] Present, so von Alters heero, Zu d[en]
erhöbten Portten geschickt worden, nit leng[er] aufgehalten, Sonnd[er] alle
lar Zu rechter bestimter Zeit herein geordnet werden,« Vienna, KA, AFA,
1578-8-ad6-bb, 6r–6v.

16 MATUZ 1992, 90. Michael Hochedlinger questions whether a record
of this contract exists, but agrees with the fact that the Ottoman Empire and
France intensified their favourable relations in the 1530s. HOCHEDLINGER

17 MATUZ 1992, 30–33, 66, 81, 90.

18 For an extraordinarily thorough study of documents issued by the Ot-
tomans for Hungary and Transylvania, see PAPP 2003. For the alliance with
the Ottomans, see also: LASZOWSKI 1914, 190–192.

19 MATUZ 1992, 33, 66. A detailed analysis of relevant contracts can be
found in PAPP 2003, 53–72.

20 For example: LASZOWSKI 1914, 115, 118, 143, 159, 171, 188, 260, 267,
308, 462 et passim. See also: ŠTEFANEĆ 2011, 273–289 et passim.

21 For example, see the incidents reconstructed in ŠTEFANEĆ 2004, 369–
371. See also: Vienna, KA, AFA, 1563-4-ad3; 1563-4-ad9; 1563-4-ad9 –
KLAIČ 1973 (1911), 390, 434–435, 439, etc.

22 For example, one among numerous similar letters was written by Nikola
Frankopan of Tržac in March 1563, addressing the Ottoman breaches of
truce. Vienna, KA, AFA, 1563-4-ad3.

23 »dieweil die grosse Armeuett vnd hungersnot die Kriegsleuth auff den
Gränizen dahin virmals gedrungen, das sy auch ausziehen, rauben vnd
nemmen haben müssen, wo sy vermant etwas zuebekommen zum tagl des
sy nit verstein wollen, vnd nit auszenehen, was schaden dann erdulge, da
Ir ain 20 oder 30, etwa ain etlich Schaf, ain etlich Ochsen weegfüeren, ain
Turggen drey oder vier erschlagen, etc. die Turggen hergegen gannze dörfer
Ja Ier Mt: aigne heuser vnd Schlösser einnehmen,« English translation by
the author. Vienna, KA, AFA, 1576-13-1, 3v.

24 »Wann alle annd[er]e Einfühl, Blind[er]ung vnd Raubereyen von Eur
M[ajestät] Khriegsvolkh, in Ier Hohait Lannden beschehen, die Personen
vnd viech, So hinwekh gefüert, Seelen vmbgepracht vnd der armen Güt-
tergolden, solen erzelt werd[en], Es wäre Vnmüglich, (...) Seind also
Ier lennge halben aufgelassen (...). Der ware Gott ist weis, vnd waßt alle
ding, (...) das die üblätter auf Eur M[ajestät] thail, nicht gezauert werden,
Sonnd[er] ohn vnd[er]laß mit schäden, üblätten vnd übertrettungen[en],
Freünd, die bestendigkeit des Fridens vnd guetter Ruehe begendor vnd wür-
schend, hab alle meine gedankhen, Syn vnd gemüeth dahin gewennden, auf
vnd anigkait leben könntend, (...) mit allerlai berichten, Information vnd woll
accommodierten Relatien, (...) haben wir das Fewr des Zorns seiner Hohait
ermïrdert vnd erwaiht. Auß der abeinegierten erzüllung, schlissen Eur
M[ajestät] vnsser guette naigund vnd gemüet Zu sein,« English translation
by the author. Vienna, KA, AFA, 1578-8-ad6-bb, 4r–5v. Mehmed Pasha to the
Emperor Rudolf II.

25 ROKSANDIĆ 2000. – BUZOV 2007. See also BRACEWELL 1997, 27–37,
175–232.

26 KLAJIĆ 1973 (1911), 340.

27 KLAJIĆ 1973 (1911), 649.

28 Vienna, KA, AFA, 1555-8-2; 1555-8-ad2.

29 An excellent account can be found in BRACEWELL 2000; see also

30 ROKSANDIĆ 2000. On the »law of the borderland« or the code of hon-
our, see the letters of the Ottoman qagas and begins to the commanders on
the Croatian Border published in STROHAL 1914, 47–49. Numerous documents
are also printed in the edition of sources: DESNICA 1950–51.

31 RATTKAY 2000 (Vienna 1620), 220–221.

32 Ibid, 220.

33 Ibid, 221.


35 The commander was also ordered to keep Ottoman prisoners in captiv-
ity, with or without the ransom money having been paid, and to allow them
to travel only once he had issued an official permit and a passport to them.

36 There were many of these throughout the 16th century. Often they were
welcomed by Christian commanders who attempted to settle them. For the
first decades of the 16th century, see for example: LASZOWSKI 1914, 265, 411, 421 et passim.

37 The term Martolos usually defined a ferocious Ottoman infantryman raiding along the border, usually in small units of men, and often transmitting news. ‘Guides’ or Martoloses in this instance also named people (spies or double agents) who changed sides or knew their ways through the largely impassable forests, swamps and brushwood mazes on the Military Border, selling their knowledge as to how to reach an enemy fortress to whomever paid best. See, for example: LOPAŠIĆ 1887, 50–51, 54.


39 SIŠIĆ 1916, 172; see also KLAJC 1973 (1911), 37. – KLAIĆ 1973 (1911), 125–126.


43 KLAIĆ 1973 (1911), 484–485.

44 THALLÓCZY/HODINKA 1903, 493.


46 Vienna, KA, AFA, 1560-3-ad2 (two letters).

47 MESIĆ 1866, 15.

48 KLAJC 1973 (1911), 12.

49 Mesić corrects this statement, clarifying that the Croats were in fact not left out of the peace agreement – instead, they were omitted by the «Turks» in their peace treaty with Vladislav II in 1511. MESIĆ 1866, 18–19.

50 Ako nas ostavite bez pomoći, jedno će se dogoditi od ovoga dvoja: ili će Hrvati primiti ponude turske i tako se podložiti ili će ostaviti svoju posto-

51 Even early modern chroniclers ignored to elaborate on this issue, even though they portrayed Simon Erdödy in a pejorative way. Baltazar Adam Krčelíc, for example, gave a rather detailed account of Simon Erdödy, concluding that the circumstances of his life and deeds «made a better memory of him impossible». KRČELIĆ 1994 (1770), 246–258, citation 255.

52 KLAIĆ 1973 (1911), 116–117. It is important to note that Vjekoslav Klaić states the diet in Ivanic to have been held on January 25, 1530. Ferdo Šišić, however, does not edit the document from the Ivanic diet in his «Acta Comitialis rei...; instead, he publishes a letter in which supporters of King Ferdinand I claim that they prevented Szapolyai supporters to meet in Krževci on January 25. ŠIŠIĆ 1912, 211–212.

53 MESIĆ 1866, 52–53. – KLAJC 1973 (1911), 140–146.

54 SIŠIĆ 1912, 207–208.


56 KRČELIĆ 1994 (1770), 282. – KLAIĆ 1973 (1911), 387.

57 Mesić cites Nikola’s words according to the 17th-century account by Valvazor, hence these figures should be treated with caution. MESIĆ 1866, 37. – KRUHEK 2002, 65–66.

58 Detailed description of events in: MESIĆ 1866, 61–69. – KRČELIĆ 1994 (1770), 252–253. Krčelíc’s account of these events is based on a 1539 letter from the castellan of Donji Gradac and other contemporaneous sources.

59 In her analysis of Mustafa Selânik’s history, a contemporary Ottoman source, Snježana Buzov cites its author as stating that Zrinski – famous in his strength and power – «united all Hungarian and Croatian magnates under the condition to become king later on. They have declared that the alliance
was formed and the word given that the kingdom should be transferred from the Austrian tribe and pass to the Hungarians and Croats.» Translation by the author. According to Selanik, the Ottoman army actually attacked Sziget (1566) in order to forestall this scheme because it potentially endangered Ottoman interests in the region. BUZOV 1994 citation 132. The historiography also transmits one more insufficiently corroborated episode. A decade earlier, in May 1557, the envoys of King Ferdinand – Antun Vrančić (Hung. Antal Verancsics), Ferenc Zay and Ogier Ghiselin Busbeque – wrote him a letter from Istanbul. They stated that their informant from Edirne had notified them of Zrinski’s secret plan to abandon Ferdinand. Accordingly, he had even sent a letter to Sultan Suleiman, through the Bosnian pasha Ali, offering to accept the sultan’s protection, if the latter promised to leave him all his lands and allowed him to take control of the entirety of Croatian-Slavonian lands. The sultan accepted the terms, and even granted Nikola the choice of one entire snajak in addition. MESIĆ 1866, 168–169.

72 Vienna, KA, AFA, 1577-9-ad2-Litt-a.
74 LOPAŠIĆ 1887, 56.
75 The leaders were the highest dignitaries in the Hungarian Kingdom: The Croatian Banus Nikola Zrinski VII, the Hungarian Palatine Ferenc Wesselényi, the President of the Supreme Court Ferenc Nádasdy, the Archbishop of Esztergom (Germ. Gran, Lat. Strigonia) György Lippay, and the Transylvanian Prince Ferenc Rákóczi I.
76 ŠIŠIĆ 1926, 79–98.
77 From the 1530s, the key objective of the Ottoman Empire was the taking of Vienna which remained impenetrable for the Ottomans. Most of the Ottoman advances passed through Hungarian territory, Croatia-Slavonia considered to be less important. Probably because of this, the Ottoman Empire did not insist on the vassal status of the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom as it had done during the 15th century.
78 Research on these themes is currently being undertaken by Croatian scholars; see, for example: DUKIĆ 2003. – BLAŽEVIĆ 2008. See also basic studies: PETKOV 1997. – MATAR 1999.
79 For an instructive article on the construction of the notion of Europe and the role of Pope Pius II Piccolomini, see MASTNAK 1997.
80 «Turcae, hostes fidei Christianae, immanissimos Turcae, etc. Voices from within the kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia used the following phrases: misericordiae regni, miserim patria nostra, afflictum regnum, desolatum regnum, etc. ŠIŠIĆ 1912, 1916, 1917, passim. See also KLAJC 1973 (1911), 212, 334.
81 DUKIĆ 2003.
82 GLIGO 183, 23–24 and passim. Apart from priest Martinac, notable other exponents of this rhetorical genre in Croatia were Marko Marulić, author of a Prayer against the Turks, Šimun Kožić Benja’s De Corvatio desolatuone, Franjo Trankvil Andreis’s Ad Deum contra Thuras eratior carmine heroiaco and Oration contra Thuras ad Germanos, and Juraj Štigorić’s De Siberiensis agris ostatione. With regard to the wider European context see: MERTENS 1997. – MARTELS 2003. – HELMRATH 2004.

83 «Tagda ze robijahu vse zemlje hrvatske i slovinske (...), vse že dežele kranjske daže do mora robeče i harajuče, i domi božije paleče ognjem i olari gospodnje razdrzujuče, prestarih že izbijajuči oružjem, junoti že, devi i udovi, daže i kvekajučia čeda, plk božji, peljajuče v tuze usilija svezani suci železom, prodajući je na tržiščih svojih, jakežko skoto običaj jest.» English translation by the author. MACAN 1995, 79–80.
84 «weitläufig erklärt was nicht allein dem lüblich Fürstenthum Steier, sonder zugleich auch andern Landen und benachbarten für merkliche Gfar und endlichs verderben gewisslich erfolgen müsste da der berühte Boden zwischen Mur und Drau hilflos gelassen werden und durdurch dem blutgeri-
In the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation the attitude towards the Ottomans depended on the actual threat they posed to the Empire. Therefore the attitudes and actions of the Estates within the Empire towards the Protestants and the Ottomans were to a great extent interdependent. For more details, see Fischer-Galati 1959, 25–26 and passim.

Scribner 1987, 277–300, chapter on »Demons, Defecation and Monsters: Luther’s ‘Depiction of the Papacy’ (1545)«.

> »weil die, so dißer Augspurerisch(en) (Augsburgischen, n.s.) Confession zuegethan, Bishero von Gegenthail denen Iesuitern, vnd anderen ganz schmächlich für Verdambte Khezer ausgeschriren, Ihnen, so die mit Tott abgehen an Etlichen orthen im Landt das Erdtreich nit vergunt, vnd auf Freyer strassen vnbebargen gelassen werden.« UB-Graz, HS, No. 432, 41v, Estate representatives to Archduke Charles in 1578.

Cited from: UB-Graz, HS, No. 432, 107r–107v, Estate representatives to Archduke Charles in 1578. Furthermore, the Estates were continuing with concrete examples: »wie dan noch alhie, vnd zuor zu Ludenburg von Ihrer Fürst: durch: etc Hoff-Prödiger auf der Canzl angehört worden, das Er die Iennigen, welliche dißer Religion, vnd Confession zuegethan, offentlich, vnd mit dißen wortten Beschuldiget hat: gleich wie man sich aus der Römischen Khürchen-Ioch, vnd gehorsamb ausgezogen, also wolte man gern der weltlichen Obrigkeit auch thuen. (...) Item der türgg seyn der Lutterischen glickh, sonst wurde man anderst mit Ihnen vnbgahr; vnd was dergleichen vngebührliche röden mehr seyn, mit wellichen die Iesuiter Ihrer Fürst: Durch: etc ein gewüssen machen, vnd alles dahin andeiten, was Ihr Fürst: Durch: etc. dis orths zum Besten, vnd zu Erhaltung gueter ruehe, vnd annig-kheit mit der gnedigist verthrösten assecuration, vnd das niemant in seinen gewüssen Betrangt solle werden, fürmemben, das sy vnrecht, vnd würd[er] die gebott gottes: (...)« UB-Graz, HS, No. 432, 107v–108r.

See: Rajšp 2011.

Though a majority of the Croatian-Slavonian magnates was actually Protestant, the Croatian-Slavonian diet, consisting of lesser and middle-ranking nobles, formulated several laws against Protestants following the return of Bishop Juraj Drašković from the Council of Trent (where he represented the Hungarian king). This was possible due to the fact that magnates rarely attended meetings of the Croatian-Slavonian diet, considering the Hungarian diet more relevant.

»naj se čuvajo zapeljavanja vraga in sveta, naj slušajo in verujejo božjo besedo in naj molijo neprestano, to jim bo uteha »v težkem križu, ki ga dan na dan nosijo od turaka in papeštva«, in iz tega bodo spoznali, zakaj Bog pošilja to nad kristjane, namreč, da bi nas s tem odvrnil od krivoverstva in da bi ne bili prokleti.« English translation by the author. Ilešič 1908, 277.

Elze 1897, 70–77.