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Table of Contents

Preface ................................................................. 9

Part I: Selected Classic Studies of Meta-power
1. Conceptualizing Power and Meta-power: Causalities, Mechanisms, and Constructions ................................................. 21
   Tom R. Burns (with Peter M. Hall and Patrick W. McGinity)
2. Meta-power and Relational Control in Social Life ................................................................. 83
   Tom Baumgartner, Walter Burkhart, and Tom R. Burns
3. Interactions and the Study of Social Organization ................................................................. 107
   Peter M. Hall
4. Meta-power and the Structuring of International Economic Institutions and Exchange ................................................................. 129
   Tom Baumgartner, Tom R. Burns, and Philippe DeVille
5. Meta-power and the Struggle over International Regimes: The Case of the Third World against Global Liberalism ................................................................. 155
   Stephen D. Kraser

Part II: Meta-power Paradigm Extended
6. The Exercise of Power to Transform Structures: Concepts, Principles, and Illustrations of Meta-powering ................................................................. 177
   Tom R. Burns (in collaboration with Peter M. Hall)
   Peter M. Hall
8. The Cultural Domain: Extensions and Applications of Meta-power and Structural Power ................................................................. 259
   Peter M. Hall (in collaboration with Tom R. Burns and Nora Machado)
   Tom R. Burns (in collaboration with Philippe DeVille and Anne Marie Kallikoski)

Part III: Agential Meta-powering (Micro-Meso-Macro Case Studies)
10. Meta-power, Staging Work, and Constructing a Religious Experience ................................................................. 379
   Kevin McElmurry and Peter M. Hall
11. The Lip Factory Conflict: Meta-power and Game Transformation – Lessons in Conflict Development and Conflict Resolution ................................................................. 405
   Tom Baumgartner, Tom R. Burns, and Philippe DeVille
12. Social Organization across Space and Time: The Policy Process, Mesodomain Analysis, and Breadth of Perspective ................................................................. 421
   Peter M. Hall and Patrick W. McGinity
13. Meta-power and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

Danilo Soladic

Part IV: Meta-power and the Structuring of the International Global Systems


Vladimir Petkovic

15. The Meta-power of Interactions: Security and Commerce in Networked Environments

J. P. Singh

16. Redefining Power in the Global Age: Eight Theses

Ulrich Beck


Tine R. Burre

Epilogue

References

Index

Preface

"All of social life involves some form of influence, molding, direction or compulsion" (Stone, 1983:44). However, Stone (1983:44) adds that reducing all such questions to questions of power "renders it almost impossible to make the fine intellectual, moral and material distinctions necessary for any serious assessment of change in history" or, one might add, change of the everyday patterns of social life.

Power is one of the most important concepts in the social sciences – in part because it relates closely to social control, regulation, and governance and, more generally, causality and causal mechanisms. One does not need to emphasize that power notions are highly interdisciplinary: sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, management scientists, historians and others all make use of them.

Although social power is endemic to all societies, the concept of power in the social sciences remains amorphous and ambiguous. It has various definitions and refers to a wide spectrum of phenomena. One encounters expressions such as the "power of beliefs," "people power," "bargaining power," "power as control," "power as coercion," "the powers of property," "the power of education," "the power of ideas," "the powers of government, of the courts, and of the military," "the Great Powers," and ultimately "the power of the gods," etc.

Power and control phenomena are ubiquitous as well as being multiple and diverse in social relationships, networks, enterprises, government agencies, politics, international arenas and the global society. Many power mechanisms are characteristically difficult to

1 Tom Burns and Peter Hall planned and outlined this preface together, but unfortunately due to Hall's illness in 2011-12, Burns had the task of writing the preface himself. It undoubtedly would have been improved by Hall's involvement.

2 Oppenheim (1984) conceptualized power as the capacity to produce any and all effects – and thus synonymous with causality. See also Baldwin (2002); Barnett and Duvall (2005:42); Berendtsoetter (2007); Ruppe (1975, 1976); Scott (2003), among others. In linking power to causality, Berendtsoetter (2007:14) writes: "Both concepts give meaning to relationships that are logically linked to effect. Most obviously, if power is the ability to make a difference, that is, if it is because of 'power' that things turn out one way rather than another, then identifying 'power' is analytically indistinguishable with identifying a 'cause'."

3 While we were completing this book, Searle's Making the Social World (2010) was published and, in a certain sense, can be considered a treatise on power. It suffers, however, many of the same limitations of Lukes (1974) and others, on whom Searle builds to some extent (see Chapter 1), especially in its neglect of meta-power phenomena (see later).
Chapter 13

Meta-power and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia¹

Dusko Sekulic

The usual critique of functionalism — also known as system theory — is that it is inadequate in describing social change. In this paper, I will try to see if we can successfully apply the concepts, theoretical framework and vocabulary of meta-power (and its foundations in actor-system-dialectics (ASD Theory), to explain an eminently dynamic event of recent history — the dissolution of Yugoslavia.²

In its early stages, the ASD framework was used to analyze the dynamics and basic conflicts underlying institutional and social development in Yugoslavia after WWII (Baumgartner, Burns, Sekulic 1986; Sekulic 1980). The question can be asked if the same conceptual apparatus can be fruitfully employed to capture the dramatic revolutionary transition from communism to post-communism in the context of the dissolution of the communist state and “war of succession”. Other approaches emphasize mass movements or ideological tendencies — mainly the rise of nationalism and nationalist movements — to explain these events. ASD Theory instead postulates that the major struggles of human history evolve around the mobilization and utilization of meta-power in the formation and reformation of major rule systems. Through this lens the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be regarded as a result of the key actors’ struggle over rules and power to set rules. These actors were an “exclusive club” of the party leadership of the republics and the federal center, clustered around the “president for life” — Josip Broz Tito. They oscillated between the repression of and the alliances with some of the spontaneously arising alternative

¹ The former Yugoslavia was established after World World II consisting of 6 Republics (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Montenegro) and XX autonomous regions (Kosovo, Vojvodina). It was dominated by the Communist Party under the leadership of Tito. Its break with the Soviet Union (under Stalin) in 1948 led to efforts to create ideological and institutional arrangements different from the Soviet system and to maintain neutrality in the East-West “Cold War”, while still accepting aid from the West.

² Actor-System dynamics is used in two volumes edited by T. Baumgartner, R. Burns and P. Deville (Burns, Baumgartner, Deville 1985; Baumgartner, Burns, Deville 1986). In the later work (Burns and Flaim 1987) a particular part of the theory is developed as Social Rule Systems Theory. In both cases the theory is oriented toward the synthesis of different “systemic” approaches starting from the main assumption that actors are purposeful, reflecting beings endowed with strategic capabilities and engaged in the decision-making process embedded in institutional and cultural formations. Rule systems theory reflects the strong emphasis on rule processes (making, interpreting, enforcing, and transforming rules and rule systems) as a key component of social dynamics.
power centers – these oscillations were an important part of the Yugoslav political and social dynamics.

Not only the concept of meta-power but the struggle over rule systems belonged to the early innovations of ASD. Conventional sociology is insensitive to the complexity of power as a phenomenon. Power is usually defined in the Weberian tradition as the ability to control or influence the behavior of others, even against their will. But such an approach does not take into account the broader social and cultural matrix within which power is played out. The concept of meta-power conceives of it as a two-level concept, emphasizing the power to restructure the “rules of the game” within which power relationships take place – it is a meta-level resource used to exercise control over others. “We refer to the exercise of such “meta-power” as relational control, that is control over social relationships and social structure...” Relational control is used by social groups to promote or stabilize their advantages or dominance over others and/or to ensure the effective functioning of a social system (Baumgartner, Buckley and Burns 1985:161).

The Yugoslav system was characterized by the struggle in terms of rules of the game, but also by the power struggle over the rules waged among the actors at the center who monopolized the “final say” in any restructuring of the rules of the game. Only with the dissolution of the center, which basically coincided with Tito’s death in 1980, did the power struggle become more overt. The rules were changed and the leaders were removed. The role of the center was taken over by the republics. The dissolution of the center and the failure of the republics to maintain their independence and power has led to the rise of a new power structure. The new international order significantly changed the choices of the actors involved.

My main aim in this chapter is to analyze the struggle over formal and informal rules of the key actors in the former Yugoslavia. Every social system is “nested” in the sense that meta-power holders on one level are under the influence of meta-power holders on the higher level. My main concern here will be the interaction of the “center” and the republican elites. The center had the meta-power to create the framework of action for the republican elites. The republican elites in turn possessed meta-power in relation to alternative elites and societal forces within their own republics. The meta-power center itself was nested within the international system. Although this global system was to a large extent “amorphous,” the international power relationships were taken into account in decisions and actions of the key Yugoslav players. The developments in the former Yugoslavia could not be fully understood without taking into account this international context. The 1948 Yugoslav break with the USSR set the stage for its international policy prerogative “balancing” between the two blocks. When, however, the bipolar international system structure disappeared, this prerogative lost relevance – the choice among and negotiations between internal rules expanded, leading to the disintegration of communism, and facilitating the choice of exit for the republics.

In describing these developments, I will try to prove the “explanatory” superiority of the meta-power and relational control approach to describing and analyzing these developments. Although my intention is not to discuss the myriad of approaches to explaining the dissolution of Yugoslavia, I will include some obvious theoretical alternatives and supplements to this conceptualization, in particular those which stress the role of nationalist mobilization, cultural differences, elite mobilization, and economic crisis in their accounts of the dissolution process.

Internal system – the socialist period

The period in which the Communist Party (CP) consolidated its rule in Yugoslavia (1945 into the 1950s) bestowed great power on the center. Later on power devolved from the center to the republics, while meta-power remained solidly in the central hands until the death of the “living embodiment of the central power”, president Tito in 1980. From that period on, even the meta-power of the center rapidly dissolves.

Frequent constitutional changes as well as the introduction of a completely new institutional system of self-management as the result of the conflict in the international arena (1948, Tito-Stalin conflict) are indicative of the meta-power held by the political center. By structuring the “rules of the game” in the form of the constitution and the unique principles of self-management the center was trying to achieve its goals and ideological visions, while creating a balance of power between the constitutive units of the system – the republics. The center always kept this meta-power functioning as a key structuring element of the system. Coalitions between the republics were of course “allowed” but with the center having the final word in solving any stalemate situations and conflicts. The key concern of the center was preventing coalition building that could undermine its power.

In understanding the meta-power of the center, we must also emphasize that the rules it was creating were not only written norms like constitutions or laws, but also informal rules limiting the maneuvering space of the units. One of these unwritten rules was that the leadership in the republics could not make alliances with emerging

4 The dynamics of the conflict is described and interpretation of its meaning for the actors and its historical causes is given in Selonic (1990).
power centers within their own societies. The “legitimate” players were limited to the central leadership and the official party leaderships of the six republics. The party leaderships in republics which gained in autonomy, especially in the mid-1960s, had an incentive to mobilize societal support within their own republics usually as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other republican leaderships. Alternative power groups, different associations of intellectuals, were from time to time regarded as “partners” within each republic. The center usually criticized and tried to limit this “power sharing”. In 1971 the center justified the major changes it imposed on the republics by pinpointing that the leadership in the republics had lost “political control” by allowing the growth of the independent political power centers. In the “Croatian spring” of 1971, the political leadership of Croatia tolerated or even stimulated the expressions of independent societal actors in Croatia which it used as leverage in its negotiations with other republics. The result was the creation of the more or less independent new power centers around the cultural association “Matica Hrvatska”, the independent newspapers “Hrvatski tjednik” and the independent student movement (Bilandzic 1999:515-628). In the wake of the 1971 crisis the Croatian as well as other reformist leaderships in Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia were removed and a new constitution passed in 1974. This constitution substantially reflected all the demands and proposals of the replaced Croatian leadership (Sekulic 1992). It was not the content of the proposals that mattered, but the independence and the alliances of the Croatian leadership that transgressed the informal rules imposed by the center.

From 1974 on, the Yugoslav system—both the state and the CP—evolved gradually into a confederate system in which every constituent unit was equipped with veto-power. It went through three major phases. The first phase was the stepwise increase of the autonomy of the republics. This increased autonomy was, until Tito’s death, balanced by the power of the center. In the second phase, after Tito’s death, the meta-power at the center dissolved and the change of the meta-rules could be achieved only with the consent of the republics as stipulated by the 1974 constitution. The problem was that the rule regime did not contain a decision-making principle helping to make or implement decisions, when the positions of the key actors were polarized. For this reason consensus could not be reached and thus the Yugoslav politics was blocked exactly at the time when restructuring was needed in order to respond to the dramatic shifts in world politics and economy. Although the system produced blueprints for change, these were contradictory and did not help counteract the stalemate. Milosevic’s rise to power in Serbia indicated the third stage in which force (initially by Serbia) followed by other republics was used in order to bypass the stalemate and change the rules of the game.

Internal system—toward dissolution

All actors, meaning leaderships in the republics, agreed that the “rules of the game” must be changed. The problem was that there was no agreement about the direction of change. The split existed between the proponents of further devolution, who envisioned strengthening the confederate elements of the existing system, and their opponents, who argued for centralizing rule making, moving towards “modern federation”. The third stage, the final violent disintegration, started in 1987 with the ascent of the Slobodan Milosevic to power. Milosevic rejected the strategy of his predecessor, Ivan Stambolic, who tried to negotiate with other republics within the existing constitutional rules. His role is important because with him came the idea that if the state were to be broken by negotiation, then use of force would be necessary (and justifiable). This was a recognition that within the existing rule system the positions of players were so divergent that common ground could not be found. In order to find it, the existing rules had to be broken and if others resisted, then force should be used to impose a new regime, that is, the coercive form of meta-power.

In the second and the third phases, in the changed situation of the weakening of the center with its meta-powers, the elites in the republics encouraged the mobilization of existing alternative power centers within their republics to strengthen their own power base—the role of permissive institutions. In Serbia “small power imperialism” (Seaton-Watson 1945) was used by Milosevic to mobilization—the permanent crisis in Kosovo, reopened in 1989, parallel to Tito’s death, helped evoke it. These mobilizations and counter-mobilizations were mostly concerned with the Serbia—Slovenia relationship and it could be argued that the disintegration of Yugoslavia started with the drifting apart of these two elites. Historical and structural constraints prevented the initial mobilization in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The result was that in Slovenia and—to a greater extent—Serbia the communist elites survived the first free elections because they mobilized and controlled their alternative power centers. In contrast, in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the elites were swept away because they were less in control of the mobilization of the alternative power centers.

There are two general interpretative schemes explaining the mobilization of the “Yugoslav” republican societies in this phase. One sees it as a result of mobilizing efforts of the republican elites—its extreme version being the elites’ manipulation thesis. A contrasting explanation stresses that societal movements were already in

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5 Dugorocni program ekonomske stabilizacije (Long term stabilization program) (1982).

6 Jovic calls this major division of the Yugoslav political spectrum the conflict between “constitutıonal defenders” (ustavobranitelji) and “constitutıonal reformers” (ustavoreformatori).

7 As formulated by W. Zimmerman (1999:vi), ‘Yugoslavia “…was destroyed from the top down”’.

442
place, but used the chances of expansion opened up by the democratization process. In my view without the willingness of the elites to encourage mobilization, there would be no expansion of the role of social movements and alternative elites. However, once the political leadership opened up space for the movements and alternative elites to maneuver in, its own capability to control them gradually declined. In the case of Milosevic and the Serbian nationalism this type of dialectical relationship between the leadership and the movement is well documented (Dzidarevic 1999; LeBoeuf 2002; Selig 2002). A similar case can be made for Slovenia. The space for the alternative’s action was open by the decisions of the Slovenian elite, but the alternative elites used this mobilizing space for actions that went against the political goals of the elite at the federal power center which made its negotiations with other republics even more difficult. (A similar situation in 1971 in Croatia brought down the political elite. Namely the independent actions of the student movement created tension between the Croatian leadership and the central state leadership which was resolved by Tito – the undisputed arbiter – by removing the leadership under the threat of using military power. The threat of the USSR intervention was used as an excuse for Tito’s forceful intervention in 1971.) In contrast to a similar situation in Croatia in 1971, the weakening of communism and the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet intervention changed the meta-power situation which created a new action framework for the elites in republics. Unrestricted, the Slovenian elite could formulate its pro-European program and create a political space for the opposition movements and alternative elites in Slovenia.

This amounts to saying that the dismantling of Yugoslavia did not start first with an open war in Slovenia in August 1990 as most accounts claim. Instead Milosevic’s violent dismantling of the confederate principles on which the Yugoslav system was based started the actual process of disintegration. This process initiated by Milosevic went through two stages. In the first stage he used the existing constitutional framework combined with populist-nationalist mobilization in order to change the rules in such a way as to increase his control over the whole of Yugoslavia. In his words this was an “anti-bureaucratic revolution”. It started in the summer of 1988 with mass demonstrations and the resulting forceful replacement of the leadership in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo. After “conquering” these autonomous provinces, their constitutional position was changed using un-constitutional ways. The “rules of the game” were thus changed: the number of independent actors reduced, the constitutional position of units was changed, and the pressure on other republics was increased to accept compromises. This change slides into the second phase where bare force was used. After unsuccessfully trying the same methods applied in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro on the rest of Yugoslavia, the open war started with the deployment of the Army in the “10-day war” in Slovenia, which ended with retreat of the Army and Slovenia’s successful secession from the Yugoslav confederation.

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**Selected Alternative Explanations**

**Nationalism and ancient hatred**

A typical alternative explanation proposes that Yugoslavia fell apart because of the strength of nationalist ideology and/or because of the “ancient hatred”. This explanation is prevalent, it also constitutes the public image of the countries composing the former Yugoslavia. Although these are two logically distinct explanations we will treat them here as one.

It is an undeniable fact that nationalism as a ideology played an important role in the process of dissolution providing a justification for the actions of the main participants and serving to mobilize broad strata of society. This explanation, however, fails to address the question of timing: why was nationalism “waiting” to “explode” and tear apart Yugoslavia when it did. A usual answer is that first when the suppression by the Communist Party weakened, the nationalist forces could overwhelm society. Although it is true that nationalism as an ideology was always present in certain segments of society in which hatred for other groups was kept alive, this hatred was not virulent. It caused neither instances of communal violence as between Hindus and Muslims in India nor attacks on Chinese merchants as in many Asian countries. If ethnic hatred is intense then even authoritarian regimes cannot prevent outbreaks of violence. In Yugoslavia such outbreaks of ethnic violence did not occur. The “nationalist excesses” were limited to manifestations of ethnic pride like singing “nationalist” songs or displaying nationalist symbols. In reality, ethnic tensions always emerged as a consequence of mobilization starting from the top. In 1970-1971 ethnic tension in Croatia was the result of the mobilization of “the nation” in support of the political leadership who was negotiating the restructuring of Yugoslavia with the center and the leadership of other republics. The same happened in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Nationalism was mobilized in the process of negotiation. It was not an autonomous mass mobilization that swept away the existing political power structures.9

**Why was there no mobilization transcending borders of the republics?**

The few attempts to create Pan-Yugoslav organizations like for example the last Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic’s efforts to create a political party that would be all-Yugoslav failed miserably. This was a result of the path-dependent de-

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9 The processes of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia could be compared with that of religious conflicts in Java (Geertz 1957). The traditional rule was the accommodation of the Muslims and the practitioners of the traditional Islamic beliefs and practices. Thus, traditional accommodation rules were broken and transformed into conflict rules by the development of politics on the “higher level”. This higher level was the result of the movement of the purification of Islam and development of the Permai, a specific synthesis of Marxism and indigenous beliefs. In the same way, rules of accommodation among the Yugoslav ethno-national groups changed as the result of the conflicts on the higher levels. One excellent description of how the perception of the members of the other is redefined – depending on the historical context is given by Zapara (1993:38-40).
development (based on the way in which the Yugoslav state was formed following World War II and afterwards) – of the structuring of the power system that simply did not allow for the creation of the all-Yugoslav organizations or movements.

The anchoring of the political power in the hands of the republics’ leaderships and the creation of the federal bodies that were only derived from the organizations of the republics meant that the federal bodies did not have any autonomous power. They became just the negotiating arenas for the republican leaderships. Even student movements, intellectual elites, or other political expressions of economic and social grievances, because of that structuring of the political space, were mostly oriented toward the leadership of the republics and confined to the republics. The space for political action was totally fragmented along the political lines of republics. This was the result of the constitutional changes in 1974 in line with the wish of the central power holders keen to constitute a fragmented system. Line and Stepan (1992) in their comparison of Spain with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union claim that the preservation of Spain as a unified state was the result of the fact that a federal election was held before the regional. In Yugoslavia (as in the USSR), regional elections in republics preempts the federal elections. Although the argument that federal elections held before the elections in republics prevent disintegration has some merit, it does not go far enough. The evolution of the rules in Yugoslavia were for a long time moving in a direction that did not allow the federal elections to be held before those of the republics. Everything was functioning in the bottom-up fashion – from the republics to the federal center. This process of the reversal of rules from the center to the republics started gradually already in the 1960’s. The symbolic turning point was when the republican party congresses started to be held before the federal party congress (1968-69). At the same time the principle of parity was introduced in all bodies of the federal communist party. This was then extended to all institutions of the federal government (Blondzic 1985:330-331) That evolved into the system in which the decisions made at the levels of republics based on the bargaining between the republics’ elites was rubber-stamped at the federal level. In short, the choice of the level at which the election would be held was not free (open). The rules established earlier precluded the federal elections to be held before the elections in the republics were concluded.

Labor strikes in Yugoslavia also show that decision-making rules structured social mobilization. Although the strikes and work stoppages were frequent they were always confined to the factory or company. The rules of the self-management market economy created the situation in which the position of the worker differed greatly from one factory to another. This prevented the emergence of class solidarity. The lack of independent trade unions only reinforced this tendency. Strikes happened frequently, even in their absence. The point is that the institutional frame and the rules oriented workers’ actions against management in their enterprises or against the local political power centers because these determined their situation – wages and social conditions in general. Consequently no movements transgressing the local, and especially republican boundaries, were created.

One way of transcending the existing power rules was to mobilize nationalities disregarding these rules and ignoring the existence of the republican borders. Milosevic used this strategy in the last phases of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and in the discussions about “designated” actors of the political game. By reinterpretting constitutionally designed actors as nationalities rather than republics, Milosevic used the distribution of Serbs in all republics of the former Yugoslavia (except Slovenia) as a tool in his restructuring of the rules of the game.

Elite manipulation
Another alternative theory proposes that both the disintegration and the nationalist mobilization were the result of elite manipulation. This argument was strongly advocated by Warren Zimmerman, the last US ambassador in the former Yugoslavia. As in the case of “nationalism,” this explanation contains also a kernel of truth. Political elites, the leadership of the republics, who were involved in the negotiation about the rules for transition and the stalemate that was produced, were the main actors in the initial stage of the dissolution. If the struggle over rules can be called “elite manipulation”, then there is no difference between the approach proposed here and “elite manipulation” theory. But “elite manipulation” theory has usually a strong moral overtones. The main argument is that the elites mobilized nationalism in order to achieve their political goals. This moral overtones “apportion blame” between the elite and the masses, where the masses are blameless, while the elites appear as cunning manipulators. The meta-power approach (and ASD theory more generally) is interested more in explanation than in blame attribution. But even from the moral perspective, we can argue that nationalism or any other ideology is a latent resource that remains preserved, carried over from generation to generation. The historical experience just as the rules of the game influence the forms of its expression. The actors are creating the context in which the mobilization of latent resources – in this case, nationalism – became possible.

International System
The changing framework of the international system influenced the decision making process of actors within Yugoslavia – its very existence as well as its disintegration. In the first phase, we can say that the main goals of the Yugoslav leaders were a) to create a societal model following the Soviet blueprint and b) to become a “good” member of the “socialist community”. Many authors looking back at the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict were trying to find the seeds of the conflict in some ideological differences between the Yugoslav (Tito) and Soviet (Stalin) leaderships. This was especially easy to do taking into account the Yugoslav ideological innovation in the form of the self-management. But that is incorrect, mixing cause and effect. The self-management innovation came as the consequence and was not the cause of the con-
conflict. The cause was in the independence of the Yugoslav leadership based on its role in the organization of the “war of liberation” and the revolutionary processes in the country. Comparatively speaking Tito showed more inclination toward independent action in contrast to other communist leaders outside the Soviet Union. The independence and the actions of Yugoslavia in defending its national interests in the international arena become an acute annoyance for Stalin in the period of tightening control over “Eastern Europe” as a part of the unfolding Cold War. Tito’s hasty actions regarding Trieste and his leadership role in the Balkan integration processes were the main factors contributing to the conflict. The conflict, as an unintended consequence, produced self-management as a differentiating innovation only after the first phase was over during which the Yugoslav communists tried to prove themselves to be “ideologically correct”. In that first period the communists undertook, for example, the land collectivization with catastrophic economic consequences and undermined much of their political support in the process. To sum up the power relationships between Yugoslavia and the USSR not only influenced the position of Yugoslavia in the international arena but also crucially determined the key internal decisions like de-collectivization of agriculture and the introduction of self-management.

After the conflict with Stalin, the survival of Yugoslavia during the Cold War period was possible because of the balance of power between the two blocks. The fear of Western reaction probably saved Yugoslavia from the Soviet intervention in 1948. This balancing on the international scene had also important consequences for the internal political dynamics. One of the important divisions was between those who were more fearful of the Soviet intervention and those who were willing to accept even a Soviet intervention in order to keep the “revolution alive” (however they defined the key characteristics of the “revolution”). The expression of this dilemma and division is for example clearly visible in Kardelj’s talk with the Croatian leaders in 1971. As remembered by Savka Dapcevic-Kucar, at that time the president of Croatian league of Communist, Kardelj said to her “I would rather see the Russian tanks...than you, with your “dubekanism” threatening the achievements of the revolution.” (Dapcevic-Kucar 1997:551) The international position of Yugoslavia and the potential Soviet threat was an important frame in leaders minds (for example, in the 1971 conflict). The disappearance of this threat intensified the internal strife. This intensification was the result of the increased freedom of action for the leaderships in the republics. Previously the abandonment of socialism was unimaginable because it would provoke probable intervention (as in other cases ranging from Berlin 1953 through Budapest in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968). The same would happen if the political disintegration of Yugoslavia started to unfold even under the leadership of the communist forces. Towards the end of the 1980s all that had disappeared and options for the key actors expanded including “exit” from Yugoslavia. As European integration became an attractive alternative even for some communist leaders – mainly in Slovenia – while for others preservation of some socialist-communist forms was regarded as a guarantee against being submerged by the European capitalism, the positions became too disparate to handle.

The “war” between the republics started at the time when in all republics the Communist parties were in power. The last party congress (January 1990) ended with Slovenian and Croatian party leaving it, never to be completed. It showed forcefully that the Communist leaderships of the formally united Yugoslav party could no longer make any joint decisions. The first free elections brought anti-communists to power in Croatia and Slovenia (although Milan Kucan, “reformed communist” stayed as the president). At the same time, Milosevic and his puppets kept power in the rest of Yugoslavia regardless of multipartite elections. The adherents of the same communist ideology could not reach agreement when they ruled Yugoslavia – the agreement between the anticommunist and communist republics – essentially between Slovenia and Croatia on one side and Serbia on the other – was thus even less likely and so Yugoslavia slid into disintegration. The question was only if this disintegration would proceed violently or not.

Conclusion
The disintegration of Yugoslavia is usually explained as a consequence of nationalist ideology and nationalist mobilization. The position taken in this text is that such interpretations are not wrong but they do not tell the whole story. In the same way as the general accounts about the demise of socialist systems are unsatisfactory when they “explain” it by its lesser economic efficiency. The lesser efficiency was always present and that does not explain why socialism collapsed at the time that it did. In the same way nationalism was always present as an ideological force in the Yugoslav context, but that does not explain its explosion at the time of the disintegration of the country. In the case of the disintegration of the socialist system, a more adequate level of explanation is of the cold war competition, strategies of the actors in that competition and their mutual decisions. That created the framework in which internal forces of socialist societies started to play the role that led finally to the collapse of the system. In the case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia the more satisfactory explanation can be achieved by understanding the power games of the key actors that created the context in which nationalism exploded. In order to achieve this I have tried to show that the basic framework of meta-power and relational control (based on ASD) is the most adequate framework. Actors with societal power were negotiating and creating and recreating the rules of the game.

10 In 1948 Stalin complained that the USSR could not risk a war with the West over Trieste. Tito’s actions led very close to a confrontation (Bihel 1999:211).
11 More detailed elaboration of the causal forces leading to the conflict see in Schulte (1998:45-49).
12 This refers to Alexander Dubcek (1921-1992) who led the “Spring Prague” (1968) which was a movement to give Socialism a human face. The initiative was crushed by the troops of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies in August, 1968, and a more conventional communist regime was established.
In a non-democratic society like the socialist Yugoslavia, it is relatively easy to diagnose who were the actors with power to shape the system. The first phase of development was characterized by the concentration of meta-power in the hands of the political center around Tito. This center was capable of changing the rules of the game and to introduce dramatic institutional changes from centrally planned economy, collectivization of agriculture, abandonment of the multi-party system to introduction of the self-management system, de-collectivization of agriculture, and substantial delegations of powers, among other reforms. The power center remained critical however, for resolving the conflicts among the communist leaders of republics in a somewhat polyarchy system. Over time, the center established a system that granted substantial autonomy to the republics, a system that was consolidated with the 1974 constitution based on confederal principles including the veto power of every republic and autonomous province. This structure functioned efficiently through having a center capable of stepping into the decision process whenever a stalemate occurred. With the death of Tito, the power of the center disintegrated and the system entered the period of the permanent stalemate exactly at the time when the restructuring was needed in order to respond to dramatic shifts in the world political economy. The stalemate was resolved by the decision of one of the actors (Milošević) to use non-institutional means including use of force in order to achieve the systemic changes. In that process nationalist mobilization became an important instrument of change. Namely, with the veto power of every unit of the Yugoslav federation two avenues for change were opened. The first would be coalition building among republics and provinces. This path also led to stalemate because the eight constitutional units became divided with Milošević exercising control over one half (Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro) with the rest resisting his control and trying to change the rules in the direction of stripping the veto power of other units. In such a situation the only alternative avenue for action left was non-institutional action. The available “resource” for this mobilization was nationalism. Milošević used nationalist mobilization of Serbs in order to gain control of “his” half of Yugoslavia and was trying to use the same strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This mobilization resulted in countermobilization of nationalism in other republics. Consequently nationalism should be regarded as a resource used in the meta-power struggle of the communist and newly emerging elite’s and not the autonomous force shaping the outcome of the Yugoslav situation.

Chapter 14

Behind the Scenes.
The Security Council, the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, and Meta-Power

Hannes Peltonen

Introduction

Despite the extensive discussions regarding humanitarian intervention—particularly during the 1990s—little attention was given to the kind of right the right of humanitarian intervention was supposed to be. The debates focused often on whether a right of humanitarian intervention existed, if so who had the right, and when could it be legally or legitimately used. From such discussions one had the impression that a right was a right, and all that remained was to determine who had it and when it could be used. This, however, is a simplification of how rights function and what kinds of right exist. Here, I do not refer only to the distinction between something being right and having a right to something, but I draw from Hohfeld’s (1919/2010) typology of rights to distinguish between rights as claims, privileges, powers, and immunities. Later, I will also differentiate between rights as privileges and rights as liberties—something which Hohfeld forgoes—to show how a small but crucial question remained unasked in the earlier debates: What kind of a right is the right of humanitarian intervention?

My purpose is not to resuscitate these debates, and therefore I forgo a discussion of various positions taken with regard to humanitarian intervention. Rather, my goal is to clarify the operation of meta-powers as pertains to the Security Council and the right of humanitarian intervention. As my discussion will show, because the Council’s right has a characteristic of a right as power, questions of meta-powers arise. Here, I distinguish between meta-powers on the one hand as the ability to give powers to others and on the other hand as the ability to determine how a given right is to be used and what are its limits. This distinction becomes central to understanding better the functioning of the right of humanitarian intervention that in turn demonstrates how a particular meta-power operates in practice. In this case, the associated meta-

1 Some of the ideas expressed here can be found also in Peltonen (2008).
2 Naturally there were also other focal points, but these formed some of the fundamental questions.