'The Dangerous Landscape' provides fresh insight into the fabric of 21st-century terrorism. Islamist extremism, terrorist recruitment and the role of religious converts and violence are among the many important topics explored in detail. This volume also uncovers the troubling phenomenon of terrorist innovation, and addresses the creation of counter-terrorism strategy. 'The Dangerous Landscape' is written by authors from the international community, and is an excellent textbook for the study of contemporary global terrorism.
THE DANGEROUS LANDSCAPE
International Perspectives on Twenty-First Century Terrorism; Transnational Challenge, International Responses

Edited by
John J. Le Beau
Chairman Emeritus, CTWG
The Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG)
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on Twenty-First Century Terrorism;
Transnational Challenge,
International Responses

Analysis and commentary from the Partnership for Peace
Consortium’s Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG)

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FOREWORD

A long and ever expanding list of the dead and wounded from Pakistan to Yemen to Libya and Germany suggests that we all live on a dangerous landscape, and occupy an international terrain subject to violent threat. It is an obscure landscape without borders, as the threat is transnational. The armed and dangerous force that counts so many as its enemies, and seeks to include them among its victims, is international terrorism, a long-existing force that explosively made its presence felt internationally in the final decades of the twentieth century and which remains both elusive and active in the twenty-first. Terrorists have extracted their wages in blood from Mumbai, India, to Bali, Indonesia, to Madrid, Spain, to Beslan, Russia and onward to London and New York. Transnational terrorists have taken victims individually (as in the case of movie producer Theo van Gogh in Holland), by the dozens, by the hundreds, and, in the attacks of 9/11, by the thousands, a butcher’s bill that the terrorists, by their own admission, hope to repeat. Indisputably, most of the victims have been civilians. And predictably, the death of iconic terror leader Osama bin Laden—in Pakistan in 2011—has not lead to the vanquishing of global terrorism as a security threat.

Much has been written since 2001 on various aspects of terrorism as well as on the responses of governments around the world to the security challenge posed by terrorist groups with an international reach and a supra-national agenda. Al Qaeda and its brand-name franchises (such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) undoubtedly represents the most relentlessly publicized and visible example of contemporary international terrorism, but terrorist activity is carried out by other organizations as well, many (but not all) of which share a largely common political agenda or ideology based on a violent interpretation of Islam. Although the profile of terrorism in the public eye understandably advances and recedes according to the frequency and scale of terrorist attacks, the phenomenon of transnational terrorism displays no signs of disappearing in the foreseeable future and, accordingly, merits continued attention, research, analysis and commen-

1 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
This book is intended to add a special perspective to the considerable body of literature available. It is a work presenting studies and viewpoints by authors from several different countries, and the contributors represent a mix of experienced counterterrorism practitioners on the one hand, and recognized academic scholars on the other.

This volume developed as a direct result of several meetings of the Partnership for Peace Consortium's Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) during 2007, 2008 and 2009. The CTWG brings together counterterrorist thinkers from politically, geographically and culturally diverse countries including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Germany, Pakistan, Croatia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Moldova, Greece, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, among others. As well, the CTWG has hosted and worked together closely with representatives of other international organizations, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) figuring prominently in these ranks. Over the past few years, CTWG participants and guests have included representatives or alumni of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Department of State, the Albanian Federal Intelligence Service (SHISH), the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BLFV), the Azerbaijan Defense Ministry and the U.S. Naval War College, among other institutions. In short, the body of experience and knowledge represented is impressive by any measure. The present volume attempts to capture some of their thoughts, projections on how terrorism will likely mutate in the future and some proposed countermeasures in the long-term struggle against terrorism. The various authors from this broad variety of backgrounds will not always agree in their assessments of the threat represented by terrorism, or in identifying appropriate tools to mitigate the challenge. But precisely this multiplicity of perspectives should provide the discerning reader with valuable grist for reflection.

This book examines a number of important aspects of the terrorism contest, separate but linked. First, we examine the vital issue of jihadist terrorist motivation and recruitment – how an organization such as al Qaeda attracts, radicalizes and screens new members to replace losses in its ranks with an eye to extending its operational and geographic reach. Second, we explore how various countries have employed their respective intelligence (and to some degree, law enforcement) agencies to uncover terrorist groups and adherents, and how government authorities attempt to disrupt and prevent terrorist activity—including the emerging new challenge of cyber threats—before it takes place. Accordingly, this volume is looking at two sides of the coin: how terrorists organize to
promote their cause and fulfill their operational mission, and how vari-
ous states organize to prevent these plans and activities from bearing
deadly fruit.

As noted above, the voices heard in this volume are internation ally
polyphonous, and represent a broad variety of perspectives. This is en-
tirely appropriate when dealing with a threat that is transnational in na-
ture, affects numerous geographical regions, and recognizes no man-
made frontiers. The jihadist terrorism of the 21st century (which is our
primary area of inquiry) is factually a global phenomenon, as a cursory
look at the location of successful attacks reveals: Spain, Great Britain,
Tunisia, the United States, Indonesia, Turkey, India, Algeria, Pakistan,
Thailand, Egypt and Morocco have all suffered significant casualties from
terrorist attacks. It is a sad fact that terrorism is not easily defeated and
that the list of attacked locations cited above will, doubtless, continue to
grow in the future. At the same time, it is to be hoped that the instances
of terrorist attacks disrupted and frustrated by counterterrorism forces
will grow as well, perhaps even exponentially.

It is hoped that this volume can serve as a textbook aid and point of
departure for defense academies and institutions interested in including
a consideration of terrorism as a contemporary security challenge in
their academic programs. With that backdrop, the PfPC Combating Ter-
rorism Working Group is pleased to offer the present volume to the in-
terested reader.

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Chapter 1

New Blood: The Recruitment of Terrorists

John J. Le Beau

Any viable organization, regardless of its goals, requires recruits as a fundamental prerequisite of survival. To remain competitive, commercial entities like General Electric, Siemens, Apple or Toyota need to attract new personnel to make good routine losses from retirement, career change, etc. Locating, attracting and bringing on board the appropriate recruits provide, in a real sense, life blood for these organizations. The same fact of organizational life holds true for al Qaeda (following the demise of Osama bin Laden), Jamiyah Islamiyah, Hamas, the Taliban and other terrorist groups. Indeed, in the case of terrorist organizations, which by their nature are engaged in a high-risk and deadly earnest pursuit, recruitment is especially essential because the membership suffers real losses in votaries who are killed, wounded or captured by government security services. The violent deaths of bin Laden, Imam al-Awlaki and other high-profile jihadists underline this point. Without continual recruitment to replenish the ranks, a terrorist organization degrades, atrophies, and eventually dies.

No organization with either set or vague goals, no matter what its mission, can long survive without replenishing losses of personnel and experience and identifying and attracting new members to matriculate over time into positions of increasing responsibility. No organization that seeks to expand its appeal and power—be it a political party or a business enterprise—can hope to do so without increasing and refreshing its ranks. Today and historically, most organizations have employed both some form of advertisement and some type of active recruitment to ensure a sufficient pool of people appropriate to the goals of the organization—whether that be increasing the amount of sales, extending the electoral base of a political association in a democratic state or expanding the appeal of a religious system. To the extent that terrorist groups resemble other, more benign organizations with discernable goals, they will also have to advertise aims and values while recruiting the right people to staff the ranks and replace inevitable losses. In short, a terrorist group planning to engage in acts of physical terror and destruction needs people. A terrorist group with global aspirations or universalist conceits will want to attract and retain a cadre of devotees internationally. This calculus applies, undoubtedly, to Al-

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Qaeda and many similar-minded Islamist-Jihadist groups with an ideological agenda bases on expansion.

There has been considerable debate in informed counter-terrorist circles regarding the current, 21st century architecture of Islamist terror. Are we faced in a post-9/11 world with loose networks, hierarchical structure, dispersed autonomous cells, informal small groups of actors, or some variation of the above?

The killing of Osama bin Laden marks the culmination of a counterterrorism campaign that made decapitating the al-Qaeda network its paramount goal. But al-Qaeda has metastasized in the decade since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, expanding its reach and adapting its tactics in ways that make the organization likely to remain the most significant security threat to the United States despite its leader’s demise.²

Similarly, the New York City Police Department found, in its report Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, which, in the cases it analyzed, command and control from a centralized, hierarchical Al Qaeda was “the exception rather than the rule.” Indeed, some jihadist terrorists such as radicalized U.S. Army Major Malik Husan, the Fort Hood mass killer, would appear to be lone actors, deriving inspiration, but not actual instruction, from al Qaeda. Whether centralized, decentralized, quasi-autonomous or almost absent links, the fortunes of a terrorist structure will in all cases depend on its ability to make good its losses and to attract and maintain sufficient competent personnel to engage in action.

How, then, are new members attracted to and incorporated into a terrorist cause or organization (recognizing that there is a difference between the two)? This is hardly a trivial question, in view of the critical role of recruits or adherents to the viability of a terrorist organization. There is a considerable body of literature and research (if of uneven quality) on the topic of Moslem radicalization; the process whereby someone who professes the faith of Islam (including many Moslem converts) moves from a mainstream profession of faith to a more virulent, conflictual, activist brand of belief. This issue is as important as it is complex. At the same time, radicalization alone does not represent the end of the extremist journey. Can we identify the factors that impel an Islamic radical to cross the threshold separating extremist belief from active terrorist? Some individuals, apparently, make that journey without significant external contact. Arid Uka, a twenty-one year old ethnic Albanian from Kosovo who killed two U.S. servicemen in Frankfurt Airport and severely wounded two others in 2011, would seem to fall into this category.³ Yet other terrorist candi-

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dates are identified, propagandized and recruited in a recognizable sense by terrorist organizations. It should be noted here that the cycle of human manipulation and methods of recruitment are well understood in the world of intelligence operations and it may be helpful to apply a template of intelligence recruitment methods and conventional wisdoms to the terrorist universe, a consideration to which we now turn our attention.

**Recruitment Models: Similarities between Espionage and Terrorist Recruitment**

In the prevailing vocabulary of the arcane world of intelligence operations, foreign agents—“spies” in the vernacular—are “recruited” to do the bidding of their espionage handlers, the designated representatives of an intelligence agency such as the KGB, CIA or MI6. That is, pliable or vulnerable individuals are identified and assessed by trained professional intelligence operations officers and persuaded (or sometimes, though much more infrequently, coerced) into servicing the requirements of an intelligence agency. In general terms, this sort of recruitment is traditionally accomplished through offering a subject an inducement for his activity. This inducement might be money, valuable gifts, or something less tangible such as a sense of importance, the thrill of a dangerous lifestyle or other appealing lures, physical or psychological. In other instances, would-be spies sometimes volunteer their services to an intelligence organization, often for obscure personal reasons of their own (to include revenge against a hated superior, to use a not uncommon example). In espionage parlance these volunteers are generally called “walk-ins.” Is there a body of evidence to suggest that these characteristics common to espionage recruitment also apply to the “recruitment” of Islamist terrorists, for example Al Qaeda votaries? Are Al Qaeda (and other violent jihadist group) ranks replenished through structured recruitment efforts? Or do new jihadists that join the cause follow more closely the “volunteer” model, offering their services due to ideological conviction without having been approached or induced by someone else? How does Al Qaeda attract new blood to the cause? Does it target specific individuals or simply rely on internet and other forms of propaganda to attract prospective initiates? Is the word recruitment misleading in the context of contemporary Islamist terrorism? Should we more accurately refer to something like “radicalization to the point of action”?

Available open source information on terrorist recruitment methods is partial at best, and some of it, including “first hand” statements and confessions by apprehended terrorists, may well be less than reliable; portions of this record may represent self-serving propaganda and some statements may even be intended as disinformation to mislead counterterrorism authorities. Still and all, there is a sufficient body of information currently in the public sector to strongly suggest that the ranks of the terror jihadists are being filled in a variety of ways, which we will now examine.
First, there is some evidence to suggest that there are two primary types of jihadist recruitment, each with significantly distinctive characteristics. The first is the recruitment of individuals specifically to participate in attacks in theaters of combat such as Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. This type of recruitment is often intended to acquire candidates for suicide attacks. North America, Europe and the Middle East, at a minimum, have experienced this type of recruitment activity, essentially an exercise in acquiring cannon fodder. Several young Somali males appear to have been radicalized and recruited in the United States, for example, and sent to the battlefield in Somalia, where at least one of them perished as a suicide bomber. The case of a Somali suicide bomber, Abdisilan Hussein Ali, born in Minneapolis, is instructive. The second category of jihadist recruitment is more complex: the acquisition of individuals to form small, clandestine cells to carry out attacks in their countries of residence or against specific targets. We will explore both types of terrorist recruitment.

Iraq has for years indisputably exerted a magnetic attraction for intending jihadists and numerous individuals from several countries have traveled to Iraq expressly to combat coalition forces and the ruling, post-Saddam Iraqi government. Figures on “foreign fighters” may be somewhat unreliable but surely tell a generally accurate story. According to Nina Shea, writing in National Review Online, somewhere around eight hundred foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia have traveled to Iraq as violent jihadists, many of them intending to conduct suicide bombings against coalition and government of Iraq forces. Europe has contributed its share of fighters as well; the case of the Belgian woman Muriel Degauge, a convert to Islam, has received significant publicity, but there are others who have made the journey from European countries to Iraq in order to fight coalition and Iraqi government forces. Other nationalities represented in the ranks of Iraq jihadists to date include Syrians, Jordanians, Egyptians and North Africans. In many if not most of these cases, some form of traditional recruitment seems to have taken place as the individuals involved (even if initially self-radicalized) ultimately placed themselves in the hands of a formal terrorist support structure that arranged for their covert transport from place of residence to the front in Iraq and for some level of technical training commensurate with their assigned terrorist task. These committed recruits for violent jihad submitted themselves to some degree of control by a terrorist organization or hierarchy – often to the point of letting others in the chain determine when and where they were to die for the Islamist cause.

The record on how recruitment is accomplished is rather less clear regarding individuals who have committed or intended or attempted to commit ter-

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terrorist acts in Europe, North America or elsewhere. A survey of a number of would-be terrorists, discovered and apprehended before they could successfully strike, suggests that many of them have self-radicalized, sometimes after exposure to violent jihadist internet sites replete with emotionally powerful propaganda images and active chat rooms of like-minded, violent-prone individuals.6 Others, at some point in their ideological journey, came into direct personal contact with an influential extremist figure—often an Imam from a fundamentalist mosque—who reinforced their radical beliefs, encouraged commitment to the violent jihad and put these devotees on the path to terrorist training (often in rural Pakistan) and action. In the case of the London 7/7 suicide bomber Sadique Khan, the apprehended “Operation Crevice” conspirator Omar Khyam and a number of others, it now seems clear that they were not entirely “home grown” as initially asserted but were in contact with and responsive to Al-Qaeda representatives, sometimes referred to as Al-Qaeda Central (an imprecise but nonetheless useful phrase). In sum, terrorists engaged in activities outside of Iraq have taken a variety of paths toward full terrorist engagement.

It should also be noted that Islamist terrorism is generally (although not always) a group activity, conducted by clusters of people (mainly but not exclusively male). Instances of an individual acting utterly on his or her own in response to a vague proclivity to join a worldwide jihad are seldom encountered – the 2009 Fort Hood attack by Major Hassan, the 2010 attempt by Somali Mohamad Geele to kill a “Mohammed” cartoonist in Denmark,7 and Roshonara Choudhry, a Bangladeshi with British citizenship who attempted to kill a member of parliament in the United Kingdom in 2010, being exceptions that underline the rule. Imam al-Awlaki, since killed by a US missile, seems to have played a role in at least two of these cases. As well, here Marc Sageman’s continuing research and conclusions on terrorists as “a group of guys” and the importance of group dynamics seems compelling.8

Radicalizing individuals seek out others harboring extreme beliefs, either physically or virtually, as sounding boards, audiences and reinforcers. Indeed, in some cases, internet chat room conversations move aspiring terrorists on a trajectory toward an eventual physical meeting. This may be of necessity: it is difficult to imagine terrorists linked only by an electronic connection being able to effectively combine forces to bring about a terrorist attack in the physical world. Given this requirement for human contact, it would also seem logical that “self-recruited” cell members might also want to feel that they were a recognized part of the wider jihad by seeking out contact with the shadowy Al-

7 “Somali man sentenced to nine years for attack on Danish cartoonist,” The Telegraph (UK), 4 February 2011.
8 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, April 2004).
 Qaeda hierarchy. This desire may perhaps serve as the impetus for travel to Pakistan, not merely for training by experienced terror cadre, but to make formal contact with a “leadership” element that legitimizes—blesses as it were—the cell’s existence and goals. In this sense, travel to Pakistan or another area to make direct contact with Al-Qaeda might be considered a sort of “terrorist Hajj,” a theme we will address in more detail later.

Nonetheless, such travel to the “Holy Grail” of jihadi terrorism is not as easy to accomplish as it might seem at first glance, and is certainly more difficult today than it was in the year 2000 or earlier. To the extent that they are able to do so, a variety of intelligence and law enforcement agencies are clearly monitoring travel to the Pakistan-Afghanistan area and, if press accounts are to be credited, are also actively intercepting and studying communications in the region. At the same time, Al-Qaeda has always been a security-conscious organization and, given the obvious dangers of meeting with anyone who simply says he is a sympathizer, is doubtless discriminating with whom it in fact chooses to make direct contact. There are recorded instances where an intending terrorist had made the journey to Pakistan only to find that he was unable to locate an Al-Qaeda functionary to inaugurate him into the formal violent jihad. As well, traveling to Pakistan requires at a minimum sufficient funds for airline travel and expenses, the ability to acquire a passport and appropriate visa, the free time to conduct such a trip, etc., and to do all of this without alerting the authorities. The relative complexity or attendant sense of risk pertaining to such travel may in some cases preclude an initiate from undertaking the sojourn. This may have been the case with some post-2001 terrorist conspirators in the United States, for example. To perhaps misappropriate Clausewitz, in terrorism everything is simple, but the simplest things are very hard.

Arguably the important thing to note with intended travel to “the terrorist center of gravity,” as with the desire to move from virtual links to actual cells, is that it suggests that intending terrorists desire contact with other terrorists and, at least in many cases, are likely willing to accept the authority of their terrorist betters, in whole or in part. This is important, I suggest, in view of the current focus on “homegrown terrorism” and because it can represent a terrorist vulnerability, of which more later.

**From the Recruiter’s Prism**

If we return to our previous framework consideration of recruitment in its conventional espionage application, we can also note some clear distinctions between the world of intelligence organizations and terrorist structures. Espionage organizations are, in essence, set up to effect the recruitment of the least motivated members of the target organization or state. Although there are of course exceptions, espionage recruiters try to identify, assess and exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals who exhibit some flaw in character or behavior or common sense, or loyalty to their country of allegiance. Very often, the sub rosa offer of money for services plays a crucial role in successful recruitment. That is, the target individual is willing to betray his organization (for example, For-
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The recruitment of terrorists can be motivated by unbridled avarice or some pressing financial need (the payment of a substantial medical bill, for example). The seasoned recruiter, of course, takes pains to prevent the act of paying money for information from appearing crass or ignoble, and indeed will often strive to convince the target that he is, in fact, a paragon of virtue and a pillar of rectitude. To be sure, more noble human sentiments have also led people to commit espionage, but money has clearly been a standard, effective and reliable tool of the intelligence trade for centuries.

In contrast to traditional espionage recruitment, it can be argued that terrorist recruiters are looking for the most motivated people that they encounter in the Islamist demimonde. Turning our attention to Al-Qaeda and associated movements, it seems likely that money is a much less effective component of recruitment, although, here too, there are interesting exceptions. The record derived from captured Al-Qaeda-related terrorists suggests that they did not join the violent jihad because they were offered money by a recruiter or by representatives of a radical venue, such as a mosque. Money does not seem to play that important a role and many terrorists would appear to have reasonable financial security – this was certainly true of the wealthy Osama bin Laden and, to a lesser degree, of a number of suspects in the United Kingdom, with careers as medical doctors and engineers. If we stray farther afield from Al-Qaeda and consider suicide bomber recruits operating for Hamas or other Palestinian organizations, the situation is notably different. A number of Palestinian terror recruits have sacrificed their lives precisely or importantly to earn money for their families. In the perverse economic calculus of radical Islam, a livelihood might be less financially attractive than a “deathlihood.” That is, Palestinian suicide bombers have often been paid to carry out a suicide attack; the record on this is unambiguous. The funds are of course of limited use to the successful attacker but are in the event intended to be passed along to his or her family. This same circumstance does not at present appear to apply to Al-Qaeda or its affiliates.

If we put aside the Palestinian case as an exception, and view it less as an example of global jihad and more as a terror campaign against an Israeli occupation force, the record indicates that financial considerations simply do not factor greatly into terrorist recruitment for Al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups. What factors, then, would seem to be key and perhaps even essential to recruitment for Al-Qaeda or other violent Jihadist-Salafist networks?

There is considerable agreement among counter terrorism specialists that the decision to align oneself with an active terrorist group is part of a longer radicalization process and cannot be properly understood as a simple standalone episode. Some have described the process leading to terrorist allegiance as a journey, influenced by elements such as religious belief, a feeling of identity with a community of believers, personal bonds of friendship, etc. The New

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York Police Department produced in 2007 a compelling assessment of the sojourn to terrorism,\textsuperscript{10} describing the stages involved in moving toward becoming a terror activist; one willing to directly engage in violence, not merely a sympathizer with the homicidal deeds of other like-minded individuals.

Examination of a number of accused and convicted terrorists reveals some interesting points of commonality. In a notable number of instances, an individual initially took an interest in a conservative, intolerant and triumphalist (but not necessarily violent) form of Islam, such as that promoted by the Hizbut Tahrir. The first steps of the journey have sometimes involved radicalization via Islamist internet sites, many containing extremely graphic content of terrorist acts, including the savage beheading of “infidels.” In many instances, a charismatic imam has played a pivotal role in encouraging a radicalizing individual to adopt ever more extreme views, often urging the subject to think of himself as a righteous jihadist, a foot soldier in the struggle against the unbelievers. As an imam is necessarily something of a public figure, the radicalizing subject will almost certainly be brought into contact with others harboring extremist tendencies, reinforcing the sense of being part of an elect group, and not merely a lone wolf. In important ways, these radical imams are more than transmission belts to terrorism; they serve a recognizable recruitment function, although somewhat distinct from traditional espionage recruitment, as we shall see. Finally, in a number of documented instances, the radicalized intending terrorist travels (or attempts to travel) to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia or other isolated area to be trained (in the manufacture and employment of explosives, for example) and perhaps given general instructions by a seasoned, hard-core terrorist adherent. Training is generally followed by participation in a terrorist act, whether successful or failed. In general terms, and with minor variances, this would seem to represent the current Islamist terrorist recruitment cycle.

\textbf{A Journey Toward Active Terrorism}

The gradual progression from an interested voyeur of terrorist web sites to identification and voluntary action as an active terrorist appears to be valid both for those born and raised as Moslems and for those who convert to Islam (see Jahangir Arasli’s chapter of this book on converts to violent Islam). In the cases of those raised as Moslems but not necessarily practitioners of the faith (Mohammed Atta provides an excellent example), something impels them to take another look at Islam and urges them in the direction of violence. In any event, based on examination of several documented terrorist cases, we can suggest that the following progression template may have some applicability in Islamist radicalization and recruitment.

\textsuperscript{10} Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, \textit{Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat} (New York, NY: New York City Police Department, Intelligence Division, 2007).
1. An individual (hereafter “subject”) becomes interested in aggressive, uncompromising forms of Islam and seeks to acquire more information on the topic. The possible psychological reasons for being attracted to a violent form of Islam that is repellent to many are too numerous to list here and stand beyond the confines of this piece. In Pakistan, Indonesia and other heavily Islamic countries the role radical madras plays in drowning out alternate interpretations of the religion appears to be considerable.

2. Subject discovers pro-terrorist Islamist websites on line and spends considerable time sympathetically reviewing the material, eventually empathizing with the “global jihad” community and “virtual ummah” portrayed in the propaganda. Some of the material represented online can be categorized as at least a “soft recruitment pitch” to actively join the jihadist struggle.

3. Coterminous with or subsequent to the above, subject seeks out a radical mosque or cultural center to discuss the radical epistle “in the flesh” with another person. It is here that an extremist imam or similar figure performs the traditional roles of spotter, assessor and recruiter, broadly understood. Subject is persuaded to translate his violent belief structure into action.

4. Either with direct urging from the radical imam or other authority figure, or as a logical result of what the imam has suggested, subject determines to “join” what he views as the international jihad. The subject seeks to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan to meet directly with representatives of Al Qaeda, both to offer his services and to take instruction. Those unable to travel (for any number of reasons) seek to network virtually or decide to engage in essentially autonomous, uncoordinated terrorist activity.

5. If successful in contacting an Al Qaeda figure, subject is either rejected by seasoned terrorists or selected for practical terrorist training. Trainers also serve in the capacity of recruitment reinforcers, ensuring that the volunteer, once acquired, remains in the fold.

6. The subject, now trained to some degree in the craft of terrorism, prepares for a specific terror mission, with varying degrees of autonomous decision-making ability as to target, timing, etc. The mission may be participation in an attack, but can also include serving in a support or logistics capacity, or as a spotter, recruiter or trainer of other potential terrorist adherents.

The above pattern of consecutive stages has been seen in vivo in numerous cases and in a variety of geographical locations. Clearly drawn here is not only the terrorist journey, but the important role of a persuasive individual pivotal in moving an “interested party” from a passive or sympathetic role to an active one. In essence, this pivotal figure—often an imam, as noted above—serves the
same basic function as does a recruitment case officer in an intelligence organization. This role in the terrorism milieu is, to be sure, less formalized and institutionally structured than in, say, the American CIA or French DST, but no less critical in providing willing agents to do the bidding of a controlling organization or cause.

In a real sense, it can be asserted that the first required building bloc for terrorist recruitment is acceptance of an exclusionary form of radical Islam; without this first baseline step the journey to violence proceeds no further. There is no compelling evidence to suggest that known terrorists associated with an Islamist organization have been cynical in their expressed beliefs or motivated primarily by factors not associated with their interpretation of Islam. It may well be, as Marc Sageman asserts, that group dynamics and bonds of friendship play a formative, key role in radicalization, but it should be noted that the core belief that is rallied around is Koranic in nature and that Islamist terrorists regularly profess their religious views as the central force in their lives and as the justification *sine qua non* of their violent excesses. It may also be the case, and it is a case that has been credibly made, that some terrorists, including former al Qaeda in Iraq leader al-Zarqawi, have been drawn to terrorism as a moth to the flame by their innate personal thirst for violence, dominating control and taste for cruelty in its most debased form. But again, it appears irrefutable that adoption of a radical version of Islam that justifies violence against civilians as a form of jihad is a key event in the cycle of terrorist recruitment. Radical Islam and its sweeping *Weltanschauung* stressing conflict provide the plinth for the later architecture of terrorism, with a radical imam frequently serving as construction foreman. In this sense it may be preferable, indeed more accurate, to think in terms of terrorist conversion rather than terrorist recruitment.

It remains for the person of the imam, or a like authority figure, to translate radical religious belief into actual terrorist action; arguably a not inconsiderable task. Examining a number of imams who have performed this role is instructive. Abu Hamza al-Masri in the United Kingdom and Sheik Abdellatif in Germany engaged in specific functions that an intelligence case officer would readily be familiar with. Just as with an intelligence operations officer, these and other imams associated with terrorist radicalization have busied themselves with meeting and assessing potential recruits, screening them for potential and crafting a persuasive message to move their subjects from inchoate extremism to commitment to violence and willingness to accept at least some sort of direction and even control. Once this indoctrination has been accomplished, the now committed terrorist volunteer can be steered toward training and contact with seasoned terror veterans. If this contact with experienced foreign-based terrorists is not possible for a variety of reasons, the imam can as an alternative urge the willing terrorist recruit to contact like-minded people locally and to work toward an action generally in line with violent Islamist goals. These latter individuals comprise the so-called home-grown terrorists. It is important to note that even if these individuals lack a connection to foreign ter-
rorists, they have nonetheless been radicalized and recruited (or, per above, converted) to participate in terrorism.

Reference to an Imam who allegedly served as a terrorist recruiter in Tetouan, Morocco is illustrative. According to a press account by Andrea Elliott, a certain Abellah Fathallah, a youthful and charismatic cleric in a section of town called Jamaa Mezuak, drew congregants to his mosque by dint of his attractive personality. It is claimed that “at some point in 2006, the imam began talking to young men in the neighborhood about making jihad in Iraq. He acted as their recruiter and helped arrange their travel, a senior Moroccan intelligence official, Abdelhak Bassou, told me … When I asked Bassou how the imam operated, he outlined a general process that he said applied to the Jamaa Mezuak cell. Recruitment starts in the mosque, he said. The recruiter looks for people who are easy to approach and gives them books and CDs on Islam and then shows them jihadi Web sites. Eventually they become convinced.” 11 The veteran intelligence officer will recognize Fathallah’s modus operandi; at its core it is the same procedure of the progressive building of bonds and intimacy that case officers employ to recruit spies.

In the intelligence profession, an operations officer will generally employ his “legend” to meet a wide variety of people who may be of operational interest. This is, in a sense, a mathematical calculation: the more people an intelligence operator becomes acquainted with, the better the chances of finding some who genuinely have access to information of value to an intelligence service. Throughout the cold war, for example, social functions and similar gatherings provided the venue for the conduct of this activity. If this broader world served as the fish pond, the intelligence operations officer played the role of avid angler, attempting to make a catch with net or baited hook (with money, often the worm employed to entice the venal). In the sea of Islamist recruitment, however, the mosque or Islamic center substitutes as the venue to meet potential targets.

Available evidence suggests that money and venality play much less of a role in the recruitment of Islamist terrorists than with many other categories of people. Simply put, money or personal greed do not seem to be a strong motivating factor impelling individuals to embrace the Jihadi terrorist cause. Venue, however, does play an important role. The evidential plinth has clearly established that Islamist recruiters or spotters often inhabit mosques, cultural centers, information offices and sports clubs with an Islamic dimension. These and associated locations provide the recruiter or spotter with a broad audience of potential targets. As well, mosques, cultural centers and other locales that cater almost exclusively to Moslems are generally vexingly difficult for host country security services to effectively penetrate, thus providing the recruiter with a reasonably secure environment to ply his trade. It would appear completely natural to a casual observer to witness people in Islamic venues discussing es-

sententially theological matters – religious duty, the necessity of jihad, the nature of the infidels, the sword verses of the Koran and the traditions of the hadith. Accordingly, the recruiter might wish to be discreet in his enterprises, but need not seem overly conspiratorial, at least in his initial ministrations to targets of interest. Mosques and other Islamic gathering places are also useful to the Islamist recruiter precisely because they attract parties other than intending terrorists.

Even with identified radical venues such as the Finsbury Park mosque in the United Kingdom or the Neu-Ulm Islamic Information Center (IIZ) in Germany, it can be safely asserted that not all of the people who entered their portals were potential terrorists, although many of them doubtless harbored extreme, exclusionary beliefs. This mixed group consisting of the innocent (to some degree) and the dangerous (a minority) provides a further security mechanism and complicates law enforcement efforts to identify and monitor real or incipient terrorists. Just as importantly, whenever police or intelligence attention to a Moslem venue comes to light and receives media play, charges of religious harassment and prejudice invariably will not be far behind, further complicating the task of counter-terrorist authorities. In sum, the utilization of Moslem locales to meet, spot, assess and recruit terrorists makes tactical sense and poses a substantial challenge for law enforcement.

In the world of traditional espionage, a common question posed about a new recruit is whether the inductee “accepts tasking” from those whose interests he or she purportedly serves. Various procedures can be employed by agent handlers to ensure that a new spy does accept tasking and, along with it, some degree of control. A recruited spy who sets the ground rules himself is seldom loved by the organization that handles him; espionage practitioners value teamwork over independence. Of course, the utilitarian calculus is often that a spy who does not respond well to tasking is still preferable to having no spy at all. We might ask how does the subject of tasking and control apply to newly-recruited jihadists?

We do know that some recruited terrorists clearly do accept tasking, including detailed and specific tasking. This was certainly the case with Mohammed Atta and at least some of the other 9/11 hijackers who coalesced in the technical university of Hamburg-Harburg (it remains possible that not all of the hijackers understood the target of the fatal mission, but they demonstrated unfailing obedience to Atta’s instructions, at a minimum). Similarly, shoe-bomber Richard Reid’s pattern of activity and international flights before his ill-fated departure from Paris indicate that he, too, had been tasked by someone to blow up an airliner. The evidence is also incontrovertibly clear that suicide bomber recruits in Iraq have also followed directions from higher terrorist authority on target selection, and have accepted tasking unto death. In other instances, the accepting of tasking from a higher terrorist authority is less transparent. The Madrid train bombers, based on the 2007 Spanish court case and other information currently available, appear to have been mainly a self-contained cell. The failed duo that placed explosives aboard two German ICE
trains in 2006 also does not appear to have been acting in response to direction by a higher controlling authority. Still and all, it is apparent that Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements have attempted to exercise control over its votaries on numerous occasions, just as espionage organizations have traditionally done. The case of the German converts to Islam arrested in Germany in late 2007 is illustrative. The individuals eventually arrested by German and Turkish authorities (a total of four suspects incarcerated at this writing) had been clearly directed by their superiors in Pakistan to prepare to strike in September or October 2007 and not to delay their attack. The jihadist converts attempted as best they could to meet this timetable. We might accordingly conclude that reports that Al-Qaeda was not in a command-and-control position after 2002 are, at best, exaggerated. The tasking of terrorist recruits by a structured terrorist organization continues to this day.

**Belief as a Motivating Force**

We have previously noted that financial reward does not appear to play a central or even an important role in the recruitment process of intending jihadists. Rather, a persuasive process is pivotal in Islamist recruitment, with the evidence suggesting that religion and a sense of acting for religious reasons is the core motivational variable involved. The key role played by Islam in the recruitment of Islamist terrorists is insufficiently emphasized in much of the literature addressing the terror phenomenon. This is possibly due in part to an underlying Western discomfort at addressing the sensitive topic of religious or theological issues; sometimes referred to as political correctness. As well, since the West itself arguably does not place great value on religion in the 21st century, the assumption might follow that religion is equally unimportant in other cultural settings as well; the evidence strongly indicates that such an assumption is ill-advised. The manipulative techniques of Islamist recruiters are just that – techniques or tools that are employed to move another individual to do one’s bidding. To this extent, the CIA or Mossad case officer trying to land a Second Secretary of Mission, and the radical imam on the hunt for suicide bombers have much in common. It might be fairly said that they share the same trade. The core factor to which they point as the source of motivation for the recruitment target differs enormously however.

Traditionally, material gain and the image of personal wealth often represent the touchstone of motivation for many individuals who agree to conduct espionage for an intelligence service. For others, the negative but powerful motivating force of revenge is a key factor. Still other recruits assume the burden of their espionage tasks and risks for reasons of ideological preference, sometimes termed patriotism. Only this last category of motivation has even the slightest hint of commonality with the chief motivating factor of the standard recruit to violent Islamism. Mohammed Atta, Sadique Khan, Jamal Ahmidan, the German convert Martin Schneider and hundreds of other violent Islamist terrorists were moved to their actions by an expressed devotion to their vision of Islam and by a desire to serve in its cause. It is Islam that has impelled these
and other men like them to take lives, those of others and their own. It is, in all likelihood, not a coincidence that so many recruiters of jihadist terrorists are Moslem clerics. Who else enjoy more credibility in discoursing on the spiritual dimension and who better to reinforce religious motivation with ready recourse to Koranic verse? At the risk of sounding a non sequitur, the key to Islamist terrorist recruitment lies within the tradition of Islam. A dedication to a form of this belief system is at the motivational heart of the terrorist, all else is arguably device, reinforcement and technique.

Terrorist recruitment, then, hinges on channeling a profoundly held religious impulse to serve Islam and directing this impulse toward a willingness to commit violent acts under the controlling hand of some authority, Al-Qaeda or another. The terrorist recruiter is the persuader, the salesman whose “pitch” is that the truly devout Muslim should prepare to participate in violent jihad against an enemy defined in entirely religious terms. Thus, for example, violent action to end the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia (one of the initial core positions of Osama bin Laden is conducted not primarily because the troops are American and representatives of a foreign superpower, but, rather, because they are “infidel” or “crusader” soldiers whose presence on the sacred soil of the Prophet is of itself an affront to the sanctity of Islam. The justification for violence is wholly made on religious and not political grounds. Indeed, the vocabulary of the Islamist terrorist starkly underscores this point. The enemy is generally defined as kaffir, or polytheist or apostate or Jew; all of these terms emphasizing an underlying religious dimension to the struggle. The jihadist terrorist recruiter routinely employs this vivid, conflict-loaded imagery in his conversations with potential adherents.

**Islamist Recruiters**

To return briefly to our consideration of recruitment in the context of espionage activity, a point of distinction between this pursuit and Islamist recruitment efforts should be noted. In the world of international intelligence, the recruiter is a professional officer who is formally schooled by an intelligence agency in the methodology and craft of recruitment. That is to say that the clandestine service officer is subjected to a focused, and usually intensive, education in the factors that traditionally have been successful in persuading (and less often coercing) individuals to submit themselves to the direction of an intelligence organization. This formal recruitment training is a common building block of espionage operations shared by intelligence services from Albania to Zaire. A CIA or MI6 officer, for example, will be exposed to psychological training, conversational and elicitation techniques, personality assessment, manipulation skills, situational awareness, reading body language and other factors designed to assist him in acquiring the skills needed to effectively recruit espionage agents. The officer may, perhaps, participate in staged scenarios or practical exercises specifically designed to provide a “feel” for the practical

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challenges facing a recruiter. Case studies of successful and failed espionage recruitment efforts will often be examined to suggest lessons from the historical record. Similarly, the instructors selected to conduct such training are often themselves veteran intelligence officers with an established record of recruiting spies.

The Islamist recruiter, on the other hand and in most cases at any rate, would appear to operate rather differently. To date, persuasive evidence is lacking to suggest that those individuals operating, in effect, as Islamist recruiters are the recipients of formal schooling in the techniques and diverse aspects of successful recruitment. The Al Qaeda recruiter in all likelihood has not been exposed to an examination of case studies of successful and failed recruitment attempts. Also more than likely, he has never discussed personality manipulation with a trained psychologist. It is improbable that the average Islamist recruiter (or, as we have suggested as an alternate term, the Islamist converter) has taken part in a role-play exercise aiming to enhance recruitment skills. For an individual like Abu Hamza al-Masri, recruitment skills appear to be acquired more informally, perhaps through “on the job training” and simple experience. Judging from a number of publicized Islamist recruitment cases, the successful recruiting officer has a commanding presence, a well-articulated and uncompromising message, a persuasive style of speaking and a sympathetic personality. The uncompromising message must of course be sufficiently grounded in religious knowledge (Koran, haddith, sira) to be convincing. The combination of a persuasive, hard-line messenger with the appearance (whether deceptive or not) of religious authority would appear to be effective in moving Islamist radicals over the threshold to terrorism practitioners. Although the Islamist recruiter and the espionage recruiter differ in their schooling and approach, they share the same goal in the end. Different methodologies—one formal, one informal, one evidentially-based and the other intuitive—are employed to move target individuals to action; whether for espionage or terrorism is a secondary concern. Both bring new blood to the receiving organization and utilize the recruit to advance organizational goals.

**Countering Islamist Terrorist Recruitment**

How, then, can law enforcement, intelligence officials and other authorities effectively counter the ability of Islamist terror organizations to recruit new adherents successfully? As a point of entry to this topic, it should be noted that no strategy or set of counter-terrorist tactics can realistically be expected to definitively prevent or eliminate the phenomenon of terrorist recruitment. A more realistic approach to Islamist terrorist recruitment might aim to limit—rather than stop—the flow of recruits and to disrupt the chain leading from radicalization to the capability of new recruits to participate in terrorist acts. Based upon our (admittedly imperfect) understanding of how Islamist recruitment transpires, we might venture some practical counter measures, as seen from the eyes of an intelligence official.
• **Monitoring propaganda material and web sites:** As a point of departure, counter-terrorism officials should be versed in the virtual world of the international online jihad. In both intelligence and law enforcement, information and knowledge represent forms of real strength. Understanding the nuances and developments in the terrorist message—the same messages being read by potential recruits—should be a fundamental building block of any counter-terrorism campaign. What are the terrorists saying to their public audience? What are the current thematic materials, and what arguments are employed to justify a resort to violence against civilians? Web sites such as Al-Fidaa can be readily accessed and provide security officials with a window into the jihadist terrorist mind—and likely with a window into the terrorist perspective.

• **Identifying venues of radicalization** such as specific community centers, mosques, sports clubs, etc., can lead to uncovering recruiters. Identifying venues of interest can be based on tips from human intelligence sources, or from something as simple as a review of literature issued by an association; many do not bother to conceal their radical content or sympathies. If a specific location is identified as radical, resources (such as electronic or physical surveillance) can be assigned to uncover and confirm suspicious activity.

• **Infiltrating suspected radical locations:** In countries with the legal structure to permit it, undercover security officers (of the appropriate ethnicity, if required) can be sent to attend services in radical mosques or events at dubious community centers and sports associations. This can serve to uncover activities and connections, including recruitment efforts.

• **Infiltrating radical web site chat rooms using a false flag:** Intelligence services often pretend to represent different countries, and use ethnic officers to pull this off. A terrorist recruitment candidate might be more willing to be recruited by a “Turkish” intermediary than an American one. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies should pick whatever flag is convenient.

These are some of the tools of the trade that can be brought to bear in a focused effort to infiltrate terrorist organizations and complicate (one should never say stop) terrorist recruiting. The record to date is sufficiently successful to suggest that these and other steps are being taken to reduce the effectiveness of terrorist recruitment. There is another. That is the considerable number of terrorists who end up dead. The U.S. drone campaign has been highly effective, the assassination of Abu Yahya al-Libi, reputedly the al Qaeda number two, is testimony to this. It serves as a cautionary tale to respective jihadist inductees that alternative forms of political opposition, that do not threaten the international order and do not celebrate the legitimization of violence, might wisely be considered. Indeed, the use of coercive force against terrorists has proven remarkably successful; terrorist attacks have reputedly declined as a
consequence of bin Laden’s death, according to the U.S. Department of State.\textsuperscript{13} This fact has doubtless had enormous psychological consequences as well. Complicating the best efforts of terrorists to recruit “new blood” admittedly calls for a significant commitment of resources. The alternative solution—taking no action—is not to be considered.

Chapter 2

Disrupting Plots and Countering Ideology: Successes, Obstacles and Future Challenges for Intelligence Sharing in the United Kingdom

Sajjan Gohel ¹

Some time ago, before the death of Osama bin Laden, I gave a run-down of the intelligence cycle, the different intelligence and security agencies, how they operate and how they cooperate. To briefly reiterate, the British intelligence cycle consists of four main phases: direction, collection, analysis, and dissemination. To achieve greater effectiveness in identifying and disrupting international terrorist networks, the UK’s current approach necessitates an unprecedented level of inter-agency cooperation and, most importantly, information sharing. After all, as an island nation we are alone. For the UK, the significance of intelligence in counter-terrorism stems from three main drivers:

- Its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity
- Its role in post-incident investigations
- Its contribution to preventive/protective security measures.

Since we met in Albania, there have been significant developments in the UK. In fact mostly within the last six weeks. Fortunately, there was not a terrorist attack but two major terrorist trials which gave great insight to the way intelligence agencies cooperate, share information and ultimately foil and disrupt plots and save lives. I want to look at this in more detail which hopefully will illustrate the level of intelligence cooperation—not just internally but also with foreign partners—and look at the benefits and advantages as well as the weakness and challenges that still exist. Certainly controversy has emerged from both the trial of three men accused of conspiring with the 7/7 bombers and the Liquid Bomb Plot trial which was allegedly about bringing down an airliner.

It is widely accepted that obtaining “good” intelligence is the most effective way to prevent or pre-empt acts of terrorism. Since surprise is the cornerstone of successful terrorist operations, it is the primary function of the intelligence

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and security services to detect them and to thereby provide sufficient warning to enable counter-operations to be conducted. Current, accurate secret intelligence is indispensable for the prevention or pre-emption of terrorist activities. However, as can be seen, the global nature of the international threat poses some unique challenges for the UK’s intelligence and security services particularly through our legal systems.

For the UK, the significance of intelligence in counter-terrorism stems from three main drivers: (1) its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity; (2) its role in post-incident investigations; and (3) its contribution to preventive/protective security measures.

**Operation Overt**

On 8th August, 2008, one of the biggest ever terrorist trials in the UK, known as the Liquid Bomb Plot/Operation Overt Plot, concluded at Woolwich Crown Court. Three men were convicted of conspiring to commit mass murder but the jury failed to reach a verdict on the allegation they were plotting to bring down trans-Atlantic flights by using liquid explosives. Prosecutors had alleged that eight Britons planned to blow up at least seven airliners heading to North America with 1,500 people aboard, in attacks that would have had a global impact and rivalled the 9/11 atrocities.

The plot was disrupted in August 2006 when the men were arrested. This led to weeks of chaos at airports in Britain and the US. Air traffic on two continents was paralysed. Even though the terror cell’s plot was foiled, and no one was convicted for conspiring to bring down airplanes, the conspirators did achieve one objective, which was major and long-term disruption to the aviation industry. The restrictions on liquids travellers can take in their hand luggage remains in force today.

By majority verdicts, the jury convicted three men of conspiracy to commit murder. They were the cell’s ringleader, Abdulla Ahmed Ali, the bomb-maker Assad Sarwar, and Tanvir Hussain. They had also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions and conspiracy to commit public nuisance. The three admitted plotting to detonate a small device at Heathrow’s Terminal 3 because it was used by several US airlines. They had earlier aborted plans to explode a home-made bomb at the Houses of Parliament due to the tight security at Westminster. They did not plead guilty to bringing down aeroplanes.

One defendant, Mohammed Gulzar, who flew into Britain from Pakistan to allegedly oversee the plot, was acquitted of all charges. The jury failed to reach verdicts on four other defendants, Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan, Waheed Zaman and Umar Islam, who had earlier admitted conspiracy to cause a public nuisance by making al-Qaeda-style suicide videos. In presenting the case, prosecutors had used evidence from several months of police and intelligence co-operation efforts which included thousands of items seized in 69 searches which included DNA and chemical evidence; internet and audio and video surveillance, travel records and the defendants’ own apparent suicide videos. For the security agencies and police authorities, the plot was the biggest ever surveil-
Disrupting Plots and Countering Ideology

lance operation in terms of manpower and expense. The acquittals on the most serious charges is a setback for the British government. Prosecutors have requested a retrial.

The verdict showed the limits of intelligence cooperation. Despite the best efforts of MI5, the domestic intelligence agency, the Metropolitan Police, other local forces and the FBI and CIA – good intelligence cooperation cannot always guarantee a successful trial and verdict. There were also some problems with intelligence co-operation and we’ll have a look at that later.

Assembling the Plot

The following description and analysis of the Overt Cell is based on the intelligence co-operation between MI5 and the Metropolitan police. A USB flash drive was found in Abdulla Ahmed Ali’s right-hand pocket when he was arrested. The data in Ali’s flash drive contained details of flight timetables, baggage information, security advice about what items could be taken on flights as hand luggage and which were restricted, plus other information about Heathrow airport. The timetables covered the period from 2nd August, 2006 to 1st August, 2007. Seven flights of commercial airliners flying to the US and Canada from Heathrow Airport’s Terminal 3, each with a passenger capacity of between 285 and 241 people, had been highlighted on the flash drive. Despite the prosecutors’ case, the jury could not be convinced that the plot was designed to bring down trans-Atlantic flights. The seven flights targeted were:

- 1415 United Airlines Flight 931 to San Francisco
- 1500 Air Canada Flight 849 to Toronto
- 1515 Air Canada Flight 865 to Montreal
- 1540 United Airlines Flight 959 to Chicago
- 1620 United Airlines Flight 925 to Washington
- 1635 American Airlines Flight 139 to New York
- 1650 American Airlines Flight 91 to Chicago.

The Overt cell also considered targeting national infrastructure – including gas terminals and oil refineries. Evidence revealed Canary Wharf, the Bacton gas terminal pipeline, various airports, the electricity grid and internet providers were also studied. Assad Sarwar was described as the terror cell’s quartermaster, purchasing and storing bomb-making materials, with terrorist ambitions that were “limitless.” He bought and stockpiled bomb-making materials and was responsible for experimenting with hydrogen peroxide and HMTD. On 1st August, 2006, Sarwar is watched by a surveillance team visiting three pharmacies in High Wycombe within 15 minutes. He buys citric acid at each one.

During the trial, Sarwar explained in detail how to concentrate hydrogen peroxide to bomb-making levels, articulating the difficult formula with chilling accuracy. Under surveillance, he was also watched by the authorities buying a suitcase and walking in Lloyds park, Walthamstow, north-east London, where
the police later found a partly buried suitcase filled with materials to make HMTD. The group had not yet made the HMTD or refined the hydrogen peroxide to the correct concentration. The plotters would drill a small hole in the base of each of the injection moulding points of the Lucozade and Oasis soft drinks bottles. The original content would then be removed and the ready-mixed liquid explosive, hydrogen peroxide, introduced using a hypodermic or syringe in order to have their original contents removed. The liquid explosive, which can be made from commonly available items, was to be mixed with a powdered fruit drink called Tang. When Tang, which is an energetic compound, because of the material from which it is made is combined it is capable of creating an energetic mixture that can be detonated. On 27\textsuperscript{th} April, 2006, Sarwar travelled to Health Leads UK, in Carmarthen, south Wales, to purchase hydrogen peroxide as well as other household goods. He is caught driving at 85mph on a speed camera.

Whilst under surveillance, the plotters were also seen disposing of apparent bomb-making materials in a park shortly before they were arrested. Undercover police watched the men dump plastic bags, containing items including miniature light bulbs with the filaments exposed and attached to short wires, in bins. Two plastic carrier bags recovered from bins in Lloyds Park also contained Lucozade bottles, latex gloves, plastic cylinders, needles and parts of a battery. The park is close to the flat in Walthamstow where the men constructed their bombs and recorded “martyrdom” videos. A bag, containing heavily-stained latex gloves, was found outside the flat three days before the material in the park was uncovered. One of the most curious dimensions of the plot was the flat which was bought by Ali for £138,000 cash. Ali explained the urgency, he was splitting up with his wife. This was not true. Ali had just returned from Pakistan with orders to prepare the plot.

Where the money to purchase the flat came from remains a mystery and it appears highly unlikely that any of the plotters had the financial resources to pay for it. Some of the money was traced to a Pakistani charity in Muzaffarabad, Pakistani Kashmir. However, there was very little co-operation from the Pakistani authorities. In many trans-national terrorist plots, al-Qaeda provided large sums of money to their operatives to travel, purchase material and explosives. In this case it appears that the money was used to purchase a “bomb factory.” The flat contained the paraphernalia needed to produce devices to be smuggled through security. Photographs of soft drink bottles in the kitchen cupboards were shown to the jury.

**Passports**

The plotters wanted “clean” replacement passports without suspicious stamps to places like Pakistan. Tanvir Hussain was issued with a UK passport on 26\textsuperscript{th} June 2002. In February 2006 he travelled to Pakistan. Later in 2006, he too notified the agency that his passport had been lost. He too sought a replacement by fast-track. The dates similarly coincided with the attendance on 2\textsuperscript{nd} August

Ali was also applying for a British passport for his baby son at the time of his arrest. Mohammed Said Ali was nine months old when his father, Abdulla Ahmed Ali, was arrested in August 2006. A fingertip search of the family home in Walthamstow, east London, uncovered passport application documents signed by Ali on behalf of his baby. Woolwich crown court heard earlier in the trial how a police bug captured Ali considering whether he should take his children on suicide missions. Ali asked co-conspirator Umar Islam, “Should I take my lot on? I know my wife wouldn’t agree to it, but...” On 2nd August, 2006, Ali and Hussain go to the passport office in Victoria, central London, for fast-track applications. Ali’s bid is rejected because of a problem with his photograph.

**Videos**

The jury were played extracts from suicide videos made by six of the plotters. All the videos used as a background the same black flag with Arabic writing which said: “There is no god but Allah, and Mohammad is his Messenger.” The flag was recovered from the car of Sarwar. Searches of Sarwar’s High Wycombe home found further video recordings hidden away. One video featured Waheed Zaman, a former student of biomedical sciences at London Metropolitan University between 2003 and 2006 and a former president of the Islamic Society at the university. In the video, Zaman states, “I have been educated to a high standard and had it not been Allah had blessed me with this mission, I could have lived a life of ease but instead chose to fight for the sake of Allah’s Deen [his religion].” Curiously Zaman concluded with the sentence “As you kill us, you will be killed.” A very similar sentence was used by bin Laden on a 12th November, 2002 message. In the message he directly mentions the UK and France as a target if they continue to support the US. Bin Laden concluded “As you kill, so shall you be killed.” The repetition in the Overt plot of the most important line used by bin Laden shows al-Qaeda’s influence in spreading its ideology to individuals born or brought up in the West.

**The al-Qaeda Nexus**

There are some interesting connections between many of those involved in major terror plots in the UK. Abdulla Ahmed Ali was in phone contact with the leader of the 21st July, 2005, failed terrorist attack, Muktar Said Ibrahim. Ali travelled frequently to Pakistan, staying for long periods between 2003 to 2006. It is believed his travels led to South Waziristan. His co-conspirator, Assad Sarwar also visits Pakistan in 2005. In February 2006, Tanvir Hussain travelled to Pakistan. Ali claimed many of his trips were as a volunteer for an Islamic medical charity. However, in reality he was attending training camps and meeting senior figures in terrorist groups.
Both Ali and Ibrahim were in Pakistan in December 2004 which coincided with the presence of the ring leader of the 7/7 ringleader Mohammad Sidique Khan. All returned to plan attacks with bombs based on hydrogen peroxide.

There have been suggestions that the three plots, although compartmentalised from each other in order to avoid detection from counter-terrorism officials, may have been supervised by Abu Obeida al-Masri, the former head of al-Qaeda’s external operations. He is believed to have died of hepatitis at some point towards the end of 2007. Abu Ubaidah al-Masri was part of al-Zawahiri’s “Egyptian brigade” and a protégé of Mohammed Atef who was killed in a US airstrike during Operation Enduring Freedom. Abu Ubaidah showed his loyalty to al-Zawahiri when the Egyptian group, al-Jihad, split into two. Egyptian Islamic Jihad was led by al-Zawahiri whereas al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya was controlled by the blind cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman who was behind the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings.

On August 9th, 2006, the Pakistani authorities arrested a British national, Rashid Rauf, at his home in Bahawalpur, Punjab. Rauf was connected to the Overt plotters although there remains strong disagreement over his importance. Some have suggested he was a key mastermind behind the plot, others have insisted he was only on the periphery. The reality possibly lies in between. Rauf was important and relevant but the plot was not dependent on him. He may have known what was going on but he was not directing the plotters. Nevertheless, there was concern in Washington. When it appeared that Rauf’s activity in Pakistan could impact on the Overt plot, the US authorities asked their Pakistani counterparts to arrest him. This was identified by some as the most contentious part of intelligence sharing.

Rauf’s arrest caught British agencies by surprise. A decision was made to arrest the UK-based suspects before they heard news of Rauf’s detention. John Reid, then the Home Secretary, was called away from a football match watching the Scottish champions Celtic playing the English champions Chelsea in a pre-season match, to chair a meeting of an emergency committee as the arrests began. Rauf was related through marriage to Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of the al-Qaeda-linked Pakistani terrorist group, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). The JeM is banned in both Britain and the United States. Azhar openly lives in Bhawalpur.

Peter Clarke, the former British counter-terrorism chief who led Operation Overt, said that the arrest of Mr. Rauf gave officers a real problem. “On the evening of Aug. 9, 2006, I was told that a man connected to the British terrorists had been arrested in Pakistan,” he wrote in the Times. “This was not good news. We were at a critical point in building our case against them. If they got to hear that he had been arrested they might destroy evidence and scatter to the four winds. More worrying still, if they were tipped off to the arrest they might panic and mount a desperate attack.” His revelations lay bare the crucial dilemma at the heart of any counter-terrorism operation – whether to allow plots to mature so as to build up valuable evidence, or whether to move early to protect the public.
On 13th December, 2007, the Pakistani terrorism charges on Rauf Rashid were dropped. The Pakistani court claimed there was no evidence that he is involved in terrorism. Britain is seeking Rauf’s extradition in connection with the murder of an uncle, Mohammed Saeed, who was stabbed to death in Birmingham in 2002.

On 14th December 2007, Rauf mysteriously escaped from jail. He was being transported from an Islamabad court to the high-security Adiala jail in the garrison town of Rawalpindi. An investigation into the incident revealed that the escape was facilitated by the police officers guarding him. The officers told investigators that Rauf fled after they allowed him to say his prayers at a mosque on the way to the jail. Rauf’s escape has caused huge embarrassment to the regime of General Pervez Musharraf. It was also regarded as a setback to Pakistan’s effort to combat international terrorism. Rauf’s whereabouts are still not known.

Overt Summary

One of the most complex and well-handled surveillance operations ever mounted by the British security failed so far, at least to secure the convictions that the Crown Prosecution Service, the British state prosecutors had hoped for. There is broad and noisy agreement in the intelligence community that the evidence, although strong, would have been stronger if MI5 and the police had been allowed to spring the trap later. In hindsight, which is a wonderful thing, we can now say that not only was all the evidence not quite ready, but we cannot be sure we picked up everyone we should have. Timing is not just about evidence: the intelligence services like to be confident that all the main players are on the scene before the police strike.

British investigators are convinced that the size, scope, cost and ingenuity of the Overt plot bear the al-Qaeda hallmarks. There is a strong belief that the plotters learned to make the liquid explosive device from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. Just because the jurors in the liquid bomb plot trial could not definitively conclude that the accused plotters were planning to bring down Trans-Atlantic flights, it should not diminish how serious the ramifications of the plot itself were and how it caused tremendous disruption at airports throughout the world.

It is important to remember that intelligence is not an exact science and is often a question of perception. The approach and strategy to conduct an operation to observe and examine a terror cell, and then make arrests to disrupt a plot, often vary from country to country. Because the burden of proof is set so high in a British court of law, the authorities believe in the need to monitor a cell sufficiently enough so that the evidence can stand the test of a trial. They do not wait to the last minute but wait close enough where the potential of a plot is reaching its end-stage. In the case of the Overt cell the authorities in the UK did not believe the plot going active was imminent.

US authorities can often arrest plotters with conspiracy and prefer to act with more speed in order to disrupt any plot and avoid the risk of the situation
spiralling out of control. They had a belief that the plot was reaching the end stage and the additional worry of Rashid Rauf disrupting the investigation. For the US, there were fears that the “blessed operation” as Ali referred to it, was about to begin. This forced the speed of the investigation and the arrest of Rauf.

It’s important to remember that both the British and American authorities are on the same side working towards a common goal in disrupting and foiling terrorist plots that threaten to kill innocent people and create economic, social and political consequences. Obviously, lessons can be learnt form the Overt trial over what could have been done differently but it is essential that there remains effective cooperation between the two countries, particularly as both nations face an on-going and consistent threat.

The 7/7 Dimension

On 1st August 2008, a jury trying three men accused of helping the July 7 bombers was dismissed after failing to reach a verdict after nearly three weeks of deliberations. Wheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem, and Mohammed Shakil—the first and only people to be tried in connection with the explosions on London’s transport network that killed 52 people in 2005—now face a retrial.

This was another trial that illustrated in graphic detail the intelligence co-operation between the Metropolitan Police, MI5 and West Yorkshire police.

Just to remind you, on July 7th 2005, four devices exploded in London killing 52 people and leaving over 700 injured. Three explosions on London Underground trains occurred within seconds of each other and the fourth, on board a bus, detonated an hour later. On July 12th it transpired that four home-grown suicide bombers, three of Pakistani origin and residents of the northern town of Beeston, Leeds, and one Jamaican convert from Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, carried out the July 7th bomb attacks. The names of Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shezad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, and Hasib Hussain have been permanently etched on our minds ever since.

Three of the crucial questions that had received so much speculation throughout the aftermath: Why did they do it? How did they do it? And were they directed from abroad? It was this lack of knowledge that prevailed two years later. The details of the bomb-factory provided crucial revelations. In the account, the site where the construction of the explosive devices took place was identified as a rented flat at 18 Alexandra Grove, in Beeston. The site was discovered on 12th July, 2005 with the equipment still in place and Khan, Tanweer, and Hussein were all subsequently linked to it by DNA evidence. It also documents Lindsay’s online trades of perfume for material useful in the bomb-making process.

Following the attacks, the authorities launched an investigation that was designed to uncover every possible piece of detail, every clue and lead. The aim was to find out not only who was responsible for setting off the bombs, but also who else was involved. This followed 21 months of intense investigation and intelligence cooperation by the Metropolitan Police and West Yorkshire Police. More than 18,450 statements were taken. 90,000 phone calls examined, 4,700
Disrupting Plots and Countering Ideology

phone numbers probed, 19,400 documents created and some 19,000 leads pursued. 26,000 exhibits seized, of which 5,000 required forensic testing; 142 computers were being examined with thousands of hardware and software exhibits; and more than 6,000 hours of CCTV footage to be analysed.

The first major clues into the possibility of others involved in the 7/7 attacks arose in the debris of the Edgware Road bomb, when police found Khan’s mobile telephone with numbers for Mohammed Shakil and Sadeer Saleem. Waheed Ali’s number was found on Lindsay’s mobile phone at Russell Square. A variety of material that provided a valuable insight into their attitudes and beliefs was seized from the defendants’ homes when they were arrested.

Ali was a friend of Khan and Tanweer. His fingerprints were found on a booklet that Khan had photocopied for part of his Islamic will and testament. In addition a computer used by Ali had accessed radical al-Qaeda websites that included information about Osama bin Laden, jihad, Iraqi “martyrs,” and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Traces of Ali and Saleem’s DNA were found in the bomb factory, along with a key for a Mitsubishi belonging to Shakil.

Mohammed Junaid Babar

On 18th April 2008, testifying at the trial of Ali, Saleem and Shakil, American citizen Mohammed Junaid Barbar, the “al-Qaeda supergrass,” who was arrested in the US for plotting attacks against US troops in Afghanistan, revealed that he had attended a weapons training camp in Pakistan with Khan. Shakil was also at same camp in the Malakand region for “physical conditioning and small arms training.” Babar said he met Shakil and Khan in July 2003 when he went to Islamabad airport with convicted terrorist Omar Khyam who was plotting attacks in Britain with half a ton of ammonium nitrate. What is so interesting about this, is that intelligence cooperation can also benefit through the use of terrorists to inform on their former colleagues. So in effect you have cooperation between an intelligence agency and a terrorist but with full control by the intelligence agency. I like that. Babar betrayed a number of fellow jihadists during his interrogation including those connected to the ammonium nitrate plot.

SHAXMOB

The strength of Ali’s relationship to Khan was demonstrated by a text message Ali sent to the 7/7 ringleader on 7th December 2003. It read “Gates of memories I will neva (sic) close. How much I will miss you no one knows. Tears in my eyes will wipe away but the love in my heart for you will always stay.” In the remains of Khan’s mobile telephone, recovered from the debris at the Edgware Road tube blast, were numbers “attributable” to Shakil, saved as “SHAXMOB,” and Saleem, saved as “Sads.”

The prosecution alleged that the trip Ali, Shakil and Saleem made to London on 16th and 17th December 2004 with Hussain and Lindsay was a “hostile reconnaissance mission” scouting for possible targets for 7/7. The group ended
up staying the night at Ali’s sister’s house and spent their second day visiting the London Eye and the London Aquarium. Ali insisted he never went on the tube. Ali and Saleem, who claimed on their visa application that they were visiting a relative, flew to Pakistan within days of the reconnaissance mission. The jury was told that according to evidence from mobile phone calls intercepted by MI5, it was “no coincidence” that the journey came around the same time as the trip made by Khan Tanweer. They visited the Pakistani consulate in Bradford to submit their visa applications a day before Ali and Saleem did.

Mobile telephone evidence showed “an unusually high level of contact” between Ali and Tanweer in the days before Khan and Tanweer left the UK on 18th November 2004, indicating a link between the respective trips to Pakistan. Similar radical material was found in the home of Saleem who is a trustee at the controversial Iqra bookshop in Leeds, the alleged hub of the July 7 plot. A computer was found that contained images of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre, of fighters holding aloft AK-47 assault rifles and pictures of bodies in bags. Also on the computer were speech files extolling the virtues of jihad and martyrdom. On a notepad also found by police, Saleem wrote: “When I am a shaheed (martyr) I don’t care in what way I receive my death for Allah’s cause. If he wishes he will bless the cut limbs.” Writing about children, he said: “I want loads and have them with the intention of making them mujahids... and mujahidas (holy warriors) because the filthy kafir (non-believers) have got big plans against the Muslims.”

Despite all this evidence obtained through intelligence cooperation between three different agencies, like with the Overt plot, the jury could not make a decision and a retrial will take place. Again, this highlights the problems of information through intelligence cooperation being used in a court of law.

20th Anniversary

Al-Qaeda celebrated its 20th birthday last month, making it two years older than Hammaad Munshi who became the youngest person ever convicted of terrorism in the UK. Munshi, and his co-conspirators Aabid Khan and Sultan Muhammad, typify the home-grown terrorist, the son or grandson of immigrants. Munshi, a West Yorkshire schoolboy possessed a guide to making napalm on his computer and notes on martyrdom under his bed. Munshi, whose grandfather is a leading Islamic scholar, was 16 and taking his GCSEs when he was arrested. Munshi ran a website selling hunting knives and Islamic flags and was the cell’s computer specialist, his online Arabic profile “fida dee” means a “person ready to sacrifice themselves for a particular cause.” Two bags of ball bearings—described as the shrapnel of choice for suicide bombers—were found in one of his pockets. On his PC were al-Qaeda propaganda videos and recordings promoting “murder and destruction.” The conviction of his mentor, Aabid Khan, marks the latest chapter in a series of raids and arrests across three continents. Four trials have already led to convictions in three countries – and the investigations continue. It also highlights the intelligence cooperation between the UK and other countries in Europe and North America.
In March 2005, armed police closed in on an apartment on a rutted road in a village on the edge of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. As they burst in, they subdued a group of men they had been observing. One of the group had an armed “suicide belt” of explosives. These arrests were a major breakthrough in an investigation that would reveal how international terrorists were operating through the internet – from North America and Europe through to South Asia. The searches in Bosnia uncovered a so-called “martyrdom” video explaining in English how the men were fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims around the world. Materials included the mobile phone belonging to the ringleader, who had travelled from Scandinavia hoping to carry out attacks on NATO targets. But just as importantly, detectives established the phone had been in contact with a number registered to an address in the UK.

When officers from the Metropolitan Police kicked in the door of a modest flat in west London, they had no idea they were about to arrest one of the then most significant figures among a growing network of cyber-terrorists. The occupant was a young Moroccan, Younes Tsouli, who had used the internet to build links to al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq and a wider network around the world. In July 2004, Tsouli hacked an FTP server operated by the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department and transformed it into an al-Qaeda message board. He also later hacked a server belonging to George Washington University. Tsouli’s encrypted hard drive was a treasure trove of evidence which led detectives to other suspected extremists across the world. These men had been using password-protected internet forums to exchange views on jihad – but they did not realise they had also left themselves exposed to infiltration by intelligence officers.

Within a couple of months of Tsouli’s arrest, West Yorkshire Police officers began observing the activities of Bradford man Aabid Khan. He had worked on one of Tsouli’s key websites, at Tibyan. Meanwhile, in North America, police and intelligence agents began watching another group they linked to this online network. Like Tsouli and Khan, many of them were very young. The targets they are alleged to have discussed attacking—the global positioning system and the Canadian Parliament—often seemed fanciful. Khan allegedly talked online to some of them about setting up a mini-Sharia state in a remote part of Scotland. Nevertheless, his naivety was combined with a deadly seriousness and burgeoning connections to militant groups in Asia. Gradually, once evidence had been gathered of various alleged plots, the authorities moved to arrest those they had placed under surveillance.

Two men from the United States were among those picked up in March and April 2006. They are alleged to have emailed Tsouli and Khan reconnaissance footage they filmed of targets in Washington DC. Khan is then believed to have met one of the men in Pakistan to arrange terrorism training. Scottish police arrested a student, Mohammed Atif Siddique, as he was about to board a flight to Pakistan to join up with Khan. Analysis of internet chat between him and Khan suggested the latter was grooming and radicalising the former. Then in June 2006 Toronto witnessed the dramatic arrests of 17 men. The group had
been infiltrated by two police informants and was accused of planning attacks on Canadian targets. The alleged leader was a friend of Aabid Khan’s. The men deny terrorism charges in an ongoing case.

Days later Khan flew back to Britain from Pakistan. Despite knowing about the arrests in Toronto, he entered the country with a mass of incriminating material. Officers from West Yorkshire Police had been tipped off by MI5 that Khan was coming into the country. When they searched his luggage they were astonished to find evidence that dramatically illustrated his involvement in Islamist extremism and his dedication to the cause of the global jihad.

**MI5 Figures**

In 2001, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the House of Commons’ Intelligence and Security Committee reported that the Security Services MI5 were investigating 250 primary “terrorist” subjects. This compared to around 800 by July 2005. In 2006, then head of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, pointed out that MI5 had identified around 1,600 individuals who they believed posed a direct threat to national security and public safety, because of their support for terrorism. The current head of MI5, Jonathan Evans believes that the figure today would be at least 2,000. This growth, which has driven the increasingly strong and coordinated government response, is partly because of their coverage and intelligence cooperation of the extremist networks is more thorough. But it is also because there remains a steady flow of new recruits to the extremist cause.

In April 2008, British Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, revealed that there are 30 active plots in the UK, with 200 networks involved. One thing to think about is that since 9/11, every major terrorist plot in the UK utilized immigrants or immigrant communities. Despite being local, many of these plots have an international dimension. It was through intelligence co-operation that each region in England could be ascertained for its level of terror.

**RICU**

Despite the many successes in foiling and disrupting plots through intelligence sharing, we still face a major dilemma. For every individual that is being captured, arrested and prosecuted there are at least five more coming along the assembly line. We are not stopping the recruitment of terrorism and by the same token not defeating the ideas, as articulated by the ideologies that are being used to radicalise them. What counter measures can intelligence and law enforcement agencies engage in? The government has now began a campaign of countering the ideas of al-Qaeda and its ideologues to prevent them from recruiting Britons. The research, information and communications unit (RICU) is a counter-terrorism PR operation set up in 2007 within the newly created office of security and counter-terrorism. Though based in the Home Office, RICU also reports to the Foreign Office and Department for Communities and Local Government.
UK officials finally concluded that while al-Qaeda and its allies were excelling at promoting their own narrative and propaganda, no one in the government was responsible for pushing back. RICU was established to fill this gap and achieve three key goals: exposing the weaknesses of and undermining violent ideologies; supporting and promoting credible alternative voices; and strengthening and protecting the UK government through strategic communications. Its creation, Tony Blair said in March 2007, “marked a change in the government’s approach to managing the terrorist threat to the UK and winning the battle for hearts and minds.” The material being used by RICU in the global propaganda effort to taint the al-Qaeda brand is designed to undermine their narrative.

Governmental officials were and are continually asked to draw up “counter-narratives” to the anti-western messages on websites designed to influence vulnerable and impressionable audiences in the UK. They will set out to explain the government’s “foreign policy in its totality,” counter the accusations made by al-Qaeda sympathisers and extremist groups and pinpoint the weaknesses in their arguments. The unit will also support “alternative voices” in the Muslim community.

A RICU document makes the following statement: “AQ is not the only extremist ideology of interest or concern, domestically or overseas. But counter-acting the AQ threat is a counter-terrorism priority and requires AQ-centric communications efforts.”

The target of the campaign—the al-Qaeda narrative—is seen as linking together genuine or perceived, commonly held concerns into a “narrative of grievance” that reinforces the portrayal of Muslims as victims of western injustice. “It [the narrative] combines fact, fiction, emotion and religion and manipulates discontent about local and international issues. The narrative is simple, flexible and infinitely accommodating. It can be adapted to suit local conditions and may have a disproportionate influence on understanding and interpretation of local or global events.”

RICU says it needs to be challenged to reduce the opportunity for terrorist exploitation of underlying grievances: “The objective is not to dismiss ‘grievances’ but undermine AQ’s position as their champion: and violent extremism as the solution.” Initial attempts to counter this narrative focused on arguments for siding with the UK government in the War on Terror but were met with resistance. So RICU switched instead to an audience-focused, three-part counter-narrative. The first part is the message that there is a real threat to all UK citizens – Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Citing the number of Muslims killed in the July 2005 terrorist attack in London. Jonathan Allen, the head of RICU stated that “bombs don’t swerve around faiths.”

Second is the message that the terrorist ideology is morally repugnant. Rather than “jihadis” or “warriors,” as they like to call themselves, they are thugs who murder innocent people and who attempt to use Islam to justify violence. This effort seeks to draw a line around the terrorists, not the UK government: a person might not like UK policies or the government very much, but
as long as they oppose extremism, they are still in some way on the same side. According to Allen, Muslims should be able to feel like they are both Muslims and British at the same time. Finally, RICU seeks to challenge its audiences to do something about the threat. Once one accepts that there is a threat, said Mr. Allen, one must take on a personal commitment to do something about it. Understanding audiences is vital in a world of globalized communications. RICU draws little distinction between domestic and international messaging, though it pays careful attention to individual segments of its audiences – which radio programs a teenager or an adult prefers, for example, or where children seek information about religion online. Most importantly, messages must be crafted to resonate emotionally with audiences.

Individuals taking their own actions will make the real difference. The most important contribution by government will be empowering credible voices to oppose the extremist ideology; once a debate has been fostered, the ideology is likely to crumble under its own weight. This often requires capacity building within communities, often something as simple as training in public speaking. Some of the most powerful voices against terrorism are those who have left and rejected the extremist movement. Most of those credible voices will likely never be known to the wider world. They will be the parents, siblings, or neighbours who notice something and get involved.

This is not intelligence cooperation in the strictly operational sense but it is very valuable intelligence cooperation between governmental departments and intelligence agencies in the process to counter the ideas and doctrines that groups like al-Qaeda preach and articulate. Since I first took part in this working group in Tbilisi in April 2007, I’ve spoken about how this “war on terrorism” is a “war of ideas” and you have to defeat the idea in addition to capturing, arresting and prosecuting terrorists. The British government has finally adopted a mechanism which could potentially yield positive dividends. Let us see what happens in the next six months.

**Assessment**

Developing and delivering an effective counter-terrorism strategy involves all parts of Government acting together and taking a joined-up approach to dealing with this complex and wide-ranging threat. Delivery also depends upon partnerships with the police and emergency services, local authorities, and devolved administrations, as well as with the private sector and the voluntary and charitable sector. Perhaps the most important of all these partnerships is between these bodies, led by the Government, and our citizens and communities. Public awareness of the threat, understanding of the measures needed to combat it, and active support and cooperation with the police are critical to the success of the strategy.

I think we have a central dilemma – how to protect our citizens within the rule of law when intelligence does not amount to clear cut evidence and when it is fragile and cannot hold up in court. We also, of course, and I repeat in all our countries and within the EU, value civil liberties and wish to do nothing to
damage these hard-fought for rights. But the world has changed and there needs to be a debate on whether some erosion of what we all value may be necessary to improve the chances of our citizens not being blown apart as they go about their daily lives and to ensure convictions in court.

To look at the international angle, shared intelligence can decisively shape decision makers’ perspectives on the problems they face and the policies they select by providing them with important information beyond that available to their national intelligence agencies. The principal benefit from sharing for recipients is the acquisition of intelligence that is valuable to decision makers but otherwise unobtainable at an acceptable cost. I am sure you all agree with me that containing terrorism in a democratic society, governed by the rule of law, where civil rights are of great value, having been acquired with difficulty over many centuries, is not straightforward. Our courts require evidence that meets high standards of proof and strong evidence of a crime having been committed or strong evidence of a conspiracy to commit such a crime. Of course it is a perverse irony that the terrorists use our legal system to protect themselves. The same legal system that they wish to destroy.

This is one of the central dilemmas of countering this sort of terrorism. We may be confident that an individual or group is planning an attack but that confidence comes from the sort of intelligence that is patchy and fragmentary and uncertain, to be interpreted and assessed. All too often it falls short of evidence to support criminal charges to bring an individual before the courts, the best solution if achievable. Moreover, there is a need to protect fragile sources of intelligence including human sources. Which at times can mean that intelligence sharing is controlled.

Being in this position can be uncomfortable for the authorities. We can believe, correctly, that a terrorist atrocity is being planned but those arrested by the police have to be released as the plan is too embryonic, too vague to lead to charges and possibly convictions. Furthermore the intelligence may be highly sensitive and its exposure would be very damaging by revealing either the source or the capability of the authorities.

The bottom line is that in all of our respective countries we face a common threat. A threat that has many different autonomous components. The components, however, unlike us, are united. They share intelligence, information, resources and even personnel. They are motivated and focused into achieving their objectivities. We need to match their resolve. In addition, we need we all quite often have a piece of terror puzzle that when put together provides us with the complete picture. Cohesion is essential.

Based on the current global threat, protecting our allies is a way of also protecting ourselves. So the UK has a very strong interest in international co-operation and intelligence sharing. In the UK, intelligence cooperation is not only used to help track down and disrupt terrorists. It is also about trying more widely to reduce the risks of terrorism. Intelligence supports wider policies and action to make it more difficult for terrorists to succeed. As we pass the 7th
anniversary of 9/11 and with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri still on the loose, that co-operation has to and must continue.

**Box 1. Under-Reported Significant Terrorist Acts since 2008**

John J. Le Beau

The following information is provided as a point of reference. The sheer number of terrorist attacks around the globe—perpetrated primarily by jihadist groups—is so enormous that it dulls the senses. Only the most spectacular assaults—such as 9/11, Madrid and London—are retained in the public consciousness. The list below captures some less spectacular terrorist attacks in recent times that nonetheless caused considerable loss of life and destruction of property, or that were intended to do so, but failed. The cases listed underline the substantial damages and casualties inflicted by jihadist terrorism, and the global scope of what has become a battlefield without borders.

**20 September 2008:** A truck bomb attack in Iraq kills fifty-four and wounds nearly three hundred. Building caught fire as result of the blast.

**26-29 November 2008:** Small unit infantry-style assault by Pakistani jihadists on multiple targets in Mumbai, India, including two major international hotels and the main train station. At least 173 people killed, with circa three hundred wounded. In addition to Indians, casualties include several Westerners and Israelis.

**1 February 2009:** Twenty-eight killed during Taliban attack on a prison in the Afghanistan capital of Kabul.

**10 August 2009:** A truck bomb attack conducted near Mosul, Iraq kills circa twenty-eight Iraqis and wounds over one hundred, also causing extensive property damage.

**5 November 2009:** U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan kills thirteen and wounds thirty at Fort Hood, Texas. Hasan, a Sunni Moslem who is a trained psychiatrist, is determined by the FBI to have been in touch via the internet with known jihadist-Islamist cleric in Yemen, Imam al-Alawki, a fugitive U.S. citizen and supporter of al-Qaeda.

**28 November 2009:** A major bomb blast derails a train on Moscow-St. Petersburg line, killing 29 and injuring scores. A Chechen Islamist group takes “credit” for the attack.

**3 December 2009:** Nineteen Somalis—including three government ministers and a number of female university students—are killed at a graduation ceremony being held in Mogadishu. The attack was conducted by a suicide bomber from al Shabaab, a Somali jihadist group sharing al-Qaeda's ideology.

**29 March 2010:** Coordinated attacks on two Moscow Metro stations leave forty dead and scores seriously wounded. The suicide bombing attack was carried out by two Chechen “Black Widows,” one of them only seventeen years old.

**13 April 2010:** At least ten are killed and twelve wounded during the course of an attack in Isabela, the Philippines. The assault was attributed to members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group.
1 May 2010: A crudely made propane tank car bomb fails to detonate in Times Square, New York City. A naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin was arrested for the planned attack as he tried to flee the country. U.S. authorities linked his activity to the Pakistani Taliban. The incident stepped up security concerns about "homegrown terrorism" in the United States, as well as the role of Pakistan as a magnet for terrorists.

17 May 2010: Over thirty Indian policemen are killed and more than forty wounded after the bus in which they were traveling was bombed in the city of Dantewada.

28 May 2010: Lahore, Pakistan. Over eighty killed and hundreds wounded in a bombing attack against the places of worship of a minority religious sect. Pakistani Taliban sympathizers were believed to be behind this and similar assaults on religious minorities in the country.

11 July 2010: Kampala, Uganda: Multiple explosions at popular restaurants result in over seventy deaths and many wounded. The attacks targeted restaurants featuring coverage of the World Cup games. Westerners are among the casualties. The Somalia-based jihadist group Al-Shabab subsequently takes credit for the attack, threatening more strikes at African Union countries that are performing a stability role in Somalia.

20 September 2010: Islamist fighters ambush a military convoy near the Rasht Valley, Tajikistan, killing at least twenty-three Tajik soldiers, and seriously wounding many more. Tajik authorities claim that the jihadists included individuals from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Chechnya.

11 December 2010: An Iraqi-born Swedish citizen detonates a car bomb and a backpack explosive device in Stockholm, killing himself and wounding two pedestrians. Authorities believe that the explosion was premature, and that the bomber intended to target busy ships in the immediate area. Although the attack failed, the “near miss” resulted in considerable security concern in Europe.

1 January 2011: An explosive device directly outside a Coptic church in Alexandria, Egypt detonates as attendees were leaving a religious service, killing twenty-three Christians and wounding nearly one hundred. Violent jihadists were regarded as the perpetrators, with Egyptian authorities blaming “outsider” radicals for the attack.

4 January 2011: The governor of Punjab province, Pakistan, Salmaan Taseer is assassinated by his bodyguard, a radical Salafi-Islamist. Taseer is targeted and killed because he opposed the prevailing blasphemy laws in Pakistan, often used to prosecute non-Muslim minorities. The assassin, Malik Hussein Qadri, openly justified his deed as an Islamic obligation, and was accorded broad public support during his court hearing.

17 January 2011: A suicide bomber in Tikrit, Iraq kills over fifty at a police recruitment center; several dozen more are severely injured. Al Qaeda in Iraq is seen as responsible for the attack, which is the worst experienced in the country in several months. Similar deadly attacks transpire at other locations in Iraq in the following days.

24 January 2011: A suicide bomber kills at least thirty five people and wounds over a hundred in an attack in the arrival terminal of Domodedovo airport, Moscow’s largest. A number of the casualties are foreigners. Islamist elements from the so-called “Emirate of the Caucasus” are widely suspected to be behind the blast.
28 January 2011: A bomb is detonated and shots fired in a supermarket in Kabul, Afghanistan frequented by foreigners. Nine people are killed outright, including at least three non-Afghans, and several more are wounded, some of them critically. The Afghan Taliban takes credit for the attack.

12 March 2011: Five Israeli settlers, including three children, are killed by stabbing in their West Bank settlement, after a Palestinian terrorist infiltrated their home. A Hamas spokesman in the Gaza Strip said that the attack had the organization’s “full support.”

2 March 2011: Two U.S. servicemen are killed and two more critically wounded with a handgun by an ethnic Albanian from Kosovo. The attacker was active on Islamist websites, and the case is believed to represent an example of individual “virtual jihad.”

28 April 2011: A powerful bomb placed in a popular tourist cafe in Marrakesh, Morocco kills sixteen people, most of them European tourists, and wounds dozens more. Moroccan authorities attribute the attack to al Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb. Six terrorists are subsequently arrested.

7 May 2012: Thirty soldiers were killed and forty wounded by an Al Qaeda attack in the Abyan governate of Yemen. The attack followed an alleged missile strike on an al Qaeda senior operative, Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso.

18 July 2012: A suicide bomber kills five Israeli tourists and seriously wounds several others in an attack at Burgas airport. The attack was publicly linked to Iran by Israeli politicians.

11 September 2012: The U.S. Ambassador to Libya and four other diplomats are killed when hundreds storm the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi.
Summary

Information technologies are an unavoidable and integral part of the lifestyle of a modern man who is using them fully aware of their usefulness, but frequently without enough information on the threats that directly endanger his own privacy in its narrower but also in its broader sense. In this respect, emphasis should be given to information on the threats accompanying information technologies, with particular attention being paid to the possibilities of the Internet abuse. The Internet as the communications platform of modern man is understood to contain the threat of identity theft, but our particular concern today is the abuse of the internet by terrorist, and primarily jihadist, elements.

The evidence indicates that violent jihadists use the Internet primarily to spread their terrorist ideologies and to encourage terrorist acts, and also as a platform for the recruitment and training of terrorists globally. During the preparation and terrorist attack stages, the Internet has additionally been used as communications infrastructure.

A particular, if at this stage potential, problem with the Internet is the prospect of Cyber terrorism. The (non-terrorist) cyber-attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan illustrated the strength and power of such disruptive measures.

The issues which arise in the field of fighting terrorist Internet abuse are mainly of a legislative and then of an information technology nature, so it is necessary to make legislative and informatics preconditions for efficient combating terrorists by all those in charge of protecting us from the terrorists but also including ourselves.

Creation of a new information infrastructure and reinforcement of the existing one in which the Internet Forensics, as a growing discipline, will have a significant part, is not a small contribution to this struggle.

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Introduction

Ongoing global processes in the world today which have influence on the changes and development of strategic environment are primarily caused by strategic drives such as globalization, political geometry, demographic changes, environmental changes and the influence of new technologies and above all, the Internet.

According to the action and reaction principle, globalization has impact on overall world events, along with political geometry which from the view of partial transfer of sovereignty to the existing and newly-created alliances that go together with evident problems of the collapsed states and appearance of some non-state actors which are often the cause of non-conventional threats as well as the reason for coordinated response of the international organizations and security alliances.

One of the issues is the result of demographic changes and unwanted environmental changes such as global warming. The world is faced with the issue of energy resources regarding the location of the resources but also their supply routes as well as food and soon, water shortage. All previously mentioned is leading to poverty, hunger and diseases and humanitarian interventions and unavoidable migrations as an escape from the mentioned disasters.

New technologies, such as information and communications, biotechnology and nanotechnology and especially the Internet are among those that will also determine global processes and changes. It is their global impact that requires more detailed research along with the attention which should be paid to their abuse by the terrorists.

In the contemporary world information is the power. Therefore, information exchange is a process which directly influences the spreading of this power to all those that we are ready to share it with. One of the consequences of such global processes is establishment of new and preservation and spreading of the existing security alliances.

All those who can provide timely information by means of their own information resources, by bilateral and multilateral information exchange, will be able to prepare themselves for new security threats and challenges brought about by contemporary world processes.

Technical and Law Enforcement Pre-requisites in Fighting the Internet Abuse

In this respect, we should notice growing of new professional disciplines, which in time could become scientific disciplines such as the Internet Forensics. The Internet Forensics is comparatively little known discipline which appeared as a forensics discipline by gradually evolving from computer, i.e. network forensics. The Internet Forensics has moved the focus of attention of computer forensics from individual computers to the Internet. Internet Forensics is a global challenge of finding out the criminal activities and people behind those activities. The very term forensics is directly connected with the investi-
gations into illegal activities of individuals and groups and search for security solutions to overview and protection against the Internet threats, such as from a terrorist organization. Yet, just as in the case of computer forensics, different authors give different definitions of the Internet Forensics, some focusing on methodology deployed by the Internet forensicists, the others on the tools used by the Internet forensicists or on the purpose and reasons for applying the Internet Forensics. By its methods and techniques, the Internet Forensics is aimed at reinforcing our efforts in bringing to justice all those who are flooding us by spams or threaten by different forms of DoS (denial-of-service), DDoS (distributed denial-of-service), DRDoS (distributed reflected denial of service) attacks, etc., to our business activities done via the Internet. It is the Internet Forensics that will help us to discover the identity of the Internet thieves and create pre-conditions for bringing them to justice by means of digital forensics evidence collected from hidden places in emails, web pages, web servers and elsewhere on the Internet. The results obtained are very often used afterwards in building and/or upgrading the systems providing protection from similar threats in future.

To understand general threats coming from the sphere of terrorism, especially the information security-related issues, it is good to start from the wisdom of those who acquired it by considering the security issues seriously and systematically and writing some of it down in books such as “The Art of War” written by Sun Tzu. What I have in mind are the following quotations:

- “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
- “So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.”
- “Knowing the place and time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distance in order to fight.”
- “To win without fight is best.”

If we agree with the thesis that the information means power then we certainly need to work out the protection of the systems which create, store, transmit and supply the authorized persons and those are the information systems as well as infrastructures which globally support them, that is, the Internet.

Strategic frame for combating terrorism is made through the National Strategy for Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, the Republic of Croatia (No.139 of 3rd December, 2008).

Croatia’s legislative frame which secures protection of the information systems from terrorism and other threats includes also EU Convention on Cybercrime and the Information Security Act of 13th July 2007.

Amendments to the Penal Code and to the Criminal Procedure Act of 15th December 2008, based and adjusted to the EU Convention on Prevention of Terrorism, have also contributed to the quality of legal standards at the national level. For example, they introduce in criminal legislation of the Republic
of Croatia a new definition of terrorist act and criminal acts dealing with terrorism which include: recruitment and training for terrorism and public support to terrorism.

The Republic of Croatia, apart from national legislation in the domain of combating terrorism, has taken over the international responsibilities which are not small and include bilateral international cooperation in combating terrorism which is formalized by the treaties with 29 states including, first of all, the neighboring states. It also includes the responsibilities for multilateral cooperation and those taken over from the international organizations whose member state is Croatia, such as the UN, NATO and others, formalized in resolutions, conventions and protocols.

From the aforementioned, it is obvious that the terrorist act can be directly connected with the issue of the information security, i.e. that the information security can be threatened by a terrorist act. In this respect, it is important to study the relationship between the information security and terrorism with the aim to prevent and suppress unwanted situations caused by possible terrorist acts.

**Terrorism – Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow**

Contemporary terrorism is something essentially different from what we understood as terrorism before the events of 9/11/2001. Before 2001, terrorism was in service of the promotion of particular political options, parties, movements, states.

Yet, what terrorism brought us on 9/11 is the internationalization of the terrorist organizations which threatens global security and announces a new bipolarity.

The basic concept of this approach is a struggle which does not want, by means of terrorism, to reach the negotiation situations, new solutions and positions of those who use it, but a big global victory that will be spoken about and promoted through public meetings as well as by media, above all by the Internet.

But if we wonder what we can expect in the future, regarding a further transformation of the organizational form of the terrorist activities, which in accord with Sun Tzu teaching is good to be recognized, we can say that it is definitely a tendency to establish a Global Terrorist Movement (GTM), based on the “Global jihad.”

The claims on such tendencies and likely projects can be supported by some articles and books written by ideologists of terrorism, such as al-Suri’s book “The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance,” published in late 2004, in which the writer on 1600 pages analyzes the issue of jihad in order to justify and promote it.

However, the most recent research conducted by one of the biggest world centers for studying counterterrorism, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the USA, have recognized the tendency and attempts of Al-Qaeda to reshape global terrorist movement. From the part of the conclusion of the re-
search entitled “Exploiting the Fears of Al-Qaeda’s Leadership” by Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Terrorism Studies at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, James J.F. Forest which says: “Al-Qaida operatives are persistent in reshaping global perception that they are a strong movement with cells worldwide,” it is obvious that Al-Qaida really tends to be something similar to it, i.e., first to make an impression and then, most likely, to establish a global terrorist movement in future.

In any case, it is the right moment to find out, and act according to our national saying: There is no smoke without fire, or according to Sun Tzu’s wisdom to spot a threat while still minor, to learn about it, and suppress it.

**Unstable States and Terrorism**

What we can expect to be the first target of the terrorist attacks are unstable states and their “recruiting” by various forms of force including financial one.

This is possible to expect since it is just the unstable states which are faced with serious economic, social and political difficulties, corruption and organized crime, ethnic and religious rivalry, human rights violation, suffering people, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed attempts to carry out reforms—e.g. non-transparent privatizations, dissolution of states and internal or interstate armed conflicts, active or frozen, a low level information safety—the main culprits are training, operational standards and international standardization.

What can be expected is financial expansion of the states whose capital supports the terrorists, especially towards the unstable states which we are currently faced with: financial overdebtiness in the World Bank and other financial institutions of the developed states, corruption and organized crime—connected with the governing structures, non-transparent loan spending, etc. The only way for the country to survive or for the government to maintain power is to provide the money from the rough countries—at least temporarily, for what they are ready to make any concession to their saviors, including political one.

So, global financial crisis will certainly have impact on national, regional and global stability and be favorable for terrorism. It is clear that terrorists see it as their chance and talk explicitly through Al-Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn who announced in a propaganda video of October, 2008 that this terrorist network was going to take advantage of financial crisis to give a decisive blow to “the enemies of Islam.” Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says that Al-Qaeda’s goal is to destroy the “Western lifestyle,” “Al-Qaeda’s propaganda in the past six years has stressed that their goal is – our bankruptcy.”

**The Internet – Promotional, Educational and Recruitment Infrastructure of Terrorism**

Media are the means particularly highly positioned in the terrorist concept with special emphasize on the Internet mainly due to the following features: decentralized infrastructure, easy access and anonymousness, global impact on the world public, fast communication, cheap maintenance and development of
web applications, multimedia possibilities, superiority over traditional mass media that search for information on the Internet when making news.

Yet, due to all the possibilities provided by the Internet and the central position it occupies in national information infrastructure, it should be adequately treated regarding the information security, especially ubiquitous terrorist abuse of the Internet.

The Internet abuse by the terrorist organizations is aimed at creating publicity and propaganda as a form of psychological war in the service of networking, recruiting and mobilization via the Internet forums and similar, data mining of the targets and information exchange, for example about manufacturing of the improvised explosive devices (IED) and providing the means to manufacture them, fundraising for donations, planning and coordination along with preservation of secrecy by coding the messages and communications, for public provocation to commit a terrorist offence.

Frightening is the data obtained through the research project at University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Lab Chen’s “Dark Web,” that there are 500,000,000 terrorist pages and reviews on the Internet today, tens of thousands of them about IED explosive devices.

Concern over the information security threat by terrorists at global, regional and national levels is clear and justified. Very likely and relatively simple to be carried out, the information threat by cyber terrorism is recognized globally by the largest states such as the USA, Japan and others and security alliances such as NATO. In this respect, European states are not less threatened, so it is important to point out their reorganization in the domain of combating cyber terrorism. For example, the German military (Bundeswehr) is training their own hackers to defend themselves from denial-of-service attack.

How big the threat is coming via the Internet regarding encouragement of terrorism is obvious from the invitation to the BH Muslims for the “duty of jihad” which was announced on the Internet portal www.putvjernika.com, on 14th February 2009, being the third serious Internet invitation to BH Muslims in the Bosnian language to join the terrorist actions on the portal registered in the US state of Ohio.

Generally, reviews of the terrorist pages are focused mainly on the following topics: historic development of organizations, list of their activities, terrorist actions, their attitude to social and political issues, biographies of prominent members, information on ideological goals, explicit recognition of the adversaries and their criticism, some web pages include description or video recordings of violent activities of Hezbollah and Hamas and even the handlers of suicide bombers.

Great attention is directed to the target groups: current and potential supporters, sympathizers, international public opinion, special emphasize is on interaction with journalists and multilingual approach to the contents, to the enemies, their demoralization and creation of the sense of guilt undermining in this manner the support of the public to the governments of the adversary
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states, making internal enemies in the adversary states, i.e. making pre-conditions to establish GTM.

It is possible, for example, to find a terrorism recruiting manual on the Internet in which the authors Brian Fishman and Abdullah Warius teach how to radicalize and organize new generations of terrorist operatives. The 51-page-long manual Abu 'Amr al-Qaidi “A Course in the Art of Recruitment,” is made to enable less trained jihadists for recruiting entirely independently and be successful in recruiting secular and modest Muslims into the Jihadist movement.

Since global recession is favorable to various types of extremism, western countries will not be spared, either. So, the US Department of Homeland Security stresses that their problem is rightist extremism. In their opinion, rightist extremists in the USA could take advantage of the economy recession and the election of the first president of African origin to recruit new members. What is also favorable to the rightist extremists are the forced sales of the houses and apartments, unemployment and insolvency which might create a fertile soil for recruiting that sort of extremists.

War veterans could become recruiting targets thanks to their war experience, particularly those who have problems with returning to civil life. Also, new regulations proposed on carrying and possessing arms could cause discontent among the members of the rightist organizations. At the same time, some conservative commentators criticized these warnings claiming that it was the case of criminalization of political discontent of the citizens and suffocating the freedom of speech.

Conclusion

Despite many legal provisions which today enable the establishment of a high level of information security, one part of the information infrastructure still remains in the legal and formal vacuum, and that is the Internet. The Internet may have no boundaries, but law enforcement does. All of the use of the Internet by terrorists that we see today is not possible to easily prevent due to its global character, and the non-existence of global and generally accepted legal norms to regulate the Internet. Such norms should have an international character – at the level of UNSC resolutions, conventions or protocols, and would apply the same standard to everything that is accessible via the Internet. All the above-mentioned points are the grounds to start the initiative to establish the International law of the Internet – similar in nature to the International Law of the Sea. Namely, just as the sea is global, the ubiquitous dimension of the Internet is global, too. But unlike the sea, the Internet washes all the world states; there are no countries without an Internet “coastline.” These Internet norms should be observed by the states that host the Internet providers, first of all regarding their authority and responsibilities for monitoring the contents and services and then the authority to react and sanction.

This effort represents a major legal challenge to the international community and, at the same time, if effective legislation can be agreed on, would provide a major contribution to combating global terrorism, especially concerning
the terrorist abuse of the Internet which is a worldwide battlefield of ideas, aimed at establishing a transnational terrorist movement. The complexity of this demand starts from the legal requirement of maintaining an admittedly difficult balance between democratic freedom and the restriction of absolute freedom on the Internet, in order to prevent and suppress the advantages that this means of communication provides terrorist adherents on a daily basis.

References

Chapter 4

A Comprehensive Approach to Cyber Security – Trends, Challenges and the Way Forward

Raphael Perl and Nemanja Malisevic

Growing dependence on information technology (IT) and increasing interconnection of critical (information) infrastructures have made a secure cyberspace vital to the functioning of a modern state. Consequently, cyber threats or “cyber terrorism” remain one of the crucial concerns to be addressed by decision makers – not just political decision makers, but those from industry and civil society as well. This chapter will showcase how dependency on cyberspace is increasing and outline cyber security threats not only to governments and industry but also to the individual Internet user. Specific challenges to cyber security will be highlighted and concrete options offered on how such challenges can best be addressed by implementing an OSCE-type comprehensive approach to cyber security.  

Dependency on Cyberspace is Increasing

Exactly how dependent on cyberspace are we, really? In June 2008, the numbers of personal computers in use worldwide hit one billion, while another one billion are expected to be in use by 2014. These computers are operated by more than a billion and a half users worldwide. Much of what most people—at least in the developed world—would describe as “normal everyday life” is to-

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2 Note that this chapter addresses cyber threats emanating from terrorists and other criminals only. It will not cover cyber-espionage and cyber-war – namely conflict in and for control of cyberspace among nation states. These issues are beyond the OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit’s present mandate.

3 www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=703807.

day based on information technology and cyberspace running smoothly in the background – be it in the home, the car or the office.

But not everybody is convinced that they are directly dependent on the Internet: According to a recent EU study, one third of all Europeans have never used the net. The same study showed that one in four has never even used a PC. Some claimed that they had no need for an Internet connection while others said they simply could not afford one. Europeans above the age of 65 and the unemployed were least active online.\(^5\)

However, that same EU study also noted that in 2008 56% of EU citizens had become regular Internet users – up one third since 2004. Importantly, more than 80% of those users had installed a high-speed Internet connection, compared to some 30% in 2004. According to the study, nearly 70% of EU citizens under the age of 24 used the Internet every day, compared to the EU average of 43%.

While the above represents only a small sample, the trend is clear: Use of the Internet and dependency on cyberspace is increasing. It is unrealistic to expect modern society to overcome its reliance on information technology and cyberspace. Clearly, for the current generation and the next ones, at least those in the developed world, their way of life, both in terms of work and leisure is intrinsically linked to cyberspace. Their dependency on cyberspace is increasing continuously and exponentially!

Ironically, as with anything one takes for granted, modern societies may only realize just how dependent they have become on the cyber infrastructures and related services—such as the Global Positioning System or digital communication—when they crash.\(^6\)

Try and think of any infrastructure, service or commodity that could function without it. Saying one could live a modern life without cyberspace is akin to saying: “There was a time before electricity, and we were fine then, too.” Or a time without running water. Imagine one actually had to live without running water and electricity. Sure, one would survive, but one’s priorities and daily routines would change. Life, as one knows it, would change. And that is exactly what would happen, if cyberspace were to be disrupted in a meaningful way.

Modern societies simply can no longer function, in the way we are used to, without a functioning cyberspace. Terrorists and other criminals are increasingly grasping this, too. As a result, the main challenge for cyber security practitioners is to raise awareness of decision makers and create sufficient will to address cyber security in a comprehensive manner.

And to do it before a large-scale cyber attack occurs.


Recent Trends and Developments

Looking at cyber threats, what are some recent trends and developments? To cite but a few:

1. Cyber criminals are increasingly operating akin to successful businesses.
2. Command-and-control systems remain vulnerable.
3. New technologies create innovative attack vectors.
4. Threats to mobile devices are increasing.
5. Attacks on legitimate websites are increasing.
6. Volume of SPAM is increasing.
7. Attacks on social networking sites are increasing.
8. Volume of spear phishing is increasing.
9. Lack of user awareness combined with negligence leads to loss of sensitive data.
10. Cyber infrastructures may be more vulnerable than is traditionally believed.

1. Cyber criminals are increasingly operating akin to successful businesses

Cyber criminals are increasingly operating akin to successful businesses—incorporating practices used by the private sector, including resource sharing, specialisation, co-operation and co-ordination—with the overall aim of maximising profits.7

2. Command-and-control systems remain vulnerable

Attacks on command-and-control systems of critical infrastructures remain a concern. For example, a recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) report warns that unless “effective action is taken quickly, it is likely to be a matter of when, not if, ATC (air traffic control) systems encounter attacks that do serious harm to ATC operations.” Among other cases it outlines a cyber attack on FAA computers in Alaska in August 2008. Hackers seized control and by exploiting the network’s interconnection stole an administrator’s password and took control of a domain controller in the Western Pacific region, thereby gaining access

to more than 40,000 login credentials used to control part of the FAA’s mission support network.8

3. New technologies create innovative attack vectors

The number of instances is rising where in addition to using key loggers to record the victims’ keystrokes, cyber criminals take control of webcams – sound included. Many computers today already contain built-in webcams and such cameras will likely be a standard feature in all computers of the future. Therefore, these recent cases may well only represent the tip of the iceberg.9 Moreover, the thirst for and the availability of instant news in cyberspace is another attack vector exploited by cyber criminals. For example, hiding malicious software in emails that appear to be linked to major news stories is becoming increasingly popular among cyber evildoers. Recent examples include malicious code hidden in emails posing as news on the swine flu or President Obama’s inauguration speech.

4. Threats to mobile devices are increasing

Mobile device threats such as smishing are another threat vector that is expected to become more prevalent. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that several billion handsets are already in use worldwide.10

5. Attacks on legitimate websites are increasing

A recent report by Cisco predicted a surge in attacks on legitimate websites. In fact, their data showed that, already, exploited websites are responsible for nearly 90% of web-based threats.11

6. Volume of SPAM is increasing

Cisco estimates that, currently, almost 200 billion messages per day—or approximately 90 percent of all electronic mail sent worldwide—can be defined as spam.12 According to a recent Microsoft security report more than 97% of all e-mails sent over the net are unwanted.13 Many of these emails contain mali-

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
cious code or are sent with malicious intent. And even though most never reach our inboxes, the sheer volume guarantees that many still get through.

7. **Attacks on social networking sites are increasing**

As a general rule, cyber criminals follow the user. They commonly target software that is used by the majority of users and routinely target those websites attracting the most people. As a consequence, one can expect a continuous increase in attacks on social networking sites. The Kaspersky Lab Research Centre found that cyber criminals who used sites like Facebook, MySpace and Twitter to spread viruses and worms were *ten times* more successful in their attacks than if they had used email.14

8. **Volume of (spear) phishing is increasing**

According to an April 2009 study from Gartner Research, more than 5 million Americans alone lost money to phishing schemes in 2008, a 40% increase from the year before, although the average amount lost in each scam decreased, largely due to strengthened bank safeguards.15 Highly targeted phishing attacks—so called “spear phishing”—continue to be particularly effective even against users who have previously participated in user-awareness training. Moreover, cyber criminals are, it seems, using spear phishing to increasingly target small business accounts.16

9. **Lack of user awareness combined with negligence leads to loss of sensitive data**

Many users still have not grasped the concept that pressing “delete” does not permanently remove data from their machines. In one recent study, of 300 hard disks bought randomly at computer fairs and an online auction site, 34% still held personal data. Shockingly, this data included sensitive information for shooting down intercontinental missiles, bank details and the UK’s National Health Service (NHS).17 Combined with all the USB-sticks and laptops lost worldwide, the amount of sensitive information that is lost every year is concerning, indeed.

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10. Cyber infrastructures may be more vulnerable than is traditionally believed

Events which unfolded after the death of Michael Jackson provided insight into just how fragile the cyber infrastructure can be – at least in certain circumstances: When the news broke such large amounts of people rushed online to double-check, contact their friends or just express their feelings that many sites and services slowed down significantly. Some even crashed. Examples include Google News, Twitter, Wikipedia and AOL’s instant messenger service. Clearly, the cyber infrastructure is vulnerable, if not fragile – under certain circumstances. This did not go unnoticed among cyber criminals and terrorists.

Challenges

With the above in mind, what are some of the challenges when responding to the aforementioned developments and trends?

1. Security was not a priority when the cyber infrastructure was created.
2. Research on key cyber security questions is lacking.
3. Cyberspace favours the aggressor and not the defender.
4. High-level expertise on cyber attacks is likely spreading.
5. Skill required to conduct cyber attacks is decreasing.
6. Likelihood of cyber attacks by terrorist groups is increasing.
7. Classification of cyber attacks as “weapons of mass disruption” is confusing.
8. Threat of a combined cyber- and physical attack is increasing.
9. No universally accepted legal framework for dealing with cyber threats exists.
10. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are still lacking.

1. Security was not a priority when the cyber infrastructure was created

Much of the challenge in keeping cyberspace safe, secure and functional derives from the fact that security was not a priority when the Internet was created. Instead, the focus was on redundancy, efficiency and interoperability.

2. Research on key cyber security questions is lacking

Another challenge lies in the fact that societies, in general, are uncomfortable dealing with issues they do not clearly understand or cannot control. Unfortunately, in terms of cyber security, there is actually quite a lot we do not understand.

- We do not know exactly how dependent we are on IT infrastructures.
- We do not know exactly how robust our Internet infrastructure is.
• We do not know exactly how much damage cybercrime does annually.
• We do not know exactly how far terrorists are in terms of developing cyber capabilities.

The list goes on.

Much speculation exists, but not enough factual knowledge. Focused research is required to shed light on the above questions.

3. **Cyberspace favors the aggressor and not the defender**

A key challenge is the immense difficulty in locating the origin of a cyber attack. As a result, attribution remains virtually impossible. As long as law-enforcement authorities cannot locate *with certainty* the origin of a cyber attack, cyber terrorists and all other cyber criminals have a decisive advantage – cyberspace presently favours the aggressor and not the defender.

4. **High-level expertise on cyber attacks is likely spreading**

Another challenge is that the current economic situation has already led to many qualified people losing their jobs in all walks of life – including people with considerable IT skills. Much concern exists that, if the current economic crisis continues, unemployed IT specialists may sell their skills to the highest bidder – potentially even to criminal or terrorist groups.

5. **Skill required to conduct cyber attacks is decreasing**

Linked to Challenge # 4 is an additional overarching challenge: Evidence clearly suggests that, on the whole, it is constantly becoming easier to conduct cyber attacks. Thousands of websites dedicated to hacking exist. Many of them not only offer the necessary tools of the trade for download, but also contain detailed descriptions and how-to manuals. In short, with the tools that are available today people with little or no IT experience can commit crimes online. It takes about 20 minutes to set up all the necessary programmes to steal music, movies, and games via one’s computer. It takes a little longer to set up a botnet but, as was not too long ago even illustrated by the BBC in their show *Click*, it is not all that difficult.

The challenge posed by this trend is very worrisome. More and more people will eventually realise just how easy it is to conduct cyber attacks. These will be people who would never rob a store, a bank or somebody else in the street. But if they could attack from the comfort of their homes without ever having to look their victims in the eyes … who knows?

6. **Likelihood of cyber attacks by terrorist groups is increasing**

Disagreement exists among experts over the likelihood of a cyber-attack by terrorists. In particular, some argue that terrorist groups have neither the necessary resources nor the skills to conduct large-scale cyber-attacks, namely attacks which would disrupt critical infrastructure or critical information infrastructure in a significant way.
However, terrorist groups—in addition to engaging in activities such as identifying, recruiting and training new members, collecting and transferring funds, organizing terrorist acts, and inciting terrorist violence—have shown their clear intent to study hacking and cyber attacks. Data found on seized hard-drives proves this.

Some terrorists are already abusing cyberspace for profit, akin to “ordinary” cyber-criminals. They include people like Younis Tsouli, better known as Ir-habi007, who was jailed in July 2007 in the UK on terrorism charges. Tsouli, in addition to his cyber-activities in support of Al-Qaeda, was also engaged in credit card fraud.

To date a major cyber-attack has not been conducted by terrorists. However, cybercrime remains on the rise: Cyber criminals continue to find new and improved ways to abuse information technology and cyberspace. Although most individuals who engage in these types of activities are “ordinary” criminals or, at times, pranksters rather than terrorists, their actions continue to set precedents. Or even “proofs of concept.”

What this phenomenon demonstrates is that, as previously mentioned, the relevant expertise to conduct cyber attacks is available and it is growing, both in terms of depth and dissemination. It also means that terrorists can acquire such expertise, through money, violence or the threat of violence, or even their own diligence. Regardless of which path evildoers choose, the technology and the related techniques to do harm cannot be contained and—as with every other type of expertise—eventually those who have it may likely be tempted to use it. At least once!

The challenge countries and individuals alike face is that “at least once” may just be once too many for much of the world’s economy. Every precedent, every cyber-attack, regardless of its individual background and the motivation of the individual perpetrator is something that can be copied by terrorists.

7. Classification of cyber attacks as “weapons of mass disruption” is confusing

Another challenge is one of definition: Cyber attacks are often classified as “weapons of mass disruption” as opposed to “weapons of mass destruction.” What exactly does this mean? What purpose does such a distinction serve? Human casualties aside or whether an IT service or infrastructure is disrupted or destroyed, the key point is that said infrastructure cannot be used. Disrupted or destroyed only refers to the time it may take to rebuild it or to get it going again. If a cyber attack on a critical infrastructure were to be conducted over an ongoing and extended time period the effect would be akin to that infrastructure being destroyed.

Imagine a bombing attack on a pipeline or a container shipment. It would disrupt the supply chain. Now imagine a cyber attack on the computers of the port handling the container or on the command-and-control centre that regu-

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18 Geers, “The Cyber Threat to National Critical Infrastructures.”
lates how much oil or gas is pumped through the pipeline. Again, the supply chain would be disrupted. A cyber attack, in this example, achieves the same effect as a conventional attack, just by different means.

Obviously, a pure cyber attack—at least for the time being—still does not have the same potential for human casualties as the detonation of a bomb. However, it needs to be understood that terrorism is not only about killing. It never was.

Terrorism, as a method, is about inflicting harm on any number of people to scare a much larger audience, including governments, in order to influence them into taking or abstaining from certain policies or actions. Terrorism is about forcing people to change their way of life. Clearly, dealing with the effects of a large-scale cyber attack would force many people to change their way of life—at least temporarily.

8. Threat of a combined cyber- and physical attack is increasing

Another potential challenge is posed by a combined cyber- and physical attack. Think about damage caused by cyber attacks in both physical and economic terms. What if a series of cyber attacks were coupled with strategically placed bombs, or with a series of biological, chemical, or radiological attacks? Such attacks, in particular on critical infrastructure would have devastating effects on large parts of the population—also in terms of psychological effects.

A cyber attack, coupled with strategically placed bombs. Such a combined real-world/cyber attack remains the biggest threat. And it may only be a question of time.

The fact that cyber-terrorists currently use methods pioneered by cyber-criminals and hackers to communicate or make a profit does not limit their potential activities to these fields. It may only be a question of time until they use cyber-attacks to either increase the effect of a more traditional terrorist attack—for example a bombing—or cause large scale damage to the information infrastructure or critical infrastructures in general.¹⁹ The potential for economic and possibly even human damage is immense.

Some argue that a terrorist attack on critical information infrastructure or the Internet itself is unlikely because terrorists themselves depend on it. We would counter that relying on terrorists not attacking an infrastructure they themselves depend on is very risky—one just needs to look at civil aviation or public transport.

9. No universally accepted legal framework for dealing with cyber threats exists

On a multilateral level, no agreement exists on how to effectively enhance cyber

¹⁹ This concerns in particular electrical power systems, telecommunication systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems and emergency services. See Marco Gercke, “Cyberterrorism: How Terrorists Use the Internet,” Computer und Recht (2008).
security. The OSCE has been promoting, among other issues, the ratification and implementation of various anti-terrorism instruments – among them the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Convention on Cybercrime (2001) and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005). Both instruments are open for accession by non-members of the CoE.

However, some OSCE participating States have been calling for the creation of another international instrument dealing specifically with terrorist use of the Internet. This is of particular importance in relation to a much overlooked issue, namely Article 27 Paragraph 4a of Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (2001) which allows for a requested party to refuse assistance if “the request concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence.” Such a “political exception clause” is always problematic for those who seek to bring terrorists to justice.

Importantly, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) does not allow for such a political exception (Article 20, paragraph 1) for terror motivated cybercrimes. Moreover, it criminalizes public provocation to commit a terrorist offence (Article 5) as well as recruitment (Article 6) and training for terrorism (Article 7), which are, of course, some of the key reasons why terrorists use the Internet.

In theory, therefore, both instruments together—and only together—provide a good framework for countering terrorist use of the Internet. In reality, however, many states face certain challenges in becoming parties to these conventions. Today only about a dozen countries worldwide are party to both instruments.

10. Public-Private Partnerships are still lacking

Systematic consultation and co-ordination with private sector experts, academia and civil society is still lacking. Industry expertise and academic research, in particular, could bring large benefits during the drafting of national cyber security strategies and during the elaboration of any new law aimed at tackling cyber threats. For example, some countries’ inadequate laws on dealing with encryption could have been significantly improved had the private sector and academia been consulted beforehand.

The bottom line is that many challenges exist and that individuals, businesses and countries need to be better prepared.

Need for a Comprehensive Approach to Cyber Security

Why is a comprehensive approach to cyber security needed and how can it be accomplished?

Arguably, the best option to address the challenges to our cyber security by terrorists and other criminals is to implement a comprehensive approach to cyber security – an approach (a) that strengthens national security; (b) that tackles cybercrime, and (c) terrorist use of the Internet; (d) that is responsive
to a wide variety of risks and threats; and (e) that enables countries to protect a wide spectrum of targets ranging from the individual Internet user to critical infrastructures.

Why is such a comprehensive approach so important?

✓ Because there is only one cyberspace

The cyberspace we use at work and during our free time is the same our children use to play videogames or chat with friends. It is also the very same cyberspace abused by cyber criminals and terrorists.

Cyber evildoers share common methods of cyber attack even if their goals and motivations differ. They learn from each other and, as mentioned above, often work together. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the international community lacks a shared and common response. All too often it is divided and firewalled in the use of resources, expertise, functional jurisdictions and legal frameworks.

It is therefore crucial for the international community to implement a comprehensive approach to cyber security as soon as possible. Cyber security needs to be an intrinsic part of any state’s national security considerations and planning – and a comprehensive approach is the only viable option for national authorities and the international community to ensure long-term and sustainable cyber security.

Options for Consideration

How can the aforementioned cyber security challenges potentially be tackled?

Participants at OSCE expert workshops on the topic have identified a series of policy options for decision makers, some of which include:

1. International co-operation should be improved & the role of RO/IOs strengthened.
2. The international legal framework should be strengthened.
3. Computer Emergency Response Teams should be established.
4. Critical Infrastructure protection should be improved.
5. Baseline questions for critical infrastructure protection should be established.
6. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) should be improved.
7. The role of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should to be clarified.
8. Research on cyber security threats should be conducted.
9. Traditional law-enforcement practices should also be used against cyber-threats.
10. End-user education should be improved.
1. **International co-operation should be improved and the role of RO/IOs strengthened**

International co-operation remains crucial. As cyber-threats are truly global threats, effective responses need global co-ordination. Countries should establish and maintain reliable and knowledgeable contacts, in particular as many investigations into cyber crimes and cyber threats are highly time sensitive. To enhance international co-operation a constructive dialogue on a multi-lateral level and using all available and appropriate fora, including International and Regional Organizations should be sought.

2. **The international legal framework should be strengthened**

Existing laws pertaining to cyber security should be harmonised and universally implemented. No agreement exists whether present international and regional legal instruments, including the CoE’s Convention on Cybercrime (2001) and the CoE Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005), provide a legal framework adequate for dealing with modern threats to cyber security or whether new specific instruments may need to be adopted for this purpose. Focussed discussion on this topic should be promoted.

3. **Computer Emergency Response Teams should be established**

All countries should establish specialised Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) or Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) and continuously train their staff in the latest trends and developments pertaining to cyber security. Moreover, specialized units within law enforcement agencies should be established and provided with the necessary means and standardized training for the investigation of serious criminal offenses committed through the Internet. Law-enforcement agencies should also establish mechanisms to systematically share information, best practices and lessons learned.

4. **Critical Infrastructure protection should be improved**

Critical infrastructure protection should take into account physical threats as well as cyber threats. Vital command-and-control systems need to be protected through appropriate technical measures and maintained by adequately trained staff. For the most critical infrastructures, “air-gapping” of at least the backup systems should be considered. Staff should be trained in password protection and, if necessary, other means of authentication should be installed. Particular focus should be placed on countering the threat posed by “insiders” – cyber-measures may not be enough to counter this particular threat. Thorough background checks, vetting and individual accountability procedures should be established. Overall, stricter regulation of cyberspace may be necessary with regard to critical infrastructure protection.
5. **Baseline questions for critical infrastructure protection should be established**

The majority of critical infrastructures are very resilient and strong, having been designed not only to allow for human error but to withstand natural disasters as well. Nonetheless, some experts argue that national security planners should aim to answer, at a minimum the three following questions and follow-up as necessary: (1) How dependent is the country’s critical infrastructure on IT? (2) To what degree is said critical infrastructure connected to (and dependent upon) the Internet? (3) In theory, what would the most successful cyber attack against this infrastructure look like, and would it rise to the level of a national security threat.20

6. **Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) should be improved**

PPPs are critically important – not only because the private sector researches, designs, develops, builds and maintains many of the most commonly used information technologies, but also because many of the world’s critical infrastructures are, in fact, owned by industry, often with the main goal of turning a profit and being cost efficient rather than being as secure as possible. As a result, incentives may have to be provided to the private sector to address this issue.21 Moreover, expertise as well as technical knowledge available from the private sector and academia should be sought and utilised in a systematic manner, in particular when new legislation is drafted in this area. This would ensure that such laws are adequate and useful. Similarly, civil society representatives should be involved in initiatives which foster end-user education and in efforts to counter terrorist messages online.

7. **The role of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be clarified**

The international community also needs to reach agreement on the roles and responsibilities of ISPs in efforts to comprehensively enhance cyber security. Governments need to give clear guidance to ISPs so that they can contribute to national and international cyber security efforts. In particular, guidelines are required regulating the data ISP’s should store, for how long and who should have access to such data.

8. **More research on cyber security threats should be conducted**

A need exists for the promotion of more focused research on cyber security threats. One long-term priority should be development of technologies to enable law enforcement to locate the origin of a cyber attack – in line with clear legal frameworks that provide guidance when and by whom these technologies

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20 Geers, “The Cyber Threat to National Critical Infrastructures.”

can lawfully be used. The international community needs to ensure that cyber evildoers know and fear that negative consequences exist for their actions online.

9. **Traditional law-enforcement practices should also be used against cyber-threats**

Online problems may not always have online solutions. Moreover, the experience of well trained people cannot be replaced by technology. While attempting to stay ahead of the technology-vulnerability curve, countries should not disregard tools which were used prior to the IT revolution. Even if terrorists do not make technical mistakes in cyberspace, they can still make mistakes in the real world. For example, the infamous *Irhabi007* was apprehended through traditional detective work and not through a trace in cyberspace. Consequently, traditional law-enforcement cooperation also needs to be continuously strengthened.

10. **End-user education should be improved**

Enhancing end-user education is critically important as well and should be significantly improved (see below). Many forms of cybercrime take advantage of—and frequently even depend on—the fact that most Internet users do not take all possible precautions to make their machines and accounts as secure and as impenetrable as possible.

**Need for Improved End-user Education**

Investing into new technologies, setting up CERT’s, training specialised staff—these are all very necessary steps. But for most cyber threats, the key step that all countries need to take is to significantly raise awareness and improve end-user education. Educational efforts should emphasise that many easy steps exist which each and every user can take to stop their computers and accounts from being hacked or hijacked, or at least make it much more difficult for all criminals, whatever their motivation, to do so.

Cyber criminals are taking advantage of a growing pool of users who do not keep their machines and accounts as secure as possible – the “Conficker” worm, which infected millions of PCs in mere days, is a case in point.

Too often security measures are only implemented after the user has become a victim. However, neither industry nor the international community can afford to wait until everybody has a bad experience before they become more vigilant against cyber threats.

Clearly, central here is raising awareness of political decision-makers about the need for end-user education – and it is here that regional organizations such as the OSCE can be of particular value by providing a platform for networking and information exchange.

Every uneducated user, every unprotected computer, every unsecure network is a weak link begging to be exploited. In the real world, we tend to look
out for ourselves. Online, we need not only to better protect ourselves, but also our cyber neighbours. In this way all of us can contribute to making the Internet more secure. Because in a cyberspace where users are not security aware and their machines not secure, nobody is safe!

**Summary and Conclusion**

In conclusion, it is clear that along with contemporary society’s dependency on information technology and cyberspace, the threat posed by terrorist and criminal use of the Internet is growing. In particular, increasing concern exists over the potential threat posed by combined real-world and cyber attacks. Continued and enhanced international co-operation is crucial in addressing this threat and international and regional organizations can play a key role to establish, foster and strengthen such co-operation.

There is only one cyberspace. No matter from where we access the world-wide-web, the cyberspace we navigate is one and the same. An attack on this cyberspace, any attack, whatever its background or motivation is an attack on all of us as it affects us collectively as Internet users in an increasingly IT dependent world. A comprehensive approach to cyber security is therefore the only reasonable way forward – an approach (a) that strengthens national security; (b) that tackles cybercrime, and (c) terrorist use of the Internet; (d) that is responsive to a wide variety of risks and threats; and (e) that enables countries to protect a wide spectrum of targets ranging from the individual Internet user to critical infrastructures.

Such a comprehensive approach to cyber security is the only way to achieve the long-term goal of making cyberspace as safe and secure as possible – and to ensure that it remains that way.
Chapter 5

After Bin Laden: Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication to Enlarge the Community of Believers

Carsten Bockstette

Introduction

On May 1st 2011, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda, bin Laden, was killed in a counter terrorist operation. One year earlier, in May 1st 2010, Mr. Faisal Shahzad, a thirty year old Pakistani legal immigrant to the United States, tried to blow up a car bomb parked on Times Square, one of the busiest areas of New York City. For technical reasons, the bomb failed to properly ignite. This unsuccessful attack demonstrated once again the ability of the terrorist cause to recruit self-radicalized adherents.

In this instance, the self-radicalization happened partially due to the effective use of strategic communication. For al-Qaeda, strategic communication is a vital part of its asymmetrical war fighting campaign. Countering this threat requires knowledge of what motivates, feeds, and “sanctions” radical Islamist terrorists and their followers. Research and analysis of the root causes and underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of terrorism—including the propaganda strategies of terrorists—are vital to shaping appropriate countermeasures to the threat from radical Islamist terrorism. The mass media, and especially the Internet, have become the key enablers and the main strategic communication assets for terrorists and have ensured them a favorable communication asymmetry. With these assets, terrorists are able to compensate for a significant part of their unfavorable asymmetry as measured in conventional military power. Al-Qaeda-networked terrorists place a great deal of emphasis on developing comprehensive communication strategies in order to reach their desired short-, mid-, and long-term goals, as well as their desired end states. They craft their strategies based on careful audience analysis, and adapt their messages and delivery methods accordingly, adhering to the fundamental rules

1 Dr. Bockstette, German Bundeswehr officer, has served in CTWG, and is a specialist in terrorism who has lectured at the NATO school and other defense institutions.
underlying any communication or public relations campaign. Their skillful use of the mass media, cell phones and the Internet to compensate for asymmetrical disadvantages has enabled them to keep generating new generations of radical Islamist terrorists.

The recent fusion of terrorist messages with the global mass media has allowed terrorism to take on a worldwide dimension. For the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets or iconic symbols. Such acts are intended to send a message to a local, national, or global community from a non-statist illicit, clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as a force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in pursuit of short- and mid-term political goals and/or desired long-term end states.

As has been observed by Brian Jenkins and others, terrorists do not primarily aim at producing maximum physical damage with their attacks, but, rather, strive for the greatest possible psychological effect. Terrorism uses a strategy that primarily relies on the symbolic strength of the act. Thus terror does not primarily serve the purposes of fighting, injuring, or destroying the opponent; rather, its primary purpose lies in the conveying of messages to the target audience(s). Terrorists perpetrate their acts without regard for the conventions of warfare. The symbolism originating from terrorist acts and the media marketing thereof is intended to address the broad public, to use them as a vehicle and a communication channel to influence the political representatives/decision makers and other target audiences like potential recruits. Al-Qaeda offers a coherent worldview with a simplistic, unitary explanation of ostensibly disparate phenomena that neatly packages the potential recruit’s frustrations with the struggles of Muslims across the globe. In these messages, there are only two choices: continue to suffer, or join the jihadists and fight the oppressor.

In this context, I define strategic communication as the systematic planning and realization of information flow, communication, media development, and image care with a long-term horizon. Strategic communication conveys deliberate messages through the most suitable media to designated audiences at the appropriate time to contribute to and achieve the desired long-term effect. It has to bring three factors into balance: the messages, the media channels, and the audiences.

This kind of terrorism is ostensibly motivated by an extreme, literal interpretation of Islam. Its practitioners regard the use of violence as a divine duty or sacramental act (EUROPOL 2007). Al-Qaeda’s self-proclaimed goal is to reinvigorate the Islamic Ummah and to mobilize the Muslim community in a revolutionary transformation of the Muslim world population to participate in a confrontation with the international order embodied by Western society. Al-Qaeda, and like-minded groups, strive for the creation of a new global Islamic caliphate, which Islamist terrorists widely consider to be the ideal Islamic form
of government to represent the political unity and leadership of the Muslim world. Relying on successful agitation and increasingly self-radicalization, they strive to expand the Ummah. In a 2006 interview, the al-Qaeda ideologue and second-in-command Abu Musab-al Zarqawi explained the jihadists’ goal thus:

“Our political agenda, … is that of the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him), I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour, until Allah is worshipped alone … this is what determines our political goal. We fight in the way of Allah, until the law of Allah is implemented, and the first step is to expel the enemy, then establish the Islamic state, then we set forth to conquer the lands of Muslims to return them back to us, then after that, we fight the kuffar (unbelievers) until they accept one of the three. I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour; this is our political agenda.”

**Short-term Goals**

In the short term, the terrorists’ primary aim is to enlarge the scope of their supportive patronage. Therefore, the persuasion and self-radicalization of receptive global Muslim audiences via the heightening of an Islamic identity in confrontation with the West is one of their primary short-term goals. As Brian Michael Jenkins illustrates, “the recruiting vocabulary focuses on humiliation, shame and guilt, contrasted with dignity, duty and honor.” Or, as John Venhaus notes: “The al-Qaeda legend portrays the group as the acme of jihad, and this legend is its greatest asset. It is a glorious, wispy presence, just out of reach, which only the most dedicated, most committed, and purest of heart can hope to obtain.”

In addition, the terrorists exploit troop presents and their military action in the Muslim world in order to implement their media strategy. The presence of troops and their actions produce the desired graphic footage of “occupation of Islamic nations” like Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of the Caucasus that furthers their media-centered strategy. It thrives on emotive images and words about every innocent civilian killed by Western bombs transmitted via television and the Internet, producing intense antipathy towards the West. Building on this sentiment, the terrorists can more effectively call for the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries. Therefore, even though it is an obvious contradiction, another of their stated short-term goals is to drive those they call invaders from Muslim nations.

**Intermediate and Long-term Goals**

In the mid-term, al-Qaeda’s goals include the removal of all political leaders who currently govern secular Muslim states and the elimination of the state of Israel. The terrorists’ aim is to install supportive Islamic regimes and transform the current fractious political landscape of the Muslim world from a decentralized network organization to a massive Islamic movement that strives toward their desired end state. The 2011 Arab Spring is the opposite of what al-Qaeda strives for. Like Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, a leading ideologist of the Caucasus
Emirates Jihadist Network, stated in 2010: “In the near future we can assume that after the liberation of the Caucasus, Jihad will begin in Idel-Ural and (...) all these lands will again be a united state living only by the law of Allah – the Caliphate.”

Al-Qaeda’s primary long-term goal is to restore a devout Islamic caliphate by politically unifying all countries that have a Muslim majority into an Islamic realm through a monolithic Islamic religious and social movement. The desired end state is the caliphate’s rule worldwide. Al-Qaeda’s communication strategy is inseparable from their political strategy, as their terrorism and rhetoric alike work toward their common goals and desired end state. Consequently, their communication goals are based on their short-, mid-, and long-term goals. Their primary long-term strategic communication goal is the propagation and enlargement of their movement through the global dissemination of information among receptive Muslim audiences and potential converts to expand the Ummah. The terrorist communication strategy aims ultimately at a fundamental restructuring of the political discourse and identity of the Islamic world.

The legitimization of al-Qaeda’s movement and methods—establishing its social and religious viability while they engage in violent acts—requires a continuous communication effort. Their violent methods and the killing of innocent people inevitably face contradictions with some of the core tenets of Islam. This built-in drag on the organization’s legitimacy can in the long run only be circumvented through an unceasing communication effort in which, as Weimann notes, “Violence is presented as a necessity foisted upon the weak as the only means with which to respond to an oppressive enemy.” Therefore, legitimacy and the ostensible demonstration of compliance with Islamic law are prominent in their communication strategy. The utopia of their aimed-for end state and their Islamist-jihadist worldview fulfills a significant purpose: the utopia is not only the goal of their violent action, but also its moral and religious justification. They try to portray their movement as one made up of freedom fighters, forced against their will to use violence due to a ruthless enemy that is crushing the rights and dignity of their community. They communicate the messages to reinvigorate a pan-Muslim identity with a vengeful defiant underdog narrative in which Islam is under constant and global attack. This makes legitimatization of their terroristic deeds their second strategic communication goal.

The coercion and intimidation of opponents both nearby and abroad is al-Qaeda’s third main strategic communication goal. The near enemy is composed of apostates, or secular Muslim regimes, especially ones that receive Western (in the case of the Caucasus-Russian) support. The far enemy is, in their view, made up of Jews, unbelievers, and Western society as a whole. They try to manipulate the near enemy in order to reach their mid-term political goal of removing the near enemy from power. They also try to intimidate the far enemy into a complete withdrawal from the Muslim world and a removal of support from secular Muslim regimes (i.e., “the near enemy”). The effective propagation
of the desired end state—global rule by a devout Islamic caliphate—is the all-embracing long-term communication goal.

**Communication Infrastructure**

During the 1990s, al-Qaeda communicated with their audience using more traditional means, such as storytelling, journalist interviews, fax, face-to-face propaganda, and even press conferences. At the end of 1998, there was a shift in the primary means of strategic communications due to technological advances and the rise of the Al-Jazeera television network. Al-Jazeera became a channel for broadcasting al-Qaeda’s messages to the Muslim world, and would then provide the tapes to CNN and other international news organizations. To a certain extent, the media mutated from its role as a critical observer and reporter and, perhaps unwittingly, came to play an increasingly active role as a conflict participant.

After 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda expanded its communication infrastructure and methods of communication considerably. Importantly, that year saw the formation of the As-Sahab (The Cloud) Islamic Media Publication Company. It is essentially the main entity of the media production division of al-Qaeda, which relies heavily on the Internet. As of 2007 Mohamed Abayath aka Abd al-Rahman al Maghrebi is steering As-Sahab as leader of the al-Qaeda Media committee. Today, al-Qaeda communicates primarily through three media communication channels: Fajr, the Global Islamic Media Front, and As Sahab.

The organizational structure changed after the loss of Afghanistan as a physical base for al-Qaeda. The conversion from a clandestine organization to a decentralized, open network organization represented the Islamist terrorist movement’s only possible means of survival. Their previous dependence on traditional broadcast mass media was replaced and its impact was multiplied by their adoption of the Internet as their medium of choice and supplemented by the dissemination via CDs, DVDs, cell phones and night letters. After losing their base in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda decreased the size of their attacks to a target victimization of around 50 to 200 casualties, like the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on 20 September 2008. The blast of 600 kg of RDX and TNT occurred hours after Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, told the Pakistani parliament that the country would continue its fight against terrorism. Bigger and more complex operations with thousands of victims, like the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, are no longer the operational norm. The risk that operations of this scope could be detected and stopped by law enforcement and intelligence agencies is too great. According to a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate from January 2010, intelligence and military officials agree that al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out large-scale operations has been significantly degraded. Their financial and popular support is declining and allied operations have killed or captured much of al-Qaeda’s leadership. Many terrorists have taken refuge across the Afghan border in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area. This area largely remains a major safe haven. According to intelligence
and counter-terrorism officials, hundreds have relocated primarily to Yemen and Somalia. Both of these nations have weak central governments that exercise little or no control over vast swaths of their own territory. According to the former Director of the US National Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, al-Qaeda “today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago.” In June 2009, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, al-Qaeda’s leader in Afghanistan, released an audio message asking desperately for money: Al-Qaeda members were short of food, weapons and other needed supplies.

Radical Islamist terrorists now resort to the tactic of “guideless resistance,” in which responsibility for planning operations rests solely with the decentralized actor (Abu Musab al Suri wrote a lengthy essay on this scheme). Decentralized operations became even more important after the death of bin Laden in 2011. In recent years, these attacks are increasingly committed by self-radicalized Muslims and self-radicalized converts. Al-Qaeda concentrates on producing abstract directives and “motivational” audio and video calls in order to steer their movement. Processes running in parallel and coordinated via the World Wide Web enable the jihadist terrorists to survive as a loosely connected network. The fusion of interpersonal communication, e.g., cell phones and mass communication—connecting audience members who all can also be publishers or broadcasters at the same time via the World Wide Web—enables the resonating space available to terrorists and greatly increases their access to audiences.

Even though mainstream press outlets tend to adhere mainly to official news sources, the terrorist message still receives abundant international coverage. There is always the clear danger that the mainstream press will become the outlet for the state’s or the terrorists’ “spin” if their research and investigation does not provide the necessary intellectual context and depth.

The intensive, sometimes obsessive coverage in the media given to a terrorist act often generates the desired psychological effect. Terrorist actions are planned and organized in a manner that causes a strategically maximum communicative impact, while requiring minimal resources. The symbiotic relationship between terror events and the media is apparent: the perpetrators would have far less impact without media publicity, and the media can hardly be expected to resist reporting on terror events. Terrorists already make abundant use of the Internet for internal and external communication. They raise capital, franchise their brand names, lay the basis for self-radicalization to recruit followers, find partners and suppliers, provide training materials through their online library, and manage operations. Terrorists capture information about the users who browse their sites. Users who seem most interested in their terrorist cause or well suited to carrying out its work are then contacted, but more often, they try to get in contact with al-Qaeda themselves. Regularly the recruits followed a “bunch of guys.” The theory was proposed by Marc Sageman. According to Sageman, the individual usually seeks information about al-Qaeda through friends and associates.
Al-Qaeda’s Media Structure

For years, terrorists could rely on an almost streamlined Islamic media infrastructure, which willingly conveyed the desired messages and videotapes and helped terrorist groups shape a “brand name.” Until the advent of the Internet, terrorists focused their attention on television, radio, or the print media. But these traditional media have “selection thresholds,” which are multi-stage processes of editorial selection over which terrorists have no control. In addition to this obstacle, by early 2003 the media environment in the Arab world had begun to fragment, becoming increasingly crowded and competitive. A growing array of satellite television stations began to ensure competition and therefore a diversity of opinion, which hampers the communication strategy of the terrorists on the TV front. The quantity and volume of anti-al-Qaeda voices in the Arab media have dramatically increased since 2003, with many al-Qaeda-linked terror attacks being met by a chorus of Arab criticism and condemnation. Public opinion polls have shown steep declines in support for al-Qaeda, particularly in countries directly affected by its terror attacks. Facebook, Twitter and Arab satellite television became one of the strongest forces today pushing for change in the region, and that represents one of the biggest obstacles to al-Qaeda’s agenda of imposing a monolithic Islamic identity through a streamlined Muslim media voice. It therefore poses the greatest challenge to the terrorists’ political vision, and accelerated the use of the Internet as an information-spreading platform to compensate for the loss of satellite TV as a friendly media outlet. This further entrenches the Internet as they key enabler and main strategic communication infrastructure asset for terrorists. As Abu Omar expressed it, “We are the energy behind the path to jihad. Just like the jihadis reached their target on September 11, we will reach ours through the Internet.”

Target Audiences and Communication Channels

While some propaganda messages are intended for a broad audience, the majority are tailored to a particular target group. The messages, the channels by which these messages are communicated, and the languages they use are customized to suit the special needs of the target group. The terrorists select and segment the strategically desired target audience, the transmitting medium, and the targets for destruction. They determine the location and timing of their actions to satisfy media criteria for newsworthiness that fit in with the media’s deadlines and news cycles in order to effectively reach the desired audience. The actual violent operation is embedded within their strategic communication efforts as, for example, the suicide bombers in Moscow’s subway system by the “Caucasus Emirate” Jihadi Network in March 2010 showed. Radical Islamist terrorists have become extremely adept at exploiting the unique attributes of the Internet. It offers the possibility to communicate in near real time. The Internet is also used extensively as a terrorist knowledge transfer base and education medium for the movement’s own followers. Further, they use the
medium extensively for command and control, to gather intelligence, and to
distribute information among their sympathetic audience to stimulate self-
radicalisation. The Internet has enabled the rise of numerous loose and decen-
tralized terrorist networks and enables terrorist groups to operate like decen-
tralized franchises or freelancers. This revolutionary electronic medium en-
ables the terrorists to operate as virtual transnational organizations and reach
their audiences around the globe to maintain group identity, indoctrinate new
members, and demonstrate the implementation of its revolutionary ideology
and principles. The Internet, as an uncensored medium, carries information re-
gardless of its validity or potential impact. It allows even small groups to am-
plify their messages and exaggerate their importance and the size of the threat
that they pose. The target audiences of the Radical Islamist terrorists can be di-
vided into two groups: those who lie outside and inside the Ummah.

The Ummah

Ummah is an Arabic word used to describe the Muslim diaspora or, more pre-
cisely, “Community of Believers” (or “Nation of Believers”) and thus the global
community of Muslims. This group can be segmented into insiders and outsid-
ers of the al-Qaeda audience. The outsiders include two groups: the sympathiz-
ers and the neutrals. They consist of the Muslims and converts who could po-
tentially be persuaded to become Ummah insiders and in a follow on step de-
velop into active al-Qaeda terrorist. In the long run, major portions of this audi-
ence are needed in joining the community of ummah insiders to realize the de-
sired end state of a global devout Islamic caliphate. This means in consequence
that the terrorists’ primary target audience is neither a minority of radicalized
terrorists nor the public of the nations with a Muslim minority, but the vast
majority of the Muslim public and potential converts. Not in possession of a
central recruiting organization (autonomous jihad), the main communication
channels for reaching this vast audience consist of face-to-face methods, util-
izing prayers, speeches, and sermons in mosques and madrassas; the mass me-
dia; and increasingly, the Internet. Especially for converts, the internet plays a
significant role. In order to stimulate transformation of Muslim and non-Mus-
lim Ummah outsiders to Ummah insiders and jihadists, the terrorist network
provides inspiration for homegrown self-radicalization. Social networks and
local group dynamics, especially peer pressure plays a significant role in for-
ging intimate emotional ties. Suffering identity crises, a majority of jihadists be-
gan as “unremarkable” individuals living ordinary lives, before they were “re-
born” in their late teens and early twenties as Ummah insiders. Next to other
competing models, the New York Police Department developed a compelling
four-phased model in 2007 describing this multi-step self-radicalization proc-
ess:

1. Pre-radicalization phase
   Receptive individuals initiate the first step, the so-called pre-radicaliza-
tion phase. This step characterizes the period before every process of
radicalization in which the individual lives an essentially ordinary life,
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not showing any ambitions to become an Ummah insider or to convert to Islam in the first place. In a two year research project that investigated the difference between violent and non-violent radicals, 58 in-depth profiles of “homegrown” terrorists were analyzed. The study by Jamie Barlett et al. found that usually the recruits have experienced some degree of societal exclusion, experienced an identity crisis of sorts, a hatred for western foreign policy and/or felt a disconnection from their local community. This is in a similar way supported by John Venhaus, a career psychological operations officer experienced with foreign media influence operations. He came to the conclusion that potential recruits have unfulfilled needs to define themselves. He divides them in four groups: The revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, the status seekers need recognition, the identity seekers need a group to join, and the thrill seekers need their need for adventure saturated. Al-Qaeda presents itself as the best way to satisfy their needs by providing a clear narrative that appeals to their concerns.

2. Self-identification phase
Frequently, the occurrence of an unexpected event triggers the individual to, if not already Muslim, convert to Islam and join the Ummah and continue on to become an Ummah insider. Often, a key political, social, personal or economical occurrence or message shakes the individuals’ certitude in previous held beliefs and leads to some kind of cognitive attitudinal shift that catalyzes the individual to be “reborn” as Ummah insider. This occurrence marks the beginning of the self-identification phase. The Jihad-Salafi ideology and derived communication messages provide simple answers to complex disputes. These messages resonate especially well with certain politically naïve Muslims and converts. In general, they have an inadequate understanding of their own religion. That makes them vulnerable to misinterpretations of religious doctrines by jihadist advocates. The messages generally justify and endorse the use of violence against all kinds of kafir (non-believers). Based on moral outrage, al-Qaeda propagates three key messages to receptive individuals that reverberate with personal experience in this phase:

- Broadly appealing message to withdrawal from the impure mainstream society and the need for violent action to cleanse it
- Jihad is represented as the only way to permanently resolve glaring problems of global injustice faced by Muslims
- It incites moral outrage against perceived attacks upon Islam.

After the individual has been inspired to self-radicalize, they are now Ummah insiders. The Ummah insiders consist of two groups as well: the supporters and followers. The supporters are committed Muslim radicals who provide operational, financial, administrative or potential “ultimate” support to the global al-Qaeda movement as martyr. For this audience, the main communication channel is the Internet, with the
mass broadcast media providing a secondary avenue. But reaching both elements of the Ummah is crucially important to the jihadist movement. As Ayman al-Zawahiri stated in July 2004: “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media…. (W)e are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our Ummah.” Yet expanding the Ummah alone is not sufficient. Al-Qaeda needs indoctrinated terrorists to actively, and violently, support al-Qaeda’s goals.

3. Indoctrination-phase

Therefore, this development is followed by the indoctrination phase. Using strategic communication methods, Ummah insiders are stimulated to be more receptive for Jihadi-Salafi messages and to seek information to reinforce their newfound spiritual commitment. At the same time, they are looking for like-minded Ummah members to exchange beliefs and increase their commitments. Usually eager acolytes coalesce into autonomous cells in small like-minded groups (in effect, mini Ummah’s). These mini Ummah’s function as catalysts, creating a competitive peer pressured environment amongst the members vying to be the most radical. Converts seem to be the most zealous members trying to prove their new religious convictions more aggressively. Within these mini-Ummah’s common physically stimulating group leisure activities, like soccer, serve as additional binding forces. This radicalization process makes little noise and is therefore hard for security services to detect. Many self radicalized mini Ummah members at some point in this phase come into contact with a charismatic al-Qaeda leader or radical Imam who effectively function as communication channel, providing ideological background and moral justification by communicating and propagating suitable messages.

4. Jihadization-phase

The final step in the radicalization process is the Jihadization-phase, in which the Ummah insider is indoctrinated to the extent that he is willing to commit terrorist attacks and possibly sacrifices his life in order to prove the firmness of his beliefs as a jihadi by becoming a martyr. The main attribute of this phase is characterized by the readiness to perform as terrorist.

The Adversary Outsiders

This audience includes apostate secular Muslim regimes, sometimes referred to as troublemakers, and all unbelievers: the so-called crusaders, Zionists, Apostates, Jews, and the West, of which the United States is considered the leader. These segments are further dissected into the near enemy (apostates, secular Muslim regimes) and the far enemy (Jews, Unbelievers, and Western society). The preferred communication channel to reach these groups is the global mass media, especially television, with the Internet playing a secondary role.
Findings and Recommendations

That terrorists use strategic communication techniques is certain, as this article has attempted to demonstrate. The terrorists have defined their communication objectives, developed their communication tactics, and established the media strategies necessary to reach these communication goals.

Al-Qaeda's communication goals aim at legitimizing their methods, propagating their membership, and intimidating their opponents. They customize their strategies based on thorough audience research, and shape their messages and media choices accordingly, following the established rules of any successful public relations campaign. Their skillful use of many forms of electronic media has enabled them to promote their message and continually win new adherents to their cause. Through Strategic Communication, al-Qaeda provides the inspiration for becoming an Ummah insider and for homegrown radicalization. Becoming an al-Qaeda terrorist is a gradual, multi-step process. It usually involves informal congregations and prayer groups in mosques, cafes, schools, prisons and via the internet. Eager acolytes often coalesce into autonomous “mini Ummah’s.” Their unremarkable record, background and appearance make it especially difficult for law enforcement agencies to expose a potential self-radicalized terrorist. There is no single psychological/sociological/ethnological profile. They usually do not easily fit into one distinct economic profile. Often they seem to be seeking adventure, esteem in the eyes of their peers looking for a sense of brotherhood and a sense of purpose.

Nevertheless, overall the recruiting process seems to be inefficient and the yield is low. This information asymmetry must be further undermined in order to counter the threat of a growing radicalization of the Muslim community more effectively. This can best be accomplished by calling al-Qaeda’s credibility into question. It is possible to counteract the three primary communication goals of the terrorists that have been outlined in this essay: legitimization, propagation, and intimidation. Next to eliminating the root causes and alleviating the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of terrorism—e.g., rooting out the terrorists’ physical bases—developing an effective counter strategic communication plan that exploits weaknesses and contradictions in al-Qaeda’s use of strategic communication is a vital step in winning the asymmetrical conflict with terrorists.

A successful counter strategic communication plan must destroy the psychological appeal of the al-Qaeda “name brand” by destroying and displacing the feelings that draw young men to the cause. In this context, President Barak Obama sent a very strong communicative message to all potential recruits, and potential and current terroristic leaders right after bin Laden’s death: Terrorist leaders cannot hide. The US-President can (virtually personally) hunt down any terroristic leader, while safely watching the operation live from the White House. This message is of the same communicative magnitude as the 2001 attacks. This message will have even greater impact than the fact that bin Laden can no longer execute al-Qaeda leadership functions.
But at the same time, options need to be presented that satisfy adolescent developmental needs, to reduce the likelihood for al-Qaeda of becoming the chosen path. Being radical and rebelling against the received values of the status quo is, as much research has illustrated, an important part of being an adolescent. Effective ways must be found to ensure that young individuals can be radical, dissenting, and make a difference, without it resulting in serious or violent consequences. A good way to fight radical ideas is with a liberal attitude to dissent, radicalism and disagreement. Governments must focus on the things they can realistically change. But the lead role ultimately rests with society at the local level. Individuals, groups, organizations and communities that understand and respond to these complexities at the individual level play a significant role. Radical ideas that do not break the law should be given air, but they should be debated and renounced. Governments and, more importantly, independent voices, especially Muslims, have to set out clear counter arguments as to why particular radical ideas are wrong. Local social workers, teachers and sports coaches with local street credibility should play a central role.

The first phase in developing an effective counter-communication plan is research. The goal of this phase is to take a comprehensive look at all the variables that will have an impact. To attain a complete picture of the root causes that are driving the terrorists, it is crucial to research and synthesize the causes at different levels. This includes mapping the spectrum at the individual, group, societal, and governmental levels. Besides political sciences, it involves numerous additional academic fields like computer science, comparative sociology and religion, psychology, and ethnology. Addressing the underlying root causes that facilitate self-radicalization, recruitment and support for terrorists is an elementary part of such an effort. Alternatives to extremism need to be offered for development of the revenge-, status-, identity- and thrill-seekers in our societies, so that they do not fall for al-Qaeda. Our society must offer them what they are searching for.

The fragmented strategic communications efforts in nations opposing the effective pervasiveness of al-Qaeda need to be harmonized. In order to successfully employ a strategic counter communication plan, it has to be woven into a comprehensive approach of coercive military and law enforcement measures and conciliatory political, diplomatic, and socio-economic measures. These measures and the counter-communication plan have to be synchronized at all levels of government (political, diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and intelligence) and with our partners and allies in order to harmonize international efforts within a grand strategy. This grand strategy—a comprehensive approach as security philosophy—is an all-embracing approach that can only be developed within networked security structures based on a comprehensive international security rationale that effectively combines civilian and military instruments. Data on terrorism research should, as far as possible, be made public and shared to reduce the "hidden knowledge" in disparate databases and disconnected researchers. We need to move further from a "need to know" to a "need to share" mentality – that is, move away from risk aversion and in-
formation protection to more risk acceptance and broader information dissemination. By internationally democratizing data and integrating both qualitative and quantitative information utilizing different academic fields, we can dramatically increase our knowledge and bring greater empiricism to this field of research.

Al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out large-scale operations has been significantly degraded. Their financial and popular support is declining and allied operations have killed or captured much of al-Qaeda’s leadership. The communication management by the White House of bin Laden’s death on May 1st 2011 was a historic asymmetric communicative turning point to the disadvantage of al-Qaida. In recent years bin Laden had become the ideological figurehead. Bin Laden was one iconic symbol without whom al-Qaida will not recuperate to its former strength. Without his leadership, spiritual guidance and virtual recruiting power, al-Qaeda lost direction, cohesion and its inspiration. If David Rapoport’s four waves’ theory of international terrorism is applicable, the wave of recruits radicalizing in society might have past its peak and is on a decline. According to the EUROPOL Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2010, the overall number of all types’ terrorist attacks in all Member States in 2009 decreased by 33% compared to 2008 and is almost half of the number of attacks reported in 2007. The fourteenth-century ideology promoted by al-Qaeda and the indifferent killing of innocent people, both Muslims and unbelievers, holds little appeal for the majority of Muslims. According to Peter Waldmann, they have no wish to live under a repressive theocratic dictatorship in a new Islamic caliphate striving for global domination. The Facebook and Twitter revolutions in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen clearly showed that al-Qaeda’s ideology is not appealing and its influence is diminishing. The Arab Spring in conjunction with the death of bin Laden will further accelerate al-Qaeda’s decline. If the terrorists’ effective strategic communication—and in particular their use of the Internet—can be curtailed by a counter-communication plan embedded in a grand strategy as part of an internationally unified effort, the basis of their favorable asymmetry can be eroded. If al-Qaeda can be prevented from expanding the pool of Ummah insiders and generating self-radicalized adolescents and young adults, finding new physical bases in safe havens or in ungoverned areas, including those on the World Wide Web, jihadism may ultimately prove to be yet another instance of fanatical backlash that eventually fades.
Homegrown Terrorism Reaches the United States

John J. Le Beau

Following the 9/11 attacks, and for some time thereafter, a familiar litany in U.S. counterterrorism circles was that the country did not have a real problem with terrorist leanings within its own Moslem community. Generally, it was conterminously asserted that Europe, by contrast, was in a more vulnerable position, with signs of radicalization in several countries. The 2005 jihadist attacks in London were cited as an example of this “homegrown terrorism.” All of that changed dramatically in 2009, with the discovery of various jihadist plots by U.S. residents or citizens and, most alarmingly, the successful 2009 assault at Fort Hood, Texas by Major Nidal Hasan that left thirteen dead and many wounded.

Below are listed a number of individuals associated with disrupted plots and attacks targeting the U.S. (not all of them hatched in the U.S.) that were broken up by law enforcement (either FBI or local police departments) before they could be carried out. Some of the accused terrorists cited below are U.S. citizens; others are permanent or temporary legal residents.

- The three Duka brothers, of Albanian ethnic extraction, formed the core of a six man Islamist cell in New Jersey. The men were convicted for “conspiracy to commit murder” in 2008 of training for and planning to carry out a small arms attack against personnel at Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base. The plan had similarities to the Nidal Hasan attack at Fort Hood some years later.

- Najibullah Zazi planned an explosives attack on the New York subway system, and was arrested in September 2009. Zazi is an Afghan citizen and legal resident of the United States. Zazi is accused of having been trained in terrorist camps in Pakistan and planned the attacks on the orders of the external operations chief of al-Qaeda central. Zazi’s father and uncle were indicted on related charges.

- Daniel Patrick Boyd (also known as Saifullah) plead guilty to terrorism charges in February 2011. Boyd is a convert to Islam and fought with the Mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989. Boyd was accused of recruiting six individuals, including two of his sons, to participate in violent jihad. Boyd had traveled to Gaza, Israel and Kosovo in the past.

- Coleen Renee LaRose, better known as “Jihadi Jane” in the popular press, was arrested in October 2009 for conspiracy to commit murder and providing material support to terrorists. LaRose is a U.S. citizen and convert to Islam. She pleaded guilty in 2011 to plotting to murder Lars Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist who had drawn one of the controversial “Mohammed cartoons.”

- The “Christmas bomber,” Nigerian citizen Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab. This episode was not “homegrown terrorism” in the sense that the at-
tacker or his co-conspirators were resident in the United States. They were not, and the planned bombing seems to have been designed in Pakistan and Yemen. Nonetheless, it was a plot that was meant to take place in the United States, failed (for technical reasons) and was subsequently handled by domestic U.S. law enforcement – the FBI. The perpetrator confessed, provided information to his interrogators and was subsequently prosecuted on terrorism charges.

- The “Times Square bomber,” Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani ethnicity, was arrested in May 2010 for attempting to detonate a car bomb in one of the busiest parts of New York City. Shahzad was unrepentant in his court appearance, claiming to be a jihadist warrior.

- Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Awlaki is a U.S. (and also Yemeni) citizen who traveled to Yemen in 2004 to serve as an internet-based jihadist ideologue. He had served as an imam in the U.S., including in the Washington, D.C. area. Awlaki, an English-speaker regarded by some as charismatic, is a prolific author of Islamist tracts and tapes justifying violent jihad. Awlaki has served as an inspirational figure for several accused or convicted terrorists, and was in direct email contact with Nidal Hasan and others. He is accused by U.S. authorities of being an al Qaeda organizer, recruiter and trainer.

- David Headley (anglicized name; born Daood Sayed Gilani), a U.S. citizen of Pakistani ethnicity, born 1960, plead guilty to terrorism charges in March, 2010. Headley had conducted ground surveillance, covert photography and support activities for the deadly assault on Mumbai hotels in 2008, and the disrupted plot to attack a newspaper office in Denmark.

- Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh are arrested for plotting to blow up synagogues and churches in multiple attacks planned for New York City. Both individuals are of North African descent. One is a U.S. citizen, the other a legal resident alien. Arrests took place in June 2011.

In addition to the various conspirators who plotted or conducted attacks aimed at the United States, there have also been a number of cases where radicals resident in the United States have traveled to other countries to carry out or support attacks as part of an international jihad. Considerable media attention has been given to the Somali diaspora community, especially in the Minneapolis area. This community has supplied a number of young men (at least twenty according to U.S. government officials) to fight in Somalia on behalf of the Al-Shabab (“The Youth”) terrorist insurgency. Their radicalization, based on the information presently available, appears to have taken place in the United States. They regard their onward travel to Somalia as participation in jihad.
Chapter 6

Terrorist Innovation: Homegrown Terrorism and the Internet

Peter K. Forster

We face threats from homegrown terrorists – those who live in the communities they intend to attack and who are self-radicalizing, self-training, and self-executing.

Robert Mueller III, Director FBI, January 20, 2010

Between September 11, 2001 and October 2009, the United States faced 32 “domestic” incidents of terrorism with thirteen of them occurring in 2009. At this point, it remains unclear whether 2009 represents an increasing trend or merely a spike in domestic incident. It is, however, clear that the threat of domestic terrorism is real. While these incidents share similarities, it is their differences that indicate multiple threats are emerging from multiple sources. Thus, it is important for the counter-terrorist professional to examine both the successful and failed attacks and understand the similarities and differences displayed by the adversary in each case. This can be a laborious process involving many variables. This paper seeks to launch the debate by narrowing the broader subject to one focusing on how terrorist groups innovate and more specifically, assessing how Internet-based communication is influencing the innovation process. The paper concludes that terrorist use of the Internet can be characterized as serving informational, operational, and knowledge transfer needs and that the competition for the communication battle space will continue. Furthermore, it identifies some approaches to combating this effort.

Terrorist use of the Internet is well developed in three relevant areas – recruitment, radicalization, and exploitation of events which includes not only the media coverage but the more subtle process of “peer review” that either encourage or dissuade others from using the tactic. If information transfer represents the first generation use of Internet, the second generation is knowledge transfer which encompasses the enhanced ease and value of the Internet’s

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growing interactivity that facilitates tactical, operational, and strategic situational awareness. The November 2008 Mumbai attacks epitomized the tactical use of interactive Internet-based technologies. The terrorists’ efficiency and effectiveness was enhanced through the gathering, fusion, and sharing of information gathered from a variety of sources. Although in its infancy, knowledge transfer or learning via the Internet, as discreet from information transfer, is a strategic concern for those concerned with counter-terrorism.

To approach this subject, it is important to understand the global context in which the integration of technology is occurring, to identify the role technology plays for terrorist groups and in the terrorism processes, and finally what this says about terrorism in the 21st century and how might it be combated. This study will limit its scope by using information from a variety of cases, primarily but not exclusively US domestic ones, to develop some assertions and possible counter-strategies. As a result of this methodology, it is not meant to be a comprehensive study but one that offers some lessons learned and thus contributes to a broader understanding of a complex and dynamic issue. The study’s greatest contribution is to emphasize that terrorism is a dynamic issue and as a result counter-terrorism also must be.

Terrorists or terrorist groups continue to innovate, adapt, and redesign themselves in order to promulgate their objectives. As a result, innovation and learning evolving from what others have done, what has been successful, and what has been the response and reaction is critical. “Copy catting” in the terrorist world is an understood phenomenon and concern. At a more sophisticated level, innovation and learning by and among terrorist groups is neither new nor should it be ignored. Between 1997–2001, the IRA reportedly generated between $20 – $30 million by providing training to the FARC, the PLO, and the ETA. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps supplied new IED technology and training to Iraqi Shiites as recently as 2007. Today, a growing number of British and American Muslims are travelling to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen to receive training from the bomb-makers, operational directions from planners, and practical field experience by participating in in-theater attacks. The increasing use of communication technologies has only served to increase inter-organizational and individual adaptation of successful methods and innovation and promises to continue to be a key part of the terrorists’ strategy into the future.

Global terrorism in 2010 is characterized by a convergence of need, interest, and means. These are being met by Internet communications that increase accessibility and offer greater interactivity. Virtual communications have become the center of gravity for terrorism in the 21st century. The ultimate control and

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manipulation of this battle space is essential to implementing an effective counter-terrorism strategy. In order to develop and implement such a strategy it is important to understand how the Internet is being used by the jihadist, where are its weaknesses and strengths, and how might it be exploited as an instrument of change.

Communication is the adhesive between the individual and the group and in increasingly geographically disbursed terrorist groups is critically important.⁵ US successes at disrupting the activities of “al Qaeda central” in the wake of 9/11 has resulted in an increased need for engaging or permitting “affiliated groups” to extend the battle space. Al Qaeda has made good use of virtual communications to promulgate its Salafist ideology and incite individuals and organized affiliated groups to action. Certainly the message has resonated with some closely linked al Qaeda allies such as the Pakistani Taliban who reportedly provided training to Faisal Shahzad. A more geographically disbursed indication of increased affiliate activity is a May 2010 recording by Abu Basir Al-Wahishi, a reported leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in which he talks about AQAP’s commitment to attacking the US and Western interests.⁶ While affiliates seek to act, previously unconnected individuals and groups are coalescing to either perform specific tasks such as David Headley and Tahawur Hussain Rana conspiracy to attack a Danish newspaper or pursue mutual interests such as the reported connections between Hezbollah and South American drug cartels. Third, the Internet has been successfully used to recruit and further radicalize the disenfranchised. Finally, it has enhanced the exploitation of events increasing the reputation of those who move to “violent radicalization” and enhancing the conviction of the self-radicalized, such as Nidal Hasan, to take violent action.

Use of the Internet as a recruitment and radicalization venue is well documented. Using well designed strategies to reach target markets including multilingual websites and blogs, terrorist groups continue to use the Internet to disseminate their message and seek new adherents. Young Muslims who feel disenfranchised from the Western society in which they live explore the Internet for information on extremism, find like-minded individuals, and build virtual groups of radicalized individuals.⁷ What has increased is the recruitment of westerners or those sufficiently familiar with western culture to reduce the scrutiny by local law enforcement. However, the vast majority of radicalized individuals do not convert their words to action. Those who do, such as Najibullah Zazi and Shahzad, have sought additional connections beyond those

⁵ John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (Political Violence) (New York: Routledge, June 2009).
⁶ Targeted Actionable Monitoring Center (TAMC), Institute of Terrorism Research and Response, 17 May 2010.
offered by the Internet. The predominance of “violent radicalization” processes combines the Internet with some kind of face-to-face interaction and “training” usually outside of the target country. Additionally, a review of cases indicates an increasingly important role for a “spiritual adviser” who continues to act as a mentor to the terrorist once he or she has returned to the country of the attack. Anwar al-Awlaki, killed by a US drone, is well known for providing such a service to Hasan and Shahzad, but Zazi received similar support from the Imam in his Queen’s mosque. Apparently, this combination is sufficient to push many towards actions although the level of success remains surprisingly and fortunately minimal.

The third part of the information sharing paradigm is the exploitation of events. Renown and recognition resulting from a terrorist act are often cited as key characteristics or objectives. The live video of the United Flight 175 striking the South Tower on 9/11 encapsulates the impact of disseminating an event. Exploitation has flourished in the video era. The dissemination of Internet-based video to exploit the effectiveness of IED attacks has become a key part of the planning and execution process and has contributed to their expanded use and resulted in the video man, who records the material, becoming an essential element of attack group.

The use of commercial networks has created a global presence for terrorists and has eliminated many barriers to recruitment, radicalization, and exploitation. Notwithstanding, the globalized network is a venue for planning, attack coordination, and learning as well. Hence, the potential for greater terrorists’ operationalization of the Internet is significant concern. Like the information sharing paradigm, the knowledge sharing use of the Internet has tactical, operational, and strategic dimensions.

At the tactical level, Internet-based technologies may be used to enhance target refinement and situational awareness while shortening training and implementation times. Irhabi 007 used the Internet as a propaganda vehicle. However, his understanding of the web’s tactical value was evident when he connected with US-based terrorists plotting to blow up US sites and proceeded to review photographs of potential targets.8 A more disturbing example is the previously mentioned Lashkar-e-Taiba coordinated attack on Mumbai. The effective use cell phones, blackberries, and GPS devices, as well as the terrorists’ monitoring of social networking sites displaying information from people on the streets and the news media provided enhanced situational awareness for the attackers and their external handler. In this circumstance, the use of technology tactically altered the incident by providing unprecedented command and control and operational flexibility. The terrorists’ maneuverability confused security forces and acted as force multiplier. Direct connections between the terrorists and their external handler permitted real-time situational awareness which allowed the attackers to avoid security forces until their

choosing, to make decisions on whether and when to exchange or execute hostage, to provide suggestions on the type of weapons to be used, to motivate the terrorist teams when their conviction appeared to wane, and ultimately to order them to commit suicide.

Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, characterized the reality of the networked world as “tools for creating violence and chaos are as easy to find as the tools for buying music online...”9 The Internet also remains a means of direct communication. Terrorists prefer simplicity and effectiveness. At the operational level, Internet interactivity provides a vehicle by which communications among perpetrators may be maintained and effective approaches may be disseminated. Zazi e-mailed his facilitator in Pakistan about bomb making ingredients as he was preparing for his New York City attack.10 A simple search of websites yields a plethora of homemade videos of IED attacks and information on construction. As a result their use has proliferated and migrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the extent to which information is being disseminated to IED users has reduced the half-life of new countermeasures against IEDs to a few months.11 While the privatization of violence has decentralized terrorism, a brief review of failed attacks, as previously noted, still indicates that the on-line learning function appears not to be fully developed.

Strategically, the enhanced Internet interactivity may be used as learning platform in which inspired groups with limited or no connection to a more formal training apparatus of sophisticated groups will increasingly turn to virtual community to learn the “tools of the trade.” To date, the results from engaging in the virtual learning environment have failed to meet expectations. While the Internet offers a high level of proliferation, its anonymity makes it hard to confirm the quality of information. Bilal Abdallah and Kafeel Ahmed failed to detonate an improvised explosive vehicle device in London in July 2007, the day before resorting to a suicide mission at the Glasgow Airport. Their case proves the difficulty of constructing a workable explosive device using the web as the primary information source even if the builder has a relatively high level of intelligence. Furthermore, the perpetrators of the Hyderabad attack in August 2007 apparently did not examine lessons learned from the Abdallah and Ahmed’s failed attack and made some of the same resulting in only two of 19 exploding in that attack. Limited success continues to lead to would-be terrorists seeking face-to-face training sessions with the bomb-makers and planners. As result, the Internet as an information dissemination vehi-

11 Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures.”
cle rather than the knowledge transfer one remains predominant. The risk of
today is the return of the foreign trained radicalized American to the US to ini-
tiate an attack. Tomorrow’s threat is a sufficiently improved knowledge trans-
fer process that allows the same individual to learn the trade over the Internet
without leaving the country. Fifteen years ago, on-line learning was the pur-
view of the for-profit and a handful of traditional universities. Today, on-line
learning has been embraced by much of academia and is recognized as a viable
learning method. Considering terrorists’ propensity for simplicity, efficiency,
and security, the continued evolution of a terrorist on-line classroom that be-
gins to address previous weaknesses by integrating synchronistic student-in-
structor interaction, creating dynamic feedback, and establishing a viable
community of practice might well change this dynamic.

Counter-terrorist experts must simultaneously seek to understand the cur-
rent environment and develop counter-strategies for the future one. Domina-
tion of the communication battle space requires merging strategic and tactical
approaches that encompass political and legal cooperation as well as proactive
physical and virtual interdiction including disinformation and forensics. How-
ever, the initial steps are ones of documentation and communication. It is not
clear that the threat posed by terrorists’ activities on the Internet is readily
recognized. Hopefully, the recent revelations about the global scope of the US-
UK plot involving Zazi and others should draw attention to the influence of the
information society. Still, an active communication campaign by governments
is needed to enhance a public-private partnership aimed at curtailing accessi-
bility.

International cooperation is required to reduce Internet influence. Public
cooperation takes two forms, one is an agreement on the definition of provid-
ning material support to terrorism, which requires agreement on a definition of
terrorism. The second is a willingness to prosecute those who violate the for-
mer. We are far away from both. However, government standards are insuffi-
cient. The private sector needs to be engaged in the process. A study conducted
by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center revealed that Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) from a variety of countries including the US and Can-
ada routinely host terrorists’ sites.\textsuperscript{12} Controlling communication is a politically
charged issue. While the issue of freedom of expression is a primary point of
debate, the private sectors is happy to pursue business opportunities. The
counter questions are whether a terrorist organization is a terrorist organiza-
tion and if so should there be a differentiation between physical and virtual ac-
tions taken by these organizations? Currently, the legal interpretation is am-
biguous and appears to favor the terrorist organization under the auspices of
freedom of speech. While discriminating against access to and of information

\textsuperscript{12} “The Internet as a battleground used by the terrorist organizations: How Hezbollah
and Hamas exploit the Internet in the battle for the hears and minds, and how to
combat them” (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), Israel Intelli-
gence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IHCC), 1 August 2007), p. 6, p. 12.
places one on the edge of a “slippery slope,” when does the public good, “shouting fire in the crowded theater,” replace a provider’s right to freedom of speech? A potential remedy is not suggesting shutting down communication but simply requiring the provider to disclose the organizations whose sites they support and see whether market forces might dictate a change.

With the political and legal responses in disarray, interdiction offers another option. In order to interdict virtually, one must understand the Internet’s ultimate use. The primary interdiction strategy has been shutting down sites, which is less than effective. Another approach might be to directly discredit messages by demonstrating the horrors of terrorist tactics – the response to the video of Richard Perle’s beheading offers an indication that this method has value. However, the impact on potential radicals is unclear. John Horgan contends that the Internet is insufficient to establish the qualities needed to be a terrorist, but asks whether the terrorist recruiters are seeking “true converts” or “foot soldiers?” To the contrary then, when is the Internet effective in dissuading involvement? Zazi and Shahzad would undoubtedly contend they are “true converts,” but their willingness to provide information upon arrest demonstrates a lack of affinity or coalescence with the group associated with “true converts” to the cause and may be more appropriately termed “foot soldiers.” However exposure to the horrors of the Salafi jihad did not turn them away. As a result, more research is needed around the soft commitment and when counter-messaging might sway opinions that interrupt the progression from radicalization to violence.

Exploiting the weaknesses of the Internet environment is another interdiction strategy. By focusing on the Internet’s weakness for not developing strong coalescence or leveraging its anonymity, eroding trust among Internet users emerges as a strategy. This may be accomplished through disinformation such as counter-training sites or more nefarious methods such as hacking existing sites and changing information. Effective infiltration however requires an in-depth understanding of the adversary which is time consuming. Another method that may be easier to implement is to use the networked world to gather information on potential terrorist’s virtual operation. Less group cohesion and increased ability to disseminate information via personal mobile technologies weakens security protocols and increases the possibility of the unintentional or purposeful release of useful information. Capturing and effectively analyzing this data, particularly considering its volume, remains a challenge but as data fusion technologies and techniques improve, monitoring social networking sites, gathering information via participatory sensing, and conducting accurate analysis might become viable strategies for identifying and ultimately tracking Internet terrorists.

Physical interdiction (i.e., arrests, targeted killings, and military action) remain key disruption strategies for a wide variety of terrorist operations. Continued face-to-face training is a weakness to be exploited because it necessi-

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13 Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism*. 
tates overseas travel and thus enhances an opportunity for identifying perpetrators. Understanding what is sufficient training needed to launch an attack and how long such training might take is important information in separating the potential terrorists from the innocents. Unfortunately, the Internet is reducing the length of face-to-face training time and threatens to disrupt potential models. Zazi returned to the US with notes on his computer on bomb-making. While his communications with "Ahmed" upon returning provided another opportunity for identification, this process reflects the increasing value of the Internet as knowledge transfer mechanism. The perpetrator doing preliminary work on bomb-making on-line, travels to Pakistan for a few days to have his work reviewed, and returns to the US to execute the attack but has a facilitator available to answer questions, if needed. This may be indicative of the new challenge in this area. Physical interdictions also should include targeting those who facilitate the information supply chain. Although the long-term impact of eliminating a spiritual confident such as Anwar al-Awlaki still needs to be assessed, the short-term impact may again be sufficient to dissuade some from following through with terrorist acts. It also might deter others from assuming the role of the spiritual confidant.

Although terrorist groups have a propensity to using “tried and true” methods, they also will innovate and are notorious “copy cats.” When the innovation undertaken by one group is successful, it is often adopted by others. The use of the Internet provides an example of how successful innovation proliferates and evolves. This paper has sought to outline how the Internet is being effectively used by terrorist organizations, the potential future uses for the Internet by terrorist groups, and finally offering some possible solutions for consideration. The reality is that we are at the beginning of the use of virtual technologies by terrorist groups to transfer knowledge and leverage the Internet’s interactivity capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. Now is the time for counter-terrorist experts to begin understanding where we have been, where we are, and what the future might bring and how it might be countered.
Chapter 7

Islamic Extremism – Analyzing the Risks

Michael Feiler

Abstract

Islamic extremism, especially the terror networks, represents the greatest threat for the internal security of Germany. After the attacks in Madrid, the bombings in London have again shown that in many cases, regionally operating cells are able to carry out attacks without centralised preparation and control. Even Germany and Bavaria are considered areas of activity for networks of Islamic terrorists which are not only seen as areas for retreat and rest, but also as areas to prepare attacks, and even as potential targets of attacks. Even though the risks emanating from Islamic terrorism are evident, the dangers coming from political Islamism must not be underestimated either. Not only are they a breeding ground for terrorist activities, they also aim at the indoctrination of Muslims living in western societies. Islamism seeks to prevent their integration into the state and social order, trying instead to build up parallel societies in which the national legal system is no longer valid. A long-term objective is the elimination of the political and social order of the country concerned and the establishment of a world-wide rule of Islam.

For the development of effective strategies to counter this, it is necessary to deal with the ideological basis and to get the most accurate idea possible of the real potential of danger. This is the duty of the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. A comprehensive and up-to-the-minute exchange of information among all security authorities is absolutely necessary too. To accelerate this exchange of information and to compile existing knowledge, various federal institutions as well as institutions in Bavaria have been founded.

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1 Michael Feiler, Dipl.-Pol., worked at the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Berlin beginning in 1997; and since 2003 is Head of Staff and press relations officer at the Bavarian State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BLFV) in Munich. The chapter by Michael Feiler provides an in-depth analysis of the risk potential emanating from Islamic extremism for the internal security of Western democracies, from the perspective of a German law enforcement official.
Islamic Extremism – The Greatest Threat to the Internal Security of Germany

At present, Islamic extremism (Islamism), and in particular international Islamist terrorists, pose the greatest risk to the internal security of Germany. In spite of national and international success in combating terrorist networks, the threat to the western world has not been reduced with lasting effect. The Madrid and London attacks of 2004 and 2005 as well as the thwarted attempts at carrying out attacks in the United Kingdom and Germany in recent years have shown that cells of different size and composition, operating regionally, can indeed carry out or plan attacks without requiring any central planning and control. Several court proceedings, including in Bavaria, have shown that Germany has been considered an area for preparing terrorist attacks as well as a potential target of such attacks. Security authorities, and in particular intelligence services, focus primarily on the tasks of early recognition of planned attacks as well as identifying and taking to court potential perpetrators. Fast and up-to-the-minute exchange of information among several authorities, and especially between the intelligence services on the one hand, and law enforcement and judiciary on the other, is the order of the day. Moreover, in-depth engagement with the ideological foundations of Islamist terrorism is needed for the purpose of pinpointing tendencies towards radicalization in Islamist circles.

The Current Situation

Several plans for attacks thwarted in the past have clearly shown that Germany is not only considered an area for preparations and rest for jihadists, but also a valid target of attacks. In this context, prime examples are the attempted simultaneous “suitcase bomb” attacks planned against two German regional trains on 31 July 2006, and in the 2007 foiled attacks by the “Sauerland Group.” The three activists arrested belonged to an Islamic terror group called “Islamic Jihad Union” (IJU) and had been able to procure on the open market a large quantity of hydrogen peroxide and other ingredients to make explosives and military detonators. The material they had accumulated would have sufficed to make explosive devices that would have detonated with greater force than those used in the Madrid and London attacks. The suspected assailants had gained most of their knowledge about the construction of explosive devices by attending IJU training camps in Pakistan. The bombers’ preferred potential targets were American facilities or airports. Aided by two other people, one of them had reconnoitered an American base in the Federal State of Hesse on New Year’s eve 2006/2007. In the course of the investigations, it became clear that the perpetrators were making serious efforts to launch several attacks in Germany, presumably simultaneously, and to cause as much damage to life, limb and property as possible.

In March 2008 Cüneyt Ciftci, a Turkish national who had lived in Bavaria until 2007, carried out a suicide attack in Afghanistan by driving a truck carrying
explosives into a military camp, claiming several other lives in the process. He made a "martyrdom" video about his terror mission. He is thus the first suicide bomber with Islamist terrorist motives to have been born, raised and socialized in Germany.

In 2009, Jihadists turned their sights more specifically on Germany itself. Threats disseminated on the Internet were expressed by several Islamist terror groupings such as Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The messages included statements from top Al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and his deputy (and later successor as Al-Qaeda chief) Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. The new dimension was that the terrorist groups specifically threatened attacks within Germany and appeared on screen with German speaking individuals.

Between 11 September and 9 October, with unprecedented frequency, eleven audio, video and written messages from al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups were released containing references to or threats against Germany. This concentration of messages was part of a large-scale propaganda strategy clearly designed to influence the Bundestag elections on 27 September. The propaganda offensive reached its pinnacle with the hate video entitled “The Call to Truth” and an online message called “Security – a shared fate” featuring German Al-Qaeda member Bekkay Harrach. The background images for the “Call to Truth” video included the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, the skyline of Frankfurt am Main, the Oktoberfest in Munich, Hamburg Main Station and the Cologne Cathedral. Speaking German, the man featured on the video made threats in connection with the deployment of Bundeswehr troops in Afghanistan.

The “Security – a shared fate” video presented Bekkay Harrach in front of a red curtain wearing a suit and tie rather than martial Taliban attire, as is usually the custom in this kind of hate video. His intention undoubtedly was to make visual reference to a speech made by Barack Obama on 4 June at Cairo University – when the US President stood in front of a red curtain as he addressed the Muslim world. Harrach explained that in a democracy the entire nation is responsible for the decisions made by its government. Therefore all Germans were a legitimate target of attack if they failed to vote for a new Federal government that would withdraw the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan:

In a democracy, only the people can order their soldiers back home. If the German people decide to continue the war, however, they have passed sentence on themselves.

To varying degrees, all the videos share in an attempt to reach the target groups with a mix of theological, moral, emotional and political arguments. Typically, these Jihadist statements use quotations, above all select verses from the Qur’an, to add religious legitimacy to the speaker’s remarks. For example, promises are made that taking part in armed conflict offers not only the chance to expunge previous sins but, at the same time, to attain “martyr” status and elevation to the highest level of human worth in the eyes of God.
Some messages talk about issues in detail: for example, if anyone is worried that his commitment to Jihad means neglecting his family, he need have no fears. One video points to the good infrastructure in the training camps, explaining that “they are very family and children-friendly with their hospitals, doctors, pharmacies and schools.”

Even though the videos were not followed by attacks and were unable to influence Germany’s general election or its foreign policy, they do serve to recruit, mobilize and emotionally charge young Jihadists and sympathizers. Their effects are therefore to be taken quite seriously. More so than in previous video offensives, these self-portraits in the realm of real battle areas make a greater impression than messages from other Islamist propaganda forums which Germans find rather abstract. Therefore, this type of video could prove a spur to Islamists domiciled in Germany when they see that “German Mujahideen” have moved up the ranks of Al-Qaeda and that some now enjoy leadership positions. The intention is to demonstrate that German Islamists have obviously reached positions that entitle them to speak on behalf of Al-Qaeda.

Since early 2009, the German security services have registered a considerable increase in planned, attempted and (actually) completed travel from Germany for the suspect purposes of participating in violent Jihad or receiving terrorist training. The presumed destinations were terror camps in crisis regions such as Afghanistan and Pakistan or conflict zones where the individual could join the fighting. As Al-Qaeda is widening its regional presence, the security services are working on the assumption that terrorists are also being trained in locations in Yemen and Somalia. People resident in Germany who may be counted as potential Islamists often travel to strongly Islamic states. The purposes of these trips range from family visits and holiday travel to religiously motivated pilgrimages, Arabic language courses and Qur’an studies or even time spent in terrorist training camps and participation in violent Jihad. Generally speaking, whenever people with Islamist tendencies travel to Islamic states, there is always a possibility that the process will make a major contribution to their radicalisation and recruitment, up to and including participation in Jihad and the perpetration of terror attacks. This poses a considerable security risk to Germany and western security interests abroad.

German Federal security services have information on a total of 215 people with connections to Germany who have an Islamist or terrorist background and are thought to have received paramilitary training at some point after 1990 or to be contemplating such training. These people include German nationals from an immigrant background, German converts to Islam and nationals of other countries who have in the past spent a period of time residing in Germany. Since 2001, around 40 of these people have played an active role in fighting in crisis areas.

The only way to protect the country from such attacks is their early identification in the planning stage. This requires among other things well-founded information about current developments in the local “scene” so as to pinpoint radicalization tendencies early on. Doing so is an intelligence task, which in
Germany is fulfilled by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The task is rendered difficult by the fact that there is no standardized perpetrator profile, as the analysis of explosive attacks planned and carried out so far has shown. While the perpetrator groups in the United Kingdom and Spain were people who had lived in the countries for a long time or had even grown up there, the perpetrators of 11 September 2001 were young students from the Near East, and the attacks are believed to have primarily been planned centrally in Afghanistan. Whereas some of the London attackers were even second- or third-generation immigrants who had been raised in the country in apparent integration, the “suitcase bombers” had come to Germany to study. The New York and London perpetrators committed suicide attacks, the attackers in Madrid and Germany’s “suitcase bombers” sought to get away. This inconsistent profile makes it difficult for the security authorities to identify potential perpetrators early on. It is true that after the event certain common traits can be identified, such as discontinuities in personal biographies or attendance at Islamic seminars. However, these characteristics apply to a large number of people who never come into any direct contact with Jihadist terror acts at all. Another important influence is that of charismatic personalities who play a central role in a communication network. Through personal conversation or via the Internet they exert a crucial influence on the individual’s process of radicalization.

For this reason, security services must focus on various perpetrator profiles without giving rise to the impression that Muslim immigrants at large are under suspicion. After all, Muslims are not a monolithic group, neither in Germany nor elsewhere in the world. A realistic look reveals considerable differences according to ethnicity and geographical origin, denomination and religious orientation, education, age, as well as affinity or non-affinity to the political culture of the country a person migrated to. As for figures, Germany has roughly 30 Islamist organizations with a following of circa 32,000 persons, out of which 5,500 live in Bavaria.

This corresponds to roughly one per cent of about 3.2 million Muslims in Germany. However, this low percentage should not be taken to mean that Islamist organizations are isolated within the Muslim population, and there are several reasons for this. If we include the families of the members, which is especially legitimate against the backdrop of the enormous importance of the family as a social institution, the number is considerably higher. Beyond that, the potential for mobilization and attracting sympathizers is hard to pin down with accuracy. In any event, Islamists must not be considered terrorists across the board. The large majority of Islamists living in Germany seeks to achieve their goals while adhering to the local laws (legal Islamists). They deliberately want to give the impression of being a mere religious community, exclusively existing for the purpose of attending to the religious and social needs of Muslims living in western countries. They pretend to pursue goals that are in keeping with the constitutional framework and seek an inter-religious dialogue.
Out of 5,500 Islamists in Bavaria, only about 500 advocate violence as a means of reaching their political goals. In this context, they primarily focus on their home countries. Looking at the membership figures of the organizations in isolation, however, does not do justice to the potential threats emanating from them. The people connected with terrorist activities in Germany are almost exclusively individuals independent of any organization or followers of splinter groups attached to foreign organizations with Islamist terrorist connections. About 50 persons in Bavaria are believed to be connected with networks of a terrorist orientation.

In view of this situation, the following critical question arises: Where is the boundary between the legitimate exercise of freedom of religion as a fundamental right and unacceptable political endeavors to undermine the free democratic fundamental order?

Ideological Background

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) observes so-called extremist activities, that is, endeavors directed against the free democratic fundamental order of the Federal Republic of Germany. The most important principles of this fundamental order are respect for human rights, including, without being limited to, people's right to life and free development, the sovereignty of the people, as well as the principles underlying the separation of powers, a multi-party system, and the independence of the courts. If Islamist groups direct their political activities against these principles, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution will classify them as extremist and observe them. In such a case, we refer to them as Islamic extremists or Islamists. Islamism is an ideology and political doctrine claiming universal and absolute validity. It is an ideology directed against the central values and procedural rules of a free democracy as well as any and all forms of integrating or assimilating Muslims into our order of state and society. For Islamists, Islam is the only basis and criterion for everything they think and do. Islam is the sole foundation of individual conduct and public order, decreed by God and unchangeable by human beings.

Islamists also believe that Islamic teachings provide both ultimate ethical principles and specific instructions for action in politics, economy, law and culture, all based on the two normative sources of Islam, the Qur'an and Sunnah, which are thus superior to any national constitution. Such an interpretation of Qur'an and Sunnah is incompatible with a free democratic fundamental order. It contradicts fundamental democratic principles such as the sovereignty of the people, the majority principle, the separation of powers and the right to education and parliamentary opposition. A doctrinaire claim to the inviability and absolute binding force of the Islamist readings of Qur'an and Sunnah also runs counter to the approach of a free democracy to human rights, whereby all people are by nature equal in terms of human dignity, an idea which underlies all other fundamental rights. For Islamists, the legal status of individuals is solely dependent on their belonging to the Muslim religious community. Islamists also use literal interpretations of certain Qur'an quotes as a reason why women
are discriminated against in many areas of daily life and deprived of their fundamental rights. These restrictions of the principle of equality impact significant parts in the central element of western democracies, i.e. human rights. According to Islamist ideas, Islam is translated into reality via the Sharia legal system which is directly binding for state and society and delineates the framework of Muslim life. It legitimizes inhuman penalties incompatible with prevailing Western values. The separation of state and religion in western countries is not only rejected as “un-Islamic,” it is also fought actively.

Islamism is thus characterized by intolerance towards other faiths and moderate Muslims alike. Due to its claim to absolute validity, Islamism calls for active combat against all the unfaithful and the world-wide spreading of Islam, if necessary by subjugating all non-Muslims. Western ideas of democracy and society are rejected if they do not conform to the Qur’an and Sharia law. Islamist Muslims will thus be hard to integrate into democratic systems and they do not seek to become integrated. Islamism in a democratic state is inevitably not only hostile towards democracy but also towards integration. Islamist groups also put up massive resistance to integration by seeking to influence primarily young people so as to make them reject our democratic order and free society. This task is fulfilled inter alia by private Islamist madrassas run by extremist organizations.

**Islamist Groups in Germany**

The majority of Islamist groups active in Germany primarily aim at replacing the governmental systems in the home countries of members by an Islamic societal order based on Qur’an and Sharia. However, a complementary strategy aims at offering Muslims social, cultural, economic and religious institutions that cover all areas of life, thus preventing them from becoming integrated in German society. Islamic centers, self-contained religious circles and mosques used by fundamentalists thus play an important role in the recruitment of militant fighters who are provided with the relevant ideology there. For Islamists, the issue of violence for the purpose of reaching political goals is mainly a matter of tactics. According to Islamist theorists, “Jihad” (which translates literally as an internal struggle, striving, or Holy War) as an instrument of making the Islamist societal order materialize includes any means leading to victory. Hence, the majority of Islamist groups from the Arabic region advocates violence as a means of reaching their political goals. Other groups rely on non-violent political activities to change society.

About 2.5 million out of the 3.2 million Muslims in Germany are of Turkish origin. Thus, Turkish Islamist groups are more important and have more influence on social and political life in Germany and the Muslims living in the country than Arab groups. At this point, it is worthwhile mentioning one group which differs from other Islamist groups in several instances. It is the Islamist group with the largest membership in Germany, the “Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs e.V.” (IGMG).
Unlike other Islamist groups, the IGMG is engaged in political activities, not violence, and has put much effort into building a legally impeccable image for several years. The organization has a total of about 26,000 members in Germany, out of which 4,800 live in the state of Bavaria. The IGMG is a rallying point for followers of the former Virtue Party (FP) and the current “Felicity Party” (SP) of former Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan. In June 2001 the “Virtue Party” was prohibited by the Turkish Constitutional Court for reasons of “anti-laicist activities,” e.g., a violation of the principle of religious neutrality of the Turkish state. IGMG has about 500 local groups throughout Germany; the number of groups located in Bavaria is 70. Unlike other Islamist organizations, the outward impression IGMG seeks to create is one of conformity with the German constitution as it engages in the “interreligious dialogue” and participates in the “Open Mosque Day,” on which occasion it presents itself as cosmopolitan and tolerant. However, the impression one gains from internal IGMG events is often entirely different.

The “Muslim Brotherhood” (MB) founded in Egypt in 1928 is the oldest and, ideologically, most influential movement of political Islam. It is a multi-national organization consisting of national chapters. The basic ideology of the MB is geared to the establishment of Muslim theocracies. This goal for the distant future is what unites all movements within the Muslim Brotherhood. MB ideology has spread throughout the Muslim world and has led to the formation of numerous militant Islamist organizations. These include the Egyptian MB offspring “Jihad Islami,” which emerged in the 1970s and which inter alia carried out the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor as the leader of “Al-Qaeda,” was first a leading figure in “Jihad Islami.” The Algerian “Front Islamique du Salut” (FIS) and the Palestinian organization HAMAS are also rooted in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The “Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland e.V.” (IGD)—Islamic Community of Germany—is considered to be the German headquarters of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood branch; it has been active in Germany since the 1960s. The total membership in Germany is about 600, more than 120 of these live in Bavaria, and the organization also has a seat at the “Islamischen Zentrum München” (IZM). It is also a member of the “Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe” (FIOE), founded in 1989. FIOE was formed under a resolution adopted by a general assembly of representatives of the major Islamic centers, societies and associations in Europe. The followers of IGD seek to present themselves to the public at large as a representation of Muslim interests loyal to the German legal order. Hardly ever do they express reservations in respect of western democracies or the political and social order in Germany in their public announcements.
Terrorist Networks and How the Office for the Protection of the Constitution Combats Them

After the logistic basis of “Al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan had been destroyed in 2001, far-reaching changes took place in international Islamist terrorism. The solid world-wide network structures which had been created in the “Al-Qaeda” training camps in Afghanistan disappeared and came to be replaced by small local autonomous terrorist cells which have interiorized the ideology “Al-Qaeda.” The former terrorist cadre organization “Al-Qaeda” has turned into a loose community of “religious fighters” who plan their activities in small groups and act independently. A new generation of perpetrators is able to prepare and carry out attacks without instructions from al-Qaeda central authorities. The ideas and goals of Bin Laden, the deceased but iconic leader figure, can be and are disseminated via the Internet. Direct contact between leaders and terrorist cells is no longer required. Thus, the terrorist network can make up for an environment in which it has become more difficult to operate by means of using the Internet. Lacking training facilities after the destruction of camps in Afghanistan have come to be replaced by a kind of “virtual training” on the Internet, and so-called “terrorist manuals” including instructions for bomb building and explosives handling are circulated on the WWW as well.

Information about arms, practical combat training, fitness programs and survival training is also available online. The Internet is used for religious and ideological instruction, too. Thus, violence-prone Islamists around the world may acquire terrorist know-how without running the risk of being identified because they have been to training camps. This is a new kind of threat that should not be underestimated.

How can the security forces respond to this type of threat? The only chance of preventing potential attacks lies in the early recognition of planning processes as well as identifying emerging radicalization. Intelligence services are primarily called upon in this context to be pro-active. Another thing that is indispensable is the up-to-the-minute exchange of information among all security authorities concerned, especially the intelligence services and the police. To speed up the exchange of information, bundle existing knowledge and create a cluster of analytical capacity, a joint counter-terrorism centre (“Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum,” GTAZ) was created in Berlin; it brings together about 180 specialists from various law-enforcement authorities at the federal level and the Länder (the separate German states); the federal chief prosecutor and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees are also represented. There are daily briefings and the flow of information is enhanced via co-ordination fora. Bavaria has additional bodies serving to improve co-ordination among various authorities in combating international Islamist terrorism. A special organization structure in the Bavarian police headquarters is worth mentioning at this point: AKIS = Aufklärung krimineller islamistischer Strukturen (identification of criminal Islamist structures) is in charge of en-
suring close co-operation between police, public prosecution, the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, tax investigators, etc.

The AKIS aims at gathering information on relevant connections and structures among criminal Islamists across the boundaries of individual offences. The working group titled BIRGiT – Beschleunigte Identifizierung und Rückführung von Gefährdern aus dem Bereich des islamistischen Terrorismus/Extremismus (fast-lane identification and repatriation of persons with a background in Islamist terrorism/extremism who pose a threat) was created by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior in October 2004. Its task is to make Islamist extremists leave the country in a consistent way, or if this is not possible, to limit their leeway for action to the greatest possible extent if they are dangerous (e.g. by surveillance measures). The aim is to make it clear to potential terrorist sympathizers that the approach to extremism or support for terrorist activities in Bavaria is “zero tolerance.” Various authorities, including e.g. the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Bavarian Office of Criminal Investigation, co-operate in the BIRGiT working group, which gives it a special clout.

Specifically, the working group is composed of the following elements:

- A representative of the unit in charge of aliens’ matters at the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior. This person is seconded by the police to ensure the law enforcement angle is handled appropriately, and heads the working group;
- Representatives of the units in charge of aliens’ matters and Central Offices for Repatriation in Upper Bavaria and Central Franconia. In complicated cases, these are empowered to order expulsions and residence-terminating measures;
- Employees of major aliens’ authorities (Munich and Nuremberg) specializing in residence-terminating measures, and of local aliens’ authorities in individual cases, as well as
- Specialists representing the Bavarian Office of Criminal Investigation and the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Representatives of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees are brought in on a case-by-case basis if matters of asylum law need to be dealt with, and so are representatives of the Bavarian Office of the Prosecutor, in the event of procedural matters. The group works together as a team when preparing the basis for issuing orders. The officers exchange general information about the situation of persons posing a threat to help the employees of aliens’ authorities who specialize in issues of extremism among aliens, and, by the same token, to help the others understand the implications of aliens’ law and the work of the aliens’ authorities. In case of difficult legal problems, workshops or joint seminars are held to find in-depth approaches. The intense cooperation among representatives of different professions as well as theorists and practitioners has proven very fruitful; as a result, creative solutions resting
on a sound legal and specialist basis can be found. By networking among a number of institutions and authorities, processes and proceedings have been streamlined and accelerated.
Chapter 8

Violent Converts to Islam: Growing Cluster and Rising Trend

Jahangir E. Arasli

Introduction

Before and since the death of Osama bin Laden, the role and place of violent Muslim converts in the context of Islamist homegrown terrorism (hereafter HGT) largely remains below the radar screen, both in the research community and in the security practitioners’ pool. Despite the exponentially growing evidence which suggests that converts are steadily moving from the periphery into the epicenter of HGT, conventional wisdom still treats them as a marginal, fringe phenomenon rather than as a sustained and arguably growing trend posing serious security challenges. This essay represents a modest attempt to help bridge the gap between outdated perceptions and existing realities vis-à-vis the (in some quarters sensitive) issue of converts. It is to be hoped that this chapter will also contribute to future shaping of the topic as an independent and important sub-discipline in the field of counterterrorism.

Accordingly, the essay first touches upon the general issues of definition and terminology. Subsequently, it provides a brief historic overview and offers empirical data suggesting that the threat posed by violent converts is evolving to a higher level. After that, this chapter addresses the core questions, related to the personal characteristics of converts, as well as the reasons for and patterns of their conversion experience and radicalization. Finally, it analyzes practical aspects of violent converts’ activities in the format of HGT. Given its limited scope, this essay is not aimed at covering the whole picture in a comprehensive sense. Rather, ambitions are limited to simply charting the general contours of the

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2 For an example of such “traditional” approach towards the issue see all editions of the “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report” (a.k.a. TE-SAT), issued by the EUROPOL before 2010 (accessible at the agency’s website: www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2010.pdf). It has never identified converts as a trend to within HGT, rarely referring to the issue only in relation to some concrete terrorism-related cases. The TE-SAT 2010 represents a remarkable and welcomed departure from that tradition, as has been indicated in chapter 6.
problem and providing a number of initial thoughts, while leaving its particular aspects, as well as policy recommendations, for future in-depth research publications. All views, expressed in the essay, are those of the author and do not reflect an official position of any institution.

**Definitions**

This chapter offers a notional terminology that the author operates with throughout the text. As well, it encompasses some statements that help to clarify a relevant distinction between the “normal” (that is, moderate) convert and violent converts.

1. In the simplest terms, religious conversion might be understood as a change from one faith to another that involves internalization of a new identity by a neophyte. Conversion is not restricted to a transition from one religion to another, but also includes a journey from non-religion (such as atheism and agnosticism), or nominal religion (i.e., when an individual has a formal religious affiliation by place of birth, nation and parentage, but does not regard himself/herself as a practicing believer).

2. As in many other cases, there is no universal, officially-coined definition of violent Muslim converts. This permits the author to offer his own working definition, if admittedly improvised, incomplete and provisional. Violent Muslim converts are individuals who adopt a new identity, based on and linked to self-assumed misinterpretations or distortions of Islam that justify or encourage violence, including terrorism. Hereafter in this text, violent convert actors, operating in the realm of radical Islam, are indicated as violent Islamic converts, or VICs.

3. Conversion to extreme interpretations of Islam becomes a first and the most important step prior to further radicalization, indoctrination, recruitment, and eventual violent intention and/or activity. Though in certain personal cases it may vary, almost all violent converts perform a conversion – radicalization – activation (CRA) loop.

4. A combined conversion and radicalization (C&R) segment of the mentioned CRA loop serves as a crucial “boost stage” that enables an individual to jump to distorted and politicized versions of Islam that approve of and legitimate violence as religiously justified. The final product of such a trajectory is ultimately violent intentions and actions.

5. The term “violent activity” applies to an engagement into a broad range of functions of “newborn” Muslim converts, not necessarily just direct

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3 This statement is a fusion, based on a compilation of different sources which address the issue of religious conversion. The quantity of the mentioned sources does not allow citing them.

4 The notion of CRA loop (or, a “conversion ladder”) is for the first time introduced by the author in this essay. It will be elaborated in more details in future publications.
application of violence. Mainly, we refer to terrorism and insurgency. Beyond “direct action,” it also implies related ideological and propaganda activities and efforts (such as recruitment of others to the ideological cause, spreading politico-religious extremism, and hate preaching) as well as different forms of organizational, technical, materiel and financial support that sustain violence. “Violent activity” also applies to certain “gray area” cases that at a glance might appear purely criminal, yet in fact involve a traceable causal influence of conversion to Islam.5

All of this is not to say that a mere conversion to Islam poses a security problem by default. Conversion to Islam, as to any other belief system, should be treated as a manifestation of the right of an individual to make a personal choice, assured by freedom of belief and expression. Neither Islam per se, nor conversion to its mainstream form is a security threat as such. A key word in the equation of violent Islam convert is “violent”; that signals a clear distinction from “normal” (i.e. moderate) conversion pattern, related to mainstream, purely “spiritual” Muslim faith. Violent actors are representing only a thin slice from the general pool of people who choose Islam as their new religion.6

The last point raises a legitimate question: why should anyone care about violent converts? The answer is simple: although they represent a minority among converts to Islam, in real numbers the violent individuals constitute a growing pool of hundreds, if not thousands of extremely dangerous people who represent a direct security threat. The empirical evidence is examined in the next two sections.

A Brief Pre-9/11 Overview

Indeed, prior to the 9/11 watershed terrorism event, the converts were an exotic product of the global bazaar of violence. Yet, they were not completely foreign to it. A first generation of violent converts can be traced back to the late 60s – early 70s, when a certain number of young Afro-Americans joined either the radical wing of the Nation of Islam (NOI) movement, or the ranks of the Black Panthers and similar anti-establishment groups, which were involved in the projection of violence. Later, in the 70s and the 80s, a number of American converts, some of Caucasian origin, joined the extremist Pakistan-linked Islamist sect Jamaat ul-Fuqra (JUF) that was active throughout the U.S., often


demonstrating a violent modus operandi. In 1980, an American convert David Belfield, a.k.a. “Dawood Salahuddin,” who has been recruited by the security services of the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran, killed a prominent Iranian opposition leader who lived in exile in the USA.

However, these first-generation converts were not embedded into a broad context of global jihad that still remained to emerge. Rather, these converts represented what might be termed “protest conversion,” like the Panthers who choose Islam as their racial identity assertiveness tool, mixing it with a good portion of Marxism, or were contained within a peripheral trend, such as the case of JUF. Or, in some single-issue cases such as the one of David Belfield, they were acting as operatives of a foreign intelligence service. It is important to stress that most of converts in that period were still lacking an articulated and elaborate religious justification of the violence they committed.

The second generation of violent converts arrived with the global transformation that occurred in late 80s – early 90s. The ascendance of a radical political Islamism and the associated violent trend has contributed to the emergence and rise of the convert phenomenon. The war in Bosnia was a notable first call. That conflict engaged dozens of European converts, who were radicalized and fought on the Muslim side. The notorious “Roubaix Gang” and a particular member, a French convert and Bosnian war veteran Lionel “Bilal” Dumont, serve as an eloquent example of this developing trend, which nonetheless remained unnoticed at that time. Indeed, the armed conflicts of the last decade of the past century (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and some others), that involved a direct or indirect participation of Al-Qaeda (AQ), produced scores of professionally trained and battle-hardened violent converts to Islam. For instance, before 2001, AQ founded Al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which was exclusively used for military and terrorist training of non-Arabs, including converts. Those who survived the fighting came back to Europe and North America. In a parallel development, a sharp rise of migrant communities with extensive outer social relations—a particular outcome of the European liberal migration and asylum policies—also preconditioned the expansion of a pool of Western converts to Islam. The third factor was an aggressive and financially-sustained preaching of radical Wahabbist and Salafist versions of Islam, projected by certain religious circles and centers in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Arab states of the Gulf via forward outposts, located in the West. The worldwide preaching campaign, waged everywhere from official mosques to correctional facilities and aimed primarily at Muslims from migrant communities,

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delivered an important by-product – Western converts to Islam, radicalized to a level of readiness to perform violent activities.

A combination of these three mentioned factors contributed to the emergence and initial development of the VICs’ phenomenon as an integral cluster of the *global jihad movement* (GJM). Yet, before the start of the new Millennium, violent converts were still treated both by practitioners and scholars as an isolated and marginal phenomenon, when they were even noticed at all.

**A State of the Field**

The 9/11 attack reshaped the entire global politico-security landscape: with the WTC towers’ collapse, major paradigms decisively shifted. Foremost, the events of 9/11 marked a beginning of the new stage of the overt and broad confrontation of the GJM against the Western world. Among thousands of other things, it influenced the rapid evolution of a VIC-associated trend. The high-visibility attack itself attracted and brought scores of already disgruntled or disenfranchised Westerners under the banner of radical Islam. In a stunning development, hundreds of Americans, citizens of a nation which was a victim of terrorist attack, converted to Islam within months after 9/11, most likely to demonstrate disagreement with the public mainstream. Another example are the convert members of the so-called “Toronto 18” terrorist group, dismantled in Canada in 2006, who admitted that the 9/11 attack captured their imagination and attracted attention to Islam, eventually making them susceptible to radical jihadist ideology. The role of the 9/11 event as an enabler of conversion is itself interesting; however, this essay’s format does not provide an opportunity to go deep into this issue. What is important in this regard, is to understand that 2001 indicated a start of the *third generation of violent converts*, fully integrated into the GJM. This chapter examines some empiric evidence suggesting that within less than a decade after 9/11, the growing influx of violent Islam neophytes has impressively expanded the VIC cluster of GJM, making it a substation security threat in the context of homegrown terrorism. The brief

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9 Since the GJM will be referred further in this essay, its notion should be elaborated. In simple terms, the author understands the global jihad movement as a loosely-knit but strongly-motivated trend, rooted in radical and politicized interpretation of the Muslim faith. The eventual goals of GJM are vaguely defined and ultimately irrational. However, on the operational and tactical side the GJM is quite rational. The combination of the two mentioned factors makes the GJM a threat of a worldwide magnitude.

A precursor organizational nucleus for GJM was Al-Qaeda v1.0 (a.k.a. Al-Qaeda Central), which created an impetus for the GJM by launching the 9/11 attack. Current organizational structure of the GJM is based on the loosely connected small groups, cells and individuals, sharing common radical Islamist ideology and joint vision of the enemy (the U.S., Israel, Western civilization in general, and the moderate Muslims).


analysis is broken into three supra-regions of the globe: the U.S., the rest of the West, and the rest of the World.

**The United States**

There were 40 Islamist terrorism-related plots and incidents that took place or were foiled in the U.S. after 9/11.\(^\text{12}\) Violent converts were directly engaged in 26 of the mentioned 42 cases, what makes a full 61.9 per cent of the total number. The particular patterns of involvement were as following:

- Part of VIC operated within groups or cells (between 4 and 11 members). Roughly half of the mentioned groups/cells were amalgam of “native” and “newborn” (i.e. convert) Muslims, such as the “Portland 7” group (three converts of 7 members), the “LA Prison” cell (three of 4, including a leader), the Raleigh Jihad group (four of 8, including a leader), and Virginia Jihad Network (four of 11). Another half consisted solely of converts (examples: the “Miami 6” group, the “JFK Fuel Tanks Plot” cell, the “New York Synagogue Plot” cell).

- Some VICs were part of the self-radicalized pairs of like-minded action-oriented friends each consisting of a “native” Muslim and a convert (examples of the latter are James Elshafay and Carlos Almonte). Many other converts acted either as “lone wolves” (such as Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, a.k.a. the “Arkansas Shooter,” and Derrick Shareef), or those with formal ties but without a clear operational link to any known terrorist structure (examples: Michael Finton, Chris Paul). One “gray area” case involved a non-Muslim (Michael Reynolds), who offered his assistance to AQ on motivations other than religion. Yet, their terrorist intentions and activities were of low-profile, amateur nature, and localized within the U.S.

- In at least three cases (Richard “Shoe-bomber” Reid, Jose “Dirty-Bomber” Padilla, and Diren Baroth), converts were chosen by AQ-affiliated structures to plan or execute high-profile, mass-casualty-oriented attacks against an airborne jetliner (with the use of an improvised but

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Innovative explosive device), and in the urban environment (with the use of radiological dispersal devices (RDD)).

- Two episodes involved converts then in the service of the U.S. military, attempting to provide classified information to AQ recipients (Ryan Anderson, the U.S. Army National Guard and Paul Hall, a.k.a. “Hassan Abu Jihaad,” from the U.S. Navy). In one more case, related to the military, Hassan Akbar, a U.S. Army convert serviceman, motivated by religious rage, conducted a successful armed attack against his unit members (Iraq, 2003).

- One specific case involved two American women converts (Coleen LaRose and Jamie Paulin-Ramirez), who conspired within a wider jihadist group to kill a Swedish cartoonist on the grounds of alleged blasphemy against Mohammed.

- Several U.S. converts (including Omar Hammami, Bryant Vinas, and Daniel Joseph Maldonaldo) were involved into direct fighting in conflict zones, such as Afghanistan and Somalia, including against fellow Americans. At least one convert (Adam Yahye Ghaddan) was engaged as a media spokesman in a sophisticated strategic communication campaign, conducted by AQ-Central. A recently detained convert, Barry Bujol Jr., was allegedly providing materiel support to AQ.

- These facts eloquently illustrate the tense dynamics, operational magnitude, spatial dimension, foreign linkages and diverse patterns related to American converts’ activities, both within the homegrown terrorism domain, and in the jihadist movement on the global stage.

The Rest of the West

In Europe, converts have been part of most of the major known terrorist plots and associated networks which have come into the spotlight since 9/11. It is hard to find a country on the continent, from Spain to Norway, where VICs did not leave footprints. The converts-related developments in Canada and Australia are equally eventful. The facts in support of this statement follow.\footnote{All data below is a compilation of information, produced by different news agencies between 2001 and now.}

- A British – Jamaican convert Germain Lindsay was one of the four suicide bombers, who conducted the 7/7 attack (the London tube bombing in 2005).

- A Spanish convert Jose Luis Galan Gonzales (a.k.a. “Yousuf Galan”) was a member of a jihadist logistic and recruitment ring, linked to the 9/11 hijackers. Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras supplied 110 kg of stolen ex-
plosive to terrorists who launched the 3/11 attack (the Madrid mass transit bombing in 2004).\textsuperscript{14}

- A Belgian convert to Islam, Muriel Degauge, became a first-ever European female suicide bomber (died in an attack in Iraq, November 2005).

- A German–Polish convert, Christian Gancharzski, affiliated with AQ and operating within Germany, was a mastermind of the terrorist attack in Jerba, Tunisia in April 2002, which left 14 German tourists dead.

- Two of the four members of the \textit{Sauerland} cell in Germany, who planned a mass-casualty attack against German civilian and the U.S. military targets, were homegrown converts (i.e., fifty per cent of the total number).

- Three of 24 detained conspirators of the “liquid explosive plot,” aimed at the midair destruction of several Trans-Atlantic jetliners in summer 2006, were converts (12.5 per cent of a total number).

- At least three of the 19 members of the \textit{Hofstaad} Islamist terrorist network in the Netherlands, that killed filmmaker Teo van Gogh, were ethnic Dutch (that is, 15.8 per cent of a total number). This figure might be even higher, if we also count the so-called “barnacles” (i.e., members of the outer ring, friends and sympathizers, etc.). The second-in-command of the network was a convert Jason Walters of Dutch–American descent.

- At least four members of the “Toronto 18” terrorist network in Canada were converts (22.2 per cent of the total number).

- Between 2002 and 2006, Australia has experienced eight criminal cases, related to converts’ engagement into terrorist activities. That number included one case of a preparation of the attack with the use of explosive by a female convert, four cases of cooperation with the foreign terrorist networks AQ, the \textit{Taliban}, \textit{Jemaa Islamiyah}, and \textit{Lashkar-e-Tayyaba}, and one case of participation in a grassroots self-radicalized cell.

This list of examples could be continued, however, the above facts are sufficient to demonstrate both the scope of the problem, and its diverse patterns, such as in the previously discussed American case. Still, although they display certain similarities with the U.S., the European converts’ trend demonstrate differences as well.

The major factor in Europe, determining the influx of converts and their rapid radicalization, is the existence of massive, not-fully-integrated Muslim first- and second-generation migrant communities, which are as of this writing

\textsuperscript{14} Christopher Jasparro, “Madrid Attack Points to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review} (August 2004), 31. The conversion of Trashorras to Islam is still disputed though by those who argue he was involved into the conspiracy on the criminal profit-driven motivation.
growing steadily across the continent. Those communities, with their extensive social networks, and associated web of mosques, Islamic centers and clubs create a gravitational force for the “indigenous” Europeans, who experience certain problems, feel alienated, need guidance, and wish to fill a social communication void or change their whole way of life. Such factors create a fertile environment for conversion, and in many cases, for the subsequent radicalization of these converts. According to some estimates, out of nearly 5,000 confirmed Moslem extremists of the Salafi trend, put under police surveillance in France, more than four hundred of them were the “newborn” Muslims (a total of eight per cent), grouped mostly around mosques and praying congregations.

The second factor of note is the relative geographic proximity of Europe to the Muslim-majority world, in particular to the Middle East, the Gulf and South Asia. This proximity facilitates a relatively easy access to those regions for two primary purposes associated with converts: the study of Islam, and participation in armed jihad. The first track assures a sustainable radicalization and indoctrination mechanism, while the second provides professional training in terrorist tradecraft and “learning-by-fighting.” The last point has important security implications. The breaking of the Sauerland cell (2007) and revealing of the existence of the “German Taliban” nucleus group operating in the lawless area of Afghan–Pakistani border (2009) were wake-up calls for European security authorities, highlighting the real danger of the “exchange” of convert cadres between active jihadist war zones and Europe.

**The Rest of the World**

Violent converts are not an exclusively a Western phenomenon. They may be traced in many conflicts involving Islamist movements and organizations around the world.

The most notable example is Russia, which is fighting an Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus. Since the start of the Chechen war in 1994, hundreds of ethnic Russians and other Slavs, including military personnel, have converted to Islam, joining the ranks of the insurgency (in some cases, the sequence of action was actually the opposite: join the insurgents and then convert). An analysis of the search warrants issued by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs against 59 individuals for their participation in the Chechen invasion into Dagestan in 1999, demonstrates that five of them (or 8.4 per cent of the total number) were ethnic Russians, i.e., at least formally Orthodox Christians prior to the conversion. At least three (or, perhaps even more) of 32 terrorists who

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17 Based on the data posted on February 12, 2001 on the website of the РОСИНФОРМЦЕНТР (The Russian Information Centre, www.infocentre.ru, in Russian). That website is currently defunct.
seized hostages in the Beslan school in Russia in September 2004 were converted ethnic Slavs, including the alleged group’s leader Vladimir Khodov (thus, 9.3 per cent of a total number). Even more importantly, a convert, Alexander Tikhomirov, a.k.a. “Said Buryatski” (killed in March 2010), was for more than two years a primary ideologue of the “Caucasus Emirate,” an umbrella for the constellation of Islamist insurgent groups in the North Caucasus. His example indicates that converts are trusted to the extent that it is possible for them to occupy senior positions in the command hierarchy, and to act as authoritative sources of the jihadist ideology. Another notable convert, Pavel Kosolapov, a dropout cadet from the Russian Strategic Missile Forces’ Military Academy, who joined the Islamist insurgency, is allegedly a mastermind behind several major terrorist attacks in mainland Russia.

Beyond Chechnya and the North Caucasus, some Russian/Slav VICs were detected in several Islamist self-radicalized cells in the Volga region and in Siberia, as well as found in the ranks of Islamist groups in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and even as far afield as Lebanon. Overall, in addition to the influence of a decade and a half-long conflict in North Caucasus, other driving causes behind a high rate of conversion to a violent form of Islam in Russia appears to be the post-Soviet ideology/identity vacuum, and more recently, frustration due to the severe economic crisis. These factors seem to have made many non-Muslims turn their attention to the “protest potential” of Islam. A factor complicating an assessment of the role of Russian converts in the Islamist activities in Eurasia remains the less than transparent information picture generated by official Russian sources that make it difficult to verify facts.

Other remarkable examples of VIC activities can be taken from two disparate regions of the world. In the Philippines, the underground Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM), consists, according to some estimates, of several hundred converts, and is engaged in a terrorist urban insurgency against government. The RSM operative cadres are blamed for the worst incident in the history of maritime terrorism, when a February 2004 arson attack onboard of MV Superferry 14 claimed 116 lives. On the other edge of the globe, in Trinidad and Tobago, the extremist organization Jamaat ul-Muslimeen (JAM), consisting of Afro-Caribbean converts, is engaged in a broad array of violent and dubious activi-

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ties, ranging from organized crime to political militancy (including an attempted armed coup in the past).  

Summarizing the chapter, it is safe to state that the displayed evidence is sufficient to recognize the rise of converts’ cluster in the context of HGT/GJM in the last decade. The vast reservoir of open source information makes it easy to establish that fact. What is really difficult is to find out the answers to three key questions, arising from the abovementioned findings: who (are the converts?), why (are they converted and radicalized?), and how (do they undergo conversion in a practical sense?).

Patterns

This chapter omits broad dynamics and structural dimension, focusing exclusively on the individual level, crucial from the standpoint of understanding the motivations behind violent conversion, and mapping out trajectories leading to it. Furthermore, it is relevant for assessing political and operational implications of the VIC factor, and an elaboration of effective counter-measures (such as profiling, counter-radicalization narratives, de-radicalization strategies, etc.). Given a broad scope and a complex, if not perplexed, nature of this segment of the overall theme, the ambitions of the chapter are limited to simply highlighting some key observations. These observations are derived from researching the set of converts’ profiles, which were compiled from multiple sources by the author.

Who?

The first discovery coming from the study is: there is no a universal portrait of converts. They are all different. Violent converts might come from any nation, race, age, social strata, family background, level of education, and previous religious faith-affiliation (all branches of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.), “nominal” religion, or non-religion (atheism and agnosticism). A violent convert may be a member of the parliament and of the erstwhile ruling party, a wealthy businessman in his 50s, a father of three adult children, like Mr. Abdul Qader from Guyana, who conspired to blow up fuel tanks in the New York City international airport. Or, he could be a borderline mentally-retarded, uneducated and unemployed 22-years-old young man, like Nicky Reilly from England, who detonated an explosive device in the shopping mall in his

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21 The created VIC’ unified profiles are planned to be revealed in a future publication.

hometown.23 An example of these two completely disparate personages illustrates the diversity of the pool of radical converts.

Yet, notwithstanding all of these existing differences, a careful investigation of the personal profiles of violent converts reveals one inherent common denominator. This denominator is a crisis that all individual converts had in the period of life preceding their conversion. The problems causing a crisis might be of any origin – psychological, personal, social, etc. Whatever the nature, these troublesome life experiences bring the individuals in question to the decision of conversion to Islam as a remedial solution.24 In simple terms, the pre-conversion experience of a neophyte creates a trigger factor for conversion. Such a move constitutes a first stage of the CRA loop.

This complex issue requires illustration with concrete examples of negative life experiences and the resulting syndromes, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. For instance, we note that all three of the most notorious German convert jihadists (Fritz Gelowicz, Daniel Schneider and Eric Breinninger) came from what would be commonly described as dysfunctional families. That hardly could be a coincidence. Since the respective parents of the future perpetrators divorced when the latter were in their early teen years, their still-forming psyche definitely has been affected. Another example is the previously mentioned Muriel Deagauge, a Belgian convert and “she-bomber.” Prior to her conversion, she had experienced a permanent life-crisis chain: a shock event (her brother died in a motorbike accident), social problems (she was employed in low-income jobs only), communications problem (had bad relations with parents), and personal problems as well (was twice-divorced). In both mentioned cases, as in most of the others, the life crisis had created a point from which the individuals started to seek a solution. Development of personal exit strategies eventually saw them gravitate towards conversion to radical Islam.

The above mentioned outcome is not too random or uncommon. Life crises make individuals suffer, feel disenchanted, frustrated, alienated, or marginalized. Yet, quite a few tend not to blame themselves for their own problems. Rather, the majority, concisely or not, put the blame on the environment (the society and state they live in, and their well-doing fellow citizens). Generated anger moves the disgruntled and disenfranchised individuals closer to conversion, and precisely to radical interpretations of Islam, bridging the gap between C and R inside the CRA loop with more speed.

Why?

The previous piece indicated the need for a pre-conditional crisis phase to occur prior to conversion. A relevant question to address in this regard is why are

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24 Perhaps, not coincidentally, the main electoral slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sounds very neuro-linguistically: *Al-Islam huwa al-Hall*, or Islam is the Solution.
some individuals opting for conversion to Islam to curb their problems? Below is a set of several possible reasons (the order in which they are listed is random).

- **Simplicity.** Compared to the practices of other religions, Islam is characterized by a simple and short conversion procedure. To become a full-fledged Muslim, a neophyte need only vocally articulate a *shahada* statement (*La Illahi illa’Llah wa-Muhammad ar-Rasool l-Llah*, or “There is no God except God, and Muhammad is his Prophet), verified by two Muslims.

- **Guidance.** Islam provides a detailed and simple mapping both for daily life and dealing with contingencies. A strict dichotomy of what is permitted and forbidden (a clear “can” and “can’t”) suits many. This reason often goes in hand with the lure of “simplicity.”

- **Identity.** The process, sometimes referred as the “post-modern ideas crisis,” is associated, according to some estimates, with “losing confidence in the Christian vision.”\(^\text{25}\) Actually, this is not a new phenomenon: the notion of *Gott ist Tot* was coined by Friedrich Nietzsche as early as 1882.\(^\text{26}\) Such a decline, and a widening spiritual void, can result in a deteriorating of identity in at least some Westerners. The seeking of identity assertiveness and “a need to belong”\(^\text{27}\) may eventually bring them towards Islam. As explained by Yvonne Ridley, a British journalist who converted to Islam in *Taliban* captivity, turning a fierce critic of the West, she chose to be a part of “the best and biggest family in the world”\(^\text{28}\) (i.e., the Muslim ummah).

- **Protest.** In the current global political environment, the radical interpretations of Islam are serving as an “outlet of rebellion”\(^\text{29}\) against the existing order and prevailing realities. This draws a striking parallel with the period of the Cold War, when some disappointed Westerners, especially among youth, were susceptible to radical leftist ideology. In other words, “...some of the converts believe in the utopian role of Islam

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\(^{26}\) Means “God is Dead” in German.

\(^{27}\) The “need to belong” concept is elaborated by a French–Lebanese philosopher Amin Maalouf. See Amin Maalouf and Barbara Bray, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and a Need to Belong* (New York, N.Y.: Arcade Publishing, 2001).


in the same fashion as the middle-class leftist youth in the 1960s and 1970s believed in Marxism or communism. Islamic terrorism partially feeds on the exhaustion of leftist ideologies that mobilized part of the youth in Europe...". The potential of radical Islam as an internalization tool of anti-establishment, anti-state and anti-societal defiance and militancy likely remains one of the most common causes of conversion among the profiled VIC actors.

- **Ego.** Adventurism, machismo, and a need to overcome an inferiority complex make some personalities, primarily young men with no hopeful life perspectives, drifting towards radical Islam domain, where they can find the whole variety of benefits: new likeminded friends, self-confidence, a feeling of superiority towards “ordinary” fellow citizens, and adrenalin rush. As noted by Oliver Roy, a prominent French scholar in the field of the political Islam and Islamism, “they (converts) are people who feel devalued, despised and by becoming terrorists they suddenly become supermen, heroes.” Not surprisingly, the conflict areas in the Muslim world, such as Afghanistan, Waziristan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq or Somalia, serve as a magnet for these young and disenfranchised converted jihad-wannabes.

This list of reasons above is, of course, incomplete and shows only some of the many possible considerations within a broad spectrum of motivations, ranging from technical to spiritual. Again, it is impossible to establish a universal motivational pattern of conversion to radical Islam. The extreme challenge here is a need to assess identity, penetrate an individual cognitive level and establish syndromes caused by life crises, which are all different in each single case. In the words of Gen. Wesley Clark, answering on the CNN anchor’s question about possible motives of a U.S. convert soldier’s assault against his fellow servicemen in Iraq in March 2003, “you can’t imagine what the motivation could be. What could he be thinking?” Furthermore, it also involves a broader set of issues in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and some other sciences, relevant both to the study of the violent convert phenomenon and the preemptive profiling.

**How?**

There are multiple ways that the neophytes convert in practical terms. Each convert has his/her own unique trajectory that move them toward an eventual  

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30 Farhad Khosrokhavar, 37.  
landing in the domain of radical Islam. Yet, it is still possible to identify some of the most common enablers as follows.

- **Internet.** The Net (emails, chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter and other social networks, blogs and websites) is a huge enabler of C&R, providing access to sources of knowledge, indoctrination, and guidance, not to mention a network of contacts. The last point is crucially important, since contacts are often used as a recruitment “hook.” An absence of direct physical contact creates an initial friendly environment that emboldens neophytes who otherwise would abstain from certain decisions.34 Two early American jihadist-converts, John Walker Lindh and Adam Yahee Ghadan started their C&R trajectory through Internet surfing.

- **Mosques.** Preaching facilities and congregation communities, controlled by radical imams, have produced hundreds of radical converts in Europe and the U.S. Affiliation with such hubs becomes a starting point for the C&R trajectory. For instance, two French violent convert brothers Jerome and David Courtallier, who plotted an attack against the American Embassy in Paris in 2001, converted and radicalized in the Brighton mosque in the UK.35 Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider of the Sauerland cell were attending radical gatherings in the now notorious Multikulturhaus Islamic center in Neu-Ulm, Germany.36 These mosques and similar facilities are centers of gravity for alienated and disgruntled Western Islam neophytes.

- **Relations.** Different kinds of social relations provide another enabler of C&R. Many future converts contracted a radical version of Islam through a series of contacts with “native” Muslims. Such contacts may be facilitated via study in school or college, affiliation with a particular sports team or fitness club,37 other common interests, friendship, marriage, or an equal kind of partnerships and relationships. Germaine Lindsay, a 7/7 suicide bomber, was converted and radicalized by his

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35 An initial motivation for conversion of both brothers was to curb drugs additions. Visiting a mosque they were hooked and consequently indoctrinated. For details, see: Anthony Barnett, Martin Bright, and Nick Paton Walsh, “UK Student’s ‘Key Terror Role’,” *The Guardian*, 28 October 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/28/terrorism.uk.


ethnic Pakistani schoolmates. By the same token, a Russian convert Pavel Kosolapov got C&R from his Chechen neighbors. Jason Walters from the Hofstad network was converted by his converted father, and then became self-radicalized with the little help of his Moroccan friends, eventually converting his younger brother, who also joined the mentioned network. Many violent converts, such as Jack Roche from Australia and Willie Brigitte from France, converted first due to their marriage to Muslim women (a mandatory step to formalize relations in accordance with the Islamic tradition), and then radicalized in the process of interaction with Muslims. Some female converts, like Jill Courtney from Australia and Egle Kusaite from Lithuania, were converted and rapidly radicalized by their Muslim boyfriends.

- **Study.** Though it is often said that travel broadens the mind, it is not always in the right direction. Examination of the known converts profiles indicate that some of them were converted upon their travels to the Middle East or South Asia. Often starting as a natural curiosity about another country, culture and tradition, the process eventually ended with conversion. Not being a problem as such, however, the conversion stage was rapidly altered by the radicalization stage, after the “new-born” Muslims turned to education in the religious schools (madrassa), controlled by the radical Islamist centers throughout the region and found in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf region and Pakistan. An American convert Carlos Leon Bledsoe, a.k.a. “Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad,” launched a shooting attack at the U.S. Army recruitment center in Arkansas, killing one and injuring another serviceman, shortly after completing such a brainwashing study experience in the Yemeni madrassa.38

- **Incarceration.** Prison conversion, as recognized by a number of scholars and law enforcement practitioners, is increasingly transforming into a real problem.39 Muslim inmates constitute a substantial part of the European prison population: for instance, in the UK they make 11 per cent, as for 2008.40 Many correctional facilities in Europe and the USA already have turned to a “radicalization incubators,”41 controlled by

various radical Muslim gangs and visiting radical preachers, who openly proselytize Islamism. Psychological specifics of confined environment and “captive audience” deform the psyche, making non-Muslim inmates, especially those who want to break the criminal record circle, more susceptible to conversion offers. Richard “Shoe-Bomber” Reid was converted and radicalized behind bars. Two American homegrown terrorist cells consisting of converts (the LA gang and the Synagogue plot group) originated from prison cells.

There are additional observations relevant in the area of conversion and radicalization. The first is related to the C&R enablers. The first four of the five above-listed enablers are obviously linked to the globalization factor (G-factor). Globalization, both in its technological and human dimensions, trumps geography, leading in intensifying interaction between disparate civilizations. Air transportation squeezes physical distance, allowing travel to take hours, instead of weeks and months as in the not so distant past. The Internet makes communication even faster. Additionally, migration changes demography. One must not necessarily travel from Europe any more to explore and contact another world; it might be found the next door, just behind the street corner, in the London’s suburbs, in the Paris banlieues, in Milan or The Hague. The openness of Western culture makes it easy for Islam to proselytize, while countering penetration with the strict and prohibitive safeguards that operate within radical Islam. The “dark side” of the “Globalization factor” is important to assess with regard to the phenomenon of conversion in general, and its violent dimension in particular. Increasingly, the converts-related terrorist cases illustrate their “globalized” nature. The March 2010 “Cartoon” plot was based around a cell whose members originated from Algeria, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, Croatia and the USA (three of the seven detainees were converts), based in both sides of the Atlantic, in Ireland and the States, and aimed at a target in Sweden. Sergey Malyshev, an ethnic Russian convert from Belarus, who fought in Chechnya on the rebels’ side, was arrested in 2005 in Spain for his role in a recruitment ring, consisting mostly of Pakistanis and linked with the Iraqi insurgency.

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42 Ibid., 39.
A second observation focuses on a *vague nexus* between C and R. As was noted by Jean-Louis Bruguiere, the French anti-terrorism judge, "*the converts are undeniably the toughest. Nowadays the conversions happen more quickly and the commitment is more radical.*" Michael Taarnby, an Islamism expert from the Danish Institute for International Studies, echoes him: "*It's striking, the number of converts engaged in terrorist activities.*" The question of why some converts prefer exactly *extreme violent interpretations* of Islam is perhaps the toughest one to answer authoritatively. Are they blindly lured and recruited, or do they cross the threshold to radicalism voluntarily? Did they succumb to peer pressure, internal group’s dynamic and leaders’ charisma, or did they come already prone to hatred and violence, just comfortably embedding their rejection and prejudice into an already existing extremist resistance ideology? Identifying a "*missing link*" that bridges the gap between conversion and radicalization certainly leaves a broad field open for useful future research.

Summarizing the current chapter, it is necessary to keep in mind that violent conversion is a very non-linear, complex and obscure process, as is illustrated by hundreds of personal narratives. The centerpiece of each story, however, is a specific problem(s) an individual suffers from. A need to combat this problem causes a reaction – a conversion to Islam viewed as a sought solution. In other words, at a certain point, existing long-term causes meet a trigger factor, as in a classical "precondition – precipitance" equation designed by Martha Crenshaw. When conversion is offered in a package with radical ideology, the outcome becomes a beginning of ascendance of “newborn” Muslims up the violent conversion ladder.

### Practical Aspects

This section discusses the value of violent converts for GJM, and their operational and structural dimensions. It also touches briefly upon two randomly selected aspects associated with converts, namely their role in the so-called “war of ideas” and the phenomenon of female suicide terrorism.

### Value

Assessing the place and role of VIC in the context of HGT underlines the multiple *utility* of converts for the global jihad. That utility of both a practical and symbolic nature may be broken down along several functional activity lines, as follows:

- *Direct action.* This track includes direct involvement in terrorism, insurgency and, in some cases, associated organized crime. The converts

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47 Ibid.
may operate in the violent domain either as ordinary ranks ("muscles") or as leaders. The area of operations could be their native environment (i.e., the West), conflict zones in the Muslim world, or elsewhere. The scale of their terrorist tradecraft may vary from expert and high-profile to low-tech and amateur. Some examples of such activities have already been referred to in this essay. In addition, a selected specific segment (female suicide terrorism) is explained in more details in this section as an example of the potential operational roles of converts.

- **Ideological support.** This domain includes participation in Islamist propaganda efforts, the recruitment and indoctrination of the new followers, and related activities. One notable example of an individual engaged in the ideological support of terrorism is Trevor William Forest, a.k.a. “Abdullah al-Faisal,” a British – Jamaican convert imam, who preached religious and racial hatred across the UK Muslim community, until being legally banned.49 The role of converts in the “war of ideas” is elaborated on further in this chapter.

- **Other support.** Available information suggests that converts are widely used in different forms of material and technical support in the context of the GJM. For example, Raphael Gendron, an ethnic French convert IT-specialist, was maintaining a website of the Malika al-Aroud Islamist network, which was used for jihadist propaganda and recruitment, principally in Europe.50 Some converts are active in various Islamic charities, controlled by the radical centers. Another form of contribution by converts is engaging in classical espionage. As mentioned in chapter 4, two U.S. Armed Forces servicemen were convicted this decade for their attempt to act as AQ “moles” or sources of intelligence.

**Structural Dimension**

In recent decades, converts were spotted in the ranks or in the outer circles of major terrorist, insurgent, political extremist and criminal groups. Some examples include Al-Qaeda, Taliban (both in its Afghani and Pakistani branches), Jemaah Islamiyeh /Jl/, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba /LET/, Hezbollah (Lebanon), Moroccan Combat Islamic Group /GICM/, Al-Shabab (Somalia), and People against Gangsterism and Drugs /PAGAD/ (South Africa). As well, they served in different structures of the Iraqi, Kashmiri, Chechen and Niger Delta insurgencies. Only two organizations with more than one hundred members consisted solely of VICs – the RSM in the Philippines and the JAM in Trinidad and Tobago, already mentioned in earlier section. Otherwise, violent converts have been embedded

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in small numbers into a huge mass of “native” Muslim members within different terrorist organizations.

However, on the lower organizational level, the converts-related structural dynamic is disturbing. VICs are increasingly represented as a percentage of members in the grassroots self-radicalized autonomous cells and groups scattered across the Western urban environment. Most of the mentioned structural units are amalgam, i.e. consisting both of “native” and convert Muslims. However, some are including exclusively converts (such as “Miami Six” or “Synagogue Plot” groups). To further complicate the landscape, many violent converts have demonstrated their willingness and ability to operate as “lone wolves” without formal affiliation to any specific jihadist group. Such a dynamic poses obvious implications to the Western security services and law-enforcement agencies.

**Operational Dimension**

The small groups and loners embedded into growingly multicultural, diverse and fluid Western human terrain and not easily distinguishable from the moderate Muslim pool, pose the key security challenge from the standpoint of profiling, detecting, penetrating and dismantling terrorist plots. This fact was openly noted by Dennis Blair, then Director of the U.S. National Intelligence (DNI), and Robert Mueller, FBI Director. Such scattered and low-profile groups of likeminded and “action-oriented friends” with hardly predictable internal dynamic, absent formal hierarchy, and loose outside connections are a real center of gravity of security concerns and efforts. If such entities are keeping a low profile and look and behave “traditionally,” they produce few warning indicators prior to activation. An illustrative example of this is the 7/7 terror cell, which consisted of three members of Pakistani descent and a convert. The current small groups’ threat that in some ways is comparable with the challenge of sleeper espionage cells of the Cold War period, and trumps the meaning of strategic intelligence in combating terrorism. Equally, it defeats Sun Tzu’s paradigm of penetrating the enemy army commander’s intent. Instead of the army, there are hundreds of decentralized “platoons” (groups, sells and lone-wolves), which are well-blended into environment. The threat posed by “white-skinned, blue-eyed, hard-to-detect” converts (a dream of the late terrorist Abu Mus’ab al-Zarkawi) in such an environment seems to be continually expanding.

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52 Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?.”

53 Mili, “Al-Qaeda Caucasian Foot Soldiers.”
Female Suicide Terrorism

The use of women as suicide bombers is not unique in the context of Islamist terrorism: it has a record in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya/Russia, and other areas. However, the use of converts for this end is a relatively new, but potentially very dangerous trend. It is directly related to a steadily growing pool of Western women who convert to violent interpretations of Islam. In the spring of 2010 alone, two American female converts were detained for their alleged role in the so-called “Cartoon plot,” and an Australian woman was imprisoned in Yemen for her suspected ties to AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The utmost threat emanating from this phenomenon is the creation of a new source of willing suicide executioners – female converts.

As was indicated as early as in September 2005, “it is no longer if but when – when will we have Caucasian converts to Islam... American or Canadian female suicide bombers? It is only a matter of time.”54 This frightening prediction materialized just two months later, when the first known convert “she-bomber,” Muriel Degauge, committed her attack in Iraq. She was one of up to 47 female converts (originating mostly from Germany, Belgium, and Denmark) who reportedly were targeted by recruiters for suicide missions in Iraq and Pakistan.55 Although such media-originated reports could not be verified from independent sources, the alarming truth is that many women upon conversion to Islam fall under influence of radical Islamist ideology, subsequently becoming more susceptible to brainwashing, and eventually directed toward suicide missions. A study of the profiles of Muriel Degauge and Egle Kusaite,56 another female convert who opted for a suicide mission (and was arrested in Lithuania in 2009), reveals some striking parallels. Both experienced crises in their pre-conversion period. Both were converted and radicalized by their Muslim male partners. Both had never been in the Muslim world, their C&R stories took place in Europe. Though, M. Degauge eventually travelled to Iraq and detonated her explosive belt next to the American military convoy, but did not manage to claim any fatalities. Unfortunately, the next she-bomber may choose a less complex and more effective way (from the standpoint of the media-political effect) to do the same in a crowded public place in one of the European cities.

War of Ideas

Analysis of strategic communication, projected by different segments of the GJM, indicates that its leaders increasingly appreciate and exploit the propaganda value of converts. In particular, this has been well demonstrated by the frequency the converts appear in the jihadist propaganda videos and Internet forums, and other tools of ideological support of terrorism (IST).

Converts, able to appeal to specific groups of people, are skillfully used by jihadist entrepreneurs to hit different Western target audiences. Adam Yahyee Ghadan, working for AQ, speaks American-accented English and addresses primarily the American mid-class, trying to turn it against the U.S. government's foreign policy. For instance, his speech aired by Al-Jazeera in early October 2008 was devoted to commenting on the unfolding financial crisis in the States. On the other part of social spectrum, the young convert Eric Breinninger (killed in Pakistan, April 2010) was messaging to his peers from lower-class disenfranchised German youth, urging them to join the jihad in the ranks of Taliban. The media-spread images of Breinninger, posturing in military fatigues, traditional Arab scarf around the neck and with Kalashnikov rifle in his hands, creates a very appealing message to those unstable “angry young men” back in Europe, who feel themselves alienated and deprived of life perspectives. Such use of turncoat Westerners for propaganda purposes by GJM provides another resemblance of the Cold War pattern.

The growing role of converts as high-value assets in the IST field made in 2010 the EU officials, for the first time, to recognize it by stating: “Western converts are increasingly being used by Islamist terrorist groups for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Native speakers have appeared in videos produced by terrorist organizations and disseminated on the Internet, broadcasting messages to potential recruits in EU Member States in their own language.”

Conclusion

Summarizing the main points of the above considerations, it is important to underline the following key items relevant to violent converts to Islam. Part of these findings were reported by the author in the meetings of the Counterterrorism Working Group in Tbilisi, Georgia (April 2007) and in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (September 2007), as well as during the 12th Annual Conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in Warsaw, Poland (June 2010).

1. Violent Muslim converts clearly represent a rising trend and an expanding physical subset within the domain of homegrown terrorism, associated with the global jihadist movement. Yet, this violent conversion trend is indivisible from the entire issue of homegrown terrorism and

should arguably be treated as a “big threat within great threat.” Converts create a “third element” of HGT, beyond radical, second-generation Muslims and legal and illegal Muslim non-citizen migrants.

2. Violent conversion is a multifaceted phenomenon without discernable universal patterns of conversion and radicalization of its actors. The highly diverse and individual internal motivations and drivers behind C&R represent the most complex segment of this phenomenon.

3. From the operational standpoint, the converts are hard to observe, scattered and profiling-proof targets, and pose a substantial security challenge as such. The absence of clearly defined characteristics of such targets, blurred in Western human terrain, complicates detection and the prevention of converts’ activities.

4. Converts provide a multiple value for the global jihad in the domains of operations, support and propaganda. In particular, the role of converts in IST and propaganda efforts of the GJM, aimed at the Western public, is steadily increasing. Thus, converts are currently forming a promising potential recruitment pool and are regarded as an essential force multiplier by the entrepreneurs of global jihad.

5. The converts-related dynamic is evolving. The next generation of violent converts will likely be more action-oriented, and consist mostly of young people, including scores of female converts. In a time of protracted global socio-economic crisis precipitating in growing frustration in society, the number of Western violent converts to Islam will likely continue to rise. The problem will continue to gradually move from its previously peripheral position to the very epicenter of the HGT domain.

6. Violent actors should be clearly distinct from moderate converts, who represent a majority of the Islam converts’ pool, and mainstream converts should not be treated with any prejudice. However, to combat the VIC threat effectively, it should first be recognized as such, properly identified and named. The political sensitivities and post-modern ethical values surrounding the issue of VIC should not become the factor that may potentially complicate the development of effective strategies to counter the challenging phenomenon in question.

Being an indivisible part of HGT, the VIC phenomenon still requires special consideration from the standpoint of devising and employing proper counter-terrorism policies and practices. To be countered effectively, the conversion phenomenon still has to be rigorously studied and understood. In this regard, one of the most relevant requirements is increased scholarly research. This chapter represents an attempt to provide an initial overview of the problem, and is intended as the first of a series of planned publications examining various aspects of converts to radical, violent Islamism.
Chapter 9
Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Combating Terrorism: An Academic Point of View
Anton Dengg 1

Introduction
Global challenges require global answers. This is especially the case with the current threat of transnational terrorism. Undoubtedly, there is an increasing need for states to cooperate in the sphere of counter terrorism. Information, even sensitive information, has to be shared because of two compelling reasons:

- to prevent attacks,
- to investigate after an attack, as fast as possible and to ensure that attackers get appropriate punishment, and to nip further attacks in the bud.

But what should such cooperation actually look like? Especially after the 9/11 attacks, state institutions have tried to share information – about knowledge of terror organizations and to interlink them. Similarly, after the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the European Union (hereafter EU) has intensified the coordination and interlinking of security organizations.

EU Information Sharing
The EU has decided upon many new regulations and cited some requirements that have to be undertaken to counter the new threats. Here are some relevant examples:

- The exchange of information between intelligence services 2 of the Member States of the European Union will be required and a joint investigation team has to be set up (September 2001);

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1 Colonel Anton Dengg, Austrian Army, has been a longtime member of the CTWG. He has been serving at the OSCE and working as a research fellow at the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management of the Austrian National Defense Academy since 2004.

The close cooperation between Europol and the relevant US authorities (September 2001);\(^3\)

The commitment to establish operational links and improve existing cooperation between relevant bodies to facilitate enhanced exchange of information on terrorist financing (March 2004);\(^4\)

The establishing of a “specific intelligence capacity in relation to terrorist financing within SitCen to inform the work of relevant bodies” (June 2004);\(^5\)

The statement that Member States use the power of their intelligence and security services not only to counter threats to their own security, but also, as the case may be, to protect the internal security of the other Member States (December 2004);\(^6\)

The statement that from 1 January 2005, SitCen (Joint Situation Centre) will provide the Council with strategic analysis of the terrorist threat. This analysis is based on intelligence from Member States’ intelligence and security services and, where appropriate, on information provided by Europol (December 2004).\(^7\) Thereupon, this is taken into account in the European Security Strategy (ESS, 12 December 2003) in which terrorism is cited as one of the five key threats to the European Union.

In 2005 the EU arranged in “The Hague Programme”\(^8\) to identify the goal of setting up and implementing a methodology for intelligence-led law enforcement at the EU level. Another fundamental regulation exists in the EU for cooperation between intelligence authorities: A Member State which organizes a major event with an international dimension should be facilitated with collection, analysis and exchange of relevant information on the event. “The information could, inter alia, include:

- Information and intelligence obtained prior to the event that can potentially affect the course of the event or the maintenance of law and order and security in general,

- Persons involved in terrorist organizations, terrorist actions or other major criminal activities, which might be indirectly related to terror-

\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) European Council, *Declaration on Combating Terrorism*, 7906/04 (Brussels, 29 March 2004).
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 20.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 22.
ism." But for the prevention of terrorist attacks, information and intelligence about terrorist groups and organizations is essential for sharing information and intelligence in general and as appropriate to the incident. Therefore the organizing Member State may request the deployment of police or intelligence officers for operational support from another Member State.

In addition to these developments, there are large numbers of close partnerships to strengthen intelligence cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism between individual European Member States and the USA. Albania, for example, has adopted a number of legislative acts calling for stronger cooperation in “counterterrorism efforts of its police, military, intelligence service, and Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs.” Also, Brussels is “timely and proactive in sharing information with the United States regarding terrorist threats to US citizens or facilities” and the Belgium “General Intelligence and Security Services also cooperated closely with US authorities.” “Intelligence and security agencies” of the United Kingdom have deepen their bilateral measures on counter terrorism and increasingly work together in solving acts linked to terrorism with countries such as Australia, Greece, Indonesia and the United States.

It should be noted that practitioners from the field of intelligence often state that they have an excellent international cooperation. But if that is true why is there always a demand for better cooperation?

**Foiled Attacks**

An increase in intelligence cooperation is also apparent from the long list of foiled terrorist attacks. These successes of international cooperation between and among security agencies—especially from the legal perspective—can be seen in various disrupted plots and in the rapid investigations of the perpetrators. Some notable examples are:

- London, August 2006: attempted attacks on several airplanes with binary liquid explosives at the Heathrow airport in London;
- Dortmund and Koblenz, July 2006: attempted attacks on two high-speed ‘ICE’ German trains with bombs hidden in luggage;

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10 Ibid., p.16.
11 Ibid., p.17.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.

The rapid investigation work after the attacks in Germany demonstrated the good cooperation between the intelligence services. Following a tip-off from the Lebanese intelligence service, one of the so-called “suitcase bombers” was arrested at the railway station in the North German city of Kiel.\(^\text{16}\)

Similarly, a good approach for professional intelligence information sharing was the news of the arrest of 14 terrorist suspects at the beginning of 2008 in Spain. As an outcome of their investigation, the Spanish Intelligence Agency was able to warn France, Great Britain and Portugal of new attacks being planned by terrorist cells.\(^\text{17}\)

**Success versus Failure**

From another vantage point, the attempted attacks in Dortmund (2006) and London (2007) could also be seen, in a sense, as failures of the intelligence services. Only good luck prevented the terrorists from carrying out these attacks successfully. The bombs did not explode because of a mistake in their construction. Upon reviewing these foiled attacks, how can one accuse the intelligence agencies of having failed, because they could not gather information at an earlier stage? Or is prior detection by intelligence services made more difficult because of the decreasing size of the terrorist groups involved who carry out their attacks with simple and easily produced means? Or is the possibility of intelligence failure made more likely because of the “home grown” terrorists who remain quiet, as in sleeper cells? The recent foiled attacks show that a new organizational structure exists. As Mark Sageman has indicated, “the world’s most dangerous jihadis no longer answer to al Qaeda. The terrorists we should fear most are self-recruited wannabes who find purpose in terror and comrades on the Web. This new generation is even more frightening and unpredictable than its predecessors ...”\(^\text{18}\)

Another highly relevant question to consider is whether it is becoming more difficult to fight against terrorists using purely conventional means? Is traditional international cooperation and information sharing between intelligences agencies sufficient to confront the current threat? Or is there a need to entirely rethink counter terrorism measures? Still further, do we need a total restructuring in the field of intelligence? It should be noted that at the beginning of 2008, two underwater cables were destroyed on the Egyptian Mediterranean coast. The result was an immense restriction of nearly the whole of internet traffic in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and


Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Combating Terrorism

even India. The Egyptian Ministry of Telecommunication stated that fully 70% of the Internet failed. The two very extremely stable cables ten kilometers away from each other had been destroyed nearly at the same time but there were no visible hints of an attack. However, it should be noted that there were some appeals in the internet to attack this kind of infrastructure. If this incident really was an attack, the ability of intelligence agencies to stop it would be still very much in question.

Do we need quantitatively more or qualitatively better international cooperation for effective counter terrorism? Why does the United States—as well as the EU—demand increased efforts to achieve better cooperation? At the end of January 2008 President Bush demanded in Las Vegas, that the fight against terrorism “requires all assets of the United States, and requires coalitions working together. I mean, we need to be sharing intelligence.”

Does this mean that all of the decisions which have been made up until now, accordingly, were only empty words? Have all the efforts of the past years been in vain? One might well ask where precisely are the current problems in counterterrorism cooperation and collaboration. What should this cooperation ideally look like? At what level should these cooperative efforts be managed?

Additionally, we might inquire what should counterterrorism intelligence cooperation look like between agencies? The first challenge is to find out in which area useful cooperation is actually possible. Intelligence agencies have different ways of acquiring data:

- Human Intelligence (commonly called Humint)
- Technical Intelligence
- Material intelligence, and
- Open source intelligence.

The question is, then, in which area is useful cooperation possible? In the new information age, there is a huge amount of information available and it is nearly impossible to analyze all of it. There can certainly be useful cooperation between intelligence services in the field of “Open Source Intelligence” through more division of labor and burden sharing on particular subjects for the sake of efficiency and cost effectiveness. This would be similar to what has transpired regarding “technical intelligence.” Because of the technical

and resource restrictions of some states, a division of labor can bring a real additive benefit.

**Fixing the Society**

If you demand cooperation in the intelligence field you must not forget to fix intelligence organizations. The more convinced the public of a state is that there is a security need for intelligence, the more the society can be convinced to support better domestic and international cooperation in this field. This situation is reflected in the willingness to give more rights to the intelligence authorities of some countries, notably the United States, in order to fight terrorism. To be sure, more authorities for intelligence and law enforcement agencies also introduce the potential danger of increased abuse of power. Therefore the society will need to maintain a special critical focus on the observance of basic rights. Thus, the winning public trust (to acquire and handle information in a proper manner within a democratic framework) is the highest precept in the field of intelligence. The more important human and basic rights for a society are, the less that society will forgive violation of these rights. This is applicable to domestic intelligence as well as for partners.

Accordingly, we might ask whether we need international agreement about common rules of conduct. That the legal prerequisites to prosecute terror suspects and cooperation between agencies of states are heading in the right direction can be seen in the example or the arresting of terror suspects in Sweden and Norway in late February 2008. The arrested Swedish and Norwegian citizens with Somali background are accused of financing terror attacks in Somalia.24

**Double Standards**

Society will criticize what it perceives as the application of double standards in basic rights. There is no way to punish one traffic offender, so to speak, while tolerating exceeding the speed limit by another one. Opponents always use things like that for their propaganda.

As an example, there are slides from Iraq on which you can see torture described as a device to instill humiliation and to force confessions. At the end of January 2008, US Deputy Secretary of State and former Director of National Intelligence admitted in the press that the US Intelligence employed methods of torture.25 One method is the “waterboarding” – a simulated inundation. Double standards in counter terrorism play a special role in moral questions. In modern states, there is generally the principle of not using information that is obtained by torture, and not permitting such information to be admissible as evidence in a court of law. But would a government decline any information if

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24 Mehrere Terrorverdächtige in Skandinavien verhaftet, NZZ, 29 February 2008, p. 3.
such information prevents attacks in their country and saves human lives? This is a real, not theoretical, dilemma.

**Intelligence Sharing**

Intelligence Service is often a very complex activity, and requires a large amount of money in order to work effectively. But how is it possible to share high quality information gathered with expensive means when the cooperation partner is not ready to spend (in relation) as much money as another Intelligence Service? Or do you cooperate nevertheless with “free riders” to achieve a unit conflict scenario? As a general principle, trust is the only way to achieve a better degree of cooperation, in particular for “extraterritorial” cooperation. The building of trust can only be successful through the reduction of prejudice. Common workshops and seminars should accordingly enjoy a special status. This also includes, ideally, a mutual exchange of intelligence employees from disparate organizations. This, in turn, involves another problem, namely the strained relationship between trust and control. Proponents of purely unilateral intelligence will cite “loss of control” and even sovereignty issues as a reason to oppose more collaborative counterterrorism arrangements with other services. But the cooperation between the intelligence services of the European Member States is a good example, that, in principle, a deepened level of cooperation is in fact possible.

The USA has with their NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Center) access to dozens of networks and information systems from across the intelligence, law enforcement, military, and homeland security communities, containing many hundreds of data repositories. These systems contain foreign and domestic information pertaining to international terrorism as well as sensitive operational and law enforcement activities. And the NCTC Online (NOL) serves as a counterterrorism community library of terrorism information with over 6,000 users and 6 million documents.26

**Common Problems in Cooperation**

At times, problems can occur when a state or intelligence organization does not agree to a cooperative effort, or reduces its willingness to cooperate with others. In this case how would the intelligence services of other states react? Would they respect the decision of the sovereign state? Or would they conduct unilateral activities and conduct their own operations and try to get the information in a different way? Will pressure be applied to the non-cooperative state? Furthermore, if such a situation occurs, does it automatically imply the loss of trust in the work of security forces and intelligence? The more “intelligence failures” which are made public, the more difficult it is for politicians to defend intelligence activity in the future.

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26 *NCTC and Information Sharing. Five Years since 9/11: A Progress Report* (September 2006).
Internal Conflicts

A frequently underestimated problem in international cooperation is arguably the problem between competing domestic security services. There are always hints of authority problems and rivalry between security forces in states. The chairman of the German detectives Klaus Jansen commented on the reporting of the defensive information policy of the German Intelligence regarding the search for the Islamist attacker in the Sauerland: The intelligence service sucked out the information from the Common Terrorism Center (GTAZ = Berliner Gemeinsames Terrorabwehr Zentrum) in Berlin, the provincial police only taking part in the GTAZ with a very half-hearted approach. Jansen complained that the intelligence services do not want or are not allowed to cooperate with the responsible police organs in countering Islamist terrorism.

Similarly, Robert Baer, a former CIA clandestine operations officer, also quoted in his book some inconsistencies in US domestic security agencies. Perhaps with the help of the NCTC Online with their classified repository some inconsistencies between the agencies can be solved. When problems in cooperation in the domestic intelligence field are discovered, how is it possible to engender a better relationship between external intelligence authorities?

At any rate, it is broadly agreed that there is good international cooperation between intelligence, and the level of intelligence-law enforcement cooperation has clearly enlarged. The wish to cooperate has especially increased after the attacks of 9/11 and the following attacks in Europe (Madrid 2004 and London 2005). We might say that terrorism has served as the primary driving force for cooperation.

Propaganda

Where can terror organizations be most easily hurt? Where are their strengths? This can only be explained with reference to their mode of operation. Terror organizations live from their propaganda. The media broadcast their strategies, goals and methods. The most important media that terrorists employ for their actions is the internet. One of the reasons for the triumphant progress of current terrorism is the internet. With the internet, terrorists are able to spread their information in a very cheap and easy way and have an enormous worldwide affect.

Perhaps we can find an effective counterterrorism strategy precisely here. If the terrorists can be successful in their propaganda campaigns, why shouldn’t counter terrorism forces succeed with their own counter terror propaganda? The challenge for intelligence agencies is to identify and employ effective...
counter propaganda. But does the field of a counter narrative also lend itself to a cooperative effort? Research in this area is critical. It is highly important to analyze under which conditions and with which arguments young Muslims can be lured away from the Jihad. But such an effort can only work with the help of moderate Imams who can provide resonant counter arguments to the jihadist hate campaigns. Is it possible to accept an Imam as a special adviser on counter terrorism issues? Is there a need to employ more Muslim specialists in Western intelligence services? Is there an additional need to cooperate and to share more information and analyses with intelligence services from Muslim countries?

**Privatization of Intelligence**

There is too little attention paid to the “privatization of security” where intelligence obtaining measures are concerned. This also provokes the “competence solving measures” of intelligence agencies and can also be a public rivalry.\(^{30}\) The private sector (catchphrase “Intelligence Commercialization”) is constantly increasing. So the question is: can also private intelligence play a special role in counter terrorism? There is a need to address whether there is a logical requirement for cooperation between state intelligence organs and private intelligence organizations.

**Conclusion**

Intensive cooperation in the field of Intelligence creates trust which, at the same time, is a contributing factor for a better relationship between states and therefore can also be a peace-building measure. Trust is a critical building block for intelligence sharing. Common training measures are important steps in the right direction. Organizations have to undergo a steady change to establish their stability, efficiency and identity. Therefore changes are always needed. The so called status quo is a “dynamic condition.”\(^{31}\)

Homeland security and intelligence sharing in combating terrorism is also an “ongoing project.” Available examples show that good results have been obtained from cooperative intelligence efforts. Nevertheless, it is also important to understand that intelligence capabilities must be improved at the local level. Subsidizing the construction of intelligence fusion centers may be valuable in this regard, but does not create intelligence capability by itself. That requires manpower and training, which also require continued support, and, equally important, a “less bureaucratic approach to the ownership of intelligence information.”\(^{32}\)

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., p.46.


The relevance of intelligence agencies and their important and excellent work must be brought home to people. Especially, the success achieved through robust intelligence sharing must be demonstrated – with the understanding that more public relations is needed. A splitting of responsibility in the field of “Open Source Intelligence” can lead to the timely and financially prudent saving of resources. The database of NCTC could be a good example for transnational cooperation. But, in terms of international cooperation, what authority should give the right of access to such a transnational data base? Who should receive which information and when? The former German Minister of the Interior Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble remarked in a speech in November 2007 at a BND Symposium in Berlin: “The most important instrument in counter terrorism is intelligence.”

Therefore, intelligence sharing must be seen as an activity of paramount importance. To fight terror with terror is the same as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and in the long term is not linked to ultimate success.

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Chapter 10

International Intelligence Cooperation against Terrorist Targets – Phase II

Tatiana Busuncian

With regard to the international threat posed by global terrorism, the area of International Intelligence Cooperation against terrorist targets represents a viable solution only in cases where both the theoretical and practical approaches are considered and linked. The death of Osama bin Laden has not altered this. This link represents a global requirement for international interdependency at national, regional and international levels, to which the cooperation and integration must be best fitted.

We should be aware that terrorism is bound to be with us for the foreseeable future. The outcome of the measures applied in preventing and combating terrorism is helpful only when a political will from all engaged parties exists. A serious engagement in the collaboration process is significant in elaborating a well-defined strategy and fostering a win-win situation in the fight against terrorists’ acts.

South-Eastern Europe represents a complex region. Starting in 1990, it was disturbed by different conflicts and political instability, which transformed it into a region that attracts organized crime from Europe, with this illicit activity forming a breeding ground for terrorist activity from outside the region and within. The strategic position of the region, situated between Western Europe and the Middle East, supposes even more active involvement of the terrorism phenomenon and represents a source of financing terrorist crimes. Moldova’s participation in the antiterrorist campaign is explained by its location in South Eastern Europe, as part of the so-called “instability train” that stretches from South-Western Asia, through the Caucasus, and on to the Balkans.

One of the main factors that contributed importantly to the escalation of this situation consists in the fact that the focus is only on counteracting already existing threats, rather than on preventing them. According to the criminal legislation currently in force, the responsibility for counteracting actions that affect national security devolves upon the representatives of security service in-

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1 Ms. Tatiana Busuncian of Moldova has been a member of the CTWG since the 1990’s, and a participant in the George C. Marshall European Center’s Program on Terrorism and Security Studies.
stitutions. Yet, in case the main efforts in combating existent threats are di-
rected only to counteracting a crime that has already been carried out, these
actions will be inefficient, because any criminal manifestation constitutes the
consequences of some social-political contradictions that were unsolved ade-
quately, thus evolving towards illegal actions.

Therefore, the countries of South-Eastern Europe are to focus mainly on
providing antiterrorism (offensive) measures that could oppose terrorism
throughout the entire threat spectrum and reduce the vulnerability of inter-
ethnic conflicts that produce a playground for terrorist acts.

Intelligence Cooperation enters a new phase in the collaboration process of
the Special Services (generally, the intelligence services). The emphasis is
placed on information exchange that considers current cases and actions. In
this way, intelligence cooperation appears to be a necessity in identifying the
best measures of directing and coordinating human resources, logistics and fi-
nancial resources that the international community disposes of.

The Republic of Moldova is a young state that at present is in the process of
consolidating its main public institutions. The information provided by ISS with
regard to the non-presence of terrorist organizations on Moldovan territory is
encouraging. In this situation, state efforts specialized in the field are focused
more on detecting terrorist plans in a timely manner and on impeding the pos-
sible legalization of such international terrorist organizations in Moldova.

As already mentioned, according to article 13 of the Law on the state’s secu-

As concerns combating terrorism, the state security bodies have the fol-

- Information and Security Service – performs tasks in combating terror-

ism, activities of prevention, detection and stopping of terrorist crimes, in-
cluding those that have political purposes as well as international ter-
rorist activities. At the same time, ISS contributes to ensuring the secu-

rity of Republic of Moldova’s institutions situated on the country’s terri-
tory, as well as the security of the citizens employed in these institu-
tions and their family members. ISS also collects data concerning international terrorist organizations.

- **State Protection and Guard Service** – ensures the physical security of persons and objects situated under its guard; accumulates, analyzes and uses information concerning terrorist activity in order to prevent, detect and stop terrorist plans and plots. The Service coordinates its activity with all departments that specialize in combating terrorism, including internationally with similar services of other countries.

- **Border Guard Service with its territorial subdivisions** – combats terrorism by stopping any terrorists' attempts to cross the border and enter the Republic of Moldova.

- **Custom Service** – combats terrorism through prevention, detection and disruption of attempts for transporting across the borders of the Republic of Moldova ammunition, explosive and toxic substances, radioactive materials and other objects that can be used for terrorist crimes.

- **Ministry of Defense** – ensures the protection of ammunition, arms, explosive substances, military objects and air space of the country in the event of antiterrorist operations taking place.

- **Ministry of Internal Affairs** – combats terrorism by preventing, detecting and stopping terrorist crimes that have material purposes.

- **The Department of Penitentiary Institutions of the Ministry of Justice** – provides necessary support in stopping terrorist acts by providing the services of its subordinating subdivision to other competent national authorities.

- **Ministry of Information Development** – ensures informational assistance to the state authorities by performing activities in combating terrorism, providing informational resources, and specialized technical assistance necessary for database enhancement and informational networks.

- **Civil Protection and Emergencies Service** – performs civil protection actions and rescue operations and undertakes other urgent measures for the combating of terrorist acts.

- **Centre for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption** – ensures the prevention and combating of terrorism financing according to the attributions stipulated by the legislation in force.

On 15 September 2003, within the framework of the Centre for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption, a specialized autonomous unit was created – the Office for Prevention and fight against money laundering and terrorism financing (OPFMLTF). This office has the following duties:

- Collection, analysis and processing of information regarding suspicious financial transactions, information presented by reporting entities, ac-
According to the legislative provisions of the Law on preventing and combating money laundering of the Republic of Moldova.

- Undertake operative investigation measures, also in accordance to the legislation in force;
- Collaborate and exchange information with administrative public authorities, inform competent bodies on causes and conditions that favor the commission of illicit acts, by undertaking measures stipulated in the legislation;
- Transmit information and documents to the prosecution authorities and other specialized bodies, as soon as the solid proofs are identified concerning money laundering, terrorism financing and other crimes that generate illicit earnings;
- Cooperation and exchange of information with similar services from abroad, as well as with international organizations specialized in preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing;
- Elaborate proposals in order to align the national normative acts to the international regulations in the field;
- Participate and elaborate on the National Strategy on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing;
- Develop an informational system in the specialized field and ensure its reliability and functionality;
- Ensure a methodology for the reporting entities in the field of preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing;
- Request and receive necessary information and acts, which the reporting entities and authorities of public administration dispose of, regarding the identification of the illegal aspects of terrorist transactions;
- Communicate with the reporting entities (when necessary), concerning the results of the information examination, publish periodical reports with regard to the performed work in the field;
- At the request of the bodies specialized in surveillance of the reporting entities, the Service performs the control and verification of reporting entities regarding violations of the law;
- Collect and analyze statistical data regarding the efficiency of the system for prevention and combating money laundering and terrorism financing, including the number of declarations concerning suspicious transactions, the number of prosecutionary cases and convicted persons, data concerning the combating of suspicious transactions, sequestration and confiscation of the received earnings from money laundering and terrorism financing crimes;
- Perform other tasks as stipulated in the legislation.
Taking into consideration the necessity of promoting a unique policy of the specialized institutions regarding the prevention and combating of money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as in order to make more efficient the relevant mechanisms and considering the importance of this phenomenon, it is necessary to define a clear strategic solution by adopting the National Strategy on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing along with the implementation of the Strategy’s Action Plan.

In the wake of the operative measures undertaken by the OPFMLTF during the year 2007, eleven offices, including four money laundering offices, were discovered. As a result of the commercial banks control concerning the non-observance of the provisions of the law on prevention and fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism, funds in the total value of 1 million lei (over 104,000 US Dollars), as well as other material goods were sequestered. Fifteen decisions were adopted for suspending financial transactions in fifteen banking accounts in Moldova, while freezing a total of 1.05 million US Dollars and 2.8 million lei. For example, as the result of productive work with similar Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) from the Russian Federation and Cyprus, accounts were frozen returning to the Russian Federation an amount of 1million US Dollars, and to Cyprus, a total of 22.6 thousand USA Dollars. It should also be mentioned that the amount of money noted above transited through the national banking system, with destinations in other states, with the goal of hiding the illegal provenance of the funds.

To ensure the effective accomplishment of its legal duties, the Office cooperates with the entire system of institutions and reporting entities including non-governmental organizations involved in preventing and combating money laundering.

Thus, at a national level, the OPFMLTF operates in the framework of the general information system formed by the following institutions:


Agreements of interdepartmental cooperation were signed with: the General Prosecutor’s Office, National Bank of Moldova, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Informational and Security Service, Court of Accounts, Custom Service and National Commission of Financial Market.
One of the priority activities of the OPFMLTF is the settling and reinforcement of bilateral cooperation with other similar foreign services, as well as with international specialized organizations. Within this framework, considerable efforts for obtaining the Egmont membership have taken place. Ultimately, the Republic of Moldova became a member of this group. During 2007, the memorandum of collaboration on the exchange of information regarding money laundering and terrorism financing was signed within the frame of international cooperation activities with similar units from Georgia, Croatia and Poland. Also at this time, negotiations regarding the signing of the memorandum of collaboration with similar services from Cyprus, Czech Republic and Belgium were initiated. Thus the memorandums signed before with similar Financial Intelligence Units are the following: Albania (Coordination Directorate of Fight against Money Laundering), Belgium (Financial Intelligence Unit), Bulgaria (Financial Intelligence Agency), Belarus (Committee of State Control), Croatia (Anti-money laundering Department), Estonia (Information Bureau of Anti-money Laundering), Georgia (Financial Monitoring Service), Lebanon (Special Investigation Commission), Lithuania (Service of Financial Crime Investigations), Macedonia (FYROM) (Money Laundering Prevention Directorate), South Korea (Financial Intelligence Unit), Romania (National Office for Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering), Russia (Federal Financial Monitoring Service), Ukraine (State Committee for Financial Monitoring). At the same time Republic of Moldova adhere to the Group of States against Corruption, according to the Law no. 297-XV from 22 June 2001.

During the year 2007, around one hundred and thirty requests for information were sent to similar Financial Intelligence Units and ninety-five were received, including ten requests sent to international organizations, and eight requests received from international organizations. The cooperation of the OPFMLTF with relevant international bodies implies, first of all, the adjustment of the normative framework in this field to international standards, as well as an intense information exchange via protected channels. This allows an active evolution of the methods and means used by the Office in the process of prevention and combating of money laundering and terrorism financing.

The Pro Marshall Center is planning to participate within the process of risk evaluation concerning money laundering and terrorism financing within the framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Strategy, as noted in June, 2008.

There are different typologies of money laundering and financing of terrorism that were identified in 2007. Here is an example of one of the types identified by OPFMLTF in 2007.

A person with a high responsibility position of one supervisory institution who, due to his working position, has access to confidential information, employs fraud and false documentation in judicial court, using dummy persons, to withdraw from different physical and legal persons the financial shares of an important organization.
Subsequently, the mentioned financial shares were sold on the stock exchange market (the assets had a high liquidity) and the obtained financial means were spent for the purchase of luxury goods (including automobiles, real estate property, etc.).

At the same time, in view of attributing a legal aspect to the illegally obtained capital and to the purchased luxury goods, as a result of an agreement signed with two other shareholders, the individual had bought on the over-the-counter market some shares of another organization, and the official price paid was 70% cheaper than the real one, paid in cash to the shareholders.

Later, the shares purchased in this manner were sold on the stock exchange market for the real price. In this manner, a legal aspect was attributed to the illegally obtained capital.

The Office analyzes and verifies information from special forms, which allows for monitoring transactions that could be connected to money laundering, financing terrorism or other serious offences.

When the Office employee identifies the constitutive elements of the crime, the OPFMLTF presents the information to the Criminal Investigation Department of the CCCEC and, if the facts are confirmed, CCCEC initiates the proposal for criminal investigation and presents it to the prosecutor for approval. When the criminal investigation is decided to be started, the prosecutor who leads the criminal investigation process gives instructions to the criminal investigation officer and he, at his turn, establishes various tasks for the OPFMLTF officer.

During the year 2007 OPFMLTF identified 9.5 million of suspicious, limited, and cumulative transactions, that constitute an increase of 35% in comparison with the year 2006. This growth is motivated by the essential increase of business figures of local companies, as a result of the development of the financial market, due to the enlargement of the European Union till the border of the Republic of Moldova, and of redirection of financial flows towards the bank system of the country.

In order to identify and counteract (destroy) terrorists it is necessary to be aware of the Special Services’ activities in the field. The contributions of the Information and Security Service are:

a. elaboration and realization, within its competence, of a system of measures oriented towards discovering, preventing and counteracting the following actions which, according to the legislation, endanger state, public and personal security:
   • actions towards violent change of the constitutional system, undermining or liquidation of sovereignty, independency and territorial integrity of the country (these actions cannot be interpreted against the political pluralism and realization of constitutional rights of a person);
activity, which contributes directly or indirectly to the deployment of military actions against the country or starting a civil war;

- military or other violent actions that undermine the state bases;
- action that aim to subvert violently the public authorities legally appointed;
- actions that favor the exceptional situations in transport, telecommunications, economic entities and those of vital importance;
- espionage, or the transmission to other states of information that contains state secrets, as well as getting or keeping illegally the information that contains state secrets in order to be transmitted to foreign states or anti-constitutional structures:
- betraying by offering assistance to a foreign state that is organizing hostile activities towards the Republic of Moldova;
- actions that endanger the constitutional rights and freedom of the citizens and threaten the state security;
- preparing and committing attempts upon life, health and inviolability of the country's officials, of state leaders as well as public representatives from other states being in the Republic of Moldova;
- stealing arms, ammunition, military equipment, explosive, radioactive, poisoning, drugs, toxic and other kind of substances, smuggling them, producing, using, transporting and keeping them illegally, if by this state security interests are threatened;
- institute illegal organizations or groups that threaten state security or participate in their activity;

b. protection of state secrets, wielding control regarding assuring, keeping and preventing the leakage of information that represents state secrets and other important information for the state;

c. creation and assuring the functionality and security of the governmental systems of telecommunication, elaboration of the strategy and realization of a national policy within creation, administration and assuring the functionality and security of the special systems of telecommunications;

d. deployment of activities on combating terrorism and financing terrorist acts.

For the accomplishment of the duties connected to the state security assurance, the Service employs:

- informative activities;
- counter-informative activities;
activities oriented towards tracing, preventing and countering actions, which according to the legislation threaten or could threaten the state security.

Other attributions within combating criminality can be granted to the Service by laws and other normative acts.

The way of informative and counter-informative measures development, as well as the terms of use of secret means and measures in the process of informative and counter-informative activity development are established by the legislation.

For the moment, the ISS activity makes-up a viable structure, able to trace, prevent and counter any action, which, from the legislative point of view represents a specific danger state, society or personal security. Following the objectives and duties established by the country’s top leadership, I.S.S. orients its activity towards opportune tracing of any action, accomplished both inside the country and from abroad, which could undermine the state system, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, could affect its political, economic and defensive interests.

The goal of the Special Services is to annihilate and to deprive the terrorist groups of funds. The main target of the Special Services is funds of the terrorist groups which have to be tracked down and annihilated. The magnitude of the terrorist acts may be reached only with enormous money sources. Thus, the objective of discovering, identification and annihilation of the terrorism financing channels is a priority.

In order to obtain the funds the criminal groups engage in conventional criminal activities, such as human trafficking, drugs traffic, money gouge, kidnapings, recruiting young women for sexual exploitation, labor force trafficking, and illegal migration.

At the beginning of the Independence of the Republic of Moldova, there functioned organized criminal groups typical descendants from the former Soviet Union under the leadership of the so-called, “thieves in law” who later have been annihilated by the Moldovan authorities. Later appeared new types of criminal organizations, under the control of persons who have no criminal records, but hold responsible functions. Usually such groups are involved in activities connected to trafficking of human beings:

- recruiting young women for sexual exploitation – each year are being discovered new groups that are carrying out activities in this field, trafficking women to Turkey, Greece, Kosovo and other countries and regions through Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, etc. Nowadays ISS is cooperating in this field with some special services of other countries.

- trafficking labor forces to the Western countries through South-Eastern Europe – in these cases the criminal groups are working as tourist agencies that prepare the documents for people as for tourists. It is difficult to discover clients who will give evidence or will serve as witnesses against such tourist companies. The clients are instructed even to re-
spect the way of behavior in order not to look suspicious to the offices of the consulates where they get visas or during border crossing;

- illegal migration going on through our country of descendents from the countries of the South-East Asia, Middle East and Africa – certainly this process provides possibility to the terrorist organizations to use these channels for their purposes. The information collected by ISS of Moldova since 1991 till nowadays proves this fact. During 1992-1996 we identified some cases where the members of the terrorist organization “Tamil Tigers” were transiting the country in small groups, being included in the migration wave to Western countries.

At the beginning of the military operation in Iraq, after the US troops were dislocated in Romania, ISS discovered and annihilated an illegal migration channel, under the leadership of a man called “Doctor Azad” through which people from Iran and Iraq were transited to Western countries. The reason to take such drastic measures in this case was motivated by the fact that apparently this person was a Saddam Hussein’s intelligence service officer, and ISS suspected that this channel could be used for trafficking the “shahids” to Romania where the US troops were dislocated. ISS also took into consideration the fact that at the Southern part of the border between the Republic of Moldova and Romania the alarm engineering systems were destroyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union that made this region vulnerable to the attempts of the traffickers. This situation didn’t last long. Anyway the system existing at that moment was an electronic system technologically obsolete and needed to be replaced by a new generation electronic systems. Nowadays the modern systems are outperforming and have advanced capacity and functionality.

An identical situation happened at the Chisinau Airport recently. During the control of passengers who arrived with the flight from Istanbul, the Border Guard Service Officer revealed a group of citizens, of African origin, who presented themselves as tourists, and travelled to Moldova on the basis of visas. However, during the border control, it became clear that the mentioned visas were falsified. At the same time, in the “tourists” passports there were no stamps confirming the crossing of the state borders during their entire itinerary up to Moldova. The structures involved in the control did not have any information concerning the mentioned group of tourists.

As a result, 10 citizens of Ghana and one from Nigeria were detained for illegal border crossing with false documents. All detained persons were aged between 20 and 46. After taking all the necessary measures the “tourists” were sent back to Istanbul.

The above mentioned situations were identified due to some collaboration between ISS with special services in the region. Certainly it points out a success, but there is a room for more, this requires an efficient cooperation, exchange of information, membership in the international organizations and institutions, etc.
Paradoxically, but the globalization must produce beneficial and civilizing effects in all spaces of the planet and offer the necessary tools in order to protect peace, security, liberty and people’s life in every corner of the world.

Anyway, we shall hear the redefinition of the global security concepts, war, national security, anti-aerial shield, etc. The new dimension is defined by overrunning any obstacles, imposed in communication in order to serve a much more important goal than defending citizens and their rights within a state.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, started the adoption of different reforms in security sector but at a slow pace. Certainly the primary steps were to break up the former security services apparatus into several agencies and then to implement legislation to ensure some civilian oversight and control over the Special Services. On paper, everything looked promising, but practically the major changes were disregarded. Comparing to the CIS countries legislation the legal framework of Republic of Moldova is one of the most advanced and corresponds to the European values. The Special Services of the Republic of Moldova are characterized by a significant degree of fragmentation. This fragmentation is a result of the need to tear down the former Security after the collapse of Soviet Union. The current Special Services system, as a consequence, duplicates some of the tasks and activities, and encourages intense rivalry between different agencies for influence and resources, resulting in an inefficient communication, cooperation, collaboration and coordination among them. Referring to the history of the KGB, in the nineties, it didn’t really dissolve, but it was reorganized. During the Soviet times, the Special Services were unified in a single body, which included beside its coercive, repressive investigation, and detention functions the Border Services and the Service of Protection and Guard and others, services to prioritize the Special Services in their main function – information, in order to correspond to the requirements of the international community. A special Service can’t have detention rights, repressive activities, but only the informative function with the right to inform the proper decision-making authorities. Reorganizations took place later on. The personnel of different institutions and public bodies was affected due to the fact that several high qualified persons retired. The lack of professional staff was felt, at that moment, and it generated a crisis that lasts till nowadays. Preparing of the new personnel requires special training and experience, which are obtained in a long period of time. The recruiting and training process of a qualified specialist is time demanding. The professional formation is conditioned by the existence of the special schools. Speaking about special training, the Antiteror Centre of the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova proposed a collaborative undertaking with the Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova for a project on “Cyber-Terrorism – a 21st Century Challenge to State Security.” After the proposal in question, at the meeting in Tirana on March 5th 2008, as member of the Combating Terrorism Working Group informed the group about of the plan, and together with NATO Headquarters was decided to conduct the advanced training course in consortium: NATO, Center of Excellence on Defense Against Terrorism, Turkey and the Pro
Marshall Center of Republic of Moldova. The proposed aim of the 5 days training is to introduce the international practices describing the ground and effects of cyber-security, economic and social policies, common and informational state security, foreign policy, justice and interior affairs, sharing the international experiences, as well as the impact on the regional security and public order.

The Security and Information Service (SIS) undertakes gigantic measures within this area in order to consolidate and move up the information and security officers’ preparedness level. Moldova needs more opinion leaders, real politic actors who will generate changes of values.

Beginning with 1994, State Protection and Guard Services, Border Services were reorganized and became independent. Afterwards a new phase was covered, demilitarization of the Security and Information Service. Nowadays the SIS representatives aren’t millenarians but they hold special grades of information and security officers.

A new democratic state is subject to the following pattern that point out to the challenging role of the Special Services’ reforms: limited time for the building-up of mature democratic institutions; fewer financial and human resources available for the reforms; the multiple-scope trait of intelligence reforms (democratization and countering new security threats) and their dual task of attaining and sustaining the level of efficiency and democratization of intelligence services; and finally the “cleansing” of the intelligence officers linked to former regimes, which creates personnel problems.

The biggest challenge for Moldova’s future is shaping an appropriate mentality of political and societal actors that will help foster the emergence of a truly democratic political culture. This will make possible a genuine reform of the security sector in accordance with European Union norms and principles. Mistakes in the initial stage of democratic reforms have weakened law-enforcement institutions as well as state regulation and monitoring, thus provoking the decline of the role of the state and reduction of its efficiency in addressing the security problems. The development of increased transparency, in line with best practice of the countries with long-term democratic traditions can truly contribute to the democratization of the sector.

Nowadays the Special Services of Moldova hardly constitute an intelligence community in the real sense of the concept described by British scholar Zara Steiner: “harmonious interplay between agencies and government control” aiming at “an end to animosities [among various Special Services], the establishment of friendly, productive relations.” Whatever level of cooperation is achieved, it takes place horizontally.

Further problems may arise when the institutional and cultural particularities are constraining. For example, overlapping occurs between law enforcement and Special Services. “Rules governing the collection of intelligence must not be confused with those applicable to the collection of information for law enforcement purposes.” While Special Services are mainly about prevention,
law enforcement agencies are about reaction. Their mandate is complicated by
an even larger contextual dilemma – that of the liberty versus security.

At the same time, it is worthwhile to mention the advantages related to the
fact that national security is ensured not only through the efforts of the Special
Services. As mentioned before, there is a common contribution of all force
structures and institutions. This objective may and is being realized only within
a well balanced mechanism of collaboration between the state institutions.
Thus SIS is able to riposte in face of the risks and threats in the address of the
Republic of Moldova. The Director of SIS considers that in this area they suc-
cceeded to ensure an efficient collaboration with the colleagues from the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs, CCECC, General Prosecutor Office, Ministry of Defence so
that they could react promptly and in time, if necessary. In working sessions,
often there are common meetings at different levels, there are carried out, im-
plemented common action plans and mutual operations. As a result the effec-
tiveness of the Special Services increases. Some recent operations of SIS are
implemented together with these institutions.

Despite concerns by the media and in academic circles, studies on the issue
of intelligence reform are scarce; therefore, the intelligence expertise in the
law-enforcement and decision-making authorities is insufficient.

Due to the fact that studies on the issue of the prevention and combating of
terrorism are scarce, eventually it leads to a reduced expertise in the field and
in the end boosts an inefficient process of identification and implementation of
appropriate solutions for concrete situations. This situation requires more
practical scientific studies in the field that would make use of an advanced
experience of relevant specialists in the field for further establishment of tech-
nical-scientific base for prevention and combating of terrorist acts.

Regarding Transnistrian region, there is no cooperation, coordination and
collaboration between Moldovan and Transnistrian Special Services. This is an
old issue, the result of the political problem in this region.

According to the Law on basic provisions of the special juridical status of the
cities situated on the left bank of Nistru (Transnistria), art.5. – The Law Courts,
prosecution bodies, The Direction of Information and Security Service and the
Direction of the Internal Affairs of Transnistria are component parts of the
unique system of judicial institutions and of the unique system of law enforce-
ment bodies of the Republic of Moldova and deploy their activity of making jus-
tice, assuring the rule of law and state security according to the Republic of
Moldova’s legislation.

According to the decision on confirming the main guarantees for the popula-
tion of Transnistria, the projects and proposals must establish the following
guarantees:

• property rights of the physical and juridical persons from Transnistria at
  the date of coming into force of the Law no.173-XVI of July 22, 2005 on
  basic provisions of the special juridical status of the cities situated on
  the left bank of Nistru (Transnistria), and after the coming into force of
the Law on the special juridical status of Transnistria – to conclude the documents that state these rights;

- after coming into force of the Law on the special juridical status of Transnistria – to preserve the existing level of social protection (salaries, pensions, scholarships, social aid, compensations, medical assistance and access to other social services) for all categories of Transnistrian population.

At the same time, the level of social protection in Transnistria cannot be inferior to the one established by the legislation for the whole country;

- after coming into force of the Law on the special juridical status of Transnistria – to keep the staff of the so-called force departments of Transnistria (“militia,” “customs” and “frontier guard service,” except the leaders and employees of the central government of the so-called Ministry of State Security), prosecution, court, Bar, notary employees and other civil servants from Transnistria in their functions, as well as to grant access to similar functions on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova.

At the same time, these categories of employees preserve their years of service in the mentioned functions.

As already mentioned, at present in the Republic of Moldova are many public authorities with competencies in the field of ensuring national security; each of them has a competency and structure strictly established by the legislation in force. A more efficient interaction would contribute significantly to the process of problem-solving of major importance for the national security. The exchange of information between the responsible structures acting in the field of national security is inefficient. The problem still will persist not only in the Republic of Moldova, but also in other states, where the attributions in ensuring the national security devolves upon a series of ministries, institutions, departments. Thus, the dispersion of the personnel responsible for achieving the national security leads to the extremely irrational use of their experience, which negatively influences the quality of the activity they carry out. The elaboration of the legislative documents directly with the assistance of the representatives of the state security bodies, in cooperation with the special central institutions constitutes, probably, one of the main forms of collaboration. Through the instrumentality of these actions the tasks of the executive power are achieved in two or more sectors of the public administration. The horizontal connection is reflected through certain organizational measures carried out by the bodies of state security concordantly with the representatives of the special central structures.

In accordance with Chapter III, article 10 of the “Law on countering terrorism” of the Republic of Moldova, the management of the specific antiterrorist operations is performed by one leader and on the base of non-interference principle in the activity of that leader: “the leader of the operative group de-
cides upon the activity zone for performing antiterrorist operation and decides on the forces and means that are used in the operation.” According to Article 10 of the above mentioned law:

1. In order to perform the antiterrorist operation, an operative group is created by the representative of the Anti Terror Center of the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova.

2. The activity of the operative group is organized according to a Regulation approved by the Government, in order to carry out the antiterrorist activity.

3. Military, collaborators and specialist involved in the antiterrorist operation are subordinated to the group’s leader.

4. The interference of any other individual, no matter what function he or she has, into the counter-terrorist operation leadership is not allowed.

As concerns communication, cooperation, collaboration and coordination in preventing and combating terrorism we can point out a recent example identified as a result of the monitoring process performed by the Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova, which currently is responsible for monitoring the Customs System and Police Bodies set forth in Annex 1 of Governmental Decision No.32 which serves the Moldovan Threshold Country Program (TCP) Action Plan, supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The monitoring process implies activities regarding the collection and analysis of the official information.

One of the monitoring activities is the activity II-13 regarding the Creation and maintenance of an information system, ensuring adequate access and security of access to the data base; creation and maintenance of an automated data base; elaboration and procurement of a support software program; consultancy services in implementing and maintenance of this system.

In view of implementing this activity it is proposed, at the initial phase, to assure the legal support of this information system, taking into consideration the international practice, in order to avoid control of information.

According to the external donors and coordinators, the project could develop a mechanism within this information system, where citizens can have the possibility to establish a direct interaction with particular MAI subdivisions in case of detecting any corruption act. This has a role of providing an active reaction in order to identify and apply the required solution on time. It would be useful that corresponding bodies from the left side of Nistru River would be able to join the above mentioned system – this will improve the communication, cooperation, collaboration and coordination among all involved institutions in order to ensure a direct and absolutely necessary improvement of the decision-making process as regards security problems and fostering the access to information on the base of the transparency principle.

In conclusion, we note that in the era of globalization, the states cannot adequate and promptly act without taking into consideration the consequences, as well as respond individually to threats to their security.
Moldovan Special Services are legally allowed to cooperate at the international level. This aspect is highly relevant because, viewed in the broader perspective of Moldova’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspiration, it offers more incentives for the alignment of Moldovan Special Services to the democratic values and norms inherent in the European Union and Euro-Atlantic community.

Starting in 1991, the Information and Security Service established bilateral relationships with the Special Services within the Community of Independent States, aimed at the concentration of efforts in order to prevent and combat the risks and threats to national security.

On the multilateral level, the Service cooperates within the Council of leaders of security bodies and special services of the CIS member states that work in the field of countering international terrorism, drugs, arms and human trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering and other grave infractions.

By the Law no. 229-XV of June 05, 2003 the Service was appointed as the competent institution of the Republic of Moldova for official relations with the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS member states. In this position, the Service participates in common operational and tactical applications and in scientific-practical conferences on problems linked to preventing and countering international terrorism.

On the regional level, the Service maintains cooperation relationships with the institutions in the field from the GUAM member states, where working sessions are organized on national security issues of the member states.

In the context of the policy of the Republic of Moldova toward integration in the European Union structures, the Service makes efforts to join the informative European and regional communities, establish and promote bilateral and multilateral relationships with the same institutions from European states, dealing with problems of common interest.

During 2003-2006, the Service established bilateral cooperation relationship with special services from Bulgaria, Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, Turkey, Baltic countries, Hungary, USA. These relationships have as basis the sense of reciprocal trust and the steady decision to act on preventing and countering risks and threats in the address of the European, regional and national security. Cooperation is made through exchange of information, experience and normative acts within the state security area, as well as through requests to interfere in certain situations in countering the asymmetric threats. The support from the European partners accorded to the Special Services to accede to European and regional special services is welcomed, fact which made possible the participation as observer, to the works of the IVth plenary reunion of the South-Eastern Europe Special Services Conference (SEEIC), in June 2005, in Tirana, Albania. Special services, members of (SEEIC) unanimous decided that at the reunion from 2006 Security and Information Services of Republic of Moldova will participate as member with full rights.

Within the context of the actions taken in the area of European Integration, the leadership of the Service paid a number of working visits to Bruxelles, where it had meetings with the leaders of the European Commission Security
Directorate and the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the European Union and the first official contacts with the security structures of the European Community.

The Service participates at the annual multilateral reunions of the Chiefs of the Foreign Information Services of some neighboring countries, where are examined the subjects linked to the necessity to make more dynamic the cooperation in the area of European, regional and national security. The cooperation between SIS and special services of the EU Member States follows to adopt and apply anticipated active measures, destined to impulse and make more efficient the counteracting actions of the national and international terrorism, to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to determine risks which threaten the national and European security.

During April 15-18, 2008 the Antiterrorist Center staff participated in the Meeting of antiterrorist centers’ leaders within CIS that took place in Moscow, Russian Federation and was organized and hosted the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS.

The meeting was attended by representatives of national antiterrorist centers, subunits dealing with combating terrorism and those with special antiterrorist destination from: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, representatives of the Executive Committee of the CIS, Antiterrorist Center of the CIS member states, National Antiterrorist Committee of the Russian Federation.

During working sessions participants exposed their opinion about raising the level of cooperation efficiency in the field of preventing and combating terrorism, and each country presented its national report. Within the meetings the participants agreed on several aspects that would contribute to the cooperation level increase in future, the most important being:

- intensification of the cooperation between security bodies, law enforcement organizations and special services of the CIS member states within combating terrorism;
- participants referred to the importance of the analytical structure in the activity of the security bodies, law enforcement organizations and special services, concluding about the necessity of acceleration of materials exchange between national centers and Antiterrorist Center of the CIS, regarding the qualitative analysis and adequate prognosis of the state and development tendency of the situation in the field of combating international terrorism and other extremist activities, as well as for the elaboration of the concrete proposals addressed to the Council of Leaders of Special Services, Law Enforcement Organizations and other bodies within the CIS;
- efficiency increase in combating international terrorism and other extremist actions, development of the informational infrastructure of the antiterrorist subunits of the CIS using the possibilities of the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS and of a special data base, intensification of the in-
formation exchange between the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS and international specialized organizations in the field of combating terrorism and extremism;

• taking into account the recent analytical research made by the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS, it was decided to recommend to the security bodies, law enforcement organizations and special services to pay special attention to antiterrorist assuring of transport and its infrastructure, including oil and gas pipes and preventing radiologic terrorist attacks;

• the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS proposal regarding the opportunity for Center’s specialist to participate in national antiterrorist trainings that are held on the territory of the CIS member states, in order to get practical coordination of sustained interstate interaction.

As a result of the examination of the reports presented within the meeting and considering the experience of the national antiterrorist centers inside the CIS, the following recommendations were proposed:

• study of the experience of the Antiterrorist Center of Ukrainian Security Service regarding the determination of terrorist threats towards potential objects, adaptation of the situations of counteracting terrorist attacks, working out plans of preventing and liquidation of threats in trainings and operative games;

• extending training programs, introducing modules for specialists in combating terrorism: minimizing the consequences of the terrorist attacks in urban environment, preparing antiterrorist units for actions in mountainous regions, organizing and leading negotiations with terrorists (using the experience of the Antiterrorist Center of the KGB from Belarus);

• in order to use the potential of the National Antiterrorist Committee of the Russian Federation regarding training and preparation of the antiterrorist subunits specialists, it was recommended to organize a number of meetings with experts from antiterrorist centers of the CIS, to discuss the actual models of terrorist attacks and elaborate methods of tracing, preventing and counteracting them;

• use of media possibilities of the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS in order to promote the image of national antiterrorist centers, to increase the efficiency of the antiterrorist actions and to intensify the informational-propagandistic actions in the field of preventing and combating terrorism.

Due to the multitude of particularities that characterize each democracy in its unique context, there is no universally accepted solution on how to manage the intelligence process. However, some traits are considered to be essential in any discussion regarding intelligence reforms in a democracy. A dialectical
style is appropriate when arguing for the balance of these values: freedom vs. security, transparency vs. secrecy, centralization vs. fragmentation of the intelligence community, and legislative vs. executive control over intelligence.

In this context, the aspect of national security first of all takes into consideration the assurance of implementing international democratic standards.
In the several years since Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in 2001, there has been unprecedented growth in violent activity related to and inspired by radical Islamism perpetrated by individuals of Western descent.

Ordinary citizens, with unremarkable lives, unremarkable jobs and an overall appearance generally considered as “normal” are turning into radicals and actively involved in small extremist groups, planning and executing assaults inside their respective home countries.

While in the 9-11 attacks the perpetrators were of Arab national origin, using Western infrastructure for their activities, subsequent attacks have been committed by regular citizens or at least permanent residents, predominately in European countries.

The cases of the Madrid bombings in 2004, the series of assaults in London in 2005, the foiled planning in Germany in 2007 or the recent events in the United States prove that the threat has changed in a significant way. The new suspects, such as the London bomber Mohammed Khan are well integrated and highly educated European citizens with unremarkable CVs and no clearly visible signs of extremist thinking, either in ideology or religion. A significant number of these individuals were even converts, originally fully committed to the Western set of norms and rules which they then rejected.

This so called homegrown terrorism poses a serious threat to national intelligence and police agencies, and is even more difficult to control than the original imported form of Islamist terrorist plots. But with a growing number of incidents and case studies the need for adequate countermeasures is growing, and the nation states need to react.

The essential precondition for determining the way to react to a problem is to know its origins and characteristics. Unfortunately the case of homegrown terrorism lacks clear rules and obvious signs. The unremarkable record, background and appearance of the suspects makes it impossible for counterterrorist experts to predict imminent threat without putting whole groups of the population under general suspicion. Thus, law enforcement structures have to focus on the process of how these unsuspicious citizens turn into potential terrorist attackers or – to put it simply: How, where and when does this development take place? Who is involved? And, most important for the prevention of

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1 Mr. Armin Sick is a German academic and a guest lecturer at CTWG.
this development: Why do Western individuals get into this process of radicalization?

**How to Become a Radical**

Determining or anticipating who is a potential terrorist is difficult; especially when there are no clear characteristics or strategies to apply.

However, there seems to be a subgroup that is more susceptible to radical influences, that is, single males in the age of 15 to 35, with migration background and Muslim faith.

Apparently these features are found more often in the Islamic communities in the European countries, which produce a number of individuals belonging to the second or third generation, torn between the secular West and their religious heritage and living in an ethnically homogenous environment. Europe’s failure to successfully integrate these parts of the population helps radicals seeking new aspirants.

But alienation and frustration are not the key factors in making an ordinary person a fundamentalist. Most promising and well integrated individuals can initiate the first step, the so-called pre-radicalization phase.²

This step characterizes the period previous to every process of radicalization in which the individual lives an ordinary life, not showing any ambitions to become part of these communities. The occurrence of an unexpected event, political, social, personal or economical which shakes one’s certitude in previously held beliefs and leads to some kind of cognitive opening, marks the end of phase one and the entering in step two, self-identification.

This particular incident opens the individual to be more receptive to new worldviews, which leads—with the active help offered by spiritual mentors—to radical thinking, e.g. extremist Islamism or Jihad. The Jihad ideology provides simple answers to complex disputes, especially resonating with certain politically naïve Muslims in the West, and justifying the use of violence against all kinds of non-believers. Increased gathering of information about the new belief, often via the internet, leads the individual to new confidence in his/her ability to evaluate political developments.

At this point of the development, the indoctrination phase, the subjects are seeking facts and details in order to strengthen their ideas. Further they are looking for like-minded fellows to form small circles to meet, exchange beliefs and increase their commitments. Apparently this happens in public places like cafes, mosques, universities and increasingly in prisons, which play a crucial role in both triggering and reinforcing the radicalization process.

Meeting in a small like-minded group is key for the process of radicalization since the individual is seeking acceptance for his/her new beliefs. Further, groupthink is one of the most powerful catalysts, creating a competitive environment amongst the group members for being the most radical. Converts have played a prominent role in the majority of terrorist case studies and tend to be the most zealous members of the groups. Their need to prove their religious convictions to their companions often makes them the most aggressive.

Many of the reported suspects, who went through this process, got in contact with a charismatic leader, who facilitated and guided them, providing ideological background and moral justification for the operations to follow.

The last step is the so-called Jihadization, in which the individual is indoctrinated to the extent that one is willing to commit attacks and even sacrifice one’s life to prove the firmness of one’s beliefs.

In this phase, the internet again provides crucial information for finding appropriate targets and completing preparations. Whether this final stage actually contains the planning and execution of terrorist actions depends on the individual’s position inside the respective group. What is important is the readiness to perform.

Among the many cases which would fit into this scheme, the 2005 London bombers can serve as an epitome of a small self-radicalized circle of terrorist plotters.

Present British society contains nearly two million Muslims, primarily with South Asian origin from British former colonies India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Starting in the 1960s and 70s, these immigrant groups formed communities in the UK, gaining British citizenship.

Three of the London attackers were second-generation British citizens of Pakistani descent. The fourth bomber, Germaine Lindsey, was of Jamaican origin and converted to Islam in 2000, thus only five years prior to the attacks. All four had Westernized and unremarkable backgrounds, and had grown up in well-to-do families.

By spending time at mosques and youth clubs known for their radical messages, the Pakistanis appeared to experience a religious transformation; praying regularly, changing in appearance and leaving behind the Western way of life.

After shifting mosques and Islamic centers, looking for acceptance for their increasingly radical views, they ultimately formed a circle, isolating themselves from British society and moderate Muslims. A trip to Pakistan to meet an influential Al-Qaeda leader, confirmed them on their course, which found its culmination in the suicide attacks in July 2005.

Also, in a recent report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, some statistical data concerning homegrown terrorism was collected. The study included the cases of 191 reported Islamist terrorists and tried to find out empirical information about the process of radicalization.

These data sustain some of the assumptions above. For instance around 26% of the suspects actually had a spiritual guide, 40% travelled abroad to re-
receive special training and one third of these individuals had converted to Islam (among the US-citizens closer to 43%).

Nearly 50% of all suspects adopted a legalistic interpretation of Islam, i.e. deriving strict guidelines for every aspect of one’s daily life, a total of between 39.3% and 50% in the UK considered Islam and the West as incompatible, and even 73.5% were convinced that the Western world has conspired against Islam to subjugate it, thus clearly demonstrating political radicalization. That this kind of politicization was connected to some cognitive awakening is affirmed by the fact that more than 40% of the accused stated that they had experienced this religious eye-opening prior to the process of political radicalization.

Given all these statistical data, as well as case studies from different countries and incidents, a number of conclusions and characteristics can be derived. It is stated that Muslim or migration background seems to be one of the things that most of the suspects have in common. However, if Muslim faith, minority status and economic disadvantage were sufficient explanations for al-Qaeda-inspired radicalization and recruitment, one would expect the structures and dynamics of Islamist militancy to be uniform across Western Europe. Apparently, they are not. On the other hand the feeling or perception of alienation is one of the main characteristics which could be observed in a significant number of cases. The so called cognitive opening—no matter in which way it might occur—and the search for validation of one’s own beliefs are key factors which make the individual receptive to new, and in some cases extremist, ideas.

This frame of mind is deliberately exploited by radical activists looking for adherents and followers to fanatic groups.

**The Recruiters**

As the individual has made the first step in the process of radicalization the potential terrorist receives more often than not something like spiritual guidance. In some cases the individual is actively recruited by prominent members of existing terrorist groups; in other instances, the influenced person is seeking guidance alone via the internet or is actually attending discussions and religious sessions of spiritual leaders. Out of this variety of recruitment and indoctrination forms, a few characteristics can be identified in categories.

Three categories of recruiters can be detected; the first being the so called gateway organizations which are not directly involved in violence. They rather serve as means to facilitate the individual’s movement towards violent extremist organizations. A good example for this kind of recruitment institution is the Hizb-ut Tahrir, which operates in a number of countries, ultimately trying to establish a worldwide Caliphate under the rule of Sharia law. The group is not involved directly in the plotting and execution of attacks, however it could serve as the first point of contact when looking for terrorist networks, providing guidance, information and probably connections.

The second category includes radical priests, imams, prophets and spiritual leaders, capable of speaking to a large audience and to convince them to take their path. They play a major role in the formation of a terrorist network by
acting as the main propagandist and spreading “the message” through which they are able to attract followers. They are also the religious authorities that provide justification for the group’s activity, e.g. killing civilians as traitors and non-believers etc. However, they do not provide strategic or tactical training and information on how to execute a successful attack.

This is done by the so called activists, the third category of recruiters. These are the highly political leaders of the group who supervise the attack preparations, complete recruitment and training prior to the violent act. Recent terrorist plots like the shooting at the Fort Hood military base in November 2009 or the case of the so called underwear bomber are vivid examples for the role of radical imams capable of inspiring people to join violent Jihad and commit attacks in their respective environment. In the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the manipulation was successful even though no face-to face interaction had taken place. The messages were able to propagate through other means of communication. It bears noting that the Internet and extremist forums play a major role at this point in the process, confirming the argument that recruitment and indoctrination can take place nearly everywhere.

Nevertheless, there is a range of specific locations which can be described as areas for active recruitment by radical organizations or places where radicalization is generally likely to happen.

**Locations for Recruitment and Radicalization**

Before we can focus on the topic of where recruitment is likely to take place, a short definition of what we understand by recruitment is needed. Terrorist recruitment can be defined as an activity that intends to enlist individuals in an existing terrorist cell. Therefore recruitment serves as a bridge between personal belief and violent activism. The recruitment itself contains communication and information, while the information is intended to guide the individual towards the aims of the extremist organization. The communication between the recruiter and the potential follower can be found in diverse places, for example social institutions, colleges, mosques, churches, and last but not least in prisons and detention centers.

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3 This is an interesting phenomenon. Case studies of Islamist terrorist incidents show that recruitment and radicalization differentiate according to the country the suspects live in prior to the attack. For instance, the Muslim communities in Southern Europe originate mainly from North African countries and are still fluent in Arabic, while the communities in the UK are connected to South East Asia, or as in Germany to Turkey. The descendants of these communities mainly do not have the skills to read the Quran or other Muslim texts by themselves what makes them dependent on imams who are trained to translate, interpret and explain the chapters they refer to in their preaching. This factor facilitates the spreading of radical messages since the audience is not able to reread and rethink their arguments in the original texts. For further information, see: Peter R. Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda. Jihadist Recruitment in Europe* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).
This wide range of possible places for recruitment clearly complicates appropriate prevention strategies, but within this variety a number of categories can be applied.

The first category is the so-called places of congregation, where people usually meet, exchange ideas and spend time regularly. For countering terrorism and radicalization, this kind of location is only significant inasmuch as a particular group of people is involved, e.g. Muslims in mosques or Koranic schools under the authority of imams or spiritual leaders, but also youth clubs and universities. This does not mean that Muslims in general are by definition susceptible. However, radical recruiters are found in these locations as well, looking for a susceptible audience. There are reports about active attempts by extremist organizations to infiltrate public mosques and to use them as a platform to spread their radical ideas, though this leads in most cases to conflict with the local Muslim community, which is generally more moderate in its belief systems. Of course, open disagreement and clashes with the local imams, which would attract the attention of police and law enforcement institutions, is the one thing extremist cells want to avoid. In effect, Islamists have changed their behavior, meaning that public expression of their messages and long discussions with moderate imams have given way to quiet disagreement and continuation of discussions in smaller circles among an exclusive, more susceptible audience. This development is also one of the reasons why increased interaction between government authorities and Muslim communities is on the one hand an important factor in helping to integrate them into Western society, yet on the other hand, moderate Muslim communities might not be able to support and deliver valuable information to law enforcement authorities to counter the spread of radical ideas.

A more exclusive and hidden environment is offered by detention institutions or prisons which are part of the second category, the so-called places of vulnerability in which the individual is likely to experience stress and alienation, making him potentially vulnerable to extremist approaches. But it is not only the exclusiveness that makes prisons attractive for active recruitment. Prisons are by their own nature “highly unsettling environments in which people are confronted with existential questions.” As Michael Waller states, prisons can be seen as the ideal breeding grounds for terrorist ideas and cells, since they recruit the alienated and angry to join their ranks, providing them with a cause to believe in, a special brotherhood to join, and a means to fight back at the society that locked them up. Adherents become members of a fraternity that offers a special relationship and the spirit of solidarity. Thus, joining certain groups or communities inside prison is a way to cope with the insecure environment in which the convicts find themselves after having been arrested and sentenced in court. What follows is the well-known effect of peer pressure which can be observed in various surroundings, especially effective in groups of young men.

In addition, the psychological unsettlement is one of the key factors in the process of radicalization, as was discussed before. The experience of trial in
court and detention is undoubtedly a huge shock for every individual that can lead to a mental state of uncertainty, alienation and the need for help. This explains why more people in prison reach out to religion and faith in order to find something to hang on to than in any other environment; religion provides certainty, security and answers to some of the fundamental questions which inmates are likely to ask themselves during their stay inside these surroundings.

Among those who respond to religion, prisoners have two choices. One is to embrace faith and practice that will help them to become better human beings by struggling with their own weaknesses. In a way, this applies to all moderate versions of faith. The other choice is to follow a path that alienates them further from society, for example through radical belief systems, confirming the convicts in their role as a victim of society; a society in which the individual does not feel at home anymore, which treated him badly and therefore deserves to be contested.

For these individuals only a slight push is needed to guide them down to the path which leads to radical ideas. The extremist’s black and white model of the world, the simplicity of who is right or wrong, good or bad, and who is responsible for misery and distress are just what the inmate is seeking in order to gain new confidence and to give his future life meaning; the consequence is breaking with the past and starting a new life.

Of course, the usefulness of prisons as universities for terrorists has not escaped Islamist radicals who are free to recruit and train inmates they believe to be suited for work within a terrorist organization. Local and immigrant, Muslim and non-Muslim, the bright, the dim, the violent: all are courted, all have a place in the network – provided they prove susceptible to indoctrination and radicalization.

But not only radical groups try to affect and use the state of mind in which the inmates find themselves. Prison officials even encourage missionary activities among the convicts since it helps lift the prisoners’ morale and assists the correction process of converting them into helpful citizens. The role of psychologists and the so called prison chaplains—no matter which faith they represent—is also emphasized and backed by government authorities.

What is alarming is that particularly in the US the influence of radical imams and chaplains in prisons is growing in a significant manner. Since the mid 1990s, mainstream Muslim prison chaplains and distributors of classical Islamic literature have warned of this disturbing trend. Sheik Kabbani calls it a “hijacking of their prisons programs by extreme Islamist organizations.” According to this information, traditional Islamic books, pamphlets, tapes, videos and other media in prison libraries and religious centers were replaced with militant and fundamentalist literature; in many cases sponsored by Salafi and Wahhabi organizations from the Middle East. The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) are the two institutions dominating the training and selection process for Muslim prison chaplains in the US. According to one source, the ISNA is described as “an influential front for the promotion of Wahhabi political, ideological, and
theological infrastructure in the United States,” therefore increased surveil-
lance in the selection of these chaplains is needed.

What stays beyond the control of the governmental authorities concerning
recruitment in prisons is the interaction which takes place in the everyday life
inside the installations. Ironically, the success of counter terrorism measures
which were introduced in the years after the 9-11 attacks boosted this alarming
development in the detainment centers in the Western States in general.
With the growing number of arrests of Islamic fundamentalists and suspected
terrorists, the extremist prison population has increased in a significant man-
ner. Apparently, the radicals behind bars are by themselves not the problem,
since they will stay there for a long time. But with a huge number of regular
inmates in the Western countries, only serving short time sentences in jail
during which they can get in contact with these radical ideas, the overall prob-
lem will persist or even increase in the near future.

Ultimately the last category of possible recruitment grounds is the so called
recruitment magnets. Under this category fall locations with both congregation
and vulnerability characteristics, especially interesting for people who have
self-radicalized before and are now looking for opportunities to join a move-
ment. Radical mosques and bookshops known for their extremist messages are
examples of this category. This can also be seen as a continuation from the sec-
ond category, for example when radicalized individuals are released and try to
get in contact with like-minded people to receive more information, training,
etc.

To demonstrate the alarming development that is going on inside prison
walls, thus more or less unknown to the public attention, some figures and case
studies can be examined.

Large Muslim communities cannot be identified in the United States, at least
not to the extent some European countries have. Representing only one per-
cent of the total population, Islamic belief is relatively inconspicuous.

However the United States has the highest prison population rate in the
world, some 686 per 100,000 of the national population. Although the effective
percentage of individuals radicalized in prison must be considered rather
small, the total figure of nearly two million prisoners gives pause. Further, the
current approximate number of 350,000 Muslims in federal, state and local
prisons is increased by 30,000 to 40,000 each year, while most of the inmates
came into prison as non-Muslims.

The prison population in the European states is overall much smaller;
though the relatively large Muslim communities are also represented behind
prison bars. Estimates figure the number for Germany and the UK to 80,000
each. There are a number of cases which help in illustrating the strong connec-
tion between prisons, radicalization and the execution of the terrorist act itself.

Three months after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, Richard Reid,
a young British national boarded American Airlines flight 63 from Charles de
Gaulle airport in Paris, bound for Miami. His mission was to detonate a con-
cealed explosive device in one of his shoes, downing the aircraft and killing all
on board, along with himself. Richard Reid, aka Abdul Raheem, aka Abu Ibra-
him, was from a broken home in southeast London, having been born to a
Catholic English mother and a Jamaican Protestant father. As he grew up, Reid’s
father spent most of his time in prison, where he converted to Islam. Petty
crime became a defining characteristic of Richard’s youth and he left school at
16. He would himself serve several sentences in youth institutions and prisons,
where he too would convert to Islam. On being released from prison in late
1995, Richard Reid changed his name to Abdul Rahim and began to frequent
several mosques and praying circles in London, radicalizing himself to the ex-
tent that he was willing to spend time in a terrorist camp in Pakistan, training
for the attacks.

On March 11th, 2004, a group of young Islamic extremists of Moroccan origin
conducted a series of coordinated bombings against the train system of Madrid,
resulting in the deaths of 191 people and wounding 2,050. Although more than
100 people have been investigated in connection to the bombings, 29 have
been charged with participating in the terrorist attack and of the 29, six have
been charged with 191 counts of murder and 1,755 counts of attempted mur-
der.

Drug trafficking played a significant role in the operations of this terrorist
cell. Dealing with hashish, cocaine and ecstasy, the well established smuggling
routes between Morocco and Spain served as their primary funding resource.
But criminal activities were relevant not only in terms of financing the attacks
but also with regard to recruitment. The prisons of Spain and Morocco pro-
vided venues for indoctrination, recruitment and networking. According to
press reports, some of the suspects, such as Jamal Ahmadan were radicalized
while serving their time in prison for drug trafficking. In 2003, Jamal Ahmadan
emerged from prison as a hardcore Salafi; the same thing applies to a signifi-
cant number of his terrorist fellows involved in the Madrid attacks one year
later.

A further example of successful recruitment in prisons is the case of Aqil, a
convert who, after being released from detention, went to Afghanistan to kid-
nap and murder reporter Daniel Pearl. The same applies to Jose Padilla, re-
cruited by Al-Qaeda who was arrested in 2002, as well as the episode of Kevin
James who was sentenced in February 2009 for conspiring to wage war against
the United States. This last incident was particularly disturbing. Not only was
the plot described by the FBI as the most operationally advanced since 9-11;
even more troubling is the fact that James designed and supervised the at-
tempted plot while serving time in a state prison in California. When he began
serving his 10 year sentence for robbery in 1997, James was already part of the
Muslim community. But during his stay he was moving from moderate to more
and more radical thinking and ideology. It is reported that by 2004, James had
developed a following of several dozen inmates consisting predominantly of
youngsters serving short term sentences, who were particularly easy to ma-
nipulate. Under James’ steering, the released followers started a series of rob-
beries to fund their operations which ultimately would have ended in an attack
on a U.S. Army recruiting office. Eventually a lost cell phone during one of the robberies drew the attention of the authorities, who were able to arrest the terrorist cell members and explore the connections to the mentioned detention center in California.

The examination of the process of radicalization, of who is involved and which places to look at has shown that a few common characteristics can be derived from the seemingly unpredictable phenomenon of homegrown terrorism and radicalization.

To summarize the conclusions: individuals who have experienced a real or perceived frustration or alienation are especially susceptible to radical ideas which replace uncertainty and weakness by simple ideas; ideas which deal in extremes, which can be applied to all problems of life and which are shared by small groups of like-minded people who feel “a unique sense of strength and superiority, whilst publicly breaking with the past and embracing a purer raison d’être.”

But what still remains unclear is the rationale to join a radical organization at all. We have to admit that extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda have developed sophisticated methods and strategies to attract followers and future fighters. However, the individual must have a primary motivation which serves his own needs. After exploring the different steps in the process, as well as who is involved and where, an examination of this motivation is key to an effective counter terrorism strategy and the prevention of further home grown terrorist cases.

**Why Some Join Radical Groups**

Clearly, the incentive to join a radical group is difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, assuming that all of these individuals are weak-minded, easily-led sociopaths will not provide a valid explanation of the problem; nor will it help to develop counter strategies.

Given the fact that most of the reported individuals shared a perception of alienation and frustration, it seems reasonable to describe joining as the more or less egoistic attempt to accomplish the individual’s needs. In the case of prisoners who are entering this unsettling environment, the reason to join a group which provides affiliation and security is quite obvious. To explain the drive for Western youngsters to be part of violent Jihad is far more difficult to comprehend.

In a recent study by Col. Venhaus of the United States Institute of Peace, interviews and personal histories of more than 2,000 Islamist fighters were used to answer this particular question: Why would someone want to join an organization like Al-Qaeda, or any other radical group?

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The “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab stated before his terrorist attempt in a chat room: “I am in a situation where I do not have a friend, I have no one to speak too, no one to consult, no one to support me and I feel depressed and lonely. I do not know what to do.”

This statement exemplifies that most of the potential radicals are impressionable youths, looking for attention and acknowledgement of their existence and needs. Therefore the study identifies a set of categories of seekers which can be described as the following.

The first of the four seekers is the so called revenge seeker. He feels constant frustration about his current position inside the community and generally perceives himself as a victim in society. In his view there are external influences which prevent him from succeeding. However, he is not able to identify these forces. That is why he is looking for an enemy, and a means to fight against that enemy which is the cause and aim of his universal anger.

Number two is the so called status seeker who is also discontented because of his position and influence in his society. His expectations are far from being met and he is not able to succeed no matter how hard he tries to show his abilities. This feature is especially common to immigrants to Western countries, who leave their home countries to prove themselves and to live a better life. After entering the society of the new country, they do not feel accepted even though they try to be as cooperative as they can. This frustration is quickly replaced by the will to show the world their value, eventually leading to a radical group which allegedly offers a status of respect and personal glory for dedicated individuals.

Another category is formed by the so called identity seekers. Unlike the two forms of seekers presented before, the identity seeker is not trying to improve his personal reputation in society. On the contrary, these individuals look for a place to belong to. Abdulmutallab clearly is one of these cases, when being part of a group and a large movement is the primary incentive. “The identity seeker needs the structure, rules, and perspective that come from belonging to a group, because belonging defines him, his role, his friends, and his interaction with society.” The individual identifies himself with the aims of the group; the community’s rules and ideology guide him and give him confidence; at last, being part of an exclusive club, sharing collective knowledge creates the perception of being superior, as well as the phenomenon of peer pressure, which complicates breaking off from the group afterwards.

The last category is called “the thrill seekers” who are looking for adventure and a way to break out of their secure environment to prove their abilities and strength. Though this applies by far to the smallest percentage of the suspects, the promise of spectacular violence and face-to face combat against an enemy who deserves to be contested is one of the strong features which make groups like al-Qaeda attractive to a distant audience around the globe, especially to Westernized youths who are lured by the portrayal of violence in action movies.

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5 Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda.
Armin Sick

and the everyday media. The case of the German fighter Eric Breininger could serve as an example for this distinctive category. It is reported that he was easily impressed by others and—as one investigator stated—could have ended up with any other radical group. After converting to Islam and having met members of the Sauerland cell, Breininger left Germany to join the violent Jihad. In his memoirs which were published on an Islamist website after his reported death in April 2010, Breininger described his experiences in the fighting: “I was in Islam for only 4 months; though I knew my duty (...) I wanted to go to Jihad.” In contrast to his vigor, he clearly lacked decisive knowledge of Islam, and how to achieve his aims. According to reports, he was not able to choose the right flight out of Germany, and had a hard time during his training in Waziristan when one of his closest friends left the group for unknown reasons. Nevertheless, he had fought against Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan for more than 3 years, and was involved in the production of propaganda videos in order to mobilize and recruit new followers, especially from Germany, to fight on the Taliban’s side in Afghanistan.

All of these categories of seekers do not imply the need for Islam or a religious belief system at all. Joining an organization like al-Qaeda is primarily a rational choice; either to belong to a group that provides security and confirmation, or as a means to distinguish oneself from the broader society which does not pay attention to the unremarkable individual, or just for the mere reason of escaping boredom and the monotony in life.

But why join a violent group of religious fanatics from the Far East which implicates living under deplorable conditions, fighting and dying for the sake of strangers? How is it possible that Westerners join the fight against the culture they were raised in, or at least benefited from for a long time?

To explore this particular question—which is key to the development of a successful counter strategy—it is necessary to examine the current media coverage. Al-Qaeda has become a message, a brand which stands for the fight against Western “arrogance” and behavior towards other cultures, the perceived injustice of the relationship between the United States and the nations of the Middle East, and the existence of a Jewish state within a Muslim region.

The same applies to most of the other Islamist organizations which popped up like mushrooms during the last decade, as for example the Hizb-ut Tahrir, the Islamic Jihad Union as well as country-specific associations like the German Taliban Mujahidin.

“The new generation of Islamist militants realized long ago that Al-Qaeda is no match for the United States and its allies. But the militants clearly have an edge in the propaganda battle, a crucial component of the ‘war on terror’,” said Jason Burke, a British expert in terrorist groups, adding: “The terrorists have
become producers and film directors, and video cameras have become their most potent weapon." 6

Thus, organizations like al-Qaeda cannot be defeated on a local battlefield. Their messages float across borders and are present in all Western news media. Affected or interested individuals have a wide range of Internet forums, platforms and propaganda portals to choose from. Knowing this, it is sufficient for recruiters to wait for the followers to come and make this first step, and then guide them down that path to radicalization.

Developing Counter Strategies

A successful counter terrorism strategy must be based on various grounds, such as the use of force in areas where radicals operate, as well as combating recruitment and the spreading of extremist ideas inside the respective home country. As we have seen, the threat of homegrown terrorism is difficult to grasp, the actions of radicals are hard to predict and the list of potential attackers is long and diverse.

However, with the help of case studies and analysis this shadowy threat can be characterized and categorized so that counter strategies can be designed to cover the different areas of the problem more efficiently in the future.

As we have seen, sets of categories for recruiters and locations where recruitment is likely to take place can be identified. Although not all of the individuals that enter the process of radicalization will automatically become terrorists and there are a reported number of discontinuations which indicate the possibility to interfere, the main task must be to prevent individuals from getting in contact with these radical ideas and figures at all since peer pressure and the change of mind after indoctrination are hard to overcome through external influences. Moreover, identifying radical thinking among apparently unremarkable Western citizens is nearly impossible. Therefore, the focus should be on recruitment locations and the categories of seekers presented above.

In more specific terms, this means that an individual who is seeking revenge because of his position in society needs to be calmed down and his frustration channeled to more constructive terms. The revenge seeker cannot describe what causes his dissatisfaction; therefore his energy needs to be guided to alternative outlets, for example through sports competitions, providing him with role models he can identify with or by offering other means to express his emotions and feelings, e.g. music and poetry. This seems like a weak approach to the problem of violent radicals trying to execute terrorist attacks. But it should be made clear that the potential terrorist of tomorrow is presently a “normal” juvenile within Western society.

The same applies to the case of the so called status seeker. This individual needs to be promoted in a way that he can show his qualities and achieve sat-

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isfaction in his normal surroundings. These people consider themselves as clever and capable. Giving them the opportunity to prove their qualities is one way to prevent them from seeking other forms of acknowledgement. In this respect, Western society also needs to promote the ideal of political discussions where diverse views and needs can be expressed. The years after the beginning of the War on Terror were filled with debates on Western behavior towards other cultures and the use of force in general. Animating individuals who feel concerned about their nation’s policy and its possible effects on a certain religious group or population to participate in political discussions is absolutely essential for a democratic and multicultural society not only for the sake of countering radical ideas, but also to evaluate and refine people’s own perceptions. Therefore advertising the equality of opportunities, also and especially for immigrants with a different cultural and religious background is indispensable to show that change is possible and more likely to succeed without radical force and terror.

As for the category of identity seekers who feel alienated inside an uncomprehending society, they must be guided to groups like sports clubs, student societies or—in the case of religious needs—to moderate associations. Offering a constructive alternative helps them return to and be part of society again.

The category of thrill seekers is fascinated by the message of organizations like al-Qaeda, but they are likely to quit the movement if reality fails to meet their high expectations. Hence disturbing the propaganda flow and presenting the events in the proper light is the best way to avert this disturbing development. Or, as Col. Venhaus states:

Discrediting the al-Qaeda brand in the eyes of potential thrill seekers also requires that al-Qaeda operations be publicly portrayed as inglorious and shameful. The military and law enforcement activities that are used to thwart attacks must be determined and aggressive, but the public recounting should question al-Qaeda’s effectiveness and delegitimize its struggle by making it appear bumbling, inept, and illegal. Al-Qaeda’s adventurous appeal also wanes dramatically for the thrill seeker when the reality of living in squalid conditions, fighting for a lost cause, and dying an ignominious death is prominently displayed.7

Reports and public interviews with former radicals who have changed their mind after being arrested could also help to prevent seekers from admiring terrorist groups and ideals. This approach is designed to keep or turn away impressionable individuals from radical ideas and messages. However, with the paramount availability of the Internet and daily media as a platform for Islamist propaganda, communication from recruiters to potential followers is likely to continue in the near future. And some individuals, such as prisoners who have just entered their new unsettling environment will still end up in radical associations for various reasons.

Countering active recruitment necessitates law enforcement authorities to be present at locations where recruitment is likely to occur. Places of congrega-

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7 Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda.
tion like mosques cannot be shut down, nor can they be observed without putting a whole group of the population under general suspicion. That is why cooperation and involvement of moderate elements—which represent by far the majority—are so important in the process. As it was discussed before, moderate imams may not have explicit knowledge of radical circles or single individuals among the local communities. But narrowing the area of operation that is available for recruiters is the first step in pushing radical elements out of these locations. True, moderate Muslims will not be happy to report to the authorities about suspicious incidents, but it is a small group of violent fundamentalists that discredit the whole community, resulting in public pressure on uninvolved members.

The same applies to the third category, the magnets of recruitment like radical bookshops and mosques known for their extremist ideas. If these places are familiar to public authorities, they must be observed and in case they are not willing to cooperate or are violently opposed to the law, have to be dissolved.

The case of prisons is more complex in nature. The administration and maintenance of penitentiary system is traditionally a public responsibility. Thus, a modification of design and composition of these institutions can be easily achieved. On the other hand, the existence of associations inside the prison is difficult to alter. Moreover, not every prisoner network is by itself radical and threatening. As we have seen, also the influence and work of spiritual guides is important and even supported by public authorities in many Western countries. Therefore more attention must be paid to the selection of prison chaplains etc. since their contribution to moral and emotional assistance to the prisoners and thereby to their thinking cannot be overestimated.

The disturbing development inside the US prison system is partially attributed to the lack of well educated prison chaplains, especially for those providing Muslim religious service. As Frank J. Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute stated before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in September 2006: “Strikingly the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) currently employs only ten Muslim chaplains for the entire federal prison system. (…) This handful of chaplains cannot possibly tend to the religious needs of every Muslim prisoner or oversee every religious service. As a result, prisoners often take on the role of religious service providers and prayer leaders.” Financial pressure and a constant over-occupation is reason for this evolution which leaves the door wide open for radical ideas to flow in. Especially when regular prisoners voluntarily act as spiritual guides, individuals like Kevin James can influence inmates on a regular and legal basis. The establishment of an institution which supervises the selection and education of

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these chaplains is essential for preventing radical ideas to spread inside prison walls. Furthermore, incoming books, tapes and other material must be monitored to ensure that no controversial literature and propaganda finds its way to the inmates. In addition, more emphasis should be laid on the promotion of moral values and educational seminars, especially for those prisoners who will be sent into society after a short period of time. The idea of punishment needs to be changed to a more re-educational approach, especially when talking of young criminals, since the ultimate goal is to never see them behind bars again.

The members of the German Sauerland cell might serve as an example for the positive influence on the suspects in prisons. After being arrested in 2007, the group was held in custody while investigations were still running to set up a trial, beginning in April 2009. The prosecution was expected to last for years, with long lists of testimonies and reports. However, in June 2009 the members surprisingly approached the law enforcement authorities to make an extensive confession. The decisive turn in this case may have hinged at least in part on simple boredom, as Adem Yilmaz, a Turkish man raised in Germany, declared openly in court: “I couldn’t care less how long you give me, whether it’s 20 or 30 years, (...) I just want to get what we’re doing here over and done with. It’s boring.” The confessions resulted in more than 1,500 pages of reports and inside knowledge about terrorist structures in Germany, their connections to radical groups in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and a disturbing insight to the process of radicalization and recruitment. The members of the Sauerland cell had radicalized themselves very quickly and tried to go to Jihad as fast as possible, no matter when or where. After first plans to fight in Iraq or Chechnya, the members ended up in Waziristan, training for combat with the Islamic Jihad Union which sent them back to their home country to prepare and execute attacks. We can assume that their confessions were motivated also by a possible reduction of the sentences, which ended in twelve, eleven and two times five years for the suspects; on the other hand, the assumed head of the group, Fritz Gelowicz declared in his final statement: “In retrospect, I would not do it again,” thus, clearly a message which can be used to convince other seekers to go down this route to radicalism and an acknowledgement of the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and the penitentiary system in general.

The establishment of new prisons to relieve pressure on the present system, the employment of more prison chaplains selected through a governmental institution and carrying out special training for the prison personnel to identify radical inmates will require a higher budget for the penitentiary system. But, if this leads to the reduction of the threat of homegrown terrorism, this seems money well spent.

Conclusion

The information given clearly shows that the threat of terrorism is far from being thwarted. In truth, the danger has changed into a form which is even more difficult to control, since the potential attackers are living inside Western society without attracting attention. Their unremarkable record, background and appearance make it impossible for counter terrorist experts to predict imminent threat without putting whole groups of the population under general suspicion.

Nevertheless there are characteristics in the process itself, the types of recruiters, the possible recruitment grounds and the reasons for joining these kinds of groups that can be identified and used to develop adequate counter terrorism strategies for the respective nation states.

Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic Jihad Union and many others will continue to exist and find their way into our daily life through media and Internet. However, nations and their societies can have an impact on the minds most susceptible to these radical messages. By improving living conditions, offering alternatives for the frustrated and seeking continuous cooperation with local communities and associations, the seeds of radical ideologies will fall on infertile ground. In conjunction with extensive surveillance and improvement of counter terrorism strategies, the challenge of terrorism can be met in an effective way.

References


Chapter 12

Aspects of Recruitment by Terrorist Organizations in Europe’s Muslim Communities

Sergei Sarkisyan

The main principles and methods for recruiting by Islamist terrorist organizations in European countries are essentially no different from those used by national security services, by religions, mystical and totalitarian cults, and even certain businesses.

The differences are a matter of nuance, emphasis, and the success rate of recruitment by certain patterns and schemes. However, it is specifically the study of these nuances that can help establish why the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism has become quasi-ubiquitous, as well as identifying means and methods for narrowing and reducing the base that advocates and nourishes terrorism, whilst furnishing it with ever more fresh recruits.

In order to better understand the powerful dynamics behind the spread of Islamism—the politicized component of Islam—through the Muslim communities of Europe, it is necessary to briefly dwell on the general characteristics of modern Islamic society, as well as the causes and the current degree of radicalization.

The ideological content of Islamism is Islamic fundamentalism, which, on the one hand, is a theological teaching and a movement to restore certain primary values, norms and relations that were canonized in history (these can be religious, ethical, family, domestic, etc.) and on the other hand, as a political teaching and the practice of struggling for power in Muslim states.

The political form of Islamic fundamentalism, despite its great diversity, can fairly cleanly be divided into two branches:

• Moderate;
• Radical & extremist.

The quest, within Islam, for simple responses to all questions, including contemporary political, economic and cultural challenges, first generated isolated hotbeds of extremism, and then led to the spread of extremism, transforming it

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1 Sergei Sarkisyan is a longtime member of the CTWG and specializes in Islamist terrorism.
into a broad Islamist movement. The main hotbeds and factors behind the genesis of Islamist extremism include:

1. Egypt: the distribution of the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood as a response to the pan-Arabism of Gamal Abdel Nasser;
2. The Arab-Israeli conflict;
3. Afghanistan: from the political instability of the mid-1970’s and the war of 1979-1989 to the Taliban movement coming to power;
4. Iran: the Islamic Revolution of 1979;
5. The Islamic renaissance in countries of the former USSR, starting in the mid-1980’s;

The most radical branch of Islamic fundamentalism is Salafism (Wahhabism): a teaching by the followers of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who preached a return to the “pure” Islam of the Prophet and his followers.

However, the Salafists themselves violated two fundamental stipulations of the Quran:

- an interdiction on declaring jihad against Muslims;
- the sincerity of a Muslim’s faith can only be judged by the Supreme Being, on the day of judgment.

One of the key criteria for classifying an extremist movement in Islamist fundamentalism could be the acceptability in that movement of the principle of takfir. That is, the possibility of accusing a faithful Muslim of impiety – an act which enlarges the field of battle with infidels, to include Islamic countries with relatively secular, moderate or insufficiently radical regimes.

The spread of Salafism was facilitated by a number of factors:

- a crisis of secular ideologies (socialism, pan-Arabism and nationalism);
- a crisis of legitimacy in the Islamic world;
- the renaissance of Islam;
- the appearance of disposable income from the sale of oil by certain Muslim states, primarily Saudi Arabia.

The widespread propagation of the ideas of political Islam led followers to nurture hopes of achieving three objectives:

- establishing the norms of true Islam, which would require overthrowing illegitimate governments;
- the establishment of Sharia law in society, by “awakening” true believers;
- the restoration of the Khalifat, including North Africa, the Arabian peninsula, the countries of the Near and Middle East, Transcaucasia, the North Caucasus, Central Asia and part of India – objectives which prompted active recruitment of followers and agents in the 1980’s and 1990’s.
However, in order to achieve these objectives, Islamists had to stand up against those forces who were actively hindering them or who could stand in the way of success: first among these were the USA, Russia and India. Islamists were particularly irritated by the presence of American military bases on holy land – Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Wahhabism.

After suffering significant losses during the global war on terrorism that began after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Islamists were forced to modify their tactics, restructure their networks and overhaul systems for the recruitment and training of followers.

According to the Congressional Research Service' report “Trends in the Development of Terrorism: 2006,” a review of data on the changing development of terrorist groups and organizations across the world, the following trends can be observed in modern international terrorism:

1. Decentralization of the management of components of international terrorism networks. At the same time the lethality of terrorist acts is reduced, but the possibility of terrorist cell detection is reduced;

2. Growing professionalism:
   - in information and propaganda,
   - finances, and
   - organization;

3. Coalescence of terrorist organizations and international crime groups;

4. Growth of suicide terrorism, with a relatively high concentration in Iraq (approximately 30% of such terrorist acts in the world and 50% of the victims).

Decentralization has led to:

- an increased importance of remote control of terrorist subnets and cells via printed matter, the Internet and CDs containing the messages of international terrorist leaders, offering general position statements and proposing areas of terrorist activity;

- evolution of the tactics used by terrorist groups in the field, and greater independence for these groups in selecting targets for attack.

In parallel with these processes, an evolution has been seen in the methods used by Islamist terrorist groups to recruit new followers in Europe.

Currently in Europe, according to various data, there are between 18 and 26 million Muslims (some estimates range from 35 to 50 million), the majority of who moved to Europe during one of three waves of immigration:

- between the end of WWII and the early 1970’s. The main reason was the lack of manpower in post-war Europe;

- between 1970 and the start of the 1980’s. This wave was mainly the result of family reunification following the first wave;
• from the 1980’s, immigration was a quest for economic and political shelter from repression at home; in other words, a significant portion of immigrants were already politicized.

The majority of immigrants in the countries of Europe are from:
• Turkey
• Morocco
• Algeria
• Pakistan
• Tunisia.

In the opinion of a number of experts, including analysts of the security services of France and Germany, almost all Islamic communities in Europe contain a certain percentage of radicals. This begs the simple conclusion that the degree of radicalization and the level of dissemination of the ideas of Islamic terrorism are in direct proportion to the size of the Muslim diaspora.

However, this connection was not confirmed by a study by the Nixon Center (Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke) of the biographies of 373 members of transnational Sunni terrorist groups, who were indicted, convicted or perished in North America and Western Europe between 1993 and 2004. Moreover, it turned out that only in 4 of 6 European countries covered by the study were the majority of terrorists representative of the main immigrant communities in the given country.²

An exception from the rule is Italy, where 65% of the terrorists were from Tunisia, while the largest immigrant community was Moroccan. In Germany, meanwhile, despite a predominance of Turkish³ immigrants in the Muslim population, the majority of terrorists were immigrants from Algeria and Syria.

The absence of a direct link between the size of the Muslim diaspora, its ethnical composition and the level of terrorist activity indicate that the radicalization of Islamic communities is influenced less by objective factors, and more by subjective ones: primarily the influence of international Islamist terrorism using information and propaganda.

Indeed, some of the immigrants who took up the Islamist ideology before leaving their homeland brought the battle for establishing the rule of Sharia and the unity of the Islam umma (the global Islamic community) to Europe. However, data from a number of social science studies, including that of Mark

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³ Moreover, in the Netherlands, according to official data the number of residents of Turkish descent amongst those involved in terrorist activity is increasing. This is the result of the deliberate expansion of propaganda work by Islamist extremist and terrorist organizations to include the Turkish diaspora of Europe. *The Washington Post*, 11 March 2007.
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Sageman, indicate that 84% of terrorists became radical Islamists once already in the West. Another 8% are Christians who converted to Islam. After studying the biographies of 400 terrorists connected to Al-Qaeda, the author concludes that the overwhelming majority of them came from families with very moderate religious views, or which maintained a secular world-view.

The common denominator for all Muslim diaspora in Europe was the broader dissemination of ideas of Islamism, extremism and terrorism amongst members of a second and third generation of immigrants, who were born and grew up in Europe.

This situation can be explained in objective terms: in the opinion of many experts, these people encounter greater problems when integrating into European society. If their parents, or even grandparents, had difficulties integrating, for reasons of education or language (as a result of which there was a solid, ideological basis for a rational, pragmatic explanation of their low socio-economic status), then the next generation typically encounters psychological or political obstacles, and are reluctant to accept their status of second-rate citizens.

In addition, the gradual spread of islamophobia amongst the local population was to have an increasing, negative impact on the prospects for full integration into European society by both this new wave of immigrants, and the second and third generations of previous waves.

Terrorist ideologues became aware of this colossal potential in the Islamic diaspora in Europe and with each passing year went further in recruiting its members for terrorist activities. For example, the radical Saudi theologian Abd al-Mun‘im Mustafa Hlimah Abu Basir calls directly for immigrants to be used to “strengthen Muslims and weaken the unbelievers” via “restoring the duties of jihad.”

Who is Recruited

In order to fight Islamist terrorism more effectively, work has been done in the USA, Germany and Great Britain to produce ethnic and religious profiles of immigrants who are more predisposed than others to perform terrorist acts.

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4 Marc Sageman, senior researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.
6 Here and subsequently in the text, the concept of jihad is used in the primitive, but more widespread, extremist sense – as war against the “godless,” outside the context of a “greater jihad,” “lesser jihad,” etc.
However, this experiment has not produced any tangible results, either in preventing terrorism or denying entry to these countries for active extremists.

Neither is there any clear and unambiguous result from attempts to profile terrorists by social and economic traits. This was the conclusion, for example, of Edwin Bakker, of the Hague’s Clingendael Institute, who in one study compared approximately 20,000 factors in the suspects’ backgrounds. In his words, greater concentration on suspicious activities is required, and more attention should be paid to analyzing the personal experience and motivations of the people who are radicalized, rather than spending time on profiling.8

The accumulation of material to study the biographies of Islamist terrorists made it possible to identify one common factor: stages of recruitment.

- alienation and marginalization
- spiritual quests
- the radicalization process
- meetings and communicating with like-minded figures
- a gradual withdrawal from the previous circle of acquaintances and the formation of a group
- acceptance of violence as a just political tool
- making contact with an extremist group
- training and execution of a terrorist act.9

Psychologists studying the phenomenon of terrorism identify a number of risk factors that could spark the formation of a terrorist’s world-view:

1. early socialization
2. narcissistic tendencies
3. conflict situations, especially confrontations with the police
4. personal connections with members of terrorist organizations10
5. personal experience of persecution – genuine or imagined.11

Many experts indicate the presence of a causal link between regular mosque visits, reading the Quran and radicalization – even as far as preparing a terrorist act.

On the other hand, the same Mark Sageman, based on his own research, comes to the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of students at *madrasas* (religious schools) do not subscribe to extremist ideologies.

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Until now, there has been no clear explanation of the selective influence of reading the Quran in conditions which appear, prima facie, to be near-identical. However, in July of 2007 a series of experiments was performed at Michigan University, which identified a general rule: the level of cruelty and aggression of students identified during the experiment was in direct relationship to the frequency with which they were read violent scenes from sacred religious texts. The more religious the students were, the more cruel and aggressive they became. This effect was even stronger when students were read quotations in which God sanctioned violence. The level of aggression in atheist students also grew, but to a lesser degree.

The authors of the study consider that the constant, selective reading of holy texts that describe violence, sanctioned by God, makes sincerely faithful people more inclined to violence, on a subconscious level.

It is imagined that the thorough and comprehensive study of texts that are holy for Muslims will offer a sufficient level of knowledge to be able to understand and explore issues of faith, such that recruiters from Islamism terrorist organizations will be unable to “brainwash” them and push them to perform terrorist activities on the basis of a distorted understanding of the Quran.

Thus, mosques are a habitual, emotional environment for marginalized individuals. For the majority, such an environment is necessary, but far from sufficient, to create Islamist terrorists. A potential terrorism candidate does not necessarily have to fall under the influence of Islamism recruiters, but merely occupy a passive or active (but legal) position in the Muslim community, which depends on both objective and subjective factors.

Gilles Kepel considers that the turning point in the initiation into terrorist activity is the so-called “tumble” of the recruit himself, as “you cannot brainwash someone who is not susceptible.”

The need to change the circle of acquaintances is linked by Randy Borum with the terrorist’s inherent “narcissism trauma” – extreme dissatisfaction with their own self-image. This prompts them to search for a new, “positive” identity, and adherence to a terrorist group allows them to acquire self-respect and a sense of importance.

New members of terrorist groups can demonstrate a high level of dedication to the group’s goals and objectives, which is a rational explanation and demonstrates a strong, even painful psychological need for inclusion in a social group, experienced during the stage of alienation and marginalization. Therefore, it is virtually impossible for a terrorist to sever ties with that group – this would be the equivalent of emotional suicide.

14 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa, FL.: University of South Florida, 2004).
If E. Show links belonging to a group with protection from the fear of authoritarianism,\textsuperscript{16} then in the case of Islamism groups in Europe one can speak of a form of protection from the dictates of the European and, more broadly, Western socio-cultural environment – an environment that appears alien and aggressive to a patriarchal, Islamic world-view. This also holds true for the mechanisms of personal empowerment and freedoms.

Initiation into a group is followed by gradual assimilation of absolutist rhetoric, and the subject adopts a simplistic, black-and-white understanding of his environment. The terrorist world-view continues to form through the following stages:

- constant, gradual adaptation of a new member in the terrorist environment;
- the terrorist chooses, in line with the peculiarities of his individual character, one role or other (for example, a professional fighter is unlikely to perform an act of suicide terrorism).\textsuperscript{17}

**Who Does the Recruiting**

Initially, from the end of the 1970’s and particularly after Bin Laden founded the “World Islamic Front for the Fight Against Jews and Crusaders”\textsuperscript{18} in February of 1998, propaganda and recruiting were performed in Europe by emissaries of radical Islamist groups who arrived from abroad. However, after achieving a certain critical mass of Islamist opinion in Muslim communities in Europe, these functions migrated to local preachers and recruiters. Subsequently, growing Internet access led to the appearance of a remote form of propaganda and recruiting activity. Currently all of these forms are represented in Europe, to one degree or another.

A number of experts in the field of counterterrorism (including M. Sageman) consider that at the current time Al Qaeda is no longer involved in recruiting activity – at least, not directly. However, several nuances are worthy of attention here.

Indubitably, the core of Al Qaeda, once it became the ideological center, delegated its authority to recruit new members of the tactical, and even operational cells of the network. At the same time targeted recruitment—the search, study and selection of candidates needed for complex, tactically new, high-tech terrorist acts, as well as the performance of recruitment for the future (re-

\textsuperscript{16} Olson, “The Terrorist and the Terrorized: Some Psychoanalytic Considerations.”

\textsuperscript{17} Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism*.

\textsuperscript{18} It brings together a number of Islamist terrorist organizations, including: Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Egyptian Jamaa Islamiya, the Libyan Islamic Battle Group, Yemen’s Islamic Army of Aden, Kashmir’s Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Muhhamed, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Algiers’ Salafist Group of Preaching and Jihad and the Armed Islamic Group, the Malaysian-Filipino Abu Sayaf, and others.
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Recruitment of persons with the necessary, specific abilities and capabilities)—remains centralized.

The simultaneous presence of different recruiting systems in Islamist terrorist organizations—vertical (top-down and bottom-up) and horizontal—was observed starting from the end of the 1990’s, for example, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.19

**Vertical Recruitment Systems**

The task of searching for candidates was simplified at the time by the existence of legal associations of Afghan war veterans in the country.

Most frequently, contact was made with recruitment candidates during general, informal meetings of war veterans, usually held in private homes. Then the candidate was invited to a more exclusive meeting, perhaps even tête-à-tête, where he was offered membership in an Islamist terrorist organization. If the candidate agreed, then he was either presented to recruiters of a higher rank, or his case was considered remotely by the same. At this stage, his role and place in the structure of the terrorist organization were determined and he was given general instructions.

The second—“bottom-up”—recruitment system makes use of preachers and theologians. Most notorious is the activity of Nasir al-Fahd and Ali al-Khudayr, who played a somewhat indirect role in recruitment (general propaganda activity) and Sulayman al-Ulwan, who directly participated in filling the ranks of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.

**Horizontal Recruitment Patterns**

Several patterns of recruitment of new members for terrorist networks can be called “horizontal”:

1. autonomous formation of a protoorganisation – a group with the target of executing a terrorist attack, influenced by Islamist ideology, and which somehow comes into contact with an active Al-Qaeda network, during preparation of the attack.

2. initiation into the Al-Qaeda network takes place after the execution of a terrorist act, by an individual or a small group.

3. provision of financial, material or technical assistance, or shelter for friends or relatives participating in terrorist activity. This assistance can be seen as the first stage of initiation into the activities of a terrorist organization.

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The Vertical (“Top-down”) Recruitment Pattern

According to the security services of a number of European states, despite the arrests of Al Qaeda operational agents and recruiters in Europe, there is continuing growth in the number of people wishing to swell the ranks of Islamism terrorist organizations.

Given the sufficient numbers of self-initiating recruits, recruitment activity has changed, with the emphasis moving from the search for recruitment subjects to the selection of the best-trained and most appropriate candidates.

In a situation where legal operations are impossible in Europe, due to the heightened attention on the part of counterterrorism structures towards public associations of Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans, as was the case in Saudi Arabia, the freedom of action to recruit “bottom-up” is reduced, while horizontal and “top-down” vertical recruiting patterns take priority.

Moreover, a new phenomenon was identified in 2006: the creation of a terrorist cell and training for the execution of a terrorist act under the influence of Islamism ideology, in the absence of any links whatsoever to a terrorist network, even via the Internet.

On June 22, 2006, the USA security services arrested five citizens of that country and two nationals of Muslim countries in Miami; these were activists from the radical Islamism group “Black Muslims,” suspected of preparing a series of terrorist acts: bombs in several skyscrapers and FBI offices in various cities in the country, including Chicago’s 110-storey Sears Tower.20

At almost the same time in Timisoara (Romania) a young Romanian convert to Islam independently took the decision to perform a terrorist act in protest against the participation of the Romanian contingent in the Iraq War – he filled his car with gas canisters and tried to blow it up near the city airport.21

Examples of such indoctrinated terrorism indicate that in some sense the historical, evolutionary cycle of the organized development of terrorism has run full course:

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\text{terrorism by lone wolves} \rightarrow \text{by groups} \rightarrow \text{by networks} \rightarrow \text{by networks of networks} \rightarrow \text{by lone wolves}
\]

In order to stimulate the appearance of such indoctrinated, self-generating lone wolf terrorists and terrorist cells, Islamism terrorism organizations:

\begin{itemize}
  \item widely disseminate information about such acts of terrorism;
  \item ensure that successful terrorists are idolized;
  \item maintain constant ideological support, including by means of performing high-visibility, well-prepared, spectacular acts of terror that are fully covered by the mass media;
\end{itemize}

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20 Rosbalt information agency, 6 July 2006.
21 Ibid.
22 From the Latin \textit{inductio} – directing, guiding.
• provide the bare minimum of organizational and technical knowledge to perform the terrorist act.

Why are such apparently “low-yield” acts of terror needed?

First, they contribute to some degree to maintaining constant terrorist activity and, as a result, maintain an atmosphere of fear.

Second, indoctrinated terrorists, by means of constant technical and tactical self-improvement, will gradually increase their level of professionalism, and by doing so will increase the amount of damage caused.

Third, the most successful of the lone-wolf terrorists (in terms of the results of the act of terrorism, and in terms of evading arrest and retribution) will sooner or later create terrorist cells or begin to transfer their experience to relatives, friends, etc. (for example, as in the case of the Washington sniper).

Fourth, such acts of terrorism, being disconnected from international terrorism, distract the attention of the structures established to combat extremism and terrorism, forcing them to spread more thinly their manpower and resources.

**How Are Terrorists Recruited**

As a rule, general propaganda is distributed through specially-created organizations, newspapers and internet sites, by islamists and Islamism terrorist organizations, to achieve the following:

• formation of support groups amongst the general population. These play an auxiliary role, such as financial support. In part, these groups are used to propagate the heroic portrayal of shakhid 24 suicide bombers and the shakhid tradition in Europe’s Islamic communities;

• the ideological and psychological formation of Islamism lone-wolf terrorists;

• the unstructured growth of the network, via self-organization of small terrorist groups;

• the formation of psychological readiness for “front line” missions—in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir (India), etc.

In the latter two cases, as a rule, contact is made with representatives of an Islamism terrorist network.

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23 For example, the company As-Sahab, created upon the initiative of bin Laden, and which was involved in the production of videos praising the ideas of a jihad against the unbelievers. Ahmed Zeidan, *Bin Laden Unmasked: Meetings whose Publication were Prohibited by the Taliban* (Beirut: The World Book Company, 2003), p.15.

24 A shakhid is a warrior who has fallen in a fight for his faith.

25 For example, two young Moroccans from the town of Eindhoven (Netherlands): Ahmed al-Bakiuli and Halil al-Hassnaui went to Kashmir independently and on their own initiative; they were killed by Indian border guards. Emerson Vermaat, *Bin
Direct recruitment for deployment in “hotspots,” training of professional terrorist fighters, as well as psychological and practical training for Islamism suicide terrorists, takes the form of targeted recruitment of candidates.

Specific recruitment approaches and methods depend, in part, on such factors as:

- intramural or remote contact between the recruiter and the recruit;
- the length and total time of contact;
- the frequency;
- the regularity;
- the goal of recruitment (general, specific, long-term, etc.);
- the degree of deconditioning and desocialization of the recruit;
- the level of his education and intellect;
- his current emotional state;
- his professionalism and the personal qualities of the recruiter.

The majority of these factors, just like the psychological characteristics of the candidate, are taken into consideration and used by the recruiter intuitively, as similar skills are developed over a period of many years, in part during the study of Islamic theology and law, participation in numerous theological and secular discussions, etc.

If a recruit has a developed ability for independent, critical interpretation of religious teachings and discussion, then it is considered efficient to hold such classes in small, homogeneous groups (up to 6-8 people of similar age, background, education and social status\(^{26}\)), using group psychotrainning methods and where a “follower” is brought into contact with a sincerely and deeply faithful, but highly radical “leader.”

The foundations for recruitment can be summarized with the acronym “MICE”: Money, Ideology, Compromise and Ego (personal motives).

**Recruitment for Terrorist Activity using Financial Incentives**

The money factor plays an insignificant role in the recruitment of naturalized or long-established immigrants to Europe, but plays a relatively larger role in finding potential terrorists in the latest wave of immigration, especially those arriving from African countries.

A good example is the arrest in Spain, in May of 2007, of 14 Moroccan citizens and two Algerians, who recruited penniless immigrants from the Maghreb to go to terrorist training camps, or even straight to Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^{27}\)

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\(^{26}\) Luis Miguel Ariza, “Virtual Jihad: The Internet as the Ideal Terrorism Recruiting Tool,” *Scientific American* (January 2006).

\(^{27}\) *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 30 May 2007.

*Laden’s Terror Networks in Europe* (The Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 2002).
According to US military analyst John Robb, the fee for participation in a terrorist act in Iraq in 2004 was between 100 and 300 USD, depending on the qualifications of the fighter.

The financial stimulus for engagement in organized terrorist activity, performing secondary, auxiliary functions, more commonly takes the form of economic and propaganda/awareness-raising activities in a pre-existing terrorism environment (an existing social foundation for terrorism), in medical, social and educational structures that exist in parallel to similar state infrastructure – for example, such has been created in Libya, Syria, Egypt and a number of other mid-Eastern countries by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and Hamas.

If such a self-supporting socio-economic foundation for nourishing Islamism terrorism were to be created in European countries, this factor would play a far greater role in recruitment.

Recruitment for Terrorist Activity using Compromise

Terrorists have most commonly been recruited using the leverage of compromise in the middle East and South Asia, usually in one of the two following scenarios: a subject is revealed to have cooperated with the law enforcement or security services of the state or, in a patriarchal Islamic environment, a woman is accused of marital infidelity or improper pre-marital relations. As a rule, the recruitment subject is offered the opportunity to engage in suicide terrorism to preserve their family honor.

The increasing number of Muslim communities in Europe and the tendency within such communities to densely populate small areas leads, inter alia, to their voluntary self-exclusion from the life of society, choosing to become self-sufficient and isolated. Within such communities, standards for public morals and rules for behavior are imported from the common homeland. Deviance from these rules, excessive europeanization (this is particularly relevant for women) increases their psychological vulnerability, which can easily become a ground for ideological and psychological manipulation by Islamic terrorist organizations, and their involvement in acts of terrorism.

Thus, recruitment into Islamism terrorist organizations by means of compromise is also a growing problem, however modestly.

Recruitment for Terrorist Activity using Ideology

For a number of decades, the main goals of the radical, politicized wing of Islamic fundamentalism has been the struggle for power in Islamic states and the establishment in such states of unfailing observation of Sharia law in all areas of life. In order to achieve these goals, a strategy was developed: all states that “sold out” themselves to the godless (the West) were declared illegitimate, “barbarous societies” (“jahiliyyah”), became the so-called “near enemy” of extremists.

However, ostensibly to achieve these same goals, bin Laden justified the need to engage in a global jihad in his 1996 fatwa, calling for a confrontation with the “distant enemy,” the Christian and Jewish West, only after victory over which could all “corrupt” Islamic regimes be easily overpowered.

It is necessary to note here that even within the Al Qaeda network itself, there is no agreement over the scale and geographical distribution of this jihad. For example, if bin Laden and al Zawahiri are supporters of a global jihad, then the leaders of Al Gamaa al Islamiya and Harakat-ul-Mujahedin—Rifai Ahmed Taha and Fazul Rahman Halil—remain supporters of the struggle with the “jahiliyyah” – the near enemy.

Contradictions between supporters and opponents of exporting jihad to beyond the limits of Muslim countries played a certain role in the fragmentation and decentralization of the Al Qaeda network. Nevertheless, these were resolved to some degree by the beginning of the Iraq War, but remain a constant factor with a clear trend for growth. However, the main reason for this is most likely not ideological, but in the struggle for control over the entire Islamism movement.

Another important element in bin Laden’s fatwa was the declaration of participation in jihad as the second most important duty of Muslims, after unshakeable faith. This transformed the question of whether or not to participate in the global jihad into a personal decision to be made by each individual Muslim.

Bin Laden explained the necessity of participating in jihad by reference to a direct occupation, as well as the subjugation of Muslim lands to the West. The question of occupation is perhaps open to debate for a relatively large number of regions in the world, while the question of subjugation is rhetorical and timeless. Therefore, the main reason for jihad is simple, clear and eternal.

In order for the ideology of Islamism terrorism to be a global, renewable resource, it is necessary to generate international ideas that are not restricted by borders. It is specifically the reinforcement of such trends that is currently taking place, as the ideological principles of the global jihad are being adjusted and refined.

For example, in January of 2007 one of the famous ideologues in modern Islamism, Sheikh Hamed bin Abdalla al-Ali, in his statement entitled “Agreement on a Supreme Council of Jihad Groups,” called for the consolidation of activities by all Islamism groups. Such calls for terrorists to coordinate their actions are not new: as early as 2004, Ayman al-Zawahiri offered to establish, as part of the general ideological activities, a so-called Council for the Development of Decisions.

However, the “Agreement” does not call for tightening the main ideological line of the global jihad – in fact, calls for tolerance with respect to other Islamism groups and salafist movements contained within it have the goal of actually expanding the common ideological basis and the boundaries of acceptability of
Recruitment by Terrorist Organizations in Europe’s Muslim Communities

various possible interpretations of jihad. This includes expanding jihad to include a common enemy – the Shiite branch of Islam.29

Such a flexible approach would allow Al-Qaeda, based on dedication to general goals, to engage in tighter cooperation with a number of terrorist groups that do not share the ideology of a global jihad – with the subsequent, gradual correction of those ideological positions.

A clear example of such ideological “regeneration” is the Algerian radical Islamism group Al Jamaa as-Salafiya li-d-Daava va-l-Kital (SPJH, the Salafist Preaching and Jihad Group).

If in September of 2001 the group officially expressed its doubts that the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 were organized and executed by Al Qaeda, not least because of the illegitimacy of such attacks under Islam, in 2003 it declared its support for the activities of Al-Qaeda and its readiness to spread jihad beyond Algeria. In 2005 the group’s leader, Ibrahim Mustafa, declared jihad on the territory of Algeria and against all foreign citizens.

The gradual adjustment of ideological positions transformed SPJH from an Islamic terrorist group acting in Algeria, into a regional sub-network of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (North Africa), just like Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

SPJH has a broad recruitment, finance and technical support network in Europe, which is the most active in communities of North African immigrants in Spain, Italy, Britain, France and the Netherlands. According to a number of European security services, at least 200 people trained in SPJH camps in Iraq now live in Europe.

Another worrying aspect of SPJH is the presence within this group of aquatic units—fighters—who could offer Al Qaeda a significant advantage: water-based terrorist acts in European ports.

Thus, by gradual correction (and, sometimes, fundamental change) of the ideological positions of local terrorist groups, an international Islamism terrorist movement recruits into its ranks, to serve its own goals and objectives, numerous new members, who are moreover already organized, structured and trained.

Recruitment for Terrorist Activity using Personal, Psychological Motives

The study of specific examples of the recruitment of new members into Islamism terrorist activities, over many years and from many angles, has failed to identify the universal relevance of any personal motives or reasons.30

29 This can also be seen as an attempt to reinforce the ideological foundation for fighting the growing influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in certain regions of the Middle East, primarily Iraq, and especially given the prospect of the withdrawal, sooner or later, of coalition troops from that country.

30 “For members of terrorist groups there is a multitude of personal motives. For some it is the sensation of power in the hands of the powerless, for others the main motive is vengeance, and yet others seek to acquire a sense of personal importance.” Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychological Roots of Terrorism,” in Addressing the Causes of Terror-
However, in the opinion of some psychologists, such as Robert Lukabo, “there is clearly a certain set of personal characteristics that terrorists have to have,” and which are not acquired overnight. Before becoming a terrorist, a person must pass through apathy and other forms of social deconditioning.

A number of psychologists identify certain types of person, whose key character traits suggest a predisposition to membership in rigidly structured organizations. Yet these traits by no means lead inevitably to membership in a terrorist organization, or even criminal activity. However, these character traits, given possible problems associated with self-realization in day-to-day life, can be successfully utilized for recruitment. In generalized form, these personality types are:

- The organizer (subtypes: the ideologue, the process manager)
- The vain (subtypes: narcissus, poser, techie specialist)
- The revengeful
- The risk-taker, or thrill-seeker
- The sadist
- The loser
- The impressionable.

The specific work undertaken by a recruiter will correspond to each of the personality types.

For example, in order to recruit a “revengeful" type—after the 2003 Iraq War this was one of the most widespread types of candidate for terrorists from Islamic communities in Europe—it is necessary to provoke a desire for vengeance towards a specific, or general target. For example, European society, the member states of the antiterrorist coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, disloyal authorities in Islamic states, etc.

In line with the psychological traits of the candidate's character and personality, the appropriate method for working with him is chosen – in a group or individually. To a large degree, this is true for the “vain” set of types (on the one hand, self-sufficient “lone wolves” or “supermen,” and on the other hand vain “actors” or “posers” who need an audience) as well as the “loser” type (working in a team can both help him overcome his complexes and reinforce them; in which case his chances of being recruited for a suicide act are increased).


32 Miller, “The Literature of Terrorism.”
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Recruitment in Iraq and Afghanistan

Apart from direct support for sabotage and terrorist activities, sending volunteers to hotspots has strategic importance for international terrorism’s long-term plans: highly-trained terrorists with fighting experience will be in demand both in other “hotspots” and for organizing terrorist acts in Europe after their return.

Given an early withdrawal of coalition troops from Iraq without achieving the key military and political goals, an upsurge in activity by Islamic terrorists can be expected in Europe.

Training Professional Terrorist Fighters

The psychological and professional training of a professional fighter requires somewhat more time than training a suicide terrorist; for example, the subject needs to be taken to a training camp, most of which are outside Europe.33

According to Abd al-Samad Muassawi, the brother of Zakarius Mussawi (a terrorist involved in the preparation of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001), the mujahedin psychology is altered using a method that has been developed in great detail, and which consists of several stages. First, against a background of gradually-increasing physical and mental loads, the recruit’s food ration is reduced. After reaching the point of psychic exhaustion, strong psychological pressure is exerted on the subject: he is persuaded that he turned out to be far weaker, physically and morally, than expected; a sense of guilt is fostered in the subject, with respect to his “brothers in arms,” instructors and mentors, but also the Islamic umma as a whole. In this way the recruit is gradually brought to a state of readiness to perform any act in order to remedy his guilt and justify the hopes placed in him.34

Training a Suicide Terrorist

Unlike regular suicides, by which the subject wishes to put an end to their own real or perceived, irresolvable problems, Islamism suicide terrorists perform acts of self-sacrifice to resolve global religious and political problems which are supposedly common to all of Islam.

Despite the fact that even among Islamic theologians there is no unambiguous attitude to such a means of fighting the “godless,”35 a certain proportion of Muslim society has initiated and actively supports the cult of such sacrifices.

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33 However, some ideologues of Islamist terrorism, such as Aby Masabom as-Suri, have developed programs for training terrorists in the states of Europe. Brynjar Lia, “Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralised Jihadi Training: Part I,” Terrorism Monitor 5:1 (Jamestown Foundation, 18 January 2007).
35 For example, Sheikh Muhammad Usaimin considers that when Muslims “tie explosive devices to their bodies, and then slip into a crowd of non-believers and blow them up and themselves too, this is suicide, and may Allah save us from this, because suicide is
In 2003-2006, international terrorist organizations were forced to pay greater attention to the training of suicide terrorists, for a number of reasons, including:

- the elimination of smoothly-functioning camps in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and to some degree in Iraq and Libya;
- major losses amongst terrorists who received training in bomb-making;
- relatively low material and time costs.

The construction and launch of new camps in regions of Pakistan weakly-controlled by the central government cannot yet compensate for the loss of Islamists, as only small groups can be trained in such camps – usually no more than 10-20 subjects.

Doctor Ahmad Hadjem Muhi ad-Din, a Palestinian psychologist, distinguishes two categories of suicide terrorist:

- those ready for death: i.e. those who openly declare their intention to execute a suicide terrorist act in order to achieve political goals, or in the name of vengeance, and
- those with a death wish – persons in a traumatic psychic state, in which they are locked in a constant search for death. The death wish turns them into a cheap weapon.

In the Middle East, the idea of death is cultivated and engrained gradually, starting almost from pre-school age, and is especially intensive in the kindergartens and camps of Hezbollah and HAMAS. The cult of death in the name of the Almighty, the achievement of readiness to make this self-sacrifice is achieved by means of turning the images of shahid suicide bombers into heroes, by the repeated screenings during classes of recordings of the funerals of suicide terrorists, etc.

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36 The execution of suicide attacks in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict follows a different dynamic.


38 This process of psychological influence largely coincides with the experience of the Jesuit Order in Europe, in which it is said: “Give us a child to bring up until he is 7, and then you can do with him what you wish, but he will be ours.”
Such psychical correction has the goal of making subjects consider self-sacrifice necessary, because “if one is to die an early death anyway, why not make it happen even earlier, but in the name of the Almighty?”

In Europe, such psychological treatment cannot be widespread, which is one of the reasons why the motivation of suicide terrorists from Muslim communities in Europe has an emphasis not on ideology (fanaticism for an idea that goes as far as self-destruction), but instead on the ego – awareness of a person’s own uniqueness. The terrorist is confident of his special designation, he is proud of being called by the will of Allah to awaken wayward societies.

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The reinforcement of joint, counterterrorist efforts by the law enforcement agencies and security services of all European states to prevent and interdict terrorist activities is, indubitably, vital. However a variety of notable factors—socio-economic, ideological, psychic and psychological—influence the processes of radicalization and terrorist recruitment under Islamism slogans, and also presupposes the need to deploy broad-sweeping and multi-level anti-terrorist propaganda.

Only the effective combination of these two approaches can make it possible to prevent the formation in Europe’s Muslim communities, economically and in terms of the mobilization of human resources, of a self-sufficient terror environment, such as the ones which have been created in a number of countries of the Middle East by organizations such as Hezbollah, HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood.

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39 That is, to the simplified understanding of the statement by Sheikh ul-islam ibn Taymiya: “Because this was a jihad on the path of Allah, people started to believe, and he lost nothing, because he would still die sooner or later.” Islam protiv terorizma. Sbornik fetv [Islam against terrorism. An anthology of fatwahs].
Chapter 13

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism 1996-2011: Defining the Threat, Devising Counterterrorism Strategy

Vlado Azinovic 1

Background

Following the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001 and a sudden upsurge in attention to Islamic affairs worldwide, Bosnia and Herzegovina came under scrutiny for alleged links to Al-Qaeda and the so-called global jihadist movement. These allegations were based on the presence and activities of Islamic volunteer fighters (mujahedeen), missionaries, and foreign Muslim charities in the country during the 1992-1995 war and, in some instances, their later affiliation with the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. The fact that more than a million indigenous Muslims live in Bosnia and Herzegovina added in no small measure to the haste and care with which these links were investigated.

It is already a well-documented fact that, as of 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was indeed a meeting point for members of various militant Islamist groups. Wartime events habitually described by Western media as “the worst atrocities in Europe since World War Two” served as a rallying cry for Muslims around the world. Many of them felt that genocide was taking place, and some believed that jihad was the answer. Those who decided to join the fight began arriving in Bosnia early in the summer of 1992. Some came directly from training camps in Afghanistan; others arrived from the Middle East, North Africa, or immigrant communities in Western Europe, where they had been recruited in mosques and Islamic centers. This effort was bolstered by the arrival of Islamic missionaries and charities that embarked on a spiritual and humanitarian mission to aid the embattled Bosnian Muslims.

The most conservative estimate is that the number of foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia totaled 600 to 700; while the boldest, and probably most exagger-
ated, alleges that some 20,000 mujahideen were in the country between 1992 and 1995.\(^2\)

However, their activities in that period were not terrorism related, but rather military, as they fought alongside regular units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). They were also involved in a number of war crimes committed against Serb and Croat civilians and prisoners of war. In August 1993, amidst reports of atrocities committed by rogue mujahideen, they were integrated into the Bosnian Army’s 3rd Corps as the el-Mujahid Unit.

The real military effectiveness of foreign Islamic fighters in the Bosnian war was by all accounts rather limited; their drive for martyrdom often surpassed the logic of warfare and led to unnecessary casualties. And, they were often used in operations that Bosniak soldiers considered too dangerous and were therefore reluctant to engage in.\(^3\)

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, a number of investigations led by international and Bosnian law enforcement agencies established that some individuals who later gained prominence through the rise of militant Islamist fundamentalism, as spearheaded by Al-Qaeda, had indeed been present in Bosnia during the war.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Bosnian Army sources claim that during different phases of the war a total of 3,000 Islamic fighters passed through Bosnia. For more on this, see Sead Numanovic, “Bosnia: Mujahedin Revival Fears,” *IWPR Balkan Crisis Report*, No. 286 (5 October 2001). Western estimates on this issue differ. Dr. Cees Wiebes cites US officials who believe there were between 1,200 and 1,400 foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia. Pyes, Meyer, and Rempel cite an American intelligence source who estimates that, since 1992, a total number of around 4,000 Islamic volunteers from Western Africa, the Middle East, and Europe have passed through Bosnia. The same source said they were considered “pretty good fighters and certainly ruthless.” Yossef Bodansky claims that by the end of 1995, “the majority of the 15,000 to 20,000 foreign volunteers were already fully integrated into key Bosnian Muslim units.” However, there is consensus among experts that this claim is highly exaggerated. For more on this, see Cees Wiebes, *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2003), 207-208; and Craig Pyes, Josh Meyer, and William C. Rempel, “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,” *Los Angeles Times*, 7 October 2001. Yossef Bodansky’s *Some Call It Peace* is available at: http://members.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/geostrategy/bodansky_peace/index.html (accessed 12 January 2007).

\(^3\) In the now famous words of a Bosniak soldier near Travnik, in Central Bosnia, “the foreign mujahideen came here to die for Islam. We desired to live for Islam.”

\(^4\) Among the top jihadists who reportedly fought in Bosnia were: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), the alleged mastermind of the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.; two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar; Abu Sulaiman al-Makki, who was wounded in Bosnia and would later appear with Osama Bin Laden in December 2001, as the Al-Qaeda leader extolled the 9/11 attacks; Abu Zubair al-Haili, who would be arrested in Morocco (2002) while plotting to attack U.S. ships in the Straits of Gibraltar; Abu el-Ma’ali (Abdelkader Mokhtari, “The Gendarme”), a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and 1994 commander of the El Mujahid unit, described by American intelligence agencies as “little Osama Bin Laden;” and Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, a founding member
Interestingly enough, a 1999 random survey of Bosniak former members of the el-Mujahid Unit showed that none of the soldiers interviewed had, by that time, heard of either Osama bin Laden or Al-Qaeda.5

A few hundred mujahideen remained in Bosnia after the war. Bosniak political elite were uncertain as to whether or not the Dayton Peace Accords would be upheld, so they decided to keep these fighters “on call” in case hostilities should be reignited. In addition, there was always the notion that the presence of mujahideen in Bosnia provided an influx of significant and usually untraceable funds from abroad.6

It took years of unwavering international pressure as well as efforts by local law enforcement agencies before a list of some 1,500 cases of foreign mujahideen fighters, and others who had obtained Bosnian citizenship during and after the war, was finally compiled and reviewed by Bosnian authorities in 2007. Eventually, the citizenship of more than 600 people, believed to have been obtained unlawfully, was revoked.7

With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the arrival of mujahideen introduced at least two new and important factors into the security and social landscape of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One is the physical presence of people trained for, and capable of, committing various terrorist acts. The other is a rather narrow, puritanical, and sometimes confrontational interpretation of Islam, commonly known as Salafism or Wahhabism, which was imported to Bosnia with the wartime influx of mujahideen and Islamic missionaries.8

of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous), a banned Pakistan-based Islamist group, and alleged mastermind of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai (India), which left more than 170 dead and 300 wounded.

5 From an interview with a prominent Bosnian Islamic scholar and author who has spoken with former Bosniak members of the el-Mujahid Unit for his own research, and who wished to remain anonymous.

6 As one potential reason for preserving his bond with Islamic volunteers, the United Nations had assumed even earlier that “[Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic appeared to see the [foreign] fighters as a conduit for funds from the Gulf and Middle East.” Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 207-208.

7 It is believed that the number of these people still residing in Bosnia has been reduced to a few dozen, and that for the most part they have embraced a peaceful life with their Bosnian wives and children. The remainder, considered potentially dangerous, are being closely watched and have thus far not been involved in any terrorist-related activity.

8 The more appropriate of these terms is often contested. Members of these movements might be called Salafis or Wahhabis, but these are broad and often confusing labels, usually referring to those who reject as reprehensible most of the developments in Islam that have come after the first three generations of Muslims. However, these groups are not inherently violent, and usually choose to live in closed and reclusive communities. The terms were derived from the Arabic word Salaf (“predecessor”), and from the name of an 18th century Salafi scholar, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. In the West, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Salafism/Wahhabism has become closely associated with the small minority of Muslims that
This background has provided the filter through which threats of terrorism and ideological radicalization in Bosnia have been assessed over the last decade.

**Patterns of Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1996 to 2011**

Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but rather the focused activities of small groups or individuals. Despite the authentic popularity of these groups, and even if they are supported by large organizations or political parties, the number of active militants who engage in terrorism is very small. That reality makes terrorism prevention an enormously complex and demanding task. Following their patterns of recruitment and radicalization and understanding the *modus operandi* of such groups and individuals provides important clues for effective counterterrorism strategies.

The detailed examination of investigated terrorism-related incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that over the last fifteen years there were two distinct waves of activity and at least two generations of perpetrators, triggered by two sets of underlying motives. Also, there is a clear difference between the state’s responses to terrorism before and after September 11th.

The first wave was associated with remaining foreign mujahideen and their Bosniak disciples. It included a series of bombings and shootings against mostly Croat ethnic minority groups in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Often attributed to this group, but never thoroughly investigated, was also the foiled assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II in April 1997. The targets of this wave included returnee families, Catholic churches, Croat policemen, and a police station in Mostar.9 These former mujahideen were also behind several armed robberies and murders of other Muslims in Central Bosnia.

espouse violent jihad against civilians as a legitimate expression of Islam, the so-called Salafi Jihadis(ts) or Global Jihad Movement, spearheaded by the al-Qaeda terrorist network. However, Islamic scholars suggest that a more appropriate term, historically and theologically, should be Kharijites or Neo-Kharijites, a reference to the third major sect in Islam, alongside Sunnis and Shias.

9 Just hours before the Pope arrived in Sarajevo on April 12, 1997, police discovered a powerful batch of explosives along the route the pontiff’s motorcade was scheduled to take. The cache—more than 20 antitank mines and 50-plus pounds of plastic explosives, equipped with a remote-control detonator—was apparently planted under a bridge overnight and would have caused enormous damage. No suspects were ever arrested or tried for this attempt. See: Tracy Wilkinson and Richard Boudreaux, "Mines Found in Sarajevo No Deterrent to Papal Visit," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 April 1997. The car bombing in Mostar that damaged many buildings and injured dozens of people on September 18, 1997 was planned and executed by Saudi-born Ahmed Zaid Salim Zuhair, a.k.a Handala al-Saudi, and two former Arab mujahideen. They placed 4.5 kilograms of explosives, 40 kilograms of anti-tank mines, and 15 kilograms of so-called red explosives in a parked car underneath a residential building in Mostar. Handala was sentenced in absentia by the Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina...
The essence of this first wave of terrorist attacks was very clearly political – in the immediate post-war years, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosniak political elite used the “mujahideen factor” to avoid full implementation of Annex 7, namely the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their original homes. Finding themselves in a reluctantly-forged federation, sharing 51 percent of the country with their enemies-turned-allies the Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks used the mujahideen as powerful leverage in a struggle to maintain ethnic majority in previously mixed regions of Central Bosnia and Sarajevo, where they had established their dominance during the war and wished to preserve it.10

The second wave of terrorism-related activities in Bosnia has occurred under a very different set of circumstances. With a change of government in 2001, which temporarily sidelined the three nationalist parties around which Dayton was constructed (the SDS, HDZ and SDA), and following the attacks of September 11, the official attitude toward the mujahideen changed dramatically. Their numbers have been rigorously reduced, and many have lost their Bosnian citizenships or have been deported from the country after being declared “a threat to national security.” The authorities also closed the local offices of Islamic charities suspected of bankrolling the mujahideen and supporting transnational terrorism (including Al-Furqan, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the Al-Haramain & Al Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation, and more).

However, the elimination of remaining foreign fighters made room for a new generation of “Islamist activists.” Generally, these individuals have, in terms of radicalization, had few (if any) links to the el-Mujahid Unit or to the war itself.
While the actions of former mujahideen were aimed at addressing issues of a more local nature, this new generation is ideologically inspired by the global jihadi movement and aspires to have impact on local events in Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of wider international goals (such as the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Iraq).

Except in the case of Mirsad Bektašević, a Swedish national born in Novi Pazar (Serbia) and convicted for a foiled suicide bombing in Sarajevo in 2005, all known terrorist groups are essentially homegrown, with limited ties to transnational terrorist organizations or individuals. One such group (Rijad Rustempašić and his followers) was arrested in Bugojno, in a police operation reminiscent of FBI sting operations in the US, and charged in 2009 with terrorism, conspiracy to commit a crime, and the illegal possession and sales of firearms, explosives, and military equipment. This case, currently being tried before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, began in March 2010. In retaliation, several individuals (led by Haris Čaušević) closely associated with the Rustempašić group detonated an improvised explosive device in front of the Bugojno police station on June 27, 2010, killing one and injuring several police officers. These individuals have been charged with terrorism and, since March 2011, are also being tried before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the intended target of the foiled suicide bomb attack was never specified in the indictment, a police source familiar with the investigation claims that Mirsad Bektašević and his accomplice, Abdulkadir Cesur, a Danish citizen of Turkish descent, had planned to attack a bus of German soldiers from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) on its regular trip to Mount Igman, where the soldiers were engaged in standard fitness training. Bektašević, who on various Internet forums also went by the aliases Maximus and Abu Imad As-Sanjaki, was connected to other terror cells in Denmark and the UK. He was originally sentenced in 2007 by the Court of BiH to 15 years and 4 month in prison, but an appeals court reduced the sentence to 8 years and 4 months. He was transferred to a Swedish prison in June 2009, and after serving two thirds of his sentence, was released in the late spring of 2011. One of Bektašević’s co-conspirators, Bajro Ikanović, who was sentenced to 8 years in prison for supplying Bektašević and Cesur with explosives, is also a free man. Press reports suggest that he was at the center of activities surrounding a recent Salafi gathering at Mount Igman (near Sarajevo) that took place in mid-June 2011. For more on this, see: “Ve-habije Nusreta Imamovića na skrivenom skupu na Igmanu,” Slobodna Bosna, 16 June 2011.

This motivation fits the three most common incentives for individuals to engage in acts of terrorism through which they either seek revenge, renown, or reaction (of the authorities). For more on this, see Louis Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006).

On Sunday, June 27, 2010, at approximately 5:00 a.m., an explosive device was activated next to the back entrance of the Bugojno police station, killing officer Tarik Ljubuškić and severely injuring officer Edina Hindić. Several others sustained minor injuries; both the station and nearby buildings sustained considerable material damage. Immediately after the blast, in a nearby parking lot, the police arrested Haris Čaušević claiming that he activated the device. Naser Palislamović, who is believed to be the mastermind behind the attack, was arrested shortly thereafter in Sarajevo,
For the last decade, domestic law enforcement agencies have been closely monitoring and recording the activities of individuals in the country who may pose a security risk. While the list of potential suspects may differ some from agency to agency, there is clearly an increased awareness as to the whereabouts and conduct of these individuals. A former high-ranking FMUP official interviewed for this study in June 2011 estimates that the number of such “individuals of interest” in the FBiH currently does not exceed 600, and that the combined total with those residing in the RS is around 1,000. Following the Bugojno bomb attack, the director of the Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH (OSA), Almir Džuvo, stated in July 2010 that “there are 3,000 potential terrorists in BiH.”

Police and intelligence sources reveal, though, that the activities of the Bosniak diaspora abroad remain more difficult to track. Thorough surveillance of radicalized Bosnians abroad would require close cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, as well as more clearly defined jurisdiction and coordination between domestic security services. The need for such cooperation is well warranted, as the so-called Global Salafi Jihad is a diasporal phenomenon. A recent study shows that some 84 percent of Salafi mujahideen living in diaspora around the world have joined the jihad. Of that number, some 87 percent have joined the movement while living in Western Europe.

The process of radicalization very often takes place in diaspora communities precisely “because radical Islamism itself does not come out of traditional Muslim societies, but rather is a manifestation of modern identity politics, a following a widespread police search. The third assailant, who was supposed to spray police and emergency workers with bursts of gunfire from an AK-47 assault rifle when they rushed to the scene of the explosion, “chickened out the night before the attack and withdrew from action,” said a police source familiar with the investigation. Čaušević allegedly confessed to the police that he activated the explosive, but he denied this in his first appearance before the Court. Both men are connected to Rijad Rustempašić and his group, also from Bugojno. Out of 398 pages of the “Indictment against Rustempašić and others,” 21 pages contain references to Palislamović. Three other individuals were arrested and charged as accomplices to Palislamović and Čaušević.

For more on this, see the EUPM in BiH “PPIO Daily Media Summary, 13 July 2010.”

According to estimates of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees from 2008, the total number of people originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina who live outside its borders is about 1,350,000 people, which is about 26% of the total Bosnian population. The leading emigrant-receiving countries are: the US, Germany, Croatia, Serbia, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden, Canada, and Australia. See: Bosnia and Herzegovina Migration Profile for the Year 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security, Immigration Sector (Sarajevo, 2010).

This link between terrorism and the diaspora predates “globalization” and is not specific to religion or Islam. History shows that Russian anarchists, the Irish Republican Army, the ETA, and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) were all diaspora-driven movements. For more on this, see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
byproduct of the modernization process itself.” As such, Islamic extremism is not a new challenge, but one that carries the classic earmarks of 20th-century extremist politics in general.17

As the case of Mirsad Bektašević demonstrates, Bosnia and Herzegovina has already been challenged by the results of diaspora radicalization. It was a combination of good fortune and good police work that eventually, in the fall of 2005, prevented Bektašević and his accompani es from carrying out a suicide bombing in Sarajevo. However, in recent years, more Bosnians abroad, namely in the US, have been indicted on terrorism-related charges, making the issue of a radicalized diaspora even more pressing.18

Though perhaps not totally reliable, official records show that the number of terrorism-related incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-September 11 period remained rather modest. These official numbers could reasonably be contested in some instances, in which cases were tried as acts of terrorism when they were in fact related to organized crime. The reverse is also true, that some cases prosecuted as criminal acts carried all the markings of terrorism-related activities.19

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18 Adis Medunjanin, 25, a Bosnian-born US citizen and resident of Queens, NY, was indicted on January 8, 2010 on charges of conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and receiving military-type training (in Pakistan) from a foreign terrorist organization, namely Al-Qaeda. Along with his two former classmates, Medunjanin was also charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property in the United States. Specifically, his group is charged with conspiring to conduct an attack on Manhattan subway lines planned for mid-September 2009. For more on this, see “Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (25 February 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2010/nyfo022510a.htm. On July 27, 2009, Anes Subasic (33), a naturalized US citizen and resident of North Carolina, was arrested and charged with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad. He is one of seven men who were simultaneously arrested near Raleigh, North Carolina on these charges. See: “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” Department of Justice Press Release, 27 July 2009. Bosnian-born Sulejman Talović (18) killed five bystanders and wounded four others at Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City on 12 February 2007, before being shot dead by police. Although Talović is often listed among “Muslim-American perpetrators or suspects in domestic terrorist attacks since 9/11,” there is no evidence that his shooting rampage was motivated by any extreme ideology. An FBI agent in charge of the investigation in his case stated that he had no reason to suspect it was an act of terrorism. See: “Trolley Square: A search for answers,” Salt Lake Tribune, 15 February 2007. For more on this case, also see Christopher Orlet, “Sulejmen the Mysterious,” American Spectator, 22 February 2007; Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting (Chapel Hill: UNC, 2011).

19 A bomb attack in a shopping mall (FIS) in Vitez, on October 9, 2008, in which a security guard was killed and another sustained life-threatening injuries, was prosecuted
As many scholars of terrorism know all too well, providing an all-encompassing profile of a typical, one-size-fits-all terrorist remains an elusive task simply because there is such a range of factors that eventually determine who becomes a terrorist and why. However, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina—based on investigation and prosecution data from the past decade—we can draw with some degree of certainty a profile of persons prone to joining mostly homegrown, militant Islamist groups and engaging in acts of violence. In the years following the Dayton Peace Accords, terrorist acts were most commonly perpetrated by foreign mujahideen, of whom many already had a history of similar engagement elsewhere. More recently, individuals involved in or associated with terrorism-related activities have overwhelmingly been Bosnian nationals.20

Even a cursory look at court files provides enough evidence to support an emerging profile of recent terrorist suspects in Bosnia. They typically exhibit the following characteristics: they are economically deprived and socially marginalized; they often come from dysfunctional families; they are poorly educated; they are usually without permanent employment or any employment whatsoever; many have a prior criminal record, ranging from domestic violence to theft and illegal possession of firearms; they are often psychologically troubled and are usually between the ages of 20 and 35. Their recruitment before the Court of BiH as an act of terrorism. For more, see the cases of Amir Ibrăhimi (X-K-08/591-2) and Suvad Đidić (X-K-08/591-1). However, police sources familiar with the case claim that there was no political motive behind the attack. “It was a “warning message” to the owner of the mall who had repeatedly refused to allow his supply trucks to be used for the smuggling of illegal drugs,” said a high-ranking FMUP official in an interview for this study. A recent bomb attack in Zenica on April 11, 2011, which caused minor damage to a car carrying two HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union of BiH) officials who remained unharmed, probably had more to do with economic or personal motives than terrorism, and was also a case of a mistaken identity, according to a high-ranking FMUP police official with investigative knowledge of both cases. The 2002 Christmas Eve triple murder of a Croat returnee family near Konjic by Muamer Topalović, an individual said to be closely connected to the local branches of the al-Furqan charity organization and Active Islamic Youth, was prosecuted as a hate crime, although it carried all the markings of a lone-wolf terrorist attack, similar to the November 2005 Fort Hood shooting in the US. However, the Prosecutor's Office made a concerted effort to relieve both organizations of any responsibility for Topalovic’s actions and motives. Al-Qaeda-associated organization al-Furqan was registered in BiH in September of 1997 as “Citizens’ Association for Support and Prevention of Lies – Furqan.” The BiH authorities banned the organization in November 2002. In November 2009, US Major Nidal Malik Hasan, an army psychiatrist, went on another at Fort Hood military base in Texas, killing 13 and wounding 32 at a medical facility.

20 The Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) of BiH claims that currently, out of some 3,000 individuals registered in the country as “potential terrorists,” only 3 to 4 percent are foreign born. For more on this, see the EUPM in BiH, “PPIO Daily Media Summary,” 13 July 2010.
most commonly occurs through social networks – by family members and/or friends (a “bunch of guys”), while radicalization typically occurs through close and personal contact with other members of the group or a person of authority, as well as through online and media platforms.

In short, experience demonstrates that these individuals have come from spontaneously self-organized and unaffiliated groups, made up of trusted friends, where social bonds precede ideological commitment. They have been radicalized collectively, from the bottom up, often simply by acquiring the beliefs of their peers. The dynamics of such dense social networks promotes in-group loyalty and a sense of kinship that leads to self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause. These traits were particularly evident in both Bugojno cases (Rustempašić and Čaušević) in 2009 and 2010.21

Current Structure of the Salafi Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The global Salafi movement has never been homogenous. It is comprised of many different and sometimes rival groups. Gradually, this lack of cohesion was also apparent in the Bosnian Salafi community. Once the core leadership of the el-Mujahid Unit was sidelined by the government, remaining mujahideen and their Bosniak disciples began to fragment.

Rather than a theological dispute, the breakup of the Bosnian Salafi movement was mainly due to competing leadership ambitions and increasingly limited access to the financial resources that had funded their operations before September 11. A number of different Salafi groups emerged to public view in the process. They were mostly autonomous or loosely linked at best, often opposed, and sometimes confronted.

Initially, it was the Active Islamic Youth (Aktivna islamska omladina – AIO), a group of former Bosniak members of the el-Mujahid Unit, and their magazine SAFF that became the chief purveyors of Salafi doctrine. For almost a decade, the AIO was engaged in awakening Bosniaks to original Islamic teachings while rejecting “novelties” in Islam, which AIO attributed to ignorance resulting from

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21 This pattern, however, is not uniquely Bosnian – it closely mirrors psychological and sociological profiling proposed by Michael Taarnby, Gyorgy Lederer, and Marc Sageman, respectively. Namely, friendship-kinship- or discipleship-based groups of previously introverted, isolated, frustrated, alienated, “born-again” Muslims, who are spiritually comforted by socializing with each other. Emotionally conditioned and mentally manipulated by their ringleaders, the recruits pledge allegiance to them and to an imaginary world community (Umma), finding their purpose in life, their place in history, and the vanguard of Jihad against the common enemies they share with God. Martyrdom may be viewed as the ultimate reward, the promise of personal fulfillment and the restoration of dignity. See: Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives, Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, Submitted 14 January 2005; Gyorgy Lederer, Countering Islamist Radicals in Eastern Europe, CSRC discussion paper 05/42, September 2005; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century.
decades of Communist repression. People associated with the organization were involved in a number of public protests and often used inflammatory rhetoric against other ethnic groups as well as Muslims who did not share their views. In the wake of a post-September 11 police crackdown on Saudi and Middle Eastern charities operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the AIO came under close scrutiny by domestic and international law enforcement agencies. Their premises were raided several times and their finances thoroughly audited. As a result, the influx of money received by the organization from abroad severely dropped off, forcing AIO leadership to close down because of a lack of funds in the fall of 2006.

Over time, other Salafi groups have come to light as well, both in Bosnia and among the Bosnian diaspora. A recent study, confirmed by interviews with both Bosnian and foreign intelligence sources, indicates that the Bosnian Salafi movement is currently comprised of at least three main streams, differing mostly in their attitudes toward the official Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as toward terrorism, namely the global jihadi movement.22

One of three significant rogue groups is led by Nusret Imamović and is based in Gornja Maoča, in Northeastern Bosnia. The group—hostile toward the Islamic Community, which it considers apostate and corrupt—is the fastest-growing in both Bosnia and the diaspora, and is said to be vehemently opposed to the concepts of secular state, democracy, free elections, and any rule of law that is not based in Sharia. Imamović himself has made numerous statements in support of the global jihadi movement.23

The second largest of these groups is led by Muhamed Porča, a Vienna-based cleric usually associated with the al-Tawhid mosque in the Austrian capital’s 12th Bezirk (District).24 Members of this group argue that only their

22 For more on this, see Juan Carlos Antunez, “Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Its Links to International Terrorism” (paper presented at the Islam in South East Europe Forum, 2008), available on line at http://iseef.net.

23 A high-ranking Bosnian intelligence officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, maintains that over the last two years Imamović’s group has been growing, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in neighboring Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, as well as in Slovenia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and other Western European countries. According to this source, his followers are said to be well organized and disciplined, while Imamovic’s leadership and religious authority remain undisputed. He is the only one in the group with an exclusive right to interpret the Koran and Sharia, and controls the distribution of money. Imamovic’s sermons and other religious instructions, as well as news, a download zone – with audio and video content, and online forum and chat rooms are all featured on the group’s website, called Put vjernika (Path of Believers), http://www.putvjernika.com.

24 After his studies in Saudi Arabia, Porča arrived in Austria in 1993 to serve as an imam. From the moment he was denied a job at Sarajevo’s Faculty of Islamic Studies upon his return to BiH, Porča started developing the idea of creating an Islamic community parallel to the official one led by Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić. Porča has not succeeded in this, but he has managed to strengthen the Wahhabi movement, especially in the Bosnian diaspora and to an unprecedented level. Bosnian police sources
communities—in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Serbia, Montenegro, and elsewhere—are following what they refer to as “authentic Islam.” Porča made a name for himself when he broke off ties with the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007. He has been trying ever since to exert influence on Salafi groups like that of Nusret Imamović, which, disgusted by a world rife with what they see as overwhelming apostasy, ignorance, and corruption, have instead embraced seclusion.

The third and most extreme Bosnian Salafi group is also operating out of Austria. It is led by Vienna-born Nedžad Balkan (a.k.a. Ebu Muhammed), who’s parents emigrated from Sandžak, a Muslim-dominated region in Serbia. Balkan is believed to be a religious authority for the Vienna-based Kelimetul Haqq (Word of Truth)—an organization of Bosnian and Serbian Muslims from Sandžak—and an inspirational force for several radical groups in Bosnia and Serbia. His activities are focused around the Sahaba Mosque in Vienna’s 7th District and are featured on a number of websites, of which www.kelimetul-haqq.org and www.el-tewhid.com are the best known. The content of both sites reveals much resentment toward the official Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, referred to in a series of video postings as the “un-Islamic Community.” These postings also reflect the group’s support of violence not only against “infidels,” but also against other Muslims who do not share its worldview. Legitimization of such violence is what has led some experts to categorize Balkan’s Salafi community as a Takfiri group, aligned with the Al-Takfir w'al-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus) movement.

Intelligence sources maintain that Balkan’s influence in Bosnia itself is rather limited, and they point to two very small groups of his followers in Sarajevo and Donji Vakuf (Central Bosnia), with between just ten and fifteen members in each.

The fragmentation of the Bosnian Salafi movement also leaves room for a number of smaller, rather isolated groups that do not subscribe to any par-

estimate that Porča has been pocketing a considerable income over the years from selling audio and video material with religious, but often disturbingly violent, content. These CDs and DVDs are being sold in BiH and abroad, and are said to generate a revenue of some 2 million KM (around 1 million euro) annually.

25 The introduction to Kelimetul Haqq’s homepage reads: “Our goal is to invite people into a pure monotheism (Tawhid), to worship only Allah the Almighty, and nobody and nothing except Him.”

26 Al-Takfir w'al-Hijra is the group known for perpetrating violence against those it considers kufar (heretics), including Arabs and Muslims whom Takfiris do not consider to be living in accordance with true Islam. For more on this, see Joshua L. Gleis, “National Security Implications of Al Takfir Wal Hijra,” Al-Naklah: The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Article 3, Spring 2005.

27 From an interview with a Bosnian intelligence expert who wished to remain anonymous.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism 1996-2011

Salafi communities in Bosnia are almost always secluded and are scattered widely throughout the country. Some analysts find it disturbing that their settlements are often in the vicinity of inter-entity borders and, in some instances, arms depots. While this could be interpreted as strategic positioning in case of another conflict, for which the Salafi communities might serve as a Bosniak vanguard against invading Serb forces, it also reflects the fact that many villages along the former frontline (now the inter-entity border) were devastated to such an extent that their original owners simply decided to sell them (for instance, in Bočinja and Gornja Maoča). The Salafis turned out to be the highest, and most probably only, bidders. Their choice of remote and isolated areas for the establishment of settlements is also stipulated by their belief that true Muslims who live in an apostate state should resort to Hijra – a withdrawal (or exodus) from the surrounding (infidel) world, in the example of the prophet Muhammad and his followers, who moved from Mecca to Medina in 622 to establish the first Islamic state.

Despite a number of underlying differences, all Bosnian Salafi groups share some common traits that are not exclusive to Islamic organizations. As groups, they exhibit the tendency of some traditional religious communities to isolate themselves from their fellow believers and to define the sacred community in terms of its disciplined opposition to non-believers and apathetic believers alike. This pattern is inherent to fundamentalism within practically every faith tradition and these movements share certain traits despite differences in theological doctrine, the size or social composition of the group, their scope of influence, or their propensity to violence. However, not all fundamentalist groups initiate or condone violence, whether it is turned inward (mass suicide) or outward (terrorism).

Extremism in fundamentalist religious movements is usually linked to group-wide regression, which is exhibited by some of the following characteristics; these characteristics are not displayed by all fundamentalist religious groups and will vary according to the extent of the regression.

Regressed fundamentalist groups commonly have: a supreme leader who is also the sole interpreter of divine text; an absolute belief in their possession of the “true” divine text and/or rule; coexisting paradoxical feelings of victimization and omnipotence; psychological (and sometimes physical) barricades between the group and the rest of the world; an expectation of threat or danger from people and things outside the group’s borders; altered gender, family, child-rearing, and sexual norms, often including the degradation of women; a changed shared morality, which may eventually make allowances for the destruction of monuments, buildings, or other symbols perceived as threatening.

to the group’s beliefs; and they may have attempted mass suicide or mass mur-
der in order to enhance or protect their group identity.29

There is little if anything that is unique to the organizational and behavioral
development of the various Salafi groups operating in Bosnia and among the
Bosnian diaspora – they are simply displaying the well-known operational pat-
terns of many fundamentalist religious groups.

It is also worth noting that no Bosnian Salafi faction has thus far forcefully
imposed its leadership on any other group. In recent months, however, there
has been a concerted effort by a former religious leader of the el-Mujahid Unit,
Imad el-Misri, an Egyptian cleric and convicted terrorist, to exert his influ-
ence.30 His interviews, sermons, and lectures on Islam suddenly began appear-
ing in the spring of 2011 on websites belonging to a number of different Bos-
nian Salafi groups, but also on YouTube. The content of el-Misri’s messages is
largely educational and instructive, and he stops short of advocating or inciting
ideological confrontation or violence of any kind. Sources with inside knowl-
edge claim that these messages have been skillfully crafted to avoid creating
controversy while underlining el-Misri’s religious authority. More importantly,
his messages seem to be designed to gain popular support, hinting at leader-
ship ambitions. Bosnian law enforcement officials interviewed for this study
were unable to confirm reports that el-Misri visited Bosnia in recent months,
nor could they state for the record whether there is a standing court order pro-
hibiting him from entering the country.31

29 For more on this, see Vamik D. Volk, “Some Observations on Religious Funda-
mentalism and the Taliban,” available at www.vamikvolkan.com (accessed 18 June
2011).

30 During the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, Imad el-Misri, who like many foreign fighters
had multiple identities (Eslam Durmo, Osama Fargallah, Al Hussein Helmi Arman
Ahmed, and more), was the main ideological authority of the el-Mujahid Unit. He or-
ganized a system of 19 madrasas for an obligatory 40-day religious course, which by
rule preceded the recruitment and military training of young Bosniaks into the el-
Mujahid Unit. He is the author of a booklet entitled, The Understandings We Need To
Correct, in which he criticized local Bosnian perceptions of Islam and suggested that a
number of these perceptions be changed in accordance with Salafi teachings. In 1996,
following the Dayton Peace Accords—to which the mujahideen community was
strongly opposed—El-Misri authored another booklet called, Plan for the Destruction
of Islam and Muslims in Recent Times. In it, he expressed his disgust toward the treaty
that ended the war: “This is not peace, this is humiliation...a conspiracy to tear down
Islam and destroy Muslims ... a new occupation.” His arrest on a road trip in Herzego-
vina on July 18, 2001, and subsequent deportation to Egypt, where he had been in-
dicted for his alleged involvement in an earlier terrorist attack, caused a dramatic
public outcry from his followers. For more on this, see Esad Hećimović, “Ljeto kad su
hapsili mudžahedine,” BH Dani, No. 222 (9 September 2001).

31 A high-ranking police source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that the
confusion surrounding El-Misri’s extradition to Egypt in 2001—caused by overlap-
ping jurisdiction and the involvement of domestic law enforcement agencies in the
case—make it impossible to verify whether he was actually banned from entering
Mechanisms of Terrorism Prevention

Bosnia and Herzegovina has adapted its legal norms to combat terrorism in accordance with relevant international standards and recommendations. Key UN Resolutions on international terrorism have been embodied in the country’s Criminal Code, which also specifically addresses a number of terrorism-related criminal offenses. In 2010, the Criminal Code was amended with new articles that criminalized support of terrorism through financing, recruiting, training, public abetting, and establishment of a terrorist group. Further, the Council of Ministers adopted a National Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2010-2013. Responsibility for the implementation of this strategy is divided among the police in both entities, and by umbrella organizations such as the state Ministry of Security, State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), and the Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSA), as well as by the Task Force for the Fight Against Terrorism and Strengthening of Capacities for the Fight Against Terrorism, which has been operating under the leadership of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the supervision of the Ministry of Security.32

In the wake of the Bugojno terrorist attack in June 2010, however, it became obvious that a lack of clarity as to the division of responsibilities between various law enforcement agencies has undermined terrorism prevention efforts. Most notably, during an emergency session of the Parliamentary Commission on Defense and Security in July 2010, directors of agencies central to the task of combating and preventing terrorism complained that political obstacles and inadequate legal infrastructure hamper their counterterrorism efforts. They warned that without a law on terrorism prevention, the police and prosecutor’s office would be prevented from taking decisive pre-emptive measures, forced to act only after a terrorist act has been committed.33 More than a year later not much has been done to address these concerns. On the contrary, one could argue that the capacity to effectively combat terrorism has weakened.

SIPA, the law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for counterterrorism operations, remains rather limited in its practical capacity to fill that role. The Counterterrorism Division of the Federation Police (FMUP) has been (temporarily) reduced from nine to just four officers. Also, the decision to appoint eight FMUP terrorism investigators to cantonal detachments, as terrorism-related activities fall strictly within the jurisdiction of the FMUP, is still on hold as of this writing. Severe spending restrictions are constraining even rou-
tine operations of the Counterterrorism Division, with overnight stays in more remote areas of the Federation rarely permitted and detectives expected to drive round trip to such destinations in the same day. Interviews with key law enforcement officials revealed that these financial and operational constraints are being imposed across the board.

In addition, the development of a comprehensive understanding of terrorist threats and an effective counterterrorism strategy has been obfuscated by persistent politicization of the issue of terrorism. “Terrorism” is a pejorative term, but it is also a political label, with intrinsically negative connotations that are generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would prefer to marginalize. Labeling any (identity-based) group with terrorist intentions, in essence, delegitimizes its political goals. A relentless campaign to attach just such a label to Muslims in general, and Bosniaks in particular, has been in ongoing in Bosnia for over a decade. Originating predominantly from political elites and media in Republika Srpska, and especially from the self-proclaimed “Team of Experts for Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime in Southeastern Europe,” this campaign is aimed at entrenching a simple yet untenable logic: All terrorists are Wahhabis; Bosniaks are mostly Wahhabis; hence, most Bosniaks are terrorists.

For a variety of reasons, some international media and a number of academics have, over time, embraced this simplistic equation uncritically. A number of news reports and academic studies published since 2001 have portrayed Bosnia and Herzegovina as the “birthplace of Al-Qaeda,” as well as its “recruitment center and logistics base,” “the staging ground and springboard for operations in Europe,” and the place where “white Muslims are recruited” for the waging of global jihad. The “Bosnian terrorist link” was also duly noted in a number of international incidents, from the November 2008 Mumbai attack, to the alleged 2009 assassination attempt on Bolivian President Evo Morales. It is quite clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina is indeed vulnerable to the threats of both internal and transnational terrorism, but such a threat is no greater than that in other European countries. Statistically, Bosnia has actually ranked for many years among those countries with the lowest recorded number of terrorism-related incidents. Unsubstantiated allegations of an in-

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34 In the words of leading terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, “what is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.” As quoted in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 32.


36 A recently published, related study concludes that “the terrorism phenomenon in Bosnia and Herzegovina is no more developed nor is the risk of terror attacks any greater than that in many other parts of the world.” For more on this, see: Juan Carlos
creased terrorism threat in Bosnia, based on preposterous claim that some 100,000 Wahhabis reside in the country, are not aimed at deterring such a threat but rather at pigeonholing Bosniaks as terrorists and delegitimating their political aims. The “Wahhabis are terrorists” card has been played by the media and by Bosnian Serb elite whenever critical political processes have been underway in the country (from police reform through Constitutional amendments, to general and local elections, and during consideration of a referendum on the judiciary).

In response, the Bosniak “side,” and particularly the official Islamic Community, has descended into default denial of any security threat that may be posed by the presence of dangerous individuals and ideologies associated with Islam, calling all such references hostile and Islamophobic. The Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić has repeatedly argued that the Islamic Community should not interfere with freedom of faith of its congregation or act as some kind of religious police.

Consequently, law enforcement officials have been left to balance between two opposing, and equally flawed, perceptions – and they have adjusted their analysis and reaction to the terrorism threat to suit the outcomes desired by their respective political elite. In the words of one of the country’s leading law enforcement officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, the sole reason there have not been more terrorist attacks in Bosnia to date is due to the fact that “we’ve had more luck than brains.”

It is noteworthy that the most radical, extreme, or militant movements, regardless of underlying ideology or specific worldview, are small and unrepresentative, and do not enjoy popular support. Due to their secretive organizational character and the extent to which they harbor distaste for the wider society, such groups can be, and usually are, violent and dangerous. However, the

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37 For more on this, see: S. Mišlenović, “Političari ćute, a vehabije mute,” Večernje novosti, 29 January 2011; “Sve više islamskih frakcija u BiH, vehabije najopasnije,” Srna, 21 December 2010; ‘Po Bosni vršlja 100.000 vehabija,” Vesti Online, 3 April 2010. The allegation that some 100,000 Wahhabis reside in BiH is not only unsubstantiated and harmful for the image of the country, but could eventually hamper the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts, as it could drive fundamental changes to the current strategy for combating terrorism. If amended to reflect the assessment that there are tens of thousands instead of a few dozen or a few hundred possible terrorists, a new strategy could call for measures that are not on balance with the actual threat, and are as such ineffective and eventually counterproductive.

38 Over the years, media in Banja Luka has played a major role in “discovering” Wahhabis, mostly in the Bosniak returnee communities in Republika Srpska. Their “investigative reports,” usually written in a manner reminiscent of the style employed by Communist State Security Services (SDB) for propagandist purposes in the former Yugoslavia, have habitually published the names of Bosniaks suspected of being Wahhabis, or of concealing weapons and stashing ammunition and explosives. Interestingly, authorities in the RS, who usually seem eager to support these allegation in their statements to the press, have never prosecuted a single terrorism-related case.
real empowerment of these groups and their opportunity to have visible impact on a society comes when political elites exploit them in pursuit of their own agendas.39 Opportunities for such exploitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are rather substantial since the same political elites, through formal and informal ties, exert control over both law enforcement agencies and some militant groups.

The country will need to do better than just “more luck than brains” to deal effectively with a variety of political and security challenges which may lead to terrorism or violence as a way to address underlying internal disputes. Ongoing leadership challenges within the SDA, forthcoming elections for the new Grand Mufti of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (scheduled for the fall of 2012)—with the Mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, one of the frontrunners—and persistent efforts by RS authorities to undermine the viability of state structures and the country as a whole, are just some of the most concrete challenges that could lead extreme groups or individuals to be incited, spontaneously or premeditatedly, to violence.40

39 It is precisely in such circumstances that various militant Islamist groups have been used as pawns in internal or international disputes when political elites or ruling establishments have not been able to afford to be seen as associated with or involved in open confrontations. The most notable cases have been in Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the domestic front, and in Pakistan, where groups such as the Taliban and Laskhar-e-Taiba have been saddled with the country’s foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and Kashmir/India.

40 The mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, is no stranger to controversies caused by contested leadership ambitions and the use of Wahhabi/Salafi groups in conflict between the two rivaling Islamic Communities in Serbia. A senior Western diplomat interviewed for this study warned that Zukorlić’s election to Grand Mufti could cause a domino effect in which incumbent Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić could instigate a leadership challenge in the SDA to take control of the party himself. As a number of domestic and international surveys have indicated over the past decade, Mustafa Cerić has featured as the single most influential Bosniak political leader. Cerić has never distanced himself from such a perception, but on the contrary, has used every opportunity to reinforce it and to exert his political influence. A scenario in which Zukorlić would take the reins of the Islamic Community, and Cerić of the SDA, in exchange for mutual support, would provide Bosniak political elite with leverage in its dealings with authorities in the Republika Srpska (RS) and Serbia. Particularly with regard to possible support that the secessionist politics of RS leadership may receive from Belgrade. According to our source, the forceful introduction of Muamer Zukorlić on to the Bosnian political and religious scene is believed to send a clear message to the government in Belgrade: “Should you decide to support secession of the Republika Srpska, we are going to create a living hell for you in Sandžak.” In short, there is a calculated expectation that the Zukorlić-Cerić axis could finally end the reactive attitude of Bosniak political elite, particularly vis-à-vis Banja Luka, and transform it into a more engaged, proactive attempt at safeguarding the survival of BiH, but also of the important role that Bosniaks should play in it. Whether or not Bosniaks have the real ability to create just such havoc in Sandžak remains debatable, but the mere willingness to play the “Sandžak card,” should it become necessary, introduces new dynam-
Effective deterrents remain few, while enablers of terrorism and political violence are many. They include a weak (failing) state, an abundance of readily available arms and ammunition, widespread corruption, weak border controls, and the mobilization of unchallenged ideologies.41

A continued obsession with Islamism as the single most important ideological catalyst of contemporary terrorism is as cognitively limited as it is strategically shortsighted. Such myopia diverts focus from the possibility of other dangerous security challenges. As the recent mass shooting in Norway shows, individuals capable of murdering large numbers of innocent people may very well reside in many communities. What triggers them cannot be predicted. Bosnia and Herzegovina—with its laundry list of unresolved disputes, political agendas, and security inadequacies—has a full spectrum of worrying potential triggers for violence which does not allow them to go unaddressed for very much longer.

41 On the eve of the first anniversary of the Bugojno bombing, June 26, 2011, the local police force was on alert in response to reports that someone had broken into an ammunition depot in the town of Vitez in Central Bosnia and stolen unspecified quantities of explosives and detonators. In expectation of another retaliatory attack, additional police reinforcement was deployed, but in the end nothing happened. The stolen explosives have never been recovered. The arms depot in Bugojno, Binas, could also provide enough logistics to mount a significant terrorist attack – it houses, among other material, more than 300,000 hand-grenades. “In addition, the facility is virtually unguarded,” said an expert interviewed for this study. See also: “Iz magacina firme Vitezit ukraden eksploziv,” Srna, 26 June 2011.
Chapter 14

International Terrorism and International Tourism ¹

Alex P. Schmid ²

When people are concerned about terrorism they prefer simple answers so that they can decide for themselves “Will I be next?” or “Will I be safe?” Complex answers are not welcome, perhaps because we are not good at handling complexity just as we are not good at estimating probabilities of risks. While we live in risk societies, our assessment of risks is often intuitive and primitive. The risk of being killed in a terrorist attack aboard an American aircraft, for instance, is only one in 25 Million – fifty times smaller than being killed in any given year by lightning.³ We develop models to reduce the complexity of the world to something we can mentally handle. Yet we should not mix up models of reality with the reality itself.

When we look at Terrorism and Tourism we look at two phenomena that are complex in their own right and even more so when put together. Tourism can refer to religious tourism, heritage tourism, sport and adventure tourism, recreational tourism, mass tourism, eco-tourism and many more varieties. Terrorism can refer to religious terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, left- or right wing terrorism, lone wolf or solo terrorism, narco-terrorism, single issue terrorism, vigilante terrorism, regime terrorism and more. On top of that, terrorism is often confused with other forms of political violence, ranging from sabotage and arson to violent demonstrations and assassination.

Tourism might involve land- and sea-travelling, cruises and safaris, mountain tracking in Nepal or sun-bathing in Kenya – it comes in many forms. For some countries and regions tourism is (or was until recently) one of the pri-

¹ The present text is based on a presentation at an ESRC Research Seminar on “Terrorism and the Complexity of Soft Targets: The Case of the Tourism Industry” held at the Conference Centre Oxford, 10 March 2010.

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mary sources of income (e.g. Egypt, Thailand, Bali in Indonesia), for others it is marginal. However, worldwide tourism and travel as a whole are substantial industries, accounting for more than 7 percent of the world’s total workforce and contributing over 8 percent of global GDP in 2009.\(^4\) In 2009 there were 880 million international tourist arrivals – a 4% drop compared to the previous year. Already at the time of 9/11, tourism and travel were with 3.6 trillion dollars the world’s largest industry, employing every 12\(^{th}\) worker in the world.\(^5\) It is also one of the fastest growing sectors of the world economy.\(^6\) At the same time it is also one of the most volatile and vulnerable industries – due to shifting consumer tastes, economic cycles, domestic political instability as well as shocks caused by domestic and international terrorism.\(^7\)

The actors and key stakeholders involved are the terrorists themselves, the tourists, the tour operators, hotel detectives, tourist guides, insurance companies, airline operators and many more, including the media.

It is not easy to say something meaningful about worldwide phenomena like terrorism and tourism in their combination without sticking to generalities or getting lost in details of individual cases. In this article, I shall try to review some empirical research.

First we need to look at the logic of terrorist attacks on tourists and tourist facilities. If we look at the categories of targets chosen by terrorists, civilians are prominent – that is what makes terrorism different from much of warfare and from some other forms of political violence. Civilians are attacked for a variety of reasons such as:

1. They are easy targets, since, as foreigners, they generally lack situational awareness;
2. Tourists are usually concentrated in tourist resorts, at sightseeing points; they often travel in groups along well-known routes which makes them easy to ambush;
3. They are usually representatives of a wider group—often seen as rich, white Western elites—attacking some of them can scare the rest of them;
4. They are a source of revenue for the local regime which is often the main enemy of the terrorists;

5. When kidnapped and taken hostage, tourists are a source of ransom money and an instrument to blackmail both local and foreign governments concerned about their citizens’ safety and security;

6. Tourists from certain countries (e.g. Israel) can serve as substitute target, as it is easier to hit them abroad than at home.

For the terrorists, tourists are often unimportant in themselves but important to convey messages to third parties. Such messages might include the following:

1. Your government cannot protect you all the time everywhere;
2. We can strike at places and times of our own choosing and are strong;
3. You are not welcome here since you support the local regime.

To convey such messages explicitly or implicitly, it does not really matter which individual tourist or which group is targeted, or even where they are targeted, as long as an attack on them can be associated, directly through the location or indirectly through a constructed message, with the enemies of the terrorists. The media and the Internet allow the terrorists to link an attack in country A to a government in country B so that the location of the attack becomes of secondary importance. In other words, there can be a certain substitution of targets without detracting from the message to be conveyed with an attack.

Tourists can be hit at sightseeing points—like Luxor—en route in a bus, train or plane or in hotels. Hotel attacks have increased in recent years: while there were major attacks against 30 hotels in 15 different countries in the eight years before 9/11, there were more than twice as many attacks—62—in the eight years after 9/11 in twenty different countries. The number of fatalities increased six and a half times in the eight years after 9/11 compared to the previous eight years while the number of injured increased six times in comparison. The fact that most hotel windows still do not have a protective film that prevents glass from becoming shrapnel has increased the number of casualties.

Hotels are not only extreme soft targets. Although tourists in hotels are almost by definition civilians and non-combatants, some religious terrorists consider hotels licit targets. As one author put it:

“For jihadists, the ideological justifications for attacking hotels are numerous. In many countries with heavy militant presences, large hotels are among the most

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8 In this view, I strongly disagree with authors like H. Aziz who argues that “...violence is a reaction to irresponsible tourism development,” holding that, with regard to attacks on tourists in Egypt, “The tourism industry, the government, the developers and the tourists are as responsible for this undesirable situation as the Muslim groups.” See H. Aziz, “Understanding attacks on tourists in Egypt,” Tourism Management 16:2 (March 1995): 91-95.

prominent symbols of Western culture – especially recognized Western hotel chains such as JW Marriott, Hilton, InterContinental and Radisson. The jihadists and their supporters view hotel attacks as in keeping with the Koranic injunction of prohibiting vice and commanding virtue: Hotels are places where men and women mix freely, and guests can consume alcohol, dance, and engage in fornication and adultery. Jihadists might also see an attack on a large hotel as a strike against a corrupt elite enjoying life at the expense of the impoverished majority.” 10

Hotels are, as it were, sitting ducks. They can usually be accessed from several sides, some of those who pass through the door are guests, others are visitors and rarely are people and luggage thoroughly checked. Terrorists can check in a hotel a couple of days before they strike and carry out their operation from their hotel room. At the same time, in most hotels taxis and catering vehicles can approach hotel lobbies and other entrances without prior checks at an outside perimeter. Target hardening is costly; it scares off not only terrorists but also many tourists who do not like the inconveniences caused by security checks and in the end might feel insecure rather than secure by visible security measures, knowing that a particular hotel is considered a possible target. The choice between convenience and security is too often decided in favor of convenience, which is also helped by cost considerations. What is true for hotels is often also true for airline companies. While a national airline carrier like El Al might be able to invest almost one third of its budget on security measures, commercial airlines cannot do so without pricing themselves out of the market.

**What Do We Know about Terrorism and Tourism?**

A few things stand out from research:

Tourists are targets of terrorists but they are not the most frequent targets, although they are among the more prominent ones. What is fresh on our minds are some high-profile attacks like those in November 2008 in Mumbai on the Taj Mahal Palace and Oberoi Trident hotels – attacks that killed 71 people and wounded more than 200 people, half of them international visitors. 11 Yet if we look at statistics of terrorist incidents the picture is less frightening.

The US government’s World Incident Tracking System recorded, for the period 2004 – mid-2009 a total 77 incidents where tourists were involved. These incidents cost the lives of 196 people while another 808 persons were injured and 94 were taken hostage—all told 1,098 victims resulted from these 77 incidents—that is, on the average between two and three people got killed and between eleven and twelve got injured. These incidents took place in only 10 percent of all countries: Nepal, India, Turkey, Thailand, Afghanistan, Spain, Myan-

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10 Ibid., p.4.
mar, France, Colombia, Egypt, Yemen, Bolivia, Israel, Jordan, Ecuador, Morocco, Mauretania, Indonesia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{12}

The Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland lists, for the much longer period from 1970 to 2007, 365 incidents involving tourists.\textsuperscript{13} That is about ten incidents per year. Considering the fact that the GTD records over 82,000 domestic and international incidents, that is not that much – only 0.22 percent of the total.

However, the impact of single incidents—let alone campaigns of terrorism on tourism—can be enormous. Take Egypt, between 1992 and 1997: 96 foreign tourists were killed in those six years of which 58 were killed in one single incident in Luxor.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Attacks on Tourists, 1992–1997 in Egypt}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
October 1992: British nurse killed in bus attack near Cairo. \\
February 1993: Two tourists (one French and one American) killed outside a Cairo hotel. \\
October 1993: One US and one French tourist killed outside a Cairo hotel. \\
March 1994: One German tourist killed on a Nile cruise boat. \\
September 1995: Two Germans and two Egyptians killed in the Red Sea resort city of Hurghada. \\
October 1995: One Briton killed and one wounded with one Egyptian killed and five wounded in an attack on a tourist mini-van in the Nile Valley. \\
April 1996: Eighteen Greek tourists killed and sixteen wounded in an attack on a tourist Coach near the Pyramids at Giza. It is believed the Greeks were incorrectly assumed by their attackers to have been Israelis. \\
September 1997: Ten German tourists killed in an attack outside the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. \\
November 1997: Fifty-eight tourists massacred in the area of the Luxor Temple. Victims of this worst massacre of tourists in Egypt during the 1990s included French, Swiss, British and Japanese nationals. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

These attacks cost Egypt billions of dollars in tourism income. Yet the biggest massacre—the one in Luxor instigated by Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyy—was also the last mass casualty disaster in Egypt for almost than ten years. The dependency of the Egyptian population on tourism meant that the terrorists were losing the support of the same people they claimed to represent. In other words, the tactics of killing tourists became self-defeating and the terrorist group re-

\textsuperscript{13} Global Terrorism Database, START, University of Maryland, accessed 27 February 2010.
sponsible for it split as a consequence, disagreeing on tactics. The government increased security at tourist sites—in 1997 there had been only one guard and three policemen at Luxor—and that contributed to the fact that tourism in 1999 was already back on the 1997 level. Nevertheless, one truth sticks out above all others regarding the relationship between tourism and terrorism: such political violence deters tourism. One study by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, focusing on the effect of terrorism on tourism in Spain in the period 1970–1988 found that a typical incident scared away over 140,000 tourists when all monthly impacts were combined.14

The disruption of tourism and travel due to acts of terrorism can be severe. After 9/11 both airline passenger loads and hotel occupancy in the United States declined for several months by 50% and more in some regions.15 Yet the magnitude and duration of such a downturn is dependent on various factors like the severity and frequency of terrorist attacks. Some existing evidence indicates that frequent attacks have a more profound effect on tourist arrivals or rather, the decline thereof, than the severity of attacks. If attacks are perceived as unique events rather than as part of a sustained campaign, tourists are more likely to come back.16 The two Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, while severely damaging tourism (arrivals dropped by about 25 percent in 2003 and by 20 percent during the first six months in 200617) were less damaging than prolonged campaigns of terrorism as we saw in places like Lebanon or Sri Lanka.

Tourists, as opposed to business travelers, can easily switch from one destination to another. For instance, after 9/11 fewer Americans went abroad to tourist destinations while some domestic and regional destinations like Hawaii experienced a temporary upsurge in the period after 9/11.18 Customers of tourist products are flexible while tourist destinations—except for cruise

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ships—cannot move.\textsuperscript{19} Terrorist attacks in one tourist destination can have spill-over effects on a whole (sub-) region and damage the tourist industry of an entire region as we saw in the mid-1980s in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{20}

**What Can Be Done?**

There are two basic strategies that tourism managers and Ministries of Tourism can pursue: they can try to improve the security situation at their destination or they can try to change the security perception among tourists and tour operators about their destination.\textsuperscript{21} Since it is easier and less costly to change perceptions than to change reality, the inclination will be to go for the former. It is a well-known fact that tour operators can push certain destinations through pricing policies and advertisement campaigns.\textsuperscript{22} However, they do not want to send their customers to their deaths. Tour operators usually can switch from one destination to another while those in local tourist industries at a dangerous destination cannot.

While the local tourism industry makes investments to increase its attractiveness for tourists and expects that the profits will surpass their investment, the expenditures for public safety are largely borne by the government. If all goes well the government receives taxes to compensate it for the extra costs of law enforcement.\textsuperscript{23} If things do not go well and the tourist industry is hard hit, governments are often also expected to step in and help. That can take several forms, e.g. with sector-specific targeted subsidies and tax reductions (as happened after 9/11 in the United States).\textsuperscript{24}

However, to bring tourists back to a destination deserted due to terrorist threats as soon as possible requires that the prospective tourist makes a realistic assessment of the risks involved. The perceptions of many tourists about the risk of terrorism are indeed in many cases exaggerated. On the other hand, tourists tend to underestimate, sometimes grossly, the risks of becoming a victim of crime or a victim of diseases picked up locally in a foreign destination.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{25} R.I. Mawby, “Tourists’ Perceptions of Security: The Risk-fear Paradox,” *Tourism Economics* 6:2 (June 2000): 109-121. The author’s findings confirm the high crime vic-
Tourists themselves can take certain precautions so that they are not being kidnapped or otherwise targeted by terrorists. One of them is not to stick out in a crowd like the typical tourist. The risk-aware tourist will also check out the travel advice of his government as well as other governments. The foreign offices of the US, the UK and the Netherlands have excellent websites where realistic assessments of the risks to be expected are presented.

The main responsibility in improving security for tourists rests with local governments and those managing tourist destinations. It is important for tourist destinations not only to provide security but also, if security fails, to have a crisis management plan at hand. Guidebooks for crisis management, establishing a crisis management task force, and simulation exercises together with law enforcement officials should be part of the measures to manage the effects of terrorism and other disasters. Unfortunately, much of the tourism industry is still reactive rather than pro-active when it comes to man-made and natural disasters. The Asian Tsunami crisis in 2004 was, however, an eye-opener and efforts have been made to strengthen the organizational resilience.

While pro-active pre-crisis prevention is obviously the first strategy to pursue, one cannot realistically expect to avoid disaster all the time. Therefore emphasis must also be placed on crisis management and impact mitigation if a terrorist attack or a natural disaster occurs.

The way we tend to react to crises, including disastrous terrorist attacks, is that there is a sudden burst of activity, some useful some not, and then a slackening of attention. What is needed is an on-going concern that is not event-driven and cyclical but permanent.

Involving the media is also crucially important. Unfortunately, commercial media are often sensationalists rather than showing responsibility. Terrorists count on the fact that negative news is bigger news than good news and they are deliberately creating bad news to obtain free publicity and attract new recruits to their ranks and gain recognition for the terrorist cause. If the media would not report on terrorism, much of present-day terrorism would simply not happen for the whole point of attacking a few people indiscriminately is to scare many others who identify with the few unfortunate victims. The news...
value system of the media is largely based on commercial values: violence gets attention and more attention means larger circulation and larger audiences that can be sold to advertisers. While censorship is not the answer and would be difficult to implement in the age of the Internet anyway, the way our news system works is not very helpful to contain terrorism. It has been said by Brigitte Nacos, herself both a journalist and an academic lecturer, that “...the news media and terrorists are not involved in a love story; they are strange bedfellows in a marriage of convenience.”

The link between terrorism and the media is much closer than the one between terrorists and tourists. Tourists are easy targets but they are, until now, less frequent targets than some other unfortunate groups of civilians who get caught in conflicts of which they do not see themselves as part.

The threat of terrorism to tourism cannot be permanently reduced simply by measures taken by the travel and tourist industry. What is needed is something more fundamental: a strengthening of the norm that distinguishes between combatants and civilians and absolutely prohibits deliberate attacks on civilians. That is something that can only be achieved if those who are the guardians of our normative systems – our religious leaders and secular teachers, our parents and our political leaders and our cultural artists but also our media uphold the idea that life is precious and sacred and not something to be sacrificed for the sake of a religion or ideologies that divide mankind by class, race or religion. We must foster an understanding that we only have one life and one planet and that whether we are tourists and travelers or hosts to them, we are, in the end, all human beings whose live on this beautiful planet should not be shortened by politically-motivated violence.

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30 Brigitte Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Understanding Threats and Responses in the Post – 9/11 World*, 3rd edition (Boston: Longman, 2010), p. 263. To support her argument, she quotes a suspected London-based follower of Bin Laden who told an interviewer, “Terror is the language of the twenty-first century. If I want something, I terrorize you to achieve it.” (pp.299-300) – a statement that, according to her, “goes to the heart of the terrorist calculus” (p.300).
Chapter 15

The Death of bin Laden, and the Future of Al-Qaeda

John J. Le Beau

On May 2nd, 2011, an elite team of U.S. Navy SEALs operating under CIA command, attacked a residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and in an operation lasting a matter of minutes killed Osama bin Laden, the creator, initial financier, and active chief of al Qaeda. The man who had masterminded the first instance of “four-digit” terrorism in history was unceremoniously buried at sea; no monument would mark his grave.

The targeted killing of bin Laden did not end the life of al Qaeda, as the above chapters concede. But the events of 2011 may have signaled that al Qaeda, measured as a terrorist organization, was, if nothing else, degraded to the extent that it could only exist in a half-life; an example of violent extremism on terminal care. Arguably, perhaps, this sort of systemic degradation should have been anticipated.

The United States, enjoying unprecedented global military power, struck back at its al Qaeda adversaries in a display of patient efficiency and political will. The drone strikes that had decimated the al Qaeda leadership ranks had started years before the Abbottabad raid, and continued thereafter. By the time of the Abbotabad incursion, al Qaeda, by most accounts, was in disarray. As of the time of this publication, al Qaeda has simply not recovered. There has, as some measure, been no successful attack upon the United States since 9/11, and there have been only a handful of significant terrorist strikes elsewhere in the Western world, such as London and Madrid. More importantly, both bin Laden and al Qaeda failed to serve as a match which would set a flame the Muslim world to do battle with the forces of modernity, which was translated as the infidel West and its allies (the so-called “Near Enemy”) in the Middle East. While seething resentment and conspiracy-theory-fueled suspicion of the West is commonplace, the vast majority of Muslims did not take the bait. The Arab Spring has had a real impact on some of the rulers in the Middle East, and is importantly and perhaps disturbingly Islamist, but it is not al Qaeda.

To be sure, Al-Qaeda is not a monolithic organization. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is something of a franchise, having adopted the Al-Qaeda name to cover a number of defeats they had suffered as the Salafist Group for

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Preaching and Combat. Approximately the same thing can be said of two quasi-insurgent groups with mixed fortunes, Boko Haram and al Shabaab. The al Qaeda name has resonance, but it continues to lack popular support. And events that from time to time get enormous press coverage, such as the murder of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya in 2012, are events, and hardly represent a lasting “defeat” of the United States.

What does the future bring? Perhaps a world in which Al-Qaeda resides, ebbing and flowing from time to time, but not dominating either the news or international politics. Jihadism and radicalization are problems, perhaps growing problems, but represent a clash between modernity and the middle ages. Robert R. Reilly, in *The Closing of the Muslim Mind*, has done much to document this phenomenon, as have many others. But if jihadism remains while Al-Qaeda declines, this does not represent terrorist success. As in the past, if on a larger scale, al Qaeda goes down to gradual, incremental defeat. The RAF and the Brigada Rosa were defeated. The Sendero Luminoso and the FARC were defeated too, at any rate they are not the threat to national security that they once were. Once terrorist organizations of breathtaking brutality, they have basically disappeared or became criminal organizations. Al-Qaeda moves from the front page to the back pages and other terrorist organizations, jihadist or not, take its place. Democracies, through application of the variety of tools outlined in this volume, are resilient and abide. Democratic states as a general principle survive the test of time.

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