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THE EUROPEAN NATIONAL WELFARE STATES AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE EU

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the causes of prominent radical political options and behaviors that are already visible on a daily basis in the European Union. In public discourse there is a simplified belief that the primarily responsibility for this lies with the immigrants and fear caused by terrorist attacks carried out in Europe or the old European latent nationalism. Although these elements undoubtedly contribute to the development of radicalism, the author argues that the key sources for this issue should be found in the difficulties encountered by the European national welfare states. This is the source of ever-greater mutual intolerance among the citizens of the European Union, which can take on various forms of political, cultural, ideological and physical conflict. On the basis of these arguments the author concludes that the European Union is indeed in a historic milestone but the real danger of the European Union’s disintegration is not primarily in cultural, civilization, confessional, security or geopolitical sources, but this source should first be sought through the prism of the European national social states and the expectations of citizens referring to them.

1. Introduction

David Cameron, now the former Prime Minister of Great Britain visiting a meeting of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the Bavarian spa resort Wildbad Kreuth in early 2016, stated:

It is necessary to do everything in order to make our social systems unattractive to migrants within the European Union. (David Cameron in Germany, internet)

This sentence and the corresponding attitude is essentially multidimensional message that has strongly echoed in the European Union (EU), and reveals the great social, economic and political rift within the EU that does not even have a hint of solution. In fact, this paper aims to show how exactly these requirements could be devastating for the continued existence of the European Union.

There is no doubt that the European Union and its origin should primarily be understood in the context of post-war and Cold War political landscape, with the overall ideological charge that goes with it. Fundamental and original intention of
the founders of the three European Communities\(^1\) in the 1950s, and then the European Union in 1992 was to prevent a potential new war between European nations. The experience of two great, actually the greatest, international conflicts on European soil in a period of only 40 years, which took tens of millions of human lives and economically and demographically decimated Europe, have encouraged European leaders to come up with such an integration that would thwart any serious attempt at another military imbalance in Europe. As a further result of such efforts, it was created an increased interdependence between, until then, the warring European powers. Especially the largest ones, such as France and Germany, or Great Britain and Italy. In this regard, the European Union has managed to realize its main task because European history almost does not remember 70 years of continuous peace on European soil, except for the unfortunate war episodes in European countries which, nota bene, at the time of emergence were not a part of European Communities, i.e. the European Union – such as the revolution in Hungary in 1956, the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s or conflicts in Ukraine that started in 2014 and are still in progress.

We could say that the ominous prophecies about the disintegration of the EU more and more often appear in public media. Such visions are expressed equally in circumstances where such assessments have no credible basis in reality, as well as when the European Union really falls into serious and to many recognizable global, institutional, and foreign policy crisis situations. Such situations in the past two decades were many, and we can enumerate some of them: disorientation of EEC with regard to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and leaving this problem to be solved by other international institutions such as the UN and NATO (1990–1995); the lack of a common European policy in relation to Turkey’s membership in the EU (1999–present), the lack of a common European foreign policy regarding the “coalition of the willing” that participated in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq (2003); inability to agree on the question whether to call on Christian roots, the spirit and tradition of Europe in a multicultural and secular EU in the proposed text of the “Constitution for Europe” (2005); rejection of the proposed “Constitution for Europe” in referendums in France and the Netherlands (2005); “forcing” democracy in a way that Ireland – where a referendum initially rejected the text of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 (replacement for the constitutional text) – was intended to be submitted to a referendum on this Treaty until it accepts it (which they did in a repeat referendum 2009); the existence of the so-called “democratic deficit” that has many faces, such as insufficient and unclear communication between European citizens and the European institutions, over-regulation of EU legislation and its excessive intrusion into private life of Europeans (continuous); efforts to formalize the suspension of the Law of the Schengen borders over a period of two years by activation of Art. 26 of that Act, which would re-introduce internal border controls within the EU and would seriously call into question the existence of four fundamental EU freedoms – the free flow of people, goods, capital and services (2016); radicalization of European political scene on the entire

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1 Three European Communities are: *European Coal and Steel Community* – ECSC (established 1951); *European Economic Community* – EEC and *European Atomic Energy Community* – EURATOM (established 1957).
political spectrum (continuous), and the most recent, the lack of a consistent policy of the EU in terms of inflows and care of refugees and immigrants on its territory mainly coming from the Middle East and North Africa. So every day we witness the quite unworthy and inhuman situations at the external borders of the EU countries, and the Mediterranean Sea, “Mare Nostrum”, is turning into a big blue grave of those who are trying to get to the fortress Europe (2014–present). These are just a few of the most prominent crises European Union faced or is still facing.

Those examples partly managed to overshadow European successes such as the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty that institutionally reformed the EU and strengthened the role of the European Parliament or the introduction of a single currency (which does not include all EU countries but only those within the euro zone), which should have served for further and closer European integration.

This paper will show that the very concept of social states with a whole set of social services that they offer to their citizens is the original European “product” and to jealously keep it only for members of their own country might be a rational approach to the real socio-economic policy, but such attitude also represents a direct “blow” to the very essence of a supranational Europeanism. Therefore, the European Union is now really at a kind of a historical turning point, but the basis of this milestone is primarily of a social character, and only then of cultural, confessional, military, security, political, geopolitical, ideological or some other character.

2. Welfare State as a Premier European Product

It is a historical fact that the first legal regulation of social rights and policies were related to the first chancellor of the German Empire Otto von Bismarck, who is therefore considered to be a kind of “father” of the welfare state. He brought into existence in the period from 1883 to 1898, under the rule of a “strong hand” – resulting in unification of many disunited German states and duchies into the powerful German empire – many social laws, like the Law on compulsory insurance in case of illness, the Law on occupational injuries, the Law on old-age and disability insurance, (these three laws make the so called Code of Social Insurance), and others (Puljiz 2005: 72–75). Regardless of the subsequent reasonable argument that the basic intention of making these social laws was not for state to offer care for its citizens (with respect to the prescribed age of those who would be able to get the care and life expectancy of people of the time), but it was a way to maintain the obedience of their subjects (Hartley 2007: 142), it has undoubtedly constituted a kind of social and legal novelty.

From then until now, the idea of social protection of own citizens has spread throughout the world and thus this concept has become the original European global “export product” (along with the industrial capitalism of the British type of the 18th century, introduction of double-entry bookkeeping, and the appearance of modern banking). Applied legal forms and modalities of the welfare state – which is defined as such a social system in which the state assumes responsibility for the implementation of socio-economic security offered to its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990) – differ considerably from country to country, and this in turn depends on many factors such as the prevailing socio-economic relations in society, the
level of democracy, demographic characteristics, political system and more. Consequently, even Europe has no unique and uniformed system of the welfare state, but it depends directly on the tradition and the economic power of the individual European nation-states.

In the analysis of the existing welfare state in the European Union, the general typology of welfare states made by Gøste Esping-Andersen, Danish sociologist and the most prominent social system researcher is most commonly accepted. Its typology contains three basic forms of social state, namely:

1. **A Liberal Social State** – best represented by the United States, characterized by low and time-limited social transfers overseen by the state and the strong presence of the market in the social sector.

2. **The Social Democratic Social State** – represented by the example of Sweden which is most marked by the universal delivery of developed social services by the state, and by the spread of vertical and horizontal redistribution of income.

3. **The Conservative – Corporate Social Welfare** – which exists in Germany, whose main characteristics are subsidiarity in social assistance and reliance on a high level of employment and the protection of citizens through insurance funds (Esping-Andersen 1996; 2002).

Drawing on this typology of social states, author Maurizio Ferrer offered an additional, fourth category of so called. a South-European social state that has its distinctive features (Ferrera 1996; Puljiz 1996: 45–49).

In the context of recent events related to the outbreak of Great Britain from the family of the nations of European Union, social contributions are significant to the author of Bob Deacon, who argued that within the liberal social state it is possible to subdivide two subspecies, which are the American and British subtypes of liberal social states. If we would like to merge all these classifications and present them through the prism of the geographic position of individual countries within the European Union then we could say that the comprehensive structure of the existing social states of the European Union looks like this:

1. **Scandinavian (Nordic) type of welfare state** – whose representatives are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. This type represents the social democratic model of the welfare state.

2. **Continental type of welfare state** – which primarily refers to the welfare state of Germany and the countries of Central Europe. This type represents a conservative-corporate type of welfare state.

3. **South European type of welfare state** – which includes economically less developed countries of Southern Europe, but also Italy. This is the so-called rudimentary type of welfare state.

4. **The welfare state of the UK** – which is attributed a separate status within the European Union because it is, according to this division, the closest representative of the liberal welfare state in Europe.
From this viewpoint, it is clearly visible all the varieties of European social models, which has a very real and very different situation of social protection in which the inhabitants of the European Union live.

In the context of the aforementioned statement by the former British prime minister, and in particular with regard to the positive outcome of the British referendum on UK leaving the European Union on June 23, 2016, it becomes increasingly noticeable that the British social model differs in relation to the rest of Europe. Such its status is reflected not only in relation to the question of the model of the welfare state that it promotes, but it is also visible in other segments of European integration, which could clearly be seen in significant concessions that the United Kingdom successfully won for itself multiple times in the negotiations on important issues with regard to its rights and obligations within the EU. Examples for this are many – from the customs and tariff regimes, the principle that 66% of funds allocated for the work of the EU must be returned to the United Kingdom, freedom of choice which European laws in the field of justice and home affairs to apply, all the way to rejection of the agreement on greater budgetary discipline of EU countries or refusal to participate in the joint EU defense policy (Sorokin 2014: 63–69). There was an attempt to maintain such “picky” behavior in 2016 with the aim to
obtain additional concessions in exchange for not holding the aforementioned referendum (Duhaček, internet). Since it was a whirlpool of circumstances in which the stakes were large, diverse egos too expressed, and political assessment obviously completely wrong, it is not surprising that the insistence on maintaining the referendum finally reaffirms the phrase derived from the French Revolution that: “the revolution eats its own children”. By this we can perhaps explain the political fate of David Cameron, and perhaps can guess the fate of the European Union, if it does not change the approach to European social reality.

The reality of the 1950s to the present day has changed significantly while the European social state programs have mainly inadequately trotted behind these changes very slowly. It was easy to rely on public and state services in the period of restoration of economies of Europe from 1945 – 1975, which was marked by economic growth, raising the level of social rights and demographic renewal. This period is also called the “golden age of welfare state” and is also known by the term “famous thirty years” as expressed by a French economist Jean Fourastié (Zrinščak 2006). Of course, it is quite something else when the economy of European countries is continuously stagnating, when perpetual oil shocks and the terrorist crisis are occurring, when the baby boom generation is no longer involved in the creation of new value but goes into well-deserved retirement and is starting to be a user of public services, the demographic picture is rapidly deteriorating. From historical perspective, it is considered that the era of crisis and policy of “re-trenchment” (limiting) of social policies began with the first oil crisis in 1973 (Puljiz 2005: 158). In such circumstances, there is bound to be delamination to successful and less successful countries within the European Union itself. These are, without a doubt, clear processes of divergence that have been receiving their explication since 1980s in concepts of the President of the European Commission, the Frenchman Jacques Delors, about Europe in concentric circles (the famous so-called “Delors circles”) according to which there are main EU countries and a ring of countries around them that have yet to build their Europeanness. This trail of thought has not ended with Delors, but has gained permanent success in the European political thought, and therefore from 2000 onwards there is talk of “two-speed Europe”. Such a turn of events for a united Europe has multiple effects on both conceptual and very practical level. New challenges in the new times do not offer a guarantee that valid answers could be found for them, but we can safely say that the existing sources of European unity are no longer enough. The generations that have come into the world between 1970 and 2000 mostly are not acquainted with the war confronted Europe. They, to their great fortune, have not known what it means to have war experience and for them it is therefore no longer enough motivating and integrating to say that the united Europe is good because there is no war. For

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2 The nineties were the time of enlargement of the number of EU Member States (in 1995 EU was joined by Austria, Finland and Sweden), a large part of the eastern European countries that were under the heel of communism in the nineties repeatedly submitted their candidacy for EU membership: 1990 – Cyprus and Malta; 1992 – Switzerland and Norway (Swiss rejected membership in referendums in 1992 and 2001, and Norwegians in the referendum of 1992); 1994 – Hungary and Poland, 1995 – Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, and in 1996 – Czech Republic and Slovenia.
them it is a natural state of things. What they pursue is the life in prosperity, i.e. the abundance that they have seen in the generation of their parents or still see in some other parts of the world. They will as their role models look to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and occasionally will be amazed with the Middle Eastern countries that have achieved their own well-being with oil and petrodollars. Of course, at the same time they will turn a blind eye to the fact that although they are dissatisfied with their life’s achievements, they still belong to the richest and best-off part of the general human population. They will forget that there is a hungry Africa, the Middle East in conflicts and poor and overpopulated Asia. What citizens of the ailing, but still rich Europe have not even expected is that the very people from forgotten parts of the world would knock at their door in the XXI century. Only then they will become aware that they have the benefits of the welfare state (no matter that they have certain social shortcomings) and will by all means try to limit others to participate in these comforts.


One of the fundamental characteristics of all, including the European, welfare states is the fact that they are still functioning mechanisms at the national level. It is self-evident because all the social services that the state provides are primarily intended for its citizens. In addition, funds to finance costly social services are obtained from paid taxes and contributions of citizens. In this context, the power of economies of individual states directly influences the strength and scope of social services that the state can provide to its citizens. On the other hand, as we have already indicated, after the Second World War, the very desire for overcoming national animosities among European nations was the main engine of supranational European integration (Rosamond 2000). Therefore, a thought of Jean Monnet, the French politician and one of the people that are considered the founder of the European Union is particularly meaningful, which stated (Jean Monnet 1888–1979, internet):

“We are not forming coalitions of states, we are uniting men.

This is a thought that undoubtedly encourages European unity and promotes the existence of the European idea. And as much as this idea is an emotional and inspiring, it within a sort of repeated i.e. “second” reading opens up more questions and concerns, and at the same time promoted European unity remains only wishful thinking. If you do not offer concrete economic models of performance of an imaginary social project, the concept of some kind of supra-national fraternity of the people of Europe is nothing but a sheer utopian idea. And history has so far through many examples thought us that attempts to realize social utopian ideas usually end up in various forms of totalitarianism that typically soak the land with

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3 This was particularly true in the criticism addressed to the conception and realization of the welfare state from the perspective of liberalism in which the view is expressed that the social state contributes to social apathy of the individual, strengthening the concept of social mediocrity and of complete reliance of the individual on the state as a provider of social assistance rather than to increase the enterprising efforts of individuals themselves and in all segments of human life.
human blood. Therefore, it is advisable to take along these undeniably humanistic ideas and also offer a way of realization of these ideas in practice. That is the very thing that Elmar Altvater, a German political scientist at the Otto-Suhr Institute in Berlin, speaks about in his book, *The Limits of Globalization* when he tries to explain the structure and modalities of gradual regional integrations that are applicable particularly to the European integration processes. Altvater said that although there is no guarantee of the success of European integration they will nevertheless necessarily follows the following string:

System of nation-states connected by market → Preferential Trade Agreements → Free Trade Area → Customs Union → Common Market → Monetary Union → Political Union

**Source:** Altvater and Mahkopf 1999: 371

This presentation is of multiple interest to us because it reveals many aspects of political thought and action – from the real motivation for European integration, through the determination of the ultimate goal of European integration, to the clear and unambiguous determination of where our integration can now be found, as well as segments of European integration where there is possible resistance.

It is significant to note that from this setup of European integration in the end there can really be the realization of Monnet’s dream of a “Union of people”, but also that the path to achieving this Union is primarily reflected in the economic interests of those who should make the Union, and not some imaginary human effort to achieve in practice a brotherhood and unity of the European peoples. We note that the terms such as: common market, trade area, customs and monetary union – are first-class economic terms. Therefore, perhaps it is still first necessary to create a coalition of countries to later come to the Union of people. Of course, if they wish so.

If we look at the current level of achieved European integration processes, we could say that the European Union has already made the most of its integration work. The introduction of the euro in 1999 as a means of payment in the euro area⁴ is the realization (at least partially) of the European Monetary Union, which according to the integration concept by Elmar Altvater represents the last stage of integration before political union. In this context, it becomes understandable that the attempt to introduce the proposed European constitutional text, flag and anthem, but also the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the European Union in 2005, had the aim of implementing a European political union, both on the symbolic and the factual level, as the final stage of the European integration process (Čapeta 2010). However, the fact is that, according to the expressed will of the people in referendums, this has failed. This has sent a clear message that Europeans are not yet ready for that kind of a political union, and it is not known whether they will really be ready, and if – when. Political union is obviously too reminiscent of a federal political organization of Europe (a kind of United States of Europe) to people, for which the European nation states are quite openly not expressing interest.

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⁴ Currently, the euro area is comprised of 19 out of 28 EU member states, namely: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Denmark and the United Kingdom have refused to introduce Euro as their new currency.
Republic of Croatia has a very great experience from its own political history on how to end a multinational state (the Habsburg Monarchy and two Yugoslavias).

In such choices, are the European nation-states the greatest enemies of a unified Europe? Are we dealing with well-known European nationalisms just waiting to wake up again in some utter war? Answers to these and similar questions can be affirmative. Indeed, a new European war in which old European mutual animosities would float to the surface is not impossible. But this reasoning would be a too simplistic way of thinking and it seems without basis in the European reality. Perhaps a better explanation for these choices of Europeans lies in the fact that we cannot live from beautiful ideas without content. Open, unique, legal, secular, socially sensitive, all available and attractive European Union inevitably brings realization of the idea of the four fundamental EU freedoms, as well as all elements guaranteed by the system of the so-called acquis communautaire, i.e. the common European acquis. This common framework has its clear ideological foundation, and for Member States (or those who want to become ones) is financially not neutral at all. On the contrary! If we consider the requirements which the candidate countries through the process of accession negotiations must accept (the existing 35 chapters) to comply with the acquis we can see that these requirements are fully in line with the political construction of new liberalism and by successful “passage” in such kind of a classification entrance exams state candidates confirm precisely their political, but also economic commitment (Staničić 2005). This, in terms of our line of argumentation, is a very important attitude because it reveals that although the European Union brings together members of all political spectrum (as can be seen in the representation of political parties in the European Parliament), in its everyday political practice, however, it acts in accordance with positions of neoliberalism. And the concept of the welfare state is in a continuous state of conflict with neoliberalism and this is exactly along the lines of a different basic philosophical approach about what should prevail – the concept and practice of freedom or action through the concept of the common good and democracy as the rule of the interest of majority. On this topic there is a remarkable study by an Italian philosopher of law and political science in his famous book Liberalism and Democracy (Bobbio 1992).

The main characteristics of the existing European social model is that the costs of welfare states remain at the level of European nation-states while at the same time it is expected that the social services should be available to supranational level – to citizens of individual countries, the ones that just moved in, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers as well as all other Europeans who are looking to settle their business and/or to settle personally in the individual member states of the European Union. From this perspective, the request by David Cameron to do everything to make social programs of the Member States less appealing to everyone else becomes completely understandable. And it becomes completely understandable why the current European social model is not economically viable. Therefore, increased European nationalisms which we witness every day – and which even European leaders publicly warn are the greatest risk for the future of united Europe – are only the result of a supranational Europe designed with unambiguously national costs of their welfare states, and not their cause.
This understanding of reality essentially changes the attitude about the most serious problems currently occupying the EU – as to whether the European migrants (migrants from the EU who are moving from country to country within the EU), as well as the European immigrants (immigrants from around the world, mostly from north Africa, the Middle East and central Asia, coming to Europe as a promised land wanting to stay mainly in the rich countries of Europe: Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain ...) are a real danger for the European Union. The understanding of the current situation is made even more difficult by the world view or way of thinking, which is inspired by the concept of a clash of civilizations (promoted by the authors of the book with the same title by Samuel Huntington) in which migrants and immigrants are seen as people whose main characteristic is that they belong to another and different cultural (that whether and civilization?) circle and that they differ in language and belief system (religion), which are some of the most prominent characteristics of culture.

Europe is, in the manner of promoted political correctness particularly sensitive to subtle forms of diverse discrimination (gender, sexual orientation, race, religious denomination, political affiliation, etc...) and it is this area that is the cutting issue in European public discourse. So we could divide the European concerned public into so-called “multicultural” segment that for itself seeks to snatch characteristics such as advancement, openness, modernity, liberty, of cosmopolitanism and the like. On the other hand there are the opponents of such an attitude, i.e. those who are invoking the traditional values, the protection of one’s own culture, solidarity, conservatism, national consciousness, and in doing so will call and state intervention in the resolution of existing problems (such as, for example, demand for military defense of national borders or legal hindering and/or limiting of immigration). All of them will interpret the existing reality in the wake of their own worldview about how the future of Europe should look like.

Both will, of course, point out those arguments that are in their favor. Thus, at the example of resolving doubts about the impact of migration on the economic situation in the UK, members of the aforementioned liberal option will refer to multiple research findings, which are mainly conducted within the institutions of the European Union or in the context of numerous scientific institutes, which clearly show that the population migration within the EU does not have a devastating effect on the social systems of the countries to which people come to, but on the contrary, migration promotes economic activity in the selected countries (Dustmann et al. 2010; Springford 2013; Poptcheva 2014; Devlin et al. 2014).

In addition, Martin Kahanec, a professor with the Central European University, points out that back in the 1990s the fear of the old EU member states was recognized that after the great European Union enlargement of 2004 and 2007 there will be an appearance of the phenomenon of migration of new EU citizens to rich countries precisely in order to obtain significant social assistance as an alternative to seeking employment. It was given its name – so-called “welfare tourism”. However, Kahanec points out, that one can argue that there was not much reason to fear because the migrants in 99% of cases decide to leave their home to other EU countries because of the search for work, which means that they do not intend to go to somewhere else to be on welfare. Migration within the EU is at the
level of 3.2% of the total European population, and the cost of social benefits to migrants within the EU does not exceed 1% of social transfers in countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Malta and Portugal, and this percentage is between 1% – 5% in the countries that are the most common countries of destination for European migrants (Germany, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and France). It is interesting also that for the medical assistance to migrants goes only 0.2% of health expenditure in the countries providers of social benefits (Recent EU Migrants Entitlement to Welfare, internet; Mobile EU Citizens and National Social Security, internet). These are all indications that the fear of migration is in great part an imaginary fear that the media primarily uses for the purpose of daily political competition and promotion of interests of certain policies.

On the other hand, members of the conservative worldview will justifiably question the morality of the situation in which more generous social benefits are obtained by those who have just arrived in a country in relation to people who, for example, have been paying state taxes and contributions their entire working life (such examples are many in the countries of EU, and in media the most prominent are those of Sweden and Denmark), and will also use arguments to look at quite inadequate policies of integration of immigrants into local communities (examples of Roma slums or Muslim communities in France, Germany, the UK and elsewhere).

The ever stronger division of the European public, regarding this issue, inevitably entails tightening the overall European political scene (that is most clearly seen in the strengthening of the extreme options that are participating in the electoral processes in the Member States of the European Union), and contributes to the more common examples of radical Islamism which drives frightening terrorist activity in Europe and around the world. This radicalism is, on one hand, guided by the idea of proselytism and jihadism, while on the other hand it may be led by the desire to undermine the existing European political and ideological system or simply as a revenge for the participation of some European countries in the military campaign against radical Islamism in the Middle East. These occurrences are doubly harmful. First, there is a direct damage to the innocent victims of these terrorist actions. And secondly, in a direct way harm is done to the Muslim community in Europe, who themselves are becoming victims of increased Islamophobia driven by crimes committed by religious fanatics in the name of Islam.

It is a known political science fact that radicalisms feed each other. They are contributed by lack of information of people and the media promoted fear. As a result of such an environment, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, the negative news becomes our reality. And Europe from a proclaimed open and inclusive society is becoming a closed and exclusive community.

5 Looking at the real numbers it is still 16 million people who sought their fortune elsewhere within the EU.

6 Proselytism – (from the Greek. Proselythos – newcomer) indicates the intrusive and sometimes violent and fanatically recruitment for a religious community, a political group or for certain worldviews in order to gain as many new supporters (proselytes).

7 Jihadism – militant efforts to realize an important religious obligation for Muslims, which requires each member of this community to do everything in order to preserve, protect and spread the Islamic religion (Jihad). In the western world, the term jihadism is often translated as “holy war”.
In order to reform the existing model of the welfare state, the Republic of Finland decided to make a kind of a revolutionary breakthrough and has launched a social experiment called *guaranteed minimum income*. The primary intent of this idea (which is currently still in the experimental stage on a small sample of people who participate in the experiment), is to see whether the state guaranteed income (which would abolished core fear for one’s own existence), have the effect on people to be more entrepreneurial and economically active as they can do what they love and what they feel best, while not wanting to meet their basic needs. This maneuver would at the same time abolish the high costs of income redistribution that exist within the existing model of the welfare state, while on the other hand, it would move citizens away from poverty. And while we wait for the results of the social experiment, which sees both praise and criticism, we note two important facts. First, for such an experiment to succeed Republic of Finland must be a sufficiently rich society that can meet the cost of the experiment (especially if this is applied to the total population of Finland). That wealth should somehow be gained and someone must finance it. And secondly, this experiment is primarily a national project of the Republic of Finland and if it is moved to its full realization it would refer exclusively to the citizens of the Republic of Finland, which is a great difficulty in the context of the membership of the Republic of Finland in the European Union and respect for the rules of 4 fundamental European freedoms. If the political elite in the Republic of Finland estimate that this is a good enough model for citizens of Finland, perhaps they, like the UK could opt out from the European Union to be able to freely carry out their social policy. But it also means to re-raise their own national borders.

That the Europe is increasingly closing (and this is at the level of the EU, as well as at the level of individual Member States within the EU) is not a phenomenon of the new age but a permanent identified direction. This is perhaps best reflected in the public opinion of EU citizens towards the issue of its possible further enlargement (in particular the countries of the Balkans, but also Turkey). All relevant research by the Eurobarometer, which is an integral part of EUROSTAT, show that the resistance of EU citizens towards its further expansion is rapidly increasing (*Public Opinion*, internet). Thus it is now evident that the number of those who oppose further EU enlargement has become the majority in 13 EU member states, with further such a tendency and the rest of its members. Once the idea of European integration was the backbone of its social, economic and political integration. The opportunity to become a part of the EU was the main driver of reform potentials of candidate countries, which saw their chance for development in the EU. However, today there are countries that are already officially leaving the EU, while the European Union fears about the political options that will win on the elections in the European countries and whether they will go down the same road. In such circumstances a new (old) crack is opening in the foundations of the European Union.

### 4. Europe at the Crossroads

From the previous arguments we find that for the European Union potential enemies are not just (“some distant, foreign and different”) Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans
and other nations of mainly Muslim religion and darker skin than the Europeans, but the “enemies” are also white-skinned Christians from other countries of the EU member states who come to “our” country, exploit “our” blessings of “our” welfare state. In fact, all who come to us potentially become our enemies. Therefore, we can be justified in asking the question: to what is the open, multicultural and transnational European Union transforming? As we can see, the words of David Cameron have not even been addressed to foreign immigrants in the European Union but primarily to citizens of other EU countries. At the same time, immigration policies of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel are diametrically opposite to the policies of Great Britain and Hungary. She continuously accepts the vast majority of asylum seekers, and as the reasons for this states a more powerful argument. First, she thinks that they should help people in need. Second, she is fulfilling the constitutional obligation of Germany on the acceptance of asylum seekers. Third, she wants to be an example as a society that the modern European Union should become. And fourth, she contributes to the future economic viability of the German economy which is already missing workforce. But even such Angela Merkel in a speech to young members of her political party the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) stated that “multiculturalism as a project in Germany has completely failed and that multiculturalism is actually dead” (Weaver, internet). The recent terrorist act in Berlin only contributed to further collapse of the political influence of Chancellor Merkel, and her announcement that she wants to re-run for chancellor has the least support throughout her political activities. Instead in the political arena throughout the EU the right option, which is often attributed the title of political radicalism, is becoming stronger and stronger. This primarily refers to the political options and parties in countries that was holding elections during 2017 as Germany (Pegida) and France (National Front), but also elsewhere in Europe as e.g. in Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Hungary (Fidesz), Finland (Real Finns), Sweden (Swedish Democrats), the Netherlands (group of right-wing parties which together won 2/3 of the seats in the Norwegian Parliament) and elsewhere.

The cause of the strengthening of the radical political options, as we have seen, is not in the migrant crisis, or unexplained strengthening of European nationalism, but it is the result of fear of people that their national welfare state is jeopardized and their social protection. That the sustainability of European welfare states is threatened is an indisputable fact, but they would be endangered without immigrants and the potential risk that among them are people willing to undertake terrorist actions. European national welfare states are in crisis by the fact of long-term economic stagnation, unfavorable demographic situation of Europe, lower labor productivity in Europe compared to other parts of the world, unrealistic promises of states on the amount of social transfers to households and consequent excessive expectations of that population addressed to the country as their protector virtually from the cradle to the grave. In such circumstances, the European Union may be a less socially functional community, so it is logical that the citizens of Europe

8 Constitutional definition of acceptance of persons seeking asylum in Germany (under the conditions prescribed by law, such as language proficiency or proof of persecution in the country of origin) is the result of post-war Germany’s efforts to become a multicultural and open society so that the ideology of Nazism would never again take root in Germany.
are turning to new options, especially those that in the wake of radical thinking about the common enemy and the need to combat it, offer simple solutions. But such solutions are usually the most dangerous because they represent only a small step to the expansion of various prejudices that typically end up in some form of discrimination. In doing so, the targeted group can be truly anyone by any criterion, depending on the prevailing media image that is created in public.

Therefore, the first real victim of scattering European national welfare states is the very proclaimed solidarity and openness of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious European Union that encourages the free flow of people, goods, capital and services on their territory within which mutual borders are abolished and a common European currency is being used.

As a defense against such a scenario the citizens of Europe are being offered a closed-door policy, raising walls and wires on each other’s borders, creating a rift between the richer north and the poor south and the expulsion of all others and different. And since no one is the same, colloquially we could say that the “hunt is on” in Europe.

5. Conclusion

The welfare state is a concept and a project that was originally created exactly here in mainland Europe, and represents its important contribution to modern, civilized and solidary society which has been adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, by almost all countries of the world. Based on the idea of mutual support, the welfare state offer to its citizens a whole set of social services that make life easier to people in case of need. An important feature of this social model is that it works primarily at the level of nation states because it is also a way of its funding. In addition to the fact that the welfare states due to objective circumstances over the world are facing considerable difficulties in functioning, those in supranational political communities, such as the European Union, are faced with numerous additional challenges. Due to the inability to meet the needs of all those who appear as seekers of help, increased hostility between the local population and the newcomers whether it was about the European Union citizens from other Member States or the people who come from all over the world to find their life’s happiness in Europe. And while those who come from abroad see in Europe a kind of salvation, and to the parts of the world affected by war or poverty it certainly is, locals in these people see a threat to their way of life. In such circumstances, and supported by radical political options to find their place in the political life of the European Union as well as media campaigns produced by the so-called seventh power, Europe is becoming a breeding ground for various forms of prejudice that potentially leads to violent behavior. With such times Europe historically has a very bad experience and we should be careful to recognize them in order to avoid possible bad scenarios in time. The entire situation is exacerbated by the fact that in the geopolitical sense we live in a much more tense time that brings with it an increased number of terrorist actions that are also increasingly and more brutally affecting European states, which enables European radicalism to further gain strength. Therefore, it is utterly wrong to look for blame for the current situation in others who are different from
us no matter according to which criteria we look at these others and from where they come. Much closer to the source of the real problem would be if we put focus on the merits of the matter. And this is primarily a question of existing models of social and public services that offer the sustainability of European national welfare states. So it is a question of reform and survival of welfare states that will be the source of future integration or dissolution processes in the European Union.

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Ivor Altaras Penda

Evropske nacionalne države blagostanja i raspad EU

Apstrakt

U ovom radu se ispituju uzroci istaknutih radikalnih političkih opcija i ponašanja, koja se već mogu svakodnevno primetiti u Evropskoj uniji. U javnom diskursu je prisutno pojednostavljenije uverenje da su za ovakvo stanje najpre odgovorni imigranti, kao i strah izazvan terori-stičkim napadima širom Evrope ili stari evropski latentni nacionalizam. Mada ovi elementi nesumnjivo doprinose razvoju radikalizma, autor tvrdi da se ključni izvor ovog problema nalazi u poteškoćama sa kojima se susreću evropske nacionalne države blagostanja. Ovo je izvor još veće uzajamne netolerancije među građanima Evropske unije, što može da se ispolji u različitim vidovima političkog, kulturnog, ideološkog i fizičkog konflikta. Na osnovu ovih argumenta, autor zaključuje da, i pored toga što Evropska unija zaista jeste istorijska prekretnica, stvarna opasnost da se Evropska unija raspadne ne leži prevashodno u kulturalnim, civilizacijskim, konfesionalnim, bezbednosnim ili geopolitičkim izvorima, već njen izvor treba sagledati kroz prizmu Evropskih nacionalnih socijalnih država i očekivanja njihovih građana.

Ključne reči: Evropska unija, blagostanje, raspad, radikalizacija